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EDUCATION, SOCIAL MOBILITY AND RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN EGYPT*

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Muslim societies have been reshaped in recent decades by an Islamic revival. We document a contemporaneous decline in social mobility among educated youth in Egypt, the epicentre of the movement in the Arab world. We then develop a model to show how an unexpected decline in social mobility combined with inequality can produce a religious revival led by the educated middle class. The principal idea is that religion helps individuals to cope with unfulfilled aspirations by adjusting their expectations-based reference point. By raising aspirations, economic development may make societies more prone to religious revivals.

In the last few decades, Muslim societies have undergone a cultural transformation marked by a rise in religious participation and identification. This Islamic revival reversed previous trends towards secularisation in Muslim societies and runs counter to the secularisation thesis once predominant among social scientists. Beliefs and institutions that emerged in largely illiterate pre-industrial societies were supposed to be maladapted to and readily abandoned in a world of science, industrialisation, and improving standards of living, that is to say the modern world (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Yet there has been 'an impressive revival of emphatically religious commitments ... of vast geographical scope, affecting every single Muslim country from North Africa to South-East Asia' (Berger, 1999, p. 7).

This article focuses on Egypt. Egypt is the epicentre of the Arab world's various Islamic movements (Kepel, 2002, 2003). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood set up or inspired Islamic organisations in Algeria (Movement for the Society of Peace), Jordan (Islamic Action Front), Lebanon (*Jamaa Islamiya*), the Palestinian territories (Hamas), Syria, Tunisia (*al-Nahda*) and Yemen (*al-Islah*). Egypt is also one of the most religious nations in the world: according to the World Values Survey (WVS), 98.5% of Egyptians surveyed in 2000 describe themselves as a religious person and 99.7% report drawing comfort and strength from religion (WVS, 2009).¹

We examine the economic factors behind the rise in Islamic piety and participation in Egypt from the mid-1980s, a movement led by the educated middle class. Drawing

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¹ The results are based on the Muslim subsample (94% of respondents).

on nationally representative household survey data, we conduct an empirical analysis of educational and social mobility in Egypt. Following the 1952 Egyptian revolution, there was a big push to increase educational attainment both at lower and higher levels of education. There was also a plan to provide employment for the new educated class. In the early 1960s, Egypt introduced a scheme guaranteeing public sector employment to those with intermediate or higher education who were unable to find a job. This 'last resort' option encouraged household investment in education and raised aspirations of upward social mobility among those from the lower social strata (Amin, 1995; Assaad, 1997; Wickham, 2002). In the early 1980s, however, the scheme became increasingly untenable. When Mubarak took power in 1981, instead of abolishing the scheme, a number of changes were introduced to reduce the supply of graduates. The changes included limiting university enrolment, reducing real wages and increasing the waiting period for a government job (Assaad, 1997; see also Wickham, 2002, p. 41ff). Since the early 1990s, the scheme has essentially been defunct. As public sector employment declined, the marginalised and highly regulated private sector was incapable of absorbing the growing ranks of educated youth, leading to an overall decline in formal employment.

We document a large increase in educational attainment and intergenerational educational mobility over time. We then compare the occupational outcomes of secondary school and university graduates who benefited from the guaranteed employment scheme (i.e. graduates born between 1949 and 1960, 'old cohort') to those who expected to benefit but generally did not (i.e. graduates born between 1968 and 1977, 'young cohort'). For university graduates, the likelihood of obtaining a professional occupation (formal sector job) by age 28 declined by 18 (21) percentage points from the old to the young cohort. There was no such decline, however, for graduates whose fathers had a professional occupation. Thus, social mobility among the educated declined at approximately the same time as Egypt began to experience an Islamic revival.² This occurred in the context of rising income inequality and poverty.

We then develop a model of religion to analyse the connection between shocks to social mobility and religious revivals. We make use of advances in behavioural economics in analysing reference-dependent preferences (Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Köszegi and Rabin, 2007). In particular, an individual's reference point can be endogenously determined by expected outcomes (Köszegi and Rabin, 2006). We develop the idea that people attempt to cope with economic loss by adjusting their reference point or shifting attention to other (non-material) dimensions of comparison. Religion is one such coping mechanism. When acquiring education, individuals form expectations about their future consumption. Unfulfilled aspirations are experienced if consumption turns out to be lower than an expectations-based reference point. If this occurs, due, for example, to a sudden decline in social mobility, the appeal of religious participation as a coping mechanism increases.

 $^{^2}$ Clemens *et al.* (2009) and Campante and Chor (2012), among others, have also documented that over recent decades increases in education have not been matched with increases in economic opportunities in Egypt and the Middle East more generally. Campante and Chor (2012) link political protest during the Arab spring to these factors. To our knowledge, none of these studies examined changes in social mobility among the educated. We also focus on a different time period, during which major changes took place both in the Egyptian labour market and in society at large.

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The argument that Egypt's Islamic revival has been fuelled by relative deprivation – feelings of envy, indignation, and unfulfilled aspirations – particularly among educated youth, has been made by several authors, most notably Ayubi (1991), Amin (1995) and Wickham (2002). We make two contributions to this literature. First, we present systematic evidence of a decline in social mobility among educated youth in Egypt during this time period. Prior work has relied on anecdotal and suggestive evidence. Second, we develop a formal model of religious movements based on unfulfilled aspirations. The canonical club goods model of religion (Iannaccone, 1992; Berman, 2000) focuses on the social rather than the psychological functions of religion. We contribute to this literature by treating religious participation not only as a form of leisure or group participation but also as a psychological coping mechanism. This leads to a richer picture of religious dynamics.

In contrast to the relative deprivation literature, even when religion is a coping mechanism, a rise in unfulfilled aspirations may not lead to a rise in religious participation. Instead, individuals could work harder to meet their reference point, spending less time on religious activity. We call this the living-up-to-expectations (LUE) effect. We derive a simple necessary and sufficient condition under which the coping effect of religion dominates. This condition is satisfied when expected social mobility and income inequality are high. In addition, standard motivations for religious participation (e.g. social service provision) can interact with psychological motivations to produce a large, long-lasting and widespread rise in religiosity in response to a small and temporary shock to social mobility. At the time of the shock, the rise in religious participation is driven mainly by educated and talented individuals. Their participation builds organisational capacity and can produce dynamic multiplier effects that tip society into the basin of attraction of a high-religiosity steady state. As the capacity of religious organisations grows and expectations adjust, the psychological role of religion declines and other motivations take over, producing a broad-based religious revival.

There has been a recent surge in research on the political economy of Islam and Muslim societies led by Kuran (2004, 2010). Much of this work has focused on how the economic development of the Middle East has been shaped by Islamic institutions (Rubin, 2011; Blaydes and Chaney, 2013). There are relatively few studies that examine how religious belief and participation among Muslims are shaped by economic development. One notable exception is Chen (2010), who documents an increase in communal Quar'an study and Islamic school attendance in Indonesia following the 1997–8 financial crisis.³ In Chen's work, religion is primarily a form of social insurance. In countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, religious organisations provide social services by drawing on volunteers from the educated middle class, for example, doctors, lawyers, administrators (Wickham, 2002; Clark, 2004). We provide an explanation for this pattern of religious participation and show how the psychological function of religion can help to attenuate the free-rider problem in providing social services. In a related study of veiling among Muslim women, Carvalho (2013) shows how rising religiosity, combined with greater economic opportunities for women, can lead to an increase in religious identification among educated, urban women.

 $^{^3}$ See also Chaney (2013) on how deviant Nile flooding historically led to greater power of religious authorities in Egypt.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in Section 1, we review existing survey, ethnographic and historical evidence on the Islamic revival. In Section 2, we present quantitative evidence of a decline in social mobility among educated youth in Egypt. Section 3 sets out our theory of religion and shows how a decline in social mobility can create a widespread and long-lasting religious revival. Section 4 concludes. In online Appendices C–G, we provide details of Egyptian education and labour market institutions, further information on our data source, and additional empirical analyses.

1. The Islamic Revival in Egypt

The chief obstacle to the study of the Islamic revival in Egypt is the absence of data on religiosity among Muslims over the second half of the twentieth century.⁴ There is, however, a voluminous historical and ethnographic literature on the Islamic resurgence. See, for example, the 111-page bibliography compiled by Esposito *et al.* (1991). This literature suggests two things. First, from the mid-1980s and continuing through the 1990s, Egypt witnessed a widespread Islamic revival – a rise in religious participation, values and identification. In the 1970s, radical groups had become increasingly active, culminating in the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 (Kepel, 2002, 2003). The group responsible, *al-jihad*, had hoped to provoke a 'mass uprising' similar to the Iranian revolution. This did not occur despite the unpopularity of Sadat (Kepel, 2002, p. 87) and it was not until the mid to late 1980s that the Islamic revival gained momentum.⁵ Second, educated youth from the lower socio-economic strata were the vanguard of this movement. We provide a brief review of some of this literature.

1.1. Evidence of a Broad-based Revival

The broader Islamic revival became apparent in many ways. There was a widely perceived increase in religious observance including mosque attendance, prayer and fasting (Esposito, 1999, p. 10). Islamic greetings and expressions (such as *Mashallah* – 'whatever God wills') were more frequently used. Islamic books and journals (Wickham, 2002, pp. 101–2) and sermons recorded on cassette (Hirschkind, 2006) became increasingly popular. There is evidence of an increase in Islamic dress (Patel, 2012). Beginning with the deveiling movement launched by Huda Shaarawi in Cairo in 1923, the practice of veiling among women – concealing the hair and face in particular – disappeared from sight. Yet by 2000, around 80% of Cairene women wore some form of headcovering (Bayat, 2007). Many Egyptian singers, dancers and actresses left their professions, veiled and denounced their art as shameful (van Nieuwkerk, 2007).⁶

⁴ There are some studies that document an increase in religious belief and participation, see for example Mutlu (1996) on Turkey and Shadid (1988) on the Palestinian territories. Ideally, we would be able to link religiosity data to information on individual characteristics, including socio-economic background.

⁵ Kepel (2003, p. 248) also reports, for instance, that the decision of Egypt's national airline to forbid alcoholic beverages on flights in 1984 was ridiculed by newspapers and intellectuals were not afraid to denounce the practice of veiling at that time.

⁶ Counter to global trends, traditional values regarding women's rights and sexual mores appear to have strengthened in Muslim societies (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Based on their analysis of WVS data, Norris and Inglehart (2004, p. 155) conclude that 'the basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam does not concern democracy – it involves issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization'.

Part of the increase in religious activity was coordinated by Islamic organisations. Social organisations providing healthcare, education and financial aid, often centred around private mosques, proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s (Wickham, 2002, p. 99ff). In Egypt, Islamic organisations accounted for at least half of all welfare organisations in the 1990s and the number of beneficiaries of health services from such organisations rose from 4.5 million in 1980 to 15 million in 1992 (Bayat, 2002, p. 12).

By the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood had gained control of many of Egypt's professional associations including the engineers', doctors', pharmacists', scientists' and lawyers' associations (Wickham, 2002, p. 176ff). In 2005, Muslim Brotherhood candidates won 20% of the parliamentary seats, despite electoral irregularities and a ban on the Brotherhood forming a political party. In the parliamentary elections following the 2011 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of the vote. In June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, was elected President of Egypt before being ousted in July 2013.

1.2. Educated Youth at the Vanguard of the Movement

There is a broad consensus in the literature that the Islamic movement was driven by educated youth. For instance, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as a substantial part of its rank-and-file membership were drawn from the educated middle or lower-middle classes (Mitchell, 1993; Kepel, 2003). According to Wickham (2002, p. 1), 'the prototypical Islamic activist is not an illiterate peasant or labourer but a young, upwardly mobile university student or professional, often with a scientific or technical degree'. These characteristics match activists' profiles in the broader Islamic movement in other Muslim countries (Waltz, 1986; Ayubi, 1991; Clark, 2004).

One reason why educated youth, particularly from the lower socio-economic strata, may have been attracted to the Islamic movement was the importance they placed on de-emphasising materialistic values.⁷ Wickham's interviews highlight the distinct values espoused by 'committed Muslims' (*multazim*). According to one female graduate, 'The ordinary Muslim needs to earn more money than the committed Muslim, because his needs for material things [*istilzamatu*] are greater' (Wickham, 2002, p. 168). Religious groups also helped remove the social stigma associated with manual work, as white-collar jobs became increasingly unattainable for graduates:

Why does the ordinary youth want to wait for a government job? For the social status. But now even he is forced to find work elsewhere. In Islam, work is obligatory. But it can be any work, as long as it is honest. My cousin is a law graduate, but he sells perfume at a kiosk on the street. There's no shame in that. The important thing is not how much prestige is involved or how much he earns. The important thing is to earn a living legitimately, not earn it through stealing, drugs, or other illegal activities.

(Wickham, 2002, p. 167)

Accordingly, we develop a theory of religion in which religious participation shapes an individual's values, helping him to cope with unfulfilled aspirations. We show how a

⁷ The Islamic movement benefited from several other factors, which we discuss in subsection 4.1.

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temporary decline in social mobility can create a widespread and long-lasting religious revival led by educated youth. We now turn to our empirical analysis of trends in social mobility among the educated.

2. The Decline in Social Mobility Among Educated Youth

In this Section, we examine changes in intergenerational educational and social mobility, drawing on the cross-section of the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey of 2006 (ELMPS06). In particular, we examine whether the deterioration in labour market conditions starting in the early/mid-1980s disproportionately affected educated youth from the lower socio-economic strata, as suggested by Wickham (2002), Bayat (2002), and others. We do so by comparing social mobility for graduates – both university graduates and, more broadly, secondary school graduates and above – born in the 1950s (i.e. 1949–60, 'old cohort') who benefited from free access to education and the government guarantee of employment to those born in the late 1960s and 1970s (i.e. 1968–77, 'young cohort') who expected to benefit from the scheme but, when entering the labour market in the late 1980s and 1990s, generally did not.⁸

Our main findings are as follows. First, there was a substantial increase in educational attainment and intergenerational educational mobility across cohorts. Second, the share of professionals as a fraction of the educated work force declined, as did the share of educated men with a formal job. Hence, educated young people were increasingly pushed into low-skilled occupations in the informal sector. Third, the decline in job opportunities – a roughly 20 percentage point decline in the likelihood of obtaining a professional occupation (or formal sector job) for university graduates – was not experienced by university graduates whose fathers were professionals. On average, the job prospects of graduates with fathers holding a professional occupation remained unchanged. Thus, social mobility among the educated declined, leading to unfulfilled aspirations among those from the lower socio-economic strata. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that the increased labour market advantage of those from high socio-economic backgrounds was due to superior personal connections in the private sector, as has been proposed elsewhere (Wickham, 2002).

The core results are presented here. Further details and empirical analyses are provided in the online Appendix. 9

2.1. Data

Our data source is the ELMPS06, a nationally representative household survey with several important features (ERF, 2006). First, the ELMPS06 contains information on an

⁹ In this Section, we focus on regression results to illustrate changes in mobility across cohorts. Additionally, in online Appendix G, we present mobility tables for fathers' and sons' educational and occupational attainment and compute key odds ratios for each cohort. The odds ratios point to similar trends in mobility as the regression results presented here.

⁸ Because the scheme was gradually suspended, we omit intermediate years. Table F1 of the online Appendix presents regression results retaining the intermediate cohort in the sample. While the middle cohort also experienced a decline in job opportunities (albeit to a somewhat lesser extent than the young cohort), this decline was not yet concentrated among those from the lower socio-economic strata, something that changed significantly for the young cohort. We provide a detailed discussion of the cohort definitions and further analyses in subsection F.1 of the online Appendix.

individual's employment history. Information about previous jobs includes an individual's occupation, employment status and, for wage workers, the sector of employment and the formality of the job, that is, whether the job entailed a work contract and social insurance. This allows us, for both cohorts, to determine an individual's occupational status at a given age. By comparing job outcomes across cohorts at a given age – instead of at a given time (year) – we reduce potential lifecycle bias in intergenerational economic mobility estimates (Erikson *et al.*, 1983; Jenkins, 1987). Second, for individuals whose parents do not live in the household, the survey asks about their parents' education and work when they were young. (For individuals whose parents live in the same household, we obtain this information directly from the questionnaire.) Finally, by drawing from a single data source, education and occupation-related information is consistent across cohorts.

The ELMPS06 covered 8,349 households with 37,140 individuals. We restrict our analysis throughout to males because of low female labour force participation rates in Egypt. In addition, we focus on men born between the years 1949 and 1960 (old cohort) and between the years 1968 and 1977 (young cohort). The increase in the sample size across cohorts from 1,860 to 2,650 reflects rapid population growth in Egypt.

In our main specification, we compare a university graduate's likelihood of obtaining a professional occupation by the age of 28 across cohorts.¹⁰ To determine a graduate's occupation at a given age, we draw on the employment history section of the ELMPS06. After intensive data cleaning and consistency checks, complete and consistent information is available for 93% of men aged from 20 to 65, that is, we observe their entire job history. The vast majority of men had no more than two occupational changes in their careers and, among those with two or more occupational changes, most men had transitioned to their second occupation by the age of 28 (Table D4, online Appendix). Therefore, we take 28 to be the age of 'occupational maturity' (Erikson *et al.*, 1983). Our results are robust to comparing occupational outcomes of graduates in both cohorts at age 30 (Table F3, online Appendix).

We relate a graduate's (son's) occupation to his father's occupation when he was aged 15. The reason is that for sons not living with their father (87% of men in both cohorts), the son was asked about his father's occupation and sector of employment at age 15 (as well as his father's highest educational degree). For sons living with their father, this information was derived from the father's self-reported employment history. Of all men in both cohorts, the father's occupational status was available in 98% of cases.

2.2. Increasing Educational Attainment and Educational Mobility

We first document changes in educational attainment and intergenerational educational mobility across cohorts. The summary statistics, presented in Appendix Table A1,

¹⁰ For men, the most common 1988 ILO International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) titles for professional occupations are (Large Enterprise) Department Managers, Primary and Pre-Primary Education Teaching Professionals and Physical and Engineering Science Technicians. Details of the construction of occupational categories are provided in online Appendix D.

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demonstrate a strong overall increase in educational attainment, with men in the old cohort achieving an average of 6.62 years of schooling and men in the young cohort achieving an average of 9.78 years of schooling. The share of men with at least a secondary education increased from 39% to 63% across cohorts and the share of men with post-secondary (university) education rose from 20% to 28%. It should be noted that men in the old cohort, who were the first beneficiaries of the expansion in schooling following the 1952 revolution, had already experienced a dramatic improvement in educational outcomes. Their fathers had achieved an average of only 1.66 years of schooling (Appendix Table A1).

To examine changes in intergenerational educational mobility across cohorts, we regress individuals' (sons') years of schooling on their fathers' years of schooling, a dummy for sons belonging to the young cohort, an interaction term between these two variables, and a dummy for sons born in an urban area. The results are shown in Table 1. They indicate that for men in the old cohort, one additional year of schooling for the father is associated with an increase of 0.63 years of schooling for the son (column (1)). This association decreases significantly by 0.25 years for men in the young cohort.¹¹ Columns (2) and (3) present results from separate estimations based on the son's residence at birth. They suggest that there was less intergenerational mobility in rural areas compared to urban areas for the old cohort, though some gains were made by the rural young cohort.

The last two columns of Table 1 examine the relationship between a father's years of schooling and a son's attainment of higher levels of education, i.e. a secondary degree or above (column (4)) and a post-secondary degree (column (5)). The results in column (4) indicate that for the old cohort, one additional year of schooling for the father is associated with a 4.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of achieving a secondary or post-secondary degree for the son. For the young cohort, we observe a statistically significant decline in this association by 1.8 percentage points. For university education, the decline in the association between fathers' and sons' education is less pronounced (column (5)). This is probably a result of policy changes in the 1980s that aimed to lessen pressure on the public sector by limiting access to universities. Because of high fertility rates, however, the number of university graduates with a father who has either no education or primary/preparatory education increased by 181% from the old to the young cohort.

2.3. Declining Social Mobility Among the Educated

While the share of educated individuals in the workforce increased substantially across the two cohorts, the share of professional occupations remained essentially constant at 27% to 28% (Appendix Table A1). Figure 1 shows the increased scarcity of professional occupations. Among university graduates, 80% of the old cohort obtained a professional occupation by the age of 28 compared to 70% of the young cohort. For secondary school graduates and above, the comparable figures are 59% and 41%.

 $^{^{11}}$ For greater comparability with other studies of intergenerational educational mobility, we provide estimates for both sons and daughters aged 20–65 as well as for those aged 20–35 and 50–65 in online Appendix E.

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	Dependent variable					
	Son's years of schooling			Son's educational attainment		
	Full sample (1)	Rural (2)	Urban (3)	Secondary+ (4)	University (5)	
Father's years of schooling	0.626*** (0.026)	0.877^{***} (0.064)	0.526*** (0.029)	0.044^{***} (0.002)	0.042*** (0.003)	
Father's years of schooling \times young cohort	-0.247^{***} (0.030)	-0.377^{***} (0.071)	-0.169^{***} (0.034)	-0.018^{***} (0.002)	-0.007^{**} (0.003)	
Young cohort	3.166*** (0.214)	3.724*** (0.292)	2.277*** (0.300)	0.241*** (0.017)	0.055*** (0.013)	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.247	0.177	0.219	0.190	0.202	
N (not weighted)	4,544	2,100	2,444	4,544	4,544	

	Table 1		
Relationship Between Fo	ather's Years of Schooli	ing and Son's Educe	ational Attainment

Notes. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. OLS results are reported with standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. In the last two columns, the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the individual (son) attained a secondary or post-secondary degree (column (4)) or a post-secondary (university) degree (column (5)). Specifications (1), (4) and (5) include a dummy for sons born in an urban area, and all specifications include a constant. The analysis is restricted to men (sons) born during the period from 1949 to 1960 (old cohort) and from 1968 to 1977 (young cohort). 'Rural' and 'urban' refer to the son's place of residence at birth.




Fig. 1. Changes in the Availability of Jobs Across Cohorts

Notes. The Figure shows separately, for the old and the young cohort, the percentage of men with (*i*) post-secondary (university) degrees ('University') and (*ii*) secondary degrees and above ('Secondary+'), who had obtained a professional occupation/formal sector job/public sector job by the age of 28. *Source.* ELMPS06.

Similarly, of all wage work, the share of formal jobs, and particularly public sector jobs, declined. Among university graduates, 80% of the old cohort were working in the public sector compared to only 57% of the young cohort. The fact that the decline in public sector employment was stronger than the overall decline in formal employment means that formal employment became increasingly concentrated in the private sector.

Figure F1 of the online Appendix F plots the educational distribution of workers across occupations for each cohort. While the average level of schooling increased within each occupational category, there was a large increase in the share of men with a secondary degree who appear to have been 'stuck' in semi/unskilled manual work. Based on the available ISCO codes in the survey, the most common occupations in this group were taxi driver and security guard (see Table D1, online Appendix). In fact, secondary school graduates were by far the largest educational group among all semi/unskilled workers. While relatively few university graduates held a manual occupation, their share increased across cohorts as did their share among white-collar occupations.

Overall, the descriptive analysis suggests that changes in the Egyptian labour market affected not only the school-to-work transition of educated youth but had a permanent negative effect on their occupational outcomes.

2.3.1. Main results

We next examine whether the decline in job prospects was felt unequally by men from a low socio-economic background. To do so, we estimate the following linear probability model for the sample of post-secondary (university) graduates of the old and young cohort:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 F a_i^{Prof} + \alpha_2 F a_i^{Prof} \times Young_i + \alpha_3 Young_i + \alpha_4 Urban_i + v_i,$$
(1)

where Y_i is a binary variable equal to 1 if the graduate attained a professional occupation by the age of 28 and zero otherwise. For wage workers, we additionally examine the likelihood of holding a formal job and a public sector job by the age of 28. Fa_i^{Prof} is a binary variable indicating whether the graduate's father worked as a professional, *Young* is a binary variable indicating whether the graduate belongs to the young cohort (i.e. born between 1968 and 1977), $Fa_i^{Prof} \times Young_i$ is the interaction between these two variables, and Urban is a binary variable indicating whether the graduate belongs the the graduate was born in an urban area.¹² Thus, α_1 measures the association between fathers' and sons' occupational status for the old cohort and can be interpreted as a measure of intergenerational occupational immobility. Our main coefficient of interest is α_2 , which measures how this association changes across cohorts.

¹² Note that the survey does not provide the age of fathers who are not living with their sons. Hence it is not possible to reweight the data using the father's age. However, this should not be a major concern. First, when a son is 15, his father is typically 40 or older. As noted earlier, occupational mobility is low and usually occurs early in life, well before the age of 30. Second, we are not aware of changes in the timing of first marriage for men during the first half of the twentieth century. Third, while there is evidence of a significant delay of approximately three years in the median age at first marriage for men born 1940–75 (see online Appendix, subsection C.3), even such a strong delay in marriage is unlikely to affect the father's occupational status when the son is aged 15 given low occupational mobility later in life. Changes in marriage patterns are, thus, unlikely to alter our results significantly.

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	Dependent variable: son's probability of obtaining a						
	Professional occupation (1)	Formal sector job (2)	Public sector job (3)	Professional occupation (4)	Formal sector job (5)	Public sector job (6)	
	Panel (a) Subsample of university		Panel (b) Subsample of secondary				
	graduates:			school graduates and above:			
Father: professional	-0.004	-0.065	0.025	0.147***	-0.055	0.003	
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.041)	
Father: professional	0.190***	0.239***	-0.017	0.131**	0.241***	0.052	
× young cohort	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.055)	
Young cohort	-0.179 * * *	-0.207 ***	-0.249 * * *	-0.201 ***	-0.334 ***	-0.387 ***	
0	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.029)	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.0387	0.0532	0.0833	0.0873	0.108	0.126	
N (not weighted)	999	868	868	2,183	1,775	1,775	

 Table 2

 Relationship Between Father's and Son's Occupational Status

Notes. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. OLS coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. The analysis is restricted to men (sons) born between the years 1949 and 1960 (old cohort) and the years 1968 and 1977 (young cohort), and in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) additionally to wage workers. The son's occupation/job refers to the occupation/job he had obtained by the age of 28. All specifications include a dummy for sons born in an urban area and a constant.

The results are presented in panel (*a*) of Table 2. For the old cohort, we do not observe any disadvantage for university graduates from low socio-economic backgrounds in obtaining a professional occupation (column (1)). That is, once they achieved a university degree, they had, on average, an equal chance of obtaining a professional occupation as those whose fathers were professionals. This was not true, however, for university graduates of the young cohort: those with professional fathers were 19 percentage points more likely to become a professional. Indeed, the large decline in job opportunities across cohorts – that is, an 18 percentage point decline in the likelihood of becoming a professional – was entirely concentrated among graduates from a lower socio-economic class.

We next examine, for the subsample of wage workers, a graduate's likelihood of obtaining a formal sector job (column 2) and a public sector job (column 3). The results in column (2) are consistent with those in column (1): in the old cohort, graduates with and without professional fathers were equally likely to obtain a formal sector job. While the probability of obtaining such a job declined by 21 percentage points on average across cohorts, this decline was not experienced by graduates whose fathers had a professional occupation. In contrast, column (3) indicates that the subsample with professional fathers had no advantage in obtaining a public sector job in either the old or the young cohort. Hence, the decline in social mobility was associated with the allocation of jobs in the formal private sector, not the public sector. This is consistent with individuals from low socio-economic backgrounds lacking the required skills (e.g. English language skills) and/or personal connections to obtain a professional position in the private sector. One likely contributing factor to both sources of disadvantage is the introduction of the *infitah* (open-door) policy in 1973 by the Egyptian government, which encouraged private sector growth and particularly foreign direct investment.




Fig. 2. University Graduates Who Found Their Job Through Relatives or Friends

Notes. The Figure shows separately, for the old and the young cohort, the percentage of postsecondary graduates of the old and the young cohort who report having received help from relatives or friends in obtaining their current primary job. Both the primary and the secondary job search method are considered. Results are differentiated according to whether the current job is in the public or private sector. *Source.* ELMPS06.

While the data set does not allow us to distinguish between the two sources of disadvantage (i.e. skills *versus* personal connections), it does provide information on the primary and secondary job search methods that individuals used to obtain their current primary job. Of university graduates from the old cohort working in the public sector, only 7% received help from their family or friends in obtaining their job compared to 32% of graduates working in the private sector (Figure 2). For the young cohort, the comparable figures are 13% and 41%. Given the shift in employment from the public to the private sector, social networks seem to have gained in importance in determining labour market outcomes.¹³ Consequently, if personal or social connections are based on kinship ties, these figures suggest that the increase in economic persistence across educated cohorts may be related, at least in part, to the increased importance of personal connections in obtaining professional positions.

2.3.2. Alternative specifications

Various robustness checks on our main results from panel (*a*) of Table 2 are presented in the online Appendix (Table F3). In this subsection, we do two things. First, we present the results for the subsamples of secondary and post-secondary school graduates; so far, we have concentrated on university graduates. Second, we draw on the full sample of men of both cohorts, not just graduates, and estimate changes in the returns to education (in terms of occupational outcomes) across cohorts.

¹³ One caveat is that we have to rely on information on the current primary job for both cohorts. Also, few men in the old cohort work in the private sector.

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Panel (*b*) of Table 2 shows the social mobility results for the subsample of graduates with at least a secondary school education. Column (4) shows that even for the old cohort, a professionally employed father was associated with an increase in the likelihood that the son would assume a professional occupation (by 15 percentage points). Recall from Figure 1 that in the old cohort, only 59% of secondary school graduates and above worked as a professional by the age of 28. The association between fathers' and sons' occupational status became even more pronounced in the young cohort (an additional increase of 13 percentage points in the likelihood). The results for formal and public sector employment in columns (5) and (6) confirm our earlier results for university graduates. Overall, the results suggest that as labour market conditions deteriorated in Egypt, jobs were rationed in favour of those from high socio-economic backgrounds.

An alternative approach to studying changes in social mobility is to draw on the full sample of men from both cohorts, irrespective of their educational attainment, and to examine the returns to education in terms of occupational outcomes. That is, we regress the probability of a son obtaining a professional occupation (by age 28) on dummy variables for the highest educational degree, the young cohort dummy, a dummy variable for the father being a professional and interaction terms between these variables. Appendix Table A2 shows the results, which confirm our main results in panel (a) of Table 2. In particular, for university graduates, having a professionally employed father is associated with an increase in the likelihood of obtaining a professional occupation in the young cohort only (column 3).

2.3.3. Rising income inequality and poverty

The decline in social mobility among the educated occurred in the context of rising income inequality and poverty. During the oil-price boom of the 1970s and trade liberalisation (Sadat's open-door policy), private sector professionals benefited from lucrative jobs in the petroleum, banking and construction industries. Wickham (2002, pp. 52-3) estimates that entry-level positions for graduates in joint ventures and foreign firms paid twelve times more than those in local government administration and around four times more than those in elite government departments such as the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Petroleum. The economic crisis of the 1980s also saw the reduction and removal of various subsidies on basic goods such as rice, sugar, cooking oil, fuel and transportation and measures to cut the public sector wage bill. At the same time, the Egyptian government lowered wages to discourage graduates from applying to its guaranteed employment scheme. Assaad (1997) reports that although real government wages had been rising up to the year 1981, by 1986 they had fallen to almost 60% of their level in 1981. Similar figures are reported by Wickham (2002, p. 46f). Government sector employees were forced to take second and even third typically manual jobs, such as working as an electrician or a taxi driver. Others tried to migrate temporarily to the Gulf countries, although this became increasingly difficult. Even though public schools did not charge tuition fees, there is ample evidence that private costs to education, in particular for private lessons, had been rising during the 1980s and 1990s. The costs for marriage also increased sharply. (For more details on these developments including references, see online Appendix C.) The fact that income inequality and poverty increased at the same time as social mobility among the educated declined is an important part of the narrative we develop in the following Section.

3. A Theory of the Islamic Revival

We develop a model in which a temporary decline in social mobility can lead to a widespread and long-lasting rise in religious participation. Our main departure from standard models of religion is that religious participation is not only a form of leisure (or social interaction) but also performs a psychological function in adjusting to unfulfilled aspirations. In a dynamic extension, we show how this psychological function interacts with standard functions of religion including club goods production.

3.1. The Model

Consider a society composed of a continuum of agents I with typical member i. Agents are born into a class, choose their level of education and, subsequently, enter either the low class L or high class H (e.g. non-professional or professional class) with known wage rates w_L and w_H , respectively. We assume $w_H > w_L > 0$. Once an agent's class status is realised, he divides his time between work and religious activity.

The precise structure of the model is as follows:

- Date 0. Each agent starts out in one of two classes, the low class L or the high class H. We denote individual *i*'s initial class status by $b_i \in \{L, H\}$.
- Date 1. Each agent chooses his level of education $e_i \in \{0, 1\}$ (e.g. no university or university education). For convenience, we refer to an individual as educated if $e_i = 1$ and uneducated otherwise (although $e_i = 0$ could represent a positive level of education). The marginal cost of education e = 1 for individual *i* is k_i , which is an independent draw from the distribution *G*. We assume that *G* is strictly increasing on \mathbb{R}^{14} .
- Date 2. Agents are assigned to either the L or H class based on their education and initial class status. Agent *i*'s final class status is denoted by $c_i \in \{L, H\}$. The set of agents assigned to class c is denoted by I_c .

The probability that agent *i* who begins in class *b* ends up in class *H* is $\theta_b e_i$.¹⁵ The return to education for agents from class *b*, $\theta_b \in (0, 1)$, is the realisation of a random variable Θ_b with mean $\overline{\theta}_b$.¹⁶ Agents know the distribution of Θ_b but only learn the realisation θ_b after all decisions are made at date 3. The expected likelihood of agent *i* entering the *H* class is thus $\mu_i \equiv \overline{\theta}_{b_i} e_i$. In the Egyptian context, we are particularly concerned with θ_L , which we refer to as the degree of social mobility in the economy.

Date 3. After observing his class status and corresponding wage, each agent has one unit of time to divide between work and religious activity (e.g. prayer, communal worship, religious education, volunteer work). Following standard models in the economics of religion, we assume there exists a trade-off between work and religious activity (Iannaccone, 1992; Berman, 2000).

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¹⁴ The cost can take on negative values, which implies that some individuals derive a benefit from education in and of itself. This assumption is largely for expositional convenience and the results hold for arbitrarily small values of G(0).

¹⁵ This is similar to the reduced-form representation of the labour market used by Piketty (1995).

¹⁶ One would expect that $\overline{\theta}_H \geq \overline{\theta}_L$ but this assumption is not necessary here.

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Evidence supporting this assumption can be found in Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) and Iannaccone (1998). Labour supply is denoted by ℓ_i and religious activity by r_i . We assume that the price of religious activity is zero, so that agents spend their entire income on a composite consumption good. The price of this composite good is normalised to one. Final payoffs consisting of three components are then received.

First, agents receive utility from consumption. We assume that consuming *g* units of the composite good yields utility of ln (*g*). Second, religion is, in part, a form of leisure in our model. An individual receives utility from religious participation *r* of *F*(*r*), where F'(r) > 0 and F''(r) < 0 for all $r \in [0, 1]$, $F'(r) \to \infty$ as $r \to 0$.

The third component of payoffs depends on a reference point. This is the main point of departure of our model. Each agent compares his income $y_i = w_{c_i}\ell_i$, which is also the number of units of the composite good that he consumes, to his reference point (or target income) Y_i . This is determined endogenously (in a manner specified below) as part of the equilibrium distribution of income in society. In particular, a representative agent *i* faces the following reference-dependent loss function:

$$(1 - r_i)^{\delta} (Y_i - y_i)^{\gamma}_+,$$
 (2)

where $\gamma > 1$, $\delta \ge 1$, $Y_i - y_i$ is the gap between target income and actual income and $(Y_i - y_i)_+ \equiv \max\{Y_i - y_i, 0\}$ so that agents are only concerned with negative comparisons. (γ and δ are interpreted in subsection 4.2.) That is, an agent's reference-dependent utility is decreasing in the gap between his target income and actual income (when the gap is positive). However, the more an agent devotes himself to religious activity, the less he cares about falling short of his reference point, as the coefficient $(1 - r_i)^{\delta}$ is lower.

Religious activity thus produces religious values that de-emphasise failure to exceed one's reference point and/or adjusts the reference point downward. This is what we mean by the psychological function of religion. This concept of religion as part of 'the psychological immune system' (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002) has a long history¹⁷ and is consistent with empirical evidence that religious beliefs and participation enhance self-esteem, life satisfaction and a person's ability to withstand traumatic experiences (Smith *et al.*, 2003). For example, Dehejia *et al.* (2007) find that weekly religious attendance by African Americans fully offsets the impact of income declines on happiness.

Therefore, at date 3, a representative agent $i \in I_c$ solves the following problem:

$$\max_{(\ell,r,g)} U_{ic} = \max_{(\ell,r,g)} \ln(g) + F(r) - (1-r)^o (Y_i - w_c \ell)^{\gamma}_+$$
s.t. $\ell + r \le 1$

$$g \le w_c \ell.$$
(3)

Substituting the goods and time budget constraints into the objective function reduces (3) to an unconstrained optimisation problem with a single choice variable ℓ or, equivalently, $r = 1 - \ell$. We can then write the utility function as $U_{ic}(r)$ for agent $i \in I_c$.

¹⁷ Marx's claim that religion is 'the opium of the people' is only its most famous statement (James, 1890/ 1974, pp. 356–7; Bainbridge, 1997, p. 34).

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We must now choose an appropriate reference point Y_i , to which an agent compares his outcome. We relate the reference point to an income/consumption aspiration level, which depends, in turn, on an agent's expectations. Before learning the class to which he will finally be assigned, each agent *i* forms an expectation of his income. His strategy specifies a religious participation choice $r_c(e_i, b_i)$ for each class $c \in \{L, H\}$ as a function of his education and initial class status. His equilibrium income in class *c* will be $y_{ic} = w_c [1 - r_c(e_i, b_i)]$. Hence, *i*'s expected income is $\mu_i y_{iH} + (1 - \mu_i) y_{iL}$. This implies that an agent who expects to have a higher likelihood of ending up in class *H* will have a higher aspiration level Y_i . In tying reference points to expectations, we follow work on endogenous reference points and disappointment aversion by Loomes and Sugden (1986), Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) and Gill and Stone (2010).^{18,19}

3.2. Equilibrium: Education, Aspirations and Religion

Our equilibrium concept draws on advances in behavioural economics and is introduced in two steps. The first part of the equilibrium involves (co-determined) religious participation choices and aspiration levels, based on the notion of personal equilibrium introduced by Köszegi and Rabin (2006).

DEFINITION 1. Fix a profile of education choices $\mathbf{e} \equiv (\mathbf{e}_i)_{i \in \mathbf{I}}$. A personal equilibrium (PE) consists of an aspiration level Y_i and a pair of religious participation choices $r_i = (r_L(e_i, b_i), r_H(e_i, b_i))$ for each agent $i \in I$ such that:

(i) Treating Y_i as fixed, $r_c(e_i, b_i) \in argmax_{r \in [0, 1]} U_{ic}(r)$ for each $c \in \{L, H\}$;

(*ii*)
$$Y_i = \mu_i y_{iH} + (1 - \mu_i) y_{iL}$$
; and

(*iii*)
$$y_{iH} > y_{iL}$$
.

The first condition requires that for fixed aspiration levels $(Y_i)_{i \in I}$, religious participation choices maximise utility for each player. The second condition relates aspiration levels to income/consumption expectations and requires expectations to be consistent with equilibrium play. The third condition restricts attention to (plausible) equilibria in which an agent earns more in the high-wage class than in the low-wage class.

The full equilibrium concept incorporates equilibrium education choices at date 1. An agent's education choice affects both his wage lottery and his reference point. Hence we employ the concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium introduced by Köszegi and Rabin (2007):

To apply this to our setting, write an agent's date-1 expected payoff as a function of his education *e*, $U_i[\mu_i(e), r_i(e); Y_i(e)] = U_i(e)$.

¹⁸ It will be clear that a formulation in which the reference point Y_i equals the income of the high class (an 'envy formulation') has essentially the same mathematical structure. See Bowles and Park (2005) for a similar formulation (with $\delta = 0$). The only difference is that religious participation here also depends on agents' expectations of upward social mobility, μ_i , and, hence, their level of education.

¹⁹ Downward mobility may matter more explicitly in a different formulation of the model. Suppose the reference point of individuals who start out in the *L* class is a function of their realised rate of upward mobility minus the realised rate of downward mobility among *H* class members (one could call this the 'indignation formulation'). In this case, a decline in downward mobility could raise religiosity.

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DEFINITION 2. A choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) of the economy consists of:

- (i) For every e, a PE characterised by a pair of religious participation choices $r_i(e_i) = [r_L(e_i, b_i), r_H(e_i, b_i)]$ for each $i \in I$.
- (ii) Optimal education choices $\mathbf{e}^* \equiv (\mathbf{e}^*_i)_{i \in \mathbf{I}}$ at date 1, such that $U_i(e^*_i) \geq U_i(e_i)$ for each $e_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and all $i \in \mathbf{I}$.

We state the following result:

PROPOSITION 1. There exists a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE). In every CPE:

- (i) An individual acquires education, $e_i^* = 1$, if and only if his cost of education k_i is less than a unique real-valued threshold \overline{k}_b , which depends on his initial class b.
- (ii) Religious participation by individuals who end up in class H is independent of their education and initial class: $r_H(e, b) = r_H$ for all $(e, b) \in \{0, 1\}$ 9 $\{L, H\}$. Hence equilibrium H class income is $y_H = w_H(1 r_H)$.
- (iii) For uneducated individuals, religious participation is independent of their initial class. Specifically, $r_L(0, b) = r_H$ for b = L, H.
- (iv) For educated individuals, religious participation is higher when they end up in class L, that is $r_L(1, b_i) > r_H$, if and only if:

$$y_H - y_{iL} > (\gamma/\delta)(y_{iL}/\theta_{b_i}).$$
(4)

The proof is in Appendix B.

If we treat an individual's cost of education as a product of his ability, Proposition 1(i) implies that it is high ability types who acquire education and who experience unfulfilled aspirations when ending up in the *L* class. As such, these individuals are distinct in terms of their religious participation (Proposition 1(ii)-(iv)).²⁰ Their experience of unfulfilled aspirations, however, does not imply that their religious participation is greater. For this to occur, (4) must be satisfied.

The reason is that educated individuals who fail to enter class H may attempt to realise their expectations by working harder and devoting less time, not more, to religious activity. Due to this LUE effect, a concern for unfulfilled aspirations alone is not sufficient to explain a rise in religious participation. A psychological role for religion in coping with unfulfilled aspirations is required. To see this, note that δ measures the intensity of the coping effect: the rate at which religious activity generates religious values. The parameter γ measures the intensity of the countervailing LUE effect. As γ/δ goes to infinity, condition (4) becomes virtually impossible to satisfy.

For (4) to hold, income inequality – in particular the difference between the incomes of educated individuals in the *H* and *L* classes – must be high relative to the ratio of *L* class income y_{iL} to the likelihood of upward mobility $\overline{\theta}_{b_i}$. As an agent's expected likelihood of upward mobility $\overline{\theta}_{b_i}$ goes to zero, the level of inequality required to satisfy (4) becomes arbitrarily large. This has some intuitive appeal. While the medieval serf is at a great disadvantage relative to his lord, his sense of inequality may

 $^{^{20}}$ Other agents either exceed their aspirations or have no aspirations of entering class H.

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be less acute, because the serf cannot reasonably expect to become the lord. Thus, income inequality, expectations of upward mobility, and poverty are not separate but related factors determining the relationship between unfulfilled aspirations and religiosity.

3.3. Decline in Social Mobility and Religious Participation

We now turn to the relationship between social mobility and religious participation. The literature on relative deprivation posits a monotonic relationship between shocks to social mobility and the incidence of social movements including religious movements. We show that the relationship is more complex, depending on expected social mobility, income inequality and absolute income levels.

Define $\Delta \theta_b \equiv \theta_b - \overline{\theta}_b$ as the gap between actual and expected mobility for members of initial class b = L, H. Consistent with our findings on Egyptian trends in social mobility, we examine the effect on religious participation of $\Delta \theta_L < 0$, which we refer to as a 'decline' in social mobility (although no prior stage has yet been modelled). Let Rbe *ex post* aggregate religious activity computed as follows:

$$R = \sum_{b \in \{L,H\}} m_b \{ G(\overline{k}_b) (\overline{\theta}_b + \Delta \theta_b) r_H + G(\overline{k}_b) (1 - \overline{\theta}_b - \Delta \theta_b) r_L(1,b) + [1 - G(\overline{k}_b)] r_L(0,b) \}.$$
(5)

where r_H and $r_L(e_i, b)$ are the equilibrium values from Proposition 1. Since these values depend on $\overline{\theta}_b$ only and not $\Delta \theta_b$, we have:

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}R}{\mathrm{d}\Delta\theta_L} = G(\overline{k}_L) \big[r_H - r_L(1,L) \big]. \tag{6}$$

Note that $G(\overline{k}_L) > 0$ because \overline{k}_L is real-valued by Proposition 1(*i*), and *G* is strictly increasing on the real line. Hence, $dR/d\Delta\theta_L < 0$ if and only if $r_L(1, L) > r_H$. We established in Proposition 1(*ii*) that this is satisfied if and only if (4) holds for *i*, such that $(e_i, b_i) = (1, L)$. Hence, we have derived a simple necessary and sufficient condition under which an unexpected decline in social mobility leads to a rise in religious participation.

PROPOSITION 2. In every CPE, an unexpected decline in social mobility ($\Delta \theta_L < 0$) leads to an increase in aggregate religiosity R if and only if:

$$y_H - y_{iL} > (\gamma/\delta)(y_{iL}/\theta_L),$$

for i such that $(e_i, b_i) = (1, L)$.

Therefore, a decline in social mobility produces a rise in religiosity, when it occurs in the context of high income inequality and high expected social mobility. These were the prevailing conditions in Egypt around the time of the Islamic revival, as established in Section 3. Income inequality was rising due to trade liberalisation and public sector cuts and expected social mobility was high due to the government guaranteed employment scheme.

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In addition, the rise in religiosity in our model is driven by talented, educated individuals from the L class. This too is consistent with the Egyptian experience, where the contemporary Islamic revival was led by individuals who had graduated from elite university faculties and originated from the lower socio-economic classes (see subsection 2.2).

The Egyptian government substantially increased funding for education after 1952 prior to the decline in social mobility. We now investigate how educational policy may have amplified the religious response to declining social mobility. Subsidising education can be modelled as a shift in the distribution of education costs, *G.* Consider two distributions G' and G'' with the original properties. We state the following result.

PROPOSITION 3. Suppose G'' dominates G' in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Whenever non-zero:

$$\left|\frac{\mathrm{d}R}{\mathrm{d}\Delta\theta_L}(G'')\right|>\left|\frac{\mathrm{d}R}{\mathrm{d}\Delta\theta_L}(G')\right|.$$

The result follows immediately from (6). A downward shift in the cost of education increases the rate of education and thereby raises aspirations. A decline in social mobility implies that high aspirations among those from the L class are unfulfilled. Hence, subsidising education amplifies the religious response one way or the other depending on expected social mobility and inequality. Taken together, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that if expected social mobility and inequality are high, then:

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}R}{\mathrm{d}\Delta\theta_L}(G'') < \frac{\mathrm{d}R}{\mathrm{d}\Delta\theta_L}(G') < 0.$$

That is, government policy aimed at promoting education amplifies the rise in religiosity in response to a decline in social mobility.

Our analysis has implications beyond the Egyptian case suggesting that economic development, by raising aspirations, can make societies more prone to religious revivals. The findings also caution against imposing a simple linear relationship between religious participation and economic variables, such as shocks to social mobility and inequality, in future empirical work.

3.4. Club Goods and Propagation of Religious Revival

The psychological function of religion that we have introduced is distinct from standard conceptions of religion in the economics of religion literature. Club goods models of religion focus on the role of sacrifice in mitigating free-rider problems in collective production (Iannaccone, 1992; Berman, 2000). Religious capital models study how religious participation generates (personal) appreciation capital, which increases an individual's future religious participation (Iannaccone, 1990).²¹ We now embed our model of religion in a dynamic framework that encompasses both of these standard approaches. Beginning with equal returns to education across classes $\overline{\theta}_H = \overline{\theta}_L$, we examine the dynamic consequences of a decline in social mobility

 $^{^{21}}$ See Bisin and Verdier (2000) on the intergenerational transmission of preferences and McBride (2015) for a club goods model with religious capital formation.

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 $\Delta \theta_L < 0$. In particular, we demonstrate how social multiplier effects can arise, as supply side factors amplify the impact of a shock to religious demand.

For the dynamic model, we alter the function F, which represents the leisure utility from religious participation, to F(r, K). This is a function of religious participation rand a variable that we shall call religious capacity K. K is a societal-level state variable and is thus the same for each agent. As before, we assume that $F_1(r, K) > 0$, $F_{11}(r, K) < 0$ and $F_1(r, K) \to \infty$ as $r \to 0$ for all K. Now let $F_{12}(r, K) > 0$, so that religious capacity increases equilibrium religious participation for all agents. In addition, assume that $F_2(r, K) > 0$ for all K and $F_{12}(r, K) \to 0$ as $K \to \infty$.

Religious capacity will be determined endogenously by the following dynamic process. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ... We can conceive of a birthdeath chain in which each period, with positive probability, an agent dies leaving one offspring who begins with his parent's class status. Let K_t be religious capacity at time t and K_0 be an arbitrary initial capacity. The law of motion for capacity is:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - d)K_t + S(R_t), \tag{7}$$

where $d \in (0, 1)$ is a depreciation rate, *S* is a strictly increasing function with $S(R_t) > 0$ and R_t is aggregate religious participation in period *t*. Current religious participation thus affects future participation via increased religious capacity. Hence we can interpret religious capacity as both the capacity of religious organisations (e.g. to deliver social services) and a form of religious capital that is socially produced. In this way, our dynamic extension integrates features of a club goods and religious capital model and explores how they interact with reference-dependent preferences.

Because agents are non-atomic, they cannot individually affect R_t and hence the evolution of K. Therefore, although they may be long lived, agents face the same problem as in (3) in choosing religious participation, so that R_t is still given by (5). Consequently, there is a severe free-rider problem in building religious capacity to deliver social services and other public/club goods.

Figure 3 depicts the dynamics of religious capacity. A steady state occurs where $S(R_t) = dK_t$. R_t is strictly increasing in K_t because $F_{12}(r, K_t) > 0$. In addition, R_t is greater than zero when $K_t = 0$ because $F_1(r, 0) > 0$ and R_t approaches some limit $\overline{R} > 0$ as $K_t \to \infty$ because $F_{12}(r, K) \to 0$ as $K \to \infty$. Depending on the function *S*, there could be multiple steady states. From any initial state K_0 , the process converges to a steady state with probability one. The social multiplier effects that can be produced by multiple steady states in the example in Figure 3(a): K^* and K^{***} are asymptotically stable while K^{**} is not.

We have shown that if expected social mobility and inequality are sufficiently high, an unexpected decline in social mobility increases total religious participation (Proposition 2). This amounts to an upward shift of the R_t function. Figure 3(b) depicts a case in which this eliminates the low capacity steady states. As social mobility returns to its expected level in the next period, the R_t function shifts back, reintroducing the low capacity steady states. Nevertheless, the arrows in Figure 3(b) indicate that even this one-period decline in social mobility could shock the economy out of the lowest capacity steady state K^* into the basin of attraction of the highest steady state K^{***} . In other words, a temporary shock to social mobility could lead to a large and permanent rise in religious participation and capacity. In this way, the




Fig. 3. Dynamics of Religious Capacity Notes. The Figure depicts (a) multiple steady-state levels of religious capacity, (b) a temporary shock to social mobility induces a large, permanent increase in religious participation/capacity.

psychological function of religion can help to attenuate the free-rider problem in the provision of religious capacity.

The religious revival depicted in Figure 3(b) has a particular life cycle. During the period of the shock, the increase in religious participation is driven mainly by talented and educated individuals (Propositions 1(i) and 2). As religious capacity builds and social mobility readjusts to its original level, the psychological role for religion declines and other motivations take over. The religious revival thus becomes a widespread phenomenon affecting religious participation among the H class and less educated segments of the L class.

4. Conclusion and Discussion

This article links the Islamic revival in Egypt to an unexpected decline in social mobility. We make two main contributions to the existing literature. First, we use nationally representative household survey data to present the first microeconomic evidence of a decline in social mobility among educated Egyptian youth, which we link to a contraction in public sector employment. Second, we develop a formal model of religion that considers the psychological functions of religion. Modelling unfulfilled aspirations as deviations from endogenous (expectations-based) reference points, we derive a simple necessary and sufficient condition under which an unexpected decline in social mobility produces a rise in religious participation. We then show how a (one-time) decline in social mobility can cause a widespread and long-lasting religious revival led by the educated middle class.

Our analysis raises two questions that we discuss briefly below and that we believe should be the subject of future work:

- (*i*) Why was Islamic belief and participation the main response to economic shocks in Egypt during this period and not other belief systems and forms of collective participation?
- (*ii*) Apart from Egypt, do religious revivals in other parts of the Middle East and elsewhere have similar economic origins?

4.1. Why Islam?

Why not socialism, for example? We suggest two reasons. First, religious elites in Egypt have for centuries held a near monopoly over social expression and organisation (Chaney, 2013). Hence, the mosque was the traditional focal point for social interaction and Islam the common basis of reference in shaping beliefs. Secular modes of expression and organisation, including science (Chaney, 2011), were easily repressed by political and religious elites (Rubin, 2011). Islamic organisations were less repressed, because government agencies could not interfere too egregiously in the sacred sphere of the mosque and because close-knit, informal networks of independent mosques, and Islamic business and social organisations were already well established.

Second, Islam's egalitarian emphasis provides a natural means of coping with unfulfilled aspirations (see subsection 1.2). Michalopoulos *et al.* (2012) present evidence that Islam is a fundamentally egalitarian moral system that emerged and spread to manage severe economic inequalities. More recently, economic stagnation has shielded Islamic organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood from the usual brain-drain and free-rider problems that afflict egalitarian groups (Abramitzky, 2011).

4.2. General Applicability

Our discussion in this article is confined to Egypt but the analysis may have broader implications. Many Middle Eastern countries shared Egypt's economic experience. An expansion of education and public sector employment were part of state-led modernisation efforts, which date back to concerns over the decline of the Ottoman empire. Campante and Chor (2012) find that from 1980 to 2010, increases in schooling in Middle Eastern countries were among the highest in the world. At the same time, many governments in the region felt responsible for unemployed individuals with intermediate or higher education (Salehi-Isfahani, 2007).²² The government's role as an employer of last resort had to be scaled back in many Middle Eastern and North African countries in the 1980s due to negative real GDP and total factor productivity growth (Pissarides and Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2007; Richards and Waterbury, 2008). Combined with the highest rate of labour force growth in the world (World Bank, 2004, pp. 56–57), this sharply raised youth unemployment levels, particularly among the educated (Assaad, 1997; Richards and Waterbury, 2008; Campante and Chor, 2012).

Despite this shared economic experience, the Islamic revival is a complex phenomenon and we do not suggest that the combination of raised aspirations and a decline in social mobility is the only driving force, even in Egypt. Alternative explanations that link religiosity to economic conditions in Muslim countries treat religious participation as a form of *ex post* social insurance (Chen, 2010) or political opposition (Ayubi, 1991). Our behavioural theory is complementary, explaining how religious groups are better

²² Part of the patron-client relationship, or 'social contract,' between the state and its citizens was for the state to provide jobs and welfare benefits (including a wide range of subsidies) in return for political support. As a consequence, the public sector was, and still is, large in many Middle Eastern countries while the private sector remains highly regulated (World Bank, 2004; Richards and Waterbury, 2008).

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able to overcome free-rider problems in collective action and why educated youth from the lower socio-economic classes were in the vanguard of the Islamic revival.

It would be interesting to study other examples of religious revivals amid deteriorating economic conditions to ascertain whether the mechanisms analysed in this article are at play. Fogel (2000) describes the history of four great Christian awakenings in the United States. The most recent example, during the 1980s and 1990s, occurred amid a background of declining social mobility and rising income inequality. In addition, Latin America – once uniformly Catholic – experienced 'an explosion of conservative evangelical religion, a shift toward Pentecostalism, a rejection of ecumenism' (Martin, 1990, p. 54) coinciding with a reversal in economic growth in the region. We hope future research will test the behavioural theory of religion developed in this paper in these and other settings.

Appendix A. Summary Statistics and Further Empirical Results

	Summary Statistics					
	Old cohort (Men Born 1949–60)			Young cohort (Men born 1968–77)		
	Ν	Mean	SD	Ν	Mean	SD
Years of schooling	1,858	6.62	6.48	2,633	9.78	5.72
No degree	1,858	0.44	0.50	2,633	0.20	0.40
Primary/preparatory degree	1,858	0.17	0.37	2,633	0.17	0.37
Secondary degree	1,858	0.19	0.39	2,633	0.35	0.48
Post-secondary degree	1,858	0.20	0.40	2,633	0.28	0.45
Father: years of schooling	1,860	1.66	4.05	2,648	2.70	5.07
Father: no degree	1,860	0.84	0.37	2,648	0.75	0.43
Father: primary/preparatory degree	1,860	0.09	0.28	2,648	0.11	0.32
Father: secondary degree	1,860	0.04	0.20	2,648	0.07	0.26
Father: post-secondary degree	1,860	0.04	0.19	2,648	0.07	0.25
Farmers	1,624	0.26	0.44	2,386	0.18	0.38
Semi/unskilled manual	1,624	0.13	0.34	2,386	0.15	0.36
Skilled manual	1,624	0.17	0.38	2,386	0.23	0.42
White collar	1,624	0.17	0.37	2,386	0.16	0.37
Professional	1,624	0.27	0.44	2,386	0.28	0.45
Wage workers: formal sector job	1,167	0.60	0.49	1,750	0.45	0.50
Wage workers: public sector job	1,167	0.57	0.49	1,750	0.34	0.47
Father: farmers	1,849	0.47	0.50	2,571	0.35	0.48
Father: semi/unskilled manual	1,849	0.12	0.32	2,571	0.15	0.36
Father: skilled manual	1,849	0.11	0.31	2,571	0.13	0.34
Father: white collar	1,849	0.12	0.32	2,571	0.16	0.37
Father: professional	1,849	0.19	0.39	2,571	0.21	0.41
Urban residence	1,860	0.47	0.50	2,650	0.46	0.50
Urban residence at birth	1,860	0.44	0.50	2,645	0.45	0.50

Table A1 Summary Statistics

Notes. An individual's years of schooling is based on the highest educational degree obtained. Employmentrelated information refers to the occupation at age 28. For wage workers, information is available on whether the job is 'formal', i.e. it entails both a work contract and social insurance, and whether it is based in the public sector. Based on the ELMPS06 (weighted).

	Dependent variable: son's probability of obtaining a professional occupation			
	(1) Father: non-professional	(2) Father: professional	(3) Full sample	
Primary/preparatory degree†	0.013	-0.049	0.002	
	(0.020)	(0.093)	(0.020)	
Secondary degree†	0.269***	0.228**	0.266^{***}	
	(0.033)	(0.092)	(0.034)	
Post-secondary degree†	0.752***	0.502***	0.749 * * *	
	(0.033)	(0.073)	(0.030)	
Young cohort	-0.011	-0.145*	-0.024*	
	(0.012)	(0.080)	(0.014)	
Primary/preparatory	-0.013	0.189	-0.001	
degree × young cohort	(0.024)	(0.131)	(0.024)	
Secondary degree \times young cohort	-0.153^{***}	-0.046	-0.141 ***	
	(0.037)	(0.112)	(0.038)	
Post-secondary degree \times young cohort	-0.164^{***}	0.160*	-0.152^{***}	
	(0.044)	(0.091)	(0.044)	
Father: professional			0.184^{***}	
			(0.043)	
Primary/preparatory degree \times father:			-0.011	
professional			(0.083)	
Secondary degree \times father:			0.005	
professional			(0.085)	
Post-secondary degree \times father:			-0.206^{***}	
professional			(0.064)	
Primary/preparatory degree × father:			0.064	
professional × young cohort			(0.106)	
Secondary degree \times father:			-0.022	
professional \times young cohort			(0.086)	
Post-secondary degree \times father:			0.193***	
professional \times young cohort \mathbb{R}^2	0.870	0.900	(0.062)	
	0.370	0.260	0.401	
N(not weighted)	3,155	852	4,007	

Table A2 Changes in the Occupational Returns to Schooling Over Time

Notes. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** < 0.01. †Reference category: no educational degree. OLS coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. The analysis is restricted to men (sons) born between the years 1949 and 1960 (old cohort) and the years 1968 and 1977 (young cohort). Son's occupation refers to the occupation he had obtained by the age of 28. All specifications include a dummy for sons born in an urban area and a constant.

Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1

Let us first characterise the PE religious participation choices at date 3 for a given education level. Suppose for the moment that $y_{iH} > y_{iL}$ for all $i \in I$. Then $Y_i - y_{iH} \leq 0$, so that $(Y_i - y_{iH})_+ = 0$. Substituting into (3), the first-order condition when $i \in I_H$ is:

$$\frac{1}{(1-r_H)} = F'(r_H), \tag{B.1}$$

where we have written $r_H(e_i, b_i) = r_H$ because all $i \in I_H$ face the same first-order condition. Under the assumptions on F, this yields a unique interior solution, which satisfies the second order-condition for a maximum. This establishes part (*ii*) of the Proposition.

Notice that r_H is independent of the choices of L class members. Define r^* as the solution to $y_H = w_L(1 - r^*)$. Note that $r^* < r_H$ because $w_H > w_L$. In the proposed equilibrium $y_H > y_{iL}$ for all $i \in I$. Hence $r_L(e_i, b_i) > r^*$ for all $(e_i, b_i) \in \{0, 1\} \times \{L, H\}$.

For the moment, write $r_L(e_i, b_i)$ as r_{iL} . For $i \in I_L$, hold Y_i constant and differentiate (3) with respect to r_i on $[\max\{0, r^*\}, 1]$ to get the first-order condition:

$$\frac{1}{(1-r_{iL})} - \delta(1-r_{iL})^{\delta-1} (Y_i - y_{iL})^{\gamma} + \gamma w_L (1-r_{iL})^{\delta} (Y_i - y_{iL})^{\gamma-1} = F'(r_{iL}).$$
(B.2)

In equilibrium, $Y_i = \mu_i y_H + (1 - \mu_i) y_{iL}$. Substituting this into (B.2), we have the equilibrium condition:

$$\frac{1}{(1-r_{iL})} - \delta(1-r_{iL})^{\delta-1} [\mu_i (y_H - y_{iL})]^{\gamma} + \gamma w_L (1-r_{iL})^{\delta} [\mu_i (y_H - y_{iL})]^{\gamma-1} = F'(r_{iL}).$$
(B.3)

By assumption, the RHS of (B.3) decreases monotonically from $F'(\max\{0, r^*\})$ to some positive real number as r_{iL} goes through $[\max\{0, r^*\}, 1]$. As $\delta \ge 1$, the LHS of (B.3) goes from $1/(1 - \max\{0, r^*\})$ to ∞ as r_{iL} goes through $[\max\{0, r^*\}, 1]$. Both functions are continuous. Suppose $r^* < 0$. Then $F'(\max\{0, r^*\}) = \infty$. Alternatively, if $r^* \ge 0$, $F'(\max\{0, r^*\}) = F'(r^*)$. This is greater than $1/(1 - r^*)$, because $r^* < r_H$ and r_H solves (B.1). Taken together, this implies that there exists at least one solution r_{iL} to (B.3) and $r_{iL} \in (\max\{0, r^*\}, 1)$ for all i in every equilibrium. In addition, because $r_{iL} > r^*$, $y_H > y_{iL}$ for all i as conjectured.

Hence for each $\mathbf{e} \equiv (\mathbf{e}_i)_{i \in \mathbf{I}}$, there exists at least one PE. For each \mathbf{e} , fix a PE. We shall now show that there exists a unique optimal education choice for each agent at date 1.

Following education choice e, equilibrium continuation payoffs for agent i if he ends up in the H class and L class are respectively:

$$V_{H} = \ln (w_{H}[1 - r_{H}]) + F(r_{H}),$$

$$V_{L}(e, b_{i}) = \ln \{w_{L}[1 - r_{L}(e, b_{i})]\} + F[r_{L}(e, b_{i})]$$

$$- [1 - r_{L}(e, b_{i})[^{\delta}(\overline{\theta}_{b_{i}}e)^{\gamma}\{y_{H} - w_{L}[1 - r_{L}(e, b_{i})]\}^{\gamma}.$$
(B.4)

We can then write *i*'s date-1 expected utility, from choosing $e \in \{0, 1\}$, as:

$$U_i(e) = \overline{\theta}_{b_i} e V_H + (1 - \overline{\theta}_{b_i} e) V_L(e, b_i) - e k_i.$$
(B.5)

Suppose *i*'s initial class is *b*. Education is strictly preferred if and only if:

$$\overline{\underline{\theta}}_{b}[V_{H} - V_{L}(1, b)] + [V_{L}(1, b) - V_{L}(0, b)]_{\overline{k}_{b}} > k_{i}.$$
(B.6)

The LHS of (B.6) is finite and independent of k_i . Hence there exists a unique real-valued threshold \bar{k}_b such that $e_i^* = 1$ if and only if $k_i < \bar{k}_b$. This establishes existence of a CPE as well as part (*i*).

To establish part (*iii*), recognise that when $e_i = 0$, $\mu_i = 0$. In this case, (B.1) is the same as (B.3) for $b_i = L$, H. Hence these equations must have the same (unique) solution: $r(0, b_i) = r_H$.

To establish part (*iv*), write the first-order condition (B.3) for $(e_i, c_i) = (1, L)$ in a PE as:

$$\frac{1}{1 - r_{iL}} + B(r_{iL}) = F'(r_{iL}), \tag{B.7}$$

where:

$$B(r_{iL}) = w_L \gamma (1 - r_{iL})^{\delta} \overline{\theta}_{b_i}^{\gamma - 1} [y_H - w_L (1 - r_{iL})]^{\gamma - 1} - \delta (1 - r_{iL})^{\delta - 1} \overline{\theta}_{b_i}^{\gamma} [y_H - w_L (1 - r_{iL})]^{\gamma}.$$

Comparing this to (B.1), $r_{iL} > r_H$ if and only if $B(r_{iL}) < 0$, which in turn occurs if and only if:

$$w_L \gamma (1 - r_{iL}) - \delta \overline{\theta}_{b_i} [y_H - w_L (1 - r_{iL})] < 0, \tag{B.8}$$

which implies that:

$$y_H - y_{iL} > \frac{\gamma}{\delta} \frac{y_{iL}}{\overline{\theta}_{b_i}}.$$
(B.9)

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Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Appendix C. Changes in Egyptian Educational and Labour Market Institutions.

Appendix D. Data.

Appendix E. Additional Empirical Results: Intergenerational Educational Mobility.

Appendix F. Additional Empirical Results: Social Mobility Among the Educated.

Appendix G. Mobility Tables and Key Odds Ratios.

Data S1.

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