Part II

Economics as a colonial discourse of modernity

3 Classical political economy and orientalism

Nassau Senior's eastern tours*

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> [A]s my father says in one of his Conversations, 'The East does not change.'
>
> (M. C. M. Simpson, preface to Senior 1882)

Economists and the 'Other'

Edward Said's controversial and path-breaking *Orientalism* (1979) drew attention to the problematic way in which Western thinkers have imagined 'The Other,' cultures, groups, and people to whom they feel alien. Ever since A. R. J. Turgot and Adam Smith, classical and neoclassical economists (predominantly male, western European, and, apart from Francis Place, not from the working classes) have assumed that individuals are the best judges of what is in their best interest, yet economists have frequently shown themselves culture-bound in how they envisioned those unlike them in culture, ethnicity, class or gender, limiting this assumption to people they resembled. Scholarship on the history of economic thought has documented the ways in which class, gender, and racial-ethnic stereotypes abound not only in the works of many classical and neoclassical economists (Aldrich 1975, Cherry 1976, Hodgson 1992, Pujol 1992, Darity 1994) but also of economists from heterodox traditions (Commons 1920). For example, William Stanley Jevons, while holding that choice in goods markets worked well, did not believe that all groups made appropriate intertemporal choices (Peart 1996). He feared that workers, and especially the Irish, lacked the foresight and willpower of

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the English professional classes in saving for the future – and indeed there could have been few who matched Jevons's obsessive hoarding of writing paper and thin brown wrapping paper (Keynes 1956: 132–3).

Cultural preconceptions also shaped how classical economists viewed societies beyond Europe, and peripheral, culturally distinct European regions such as Corsica, Ireland, and the Scottish Highlands. David Hume argued for the separate creation (polygeny) and innate inferiority of non-white races:

> There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. …Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men.
>
> (Quoted by Gould 1981: 40–1)

But while the critical history of geography has explored the involvement of geography and empire (see Smith and Godlewska 1994), comparable work in the history of economic thought has concentrated on a few areas, particularly Ireland (e.g. Black 1960) and India (e.g. Stokes 1959, Barber 1975), and classical political economy did not figure in Said's critique of orientalism (which focussed on scholars whose main field of study was the 'Orient'). One reason for this absence is that despite their influence on colonial policy, few economists had direct contacts with the non-Western Other, or documented their reactions to such encounters. James Mill and later John Stuart Mill spent much of their adult lives at East India House, holding successively the key position of Examiner of Correspondence, but neither visited India or displayed a sympathetic interest in Indian culture (Zastoupil 1994, Moir *et al*. 1998). As Said (1979: 14) notes, John Stuart Mill did not consider India sufficiently advanced (i.e. Westernized) for his theorizing on liberty and representative government to be relevant as yet. Like the economists who trained the Indian Civil Service (Malthus and Jones at the East India College at Haileybury, Toynbee and, briefly, Marshall at Balliol), the Mills made their mark on India without visiting it.

One leading classical economist did venture eastward to encounter the non-European world and to report on it in journals that circulated widely in influential circles before publication. Nassau Senior's journals of his travels to Algeria, Egypt, Malta, Greece, and Turkey (1855–58) provide a minutely documented account of classical political economy's encounter with the Mediterranean world (the 'Near East' and 'Middle East') in the period of nineteenth-century orientalism studied by Said (1979, cf. Lewis 1982, and Said and Lewis 1982). Senior's account of these countries as seen by a leading classical economist is unique, and therefore not typical of classical political economy: had Senior been more like his fellow classical economists,

he would not have been there, and would not have produced that remarkable (and vast) body of documents, his journals, and conversations.[1]

Senior among the classical economists

Nassau William Senior was the first university professor of political economy in Britain, serving as Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford from 1825 to 1830 and again from 1847 to 1852, was elected the first Professor of Political Economy at King's College, London, in 1831, and was Examiner in Political Economy (1840–57) and in Law (1847–60) at the University of London (Levy 1970: 106, 159), with a seat in the University Senate. Active in the Political Economy Club, Senior was honoured with the presidency of Section F (Economic Science and Statistics) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1860, and of the Education Department of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in 1863. His views on reducing the revenues of the established Protestant church in Ireland forced him to give up the chair in London and led to his defeat for the Drummond chair at Oxford in 1841 (for which he was also defeated in 1857, see Levy 1970: 319).

Publication of twelve of Senior's Oxford lectures between 1827 and 1830 "gradually increased his reputation, not merely with economists but also with affluent clients. The latter, as the author himself confided to an intimate friend, gave him considerable conveyancing business, especially investigations respecting titles in connection with their vast real estate investments" (Levy 1970: 54). In addition to his academic and legal careers (the latter culminating in service as a Master in Chancery from 1836 until the position was abolished in 1853), Senior acted as economic adviser to the Whigs, serving on Royal Commissions on the Poor Laws (1832–34), on the Condition of the Unemployed Handloom Weavers (1837–41), and on Popular Education (1858–61). Senior reported privately to Lord Althorp in 1831 on a commission for a commercial treaty with France (Levy 1970, Appendix IX), and to Lord John Russell in 1836 on the Irish Poor Law (Bowley 1937, Appendix I) and in 1846 on the reorganization of the English Poor Law Commission (Levy 1970, Appendix XIV).

1 John Stuart Mill, a classical economist far more sympathetic than Senior to the vibrant life of Mediterranean cities, visited Greece for a few weeks in 1855 and again in 1862, and passed through Smyrna and Constantinople on his return from Greece in 1862. Mill's two known letters from Turkey (in Mineka and Lindley 1972: 784–6) were written just after Mill learned of his brother's death, and make no mention of Turkey. The lack of observations of Turkish society by Mill to compare and contrast with those of Senior is regrettable in light of Mill's rejection of racial explanations of social and economic conditions, and his defence of personal freedoms across racial and gender lines (Levy 2001).

Asked in 1830–31 by the Home Secretary, Lord Melbourne, to advise on reform of the law of trade combinations, Senior, in the words of Marian Bowley (1937: 242), "recommended the most intolerant measures which, if they had been enforced, and provided they had not provoked a revolution, would have effectively hampered the Trade Union Movement… recommendations which in practice would have undone the work of the Philosophical Radicals in achieving the repeal of the Combinations Laws in 1824–5." All picketing and all solicitation to join a union were to be illegal, employers or their assistants would be authorized to arrest anyone picketing or soliciting, and employers who countenanced combinations and strikes were also to be severely punished (Levy 1970, Appendix VIII).

The busy Oxford lecturer, Lincoln's Inn conveyancer, and government adviser also found time for journalism (Levy 1970: 313–14 lists thirty-one articles in the *Edinburgh Review* alone). One important journalistic connection has been largely overlooked. According to *The Economist 1843–1943, Centenary Volume* (1943: 20, 79, 82, 83), Senior, with his "unrivalled European contacts" and "his private intelligence from Paris," "was responsible for the paper's news and views on foreign affairs." He wrote the leading articles on foreign affairs, while those on domestic politics and economic policy were reserved to the editor, first James Wilson and then Wilson's son-in-law Walter Bagehot. The journal had unmatched ties to the Treasury: Wilson continued to own and edit *The Economist* throughout his tenure as Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 1853 to 1858, and Bagehot is credited with inventing the Treasury bill (*The Economist 1843–1943*, pp. 70–71, 112n, cf. Gordon 1955). Though perhaps not "The Prophet of Modern Capitalism" (the subtitle of the first edition of Levy's biography of Senior, Levy 1949), Senior, as Drummond Professor, Master in Chancery, Royal Commissioner, and author of *The Economist*'s leading articles on foreign affairs, was the best connected of the classical economists, far more integrated into the English establishment than John Stuart Mill. On Senior's foreign travels, his interlocutors addressed themselves not only to the economist, but also to *The Economist*.

H. Scott Gordon (1971: 202) emphasized that the first dozen volumes of *The Economist* "contain the most elaborated and consistent laissez-faire ideology I have encountered in the English literature of the Victorian Age," much more consistent and extreme than the more moderate and nuanced policy views of most classical economists (see also Gordon 1955). While Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Robert Torrens were "Philosophical Radicals" or "advanced Liberals," Senior was a Whig – hence his greater participation in the making of public policy.

Nassau Senior's standing among the classical economists has been the subject of extensive controversy. Commentators favouring laissez-faire

tend to praise Senior's intellectual acumen,[2] while those critical of the market attribute to Senior an underlying contempt for the working class and the poor. Thus, the Chicago School economist George Stigler (1949: 25–36) took Senior's Report on the Handloom Weavers as his text to argue that the most talented classical economists (such as Senior) displayed sophistication and insight in their applied analyses exceeding that shown in their treatises and programmatic statements. To Karl Marx (1977: 333), instead of Senior being an economic scientist, "The manufacturers chose [Senior] as their prize-fighter, not only against the newly passed Factory Act but against the Ten Hours' Agitation which aimed to go beyond it." Marx (1977: 333–8) ridiculed Senior's argument (in 1837 in his *Letters on the Factory Act*) that profit was earned only in the "last hour" of labour, so that a reduction in the length of the working day would eliminate all profit from the factories affected (see also Johnson 1969 and DeLong 1986).

The Poor Law Report of 1834 (Checkland and Checkland 1974), drafted by Senior and Edwin Chadwick, has attracted considerable critical attention. "[T]he *Report of 1834*, with its strictures on 'the old system', was revered for three generations as a canonical book, teaching that all forms of dole, charity, and relief to the unemployed are suspect, because they only induce him to breed in idleness; that least relief is best relief; and that voluntary charity is always preferable to public aid because it is somehow capable of discriminating the 'deserving' poor from the 'undeserving.' Without the continued influence of 'the principles of 1834,' Mrs. Jellyby is unthinkable" (Blaug 1963: 124). Quoting R. H. Tawney's description of the report as a "brilliant, influential, and wildly unhistorical document," Mark Blaug (1963) labelled it also wildly unstatistical. Seven of the thirteen imposing, and little read, volumes of appendices to the report, printed thousands of pages of replies to parish questionnaires, without any statistical analysis or even summary. Blaug (1963, 1964) argued that such questions were posed so as to elicit responses agreeing with the preconceptions of the commissioners (perhaps inevitably in an era before much thought was given to problems of survey design) and that statistical analysis of the raw data in the appendices failed to support the report's conclusions (see also Taylor 1969, McCloskey 1973). For all the hostility of Senior and Chadwick to the Old Poor Law, and their concern that the New Poor Law should not be attractive to potential paupers, note that they differed from Malthus and Ricardo in not urging eventual complete abolition of the Poor Law (see Persky 1997).

A. W. Coats (1967: 160) notes "Senior went far beyond his fellow economists in extolling the benefits of hard work, even though he himself

2 E. G. West (1964), is an exception to this generalization.

defined employment as 'toil, trouble, exposure, and fatigue,' all of which were evils *per se*." This attitude coloured his jaundiced view of English labourers: Senior asserted in his Oxford lectures that "When wages are high, they work fewer hours and inhabit better houses; and, if there still remain a superfluity the women and girls waste it in dress, and the men in drink or luxurious living. …When their earnings become insufficient for a maintenance, they throw themselves on the parish. The virtue of which they possess the least is providence" (quoted by Coats 1967: 161). Rather than viewing the labourers as rational agents who could judge what was in their best interests, Senior considered them improvident and disapproved of their consuming more leisure when they could afford it. E. G. West (1964) similarly noted that Senior, as a member of the Royal Commission on Popular Education in 1861, held that the labouring classes were unable to make rational, informed educational choices, but had no comparable concerns about the educational choices of the middle and upper classes.

Senior's view of the English labouring classes parallels his later view of the unfamiliar societies of the Near and Middle East, and reflects his Whig political views and attitude towards all who were not middle class, male (non-Irish) western Europeans (unlike the more radical position of other classical political economists, most notably John Stuart Mill).

Senior's journals

Senior published a volume of extracts from the journal he kept in Turkey and Greece in the autumn and winter of 1857–58, "written with no view to publication; but, as it throws light on questions of political importance, I think that I ought not, under present circumstances, to withhold it" (Senior 1859: v). The volume was translated into French, with a new edition appearing in Paris in 1879. An avid conversationalist and peripatetic traveller, Senior compiled extensive records of what he saw, heard, and said. Apart from his conversations with Alexis de Tocqueville (which he began writing down in 1834), Senior began compiling his journal in 1848, the year he turned fifty-eight and a year of revolutionary upheavals in Continental Europe.[3] Twelve more volumes of his journals and conversations abroad appeared posthumously, "By the late Nassau William Senior, Master in Chancery, Professor of Political Economy, Membre Correspondant de l'Institut de France, &c., &c., &c. …Edited by his daughter, M. C. M. Simpson" (Senior 1868, 1871, 1872, 1878, 1880, 1882). Some of his conversations in Britain appeared in Mary Charlotte Mair

3 Most of Senior's tour journals, correspondence, lecture notes, and memoranda are in the Nassau Senior papers at the National Library of Wales, with six manuscript volumes of journals in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and seventeen in the Bristol University Library (Sturges 1975: 97).

(Minnie) Simpson's memoirs (Senior 1898). While Senior (1859) suppressed the names of many of the people with whom he spoke, "The lapse of a quarter of a century has relieved me [his daughter] almost entirely from the necessity of omitting either names, facts, or opinions" (preface to Senior 1882, I: iv).

The unpublished journals circulated among Senior's friends: "six copies were made of [Senior's journal of his 1855 visit to] Algeria, four each of Rome in 1851 and of Ireland in 1852, eleven of Athens in 1857, seventeen of Cairo in 1856, and twenty-five of Paris in 1854. …The Prince Consort, for instance, read 'every word of them' and often talked to his intimate friends about them. They were a source of inspiration for a number of leading articles by the author himself as well as other eminent critics, and certain portions of them were used in the revised lectures on political economy" (Levy 1970: 161–2).

Senior retained careful control of the copies of his journals, writing on the cover of his Algerian journal, 'It is earnestly requested that no part of this Journal be copied, and that it be seen only by perfectly trustworthy persons' (Levy 1970: 161). Senior intended at least some of his journals for eventual publication, for upon Alexis de Tocqueville's death in 1859, Senior wrote a preface to their quarter century of correspondence and recorded conversation, and in 1861 he wrote a preface to his collected journals, conversations and articles about Ireland. Senior (1859: v) noted that 'Whenever I had an opportunity, I submitted the reports to the interlocutors themselves.' The care that Senior devoted to preparing and circulating his journals was remarked by Count Cavour, who regretted in 1860 that 'since he [Senior] has taken to keeping a kind of journal, he has neglected more serious things' (Levy 1970: 160).

The setting of Senior's travels

Nassau Senior visited Algeria from March to May 1855, returning to France and England before sailing in November from Marseille to Egypt at the invitation of the French consul-general in Egypt, Ferdinand de Lesseps, to accompany an international commission on the feasibility of de Lesseps's proposed Suez Canal. Senior remained in Egypt until March 1856, and spent a month in Malta on his way back to France. He visited Turkey during September to November 1857, and then Greece until the end of February 1858. An intended visit to Jerusalem was cancelled because of an outbreak of cholera in Palestine (Senior 1882, I: 117).

The timing of his travels is significant. French occupation of Algeria had begun in 1830, and Britain had ruled Malta since Nelson took it from the Knights Hospitaller, a byproduct of thwarting Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, but European interest in Eastern regions intensified in the 1850s when the Pax Britannica was shaken by the Crimean War, Indian Mutiny, and the second Anglo-Chinese War (also known as the second Opium

War). Britain and France fought the Crimean War of 1853–55 against Russian expansion into the Ottoman-ruled Balkans. Britain's diplomats lobbied the Sultan in Constantinople for a firman to the Khedive (viceroy) of Egypt to permit passage of British troops across Egypt to help crush the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Other prominent Englishmen of Senior's acquaintance travelled East: in 1858, Gladstone, after serving as Chancellor of the Exchequer, went as high commissioner to the Ionian Islands, a British protectorate since the Napoleonic Wars, and the next year Gladstone's former Financial Secretary, Wilson of *The Economist*, went to India as finance minister. The House of Commons censured Sir John Bowring, Bentham's literary executor and editor of his works, secretary of the Greek Committee that sent Byron to Missolonghi, and author of a report on Egypt and Crete (Bowring 1840), for his high-handedness as envoy to China, which contributed to the outbreak of the second Anglo-Chinese War. Sir Frederick Bruce, consul-general in Egypt during Senior's visit (and son of the Lord Elgin who took the Elgin Marbles from the Parthenon), accompanied his brother Lord Elgin on the expedition that destroyed the Summer Palace outside Beijing, and then remained as envoy plenipotentiary to China.

Viewing the east

Senior remarked confidently that, since he let his conversational partners speak for themselves in his journals, "The reader will therefore find, on many points, great differences of opinion. On a few, such as the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire in wealth and in population, the corruption of its officials, and the mischief done to it by diplomatic interference, he will find nearly unanimity. Nor will he find much discrepancy in the different pictures of the Greek Government, or in the description of the means by which a free constitution has been turned into a corrupt despotism" (1859: vi). Sailing along the coast of Albania, on his way to visit Turkey, Senior (1859: 1) noted that "It is desolate and barren; evidences, perhaps, of Turkish rule" although he had not yet set foot in a Turkish-ruled land (unless one counts the largely nominal Turkish suzerainty over Egypt). His opinions survived closer contact. Of Constantinople, Senior declared that "I see a capital, the streets of which are impassable to wheels, and scarcely to be traversed on foot; I see a country without a road; I see a palace of the Sultan's on every promontory of the Bosporus; I see vast tracts of unoccupied land, and more dogs than human beings; these appearances are not favourable to the government or to the people" (1859: 27).

Cairo elicited a fiercer outburst from Senior:

> The more I see of Cairo the more I am inclined to hate all its living inhabitants except my own friends and acquaintances. I hate the

> shopkeepers, with whom every transaction is a negotiation in which you lose your time or your money; I hate the half-naked one-eyed men, and the black or white veiled female spectres that jostle and dirty you in the muddy passages called streets; I hate the children covered with flies, the ungainly complaining camels, the stumbling donkeys, the teasing donkey-boys, the importunate beggars, the dogs, the flies, the mosquitos, and the fleas. In short, I hate everything in or about Cairo except the climate, the Nile, the desert, the scenery, the Citadel, and the Pyramids.
>
> (Senior 1882, I: 162)

> it soon becomes painful to live among human beings with whom you cannot sympathize. The servility and degradation of the lower classes, the tyranny and insolence of the higher, and the rapacity and childishness of all, disgusted me more and more every day. …I carried to Egypt strong prejudices against Mahometanism and despotism; four months' experience has convinced me that I undervalued the mischiefs of both.
>
> (Senior 1882, II: 155)

As S. Leon Levy (1970: 351–2) noticed, Senior was also repelled by Naples in December 1850:

> The disgusting population of Naples was all abroad – basking, quarrelling, gambling and begging over the whole road. In cold countries the debased classes keep at home; here they live in the streets; and as the dwellings of the rich and poor intermingle, the same house which in its first and second floors is a palace, having often its cellars turned into dens of misery and vice, you are never free from the sight, or, indeed, from the contact of loathsome degradation. I never saw so hateful a people; they look as wicked as they are squalid and unhealthy.
>
> (Senior 1871, II: 7)

Such an aversion to the mingling of rich and poor was consistent with the New Poor Law, which proposed to confine recipients of poor relief to the parish workhouses.[4]

4 In contrast, John Stuart Mill's biographer records that "In Naples, the light-hearted gaiety of the streets infected [Mill], and he was once again made drunk and drowsy by the natural beauty of the place" in 1854, but "When he reached Palermo, he was aggravated by the intrusion of English residents" (Packe 1954: 376).

Senior (1882, I: 134) told Hekekyan Bey "I have no doubt that we owe to [ancient] Egypt much of our religion, and almost all the fine arts.[5] In architecture, indeed, we are still immeasurably her inferiors; but freedom, and the institutions which preserve freedom, we owe to our Teutonic ancestors." Senior (1882, I: 62–3), greatly impressed by the Pyramids, had estimated the cost of building them in England, assuming that an English construction labourer could perform two-thirds more work than an Egyptian one but cost four times as much. One example of contemporary Egyptian architecture also impressed him, the mosque of the citadel of Cairo built under Mehemet Ali: "The whole effect is very fine; finer than that of any modern European edifice that I can recollect, except perhaps the Madeleine, or our House of Lords" (1882, I: 34), and he recalled "the Moorish architecture that used to delight me in Algiers" and "the cool and beautiful houses of Algiers" (1882, I: 21, 94).

With the mosque of the Cairo citadel as the most notable exception, Senior generally praised that which conformed to his vision of the noble primitive, a harder-working, simpler people (such as the Nubians of Aswan – see Senior 1882 I: 98), and relegated the cultural contributions of Egypt and Greece to remote antiquity, so that his admiration for the Nubians or the Pyramids did not clash with his 'orientalist' view of contemporary Egypt, Turkey, or Greece. He viewed the absence of political freedom and of economic development in Near and Middle Eastern societies as inherent, permanent features of their character. He was oblivious to their cultural activity, which was in languages he could not speak. He made no mention of Cairo's Al-Azhar University, whose curriculum of religion, ethics, and classical Arabic resembled the curriculum of religion, ethics, and classical Greek and Latin at the more recently established Oxford. He was unaware of the scholarly interest being taken in European history and politics, illustrated by the translation into Arabic of Machiavelli's *The Prince* in 1825 or of the first part of Robertson's *Charles V* in 1844 (Lewis 1988: 37). Language barriers cannot fully explain these limits to Senior's knowledge: he made no reference to such works as Ibn Batuta's *Travels*, which appeared in French translation in 1854, or the writings of Ibn Khaldun, whose history of the Berbers was published in French in Algiers in 1847–51, followed by a three-volume French translation of his philosophy of history (Ibn Khaldun 1858, 1958).

Most of all, Senior viewed Eastern society as unchanging, except as the result of externally imposed reforms. His daughter wrote "the present

5 Joseph Hekekyan Bey, Senior's most frequent conversational partner in Cairo, was, like Stephan Bey, one of a group of Armenians brought to Egypt by Mehemet Ali and sent to France for education. His views were coloured by his loss of office after the death of Mehemet Ali. The British Museum has seven letters from Senior to Hekekyan from 1856 to 1862 (Sturges 1975: 97).

volumes cannot be considered out of date; for, as my father says in one of his Conversations, 'The East does not change' " (preface to Senior 1882, I: iv). This view led him to record criticisms of Middle Eastern society as though they were of permanent and universal application, and to attribute the actions of individual despotic rulers to Islamic civilization in general. His literary source antedated Chaucer by three or four centuries.

Senior recorded, without expressing dissent, violent prejudices of other Europeans in the Middle East. When asked by Senior "Is the Arab improvable?" A European identified only as A. B. replied

> I fear not, at least, while he remains a Mussulman. Polygamy, wanton divorce, the seclusion of women, fatalism, indifference to all knowledge, and to all literature, except the nonsense of the Koran, and contempt and hatred of Christians; all these are parts of his religion; they are instilled into him from birth, and they are all opposed to improvement. But he is already far more civilised than the Turks ever will be. Like them he is stationary, but at a much higher level.
>
> (Senior 1859: 20–1)

It did not appear to occur to A. B., or to other of Senior's acquaintances who accused Moslems of contempt for Christians and ignorance of European civilization, that they were similarly contemptuous of Moslems and ignorant of Arabic and Turkish civilization. "Everything that a Turk does, or says, or omits to do, or even appears to think," N. O. (a Hungarian) told Senior, "excites contempt or disgust in a Frenchman." "So it does in an Englishman," replied Senior (1859: 77).

Beyond such general condemnations, Senior more specifically attributed the supposed fatalism and lack of systematic reasoning of Moslems to their religion:

> According to European notions God has ordained that events shall succeed one another in obedience to certain rules. … Mahometans believe that every event is caused separately by the will of God…it occurs not in obedience to a general rule but in consequence of God's volition that it shall occur. …The difference between the Mussulman and European theory is almost as great as the difference between a Kingdom governed by law and one governed arbitrarily.
>
> (Senior 1882, II: 199)

Nassau Senior's journals provide only limited information to economic historians on the economic life of Egypt or Turkey, in part because he spoke neither Arabic nor Turkish and also because of his lack of regard for Islamic culture, but they provide a striking depiction of how Europeans in the Middle East viewed the people of the region. It is noteworthy that

Senior felt it worthwhile to collect, circulate, and publish these opinions without expressing disagreement, and without considering that other points of view might be worth attention. The views Senior chose to record did not clash with his own prejudices.

Senior on free trade, monopoly, usury, statistics, and colonies

Although Senior observed and recorded little information about concrete issues in Middle Eastern economic life, he did not hesitate to recommend appropriate economic policies based on his support for laissez-faire and Whig politics. Senior took his travels as an opportunity to proselytize for free trade, with mixed success. He and Ismail Pasha, the Turkish Minister of Commerce (not the future Khedive of Egypt of the same name), agreed in wishing the abolition of Turkey's export duties, which the minister blamed for aggravating Turkey's unfavourable balance of trade, but then:

> 'As respects your import duties,' I said, 'you have nothing to learn. You are the best free traders in the world. I wish that you could give some lessons to France.'
>
> 'I cannot blame the French,' he said. 'If they let in your cottons their own will be ruined. The French manufacturer pays twice as much for his steam-engine as you do.'
>
> 'That,' I said, 'is because France prohibits English iron.'
>
> 'And he pays,' said the Pasha, 'three times as much for his coal.'
>
> 'That,' I said, 'is because France prohibits English coal.'
>
> 'Of course she does,' replied the Pasha; 'she *must* do so. Her own iron works and coal mines could not compete with yours.' The nature of his political economy did not induce me to prolong the discussion.
>
> (Senior 1859: 108–9)

Senior recorded images of political economy as a recognized menace to obscurantism and despotism. His friend Hekekyan Bey told him how Mehemet Ali had established an *Ecole d'Administration*, whose professors were to examine candidates for public employment, "But when he saw what the questions were, and found that men were to be asked about the incidence of taxation and the theory of government, he put an end instantly to the examinations and the school" (Senior 1882, I: 249). Dr Sciortino, a Maltese barrister, contrasted the Jesuit schoolteachers and the clerical professors at Malta's university with his own late father's service as Professor of Political Economy, but "The chair of Political Economy has been suppressed. Sir Patrick Stewart, who was then the Governor, and his advisers thought that it put dangerous notions into people's heads" (Senior 1882, II: 272–4).

Although sympathetic to the British and French entrepreneurs he met in the Middle East, Senior (1882, I: 194) retained his viewpoint as a classical economist, lecturing Francis Gisborne of the Eastern Telegraph Company on New Year's Day, 1856: "Well, you have shown that monopoly would be best for the company, but I am not sure that competition, even at the expense of a considerably greater expenditure on the part of the East India Company and the British Government, would not be best for the public. It would probably so drive down the price of messages as to occasion a development of Indian correspondence that would not even be approached under the high prices of monopoly." Nonetheless, since he approved of the project apart from the proposed monopoly clause, Senior discussed Gisborne's telegraph proposal the next day with Koenig Bey (a Frenchman who was the Khedive's private secretary, and had been his tutor), and on January 3 reported Koenig's counter-proposal to Gisborne, who proceeded to revile Constantinople, its inhabitants, and the corruption of the Turkish officials he had bribed before coming to Cairo. "Gisborne's description of Constantinople does not incline me to visit it," recorded Senior (1882, I: 198), who soon did so nonetheless.

When he reached Constantinople and intended to take a steamboat from ship to shore, Senior (1859: 6) found that "The number that ply on the Bosporus is considerable; but, like everything in Turkey, they are subject to a monopoly, and are inadequate to the demand. We found the boat therefore crowded, and as the majority of the passengers were filthy, and all were smoking, we left it, and hired a caique." Senior (1859: 135) told Vefic Effendi that "I am told that the monopoly of the butchers occasions meat to be bad and dear, that the bakers spoil the bread, and that, in other trades, improved instruments and processes cannot be introduced, because all innovation is forbidden by the corporation."

Senior found monopoly, pervasive in Egypt and Turkey, an obstacle to economic development, but did not remark on the prevalence of monopolies in western Europe in the mercantilist era, when Sir Walter Raleigh was granted a monopoly on playing cards and the Earl of Essex one on the importation of sweet wines. The East India Company's legal monopoly on British trade with India lasted until 1817, that on trade with China until 1833. Similarly, Senior, when discussing the persistence of slavery as a symptom of what ailed Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, did not mention that Britain did not abolish the slave trade until 1807 or end slavery in its empire until 1834, or that his grandfather Nassau Thomas Senior was a slave-trader and monopolist as Governor of the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa from 1757 and a slave-holder as owner of two plantations in Barbados (as of 1786) and others in Dominica and Tobago (Levy 1970: 10–21). And, as noted in connection with the telegraph proposal and the Suez Canal, Senior's commitment to laissez-faire did not prevent his support of European business interests seeking privileges in Egypt.

In addition to the problem of monopoly, Senior (1882, I: 222) held that "the prohibition of taking interest must materially interfere with the commercial progress of every Mussulman country," although Stephan Bey, Egypt's Foreign Minister, assured him that "They would get over that difficulty by an interpretation. The Koran forbids any man to make on his capital a profit of more than ten per cent, but I am not aware of any instance in which that prohibition has been voluntarily obeyed." Although Senior did not refer to it, such a process of reinterpreting the concept of usury had occurred in late medieval Europe. Pure interest, condemned by Aristotle and by Scripture, had been carefully distinguished from other, permissible payments, although even Adam Smith still countenanced the Usury Laws setting a maximum rate of interest. In Senior's view, prohibition of taking interest was not the only barrier to capital accumulation. Like Ibn Khaldun in the late fourteenth century (Issawi 1950: 84–5, Haddad 1989), Senior (1882, I: 216) warned that arbitrary and unstable government led to hoarding of precious stones and bullion, in place of productive investment. Unlike Khaldun, however, Senior regarded bad government as an innate problem of the Orient, thus implying that development would be impossible in these regions without some external imposition of better government.

The actress Fanny Kemble described Senior as "the cast-iron man of facts" (Levy 1970: 7), but he managed to garner few facts "as to the obscure questions, the revenue and population of Egypt" (Senior 1882, I: 182). "I have been trying during the last three or four days to ascertain something about the statistics of Egypt, but with imperfect success. Mougil Bey estimates the population at six millions. …Linant Bey and Koenig Bey estimate the population at only three millions" (Senior 1882, I: 32–3). On June 3, 1831, Senior proposed to the Political Economy Club "the formation of a society…for collecting facts and observations made in different Countries" (Mallet 1921: 227–8), but Senior returned from his Eastern travels with few concrete facts and with observations deeply coloured by the prejudices of the Europeans living in Egypt and Turkey. He was not aware of the Egyptian census of 1846 (Alleaume and Fargues 1998) or of efforts to assemble demographic data in the Ottoman Empire (Behar 1998).

Senior, in the tradition of Adam Smith and Bentham, did not favour colonial rule. Senior's concern was the burden of colonialism on the colonizing country, not on the colonized peoples. When Reschid Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier, told Senior "The French and Germans think that the strength of England is in India, that if you lose India, you sink into a secondary power, like Holland," Senior (1859: 117–18) riposted "There cannot be a greater mistake. If we were well quit of India, we should be much stronger than we are now. The difficulty is how to get *well* quit of it." In 1851, Senior declined appointment as legal member of the Indian Council at Calcutta, even though the annual salary of ten thousand pounds was quadruple the salary of a Master in Chancery, and in 1836 he

had declined the governorship of Upper Canada, thus missing the Rebellion of 1837 (Levy 1970: 101, 157, 309). Rather than Egypt remaining a more or less nominal dependency of Ottoman Turkey, or being ruled by a single European country (even his own), Senior wished the European powers to jointly neutralize Egypt, in view of its strategic position on transportation and communication routes between Europe and Asia: "we shall not be parties to a partition [of the Ottoman Empire], and it is only by a partition that we could get Egypt. I hope that we shall do much better; that we shall make it an independent kingdom, or perhaps a dependency of the great Powers, under their joint protection" (Senior 1859: 91). Rather than objecting on principle to colonialism, Senior was leery of entanglement in attempts to administer societies such as Egypt and India (and perhaps also Upper Canada) that were innately resistant to good government.

Conclusion

Nassau Senior's journals are a remarkable record of the travels and conversations of a leading classical political economist (whose role as a policy adviser to Whig governments both made him more influential than other classical economists and set him apart from the "Philosophical Radicals" among them such as Torrens or the Mills), who travelled to lands unvisited by other classical economists. His journals circulated in manuscript form among the London elite, and the journal he kept in Turkey and Greece was published the year after his return.

Senior appears in his journals as a critic of arbitrary, despotic government, of monopolies, and of the oppression of the Bedouins by the Egyptian Government, and as a defender of the rule of law. He also appears as sharing and reflecting the cultural preconceptions of Europeans about Middle Eastern civilization, prejudices that excluded Turks and Arabs from the fundamental classical economic principle that people are assumed to be the best judges of what is in their own best interest.

In particular, Senior uncritically recorded the self-justifications of European businessmen engaged in high-handed exploitation of the Egyptian and Ottoman governments (see Landes 1958, Clay 2001). David Landes (1958: 321) found that "One has only to read the consular archives to be struck with the sincerity of most of the claims against the Viceroy's government, with the real moral indignation of the most patent scoundrels in the face of Egypt's efforts to protect herself against spoliation." Nassau Senior encountered the Middle East as perceived by the European business and consular community there, since he could speak with them in English or French. Senior (1882, I: 115) wrote that "the English public know nothing of Said Pasha, and very little of Egypt. I had tried to acquire some knowledge of both before I arrived, but find that I have to unlearn all my previous notions." His revulsion at the unfamiliar,

bustling Mediterranean cities combined with the opinions and perceptions of the Europeans he questioned, and with his own previous notions (which were hardier than he realized) to produce a view of an unchanging, exotic, corrupt Middle East that is strongly consistent with the orientalism depicted by Edward Said.

Senior's view of the Middle East was no aberration, but rather part of a consistent world-view. In his reports on the Poor Law and popular education as well as his journals in Ireland and the East, Senior exemplified the orientalist stream of European thought identified by Said that lumped together Orientals, women, the poor, the insane, and the Irish as the Other, exotic and wayward, unable to rationally calculate and act upon their own best interests or to initiate cultural or economic progress.

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4 Trading bodies, trade in bodies

The 1878 Paris World Exhibition as economic discourse

Ulla Grapard

> I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, *no arts no sciences*…Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen in so many countries and ages, if *nature* had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any symptom of ingenuity…
>
> (David Hume in "Of National Characters," 1748)[1]

Off to the side by the entrance to the Musée d'Orsay in Paris stand six sculptures of women representing different parts of the world.[2] In conformance with Darwinian theories of the nineteenth century, they are arranged in an evolutionary hierarchy. In the language of modernity, the display goes from the most savage, or primitive, to the most civilized. The first statue, Océania, has the facial features of an Australian aborigine with very unruly hair. She is slightly crouched in a flight posture, naked, except for an animal skin covering part of her thigh, and with a wooden club in one hand. This statue is marked as *uncivilized* by the absence of traces of culture and knowledge. At the other end we have Europe looking like Pallas Athena emerging straight from Zeus's forehead. She is dressed like a Greek soldier with laurels on her helmet. Her body, and in particular her breasts, are well covered and she is surrounded by testimonials to the advanced arts and sciences of Western civilization. The inscriptions on the pedestals explain that the sculptures were produced for display at the Palais de Trocadéro on the occasion of the 1878 Paris World Exhibition.

1 Quoted in Gates (1986: 10). David Hume is well known for his writings in philosophy and political science. He was best friends with Adam Smith, the father of modern economics and author of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776).

2 See Appendix (pp. 110–12) for illustrations.

I first saw the statues in 1995 when I visited the new museum located in the former railroad station, Gare d'Orsay. Given my own interest in exploring the structuring and ordering of the world that was revealed and made possible by particular discourses in economics, the statues seemed to extend an invitation to think more systematically about the linkages between a gendered, racial construction of the world and the academic discourse of economics.[3]

How to broaden the concept of economic discourse

This discussion of linkages is specifically motivated by an interest in the discursive practices through which the European imperialist project – including trade between nations – unfolds itself at the end of the nineteenth century. It is both a postcolonial exploration of the narratives of Western nation-building and colonialist practices, and an analysis of changes taking place in economic discourse at a particular historical moment. My hypothesis is that the increasing level of abstraction and the use of mathematical models that accompany the marginalist revolution in the academic field of economics around 1870 are accomplished through the exclusion of important questions having to do with social relations between people.[4]

I suggest that the big questions in economics concerned with technological innovation, growth, and distribution are put on hold at this time. As a result, the stories of the historically situated economic relationships that are displaced from the economists' formal models become part of an alternative cultural narrative. As political economy is superseded by neoclassical economics, the purified and increasingly mathematized language of economics is allowed to develop separately from the symbolic language of the alternative discourse where lenses of gender and race structure expressions and meanings. Thus, the seemingly differing perspectives about economy in the academic mainstream and in popular culture should be understood as dialectically interacting parts of a broader discourse that legitimates and shapes nation-building and colonial projects, rather than as separable or oppositional narratives.

Economics is not generally a discipline inclined to introspection or exploration of its own assumptions and the underpinnings of its theoretical framework. We do not see many neoclassically trained economists represented in the postcolonial literature. However, hidden aspects of the structure and practices of mainstream economics have

3 Specifically, my work is situated within the new field of feminist economics, which has opened up new ways of approaching issues of discourse and gender. See Grapard (1995).

4 See Rostow (1990) and Heilbroner (1980) for the importance of this moment in the history of economic ideas.

recently been explored from a postmodern perspective by McCloskey (1985), Strassmann (1993), Grapard (1995), and Hewitson (1999), among others. Through such explorations attention has been drawn to the often unacknowledged role of social and political contexts, and to the pervasive neglect of issues of gender and of race within the economics discipline.

A similar understanding of the interaction between academic and nonacademic discourses is found in the work of several economists who have recently explored how the travel writings of classical economists from the eighteenth and nineteenth century have contributed, in their own time, to the debates on industrialization, free trade, progress, and civilization.[5]

The travel writing I want to examine here is a little different. The travelers, spectators, and commentators I have in mind stay in a single geographical location while the people and products of the nations of the world are brought together and laid out, as it were, in an orderly fashion for everyone to see. What Margaret Hunt (1993) has called the *traveler's gaze* and the *commercial gaze* is thus deployed by a great number of visitors across the vast spectacle of the Paris exhibition of 1878. For the occasion, R. M. Mason, a British national, wrote the *English Guide to the Paris Exhibition*; in addition to the physical exhibition space and the statues, this printed guide becomes part of the travel literature I propose to analyze and read as 'texts.'

Thus, starting from the concrete historical reality of the six statues manufactured in 1878 and the written text by R. M. Mason, I use the displays of the exhibition as entry points for an analysis of Europeans' representations of colonial economic relations on the eve of what has been called the *Scramble for Africa*, that is, the partitioning of the African continent by imperialist European nation-states (Hobson 1965: 12). The British historian Hobsbawm (1987) has proposed the year 1870 as the starting point for the Age of Empire. This happens to be the same year often mentioned as the beginning of the marginalist revolution in economics. It is the time when the newly formed European nation-states, Bismarck's Germany and Italy, increasingly join the older colonial powers, Portugal, Spain, Holland, Great Britain, and France, in the competition for new territories in Africa and East Asia. For France, the 1878 exhibition can be seen as a testament to the bourgeois political recovery after two devastating events of the early 1870s: the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, where France lost the regions of Alsace and Lorraine, and the working-class

5 See, for instance, Seiz (1997) who proposes that the classical political economists Smith, Ricardo, J. S. Mill, and Malthus were, in fact, quite critical of the harmful effects of colonialist practices; Dimand (this volume) who documents the profoundly prejudiced perceptions of Nassau Senior; and Cooper (1998) who points to the inspiration of travel writing for well-known popularizers of economic concepts such as Harriet Martineau.

uprising of the Paris Commune in 1871. Scholars have suggested that the Universal Exhibition of 1878 was organized to celebrate France's regeneration after these twin catastrophes so as to demonstrate the nation's recovery through industrial, commercial, and cultural production (Boime 1995: 132). The exhibition thus served important nationalist and domestic goals for the regime of the Third Republic in ways similar to how scholars have interpreted the role of French imperialism generally (Betts 1978).

Social scientists no longer find it terribly useful to focus their inquiries on questions of origins, and I am not proposing to examine and locate the origin of the race and gender inequities that – to this day – structure economic relations between European nation-states and their former colonies. A more fruitful approach consists in focusing on the ways in which social and cultural practices are structured so as to facilitate and maintain the construction of hierarchical power relations. We can then see how differences expressed in gendered and/or racial terms are used to essentialize political and economic relationships within and between what Benedict Anderson calls "imagined communities" (1983),[6] and we can begin to understand how this leads to the formulation of a particular, historically contingent view of the world.[7] Specifically, we recognize that economic discourse operates with the category of homogeneous economic communities as naturalized nation-states in ways that obliterate class, race, and gender differences within the closed boundaries of the nation (see Danby, this volume).[8] The boundaries between insiders and outsiders serve to construct nationality as a relational term, and thus to talk of the nation as subject invokes the asymmetrical power between the subject and its 'other' (Bergeron 1996: 116).

During the later part of the nineteenth century, for example, such distinctions helped establish racial and sexual categories as integral parts of an imperialist discourse that constructed the world as a hierarchically ordered system of powerful, superior white European nation-states and subordinated, peripheral areas in Africa, Asia, Océania, and the nonwhite

6 While Benedict Anderson's writing on nationalism has been very influential for much postcolonial work on the constructedness of nations and nationalism, feminist critiques have recently questioned Anderson's neglect of gender as an integral force in this construction. See Ruth Roach Pierson (2000: 41).

7 The last two decades have seen a great push of our understanding of how race and gender are implicated in the construction of imperialist and colonial relations and practices in the nineteenth century. In addition to Edward Said's work, some of the important contributions to come out of the fields of cultural and postcolonial studies are the works of, for instance, Homi Bhabha, Partha Chatterjee, Paul Gilroy, Anne McClintock, Chandra Mohanty, and Gayatri Spivak.

8 Susan Buck-Morss suggests that what is taken to be the basis for the liberal-democratic tradition, namely the notion of a collective based on depersonalized exchange by a homogeneous population, is, in fact, highly unstable (1995: 439).

parts of the Americas.[9] This is how Said writes about the connection between imperialism and cultural discourse:

> Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported by and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination: the vocabulary of classic nineteenth-century culture is plentiful with words and concepts like 'inferior' or 'subject races,' 'subordinate peoples,' 'dependency,' 'expansion,' and 'authority.' Out of the imperial experiences, notions about culture were clarified, reinforced, criticized, or rejected.
>
> (Said 1994: 9)

The first part of this quotation is related to the representations in gendered and racial terms that we can locate in the statues. The last sentence illustrates and extends the point made about nationality. Said suggests that nineteenth century European identity and culture is constructed through the encounter with non-European worlds. He argues that there is no European culture in isolation, that it is through the encounter with the 'other' that European identities and cultures are discursively constructed. Said thus sees the importance of the colonial and imperialist project in all cultural expressions, not only where there is an obvious connection such as when individual merchants or travelers go abroad.

Political and economic conflicts are integral parts of the ongoing process of creating the European nation-state and national identity in the late nineteenth century. In order to examine the ways in which the cultural discourse of imperialism facilitates or hinders these processes, I propose to show how the Paris exhibition – as an example of the practice of economics in this broader sense – fits into this discourse.

The exhibitionary complex[10]

One of the more useful frameworks for examining the contours of such discourse is presented by Foucault who analyzes the connection between

9 It is not my intention in this chapter to enter into the debate about the chronology, motives, causes, costs, and benefits of imperialist expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is considerable disagreement among scholars about these issues (Eckstein 1991, Hobsbawm 1987, Offer 1993). I follow Offer's presumption (p. 230) that there is a sense of economic and political rationality to empire even if we do not assume that everyone maximizes economic returns all the time.

10 This is the title of Tony Bennett's 1994 essay which discusses the role of the state in a post-modern framework and that presents museums and penitentiary institutions as the "Janus face of power."

power and knowledge as it is expressed and facilitated through certain institutional structures. These structures encompass the academic disciplines within which scholarship is produced and where modern culture locates the power of legitimation for many of its knowledge claims. In *The Order of Things* Foucault thus presents an 'archaeology' of the human sciences, that is, the academic disciplines that became established and formalized in the eighteenth century. He argues that there are underlying connections between the disciplines that constitute the rules of formation of modern thought:

> … but unknown to themselves the naturalists, economists, and grammarians employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories. It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts and objects of study, that I tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological.
>
> (Foucault 1973: xi)

In other writings, Foucault shows how the asylum and the penitentiary also can be thought of as elements in a discourse of power and knowledge, and how many eighteenth-century institutions come to function as representations of the state's power (Foucault 1965, 1977). This happens through the discursive construction of the sane, disciplined, and orderly citizenry in contrast to the exclusion and confinement of those perceived as disorderly elements, that is, the criminal and the insane.

Recent scholarship has taken Foucault's analysis of discourse and institutional structures into other areas that will help us see a theoretical linkage between economic discourse and the discourse that emerges out of the practical reality of the displays at the world exhibitions. Now, instead of institutions of confinement, we will be talking about institutions of exhibitions where the doors are opened to the general public. Here the public is, in fact, as much on display as the manufactured marvels they ostensibly come to observe. In this way, the halls of exhibition become part of a social and cultural discourse where women and men of different classes mingle in a new environment. This is a place where middle class, bourgeois identities are formed around ideas of industrial production and the consumption of new, manufactured goods and services. It is also a place where nationalism is solidified: where the English become specifically *English citizens*, and where the French and the English together become *Europeans* in contrast to *Orientals* and other exotic peoples from around the world.

The emergence of international exhibitions is part of what Tony Bennett calls the Exhibitionary Complex. He uses the term to refer to a wide range

of institutions – art museums, history and natural science museums, dioramas and panoramas, and, later, arcades and department stores – which serve as linked sites for the development and circulation of new disciplines (history, biology, art history, anthropology) and new discursive formations (the past, evolution, aesthetics, man), as well as for the development of new technologies of vision (Bennett 1994: 123). I suggest that economics in the broad sense should be added to this list of new disciplines that circulate in the Exhibitionary Complex.

1878: Exposition Universelle

Bennett suggests that we can see the international exhibition as an example of a tendency for society itself to be rendered as a spectacle. As such, the exhibition provides a context for the display of power/knowledge that Foucault talks about, and it testifies to the 'specular dominance' over a totality as it makes the whole world, past and present, available for observation by the visitors (ibid.: 129). This controlling vision and the order it imposes on the spectacle is one reason to see the 1878 Paris exhibition as part of a broadly conceived economic discourse. I see it as a display of industrial and economic power, and as a hierarchical ordering of relations between nation-states; between the imperialist metropole and the colonized periphery; between urban and rural areas; and between working-class and middle-class citizens. By walking and looking, the spectator at the exhibition takes in unfamiliar sights and becomes a participant in a construction of the world mapped out by imperialist, visual design. Simultaneously, he or she is constituted as a citizen-subject.

The 1878 exhibition in Paris marks the first time that individual pavilions representing the lives and crafts of people from what we often call the Third World are included in the display. Since the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London, also known as the Crystal Palace Exhibition, six international industrial fairs had been organized in London, Paris, Vienna, and Philadelphia before 1878.[11] Each time they got bigger in terms of the number of exhibitors, the number of buildings, and the number of visitors.

11 The 1851 exhibition in London is dealt with extensively in the literature, but the 1878 exhibition in Paris is much less well documented in English. The French participation in 1851 and the connection between bourgeois consumption demands and industrial development are analyzed in Walton (1992). The 1867 Paris International Exhibition has been discussed by Said as an example of 'imperial potency' and orientalism (1994: 119). The Paris exhibition of 1878 covered a surface of seventy-five hectares, and a record sixteen million people came to see the displays of manufactured goods, curiosities, and fine arts. These figures are reported by Jacques Bertrand (1997–99).

In 1878, the main galleries with displays of industrial and fine arts objects are located in the Champs de Mars (Napoleon's military exercise grounds) on the left bank of the Seine. Across the bridge of Iéna, the statues, to which I will return shortly, are placed on the terrace of the Palais de Trocadéro.[12] Surrounded by a green area, the Palais de Trocadéro has in its center an immense rotunda which is flanked by two 216 feet towers that are accessible to the public and from the tops of which the exhibition grounds and city can be seen "in all its brightness and splendour" (Mason 1878: 14). On this side of the river, there are several spectacular waterfalls and a grand cascade ornamented with "colossal animals" representing the four quarters of the world: Europe by a bull, Asia as an elephant, Africa as a rhinoceros, and America as a horse. The only official French building on this side of the river is the Office of Woods and Forest "a large and elegant construction" which houses the Entomological Exhibition and the Meteorological Pavilion (18). It does not stretch the imagination much to think that this section of the exhibition is intended to evoke themes of nature writ large, and that we are in the middle of a metonymic construction of the wild. The descriptions of the pavilions and the artifacts of the "Countries of the Sun" (17) are characteristic of an encounter with the exotic and will seem familiar to readers of Said's *Orientalism* (1978). Thus the fashion of Chinese art and the café of Tunis are found *peculiar*; the industrial arts and the natural produce of several countries in the Middle East are found very similar since "these Oriental peoples have very much in common, and their degree of civilization, their manners, tastes, and styles are very little different" (18).

Crossing the bridge to "what may be termed the Exhibition proper," the *Guide* leads the visitor to the Grande Vestibule from where the length of the exhibition stretches out so that one side is entirely devoted to France, and the other side to England and other foreign nations. The prominence of France and England reflects their importance as the foremost imperial powers at the end of the nineteenth century, and the English commentary indicates a considerable degree of national pride as well as a measure of competition between these two superpowers. The Indian collection of the Prince of Wales, for instance, is "unsurpassed for beauty and richness" by anything in the whole exhibition, yet it seems ironic that it adds prestige to England and its royal household rather than to India whose artists have created the arms, jewelry, and other treasures mentioned in the guide to an exhibition ostensibly celebrating manufacturing and craftsmanship.

The English and French colonies are represented by displays of especially large or unusual artifacts. From Lagos we thus find an ivory tusk weighing 102 pounds, the tooth of a hippopotamus, a cone of palm

12 The comments in the following passage about specifics of the exhibition are all derived from *The English Guide to the Paris Exhibition 1878*.

fruit and a war drum (34). Although France at this point has dispensed with royalty and has embarked on its Third Republic, the first items highlighted by Mason on the French side are the French crown jewels – "a magnificent display worthy of the nation, though it makes so little use of them," as he puts it (35). The *Guide* provides primarily an inventory of the state of arts of manufacturing in the countries of Europe, and it highlights the enormous potential for advantageous trading based on comparative advantage[13] and specialized niche-production. The text is much less expansive when it comes to describing the contributions from colonies and other non-European regions where the focus is on the contribution of primary products for consumption, such as coffee, sugar, pepper, tea, and tobacco, and a few raw materials for manufacturing. The French colonies have a display at the lower end of the French division. Mason says in the text that he has just received the catalogue, and that it is "a formidable study on a warm summer's day." Hence we only get half a page where we learn that there are "many picturesque and interesting objects to be seen," amongst them specimens of birds, a collection of shells, samples of wood, pearls, a fine serpent from Senegal, and two very large feet of an elephant from Cochin-China (60).

The picturesque and the unusual is what Europeans expect from what Mason calls the Countries of the Sun. When it is not forthcoming, it leads to disappointment. Japan, one of the few countries that has successfully resisted European attempts at colonization wins much praise from Mason, but he does find the Japanese presence at the exhibition lacking in one respect:

> [Japan] is one of the best represented of foreign nations, and though she sends a rather numerous staff of attendants, unlike her Chinese neighbor, *she has not required them to retain their native costumes, and to that extent she has not added to the picturesque character of the Exhibition*.
> (Said 1978: 99, italics mine)

Following the visitor through the displays of the physical space of the exhibition has allowed us to see a concrete application of the theoretical points made here. The exhibition can be read as a travel text insofar as it structures the world for the visitor. A whole new class of world travelers

13 A country is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of a particular good if it can produce the good cheaper than its trading partner can. The cost is measured in terms of the foregone benefit flowing from alternative uses for the resources going to produce the goods in question. Ricardo's major contribution to the economic theory of trade consists in showing that when countries specialize in production according to their respective comparative advantage, both trading partners can benefit and increase consumption over what would be possible without trade.

from the imperialist nation-states of the late nineteen hundreds will acquire individual and national identities as they construct themselves and their boundaries in this hierarchically orchestrated encounter with the exotic 'other.' In particular, this example of the exhibitionary complex in action presents the reader/visitor with a particularly well-constructed view of the world of manufacturing and commercial possibilities, and therefore it is also part of the enlarged sense of economic discourse.

Lady bountiful: the world constructed through the prism of gender and race

The six sculptures, which form an allegorical representation of different parts of the world, were made especially for the terrace of the Trocadéro. They are a small addition to the large number of such monuments in Paris from the nineteenth century. The widespread allegorical use of the female body in public monuments is reflected upon by Marina Warner in her path-breaking text, *Monuments and Maidens*:[14]

> On to the female body have been projected fantasies and longings and terrors of generations of men and through them of women…The iconography appears chiefly in public commissions and in the edifices where authority resides because the language of female allegory suits the voices of those in command.
>
> (Warner 1985: 37)

As an expression of the fantasy of national unity, women and the female body have often been used allegorically to personify the nation and its highest principles. They were also used to stand for Woman, the eternal feminine. As such, she became the symbol of what was immortal and unchanging in the nation (Pierson 2000: 44). With the urge to classify and the pervasive influence of scientific racist discourses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is not surprising that women's bodies have been used to personify perceived immutable and genetically determined differences between races. Within the imperialist discourses of the late nineteenth century, scientific concepts of race purport to show not just difference but a racial hierarchy. In spite of the outward female form, it would be misleading to read the sculpture as representing a particular vision of women's roles or notions of actual womanhood. Rather, they are giving meaning to and representing a particular view of relations between different parts of the world in a language that is hierarchically structured through the symbolic use of gender and race. And to the extent that

14 *Monuments and Maidens* (Warner 1985) provides a guided walking tour of gendered sculptures in Paris, London, and New York.

evolutionary theories of the late nineteenth century are embedded in a discourse of hierarchically structured pairs of opposites – such as nature and culture, woman and man, darkness and light, white and nonwhite, physical and mental, feelings and abstract knowledge – we need to deconstruct the 'text' of the sculptures and decode it for what it has to say about European images of the self and national identity as these emerge discursively in opposition to the exotic 'others.'

A good starting point for this analysis is anthropologist Sherry Ortner's influential article from 1972 "Is female to male as nature is to culture?" where she argues that the pattern of almost universal male dominance we observe in the world more often than not is expressed as an *essential, natural* opposition between nature and culture. Critics have taken Ortner to task for universalizing male dominance and social structures, and in a more recent reflection on her earlier work, Ortner recognizes that the dichotomy between nature and culture may not be universal.[15] However, she says, nature/culture as used in the earlier essay was used in the sense of a Levi-Straussian structure, and not as an empirical object. As Chandra Mohanty suggests, the binary oppositions nature/nurture and male/female are "superordinate categories which organize and locate lesser categories (like wild/domestic and biology/technology) within their logic" (Mohanty 1994: 211). But even at the superordinate, or metaphorical level, Ortner's analysis insists, this way of thinking about the world is, in fact, markedly Western:

> Nature/Culture in one or another specifically Western sense – as a 'struggle' in which 'man' 'tries' to 'dominate' nature, as a confrontation with a system that obeys 'natural laws', and so forth – is certainly not universal.
>
> (Ortner 1996: 179)

When we add gender, she says, what happens is that the gender relationship, or opposition, and the nature/culture opposition tend to move into a relationship of "mutual metaphorization":

> [G]ender becomes a powerful language for talking about the great existential question of nature and culture, while a language of nature and culture, when and if it is articulated, can become a powerful language for talking about gender, sexuality, and reproduction, not to mention power and helplessness, activity and passivity, and so forth.
>
> (ibid.: 179)

15 See MacCormack and Strathern (1980) for a discussion of these dichotomies and of Ortner's use of nature/culture as a cultural construct.

Ortner's text thus clarifies the distinction between empirical relationships and discursive formations by showing how metaphors operate to connect the gendered language of the Parisian statues with a language of race, culture, and power. This analysis lends support to the idea that the imperialist, modernist project is discursively linked to the Western perceptions of a nature/culture dichotomy. This linkage is what is articulated in the six statues when we move from the primitive and wild Océania to the civilized and cultured Europe.

Through the statues, the world is put on display for the European visitor to see, and a series of signs guides the visitors toward readings that, however obliquely expressed, have to do with trade and political economy, that is, the politics of domination and of hierarchically ordered, racialized and sexualized bodies. At the same time, the display naturalizes the non-European parts of the world in the metaphorical language of the statues: the civilized whiteness of European women is constructed in opposition to the unruly sexuality of women of color. Some elements are related to what Hunt (1993: 346) has called the "commercial gaze": the prominent display of fruits, for example, may serve to symbolize the abundance of raw materials in tropical Africa and South America available for 'the picking' of an enterprising colonialist. The listing of founding fathers at the side of the Indian Princess (North America) and the shield with the names of nation-states in South America evoke earlier European conquests and the establishment of orderly political regimes where economic rights and contracts can be expected to be upheld. The low level of technical sophistication of the so-called Third World is contrasted with the expertise of Europe as shown in her collection of instruments of knowledge: book, paint and brushes, the Caduceus – the staff with the serpent which serves as a symbol of the medical profession – and a mathematician's tool to construct right angles.

The evolutionary progression from a lower to a higher order suggested by the sculptures is a direct reflection of the scientific racism that emerged in Europe and North America in the second half of the nineteenth century. Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* from 1859 was notably instrumental in establishing the fascination with science that fueled imperialist ideologies. But even earlier, the French writer and diplomat Joseph-Arthur, Comte de Gobineau, laid the foundations for modern day racism in his *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* (1853), where he argued that the white race was superior to all other races. Applied to a colonial context, this becomes the justification for the European expansion and for the mistreatment of colonized populations around the world. For the French, white supremacist ideology dominates political discourse in the early 1880s when it provides the rationale for establishing an empire in the name of the "*mission civilisatrice*" (Warshaw 1991: 92). Similarly, the British portray the imperial colonial conquest as an expression of "the white man's burden."

Above all, we are looking at a vocabulary of signs that associates non-Europeans, especially blacks, with rampant sexuality. Sander Gilman, professor of Humane Studies and psychiatrist at Cornell Medical College, has examined (1985) the iconography of female sexuality and shown how commonplace it is, in the Western tradition, to associate the primitive with unbridled sexuality. The medical sciences in the nineteenth century eagerly brought legitimation to propositions concerning the racial inferiority of non-Europeans. Paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould (1981) discusses various practices and measurements found in the so-called scientific anthropometric record. He focuses in particular on craniometry (25), which he calls the "leading numerical science of biological determinism," and on "recapitulation" (114), the reconstruction of the evolutionary lineage. Both were used in the construction of an ascending racial hierarchy with the African race on the bottom, the Oriental race somewhere in between, and the European on top. Many nineteenth-century scientists were convinced that social behaviors and characteristics were biologically determined, and hence common criminals and prostitutes were linked through their bodies to the inferior races or animals. It was also accepted knowledge that prostitutes, because of their excessive sexuality, would end up with diseased sexual organs similar to those of the so-called Venus Hottentot, an African woman whose genitalia and buttocks summarized her primitive essence for nineteenth-century observers.[16] According to the historian Bachhofen, uncontrolled sexuality is a sign of the "swamp," the earliest stage of human history. Similarly, both Hegel and Schopenhauer believed that the presence of blacks in the contemporary world served as an indicator of how far mankind had come in establishing control over his world and himself (Gilman 1985: 229).[17]

A mixture of the primitive and the sexual is blatantly evoked by Océania's total lack of clothing, her disorderly hair, her crouching posture, the animal skin on her leg, and the club in her hand. The presence of animals – the kangaroo for Océania, the elephant for Asia, and the turtle for Africa – also evokes the animalistic and the primitive, as do the necklaces of teeth and claws in the case of South and North America. The more modest décolletage of Asia hints at the racial ordering that puts the

16 Sarah Baartmann, the woman known as the Venus Hottentot, had what early travelers to South Africa had described as the "Hottentot Apron" as a result of surgical procedures that changed the appearance of the labia (Gilman 1985: 218). Today we would call it female genital mutilation. Until 1974, Sarah Baartmann's genitals and buttocks were on display at the Musée de l'Homme in Paris. On May 4, 2002, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that her remains had just been returned to South Africa (Simmons 2002).

17 Also see Jenny Sharpe's (1994) analysis of a particularly striking example of a racial discourse that presents 'brown-skinned men sexually assaulting white women' during the 1857 uprisings in India (termed the Revolt of 1857 in India and the Sepoy Mutiny in England).

oriental above the black race. Significantly, only Europe has footwear, and only Europe is not showing naked breasts. Her clothing and armor, including the helmet, leave her invulnerable and unexposed. The tools and instruments surrounding her are indications of the dominant power and knowledge possessed by Europe in contrast to other parts of the world. She is clearly presented as racially superior, and the overall impression is thus one of a hierarchical ordering constructed through a sexualized and racialized discourse of difference.

Imperialism and colonialism: absences in economic discourse

The 1878 Exhibition shows how gender-tropes help construct a racialized order that presents the bounty of the 'Countries of the Sun' while it legitimates colonial domination, thus giving us a sense of the contemporary popular discourse about economic relations. This discourse emerges at the same time, and in seeming contrast to, the changing discourse within the academic discipline of economics, specifically the marginalist revolution, which occurred around 1870. I will not go into great details here about the economics of colonialism and imperialism; my argument is precisely that the academic discipline of economics pays almost no attention to these questions starting from around 1870 and continuing through the Second World War when the new field of development economics returns to the questions of conditions for growth and inequality on a global scale.[18] I want to make the point that a displacement takes place at the historical moment when the field of political economy is replaced in the academy by the much more narrowly defined neoclassical paradigm. In particular, I suggest that as tales of imperialist and colonial exploitation are further removed from the discourse of official economics, they find expression in alternative discourses such as the International Exposition and the statues analyzed here.

In *Theorists of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present*, the Nobel-prize winning economist W. W. Rostow, who is himself an important contributor to the field of economic development, argues that significant qualitative changes took place in the economics discipline around 1870. At this time, the central focus on the economic and political concerns of growth and the creation of wealth, which we find in the writings of the classical political economists such as David Hume, Adam Smith, J. S. Mill, and Karl Marx, is replaced, throughout the Atlantic World, by a more narrow set of questions that lend themselves to, in

18 See Escobar (1995), especially chapter 3, for an anthropologist's excellent examination of the underpinnings of economic theory and the emergence of the field of development economics in the late 1940s and 1950s.

Rostow's words, the "illusory elegance of partial and general equilibrium analysis" (1990: viii).[19] This watershed comes about for several reasons. Rostow suggests – perhaps not surprisingly for a neoclassical economist – that mathematical innovations in the modeling 'tools' available for economic analysis have a lot to do with it. Subject matter becomes driven by a consideration for where the calculus can be used to produce conclusive results within abstract models. The search for clear-cut answers results in quite narrowly focused areas of investigation. The mathematization leads to economic advances within a theoretical framework that focuses on the implications of very small changes at the margin (hence "marginalist revolution"), since that's what the calculus primarily does. Progress in economics becomes linked to the mathematical proofs that, under very restrictive and limiting assumptions, will lead to stable equilibrium in highly abstract models. The discipline, at this point, becomes identified with particular methods rather than with the great problems that need to be resolved in the real world. According to Rostow, "the refined methods of analysis lead in many cases away from, rather than toward, the issues in active contention in the political arena" (154). With the marginalist revolution we see a move toward refined and elegant theories of production and distribution brought together in splendid symmetry. The move was characterized by an institutional shift in the academy as "political economy gave way to economics," as Rostow puts it (ibid.).

In *The Worldly Philosophers*, Robert Heilbroner (1980) concurs with Rostow's notion of a major shift in economic thought in the late nineteenth century. He presents the marginalist exclusion of a whole gamut of human behavior and of important political issues from the official world of economics as part of the intellectual development that turns economics into the "special province of professors, whose investigations threw out pinpoint beams rather than the wide-searching beacons of the earlier economists" (170). What I have called displacement, Heilbroner reads as a massive move of ideas to what he calls a flourishing "economics underworld" which serves as a counterpoint to the "pale world of equations" (175). One of the elements relegated to Heilbroner's underworld is precisely the discourse of imperialism, a 'new and vigorous spirit' sweeping Europe and the United States at this time. Heilbroner's discussion of the role of the underworld as the place for the discourse of imperialism, then external to the official discourse of economics, directly supports the hypothesis I proposed earlier when I suggested that we can read the exhibition and the statues as forming an

19 I have shown elsewhere that classical political economy starting with Adam Smith has defined itself as a discipline by constructing an image of *Homo Economicus* that effectively eliminates issues of race and gender from its official discourse, while masking a deep undercurrent of racial and sexual hierarchy (Grapard 1995).

alternative or broader economic discourse. The sense of displacement is well expressed in Heilbroner's comments about the discipline's reaction to the imperialist empire building:

> Throughout all of this, the officialdom of economics stood on one side, watching the process of imperial growth with equanimity, and confining its remarks to the effect that the new possessions might have on the course of trade.
>
> (Heilbroner 1980: 190)

It was left to the critics of the underworld to see that imperialism constituted a change in the fundamental character of capitalism, and to understand the likelihood that the process of expansion would lead to war (ibid.).

It is perhaps not surprising that some of the more insightful discussions of the economic way of seeing the world come from anthropologists such as Stephen Gudeman (1986) and Arturo Escobar (1995). Escobar's analysis of economic theories of development builds on Gudeman's notion of economics as culture. Western economists usually don't think of their models and theories as part of the cultural discourse. Instead they think of what they produce as neutral descriptions of the real world (1995: 58). The tales of markets, production, and economic agents are seldom questioned, but are seen as normal and natural. Yet, humans are not born with an image of the rational 'economic man', and production based on private property for individual gain is not a natural, universal tendency. As Escobar points out, the tales about what we call economic relations are historically contingent, and "their history can be traced, and their genealogies demarcated and their mechanisms of truth and power revealed" (59).

Gudeman's central assumption is that humans are modelers, and that they construct what he calls "local models" as a way of searching, coping, adjusting, and making sense of things (37). Accordingly, all societies model such economic activities as production, consumption, and distribution, but the way in which they do this is by no means universal. Modern economists model their world in very abstract and mathematical ways where the politics of power and inequality are far from transparent. The economists' world is thus naturalized and doesn't invite basic questions about the foundations and premises on which the economic worldview is constituted. As a result, important questions tend to disappear from the economic conversation.

In contrast, I argue, the topographical presentation of the World Exposition in 1878 is structured by an unstable binary opposition between industrializing Western countries and the exotic colonial world. At the exposition, everything points to questions of power and difference. The modeling is done in a metaphorical language of racial and gendered constructs so as to present the world in a politicized, hierarchical order,

which reflects the imperialist ethos of the Western world in the late nineteenth century.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have enlarged the notion of economic discourse and the notion of text so that they include the 'travel literature' of the international exhibition. Working with the 1878 Exposition Universelle in Paris, I have deconstructed the physical space and the allegorical statues representing different parts of the world. I have used Foucauldian notions of knowledge and power as well as explanatory frameworks from cultural studies and anthropology in order to unmask the gendered and racialized structures of the imperialist discourse of the end of the nineteenth century. I further show the connections between this broader discourse and the emerging academic discourses of the marginalist revolution within the discipline of economics (also see Callari, this volume).

With this effort, I join scholars both inside and outside the discipline of economics who have lately called for a broader concept of economic discourse. They look upon the approach of mainstream economics as only one of many ways to have a conversation about economic issues. Confronted with a legacy that has spread and encouraged a Western, modernist, and economistic perspective on social relations, there is a compelling need to better understand how, and for whose purposes, economic and cultural discourses are structured by hierarchical notions of gender and race.

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Appendix

L'Océanie
Mathurin Moreau (Dijon 1822 – Paris 1912)
Fonte de Durenne

L'Amérique du Sud
Aimé Millet (Paris 1819 – Paris 1891)
Fonte de Denonvifijers et fils

L'Amérique du Nord
Ernest Hiolle (Paris 1834 – Boi le Roi 1886)
Fonte de Durenne

L'Europe
Alexandre Schoenewerk (Paris 1820 – Paris 1885)
Fonte de Voruz Aimé

L'Asie
Alexandre Falguière (Toulouse 1831 – Paris 1900)
Fonte de Denonvilliers et fils

L'Afrique
Eugene Delaplanche (Paris 1836 – Paris 1891)
Fonte de Durenne

Commandé en 1877 pour la terrasse du premier Palais du Trocadéro bãti pour 1'Exposition Universelle de 1878 de Paris. (The statues originally displayed at Palais du Trocadéro, 1878.) Currently they are placed outside, by the entrance to the Musée d'Orsay (photographs by Professor Constance Harsh).

5 Economics and the postcolonial other

Antonio Callari

> Anxiety eats at me whenever I cannot situate the geometric line organizing my powerlessness.
>
> (Fatima Mernissi, *Dreams of Trespass*, 1994: 3)

This chapter is a reflection on the relationship between postcolonial thought and the discourse of economics. A distinction is often made between the disciplinary structure of economics and the broader intellectual, cultural, and political conditions and effects of that structure. I use the term discourse in order to include both sides (what is on the in-side and what is on the out-side of the disciplinary borders of economics) in this reflection and also in order to suggest that these borders are porous and changeable. It is reasonable to expect that the borders of economics will be changed by the encounter with the postcolonial; postcolonial thought in general tends to transgress the borders of Western knowledge(s).

One of the key contributions of postcolonial thought has been the registering of *the other* as a moment of theoretical definition *of* the West. In this registering, we now know, 'history' and 'development' came to be staged as scenes of deficit and debt. Defining itself in relationship to a deficit state of the other and, at the same time, in would-be universalist terms, the West invented history as the narrative of its own (inevitable, natural) ascendancy and scripted development as a question of that debt (to the West) which would cover the deficit of the other: White Burden, Third World Debt are but brutal enactments of this scripting. But, more than simply registering this scripting, postcolonial thought challenges its authority (the authority it would have, that is, to define the terms of history). Treating the West and the other as *representations* rather than as givens, postcolonial thought works on the conditions of representability that structure them into those subject and object positions which enact the narrative in question. The focus on the conditions, and indeed on the very idea, of representation unanchors the discourse of (and around) postcoloniality from the status of the West and of the other as subjects and objects

of knowledge, and this indeed gives to postcolonial thought a certain quality of undecidability (on the difficulty of defining the postcolonial, see Mongia 1996, Introduction). Not a vice, however, this undecidability is a virtue, opening history to the uncertainty attending the other's renegotiation of its relationship to the West.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the ways in which the very disciplinary development of economics has been implicated in the West's strategy of alterity. But it is important also to reflect on the fact that the postcolonial reflection comes relatively late to economics, after its formative work in the area of literary criticism and its incursions in all other areas of social theory: history, law, philosophy, anthropology. Arguably, the reason for this coming-late can be found in the disciplinary structure of economics, which seems capable of controlling the location of the other over the complete space of being, on both the in-side and the out-side of the borders of 'economy'. Taken on its own terms, the disciplinary structure of economics would seem to leave no room for undecidability, no liberty for the other of postcolonial interest to imagine its own conditions of economy. It must be a priority of the postcolonial, then, to understand just how the disciplinarity of economics would control the place(ing) of the other over the social space, and it is to this task that the first section, titled 'The bordered space of the economy,' is given.

The implication of this approach is, of course, that postcolonial reflection on economics must work to dissemble the bordering of the social through which economics has ordered the places and spaces of the other into the narrative of the West. It is not by chance, I believe, that the first postcolonial reflection on economics (on the structure of the theory of value) came in the form of Spivak's (1985) deconstruction of the concept of 'value;' nor is it by chance that this reflection (this very essay and this volume) is prefaced by a work of deconstruction (see, e.g.: Amariglio 2002, Callari 2002 on the undecidability of the key economic concepts of exchange and of value; Cullenberg *et al*. (2001) for a general postmodern reflection on economics; and Charusheela (2000) and Zein-Elabdin (1998, 2001) for a postcolonial confrontation of modernist economics).

As we will see in the first section, the ability of economics to order the place of the other over the space of the social derives from its construction of the 'economy' as a homogeneous space, as an area bordered by the work of a set of homogeneous (unimodal) exchange relations. Crucial to the disciplinarity of economics, this homogeneity has been symbolized throughout its history by the search for a principle (and theory) of value. Moreover, in disciplinary doctrine, the construction of this principle has been represented as a matter of scientificity, as an expression of an abstract principle of rationality by which economics could order the materiality of the world of production into a structure. But while economics would rest its principle of disciplinarity, and thus its ability to order the place of the other, on such scientific grounds, I will try to show

that the construction and disciplinary reproduction of this principle was the product of the very operations of alterity through which the West scripted its history. As I will argue in the first section, it is by reference to the concept of a social division of labor (henceforth DOL) – the general idea that the material activities of a society are re/distributed fluidly across the social space in response to the rhythm of capacities and needs, and in accordance to the idea of a rational organization of production – that the principle of rationality is given a material, economic form.

In the second section, titled 'Selves and others,' I will argue that the two main stages of the construction of the disciplinarity of economics – the initial formation of economic knowledge around a labor theory of value in eighteenth-century classical political economy and the later turn to a utility theory of value in twentieth-century economics – were the products of two operations of alterity through which the West defined itself by reference to a deficit of the other with regard to the conditions of the DOL. The initial formation of economic knowledge, prompted by a reflection on the superiority of the West's form of property, which took the form of fungible wealth, over the more restricted (fixed) form of property of the other, was steeped in a form of naturalist modernism consonant with the West's 'encounter' of the other through the period of mercantilist colonialism. The subsequent turn to subjectivism in economics, which the consolidation of the utility theory of value represented, was supported by a reflection on the superiority of the Western capacity for abstraction over the more limited epistemological horizon of the other. Consonant with the turn of the West's relation to the other at the end of the nineteenth century, the age of Imperialism, to a form of culturalism, economics was itself transformed into what could be called a subjective modernism. Economics therefore emerges in its very structure, I thus argue, by virtue of these operations of alterity.[1] I then give in 'Concluding remarks' a summary reflection on the implications of these 'postcolonial' excavations of the disciplinary foundations of economics for the future of economic discourse.

The bordered space of the economy

We start then with an overview of the disciplinary (disciplined and disciplining) borders of orthodox economics: the other has a prescribed relationship to this bordered space. The disciplinarity of economics is given by the imagination of a *bordered space* (the "self-regulating," or "disembedded" economy of Polanyi 1968, chapter 2) as a structure of

1 Feminist scholarship has similarly argued that the principle of economic rationality and the resulting concept of 'economy' are gendered operations with patriarchal conditions and effects (see Hewitson 1999, Ferber and Nelson 1993).

relations defined either immediately as exchange relations or by reference to these exchange relations. Now, this definition of the economic space has been compatible with more than one imagined form of agency, and economic agents have thus been alternatively theorized as calculators of labor values or of utilities. Beyond these differences, however, what has remained invariant has been a dimension of homogeneity, whereby it is 'one' principle of calculability that, once chosen, invests equally all agents: it is this homogeneity that allows the myriad of separate, and otherwise incommensurable, acts of exchange to be structured into 'one' (thus, 'bordered') space. These borders *would* keep out forms of subjectivity which do not recognize themselves in this calculus of 'exchange' relations. Non-exchange forms of subjectivity are, in fact, unwelcome: not bound to the homogeneous calculation operations that map all agents onto one bordered space, they would threaten that very bordering operation. Economic disciplinarity needs to keep the other (any other that would escape being disciplined into the imagined structure of exchange) either out-side its borders or control its movements with-in them. We will see shortly how the homogeneity of the economic space works indeed to prescribe the place(ings) of the other.

The structured homogeneous space we have just described receives an economic body in the concept of the social division of labor.[2] To say that the economy is constituted as a homogeneous space means, in fact, more than to assert a uniformity of the regime of calculability which structures the multitudes of exchanges into a unity. It refers also to the structuring into a unity of the various acts of production (and eventually also of consumption), which are connected with the commodities being exchanged. It is just this structured unity of productive activities that the concept of the DOL represents. In its economic representation, moreover, the DOL refers not to just any given distribution of productive activities but to a distribution which is guided by, and reflects, the application of a form of rationality to the world of production. More than just the distribution of labor, in fact, the concept of the DOL is a referent to the *mobility* of producers across the economic space: it is this mobility that imparts to the economy itself, and not just to each act of exchange, a certain quality of calculability and makes it possible to think of the distribution (or redistribution) of particular economic agents into one structure – that makes possible, that is, their mapping onto one bordered space.

2 This 'social' division of labor (the distribution of producers across different lines of production, industries, sectors) is to be differentiated from the 'technical' division of labor (the subdivision of a task into separate parts which can then be performed separately, as in the case of the 'pin factory' immortalized by Adam Smith, or as in the more modern form of Fordism). The two forms may, but need not, correspond with each other. Marx, to my knowledge, was the first thinker to differentiate clearly between the two, which had operated conjointly in Adam Smith.

The structured unity of the economy that the DOL effects is perhaps best seen in the founding text of economics ('political economy' at the time), Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, which indeed opens with a discussion of the DOL. What marks Smith's as a founding text of economics (presenting a unified object of analysis) is the elevation of the concept of "wealth" to a level of generality which had hitherto been unknown in pre-Smithian 'oeconomic' discourse, where wealth had been hinged to particular types of resources (e.g. land, agricultural labor) or particular material forms (services, bullion). Unlike his predecessors, Smith brings the organization of the whole of society's resources under the rubric of the DOL, and the production of wealth becomes then not a matter of the prudent management (including the social arrangement) of particular activities (husbandry, or trade) but of the rational organization of the entire field of material production. The DOL, Smith's entry into *Wealth*, is thus nothing but the deployment of the idea of *a unity* (and I would like to ask the reader to keep in mind that this unity is only possible as a result of the mobility of resources and producers across various lines of production, the ability of economic agents to detach themselves from the particular material and social settings to which they are concretely wedded) over a whole field of otherwise disparate and heterogeneous material activities. Arguably, then, the DOL gives the genetic code of the economy, imparting a structural unity to the productive activities that would give a real (material) content to the generality of the concept of wealth – and, indeed, to the extent that they follow this structure, various economists go on to theorize the economy through a series of generalities (labor in general, scarcity in general, utility in general), thus reproducing the homogeneity of the space of economy over the totality of social being through a serialization of generalities.

As we will see in the second section, it is exactly around the DOL that the West's operation of alterity (posing the deficit state of the other) coalesced to form the two most disciplinary moments of economic knowledge. In the remainder of this section, I want to outline the ways in which the structured unity and homogeneity of the economic space that crystallize this economic knowledge have allowed the West to map the location and function of the other over the totality of the social space. The explanation here of how the homogeneity of the economic space does not allow for the operation of non-exchange based forms of subjectivity should all by itself go a considerable way towards making clear the logic of alterity that economics offers, namely that the other indeed does not have citizenship in the space of the West (the economy) and that it belongs to a different order, if it belongs to any order at all. An understanding of this logic of alterity by exclusion, however, will not be sufficient. As Derrida's (1976) method of deconstruction suggests, the formation of totalizing discourses is never so complete that it can banish to a state of nonbeing that which is excluded from citizenship: the *trace* of the excluded remains present, and

it is the task of deconstruction to see it. This would indeed seem to be the case with economics, where the other, its lack of citizenship notwithstanding, nonetheless remains present. Economics does not so much abolish the other (for it needs it as a reference point with which to assert its own self), as it controls its location in the social space.

Economic discourse has used two strategies to contain the other; it is not surprising that these two strategies correspond largely to the two types of economic knowledge whose formation in alterity we review in the next section. The first strategy, found in the period of classical political economy (CPE), is given by the relegation of the other to an earlier stage of historical development – and, in this case, the other is quite explicitly the non-Western other. In the historicism of CPE, as practiced for example in the work of James Mill (*A History of British India*) or in the writings of Marx (1974) on India, this other appears quite explicitly, but as a marker of a lower level of development, the structure or stages of which are given by the logic of the economy of the West. Here, the other's social construction of material production is never analyzed as having a coherence of its own and the other thus is excluded, as such, from the field of economic subjectivity.[3] The second strategy is given by the way in which economists of a more recent twentieth-century vintage, working within the scope of the late nineteenth-century cultural turn in social theory, have gone about constructing a particular form of the private–public dichotomy.[4] In this strategy, the absorption of the non-Western other is carried out under the aegis not of historicity, but of a structural differential.

The economists' construction of the private–public dichotomy works to create a space for the absorption of the other within the space of the economy while still denying its subjectivity. In modern economics, the public sphere has traditionally been fully occupied by the 'state' conceived as a *supra partes* organ whose function is merely that of filling the gaps left in the homogeneous space of private calculations by such things as externalities and public goods.[5] But, from the point of view of social theory,

3 It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that it became possible as a result of the work of Karl Polanyi (1968, chapter 5) to provide the analytical tools for conceptualizing non-Western, nonmarket economies as having a logic of their own. Polanyi's analytical framework highlights the embeddedness of productive activities in concrete social and material contexts, and rejects the universalist pretensions of the abstractions of modern, market economies.

4 Of course, the dichotomy is open to different constructions (is the space of the family, for example a private or a public space?) and hotly contested. Moreover the very dichotomy has been powerfully challenged – in for example, the work of Michel Foucault (for Foucault's own understanding of this, see Foucault (1991: 163–4). Here, I am concerned only with representing the mainstream economics construction of the dichotomy.

5 Externalities are effects (positive or negative) of exchanges which are not calculated by the parties to those exchanges. Public goods are goods whose services cannot be owned/consumed by one individual (e.g. parks).

this remedial function of the state is a residual function as well, for it can function conceptually as a general space onto which everything that does not fit the stylized 'private' form of exchange can be *displaced* and *condensed*, all *without threatening the unique definition of the social by the 'private*.' Conflating the public sphere with the state, economics can thus absorb the other into the dichotomy of public/private of liberal ideology.[6] This condensation of the public into a remainder of the private imparts a certain trend to the discourse of development, the one area where the non-Western other can still be found explicitly in economics.

A particularly telling example of the influence of the other-neutralizing private–public dichotomy of modern economics is provided by Amartya Sen's work on development. Deservedly renowned for his work to humanize economics (replacing, as a definition of economic efficiency, the maximization of utility derived from consumption with the maximization of the potential for human development), Sen does not seem to me to move out of the private/public, market/state dichotomous construction of society and economy. Sen thinks of development still as a matter of getting the proper mix of market signals (appropriately adjusted to mark human capabilities) and state policies. He does not explore what development possibilities might be found in native forms of community solidarity and/or tensions. He does not, therefore, give voice (or even the potential for voice) to nonmarket forms of sociality (see "Markets, state and social opportunities" in Sen (1999)).

Selves and others

Having looked at the ways in which the disciplinarity of economics orders the placing of the other, we turn to a discussion of the two historically specific discursive formations that we have identified as giving body to this disciplinarity. Here it will be important to discuss both the two social regimes (first property, then culture) by which the West structured the DOL into a bordered economic space and the epistemological regimes under which these social regimes could come to be known and ordered. Through

6 Something here must be said about the place of "institutions" in general in the discourse of economics. The half century span from the 1930s to the 1980s saw the growth of a school of thought in economics known as the new institutionalism (e.g. North 1981). In contradistinction to the traditional institutionalism of Veblenian accent, the new institutionalism saw institutions much as economics sees the state and set out to rescue the economy, as it were, from them. Institutions, that is, become seen as arrangements that rational economic agents accept only when the nature of the activities over which they would naturally have been predisposed to engage in exchange contracts make that engagement impossible. Institutions too, thus, became transformed into a remainder of individual self-interest – with the implication that, whenever possible, transactions should be privatized and institutions should be replaced by market processes.

operations of alterity, the West produced not only forms of economy but also, and conjointly, the regimes of knowledge that made those forms representable. It is this condensation of economic *and* epistemological alterities that gives the disciplinarity of economics.

The historicist construction of the economy and the other

As we have seen, Adam Smith's construction of the economy as a space of homogeneous relations was structured by the concept of the DOL and gave body to an abstract concept of wealth. Now, for Smith, as is well known, the manifest principle binding the various economic agents into one structured unity was the principle of interest. But before Smith, as Albert Hirschman has shown, interest had come into this binding function only by reference to the principle of property, and especially the principle of fungible property (movable wealth). Amidst the failure of the old feudal order, interest in property had at first been thought of as a harbinger of social disorder, especially in the work of the Prince. The passage from the interests as harbingers of disorders to interest as principle of social organization was, as Hirschman (1997: 74–5) explains, made possible by the increasing evolution of forms of movable wealth: not only can movable property be subtracted from tyrannical princely forays, it also promotes a certain mutuality of interests and a consequent civility among persons dealing with it (the *doux commerce* thesis). It is thus the discourse on property, and indeed its elevation to a generality through its mobility, that enables the deployment of economic agents (the DOL) over the economic space. Property is thus the principle of economics in this period. Indeed, we find the principle both codified in the texts of Adam Smith and, not surprisingly, continuing to be at work in Europe's thinking about itself and the other long after Smith. In spite of signs of an advanced commercialism in the East, both James Mill and Marx, for example, could argue that the lack of economic development in "India" was explained by the arrested development of forms of property (arrested, that is, by forms of political tyranny) and the persistence of the communal "village" as a basic unit of social organization, a situation which only British colonial rule could change.

In what follows I would like to show that the use of the principle of property in the West's determination of the deficiencies of the other was rooted in an operation of alterity whose coordinates were deeply epistemological. As Said (1979: 155) has argued, the fact that even as powerful a critic of capitalism as Marx could replicate the images of the deficient other which sustained British colonialism indicates that the othering operations at work must have been deeply embedded in the structure of knowledge production in Europe.

The narrative of European telos (what authorized Marx's 'political' lapse) is rather well known. The founding texts of political economy, such

as those of the Scottish historical school represented by Smith (1978) and Ferguson (1980), have "mankind" going through certain forms of economy (Hunting, Shepherding, Agriculture, and finally Commerce – Smith: 14), each characterized by an appropriate form of property and associated cultural forms. As Ferguson (81–2) writes: "the distinction [in economic form] must create a material difference of character.... There is the case of the savage, who is not yet acquainted with property; and that of the barbarian, to whom it is, although not ascertained by laws, a principle object of care and desire. ...It must appear very evident, that property is a matter of progress. ...The very desire of it proceeds from experience; and the industry by which it is gained or improved, requires such a habit of acting with a view to distant objects, as may overcome the present disposition either to sloth or to enjoyment. This habit is slowly acquired, and is in reality a principal distinction of nations in the advanced state of mechanical and commercial arts."

Such passages offer a clear narrative of the historically organizing function of property as a principle of social and cultural organization, and exemplify the historicist logic of alterity it sustains (the other as a bearer of modes of production that precede and fall short of the Western form of property). McGrane (1989: 93–4) explains how eighteenth-century European discourse arranged the traits and customs of non-Europeans (which European explorers and settlers had been reporting, and which Renaissance discourse had previously theorized as evidence of the natural and irreducible difference of non-Europeans from Europeans) into an ordered sequence of evolutionary transformations under the rubric of history: "*Beyond* Europe [became] henceforth *before* Europe."[7] Indeed, the historicist operation of alterity of the Western Enlightenment was this transformation of "*beyond*" into "*before*," this absorption of the other into the history of the self (West). What is important to note here is that this absorption meant that the other, whose 'strange' customs had previously been coded as evidence of its unknowability as well as its difference, now became, *and had to have become*, 'knowable': only on the grounds of such knowability could the other be placeable on the historicist-ordered sequence of modes of production, its customs and forms of sociality being explainable by reference to the developing general and universalist model of human behavior which the idea of property expressed. As Gregory (1994: 26–7) explains, in fact, the knowability of the other, the non-European, was part of what Foucault (*The Order of Things*) called the Enlightenment episteme of representation which invented "man" and

7 Indeed this absorption of difference into unity is a general condition of all operations of alterity. Callari (1996) shows that a similar reduction of difference to unity (the difference of "nature" to the unity of "wealth") was at work in the male gendering of value that the birth of economics, or CPE, effected.

set about theorizing the conditions of its being (history and society) and, self-reflexively, of its knowing (knowledge, epistemology): the texts of Smith, of Ferguson, of Mill, and of Marx, to mention only the thinkers we have integrated into this discussion, are indeed full of references to "mankind." But it is exactly this knowability that is the mark of the alterity being performed: the West came to know about and of the other only what it wanted to know, and then only in terms of its own conceptual grid, in order to fit it into the structured historicist order (the narrative of its own history) it was producing.

It seems only fitting, therefore, to conclude this discussion of the discursive conditions for the initial formation of economic disciplinarity around the concept of property by documenting, from Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, the extent to which the historicism in question was indeed presented in explicitly epistemological terms. In writing his universalist history of civil society, Ferguson neither limits himself to a discussion of the varied material and social circumstances of the other, nor to the detection of a core of human sensibilities common to "our species." He also, in a way that almost eerily anticipates Foucault's assessment of the problem of representation, reflects on the conditions for a knowledge of history. Ferguson "looks" at the other not simply because it is "there," given by the reports of European explorers, but because doing so offers him a way out of what could properly be called the problem of ideology. As Ferguson puts it:

> Our method (of history), too frequently, is to rest the whole on conjecture: to impute… and to imagine…. We are ourselves the supposed standards of politeness and civilization,…. But it is probable that here, as in many other cases, we are ill qualified…to determine what must have been the properties and operations, even of our own nature, in the absence of those circumstances in which we have seen it engaged…. If conjectures and opinions formed at a distance, have not sufficient authority in the history of mankind, the domestic antiquities of every nation must, for this very reason, be received with caution. They are, for the most part, the mere conjectures or the fictions of subsequent ages…. They are made to bear the stamp of the times through which they have passed in the form of tradition…. The information they bring, is not like the light reflected from a mirrour, which delineates the object from which it originally came, but like rays that come broken and dispersed from an opaque and unpolished surface….

He goes on to argue that we cannot simply take at face value the reports that an age gives of itself, because these reports also cannot be thought of as reflecting the objective conditions from which they came and can only be used to "ascertain what [were] the conceptions and sentiments of the

age in which they were composed" (Ferguson 1980: 76–7).[8] Given the impossibility of trusting the representation we (Europe) give of ourselves, or the representations that our ancestors (Greeks, Romans, Celts, the Germanic tribes, etc.) gave of themselves, Ferguson argues, our ability to know our origins, and to construct our history rests on our ability to look at the other as a proxy (organized by the principle of property)[9] for our history.

Ferguson's text, clearly, not only contains the logic of the historicist alterity through which Europe marked off its own space of economy, but also enunciates the epistemological conditions that guided the recognition of the other and required its placing in a historicist order. Indeed, Ferguson's text seems to be exemplary of the postcolonial thesis that Europe's representation of the other was, even before and more importantly than being functional to the representation of economy, functional to the representation of Europe as a subject of knowledge. Thus, while we could agree that economics emerged as knowledge, we must also see that knowledge itself emerged in alterity and that economic disciplinarity is thereby indelibly marked by alterity. This, I would surmise, can indeed explain why even someone like Marx, who extricated himself well from 'economics,' could not, because he could not extricate himself as well from 'knowledge,' fully extricate himself from the historicist rationalization of colonialism.

Empires, others, and culture

In the late nineteenth century, the age of Imperialism, the West's framing of the other as an object of knowledge changed. It was no longer the principle of property that organized Europe's knowledge of the other, but the idea of culture; and it was no longer the borders of economics that framed the other and made it visible, but the discourse of anthropology.[10] Economics also changed at this time, taking the turn to subjectivism (utility theory) that characterizes the reproduction of economic disciplinarity

8 Ferguson's work is the first instance I know of where the question of ideology arises in its classic form of self-interested, and therefore historically doubtful, representation.

9 It would be interesting to investigate further the extent to which the very idea of 'property' might have emerged from a prior (seventeenth century) Western naturalist coding of the other (investigating whether, e.g. the possible/likely alterity roots of the Lockean notion that property is the 'natural' expression of 'work'). For an early reflection on this, see Meek (1976).

10 Asad (1973) discusses how the administrative needs of Empire led Europeans to discover, especially in African societies, the value of cultural forces in effecting a unity of tribal societies. Said (1994) discusses the connection between the organization of European knowledge of the other through the principle of culture and the experience of imperialism in the field of literary criticism.

in the regime of cultural modernism. This change, I argue, was integral to the changed framework of alterity.

I begin with a comment on the transformation of the epistemological framing of the other that the Empire's turn to culture implied. Culture marks the other as different and keeps it separate from the venues of civilization, removed from the universalist Enlightenment horizon of 'man,' and offers it as an object of analysis on its own (as Fredrick Jameson put it, culture is always "an idea of the Other" – quoted in Eagleton 2000: 26). The bracketing of the other as this distinct object of analysis was not without its own epistemological conditions. Building on the work of Timothy Mitchell (*Colonizing Egypt*), Gregory (1994) discusses how the othering effected by the West during the late nineteenth century was in fact a well constructed epistemological operation, the effect of which was to *frame* the other as an "object of exhibition," as an object of detached gaze and, thus, reducible to an object of analysis existing separate from the observer-knower (also see Grapard, this volume).

Economic discourse and knowledge also change at the end of the nineteenth century, and these changes are intimately connected (as conditions and effects) to the transformation in the West's representation of the other. In the first place, since the West's knowledge of itself had been constituted in relation to the other, the bracketing of the other as a separate object of analysis could only proceed on the basis of the West's separation of its own self as a distinct object of analysis: the other could be framed separately only if the West was similarly separately framed.[11] As we have seen, economics had indeed provided the West with a bordering which had kept the other, even if visible within a shared frame of history, separate. Now, at the turn of the twentieth century, economic discourse becomes directly implicated in the imperialist turn to culture by developing a new bordering of separateness-without-visibility, but the disciplinarity of economics continues across this change in the coordinates of alterity. The continuity in the disciplinarity of economics is given through the concept of the DOL which continues to function as a foundation of commercial society in the European thought of both times, but with the difference that, whereas it had been seen as emerging out of the natural evolution of forms of property that had been imagined by the historicist philosophers, it is now represented as emerging out of the cultural capacity of 'Western man' for abstract thought.[12]

11 It is, of course, this separation of spaces that then calls forth the work of someone like Homi Bhabha, who offers resistance to the separation through such devices as hybridity. See, for example, Bhabha (1994).

12 This transformation, by the way, involves a reversal of the relationship between economy and culture. In the alterity strategy of historicism, cultures emerge out of, and reflect, the organization of the economy. In the new strategy, it is economy that emerges out of culture.

The text of the West's reflection, during this period, on the division of labor and on its role in society is, of course, Emile Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* (1933). For Durkheim, the division of labor presupposes a certain form of sociality, which he calls "organic solidarity." In contrast to the naturalist historicism of Ferguson and Smith, Durkheim argues that neither material circumstances nor any natural evolution of forms of property can explain the progress of the division of labor (see, e.g. p. 277). He sets about to find the principle that would explain the organic solidarity that undergirds the division of labor[13] and identifies this principle with the capacity for abstraction and generalization that leads those peoples who are endowed with it to respond to material pressures with mobility over the economic space, without the attachment to the particularity of place and interest that is characteristic of less philosophically capable peoples:

> In a small society, since everybody is clearly placed in the same condition of existence, the collective environment is essentially concrete.... But (the common conscience) changes its nature as societies become more voluminous. Because these societies are spread over a vaster surface, the common conscience is itself obliged to rise above all local diversities, to dominate more space, and consequently to become more abstract.... It is no longer such an animal, but such a species, not this source, but such sources, not this forest, but forest *in abstracto*.... The idea of man, for example, replaces in law, in morality, in religion, that of the Roman, which, being more concrete, is more refractory to science.... But the more general the common conscience becomes, the greater the place it leaves to individual variations.
>
> (Durkheim 1933: 287–90)

Far from being unique, Durkheim's turn to culture was characteristic of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century European social thought. Another important, and in some ways crucial, text of this turn is Weber's (1958) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which, written in 1904–05, replaced the historicist tracing of the evolution of forms of property with a search for the cultural origins of the capitalist economy. And it is not surprising that we should also find a cultural inflection in references to the other in one of the key texts of economic knowledge of the times (Marshall 1920). "In India, and to a less extent in Ireland," writes Marshall, "we find people who do indeed abstain from immediate

13 By division of labor, Durkheim means the market form of the division of labor, characterized by the type of labor mobility that is the material form of the homogeneity of the economic space. For him, a division of labor politically administered or bound by traditional (class and nonclass) functions would be supported by the "mechanical" form of solidarity.

enjoyment and save up considerable sums with great self-sacrifice, but spend all their savings in lavish festivities at funerals and marriages. … [T]he great engineering works by which their productive resources have been so much increased, have been made chiefly with the capital of the much less self-denying race of Englishmen." "Thus," he continues, "the causes which control the accumulation of wealth differ widely in different countries and different ages…. They depend much on social and religious sanctions" (ibid.: 187). Marshall's cultural (racialized) references have, of course, more than anecdotal value. They are inscribed in a drastic change that was occurring in the regime of economic knowledge at the time, as the discipline was undergoing a paradigmatic shift and the objectivist framework of classical economics, which had foregrounded labor and production, was being replaced by the subjectivist framework of neoclassicism, foregrounding utility and consumption.

The key question for us, of course, is the relationship of this shift in the regime of economic knowledge to the operations of alterity that the West was performing in the age of imperialism. In traditional histories of economics, the turn to subjectivism has been explained as a result of forces internal to the West. Thus, in so-called Whig constructions of intellectual history, it is the perfection of certain analytical techniques that explains the turn to subjectivism. In relativist constructions, on the other hand, the explanation takes a sociological bent, and it is the growth of a leisure class that explains the turn to consumption, or it is the need to counter the 'danger of socialism' that explains the turn to individualism. In contradistinction, or at least in addition, to these traditional histories of economics, however, I would like to suggest that the disciplinary turn to subjectivism at the turn of the twentieth century was also effected by the discovery of culture as a way of framing the (now separate) spaces of the West and of the other.

The turn to subjectivism in economics was, part of an intellectual pattern to reconceptualize the foundations of the social order. Gregory (1994: 45–51) places the work of Durkheim in the context of a crisis of the European social order at the time, a crisis felt as a "need" to find roots for the social order that went beyond the naked play of economic interests that English classical liberalism had proposed as the foundations of society. The reconceptualization of the DOL that Durkheim produced certainly worked as a response to this crisis of European thought. However, the presence of the other was also clearly felt in the shaping of the intellectual horizons of the turn to culturalism that provided the framework for the reconstruction of the DOL and of economics. I have already mentioned the work of Talal Asad, linking the anthropological focus on culture to the administrative needs of Empire. To further support the thesis, I can now add Mirowski (1994) who also links the anthropological turn to culture to the dynamics of the age of imperialism (though Mirowski's focus is on the imperialist rivalry between Germany and the UK).

The reconstruction of economics at the turn of the twentieth century was thus as much an operation in alterity as the eighteenth-century construction of the economy had been. The reconstruction, of course, proceeded on the basis of a different set of intellectual and epistemological criteria. The new economics came to order the place of the other on the plane of social being in a very different way. Whereas in the case of property historicism, the other had been placed outside the homogeneous space of the modern economy, it had nonetheless remained as a visible element in the narrative of history as an evolution of economic systems. For the new economics, however, the turn to the cultural framing of the other places it entirely on the outside of the borders of the economic space. References to the other, in so far as they enter the discourse, as they do for example in the case of Amartya Sen's deep and humane concern with 'development,' must, in this case, be filtered through the prism of the stylized (private/public) relationship between the economic and the noneconomic which, as I argued, works to absorb the other and deny to it any possibility of subjectivity as other. This, I would conclude, echoing my conclusion about Marx, can explain why even someone like Sen, whose 'love' of the other is in many ways unquestionable, cannot, as long as he is working with the tools of traditional economic theory, fully extricate himself from the negation of subjectivity the West has imposed on the other.

Concluding remarks

For obvious conjunctural reasons, economics took up the work of the other more formally under the mantle of 'development economics' after the end of Second World War. It certainly cannot be said, however, that the work of development has been done: White Burden and Third World Debt frame the relationship of the West to the other today as much as they ever did, and the West continues to shape the economic life of the other – through, for example, what Spivak has called the credit trap.[14] Mainstream development economics itself is today on the verge of extinction as a separate and specialized branch of knowledge, becoming more and more a field of applied micro and macroeconomics. In its better days, it had lived as a field with a split personality: on the one hand there were structuralist and universalist approaches to economic development, and on the other hand there were culturalist approaches to it.[15] What I have

14 Karim (2001) contains a critical analysis of the ways in which, for example, the Grameen model of development has worked to incorporate (subject) the development of local Bangladeshi communities into market patterns and, thus, into (to) the logic of multinational capital.

15 I owe this point to Eiman Zein-Elabdin (private conversation).

been suggesting in this chapter is that this sorry state of affairs has a lot to do with the mental structures of alterity that historically guides economics. What I have also been suggesting, implicitly, is that economists are not likely to find the way out of the mess as long as they insist on working through disciplinary constraints. The way ahead, I believe, really does lie with those heterodox approaches which dissemble the disciplinary borders of economics, reject the idea of the economy as a field of homogeneous (and thus given to operations of alterity) relations, and attempt to reconstruct according to the protocols of a heterogeneity of forms of social being and of economic processes.[16]

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16 One of the best examples of this reconstruction of the social space, even if it is not given to the question of development, is Gibson-Graham (1996). See also the section on "a non-modernist analysis" in this volume.

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