

Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

Kevin T. Leicht
J. Craig Jenkins
Editors

Handbook of Politics

State and Society in
Global Perspective

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Handbook of **Politics**

State and Society in Global Perspective

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 **Springer**

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Study of Politics Enters the Twenty-First Century

KEVIN T. LEICHT AND J. CRAIG JENKINS

The study of politics and political phenomena is important for understanding a variety of questions that are at the core of social science research, theorizing, and policy analysis. This collection by top scholars of politics is designed to provide a broad overview of the substantive, theoretical and methodological state of political research while focusing on key areas that deserve fresh research and study by new generations of sociologists and political scientists.

Each of our authors was given a specific charge – to thoroughly interrogate a literature in the study of politics, pointing to the strengths and deficiencies of current work, and to lay out an agenda for future research that reflected not only what they were doing but also the themes that others could pick up on as well. Our collective results read more like contributions to an *Annual Review* volume than a standard Handbook or Encyclopedia, but that is largely by design. We wanted to give our authors a chance to delineate a specific subfield and define the types of research and theorizing they would like to see develop as a result of their exhaustive reviews. The end result is a volume that we hope will orient research on politics for several years to come.

Our handbook is organized into three sections. Part 1 deals with *Theory in the Study of Politics*, which privileges the discussion of theory and theoretical developments for understanding twenty-first century political activity. These contributions summarize the state of development of most of the theories that have been used to explain political activity over the past 30–40 years, from institutional theory to theories of class. Part 2 deals with *Political Change and Transformation*, which focuses on specific institutional arrangements and political strategies for influencing political decision-making around the world. These contributions cover the gambit of political arenas from terrorism, elections, and authoritarian regimes to economic inequality, development, criminal justice, and globalization. Part 3 deals with the *state of methodology* in the study of politics. This is one of the unique features of our collection that is underemphasized elsewhere. Here our authors survey the state of knowledge regarding different ways of studying politics from comparative-historical methodology and social networks to hierarchical models and time-series analysis.

The study of politics and political phenomena has expanded widely over the past 20–25 years, almost to the point where every significant social science research issue can be defined as a variation on the study of politics. If politics is defined as why, when and how people get

what they want, then the study of politics is synonymous with the study of social life. But to say that is to deprive the field of its vitality and to deprive politics of its meaning. It is also to trivialize politics as a distinctive social and cultural phenomenon worthy of study in its own right. Our contributors make the comprehensive case that the study of politics is as vital as ever and that political science, political sociology and policy analysis are not going to be subsumed under another title any time soon. Our authors work with the assumption that politics centers on contests for control over the state. Disclaimers to the contrary, the end of the state is not near and, in fact, its importance and powers appear to be growing as the forces of globalization, autonomous culture and individuals continue to grow.

PART 1: THEORY IN THE STUDY OF POLITICS

The development of theory is at the core of the study of politics from its beginnings in political philosophy in ancient times. Our authors in this section of the Handbook examine the current state of theorizing in political analysis. The result is an integrated understanding of the state of theorizing in the study of politics, with a major focus on the workings of different political institutions. Most (but not all) of these institutions reside in conventional nation-states, and one is struck by the continued vitality of that very territorially based idea for the workings of an increasingly interconnected world that is (allegedly) globalized and interconnected and where individuals are increasingly freed from social constraints to choose their fate.

Amenta and Ramsey begin our discussion of political theory by reviewing the current state of political institutional theory. While it is true that most political sociologists and political scientists consider themselves as “institutionalists,” there are a wide variety of meanings for this term and ways of understanding the use of institutions in political theorizing. Amenta and Ramsey review and interrogate sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism and political institutionalism as distinct variants of institutional theory with distinctive sets of strengths and weaknesses. Sociological institutionalism draws most heavily on institutionalism in the study of organizations with its focus on culture and ideational causes of political arrangements. Historical institutionalists focus on big questions and use conjunctural and path dependence explanations for distinctively macro-level outcomes. Political institutionalists focus on the process of state and polity formation as critical in determining the functioning of contemporary political institutions. All focus on higher-level, macro determinants of political actions and activities that occur at lower levels of analysis. The distinctive methodological traditions of each form of institutionalism have prevented the type of cross-fertilization that would advance institutional explanations of politics by combining cultural and macrostructural explanations of institutional development and change in the same package.

Jessop (in “Redesigning the State, Reorienting State Power, and Rethinking State Theory”) picks up on this theme of cross-fertilization in his interrogation of state theory and recent advancements that have looked beyond traditional state-centered explanations of political activity. Jessop suggests that studies of state activity and state institutional arrangements seemed to take a back seat to other salient issues following the end of the Cold War, the rise and recognition of globalization processes, and the rise of new social movements. New challenges to the primacy of the state and the taken-for-granted features of nation-states in particular call for a broadening of the understanding of state forms (away from the Westphalian and modern Weberian state), state types (not all states are capitalist states just because they interact with global capitalist markets and state socialism is dead), and the interface of global

organizations, social movements and other social forms with state apparatus whose reason for existing can no longer be taken for granted.

Burstein's contribution narrows the reader's focus to the responsiveness of states to public opinion under democratic institutional arrangements. He focuses on the seemingly intractable problem of capturing the true effects of public opinion on public policy, and rightly suggests that the issue is fraught with bad measurement, selection biases, and the conflation of "should" and "is." He points to a new research agenda that studies a broader range of political issues and the characteristics of policies and polities that allow salient public opinion to exist in the first place. For public opinion to have an effect on policy, public opinion must first exist, and this variable would help researchers avoid the trap of studying only policy domains where public opinion is already formed or areas that are "hot button" issues at the expense of a universe of less publicized, but no less important policy domains. He proposes that we develop coherent measures of public opinion appropriately specified so that its effects on public policy in specific policy domains might be assessed. The objective, of course, is to address the longstanding pluralist vs. elite theory debate.

Sciulli (in "Democracy and Societal Constitutionalism") picks up on a point that Burstein concludes with by examining the link between democracy, constitutionalism and civil society institutions and (especially) organized professional groups. A focus on the actions and efficacy of professional groups in state activity shifts the locus of study toward procedures and proceduralism as a way of classifying what states do. He argues that comparative politics, in particular, needs to incorporate conceptions of professional groups and professionalism as critical components in explaining various institutional designs. These institutional designs are based on different conceptions of state/civil society relationships as these are mediated by professional groups and professional organizations. Professional groups such as lawyers act as critical mediators who see the state as a set of institutionalized procedures that legitimate democratic state activities.

Jeffrey Alexander (in "Power, Politics and the Civil Sphere") examines systematically the role of the public sphere in the continued analysis and vitality of politics. The public sphere has been assaulted by the growing power of the state as an organization on one hand, the aggregation of interests it produces, and the growing economic power of multinational corporations and other global economic actors. Is it possible for the public sphere to survive these onslaughts and others? Reviewing elites' responses to public outrage over scandals and misbehaviors leads Alexander to a resounding "yes." He presents a series of reasons why the public sphere has changed (not toward an undifferentiated and passive mass, but in the means of communication and the renewed importance of image, charisma, and performance) while still remaining an important focal point for understanding contemporary politics.

Chorev examines (in "The Origins of Neo-Liberalism") the spread of a specific institutional political form, the minimalist state with unregulated markets and extensive deregulation, otherwise known as "neoliberalism." Far from arguing that neoliberalism is all of a piece, Chorev argues that there are different political mechanisms for understanding neoliberalism (national vs. global and political actions vs. political institutions) that need to be integrated to develop a fuller understanding of the compelling embrace of neoliberalism as it has affected political organizations around the world. On a global scale, neo-liberalism stands for far more than simply standing back and allowing markets to run rampant.

Jason Beckfield (in "Transboundary Politics") develops the comparative theme still further by looking at all forms of international or transboundary politics. Beckfield argues that network theory and analysis provides a useful way for studying globalized politics because it focuses on the actual connections between actors and the strategic nodes actors inhabit in

networks of concrete social interaction. The concluding questions in Beckfield's contribution revolve around the ability of transnational network analysis and theorizing to contribute to studies of new forms of inequality and political conflict.

John Higley turns our attention to a long-standing traditional type of political analysis, the study of elites and elitism. In addition to reasserting the claim that elites and their creation appear to be inevitable and even desirable consequences of all political systems, Higley suggests that the recognition of elites, the effects of the masses on elites, and the dynamics of conflicts between elites and nonelite groups constitute the central dynamic for understanding complex political phenomena. This reassertion of the central and autonomous role of elites in political decision making attempts to reinvigorate the study of elites in different types of political configurations and circumstances, while casting a sometimes skeptical eye on utopian ideologies that claim elites are superfluous parasites on contemporary political and social life. Higley puts forward the distinctive argument that rule by the few may not only be inevitable but also socially beneficial.

Obershall seeks to explain the development and seeming inevitability of conflict in the political sphere by reexamining some of the central claims of broadly construed conflict theory. The competition of individuals, institutions, and organizations for scarce resources produces different configurations of violent and nonviolent conflict in an attempt to secure wants and goods from the larger world. Conflict theory explains why coercion and violence are selected as choices to secure these goods. The study of conflict gets to the root of our conceptions of human nature, the sources of ethnic cleansing, civil wars, and genocide, and the role of violence as a strategy in political mobilization. Obershall ends his contribution by calling for more research on conflict dynamics (rather than conflict origins) as a way of limiting the spread and duration of political violence in the world.

The final contribution to the section on theory in the study of politics interrogates the role that class membership and conceptions of class have on political attitudes and behaviors. Slomczynski and Dubrow suggest that the overall utility of political class analysis comes in a variety of forms and that class definitions that focus on universal characteristics of all complex polities and specific definitions of class salient in specific situations both yield considerable fruit in explaining changes in political attitudes and behaviors cross-nationally. Key to the renewed vitality of class analysis in politics is a recognition that class alignments with specific interest groups in the polity change, and that a renewed focus on the micro-macro linkages that take into account individual attitudes and behaviors toward collective action is a central task that class analyses of politics must confront. They show how this type of work can be rejuvenated, building on the theoretical foundations developed much earlier by figures such as Marx and Weber.

PART 2: POLITICAL CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION

The contributions in part 2 of our volume focus on the arenas where political change takes place. Each of our authors examines a specific arena of political activity and makes suggestions for new directions for the substantive study of politics. These chapters focus on specific arenas of conflict over political change, the role of strategically located actors in political change dynamics, and the sometimes radical actions that are taken in the name of promoting political change and evolution.

Key to any study of political change and transformation is the study of social movements. Our contribution by Meyer and Reyes ("Social Movements and Contentious Politics") addresses

many of the perennial concerns of social movement scholars, in particular the assessment of efficacy and the effects of social movements on people's life, work, and public policy. Social movements are, by definition, slippery phenomenon producing a wide variety of costs and benefits, only some of which are connected with whether movements produce concrete and identifiable policy outcomes. The further study of social movements lies in its linkage to the study of other forms of contentious politics.

Closely tied to the study of social movements is the study of political violence. There is enough overlap between social movement activity, terrorism, and guerilla war that researchers are having difficulty in distinguishing between when and how violence is used and for what purpose. Crenshaw and Robison point to the intended targets of political violence as a key differentiation in a taxonomy that leads to different theoretical explanations for guerrilla warfare, terrorist activity, and social movement activity. This emphasis keeps the focus on violence as a strategy rather than focusing on the seemingly irrational aspects of political violence. They show that mass media is central to providing a stage for terrorism while having little effect on guerrilla violence.

Burris ("Corporations, Capitalists, and Campaign Finance"), Lange ("The State and Economic Development"), and Moghadam ("Gender, Politics and Women's Empowerment") all examine the roles that different organized groups have on political change and development. Burris suggests that the ability to study corporate PAC contributions in detail has opened up new and as-yet unexplored avenues for the study of elites and politics. Researchers have to expand their critical lens to elections outside of the traditional 1970 – early 1990s window, place more emphasis on soft money contributions and expand the analysis of corporate monetary influence to state and local elections.

Lange suggests that international development, and the study of the relationships between the state and development has been distorted by neo-classical scholars' views regarding the overall ineffectiveness of state activity. The developmental literature is moving beyond this toward a more complex understanding of the factors that promote economic development, effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Interrogating this real world characterization is a more fruitful avenue for research than the comparison of real states and abstract markets.

Moghadam focuses on the growing representation of women as representatives in formal electoral and government systems. Women's political participation matters for reasons of equity and impact (representation, redistribution, and recognition). These changes have occurred not only because of women's increased participation in formal politics, but also because of their roles in civil society and increasing presence in web-based political activism. She also shows that this is a global process that is furthered by transnational networks, international communication and the growing "smallness" of the world.

Almeida ("Globalization and Collective Action"), Johnston ("Culture and Political Protest"), Piper and Young ("Religion and Post-Secular Politics") and Hooks and Lobao ("Space and Politics") each focus on collective action in different spaces and locales. Almeida examines the history and contemporary context surrounding resistance to globalization and calls for more emphasis on local conditions outside of the global north that lead to mobilizations of large numbers of otherwise disenfranchised people. This mobilization by people in rapidly developing and less developed countries is widespread and is partially a response to political openings and democratization. More comparative research across countries and world regions would also enhance our shared understanding of the composition of the organizational infrastructure in civil society (including transnational civil society) that organizes against economic liberalization reforms and policies.

Johnston argues that resource mobilization and political opportunity structure analyses have not drowned out the study of culture and cultural influences on global political activities.

In addition to the development of frame analysis in social movements research, cultural analysis allows us to focus on texts and performances as important components of political action, activities that affect some political outcomes. He shows how a distinctively cultural analysis of protest looks like and charts some ideas for developing a cultural understanding of politics.

Piper and Young engage prior work by Habermas and Wuthnow to attempt to understand the continuing significance of religion and politics in the contemporary world. Far from the claims of rationalization and ideal speech situations, the active intertwining of religion and politics seems as strong as ever, and the prospect of a thoroughly secular public sphere seems remote and may not even be desirable. Religion not only provides a critical cultural framework for framing political action, but also provides actors with critical organizational resources in its pursuit. There seems to be little reason to believe that this influence will disappear anytime soon. They acknowledge that secularization has progressed but show how religion not only persists but remains a potent political force.

Hooks and Lobao discuss the importance of space and place in politics. Far from becoming a despatialized “flat world” (as some commentators have predicted), the geographic aspects of political life have become more important and salient as a vehicle for understanding power, the state and political action. Hooks/Lobao argue that understanding space is important for contextualizing political theories, public policy debates, and state–society relationships in an era that promotes neoliberal governance. The contribution of Hooks and Lobao suggest that a continued and renewed emphasis on the local, the regional, and the spatial is an expected outcome of the growing focus on despatialized globalization.

Brulle (“Politics and the Environment”), Greenfield and Malezewski (“Culture, Politics and Nationalism”), Clark (“Local and Regional Politics”), and Sorensen (“Democracy and Democratization”) and Zhao (“Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Regimes”) all examine different political arenas where change is often defined in very abstract terms, there are established countermovements that focus on equivalent cultural themes, and positive outcomes are often elusive and contentious. Brulle’s focus on environmental politics gives us a unique look at an arena with several competing discursive frames (everything from the Sierra Club to Earth First!), different explanations for environmental degradation and a wide diversity of strategies, countermovements, and foundations each with a definition of what the ideal natural environment is. Brulle calls for an end to the marginalization of environmental sociology and environmental politics through the integration of more established methods and theories of politics into the growing arena of environmental politics.

Greenfield and Malezewski focus on the autonomous role that culture has played in creating the focus on nationalism as a key component of political modernity. Far from an inevitable outcome of political development, nationalism has become a prevailing cultural construct for organizing the aspirations of the world’s peoples. Just as culture is an active construction of human activity, so nationalism is as well. We are capable of acting outside of cultural understandings of nationalism, but the growth of non-nationalistic political groups and actions is being done in reaction to a prevailing cultural belief that nations should be tied to states.

Clark and Harvey focus on the changing arena of cities as windows for understanding the political change. In place of the traditional analysis of urban growth machines and political regimes, or the focus on race, class and clientele as the loci for understanding the political change, Clark and Harvey examine the relationship between globalization, cities and the New Political Culture of urban professionals. These urban based professionals and skilled workers focus on a politics that transcends traditional left/right political ideologies to create a distinctively local politics that focuses on innovation, inclusion, quality of life, and political change. These changes have brought a renaissance in urban

politics as cities become arenas for a wide variety of political experiments that other political entities lack the flexibility to try.

From this relative optimism about global cities, Sorensen adds a note of caution regarding the global spread of democracy to former authoritarian regimes. He claims that, far from the inevitable transition of authoritarian rule to democracy that we once expected with the decline of one-party state socialism and military regimes, we are seeing more of what looks like a standstill. In most cases the major culprits are the lack of institutionalized political parties and the inability to develop a strong, autonomous civil society. Taking the evidence as a whole, Sorensen claims that our belief that we were witnessing a transition toward democracy in many parts of the world was illusory, and that actually consolidating democratic gains and institutions is much more difficult than even the most hardened political analysts believed it to be.

Dingzin Zhou examines contentious politics in the most restrictive of situations – authoritarian regimes. Most of the literature focuses on longstanding democracies where political opportunities are significant if not widespread, and Zhou shows that authoritarian regimes have weaker legitimacy, state capacity and societal penetration, and, therefore, depend on moral performance, economic performance, and national defense. When these breakdown, the regime has few defenses, which tends to produce a revolutionary challenge. To capture these processes, he outlines a “macrostructural informed mechanism-process” framework to guide further research on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes.

The health of modern democracy depends on an educated and active citizenry that is able to hold elected officials accountable. Dumitrescu and Mughan (“Mass Media and Democratic Politics”) address the effects of mass media on public opinion and voting while Redding, Barwis and Summers (“Elections and Voting”) look at voter turnout and choice. Tracing the development of mass media in Britain and the U.S., Dumitrescu and Mughan show how the growth of cable television and the concentration of media control has “Americanized” British and other national media originally predicated on a “public service” model. Showing how media “primes” attention to issues and thereby sets the political agenda but often fails to significantly alter the content of most public opinion, they argue for a “subtle and indirect effects” model of media influence. Although the internet raises the possibility for a democratization of political communications, it largely reinforces politics as usual since it is controlled by political candidates, parties and governments who use it for one-way communications.

How does political communication affect voter turnout and choice? Redding, Barwis and Summers trace the multiple sociodemographic and social psychological factors that influence voting and electoral choice. Concluding that the “death of class” thesis is overwrit, they trace how class persistence has combined with the rise of new factors – gender, race, religion and values conflict – that shape voting. Instead of an either/or solution, they argue for new research on the interaction of class and culture/ideology and ways in which political communications interact with and reinforce underlying sociodemographic factors shaping whether citizens vote and who they vote for when they do turn out.

We close this section by examining the effects of politics on two areas often conceptualized as apolitical: income inequality and criminal justice. In “The Politics of Economic Inequality,” David Brady and Benjamin Sosnaud show that politics is indeed central to income and wealth inequality. Traditional definitions have assumed a “natural” distribution stemming from the marketplace with the state artificially redistributing income and wealth. Beginning with the premise that markets are indeed a creation of the state, they show how political actors (e.g., unions, business think tanks and associations, rightist parties) shape income inequality and interact with economic institutions (e.g., neocorporatist bargaining) to shape economic

outcomes. Calling for more research on these state/market interactions and less developed countries, they bring politics to the center stage in inequality research.

In his essay on “The Political Sociology of Criminal Justice,” David Jacobs likewise traces how politics matters for criminal justice. Minority threat and the strength of conservative “law and order” parties produce greater spending on police units, greater police use of force and resulting killings, higher imprisonment rates and, for the supreme punishment – the death penalty – greater likelihood of execution. During the same time that the crime rate flattened in the U.S., the rate of imprisonment and executions rose steeply, pointing to the increased relevance of politics.

PART 3: METHODS IN THE STUDY OF POLITICS

The third part of our volume focuses on problems of methodology. Developing strong and sustainable results in the study of politics has long been a problem. Compared to other fields, such as social psychology, economics and demography, students of politics have invested less effort in generating strong metrics and methods for capturing political phenomena. This has contributed to the perception that the field is less scientific and more driven by the personal biases of the observer. Valid or not, scholars in the field have recently become more interested in methodological questions, asking about the validity of various metrics, ways of conceptualizing data, selecting cases for comparison, and resolving inconsistencies among different studies.

Several of our earlier essays address central questions of methodology. Slomczynski and Dubrow, for example, argue that class analysis has been hindered by debates about how to conceptualize and measure class effects. Burstein shows how limitations of measuring and sampling public opinion have prevented drawing strong conclusions about whether public opinion affects public policy. Crenshaw and Robison make a strong case that past research on terrorist violence has been misspecified, treating all non-state political violence as “terrorist” instead of distinguishing between attacks on “innocent” civilians and those on the state. Val Burris shows how little evidence exists about important aspects of campaign finance that operate outside the field of legally regulated campaign funding. Hooks and Lobao make a strong case for the centrality of space, arguing that conceptualizing political phenomena in spatial terms requires new data, metrics and methods of analysis. Brady and Sosnaud show how metrics for capturing the effects of the welfare state are affected by underlying conceptions of states and markets. Jacobs points to a number of empirical gaps in the study of criminal justice, pointing out that much of what is and what is not known about political effects is a result of unstudied aspects and often poor modeling.

In our final section, we move directly to the examination of general methodological issues. These earlier discussions center on problems that emerge in the study of specific problems. But, there are general methodological problems confronted by students of politics that deserve attention. We focus on problems of comparative methodology (Kiser and Pfaff), the use of multileveled models (Fullerton, Wallace and Stern), event history techniques (Box-Steffensmeir and Sokhey), social network methods (Peoples), and time-series analysis (Weakleim). While this may not address all the major methodologies used by students of politics, it captures the most important problems that have bedeviled the study of politics.

In their essay on “Comparative-Historical Methodology in Political Sociology,” Edgar Kiser and Steven Pfaff review a wide range of techniques for addressing problems in historical-comparative sociology. Arguing that there is one general logic of inference, they assess the utility of various techniques for engaging in large N, mid-sized N (5–30 cases) and small N

(one or two case) analysis. Addressing such questions as how to control for the bias inevitable in historical archives, the use of computer simulations to capture historical counterfactuals, ecological regression techniques, case-control methods to save on sampling and strengthen inference, Qualitative Categorical Analysis (or QCA) to capture complex causality, and various narrative methods for selecting cases to insure control over temporal processes (optimal match, event structure analysis), they show how historical-comparative methods have been adapted to address the major methodological problems confronting the field.

Andrew Fullerton, Michael Wallace and Michael J. Stern outline the use of “Multilevel Models” to make valid inferences in situations wherein there are both individual and ecological units. Multilevel models specifically address the problem of cross-level correlated errors. Newer techniques allow for the use of continuous as well as binary outcomes, three or more levels of analysis, non-nested or cross-classified models where ecological units are not nested in one another, and corrections for sample selection. Political analysts have long ignored the problem of across-level correlated errors and potentially have drawn invalid inferences.

Addressing the question as to “when” not “why,” Janet Box-Steffensmeir and Anand E. Sokhey review a range of “Event-History Methods” for capturing the timing of events. Addressing such classic questions as when cabinets dissolve in parliamentary systems, when states go to war, and when citizens decide which candidate to support, they demonstrate a range of techniques for capturing temporal processes of political events. The first lesson is that conventional ordinary least squares (or OLS) regression is inappropriate for addressing such problems. Not only are such qualitative abrupt changes non-normal in their distribution, but OLS also does not have ways to correct for censoring (i.e., partial histories on either the “start” or “end” of a temporal series) and for time-varying covariates. Reviewing a range of event history methods, they provide a detailed illustration of Cox (or proportional hazards) regression applied to explain when voters make up their minds about which candidate to support in a recent U.S. Presidential election. They also show how event history techniques can be adjusted for multiple types of transitions, repeated events, and multileveled analyses.

Taking a page from classic network images of social relations, Clayton Peoples provides an overview of “Social Networks and Political Analysis.” Noting that most network analyses focus on the structure of social networks when some of the most interesting questions center on the effects of network structure on behavior, he shows how networks among legislators in the U.S. Congress formed by the PACS which donate money to them influence their roll call votes. Drawing on a technique called Quadratic Assignment Procedure regression (QAP), he shows that having shared business PAC donors has a strong significant effect on roll call votes while sharing labor PACs does not. This supports business elite models of power structure and militates against state-centered and pluralist models. Overall, the main message is that network analyses need to move beyond simply mapping network structures to assessing how network structures influence political actions.

Our final chapter addresses problems of “Time Series Analysis.” In his essay, David Weakliem outlines some of the methods for dealing with common problems in time-series analysis. The first is autocorrelation, which creates underestimated standard errors and inflated T-statistics. Put simply, uncorrected autocorrelation leads us to accept as valid too many results. The second is nonstationarity, i.e., nonconstant effects across time. Not only are there problems of qualitative sudden breaks but there are also stochastic trends in which two or more variables are highly correlated, but the relationship is not causal. Various techniques, such as “time dummy” variable interactions and the Quandt procedure are useful in detecting “breaks.” First differencing also is the most common procedure for dealing with nonstationarity. Finally, there are special problems associated with pooled cross-sectional time-series

(i.e., pooled sets of single time-series). In addition to overtime autocorrelation, there is also the possibility of cross-sectional autocorrelation. Weakleim reviews the use of fixed and random effects solutions for addressing these problems.

WHERE FROM HERE?

This volume charts multiple ways for moving the study of politics forward. In this conclusion, we address three specific directions in which the field should move. First, we recommend moving beyond the standard “3 paradigms” theoretical model to incorporate other dimensions of politics, such as culture, agency, transboundary processes and the study of political space and time. Second, we suggest that strong models of politics can be built by moving beyond the standard micro–macro models to including multiple levels of analysis and recognizing the dynamic and interconnected nature of political processes. In part, this dovetails with the first point about the need to study space and time. Third, we recommend the use of a more flexible and diverse set of methods that allow for multiple types of data and make it possible for practitioners of qualitative analysis to talk to those who use quantitative methods of various sorts. While not all analysis needs to be multi-method, being cognizant of the strengths and limitations of any particular method is central to moving forward. We detail each of these points.

Why use multiple theories? And which theories should we use? Over the last three or four decades, the study of politics has been preoccupied with what we call the “3 paradigm” debate. Proponents of pluralist, statist and class theory have in various forums railed at one another for missing the most fundamental features of political reality. Without drawing a final judgement on this debate (which is by no means over), it is now clear that this debate is a truncated clash that ill serves the field. Yes, there are three paradigms that continue to inform how we think about politics, including the “is” and the “ought.” But, there are far more than these three paradigms and ultimately, however useful the debate about power, this paradigm debate has become stale and a barrier to progress. In addition to using models that combine features of multiple approaches, it is clear that other factors left unaddressed by this standard way of analyzing politics need to be included. Understanding politics means that we also understand the importance of culture, agency, global and transboundary processes, and assess the importance of spatial organization and temporal dynamics for how politics happens.

Several of our chapters chart these new directions. Johnston, for example, outlines a distinctive cultural way of thinking about protest and, by implication, studying politics. Applied to a very different subject matter – nationalism – Greenfeld and Malczewski show how a very different conception of culture matters. In the same vein, Pieper and Young show how religion continues to inform and shape politics despite an overall secular trend. Likewise, Alexander shows how performance is critical to political action. Instead of simply talking about values and symbolic forms, these essays show how culture functions as political action.

A second focus is the increased importance of transnational processes and structures. Moving beyond the simple point that economic globalization has transformed national politics, Almeida charts how the accompanying economic, political and cultural changes have created and channeled a new wave of protest. Likewise, Beckfield traces the development of transboundary processes as global interdependence becomes increasingly central to the operation of contemporary societies. In a similar breath, Chorev traces the spread of neo-liberal ideology and practices and Moghadam the way in which transnational networks have helped to mobilize women’s political pressure. No longer can the state/society formation be treated as the isolated closed system that characterized the field in the past.

Third, the world is not “flat.” While globalization has radically lowered the communication and transportation costs associated with space, it has also made spatial organization all the more important. Hooks and Lobao tell us to think more critically about the way in which political action and institutions are organized in space and chart some ways in which we might do this. Political protests not only have different origins in capital cities as opposed to rural areas, but they also have a different significance and potential impact. In the past, the study of politics has been able to act as if space didn’t matter but this is no longer tenable. Space does matter and needs to be taken into account. A critical way in which this can be done is by engaging in multileveled analysis that recognizes the multilayered and contextualized nature of political action and institutions. Another way is to realize that temporal processes matter. Political process takes time to occur and many political analyses require that we focus explicitly on this temporal order. Event history methods are a key tool for doing this. Or understanding political processes requires that we look at dynamic processes. Time-series analysis is a central tool for doing this.

One implication is that the longrunning “best single method” debate has come to an end. Where many insisted in the past that there is one best method for studying politics, most have come to realize that there are multiple methods that have various strengths and limitations. Methods are tools that are useful for addressing particular problems. Depending on the problem, there are typically two or three good reliable ways to capture political reality. The best way is to triangulate methods, using multiple measures and techniques and evaluating their relative effectiveness. While this might be read as suggesting that every study should be multi-method, this is neither cost efficient nor necessary. But analysts do need to be cognizant of the limitations of any single method and willing to recognize that they may not have the “one best technique.” Just as students of power have come to realize that multiple methods are useful in capturing “who (or what) has the power,” so students of politics generally need to realize the advantages and relative payoffs of using multiple methodologies.

A second implication is that the closed dialogue that often characterized the debate in the past over qualitative vs. quantitative methodology is counterproductive. Narrative history properly done has great potential for those who want to study politics with numbers. Not only can it provide a data point but it can also ground and exemplify the processes being captured with intermediate and large N techniques. Likewise, the results of large N statistical studies can also be invaluable to narrative historians who want to define the context of their study.

Hence our fourth general observation is that the study of politics needs to become more flexible and eclectic about methodology. This does not mean that there are multiple logics for inference but that studying politics requires multiple tools and poses multiple problems that can best be addressed by these multiple tools. A multi-method study of politics promises a more useful and complete picture of how politics actually functions in the real world.

What type of political study will emerge? If the authors and editors of this volume are correct, it will be a more theoretically eclectic, diverse, flexible and empirically based field of study. Instead of the old debate over which paradigm of power is correct or which method is “the” method for studying politics, we will come to see the advantages of multiple theories and methodologies. In addition to group, institutional and structural theories of politics, we will also have a variety of cultural, network-based, globally relevant and spatially/time sensitive theories of politics. Instead of assuming a single best way, the study of politics will be organized by a range of theories and methodologies appropriate to the various problems that elicit our interest. Instead of assuming that we must fit all of our findings into a single “best” theory, we will be ecumenical, willing to consider multiple perspectives and to entertain the idea that multiple theories are useful for understanding politics.

PART I

Theory in the Study of Politics

CHAPTER 2

Institutional Theory

EDWIN AMENTA AND KELLY M. RAMSEY

Although most political sociologists and political scientists nowadays either consider themselves or are deemed “institutionalists,” key differences remain among major schools of institutionalism (see reviews in Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Amenta 2005). In this chapter, we review sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and political institutionalism.¹ We discuss their similarities and differences, theoretical and methodological insights, research gains, analytical problems, and prospects for the study of politics. To focus our discussion, we mainly consider research regarding the development of public policy, the terrain on which many advances in political sociology and political science have taken place and an occasional battleground for these approaches.

The basic similarity in all institutional theoretical claims is that something identified at a higher level is used to explain processes and outcomes at a lower level of analysis (Clemens and Cook 1999; Amenta 2005). Institutionalists tend to avoid both individual-level explanations and explanations situated at the same level of analysis. For these reasons, they are sometimes criticized as “structurally biased,” though this is a feature of institutional arguments that has distinctive explanatory advantages as well as disadvantages. Institutionalists typically have problems in explaining social and political change, notably in institutions themselves, and often resort to claims about exogenous and unpredictable shocks or the actions of various agents.

Yet, these three types of institutionalists tend to focus on different sorts of higher-order determinants and differ in how much they matter causally. The sociological institutionalists in the sociology of organizations (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and those examining the influence of the “world society” (Meyer et al. 1997) focus on cultural and ideational causes. These are posited to exert influence either at the supra-societal or supra-state level for states and their policies, or at the societal level for organizations. Historical institutionalists typically focus on determinants at the macropolitical or macroeconomic level, though they rely on no particular type of institutional theory, and instead expect causation to be multiple and conjunctural and often involving time-order and path dependence (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Historical institutionalism is an approach to political research that focuses on asking big questions, highlights the importance of institutions in explanations, and rejects functionalist explanations for why institutions emerge. Like sociological

¹ We omit rational-choice institutionalism, which is more prevalent in political science, works from different epistemological premises (see Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999; Pierson and Skocpol 2002), and is beyond the scope of this article (see Kiser and Bauldry 2005).

institutionalists, political institutionalists form a theoretical school, though one with a weaker self-identity. Political institutionalists typically situate their claims at the state or macropolitical level and argue that the process of formation of states, political systems, and political party systems strongly influence political processes and outcomes (see review in Amenta 2005).

The three institutionalisms have different origins and emphases in their strategies of research, as well as different advantages and disadvantages. Sociological institutionalism is a response in part to views of organizations, such as the resource dependence model, and interactions among states, such as world systems theory, that neglect cultural structures and processes in explanations. In the study of policy, sociological institutionalism focuses on quests for legitimation in political organizations and tends to focus on processes of policy imitation and diffusion and especially on surprising convergences in forms of institutions and policies. A standard research product is a cross-national time series or event history analysis of policy diffusion or convergence.

Historical institutionalism is in part a response to rational choice theory and behaviorism in political science. Historical institutionalism holds that institutions are not typically created for functional reasons and calls for historical research to trace the processes behind the creation and persistence of institutions and policies. Institutions are often implicated in both the explanations and what is to be explained. A standard research product is a book addressing one or a small number of countries exhibiting a deep knowledge of them and often seeking to explain divergent historical trajectories.

Political institutionalism has a similar approach to study as historical institutionalism, but predates it and constitutes the main theoretical strain within it. Political institutionalism came in response to formerly dominant pluralist and Marxist treatments of politics that provided one-dimensional views of states and other political institutions. Unlike sociological institutionalists, political institutionalists focus not on convergence in policy across countries, but on long-standing institutional differences across countries. They tend to argue that nation-level political institutions mediate the influence of domestic organized political actors and global processes.

In what follows, we address institutional theory in political analysis. We first address general issues surrounding institutional theoretical claims and then turn to sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and political institutionalism. We consider their main claims and contributions, through programmatic statements and exemplars of research. We assess their achievements and promise, as well as some of their shortcomings. This review is not intended to be comprehensive, but to focus on exemplars, in order to highlight the emphases, advantages, and problems of each approach. We pay special attention to claims about the determinants of public social policy, which each school has sought to explain.

INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS

Institutional arguments rely not on aggregations of individual action, or on patterned interaction games between individuals, but on “institutions that structure action” (Clemens and Cook 1999: 442). Institutions are emergent, “higher-order” factors above the individual level, constraining or constituting the interests and political participation of actors “without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to achieve these regularities” (Jepperson 1991: 145). All three forms of institutionalists define institutions broadly. Political and historical institutionalists see institutions as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions in the organizational structure of the polity or the political economy, whereas sociological institutionalists add cognitive scripts, moral templates and symbol systems

(Hall and Taylor 1996: 938, 947) that may reside at suprastate or supraorganizational levels. These scholars break down the distinction between the institutional and cultural. The influence and durability of institutions is a function of the extent to which they are inculcated in political actors at the individual or organizational level, and the extent to which they thereby tie up material resources and networks (Clemens and Cook 1999: 445).

Institutional theories as applied to politics posit two distinct forms of institutions' influence over policy and political action. Institutions can be constraining, superimposing conditions of possibility for mobilization, access, and influence. Institutions limit some forms of action and facilitate others. Arguments about institutional constraint evoke an "architectural or maze-like" imagery; to the extent that institutions are hypothesized to proceed from powerful states, such architecture becomes a "concrete, massive, autonomous" fortress (Clemens and Cook 1999: 445, 461). Theories of "political mediation" (Amenta et al. 2005) and "political opportunity" (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) are, partially, institutional constraint arguments, to the extent that they posit that political institutions limit the conditions under which organized interests mobilize and attain collective goods from the state.

Another form of institutional theorizing, more typical among sociological institutionalism, posits that institutions are constitutive, establishing the available and viable models and heuristics for political action. Arguments about the constitutive properties of institutions evoke an imagery of cultural frameworks or toolkits. Political sociological "state constructionist" or "Toquevillian" theories of mobilization and identify formation (Skocpol 1985; Wuthnow 1985; Skocpol 1992) are institutional constitutive arguments, proposing that the actions of states "help to make cognitively plausible and morally justifiable certain types of collective grievances, emotions, identities, ideologies, associational ties, and actions (but not others) in the first place" (Goodwin 2001: 39–40). Sociological institutionalist theories of the influence of "epistemic communities" on policy paradigms (Haas 1992) or of INGOs on a "world polity" (Meyer et al. 1997) or "global governance" (Miller 2007), similarly, propose that normative and cognitive institutions as embedded in networks of expertise constitute the moral and epistemological bases of policy formulation.

SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

The two main sources of sociological institutionalism as applied to politics are from organizational and world society perspectives and developed as a response to the lacunae in state-centered and world system theories in political sociology and in neorealist theories in international relations, all of which attribute policies and actions to political actors' purposive pursuit of self-interest. The critique has three main parts. First, the instrumental, individualist assumptions of interest-driven theories, sociological institutionalist scholars have noted, predict a variety of policies, actions, and functional forms among states, whereas for many policy examples states instead display isomorphism, despite differences in relevant interests (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999). Second, the ambiguity of the linkage between observed reality, political instruments, and policy goals may render impracticable a well-informed pursuit of interests (Cohen et al. 1972; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Third, interest-driven theories may prematurely dismiss the constitutive role of culture in politics or conceptualize culture as being an artifact of political structures or economic relations (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999).

Responsible for policy and political structural isomorphism in sociological institutionalist explanations, then, are cultural institutions common to political actors: cognitive or normative constructs that define the conceivable and appropriate forms of political organization,

policy goals, and policy instruments for attaining those goals (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947–948). The institution of interest is transnational political culture, not nation-specific configurations of political organizations. As Strang and Chang (1993: 237) observe, “This perhaps makes “institutionalism” a misnomer; the institutions of concern are the codified cultural constructions, not the organizations that mirror them.” Sociological institutional theories address policy innovation only insofar as they explain waves of conformity to newly emerging cultural institutions, or address the conditions under which extant institutions constitute the production of new policy forms. They conceptualize the process of policy adoption as being a matter of emulation and diffusion, emphasizing system-level and relational-level causes that are exogenous to actors.

Political applications of these theories have been developed and tested using empirical cases of transnational policy convergence such as education standards (Meyer et al. 1977, 1992), environmental treaties (Meyer et al. 1997; Frank 1999), and citizen rights (Ramirez et al. 1997), as well as empirical cases of national macroeconomic policy stability (Dobbin 1993; cf. Hall 1993) and subnational waves of policy convergence (Soule and Zylan 1997; Soule and Earl 2001; Ingram and Rao 2004).

Sociological institutionalists form a tightly self-identified school of thinking, with many scholars being graduates from the Stanford Department of Sociology and taught or influenced by John Meyer or his students. Although much of the work concerns questions addressed by political sociologists, these scholars are more likely to be found in American Sociological Association sections on culture, education, and organizations, occupations and work. Despite their concern with political processes and outcomes in all countries regardless of level of economic development or democratization, these scholars are not closely associated with the ASA section on the political economy of the world system, in part because of this section’s close affinity to Marxian-derived world systems theory. In response, some of these scholars are forming a section on global and transnational sociology.

Sociological institutional explanations vary in the mechanisms to which they attribute political stability and the organizational structures through which these mechanisms exert causal influence. Mechanisms constitute the microfoundations of sociological institutionalist theorizing and the hypothesized primary motivators of human activity. In one view, norms, rituals, models, and conventions establish what is appropriate (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer 2000). From this viewpoint, state actors are motivated by status concerns, particularly in world society theories. Seeking legitimacy among their peer states, they adopt and maintain the characteristics and forms of a parent, global polity (Meyer et al. 1997) or of those of peers they perceive as being more legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151–152; Ramirez et al. 1997; Weyland 2005: 274–278; Dobbin et al. 2007: 450–454).

Alternately, cognitive schemas, scripts, and paradigms establish what is conceivable. In this view, actors are motivated by substantive policy concerns but the linkage between available means and desired ends is inherently ambiguous, and actors select available means based on an imperfect, bounded or “garbage can,” rationality (Cohen et al. 1972; Kingdon 1995). Consequently, they address policy either by working from a shared available stock of professional expertise (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 152–153; Dobbin 1993; Hall 1993; Hecllo 1974; King and Hansen 1999) or by emulating peers – other polities or organizations in civil society – they perceive as being more successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151–152; Miller and Holl 2005: 199–200). The latter emulation may derive from competitive motivations (Dobbin et al. 2007: 457–460) or be part of a bounded, heuristic learning process (Weyland 2005: 281–288), though such mechanisms may be difficult to disaggregate (e.g., Burt 1987: 1,291).

Third, political actors might be epistemologically dependent upon other actors – either pools of expert or managerial personnel or innovating, early adopting peers – to develop and

demonstrate the cognitive or normative feasibility of policy rationales and prescriptions. Having delegated technical authority to expert bodies, actors create policy by enacting the recommendations of scientific or technical “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992) or by defaulting to the standards and regulations of “global governance” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; Miller 2007).

In sociological institutionalist theory, organizational structures constitute the hypothesized infrastructures through which normative, cognitive, and dependence mechanisms exert their influence. In some explanations, the penetration of the state by nongovernmental organizations causes state political stability. If legitimacy-minded, states may conform to a “world culture” as a function of the extent to which culture-carrying international NGOs have an organizational presence (Frank 1999; Frank et al. 2000a). If motivated instead by bounded rationality, states may adopt and implement policy standards as a function of the pervasiveness of professional associations and academic or private policy-producing organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 152–153; Dobbin 1993; Hall 1993). If epistemologically dependent on experts or other innovators, states may defer to the judgments of salient “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992) or “global governors” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; Miller 2007).

In other explanations, the state’s networks of communication and monitoring are the main mediating structures. States may be vulnerable to legitimacy “peer pressure” from neighboring states or states in the same region (Ramirez et al. 1997). States seeking substantive solutions may be constrained by the number of viable alternative models that are available (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151–152) and may be influenced more by peers that are more available (Strang 1991; Strang and Tuma 1993; Strang and Soule 1998: 272–276) or salient (Soule and Zylan 1997; Soule and Earl 2001).

Coercive explanations for policy stability, while not normative or cognitive institutions per se, have received brief mention in the literature. More powerful actors such as international bodies or development agencies (or, for subnational units, the nation-state) may impose policy expectations on less powerful units; they may also promote certain procedures such as legal frameworks or budget schedules to induce less powerful actors to interact with them (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150–151; Weyland 2005: 271–274; Dobbin et al. 2007: 454–457). Transnational regulatory convergence due to the pervasive imposition of incentives and threats from multinational corporations (Bennett 1991: 227–229) or by hypothesized “races to the bottom” (Drezner 2007: 14–17) proceed from organizational structure propositions grounded in state penetration or state networks, respectively.

World society theories primarily rely on a combination of legitimacy mechanisms with penetration structures, though the broad propositions of the approach’s paradigmatic statements often deploy other combinations of mechanisms and structures as well. Theories examining the spread of policy ideas through professions and expert policy forums combine bounded rationality mechanisms with organizational penetration. “Epistemic communities” and “global governance” combine bounded rationality with epistemic dependence. Theories of policy diffusion through bounded, heuristic learning and competition with peer states combine bounded rationality with network structures of communication and monitoring.

The standard sociological institutionalist research project is a quantitative modeling of waves of policy convergence over an extended time across a population of political units, typically nation-states or subnational units such as U.S. states, using time series or event history analyses. Exogenous institutionalization causes are measured by levels of transnational participation, such as through treaties, conventions, or the number of international nongovernmental organizations. Endogenous demand factors or political factors are measured to test alternative, noninstitutional hypotheses. Demand data such as economic or demographic information are often straightforward and available, but measures of domestic political forces

such as mobilization pressures, being difficult to readily collect transnationally and rarely preassembled in the data sets of international NGOs, are often measured by abstract proxies such as democratic conditions or organizational strength or, sometimes, dismissed a priori (e.g., Frank et al. 2000a: 101; Buttel 2000: 118–119; Frank et al. 2000b: 123–124).

While tests of alternative endogenous hypotheses may suffer from a lack of data, tests of alternative convergence hypotheses are usually absent. Sociological institutionalist studies, like policy diffusion studies in general, to date have rarely considered multiple theories of policy convergence: evidence of diffusion is usually taken to be evidence that the single theorized institutional cause is at work (Finnemore 1996: 339; Dobbin et al. 2007). In-depth case study follow-ups that would more definitively trace policy convergence to the influence of pervasive norms and schemas – and address critics whose case knowledge contradicts broad statistical associations – are typically absent (Finnemore 1996: 339–340; Drezner 2007: 20–22).

Sociological institutional explanations seem to work best in situations in which a political actor needs institution-provided guidance – either legitimacy or a working schema – and sees no cost in adopting the forms and characteristics of other states or organizations. Although some sociological institutionalists consider relational mediators to be contributors to conformity, sociological institutionalism is *ceteris paribus* as far as endogenous causes and *alternative forms of dependence* are concerned (e.g., competitive).

The interaction of exogenous convergence mechanisms with endogenous factors, however, remains undertheorized. Sociological institutionalist explanations of transnational stability do not address how state-level institutions and path dependencies might work against incentives to conform to global standards, or how a predominance of reasonably powerful, instrumentally motivated states might minimize the influence of norm-diffusing INGOs (Drezner 2007: 19), or how domestic political factors might independently influence states to adopt similar policies (Bennett 1991: 223, 231). The influence of policy norms and paradigms relative to political calculations and constituency preferences remains an open theoretical question (Yee 1996; Campbell 2002). Sociological institutionalist explanations must not only establish not only that dominant norms and schemas exist, but also that they are in fact internally coherent enough to inspire straightforward policy prescriptions; understating internal contradictions risks prematurely minimizing the influence of domestic politics, whose debates often revolve around normative concerns that sociological institutionalist explanations posit to be settled and whose influence may be most likely where tensions among dominant norms or schemas are unresolved (Finnemore 1996: 341–342; Buttel 2000: 119; cf. Campbell 1998: 384–385).

Sociological institutional arguments, like other types of institutional arguments, largely do not address the conditions under which institutions change, beyond black-box expectations of “exogenous shocks” that may disrupt or render less salient norms, schemas, and their embedded resources (e.g., Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Institutional theorizing of emulation and diffusion takes as given the prior establishment of a newly dominant institution. Policy innovation is not divergent change in these explanations so much as a unidirectional wave of adaptation to a new paradigm. Disaggregating the ideational and resource mechanisms of institutional reproduction may be one way of more precisely theorizing the conditions under which institutions destabilize (Clemens and Cook 1999: 442–443); another way may be studies of failed or abortive waves of conformity (Strang and Soule 1998: 285–286).

Similarly, the origins of new dominant ideas, forms, and characteristics currently remain less prominent in institutional theorizing than the isomorphism and system-level stability they may produce. Alternative norms and schemas are abundant, and identifying the conditions under which particular alternatives become the foundation of replacement institutions and waves of conformity remains a subject of exploratory inquiry. The skill and connectedness of

“policy entrepreneurs” (Mintrom 1997; Mintrom and Vergari 1998) or “focusing events” or “focusing projects” (Kingdon 1995: 94–100; Lowry 2006) may be a factor, as may the success promoters may have in connecting proposed models to currently institutionalized policies, incentives, and interests (Clemens and Cook 1999: 457–459). The distribution of such policy entrepreneurial capacity may itself be a function of the dependence of advocacy and policy production on the norms, schemas, and embedded resources of other societal institutional arrangements such as class (Domhoff 1996) or transnational economic agreements (Dobbin et al. 2007: 454–457). Historical instances abound in dominant norms and schemas simply being imposed on modern states by their conquerors (Finnemore 1996: 340–341). The origins of new norms and schemas raise questions of power that currently have little salience in sociological institutional accounts (Hall and Taylor 1996). Toward this end, studies of the expert organizations, networks, and forums that produce and evaluate policy interpretations may be useful (Hall and Taylor 1996: 950; Miller 2007).

More generally, sociological institutionalism focuses on explaining stability around a dominant, consistent complex of norms or schemas, and so the rest of politics – instability around competing, contested sets of norms and schemas – lies largely outside the purview of institutional theorizing (Hall and Taylor 1996: 954). So, too, do transitory conditions during which heretofore dominant norms and schemas are no longer hegemonic (e.g., the necessity of welfare state protections, the self-sufficiency of economic development prescriptions, industrial growth without regard for climate change) but replacement institutions to solve the problem of inadequacy have not yet been formulated. An institution-based theorizing of politics must be able to account for the conditions under which institutional stability gives way to another institution, competing institutions, or no dominant institution at all.

An additional issue is that it is often difficult to sort out the explanatory benefits of sociological institutionalism as compared to political institutionalism in a given research project. In their bid to explain similarity and stasis, institutional arguments sometimes may indicate overdetermination. Initial debates about power in political sociology suggested that political institutional determinants of power were reinforced by cultural ones (Lukes 1974). The recursive effects of constraining and constitutive processes may make for a richer historical, sense-making accounts, but “the mouse may be well-socialized and in a maze” (Clemens and Cook 1999: 446), and thus it is difficult to tell which is more constraining. Sociological institutional explanations for policy stability also overlap with historical institutionalist accounts of “policy lock-in” or “path dependence” (Clemens and Cook 1999: 456–459). Institutionalized policy paradigms, and the networks of organizations and agencies that monitor and implement them, may both constrain the opportunities for interest participation and constitute the incentives for interest mobilization. Such “policy feedback cycles” or institutional “thickening” or “coupling,” to the extent that they result in a recursive reinforcement of policy paradigms and civil society, are hypothesized to limit the prospects of a policy field for reform or retrenchment.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Historical institutionalism differs from sociological institutionalism in its lack of endorsement of a specific theoretical program and as a school of thought has only a moderately high level of self-identity (Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; cf. Immergut 1998). According to its proponents, historical institutionalism is distinctive mainly in its approach to political inquiry. It focuses on big questions that may be of interest to both academics and the thinking public. It seeks explanations that are configurational and implicate a conjunction of

institutions, processes, and events. Its explanations are also contextual, shaped by institutional factors and often bound to particular places in times. Although historical institutionalism does not rely on any specific school of theorizing, it does rely on a style of theoretical argument sometimes known as historicist causation (Stinchcombe 1968). Its proponents see institutions as setting off processes of path dependence in which new institutions or policies reshape political possibilities, making some far more likely and ruling out others or making them highly unlikely. The most common institutions discussed are those at the state or country level, notably the polity or the political economy (Hall and Taylor 1996). Although historical institutionalism demands historical sophistication, expects scholars to attend to the mechanisms of explanations, and tends to avoid deductive theorizing, it does not otherwise set boundaries on theoretical thinking or the methods to appraise causal claims.

Despite working from mainly Weberian and Marxian theoretical schemes, historical institutionalists do not form a theoretical school and that means that its practitioners do not always identify themselves as historical institutionalists. Indeed, some work deemed to be historical institutionalist by its proponents is based on sociological institutionalism (Dobbin 1994; Clemens 1997). Historical institutionalism is less significant as an identity in sociology than in political science, where historical institutionalists seek to differentiate themselves from behaviorists (Immergut 1998) and, more importantly, from rational choice scholars who also deploy the term institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalists are often located in the subdisciplines of comparative politics and within American politics in American political development (Orren and Skowronek 2002).

In sociology, scholars identified or identifying as historical institutionalists typically have some connection to the ASA section on comparative and historical sociology, a group of scholars united largely by methodological approach. Historical institutionalists rely on both “calculus” and “cultural” approaches to action (Hall and Taylor 1996), similar to Weber’s classical ideal and material interests. Many historical institutionalists previously referred to themselves as “state-centered” scholars, notably Skocpol (1985), and many historical institutionalists have retained this theoretical emphasis, but have dropped the label in part because of their view that answers to big questions tend to be multicausal and in part from a wider concern for political institutions other than states. Their configurational explanations typically involve the interactions of more than one institution, and different aspects of these institutions, as well as different slow moving processes, and possibly short-term and contingent factors (Pierson and Skocpol 2002).

The conjunctural and configurational theorizing of historical institutionalists typically involves the interaction of central political institutions, but is usually eclectic, and because of their concern to address a particular question, historical institutionalist analyses may include causes from different theoretical camps. As Hall and Taylor (1996) note, historical institutionalists give pride of place in explanations to political institutions and institutions in the political economy, but allow that these institutions may be treated and understood from both calculus and cultural perspectives, as in the manner of either rational-choice and sociological institutionalists. Others in the historical institutionalist camp suggest that slow moving processes, involving such sociological processes as demographic or literacy shifts, may be important to particular explanations (Pierson 2003).

Historical institutionalist questions are motivated by puzzles often with both comparative and theoretical aspects to them. Although not all historical institutionalists engage in strictly comparative work, in the sense of analyzing and explaining political developments across more than one country (Ragin 1987), their questions often have comparative motivations and implications. For instance, in asking about the failure of national health insurance or late start

of other public social programs in the United States, an historical institutionalist scholar is usually at least implicitly comparing these failures to successes elsewhere in similarly situated countries. The puzzles addressed by scholars also typically have some theoretical components to them. That is to say, the big question is partly constructed from the failure of well-known theoretical accounts to answer them satisfactorily. For instance, left-wing partisan contexts have been one of the key determinants of the adoption of new social spending programs and differences in overall spending efforts. Thus the failure to adopt national health care in the United States in a partisan political context favorable to adopting social security may be seen as a puzzle that confounds standard theories (Hacker 2002). Similarly, efforts to retrench social policy may fail despite the fact that right-wing parties rule (Pierson 1996).

Historical institutionalism seeks to be historical in few different senses of the word. One involves the fact that historical institutionalists focus on big questions and issues of wide interest, but situate them within specific places and times. Some of these questions implicate fairly general phenomena, such as why revolutions occur (Goldstone 2003), whereas others are more specific and often concern issues central to debates in historiography, such as why the United States has no national health care program (Hacker 1998; Quadagno 2005). What is more, historical institutionalist explanations are often broadly contextual, similarly bound by time and space; even historical scholars studying general phenomena like revolutions usually limit their focus to specific times and places. In these instances aspects of the historical context are set as “proper name” (Przeworski and Teune 1970) boundaries surrounding the causal claims, though scope conditions are typically understood analytically (George and Bennett 2005). For instance, scholars may define contexts by way of specific places and periods, such as “the United States between the wars,” or, more generally, such as “rich democratic societies during the period of the rise of welfare states.”

Historical institutionalists are historical also in becoming increasingly sensitive to time order in explanations and to the possibilities of more extensive path dependence (Abbott 1992; Griffin 1992; Pierson 2000; Mahoney and Schenshul 2006). In narrative causal accounts, as opposed to standard variable-based discussions, the timing or “when” something happens in a sequence of events is often key to its influence in processes of major change (Griffin 1992; Sewell 2006). Path dependence is a specific way that time matters. Some key decision or action at a critical juncture or choice point brings about institutions with mechanisms that provide increasing returns to action and self-reinforcing processes (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). To use the social policy example again, once new policies are adopted and new institutions are established around them, such as bureaucracies enforcing the policies and corporations adapting employee benefit programs around them, politics changes (Skocpol 1992) in ways that tend to favor the new policies and disfavor previously plausible alternatives.

Like sociological institutionalists, historical institutionalists relying on path dependent arguments mainly theorize about the ways in which institutions prevent change. In the most extreme versions of path-dependent arguments, ones that produce historical “lock-in” or “self-reproducing sequences” (Mahoney and Schenshul 2006), after a specific set of events some political alternatives are removed from the realm of possibility, and reversing course may be exceedingly difficult. Policies may be “locked in” (Pierson 1996) as political actors and the public reorient their lives significantly around the policy and there are increasing returns surrounding the policy. Thus historical institutionalist arguments relying on path dependent modes of theorizing also tend to focus on the persistence of political processes and outcomes. The possibility of path dependence, or the mechanisms of increasing returns for institutions, means that causes of the rise of these institutions will have a different influence, possibly none at all, once the institutions are established (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). To take a couple

of prominent examples, Skocpol (1992) argues that the structure of U.S. political institutions and the existence of premodern military pensions made it impossible for the United States to adopt comprehensive social policy on the European model despite sometimes similar economic and political pressures to do so. Similarly, Pierson (1996) argues that well-established social programs in the United States and Britain deflected attempts by right-wing regimes to destroy them, whereas others were more easily retrenched.

Unlike sociological institutionalists, however, historical institutionalists rarely emphasize convergence in political processes and outcomes and instead often argue that country-level political or political economic institutions bring enduring differences across countries and over time. For historical institutionalists explaining the differences in large patterns usually involves showing that some structural and systemic political conditions or circumstances hindered a major development in one place and either aided or allowed the development in another, with enduring consequences. The comparisons usually made are contrasts, often comparisons between successful and failed revolutions (Goldstone 2003), successful and failed transitions to democracy (Mahoney 2003), and policy innovations and failures (Amenta 2003). In the more extreme path dependent arguments, as in the case of examining different political/economic welfare capitalist regimes, initial decisions to adopt liberal, conservative, or social democratic regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) shapes all future possibilities for social politics (Hicks 1999; Swank 2001).

In their more extreme forms, involving historical lock-ins and self-reproducing sequences, path dependent arguments typically rely on the identification of a critical juncture in which the key decisions were made to set the path (Mahoney and Schensul 2006). In this way, historical institutionalists address the issue of institutional change. Historical institutionalist analyses often seek to identify both the critical juncture and the set of causes that determined the path chosen. Hypotheses about critical junctures are closely tied to conjunctural causal analyses in which several conditions may need to occur simultaneously for a major institutional shift. This approach to explanation has an elective affinity to theoretical eclecticism.

Although historical institutionalism's theoretical eclecticism leaves roles open for the influence of ideas and other cultural sorts of arguments in its explanations, these scholars do not devote consistent attention to the role of ideas, whether as causal contributors to the content of policies or to rallying public support for policies. Policy legacies and path dependence may explain the broad contours of the policy forms, but do not address more fine-grained, change-oriented questions about why particular reforms or retrenchments took the forms that they did, or why authorities or publics took up particular concerns or shifted in sentiments (Beland 2005: 13). To address the former question, Beland (2005) draws on the policy streams approach of Kingdon (1995) and "policy learning" theories from political science (Heclo 1974; Hall 1993; Campbell 1998; King and Hansen 1999). The content of new policies is heavily dependent upon the organizational structures of policy production – the national policy domain of state bureaucracies, interest groups, think tanks, academic research institutions, and perhaps social movements that monitor an issue area (cf. Laumann and Knoke 1987; Ricci 1993; Smith 1991), as well as perhaps participating transnational nongovernmental organizations (cf. Boli and Thomas 1997, Ney 2000). The configuration of a national policy domain is itself partly the product of path dependence, congruent with historical institutionalist approaches, and national policy domains in general are constrained by the configuration of national political structures, congruent with political institutionalist approaches (Beland 2005: 8–9, 14).

Beland (2005: 14–15), like Bennett (1991: 223) and Finnemore (1996: 339–340), proposes that research engage in careful tracing of the causal influence of policy paradigms and

of the diffusion of proposals from policy-producing organizations to decision-making authorities. This suggested integration of norms and schemas, drawing from policy learning theories, presumes relatively autonomous, calculative authorities with agency to adjudicate policy decisions – but operating within the bounds of available and feasible analyses and proposals as generated by policy domain actors. At the same time, this integration calls explicit attention to the role of ideas in successfully passing policy changes through the legislative process in a democratic polity. Elected officials and policy-producing advocates must frame policy innovations in such a way as to draw sufficient public support, or to avoid public resistance, and research should consider the success or failure of entrepreneurial framing efforts as a factor in policy change (Campbell 1998; Beland 2005; cf. Clemens and Cook 1999: 457–459). Such framing efforts may require that propositions proceed from causal stories that link causes and effects, as mediated by such institutions as science and law (Stone 1989), or incorporate clear statements of problem, solution, and political action, as mediated by prevailing cultural stocks of normative and causal accounts (Snow and Benford 1988). In contrast, historical institutionalist explanations may leave the process of “selling” innovations to publics vaguely described, whereas sociological institutionalist and policy learning theories discount domestic political and public opinion constraints, positing technocratic, insulated authorities who render policy judgments on the basis of bounded reasoning and norm compliance.

Historical institutionalism is not tied to any one method of analysis, and some of the work specified by historical institutionalists as exemplars combine a wide variety of methodological techniques (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Some have noted the similarity between the types of theoretical argumentation of historical institutionalists, which is often configurational and multicausal, with the Boolean analytical techniques and algorithms advanced by Ragin (1987, 2000) concerning the analyses of sets. However, historical institutionalists only rarely deploy the types of data sets required to carry out such analyses and often do not have the data-analytical inclination or training to do so (Amenta 2009). If the modal sociological institutionalist analysis is a quantitative journal article, the standard historical institutionalist scholarly product is an historical monograph addressing political developments over time and often across countries. These works generally strategically deploy comparisons or trace historical processes to cast empirical doubt on other possible explanations and to provide further support for their own. This mode of analysis calls attention to large-scale contexts and processes, which often go unnoticed in approaches to data analysis that focus on events surrounding the specific changes under study and do not look at the big picture. It also requires detailed historical knowledge of individual countries and time periods. As its proponents note, historical institutionalism promotes social scientific research on questions and issues that would otherwise be ignored. Historical institutionalist investigations can be undertaken in the absence of the possibility of generating the sorts of data sets typically statistically manipulated in high-profile scholarly articles. Scholars working on issues such as revolutions (Goldstone 2003), democratization (Mahoney 2003), and social policy (Amenta 2003) often will react to one another’s findings and seek to appraise the theories and claims of previous scholars.

This approach has drawn criticism from rational-choice scholars, including sociologists criticizing comparative and historical sociology (Kiser and Hechter 1998). One recurrent claim is that historical institutionalists and comparative and historical sociologists deploy too few cases or empirical instances to make causal claims stick (Lieberson 1992; Goldthorpe 1999). The standard strategy in the most comparative historical designs is to try to address and hold constant as many possible relevant causal factors, known as a “most similar systems” design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). For historical institutionalists, this might mean

comparing country cases or historical sequences that were otherwise similar, but differing on key causal elements. The usual strategy is to break down large country cases into various over-time or within-country comparisons (Amenta 2009). Similarly, arguments have been made that these scholars “select on the dependent variable,” limiting the value of explanations (King et al. 1994). However, examining positive cases is a valid research strategy for explaining unusual occurrences of importance (Ragin 2008; Amenta 2009).

Within the historical institutionalist camp, there is disagreement about how central the role of path dependency might be. The strong version (lock-in and self-reinforcing patterns) suggests that path dependent processes are rare and important, whereas the weak version (contingency matters) suggests that path dependence is ubiquitous, though possibly less influential (Mahoney and Schensul 2006). The strong and rare version seems to have the most support among historical institutionalists, though even among this group there are disagreements. Notably, the idea of “layering” (Thelen 2003) suggests that a series of small and incremental changes, rather than a brief disjuncture in a critical period, may lead to a reinforcing pattern. This idea has been claimed to best describe the development of U.S. social security (Beland 2007), a program that is at the center of many policy debates.

Difficulties in path-dependent theorizing that go beyond internal disputes about the way that history matters, however. Claims about path dependence are typically counterfactual in most analyses. It seems possible that the reason that a given path is not reversed is not that it cannot be reversed, but because there is no concerted attempt to reverse it. The only way to determine an institution’s or policy’s strength would be to subject it to almost constant and varied challenges, which in practice rarely happens. To return to the case of social security, in its formative years it was challenged significantly only occasionally and thus, it is unclear when it was locked in (Amenta 2006, Beland 2007). Also, invoking path dependence may ignore the ways that institutions shape the possibilities for later political contestation. There are many potential processes that may be involved in path dependence.

Historical institutionalists are not often content to explain a large part of the variance in their cases, as quantitative investigators are content to do, but often want to explain all of it (see Ragin 1987). This task usually involves some theorizing at the meso level of political organization, often involving with the interaction of politically active groups with state bureaucrats and other actors, or some combination of theorizing at the macro and meso levels. The causal argumentation sometimes gets quite detailed at the organizational level. In the bid to explain all the variance, sometimes elements from other theoretical perspectives are added, and sometimes strictly contingent elements are brought into account. Historicist explanations are often considered to have accidental causes (Stinchcombe 1968).

Other problems result from the fact that historical institutionalists are a coalition of scholars employing like-minded approaches rather than advancing a specific type of theory. Historical institutionalists will delve into issues and questions for which it is not possible to generate the sort of data sets required for standard multivariate analyses and thus, much of what is known about some subjects is provided by historical social scientists (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Yet this process seems likely to result in intellectual cumulation only under unusual circumstances (Mahoney 2003), such as individual scholars pursuing a series of related investigations under the guidance of the same advisor. Probably, the best situation for making intellectual progress is to have larger-N studies in dialogue with small-N historical studies, with opposing theoretical camps making differing empirical claims. Historical research can appraise the mechanisms in these claims and find variance in larger statistical patterns. If there is contention among theories about these patterns, historical analyses can clarify and adjudicate among them (see Amenta 2003; Kiser and Pfaff this volume).

Another problem to be addressed is that historical institutionalists, for all their metatheoretical and historical sophistication, do not frequently bid to theorize beyond the cases and time periods of interest and do not set analytical scope conditions around claims. Similarly, their configurational causal claims are not always sorted for prominence or portability. Generally speaking, the form of the argument in historical institutional analyses is that certain combinations of variables or conditions have specific effects within a given overarching context; it seems worth attempting to speculate theoretically about these relationships beyond the cases and time periods analyzed. This theorizing would mean thinking through the impact of the contexts and whether the combination of variables or conditions would be likely to have implications in many situations or few, and what they might be.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Political institutional theorizing is the most prevalent mode of theorizing among historical institutionalists. Scholars have generally employed the Tocquevillian argument about states in an explanatory way and have added further argumentation concerning the construction of other large-scale political institutions, including political party systems (Skocpol 1985). In the hands of some theorists, the arguments became more structural and systemic, with long-standing political institutions influencing all groups and having major influence over outcomes of interest. In the hands of others, political institutionalism has become more historical and focused on historical processes, and focuses theoretical attention on the interaction of actors at a medium-systemic, interorganizational, or meso level. These actors are seen as working within institutional constraints, as well as with constraints on resources and other means of action, and attempting to influence state policy. Changes in state policies in turn set processes in motion that influence the interests and strategies of actors that will determine whether programs will feed back in a way that strengthens the program or undermines it or leaves it open to changes at a later time. The main theoretical framework is that macrolevel political institutions shape politics and political actors, who act under constraints that may influence their impact on states and policies, refashioning political institutions in the process, and so on.

These scholars have institutional homes and allegiances in some ways similar to those of the historical institutionalists. In political science, most are in the areas of comparative politics and the American politics subfield American political development, and the APSA section on Politics and History. In sociology, political institutionalists can be found mainly in the ASA sections of Political Sociology and Collective Behavior/Social Movements. Most of the political institutional political scientists study social policy (Amenta et al. 2001). Most of the sociologists study revolutions (Goldstone 2003), the political consequences of social movements (Amenta and Caren 2004; Jenkins and Form 2005), or the impact of political opportunity structures on movements (Kriesi 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

In the post-World War II period, many comparative sociologists and political scientists, notably Reinhard Bendix, Barrington Moore, Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, Stein Rokkan, Juan Linz, Shmuel Eisenstadt, and Charles Tilly, paid close attention to state processes and provided analyses that might be deemed nowadays as state-centered, but often viewed and referred to states through the conceptual tools of dominant perspectives, such as social systems concepts pioneered by Talcott Parsons (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), or views of “modernization” (Huntington 1968). Tilly (1975) notably addressed “state-building” and asked why “national states” came to predominate in Europe rather than other state-like and protostate political organizations, arguing that state-led processes of war-making led to the

expansion of states and victory the form. Skocpol (1979) argued that states, understood in the Weberian way, were crucial in explaining revolutions.

In U.S. social science, however, self-consciously statist and state-centered analyses were developed mainly in the late 1970s and 1980s, largely in reaction to other conceptual constructions and theoretical arguments. A focal point of this shift in attention was the volume by Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985), *Bringing the State Back In*. Skocpol's introduction was a kind of statist manifesto, combining and harnessing current ideas to a theoretical and research program and call to academic action that placed states at the center of political analysis. Skocpol criticized pluralist and Marxist perspectives as treating states chiefly as arenas, neutral or slanted, in which political conflicts took place. Pluralists tended to see this arena as largely neutral, one in which all manner of interest groups and citizens could participate and contend, but with some advantages being held by elected officials. Marxists tended to see the arena as one in which classes battled, with a tremendous home-field advantage for capitalists, or, alternatively, as the "capitalist state" serving the function of reproducing and legitimating capitalism, suggesting they had little variation after the rise of capitalism and little importance before then.

Skocpol's (1985) call was for scholars to embrace a Weberian understanding of states – as sets of political organizations that exerted control over territory and people and engaged in legislative, executive, military, and policing activities (see review in Amenta 2005). States hold a monopoly on legitimate violence and seek to maintain order, extracting resources from their populations and often seeking territorial expansion. States were sets of organizations but with unique political functions, missions, responsibilities, and roles, structuring relationships between political authority and citizens or subjects and social relations among different groups of citizens or subjects and interacting with other states. States engaged in lines of action known as state policy. Historically states have been structured in ways other than the today's prominent nation-state, have operated in economic contexts other than industrial capitalist ones, and have been only variably subject to democratic forces.

State-centered scholars, however, went beyond the conceptual shift about the subject matter to claim that states were crucial causal forces in politics as well. The widest break with other theoretical perspectives concerned the causal influence of state institutions on political life – what Skocpol (1985) calls a "Tocquevillian" conception of states or what Goodwin (2001) calls a "state-constructionist" conception. State institutions might be configured in different ways for any number of reasons, including historical accidents of geography, results of wars, constitutional conventions, or uneven processes of political, economic, bureaucratic, and intellectual development. But whatever the reason for their adoption or genesis, these political arrangements would have fundamental influence on political patterns and processes over new issues that might emerge, particularly those concerning industrial capitalism. This line of argument was in line with criticisms of standard views of political power (Lukes 1974), suggesting that political institutions would influence the political battles that were likely to take place as well as the groups that might win political battles.

Arguments about the causal role of state political institutions also implied a more fundamental difference with other theories of politics, in that state political institutions were posited to have key impacts on the political identities, interests, preferences and strategies of groups (see review in Amenta 2005). Political identities, organization, and action were not things that could be read off market or other relationships, but were influenced by political contexts. Even if political identities were largely similar for a category of people across different places, political institutional arrangements might encourage some lines of political action and organization by this group across polities or time and discourage others and thus shape political group formation.

In short, the political institutional theory rejected arguments that landowners or workers or experts or ethnic minorities would take similar forms and make similar demands in all capitalist societies; instead their political identities and organization would depend on political institutional situations.

Many macrolevel political institutional conditions might shape broad patterns of domestic politics. Overall authority in state political institutions might be centralized or decentralized. The legislative, executive, judicial, policing and other governmental functions within given political authorities might be located within sets of organizations or spread among different ones, each with their own autonomy and operating procedures. Politics might differ greatly in type, depending on the degree to which state rulers had “despotic power,” to use Mann’s (1986) distinction, or power “over” others (Lukes 1974). State political institutions were subject to different levels and paces of democratization and political rights among subjects and citizens. Once democratized politics were subject to different and consequential electoral rules governing the selection of political officials. States executive organizations were also subject to different levels and paces of bureaucratization and professionalization. Each of these processes might fundamentally influence political life.

The other main line of argumentation, second in ultimate importance, was that states mattered as actors. State actors were understood organizationally, largely in a resource-dependence way. As organizations, different parts of states might have greater or lesser degrees of autonomy and different capacities. The autonomy of states or parts thereof was defined as their ability to define independent lines of action. State capacities were defined as the ability to carry out lines of action, along the lines of Mann’s (1986) “infrastructural power” (Skocpol 1985). The ideas of state autonomy and capacity brought into the discussion the “power to” do something, without neglecting “power over,” on which political scientists and sociologists had focused (Lukes 1974). These differences in state autonomy and capacity in executive bureaucracies were argued as being important in explaining the political outcomes across times and places.

The initial state-centered theoretical program has evolved into a political-institutional one over the last decade or so (see Amenta 2005). Scholars have generally employed the Tocquevillian argument about states in an explanatory way and have added further argumentation concerning the construction of other large-scale political institutions, including political party systems. In the hands of some theorists, the arguments became more structural and systemic, with long-standing political institutions influencing all groups and having major influence over outcomes of interest. In the hands of others, political institutionalism has become more historical and focused on historical processes. Here, scholars continue to argue that political institutions fundamentally influence political life, but focus theoretical attention on the interaction of actors at a medium-systemic, interorganizational, or meso level. These actors are seen as working within institutional constraints, as well as with constraints on resources and other means of action, and attempt to influence state policy. Changes in state policies in turn set processes in motion that influence the interests and strategies of actors that will determine whether programs will feed back in a way that strengthens the program or undermines it or leaves it open to changes at a later time. The main theoretical framework is that macrolevel political institutions shape politics and political actors, who act under constraints that may influence their impact on states and policies, refashioning political institutions in the process, and so on.

Structural, macrosystemic political institutional explanations, like sociological institutionalist accounts, attribute political organization and policy consequences to parsimonious distillations of top-down processes. Goodwin’s (2001) theory of Third World revolutions, for

example, seeks to explain variation both in the occurrence of revolutionary mobilization and in revolutionaries' success or failure in overthrowing regimes. Goodwin's answer is that revolutions tended to mobilize in response to especially closed authoritarian regimes, those that did not even offer limited opportunities for political inclusion. A successful revolutionary coup was also most likely under particular institutional conditions: direct rule by a patrimonial or colonial regime, under which constrained capitalists and landowners had incentive to ally themselves with revolutionaries and under which militaries were least competent to defeat rebellions. Similarly, Steinmo's (1993) explanation for differences in tax policies in the United States, Britain, and Sweden attributed policy forms and stability to the structure of the state's legislative institutions: the distribution of political authority, in combination with the incentives and strategies it imposes on political actors, accounted for broad patterns of taxation. These arguments are not deterministic, in that they argue broad patterns and susceptibilities and allow for agency by authorities and political actors rather than attempt to explain all cases with purely structural causes. In their focus on political institutional structures, however, they do leave undertheorized possible causal influence from domestic political organizations.

Historical, mesoorganizational political institutional explanations, in contrast, attribute political organization and policy consequences to interactions between top-down political institutions and bottom-up mobilization. Skocpol (1992) in this way, offered an explanation for why the United States, unlike other states, developed a veterans' benefits program during the late nineteenth century and a benefits program for women during the early twentieth century rather than establish broader social insurance for male workers. Political institutions in Skocpol's account, as with more structural, systemic theories, are paramount: the comparatively early democratization and comparatively late bureaucratization of the United States resulted in incentives for political parties and elected officials to innovate policies around patronage rather than, as in other states, from elaborated prescriptive programs. Skocpol also argued, though, that political institutions also structured political organization and strategies, which in turn influenced policy paths. Early democratization in the United States similarly incentivized mobilization on behalf of the politically excluded rather than workers, who did not have to collectively organize to gain the vote, but instead among women seeking suffrage and social supports. Mobilized groups with the greatest leverage in the U.S. electoral system in Skocpol's account are "widespread federated interests" advocating on behalf of constituencies spanning many legislative districts, such as women and veterans. Policy development as a partial consequence of mobilization, in turn, imposes an evolution of incentives for elected officials and political actors, producing changes in the population and strategies of authorities and organizations.

Similar connections between political institutions and mesolevel political actors are made in the literature on the political consequences of social movements. Notably, "political mediation" arguments (Piven and Cloward 1977; Lipset and Marks 2000; Amenta 2006) hold that the collective action of challengers is mediated through political institutions. In a democratic political system, mobilized challengers' action is more likely to produce results when institutional political actors see benefit in aiding the group the challenger represents (Almeida and Stearns 1998). To secure new benefits, challengers will typically need help or complementary action from like-minded state actors and thus need to engage in collective action that changes the calculations of institutional political actors, such as elected officials and state bureaucrats, and need to adopt organizational forms and strategic action that fit political circumstances. Lipset and Marks (2000) argue that the failure of socialist movements in the United States resulted from a combination of difficult systemic political conditions for the establishment of new parties and inappropriate strategies. Other scholars argue that particular strategies work

best in the U.S. political context (Bernstein 2001; Szymanski 2003). Recent work has sought to make and test claims about the influence of different strategies in different political contexts (Kriesi et al. 1995; Cress and Snow 2000; Ingram and Rao 2004; Linders 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al. 2008).

Political institutional theorizing, like historical institutionalist work, is derived from small- and medium-N studies of delimited places and times. This has been a largely inductive, theory-building rather than theory-testing, approach. Consequently, the nascent political institutional project is at a risk of both theoretical inconsistency, to the extent that researchers identify differing institutional arrangements of interest, as well as of mutual incomparability, to the extent that researchers remain reticent to develop their findings' applicability to populations of cases beyond those from which they derived their explanations, or to set analytical scope conditions on theoretical claims.

Scholars undertaking structural and systemic explanations have argued that particular characteristics of a state's political system influence political processes, but different studies have focused on different system characteristics. For instance, Skocpol (1992) emphasizes the democratization and federalism of the polity, whereas Steinmo (1993) studies the division of authority in national legislative bodies. Numerous avenues of argument may be possible for similar types of political unit, but, even if generalized to address larger categories of cases, a proliferation of middle-range theories to explain different phenomena with different institutional causes as researchers take on disparate puzzles or stake out idiosyncratic bailiwicks is not conducive in the long term to a productive research program (Amenta 2003: 114–117).

Political institutional research projects also rarely advance arguments intended to be applicable to cases beyond those examined and explained in a monograph. Steinmo (1993), for example, does not follow his comparison of his three cases with broader conceptualizations or expectations across similar cases, nor does Skocpol (1992) develop her broad institutional arguments about the United States for appraisal against other polities. Occasional studies do examine populations of cases, notably Goodwin's (2001) analysis of Third World revolutions and Ertman's (1997) assessment of European nation-state formation, but such efforts have tended to proceed simply from the researcher's knowledge of many cases rather than explicit attempts to generalize theoretical propositions beyond the well-understood stock. To develop a more coherent body of theoretical propositions, with greater possibilities for cumulation, scholars should set forth what their cases are cases of (Ragin and Becker 1992) and work through the implications of their case-specific arguments to develop middle-range arguments for similar polities and circumstances.

To move from research framework to better developed theory, integrative efforts must accompany small-N historical social science. An attainable refinement for political institutional theorizing would be for scholars to develop explanations for salient categories of countries rather than scant handfuls of country cases, such as for democracies, capitalist democracies, liberal welfare states, or Third World countries. Subsequent scholars, thus working with middle-range theories proper rather than merely a legacy of narrow exemplars, would be better-equipped to use and build upon past work to extend arguments to other cases or improve upon predictions. Wickham-Crowley (1992), in this manner, elaborated a theory of revolutions in Latin America, as did Goodwin (2001) for revolutions in Third World countries and Pierson (1994) for welfare state retrenchment in late twentieth century capitalist democracies. A similar approach could employ time periods or processes, developing arguments applicable across multiple eras with comparable relevant characteristics, or across processes (e.g., welfare state expansion vs. retrenchment, Amenta 2003) rather than illuminating only a single era.

The development of such middle-range political institutional theories, following the recommendations of Przeworski and Teune (1970), could be facilitated in one way by theorizing in terms of Boolean combinations of independent variables (Ragin 1987, 2000). First, the researcher would develop structural-systemic hypotheses about which types of political institutions are likely to cause particular configurations of state agencies and political organization. Second, from this basis the researcher would develop feedback hypotheses positing which consequence paths are likely to result from which combinations of political institution, political organization, and activity. Amenta (1998) takes such an approach toward explaining the development of U.S. social policy compared to Britain: while case specific, the resultant claims are sufficiently broad to be relevant for other cases.

CONCLUSION

Institutional arguments are not about aggregations of individual action, but higher-order factors above the individual level that influence political processes and outcomes and tend to produce regular patterns or stasis. Of the three varieties reviewed, sociological institutionalism is a species of organizational theory and essentially a cultural theory. It treats states and other organized political actors largely like other organizations, providing a broad cultural theoretical perspective on organizations and thus politics; the theory focuses on the diffusion of ideas and other cultural forms, as organizations search for legitimacy. This way of examining political behavior and processes typically seeks to explain similarities among institutional forms and policies and typically refers to issues surrounding the development of public policy as the “diffusion” of forms and policies, often through the mediating influence of organizations that are international in scope. Standard research in this vein includes quantitative articles deploying event history or time series analyses of the diffusion of a policy form or innovation.

By contrast, historical institutionalism is a way of engaging in social science unconnected to a particular theoretical project. Instead, historical institutionalists focus on posing macropolitical empirical puzzles and deploy comparative and historical analytical and other varied research strategies to address them. Although institutions are at the center of historical institutionalist explanations, institutional structures of different sorts appear in these explanations. However, historical institutionalism has metatheoretical strictures on the nature of causation. Causation is presumed to be multiple, conjunctural, and reliant on time order. The standard product of a historical institutional investigation is a historical and often comparative monograph examining one or a small number of country cases. Historical institutionalists are mainly situated in political science and although they formed mainly in opposition to rational choice scholarship in political science, they constitute a less self-conscious academic grouping than the sociological institutionalists. That is due to the fact that historical institutionalists are more in agreement on approach and method than on theoretical stance. Although no preference is given to any specific institutional theory, historical institutionalists tend to see political institutions as being distinctive and influential and far more than sociological institutionalists are concerned with issues of power. Although many historical institutionalists rely on political institutional theorizing, the overlap between camps is far from complete. Historical institutionalists may instead rely on economic or social institutions in their theoretical argumentation.

Political institutionalism has not been as frequently discussed or identified as a school of institutionalism, but has been prominent since the 1980s, beginning its life as “state-centered”

theory. Like the new institutionalism in organizations, political institutionalism is a type of theorizing, one that addresses power explicitly and emphasizes the causal role of political institutions on political outcomes and processes. Scholars working from this perspective initially relied on state structures and actors in their explanations in reaction to Marxist and pluralist accounts of politics that tended to view the state as an area and attributed causal roles in politics to organized groups and capitalists and workers. The political institutionalists that followed tended to focus more on the systemic and structural aspects of states and political party systems and the manner of their organization in constructing causal arguments, notably that these political institutions shape the political identities, interests, and strategies of politically mobilized groups.

As research programs, sociological, historical, and political institutionalism face theoretical challenges deriving from their contrasting positions on theorizing and research. Historical and political institutionalist theorizing to date has proceeded with an excess of reticence, rarely venturing outside small-N studies' bounds of place and time to develop more general explanations applicable or transportable to populations of cases across wider eras. For some political developments and eras of particular interest, such as comparative welfare state formation, small communities of specialists have engaged with one another to refine historically delineated theories, but for more idiosyncratic puzzles scholars share mostly just a common toolkit of methods and approaches. Although historical and political institutionalist scholarship provides much of our existing knowledge about political processes and outcomes occurring in times and places in the past, it is often a body of disparate, in-depth historical case studies, examining narrow bands of space and time, providing explanations, but rarely theorizing beyond the boundaries of the cases at hand.

Sociological institutionalist theorizing, in contrast, has proceeded with perhaps an excess of boldness, proposing overarching, encompassing explanations while rarely venturing into in-depth historiographic studies of cases. Scholars can draw from a range of illustrative policy examples, such as education standards and environmental treaties, but use cases mostly just as examples or as interchangeable testing grounds for specific propositions rather than addressing combinations of factors that could mediate or counter systemic processes. Sociological institutionalist scholarship is historiographically slight, comprising large-n quantitative analyses covering broad ranges of space and time. Practitioners refer back to a few, seminal paradigmatic statements positing a few discrete mechanisms intended to be applicable across many units and policy forms. Theoretical reformulations and refinements are few.

Historical and political institutionalisms have developed along a different theoretical track than sociological institutionalism partially because the two sets of institutionalisms also tend to address different empirical grounds in both subject of study and case selection. Historical and political institutionalists predominantly address political developments and policies that are consequential in terms of resources and fundamental power arrangements; these issues inevitably attract the attention of the most powerful decision-making structures of a state and its most influential internal political actors. Sociological institutionalist studies, in contrast, are predominantly explanations for policies of less game-changing import, for which delegation to an increasingly globally interconnected civil society is unlikely to result in major reallocations of state resources or group interests. Similarly, the need for legitimacy is typically greater in more newly minted states at power deficits with societies at a low level of resources and thus may account for the usefulness of sociological institutionalist analyses across all cases. Positing and evaluating various empirical boundaries to these camps may be useful in charting frontiers for theoretically reticent historical and

political institutionalist scholarship to explore, while at the same time grounding the sweeping propositions of sociological institutionalism within a more defensible range of circumstances. Additionally, with a sense of the boundaries comes the expectation of the study of more exciting, theory-advancing, boundary-spanning cases to see just how far the claims of each tradition may go.

Institutionalist approaches would also benefit from a cross-fertilization of research methods. Sociological institutionalist research that undertakes an in-depth analysis of primary source documents, demonstrating and tracing the constitutive influence of global civil society organizations on state-level conceptualizations of policy goals and means, would shore up the claims for which statistical analyses of secondary data have been only partly convincing. Historical and political institutionalist research that applies more rigorous statistical tests to more precisely formulated explanatory claims, analyzing more ambitious sets of data, would shore up explanations whose particularistic scope has consigned them to a frequently marginal status in sociological and political theorizing and research.

Moreover, sociological institutionalism's emphasis on cultural explanations, whether cognitive or normative, is not inherently incompatible with the current trajectories of historical and political institutionalist work, nor does this emphasis necessarily require a paradigmatically unique theoretical apparatus. Historical and political institutionalist scholars interested in continuing to explore and assess post-Marxian conceptualizations of political rationality (Adams et al. 2005: 36–37) might take cues from sociological institutionalism. One way would be to disaggregate cognitively bounded or legitimacy-constituted path dependence from the ways policy decisions and governmental structures render some subsequent policy options far more feasible than others, as well as from the material incentives to constituencies and advocacy organizations that are imposed by prior policies' allocations of collective goods. Sociological institutionalist scholars interested in explaining transnational convergences, similarly, might take a cue from historical and political institutionalism and more explicitly examine how prior global political reconfigurations and economic structures render certain world policies far more palatable to nation-states than others, and render certain kinds of organizational carriers far more tolerable to nation-states than others.

Practitioners in these fields could take cues from one another to venture into a more epistemologically defensible middle ground, one informed both by case histories that exemplify broader sets and by mechanism-minded theories that have analytical scope conditions and falsifiable propositions. Institutional scholar of all stripes face the shared challenge of allowing themselves to be wrong. For any political puzzle a historical or political institutionalist scholar may postulate *some* kind of solution, but the solution can be either unique to its cases or illustrative of wider structural processes. For any example of occasionally punctuated isomorphic stability, a sociological institutionalist scholar may postulate *some* kind of shared cultural paradigm, but the paradigm can be either sustainable only at the level of broad-brush statistical analyses or specified and bounded well enough to survive contact with history. What makes a research program durable does not necessarily generate cumulative knowledge. The challenge is to step boldly into an uncertain future.

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CHAPTER 3

Redesigning the State, Reorienting State Power, and Rethinking the State

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After a relatively fallow period in the 1990s, the general form and functions of states are once again returning to the top of the agenda, both theoretically and practically.¹ This is particularly evident in the wake of the world economic crisis that became increasingly visible from mid-2007 onwards and has since triggered a radical restructuring of the state system and a profound strategic reorientation of state intervention. Indeed, following many predictions about the end of the national state, the close of 2008 and start of 2009 could be seen to herald its resurgence as the saviour in the last resort of an economic and social formation in crisis. Such changes are reawakening interest in the state apparatus, state capacities, state failure, and new forms of governance. Interest in the state and state power had declined following the end of the Cold War, the rise (or, at least, increasing recognition) of globalization processes and their effects, and the growing importance of new social movements. These three trends (and others in the same period) saw attention turn away, respectively, from the contrast between capitalism and socialism and their respective state forms to interest in varieties of capitalism and political regimes, from the national state and/or nation-state to global-local dialectics and multi-level governance, and from class struggle and the class character of the state to the dynamics of discourse and identity politics.

In this context, the 'state', especially in its illegitimately taken-for-granted form of the 'national state' or 'nation-state', was considered by many commentators and researchers less relevant as an object of enquiry than it was during the heyday of work on the state.² It seemed too abstract or artificial a theoretical object to study meaningfully in comparison with the range of contemporary political regimes, the complexities of political life, or the micro-physics of socially dispersed power relations. It was seen as a cultural or discursive construction, for

¹I refer here mainly to theory and practice in the North or West as opposed to social and political formations in the global south or the Eastern bloc. It would require too much space and take us beyond mainstream theories to address analyses of the state outside this context.

²On the distinction between the national state and nation state, see Jessop (2002).

example, as an imagined political community or as a site of governmental rationality rather than as a solid institutional apparatus with defined borders and functions. It was seen as an institutional complex that is so heavily overdetermined by other social relations (such as gender, ethnicity, race, etc.) that it could not be studied apart from these social relations. Or, it was dismissed as an institutional complex that, in the words of Daniel Bell (1987), was too big, to deal with the small problems of life and too small to deal with the big problems, such as environmental change.

Changing political circumstances may well justify corresponding shifts of thematic interest in the state, the state apparatus, and state power that reflect these changes. But, they do not justify neglecting the continued relevance of many key themes from earlier debates on the state, let alone the more fundamental issues raised by the historical origins of states, their survival in various forms, the diversity of their functions, their articulation with other social institutions and embedding in wider social formations, their impact on all manner of social relations, and their propensities to failure. Moreover, if we regard the state as a social relation, as a living institution, as a shifting set of political practices, then we must ask how recent changes are reorienting inherited forms of state and state power. In Europe, the importance of continuity in political rule after the death of a monarch was signified by the official proclamation-salutation: ‘the King is dead, long live the King!’ Today, in the light of continuing – and, indeed, currently radical changes in the state system, one could add that ‘state theory is dead, long live state theory!’

WHAT IS THE STATE?

This innocent-sounding question hides a serious challenge to students of the state. Some theorists deny the state’s very existence (or, at least, the value of studying it) but most still accept that states are real or, at least, provide a valid research focus, if only on the grounds that belief in the state modifies behaviour. Beyond this broad agreement that it is worth studying the state, however, we find conceptual anarchy. Is the state best defined by its legal form, coercive capacities, institutional composition and boundaries, internal operations and modes of calculation, declared aims, functions for the broader society, or sovereignty in the inter-state system? Is it a thing, a subject, a social relation, or a construct that helps to orient political action? Is stateness a variable and, if so, what are its dimensions? What is the relationship between the state and law, the state and politics, the state and civil society, the public and private, state power and micro-power relations? Is the state best studied in isolation; as part of the political system; or as one aspect of a more general social theory? Do states have territorial and temporal sovereignty and/or institutional, decisional, or operational autonomy and, if so, what are their sources and limits?

Everyday language sometimes depicts the state as a subject – the state does, or must do, this or that; and sometimes as a thing – to be used by a given class, stratum, party, or official caste in pursuit of its particular projects or interests. But how, if at all, does the state act *as if* it were a unified subject and what constitutes its unity as a ‘thing’? Coherent answers are hard because the state’s referents vary so widely across different times, places, and contexts. When pressed, a common response is to list the institutions that comprise the state, moving from a core set of formal juridico-political institutions to outer boundaries that may include education, trade unions, mass media, organized religion, and even the family *qua* institution. But, such lists typically fail to explain what lends these institutions the quality of statehood. For, as Max Weber (1948) famously noted, there is no activity that states always and exclusively perform, and probably none they have never performed.

Another option is to define the state in terms of means rather than ends. This approach informs Weber's celebrated definition of the *modern* state as a 'human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber 1948: 78). It is also implicit in those definitions that highlight its formal sovereignty with respect to its own population and other states. This does not mean that modern states routinely exercise power within their own territory through immediate resort to physical coercion – this would signify state crisis or failure – but rather that they have the right and capacity to use coercion as a last resort in enforcing collectively binding decisions. Normally, states secure compliance without resort to coercion. Even so, all states reserve the right – or claim the need – to suspend the constitution or specific legal provisions and many of them also rely heavily on force, fraud, and corruption to exercise power as well as on their political subjects' inability to organize effective resistance.

Another option is to focus on the wide range of modalities in and through which power is exercised throughout society, thereby refusing to privilege the state as *the* principal agency or mechanism for the exercise of political authority in social formations. This holds not only for stateless societies, but also for instances where some form of state has been consolidated. The most prominent advocate of this position in the last few decades is Foucault, although, as indicated below, he was not only a theorist of the micro-dispersion of power, but also explored the state's role as a site for the strategic codification of power relations and for the development of new forms of governmentality that sought to manage the population through disciplinary techniques targeted at individual bodies as well as the body politic (see Foucault 1980; 2008).

Building on Weber and his contemporaries, other theorists regard the essence of the state (pre-modern as well as modern) as the territorialization of political authority. This involves the intersection of three entities: a politically organized coercive and symbolic apparatus; a clearly demarcated core territory; and a population on which political decisions are collectively binding. Thus, the key feature of the state is the historically variable ensemble of technologies and practices that produce, naturalize, and manage territorial space within which political power is exercised by the state apparatus to achieve various, more or less well integrated, and changing policy objectives. Changes in the forms of territorialization of political power, including the state apparatus and the constitution of the population over which power is exercised, are not pre-given but result from past struggles; they are also reproduced (or transformed) in and through various constitutional, institutional, and organizational struggles that seek to maintain, transform, or overthrow existing states. The modern form of the state that informs so much classical theoretical reflection is the so-called Westphalian state (allegedly established by the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 but realized only stepwise during in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). This is usually associated with a system of formally sovereign, mutually recognizing, mutually legitimating national states exercising sovereign control over large and exclusive territorial areas. But the modern state in this sense is only a relatively recent institutional expression of state power (cf. Spruyt 1993; Teschke 2003; Wolf 1982). Other modes of territorializing political power have existed (e.g., chiefdoms, feudalism, empires, suzerainty, tributary relations); some still co-exist with the so-called Westphalian system (e.g., city-states, warlordism, despotic rule, informal empires); new expressions are emerging (e.g., the European Union, which has been variously interpreted as a rescaled 'national' state, a revival of medieval political patterns, a post-sovereign form of authority, or a new type of empire); and yet others can be imagined (e.g., a return to medievalism, a world state, or a global governance oriented to perpetual peace).

Another influential theorist, the Italian Communist, Antonio Gramsci, defined the state as 'political society + civil society'; and also analyzed state power in modern democratic societies

as based on ‘hegemony armoured by coercion’. This tends to downplay the significance of the borders between the ‘state’ and ‘society’. Gramsci (1971) defined hegemony as the successful mobilization and reproduction of the ‘active consent’ of dominated groups by the ruling class through the exercise of political, intellectual, and moral leadership. Force in turn involves the use of a coercive apparatus to bring the mass of the people into conformity and compliance with the requirements of a specific mode of production. This approach is a salutary reminder indicating that states only exercise power by mobilizing their distinctive resources and capacities to modify behaviour and/or transform the wider society of which they are but one part; and that domination and hegemony can be exercised on both sides of official public-private divides (for example, state support for paramilitary groups such as the Italian *fascisti*, state education in relation to hegemony).

Another approach, associated with Nicos Poulantzas, a post-war Greek political theorist, builds on Marx and Gramsci to define the state as a social relation. This elliptical phrase implies that, whether seen as a thing (or, better, an institutional ensemble) or as a subject (or, better, the repository of specific political capacities and resources), the state is far from a passive instrument or neutral actor. Thus, “like ‘capital’, *it is a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form*” (1978: 128–129, italics in original). I explore the implications of this approach below and have also used it extensively in my own work.

THE ORIGINS OF THE STATE AND STATE-BUILDING

Almost regardless of one’s preferred definition, it can be argued that state formation is not a once-and-for-all process and that the state did not emerge in one place alone and then spread elsewhere. It has been invented many times, had its ups and downs, and has seen recurrent cycles of centralization and decentralization, territorialization and de-territorialization. It has also assumed many forms and pursued a very wide range of functions. Although its origins have been explained in various mono-causal ways, none offers a convincing general explanation. Marxists focus on the emergence of economic surplus to enable the development of specialized, economically unproductive political apparatus concerned to secure cohesion in a (class-)divided society (classically, Engels 1975); military historians focus on the role of military conquest in state-building and/or the demands of defence of territorial integrity in the expansion of state capacities to penetrate and organize society (exemplary here is Hintze 1975; see also Goski 2001; Nelson 2006). Others emphasize the role of a specialized priesthood and organized religion (or other forms of ideological power) in giving a symbolic unity to the population governed by the state (Claessen and Skalnik 1978). Feminist theorists have examined the role of patriarchy in state formation and the state’s continuing role in reproducing gender divisions. And yet other scholars focus on the ‘imagined political communities’ around which nation-states have been constructed (classically Anderson 1991).

The best approach is multicausal and recognizes that states change continually, are liable to break down, and must be rebuilt in new forms, with new capacities and functions, new scales of operation, and a predisposition to new types of failure. In this context, as Mann (1986) notes, the state is polymorphous. Thus, a modern state could operate principally as a capitalist state, a military power, a theocratic regime, a representative democratic regime answerable to civil society, an apartheid state, an ethico-political state, and so on. East Asian developmental states in their initial phase of post-war growth, for example, were primarily

crystallized around national security and nation-building to pursue policies that substantively promote capital accumulation (Waldner 1999; Woo 1991; Woo-Cumings 1999). Moreover, even if capitalist bias is deeply embedded in the matrix of a capitalist type of state, the latter could still pursue other societal projects as forces inimical (wittingly or unwittingly) to capital seek to capture the state apparatus and/or subject it to heavy external pressure to pursue capitalistically irrational policies (e.g., the final years of the Nazi ‘police state’ or the Bonapartist national security state promoted by George W. Bush; on exceptional states more generally, see below).

Modern state formation has been analyzed from four perspectives. First, the state’s ‘historical constitution’ is studied in terms of path-dependent histories or genealogies of particular parts of the modern state (such as a standing army, modern tax system, formal bureaucracy, parliament, universal suffrage, citizenship rights, and recognition by other states) (cf. Barker 1966; Hintze 1975; Krätke 1985; Thomson 1994; Tilly 1973, 1992). Second, work on ‘formal constitution’ explores how a state acquires, if at all, its distinctive formal features as a modern state, such as formal separation from other spheres of society, its own political rationale, *modus operandi*, and distinctive constitutional legitimation, based on the adherence to its own political procedures rather than criteria such as divine right or natural law (e.g., Bartelson 1995; Gerstenberger 2008). Third, agency-centred analyses focus on state projects that give a substantive (rather than formal) unity to state actions and whose succession defines different types of state, for example, liberal state, welfare state, competition state (e.g., Bobbitt 2002; Esping-Andersen 1985; Hall 1989; Jessop et al. 2008). Fourth, figurational analyses explore the distinctive features of state-civil society relations and locate state formation in wider historical developments. Eisenstadt’s (1963) work on the rise and fall of bureaucratic empires, Elias’s (1982) work on the state and civilization, and Rokkan’s (1999) work on European state formation over the last 400–500 years are exemplary here.

THE STATE AS A SOCIAL RELATION AND THE ‘STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL APPROACH’

The strategic-relational approach (hereafter SRA), developed by Jessop (1990) and Hay (1995), explores the biases inscribed within the state considered in Poulantzian terms as a social relation. More precisely, the SRA interprets and explains *state power* (not the state apparatus) as a *form-determined* condensation of the changing balance of forces in political and politically-relevant struggle. In other words, a given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, is characterized by a structurally inscribed strategic selectivity. The state is an ensemble of power centres and capacities that offer unequal chances to different forces within and outside the state and that cannot, *qua* institutional ensemble, exercise power. This implies that it is not the state, as such, that exercises power. Instead, its powers (plural) are activated by changing sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state in specific conjunctures. The exercise of these powers generally takes account of the prevailing and, perhaps, future balance of forces within and beyond a given state. How far and in what ways state powers (and any associated liabilities or weak points) are actualized depends on the action, reaction, and interaction of specific social forces located within and beyond this complex ensemble. If an overall strategic line is discernible in the exercise of these powers, it is due to strategic coordination enabled through the selectivity of the state system and the role of parallel power networks that cross-cut and unify its formal structures. Yet, such unity is improbable because the state is shot through with contradictions and class struggles and its

political agents must always take account of (potential) mobilization by a wide range of forces beyond the state, engaged in struggles to transform it, determine its policies, or simply resist it from afar. This approach can be extended to include dimensions of social domination that are not directly rooted in class relations (for example, gender, ethnicity, 'race', generation, religion, political affiliation, or regional location). This provides a bridge to many kinds of work on states and state power.

Within this broader, non-reductionist reading, it can be argued that the exercise and effectiveness of state power is a contingent product of a changing balance of political forces located within and beyond the state and, in addition, that this balance is conditioned by the specific institutional structures and procedures of the state apparatus as embedded in the wider political system and environing societal relations. Thus, a strategic-relational analysis would examine how a given state apparatus may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, and some actions over others; and the ways, if any, in which political actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging by engaging in 'strategic-context' analysis when choosing a course of action. The nature of their goals, strategies and tactics will also affect how significant is this differential impact on political forces' capacity to pursue their interests. Exploring states like this does not exclude (indeed, it presupposes) specific state-engendered and state-mediated structures and processes. The form and dynamic of political processes and struggles are typically relatively autonomous from other sites and forms of struggle. But they must be related to broader social contexts and the strategic choices and conduct of particular actors in and beyond states (Jessop 1990, 2002, 2007).

This approach also brings a distinctive *evolutionary* perspective into the analysis of the state and state power in order to discover how the generic evolutionary mechanisms of selection, variation, and retention may operate in specific conditions to produce relatively coherent and durable structures and strategies. This implies that opportunities for reorganizing specific structures and for strategic reorientation are themselves subject to structurally inscribed strategic selectivities and therefore have path-dependent as well as path-shaping aspects. For example, it may be necessary to pursue strategies over several spatial and temporal horizons of action and to mobilize different sets of social forces in different contexts to eliminate or modify specific constraints and opportunities linked to particular state structures. Moreover, as such strategies are pursued, political forces will be more or less well-equipped to learn from their experiences and to adapt their conduct to changing conjunctures. However, because subjects are never unitary, never fully aware of the conditions of strategic action, never fully equipped to realize their preferred strategies, and may always meet opposition from actors pursuing other strategies or tactics, failure is an ever-present possibility. This approach is intended as a heuristic and many analyses of the state can be easily re-interpreted in strategic-relational terms even if they do not explicitly adopt them or equivalent terms.

To translate this account into detailed analyses of specific political periods, stages, or conjunctures requires the study of three interrelated moments: (1) the state's historical and/or formal constitution as a complex institutional ensemble with a spatio-temporally specific pattern of "structurally inscribed 'strategic selectivity'"; (2) the historical and substantive organization and configuration of political forces in specific conjunctures and their strategies, including their capacity to reflect on and respond to the strategic selectivities inscribed in the state apparatus as a whole; and (3) the interaction of these forces on this strategically selective terrain and/or at a distance therefrom as they pursue immediate goals or seek to alter the balance of forces and/or transform the state and its strategic selectivities.

ANALYSING THE STATE

The state has been studied from many perspectives but no single theory can fully capture and explain its complexities. Moreover, despite tendencies to reify the state and treat it as standing outside and above society, there can be no adequate theory of the state without a wider theory of society. For the state and political system are parts of a broader ensemble of social relations, neither state projects nor state power can be adequately understood outside their embedding in this ensemble. Thus, the state's structural powers and capacities cannot be understood by focusing on the state alone. We must locate it in its 'strategic-relational' context. It follows that these powers and capacities will always be conditional or relational. Their realization depends on the structural ties between the state and its encompassing political system, the strategic links among state managers and other political forces, and the complex web of interdependencies and social networks linking the state and political system to its broader environment. This indicates the need for historically specific analyses of changing forms of statehood. The historical and formal constitution of the territorialization of political power are not pre-given, but result from past struggles and are also reproduced (or transformed) in and through struggle. The balance of forces likewise changes with shifts in the strategic-relational terrain of the economy, state, and wider social formation as well as changes in the organization, strategy, and tactics of specific forces. To translate this account into analyses of specific political periods, stages, or conjunctures requires answers to four questions.

First, what, if any, is the dominant *Vergesellschaftungsprinzip* (dominant mode of societal organization) in a given social formation and how is it related to the historical and formal constitution of the state? There are competing principles of societal organization associated with different functional systems and different identities and values anchored in civil society and, in principle, any of these could become dominant, at least for a while. Hence, actually existing state formations can be seen, following Mann, as polyvalent, polymorphous crystallizations of competing and contested *Vergesellschaftungsprinzipien* (principles of societal organization). Thus, while it might be suitable in some cases to begin an analysis of the state from the viewpoint of capital accumulation, this is not always the case. It makes most sense where accumulation is the dominant principle of societalization and/or where the aspect of the state under investigation is heavily influenced by this logic. But, it is less appropriate where other modes of societalization are dominant and/or have the strongest influence on the topic in question. Which modes of societal organization predominate varies with the most pressing issues in a given period or conjuncture and with the changing balance of forces, especially as these affect the state ensemble and its projects.³

Second, what are the spatio-temporally specific patterns of 'structurally inscribed strategic selectivities' of a given state considered a complex institutional ensemble? Relevant here are six interrelated dimensions of the state:

- Modes of political representation and their articulation – these do not need to be formally instituted in a constitution, although they may be and, if so, they may not be the crucial mechanisms of political representation. So, one must identify the actual modes of political representation at various sites and scales of action and how they operate both formally and informally in voicing and promoting material and ideal interests to centres of political formation, decision-making, and implementation. Note that political

³Cf. Willke (1992) on the polycontextural nature of the state and Taylor (1994) on the state as a 'container' of different social contents.

representation can occur at a distance from the state as well as inside it and comprise forms of resistance as well as explicit channels of representation. In the contemporary world, the mediatization of politics has become increasingly important here – both as a relay of political interests and demands and as a force in its own right.

- The vertical, horizontal, and transversal organization of the state as an institutional ensemble and its demarcation from, and relation to, other states. This aspect comprises the relation among the different branches, institutions, departments, and offices of the state, including the spatial, scalar, and temporal division of labour among them as well as the temporalities of policy formation, decision-making, and implementation. It also includes inter-state relations, not only in the sense of Westphalian international relations, but also relations of clientelism, protection, domination, enclave status, and so forth.
- Mechanisms and modes of state intervention and their overall articulation. Every state has a distinctive set of state resources, capacities, and vulnerabilities that shape the possibilities of effective state action, whether the state acts alone or does so in cooperation with other political forces. From a strategic-relational perspective, state capacities are always relational, i.e., states are not, and cannot be, omniscient, even without resistance, because its capacities for action are always shaped by the specific mechanisms and modes of intervention that are available to it – including non-decision-making and the legitimate refusal to intervene.
- The political projects and demands advanced by social forces within and beyond the state system. Insofar, as the state system is a field of strategically inscribed strategic selectivity, state power is an institutionally and discursively mediated expression of the changing balance of forces seeking to advance their respective interests in, through, and in opposition to the state. How these get articulated, modified, and mediated through the state depends on the forms of representation and internal and external articulation of the state (see points 1 and 2 above).
- The prevailing state project with its *raison d'état* and statecraft that seeks to impose some relative unity on state activities and regulates the state's boundaries as a precondition for such efforts. The state, even in open and pluralistic societies, is never just a mechanism to count and weigh 'votes', 'voices', and threats of violence that thereby defines a changing parallelogram of forces. State managers of various kinds also develop their own state projects to express the nature and purposes of the state and to ensure some unity in and across its different sites, scales, and fields of action. This provides a template or framework within which individual agents and organs of the state can coordinate and collibrate⁴ their actions. It also explains why state crises are often manifested as crises of institutional integration and coherence of state action.
- The hegemonic visions that seek to reconcile the particular and the universal by linking the state's purposes to a broader – but always selective – political, intellectual and moral vision of the public interest. Note that this hegemonic vision typically rests on an 'illusory' public interest that privileges some material and ideal interests, identities, spaces, temporalities, etc., over others and that may take an explicitly inclusionary form (e.g., liberal democracies) or one that is explicitly exclusionary (e.g., the apartheid state).

⁴Collibration involves efforts to adjust the relative importance of different modes of governance (cf. Dunsire 1996).

For reasons noted above, one should not assume that these six institutional and social dimensions are always capitalist in form or function even in societies dominated by capitalist relations of production. This is excluded by the polymorphy of the state as well as the inherent tendencies of all forms of state to fail due to the paradox that the state is just one part of a complex social order with limited capacities to intervene in other parts of the whole and is, at the same time, held responsible for the whole and expected to intervene in the last instance to maintain social cohesion and institutional integration.

Third, how can one describe and explain the historical and substantive organization and configuration of political forces in specific conjunctures and their strategies and tactics, including their capacity to reflect on and respond to the strategic selectivities inscribed in the state apparatus as a whole? This raises interesting issues about the extent, pattern, and ‘policing’ of the formal, institutional separation between the state apparatus(es) and other institutional orders; and about the degree of organizational or interpersonal overlap among them. Prevailing forms of governance that connect different institutional and organizational orders are especially important here. Two other sets of issues are also important. One concerns the nature of conjunctural analysis, especially of the political scene, in the context of a broader periodization of stages, steps, and phases of economic and political development (cf. Jessop 2007). The other concerns the nature of reflexivity and learning capacities and the ability (or necessity) to put lessons learnt into practice. In this context it is worth recalling that Karl Deutsch (1963: 21) once suggested that power can be defined as ‘the ability to afford not to learn from mistakes’. This is because the powerful can ignore the costs of these mistakes, displace them onto others, or defer them into the future.

The fourth step in the analysis would bring us to the interaction of the relevant political forces on the strategically selective terrain of the state in a given conjuncture and/or at a distance therefrom as they pursue immediate goals or seek to alter the balance of forces and/or to transform the state and its basic strategic selectivities. This is a general feature of the SRA as applied to the state and will not be considered further.

All of this reinforces the importance of strategic concepts for the SRA in providing ‘middle-range’ mediations between the state form and state power. Given social contradictions and political struggles as well as internal conflicts and rivalries among its branches, one cannot understand the state’s capacity to act as a unified political force – to the extent that it ever does – without referring to political strategies. Indeed, one can interpret the state as the path-dependent product of path-shaping political strategies, as the generator of strategies, and as strategically selective. State managers (politicians and career officials) are obviously important here but they always act in relation to a wider balance of forces. Among relevant strategic concepts for the analysis of the state in capitalist societies are state-sponsored *accumulation strategies* oriented to economic development and growth, *state projects* oriented to state-building and the internal unity of the state, and *hegemonic visions* that define the nature and purposes of government for the wider society. These should be defined in the first instance in relation to specific economic, political, and social imaginaries and then related to the deeper structure and logics of a given social formation and its insertion into the world market, inter-state system, and world society. Such strategies, projects, and visions are most likely to succeed where they take account of the constraints imposed by existing forms of class domination as well as the prevailing balance of forces and the prospects for their transformation through new alliances, strategies, spatio-temporal horizons of action, and so on. A state’s current strategic selectivity is in part the result of interaction between its past patterns of strategic selectivity and the strategies (successful or not) adopted for its transformation. In turn, the calculating subjects that operate on the strategic terrain constituted by the state are in part constituted by

the current strategic selectivity of the state system (its forms of representation, its internal structure, and its forms of intervention) as well as by past state interventions.

THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

The restructuring of the state has prompted a growing interest in the forms and functions of the capitalist type of state and of states more generally. One approach to this question is to consider four different ways in which the state intervenes in the field of capital accumulation and its conditions of existence. The first field is the general role of economic policy in securing conditions for profitable private business. This matters because market forces alone cannot secure these conditions and must be supplemented by non-market mechanisms. The second aspect is the broad field of social policy. This refers to the state's roles in reproducing labour power individually and collectively from everyday routines via individual lifecycles to inter-generational reproduction. It matters because labour power is a fictitious commodity. Labour-power enters the market economy from outside and is embodied in individuals who are more than just workers. The third aspect refers to the main scale, if any, on which economic and social policies are decided – even if underpinned or implemented on other scales. This matters because economic and social policies are politically mediated and the scales of political organization may not match those of economic and social life. The fourth aspect concerns the relative weight of the mechanisms deployed in the effort to maintain profitability and reproduce labour-power by compensating for market failures and inadequacies. Top-down state intervention is only one of several governance mechanisms and states may also resort to other mechanisms in their efforts to secure the conditions for capital accumulation and social cohesion, leading to meta-governance practices. Other modes of governance, besides markets and hierarchy, are networks and solidarity (see below).

On this basis, Jessop (2002) has characterized the typical state form of the post-WWII advanced capitalism as a Keynesian welfare national state. Its distinctive features were an economic policy oriented to securing the conditions for full employment in a relatively closed economy, generalizing norms of mass consumption through the welfare state, the primacy of the national scale of policy-making, and the primacy of state intervention to compensate for market failure. He also describes the emerging state form in response to the crisis of Fordism in North America and Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s as a Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime. Its distinctive features are an economic policy oriented to innovation and competitiveness in relatively open economies, the subordination of social policy to economic demands, the relativization of scale⁵ with the movement of state powers downwards, upwards, and sideways, and the increased importance of governance mechanisms in compensating for market failure (Jessop 2002). Other types of state, including developmental states, have been discussed in the same terms. Thus, East Asian developmental states could be categorized as Listian Workfare National States on the grounds that they pursued catch-up development based on neo-mercantilist policies in relatively closed economies oriented to export-led growth; subordinated social policy to the demands of export-led growth by restraining wages and orga-

⁵The relativization of scale refers to the loss of primacy of the national scale of economic, political, welfare and civic organization that characterized post-WWII territorial states and the failure to establish another scale as primary – leading to competition among states for dominant and nodal positions in the scalar division of economic and political division of labour.

nized labour and by developing social provision that enhanced competitiveness; developed a national security state that justified repression and state control of the economy; and compensated for fears of market failure by relying on top-down planning and steering of public and private business (see Chibber 2003; Waldner 1999; Woo 1991; Woo-Cumings 1999).

CAN ALL STATES IN CAPITALIST SOCIETIES BE DESCRIBED AS CAPITALIST STATES?

One of the debates from the 1970s that still has resonance today, especially during successive periods when neo-liberalism was heavily promoted by leading states and many states have since intervened to rescue a capitalist world market in crisis, is whether all states in capitalist societies can be described as capitalist states. As indicated above, of course, the state tends to be polymorphic. But this does not mean that one cannot identify a type of state with a distinctive form favourable to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production and class domination. The key here is Moore's (1957: 85) brilliant aphorism: 'when exploitation takes the form of exchange, dictatorship tends to take the form of democracy'. This alludes to the fact that, in liberal democratic states, the freedom of economic agents to engage in exchange (belied by managerial 'despotism' in the labour process) is matched by the political freedom of citizens under the rule of law (belied by the state's subordination to the logic of capital) (Marx 1978). But not all states in capitalist societies have this allegedly adequate form – as the aphorism itself indicates in noting that dictatorship *may* take the form of liberal bourgeois democracy (on exceptional states, see below). Nor does it follow that such formal adequacy guarantees material adequacy, i.e., that liberal democracy as such will always and everywhere secure the extra-economic conditions for continuing accumulation (cf. Offe 1975).

Where a normal type of capitalist state is established, political class domination is secured through the dull routines of democratic politics as the state acts on behalf of capital, but not at its direct behest. It serves both to promote the interests of capital and to disguise this, rendering capitalist political domination relatively intransparent. Open class struggle is less evident in such states and democratic political legitimacy is correspondingly stronger (Poulantzas 1978: 80–82). In exceptional cases, whether due to the suspension of a previously normal form or to the historical absence of liberal bourgeois democracy, the resulting contingency in the nature of the state and its operations requires more concrete, historically specific, institutionally sensitive, and action-oriented studies. This is more likely to be the case outside the relatively prosperous zones of economic and political stability of the metropolitan North.

This calls for more attention to the material adequacy of specific state forms. Such an analysis is more relevant to states *in capitalist societies* (rather than *the capitalist type of state*) where the focus must shift to explore how the political process defines and attempts to secure the economic and extra-economic conditions for expansion in a profit-oriented, market-mediated economy in a given conjuncture. Thus, emphasis falls less on form and more on how policies come to acquire a particular content, mission, aims, and objectives that are more or less adequate to the reproduction requirements of the capital relation. This does not mean that the state form is irrelevant but rather its strategic selectivities do not directly serve to realize the interests of capital in general. Analyses of the state must therefore pay more attention to the open struggle among political forces to shape the political process in ways that privilege accumulation over other modes of societalization.

This suggests that the study of the historical constitution of the *state in capitalist societies* and the deployment of its capacities for capitalist purposes differs from studies of its formal

constitution as a *capitalist type of state* with structurally inscribed strategic selectivities that quasi-automatically privilege the interests of capital. The normal form of bourgeois state is a fragile historical accomplishment that rests on the continued willingness of the dominated classes to accept only political emancipation rather than pressing for social emancipation and/or on the willingness of the dominant class(es) to be satisfied with social domination (i.e., with de facto subordination of the exercise of state power to the imperatives of capital accumulation) rather than pressing for the restoration of their earlier monopoly of political power (cf. Marx 1978). Rejection of this class compromise creates a fertile ground for the maintenance of pre-democratic forms of state and/or the suspension of the electoral principle and other features of democracy.

NORMAL STATES AND EXCEPTIONAL REGIMES

It is usual to distinguish normal and exceptional states in terms of conformity to democratic institutions and hegemonic class leadership. Normal states correspond to conjunctures in which bourgeois hegemony is stable and secure; and exceptional states are responses to a crisis of hegemony. Where political and ideological crises cannot be resolved through the normal, democratic play of class forces, democratic institutions must be suspended or eliminated and the crises resolved through an open 'war of manoeuvre' that ignores constitutional niceties. Thus, while consent predominates over constitutionalized violence in normal states, exceptional states intensify physical repression and conduct an 'open war' against the dominated classes. This basic contrast is reflected in four sets of institutional and operational differences between the two forms of state.

- Whereas, the normal state has representative democratic institutions with universal suffrage and competing political parties, those who control exceptional states end the plural party system and employ plebiscites and/or referenda.
- While constitutional and legal rules govern the transfer of power in normal states, exceptional regimes suspend the rule of law in order to facilitate changes deemed necessary to solve economic, political, and hegemonic crises.
- Whereas, ideological state apparatuses in normal states typically have 'private' legal status and largely escape direct government control, in exceptional regimes they are mobilized to legitimate an increased coercion and to help overcome the ideological crisis that accompanies a crisis of hegemony.
- The formal separation of powers is also reduced through the infiltration of subordinate branches and power centres by the dominant branch and/or through extensive use of parallel power networks and transmission belts that connect different branches and centres. This centralises political control and multiplies its points of application and thereby serves to reorganise hegemony, counteract internal divisions, short-circuit internal resistances, and facilitate flexibility.

Nonetheless, the very act of abolishing democratic institutions tends to congeal the balance of forces prevailing when the exceptional state is stabilised. This makes it harder to resolve new crises and contradictions through routine and gradual policy adjustments and to establish a new equilibrium of compromise. Once again, then, we see that form problematizes function. Thus, the alleged strength of the exceptional state actually hides its real brittleness. This is especially true where they lack specialized politico-ideological apparatuses to channel and control mass support, have no ideology to forge state unity and national-popular cohesion,

and are marked by a rigid apportionment of state power among distinct political clans linked to each apparatus. These make exceptional states vulnerable to sudden collapse as contradictions and pressures accumulate such that the transition to democracy will also be ruptural and crisis-prone. The collapse of the military dictatorships in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s (Greece, Portugal, Spain) or of the socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe (think especially of Romania) are exemplary here.

NATIONAL STATES AND NATION-STATES

It is common to use the terms national state and nation-state interchangeably, but this can be confusing when precision is needed in discussing the modern state. A national state can be defined as a state that successfully claims a constitutionalized monopoly of the use of organized coercion within a relatively large territorial area that comprises more than one city and its hinterland. This excludes city-states, but is compatible with small states (e.g., Denmark, Ireland) as well as quasi-continental states (e.g., the USA, Russia). A nation-state is a state with a population that is identified in terms of one or more forms of nationhood. The three main forms, which can be combined in different ways, are the ethnic nation (Volksnation) based on a shared, real or fictive, ethnic identity; the cultural nation (Kulturnation) based on a shared culture, whether through inter-generational transmission or the acculturation of new subjects; and the state nation (Staatsnation) based on patriotic identification with the constitution, the head of state, or the national state. In ideal typical terms, these forms of nation-state are reflected in Germany, France, and the USA respectively. Discussions of how globalization undermines the nation-state generally refer to the ways in which it weakens the territorial and temporal sovereignty of national states rather than its direct impact on national identity – which could be reinforced by globalization or, alternatively, weakened through the development of more multi-ethnic or multi-cultural populations or lead to a situation of divided, cross-border loyalties (cf. Jessop 2002).

THE FUTURE OF THE CAPITALIST TYPE OF STATE: TRENDS AND COUNTER-TRENDS

Focusing on the forms and functions of the state also enables us to identify three key trends in the transformation and re-functionalization of the contemporary advanced capitalist state. These are the de-nationalization of the state, the de-statization of politics, and the internationalization of policy regimes.

First, there has been a general trend towards the *de-nationalization of the state*. This is reflected in claims that the national state is being ‘hollowed out’ as old and new state capacities are reorganized territorially and functionally on subnational, national, supra-national, and trans-local levels. This essentially affects the re-articulation of the *territorial* boundaries of states and entails a diminishing role for national frontiers. Thus, de- and re-nationalization are essentially concerned with the *territorial* boundaries of state power and the extent to which these coincide with the frontiers of mutually recognizing territorial (or national) sovereign states. They do not directly affect states in their aspect, if any, of nation-statehood. Nonetheless, these processes may be triggered by struggles over the form and future of nation-state, leading to secession, federalism, revanchisme, and so on that also redraw state boundaries. In relation to de-nationalization, then, some capacities move up to a growing number of pan-regional,

pluri-national, or international bodies with a widening range of powers; others are devolved to restructured local or regional levels of governance in the national state; and others are usurped by emerging horizontal networks of power – local and regional – that by-pass central states and connect localities or regions in several nations.

Second, a general trend towards the *de-statization of the political system* is reflected in a shift from the predominance of government to greater reliance on governance on various territorial scales and across various functional domains. Whilst, the first trend concerns the *territorial dispersion* of the national state's activities, the second involves functional reorganization in the broader political system on whatever territorial scale the state acts. Governance refers to mechanisms and strategies of co-ordination in the face of complex reciprocal interdependence among operationally autonomous actors, organizations, and functional systems. Four forms are relevant here: *ex post* coordination based on the formally rational pursuit of self-interest (anarchic market exchange); *ex ante* imperative coordination in pursuit of substantive collective goals established from above (hierarchical command); continuing self-organization based on networks, negotiation, and deliberation to redefine goals in the light of changing circumstances (heterarchic coordination); and solidarity based on unconditional commitment to the state, its citizens, or the nation. Networked governance is especially suited for systems (non-political as well as political) that are resistant to top-down internal and/or external command, but cannot be left to the market's invisible hand. At stake, here is the increased importance of quite varied forms (and levels) of partnership between the official, parastatal, and nongovernmental organizations in managing economic and social relations. The growth of networked governance is linked to the growing complexity of the problems confronting states, the extent to which they require concerned action across many social fields, many scales of action, and places spread across the frontiers of several states, and the extent to which the anarchy of the market cannot secure effective solutions. This also involves a shift from the top-down hierarchical political organization characteristic of sovereign states to an emphasis on promoting and/or steering the self-organization of inter-organizational relations. Partnerships and networks have a major role here and can – in principle – connect political activities across different scales and issues and provide the flexibility that a top-down, bureaucratic form of authority could not (Jessop 2002; Kooiman 2003; Messner 1998).

Third, there is a dual trend towards the *internationalization of policy regimes*. The key players in policy regimes have also expanded to include the foreign agents and institutions as sources of policy ideas, policy design, and implementation. And the international context of domestic state action has extended to include a widening range of extra-territorial or transnational factors and processes; and it has become more significant strategically for domestic policy. This is especially evident in the enormous expansion of international regimes of varying kinds as well as the development of international non-governmental and civil society organizations (cf. Drori et al. 2006; Meyer et al. 1997).

Each trend is also associated with a counter-trend that both qualifies and transforms its significance for the form of the state and its economic and social policies. This combination of trend and counter-trend involves more than the presence of complex 'conservation-dissolution' effects associated with successive stages in societal development. Such effects certainly exist in so far as past forms and functions are conserved and/or dissolved as the state is transformed. But, the counter-trends noted above are specific reactions to the new trends rather than survivals of earlier patterns. This is why, they are better seen as counter-trends to the trends, rather than vice versa.

Countering the de-nationalization of statehood are the increased attempts of national states to retain control over the articulation of different spatial scales in the face of an emerging

'relativization of scale'. Under Atlantic Fordism, it was the national level of economic and political organization that was primary. Thus the post-WWII international order was designed to support national economies and states; and local and regional states in turn acted mainly as relays of the national state. The current globalization-regionalization dialectic involves a proliferation of spatial scales, their relative dissociation in complex tangled hierarchies (rather than a simple nesting of scales), a shift towards network governance, and an increasingly convoluted mix of scale strategies as various economic and political forces seek the most favourable conditions for their insertion into the changing international order. The national scale has lost its taken-for-granted primacy in the economic and political organization of Atlantic Fordism. But, this does not mean that some other scale of economic and political organization (whether 'global' or 'local', 'triadic' or 'urban') has yet acquired (or could ever acquire) a similar primacy. Nonetheless, in the absence of a supranational state with powers equivalent to those of the national state, the de-nationalization of statehood is linked to constantly renewed attempts by national states to re-claim power by managing the relationship among different scales of economic and political organization.

Countering the shift towards governance is government's increased role in *meta-governance*. This should not be confused with the survival of state sovereignty as the highest instance of government nor with the emergence of some form of 'mega-partnership' to which all other partnerships are somehow subordinated. Rather, governments (on various scales) are becoming more involved in organizing the self-organization of markets, partnerships, networks, and governance regimes. In other words, states enact various forms of 'governance in the shadow of hierarchy'. States are not confined to hierarchical command, but combine all four forms of governance in different ways. They also monitor how these mechanisms are working and may seek to modify the combinations accordingly (cf. Dunsire 1996 on collibration; Kooiman 2003 on meta-governance). In engaging in meta-governance, states provide the ground rules for governance; ensure the compatibility of different governance mechanisms and regimes; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive expectations; act as a 'court of appeal' for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to re-balance power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities, and interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics; and also assume political responsibility in the event of governance failure. It falls to the state to facilitate collective learning about functional linkages and material interdependencies among different sites and spheres of action. And it falls to politicians – local as well as national – to participate in developing the shared visions that can link complementary forms of governance and maximize their effectiveness. Such tasks are conducted by states not only in terms of their contribution to particular state functions but also in terms of their implications for political class domination and social cohesion.

Somewhat ambiguously countering yet reinforcing the internationalization of policy regimes is the growing '*interiorization*' of international constraints as the latter become integrated into the policy paradigms and cognitive models of domestic policy-makers. This process is not confined to the level of the national state: it is also evident at the local, regional, cross-border, and inter-regional levels as well as in the activities of so-called 'entrepreneurial cities' (e.g., Paul 2004). The relativization of scale makes such identification of international norms, conventions, and regimes significant at all levels of economic and political organization and, indeed, leads to concerns with the complex dialectics of spatial articulations that is reflected in such phenomena as 'glocalization'. At the same time there are increasing struggles

by states to shape the form of international regimes and the manner in which they operate. This applies especially to the more powerful states in the state system and is one of the factors behind the formation of regional blocs. This tendency is, once again, especially clear in the context of the global economic crisis as the search for a new global financial and economic architecture proceeds apace.

IS STATE THEORY EUROCENTRIC?

State theory has tended to be too influenced by Northern experience. This makes it hard to assess its relevance to states in the semi-periphery or periphery of world society that are less likely to have normal (or bourgeois democratic) forms of capitalist state and where exceptional forms of state also tend to be different. Thus, different (and differently related) economic and political institutions are said to characterize social formations in the 'South' when compared with the liberal democratic market economies of the 'North'.⁶ In North East Asia and parts of South (East) Asia, this is reflected in work on the developmental state; and, in Latin America and parts of North and South Africa, in studies of the dependent capitalist state (Cumings 1999:81). This is not just a question of incomplete modernization, to be overcome as laggard economies catch-up and converge on some Western version of modern capitalism (cf. Wolf 1982). More generally, many states in the South have been described as exceptional (or non-democratic) regimes and, in some cases as failed or rogue states. Whether a third or fourth wave of democratization can remedy this is a debateable. Meanwhile, we should consider whether state theory is inherently Eurocentric or can be developed in a more general way. This is especially problematic in societies that lack their own concepts for the 'state' in its Westphalian sense and, indeed, treat the prevailing institutions and conjunctural issues of political authority as being deeply embedded within the wider social formation.

Some problems of applying Eurocentric categories and theories to 'the South' can be illustrated from the analysis of East Asian economic growth.⁷ Three accounts dominate: market-centred, developmentalist, and culturalist. The former attributes economic growth to the state's role in providing the appropriate extra-economic and fisco-financial conditions for market forces to operate effectively in setting prices and incentivizing investment from the viewpoint of medium- to long-term growth. State-centric arguments suggest that East Asia's 'economic miracles' depended crucially on wide and effective state intervention, targeted industrial policies, and the primacy of substantive criteria of economic performance over the formal rationality of market forces. The third explanation invokes specific cultural factors and is exemplified by – but certainly not limited to – the confused, overextended idea of 'Confucian capitalism'. None of these accounts is satisfactory individually and, together, they reproduce the problematic Enlightenment conceptual triplet of market-state-civil society, which is often quite inappropriate for analyzing the other social formations.

East Asian social formations are not characterized by a distinct realm of market forces, a hierarchically organized and institutionally distinct sovereign state, or bourgeois civil society. Markets are heavily linked to networks controlling economic, political, and social resources;

⁶I use this metaphor to refer to advanced capitalist societies in the northern hemisphere plus their equivalents in the southern hemisphere (e.g., Australia, New Zealand). South refers to the Third World or Global South.

⁷Some scholars deny that an East Asian economic miracle occurred, arguing that the high growth rates were simply factor-driven (e.g., Krugman 1994).

states are not institutionally demarcated but have blurred boundaries and may be organized in terms of fiefdoms and other forms of parallel power network; and citizenship and individualism are linked to collectivities, ethnicity, and so on. Thus, Enlightenment categories are not well-suited to grasp the complexity and interdependence of economic and extra-economic activities, organizations, and institutions. Indeed, there are also good grounds for arguing that even in the West, these categories are fetishistic and inadequate, as the analysis of growth poles like Silicon Valley or the Third Italy, the different forms of governance that characterize so-called 'varieties of capitalism', or general terms such as the 'military-industrial complex', state monopoly capitalism, the knowledge-based economy, or global city networks might indicate. To avoid these problems, one should locate developmental states in the context of the world market, inter-state system, and the emergence of a world society (for studies that touch on some of these dimensions, see: Chang 2007; Chibber 2003; Evans 1995; Kang 2002; Kohli 2004; Weiss and Hobson 1995).

A separate issue concerns states that do not share many of the characteristics of the modern state (including here developmental states). In many cases in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia, kinship and tribal loyalties count for more than the typical institutions of the modern state or plausible simulacra of such institutions. In these regions, states sometimes operate in a kleptocratic manner as warlords, mafias, predatory bodies that collect tribute or 'loot' from local, regional, national, or international trade in natural resources (including oil, coltan, diamonds and drugs) (see, for example, Badie 2000; Bayart et al. 1999; Jackson 1980). In the Middle East, there is a widespread religious revival linked to emergent national identities, many of which underpin aspirations to independent statehood (e.g., Shiites in southern Lebanon, Palestinians in Gaza).

SOME NEW THEMES

Notwithstanding the declining interest in the more esoteric and abstract modes of state theorizing that dominated the 1970s and early 1980s, substantive critical research on specific features of states and state power exploded from the 1990s onwards. The crisis of the national state form in advanced capitalist social formations (even as it has become more important in state- and nation-building following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc) led to new state-theoretical concerns and/or attempts to develop alternative ways of understanding politics that bypassed a focus on the formal institutions of the sovereign state. These questions include: the historical variability of statehood (or stateness); the relative strength or weakness of states; the changing forms and functions of the state; issues of scale, space, territoriality, and the state; the future of the national state in an era of globalization; and the rise of governance as a distinctive mode of coordination that differs from markets and state command and its articulation with government.

There has been growing interest in factors that make for state strength. Internally, this refers to a state's capacities to exercise authority over events and social forces in the wider society; externally, it refers to the state's power in the inter-state system. This concern is especially marked in recent theoretical and empirical work on predatory and/or developmental states. The former are essentially parasitic upon their economy and civil society, exercise largely the despotic power of command, and may eventually undermine the economy, society, and the state itself. Developmental states also have infrastructural and network power and deploy it to in allegedly market-conforming ways. Unfortunately, the wide variety of interpretations of strength (and weakness) threatens coherent analysis. States have been described as strong because they have a large public sector, authoritarian rule, strong societal support,

a weak and gelatinous civil society, cohesive bureaucracies, an interventionist policy, or the power to limit external interference. In addition, some studies run the risk of tautology insofar as strength is defined purely in terms of outcomes. A possible theoretical solution is to investigate the scope for variability in state capacities by policy area, over time, and in specific conjunctures. In this way one could test which particular state capacities with respect to which policy fields and economic sectors, over what spatio-temporal horizons of action, and in which circumstances are effective in promoting economic performance. For example, state capacities that promote catch-up export-led growth in low-tech sectors may not be equally appropriate to consolidating innovation-led competitiveness in knowledge-intensive sectors once catch-up is achieved.

Recent work on globalization casts fresh doubt on the future of national territorial states in general and nation-states in particular. This issue is also raised by scholars interested in the proliferation of scales on which significant state activities occur, from the local through the urban and regional to cross-border and continental cooperation and a range of supranational entities. Nonetheless initial predictions of the imminent demise of the national territorial state and/or the nation-state have been proved wrong. This reflects the adaptability of state managers and state apparatuses, the continued importance of national states in securing conditions for economic competitiveness, political legitimacy, social cohesion, and so on, and the role of national states in coordinating the state activities on other scales from the local to the triad to the international and global levels. Nonetheless, the classic 'nation-state' is more constrained than in the past, even more so among less developed countries than Western states.

The increased significance of governance, i.e., networked forms of self-organization rather than hierarchical forms of command and control, as opposed to government; and their role within the overall exercise of class and state powers. States have generally relied in varying degree on market mechanisms, planning and command, networks, and solidarity to pursue state projects and at stake in this debate is the changing weight of these different mechanisms and their forms of coordination. Governance operates on different scales of organization (ranging from the expansion of international and supra-national regimes through national and regional public-private partnerships to more localized networks of power and decision-making). Although this trend is often taken to imply a diminution in state capacities, it could well enhance its power to secure its interests and, indeed, provide states with a new (or expanded) role in the meta-governance (or overall coordination) of different governance regimes and mechanisms (Messner 1998; Slaughter 2004; Zeitlin and Pochet 2005). A final issue here concerns whether 'good governance' can compensate for such economic and democratic deficits.

Interest in governance is sometimes linked to the question of 'failed' and 'rogue' states. All states fail in certain respects and normal politics is an important mechanism for learning from, and adapting to, failure. In contrast, 'failed states' lack the capacity to reinvent or reorient their activities in the face of recurrent state failure in order to maintain 'normal political service' in domestic policies. The discourse of 'failed states' is often used to stigmatize some regimes as part of inter-state as well as domestic politics. This term is probably justified for predatory states, i.e., those whose officials 'live off' the surplus and other resources of specific classes or the population more generally without securing the conditions for expanded reproduction. Other names for this phenomenon are kleptocracies and vampire states. A judicious mix of good governance and liberal market reforms is often recommended in such cases but this is not a universal panacea. As in other cases of external pressure or external intervention, it is internal state capacities and the internal balance of forces (as modified by external factors) that is the primary determinant of transformation. While there are some successes of 'good governance' policies (e.g., Rwanda), there are many examples of serious

and continuing failures (e.g., Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, the former Belgian Congo). Rogue states can be defined as states whose actions are held to threaten the prevailing international order. While some 'rogue states' are also 'failed states', others are brittle but strong exceptional states (e.g., North Korea, Myanmar). Rogue states are usually identified by hegemonic or dominant states that have the strongest voice in shaping this order and this has invited the counter-hegemonic critical response that the USA itself has been the worst rogue state for many years (e.g., Blum 2001; Chomsky 2001). Charges and counter-charges of this kind indicate that terms such as 'failed' and 'rogue' states are heavily contested – but this does not mean that the validity of claims cannot be tested against specific criteria.

Closely linked to this interest in government, governance, and meta-governance is a tendency for a Marxist rapprochement with Foucauldian work on governmentality – prompted in part by the later Foucault's growing interest in the role of the state as a site for the strategic codification of power relations and his work on governmentality as a distinctive type of statecraft that complements more micro- and meso-level forms of disciplinary power. In contrast to his earlier hostility to theorizing the state and his emphasis on the micro-physics of power, Foucault turned to *raison d'état*, statecraft, and state projects. Combined with his heuristically powerful analytics of power, this has provided the basis for research that synthesizes in different ways Marxist and Foucauldian themes (e.g., Hannah 2000; Mitchell 2002).

There is also interest in the changing scales of politics. While some theorists are inclined to see the crisis of the national state as displacing the primary scale of political organization and action to either the global or the regional scale, others suggest that there has been a relativization of scale. For, whereas the national state provided the primary scale of political organization in the Fordist period of post-WWII European and North American boom, the current after-Fordist period is marked by the dispersion of political and policy issues across different scales of organization, with none of them clearly primary. This in turn poses problems about securing the coherence of action across different scales. This has prompted interest in the novelty of the European Union as a new state form, the re-emergence of empire as an organizing principle, the prospects for a global state, networks of world cities as a new form of Hanseatic League, and the revival of subnational regions as key economic and political players in political economy (for examples, see respectively Beck and Grande 2007; Brenner 2004; Shaw 2000; Taylor 2004; Ohmae 1995).

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding review has identified some major unresolved issues in many mainstream and heterodox approaches to the state. First, apart from the common starting point academic literature and state practice that the state involves the territorialization of political power, many questions remain unanswered about state forms and inter-state relations, their functional necessity and/or historical contingency, and their articulation with wider sets of social relations. Linked to this is the tendency to focus on one or two forms of state (e.g., the Westphalian state, the Weberian modern state) as if they were typical of all states or else to retreat into detailed ethnographic studies and/or highly specific historical analyses that do not lend themselves to systematic comparison and theory construction. Second, closely linked to, and reinforcing, this set of issues, is the inherent polymorphy and pluri-functionality of the state apparatus. States have been organized to pursue very different economic strategies, state projects, and societal visions and it is important to integrate this into theories of the state. One major implication of this second point is that we cannot take the capitalist nature of the state

for granted even in societies characterized by the dominance of capitalist relations of production. Third, there are major issues about the future of the state as a core institutional arrangement in complex social formations – with advances and retreats, transformations and revivals, changing functions and new forms of public-private partnership evident on a continuing basis. Fourth, while some regard state failure as an aberration and others see state failure as an inherent tendency in the state, it is important to provide a more nuanced account of state failure and the capacities of states to engage in state reform and meta-governance. Fifth, more research is needed into the appropriate scales of state action, governance, and meta-governance in relation to the growing complexities of the world market, world politics, and the emerging world society. Particularly, problematic here is the unresolved search for a new scale (or the reassertion of the national scale) that can handle both the ‘little’ and the ‘big’ problems confronting contemporary societies. These processes have been more discussed in the ‘North’ but they are also influencing the ‘South’. Finally, given that the state is no longer taken for granted as the primary locus of political action, social solidarity, or ethico-political authority, there are important issues about how to re-ground and re-legitimate state actions, how to redesign it to suit the new functions, and how to facilitate the delivery of old and new tasks.

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CHAPTER 4

Public Opinion, Public Policy, and Democracy

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Debates about the impact of public opinion on public policy are organized around a “should” and an “is.” Almost everyone agrees that in a democracy public policy should be strongly affected by public opinion. But there is a lot of disagreement about how strong the effect is. Is it as strong as it should be, meaning that the democratic political process is working well? Or is it much weaker, meaning that the democratic political process is working badly?

The past couple of decades have favored the “strong effect” view. Most studies show opinion influencing policy; some show its impact to be extremely powerful (Burstein 2003a; Erikson et al. 1993; Erikson et al. 2002). But, a counter-argument has emerged. Benjamin Page (2002), long seen as a proponent of the strong effect view, has reversed course and now argues that key studies overestimate the impact of opinion on policy: The studies (1) focus on issues on which the government is especially likely to be responsive, (2) measure opinion and policy in ways that hide instances of nonresponsiveness, and (3) ignore powerful forces that undermine the public’s influence on policy. “If we accept a populist democratic theory that calls for close adherence of policy to the preferences of ordinary citizens,” Page writes (2002: 342), “then the U.S. political system has a long way to go before it becomes fully democratic.”

This chapter agrees with Page – up to a point. To improve our estimates of the impact of public opinion on public policy, we must indeed study a wider range of issues, reassess how decisions about measurement affect our conclusions, and take into account the forces potentially more powerful than the public. But when we do, we will likely discover that studying a wider range of issues forces us to rethink our standards for deciding how well the democratic political process is working; that some decisions about measurement may lead us to underestimate, rather than overestimate, the impact of opinion on policy; and that organized interests may enhance, rather than undermine, the impact of opinion on policy.

EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON PUBLIC POLICY

The advent of scientific public opinion polling in the 1930s and 1940s made it possible to base debates about the impact of public opinion on public policy on data rather than speculation. Competing groups of theorists had very different views of how strong the impact was likely to be. Adherents of “democratic theory” (e.g., Dahl 1971; Mayhew 1974; Stimson et al. 1995) took democratic institutions seriously, believed that such institutions enable the public to control the government, and expected to find opinion strongly influencing policy. Adherents of a variety of other approaches, including Marxist, multiple elite, and neopluralist (see, e.g., Domhoff 2002a, b; Manley 1983; Schattschneider 1960; and the reviews in Lowery and Gray 2004; McFarland 2007) disagreed among themselves about who did control the government but agreed that it wasn’t the general public.

Who is right? Is public opinion the key determinant of public policy? Or are other forces much more powerful? For at least a couple of decades, research has favored the “strong effect” view. Erikson et al.’s (1993: 80) conclusion that the strength of the opinion-policy correlation is “awesome” and Stimson et al. (1995: 557) that “there exists about a one-to-one translation of preferences into policy” may seem a bit hyperbolic (e.g., Page 2002: 327), but most studies do find opinion affecting policy, often quite strongly (Burstein 1998a, 2003a). With regard to expenditures on important policies, government and public respond to each other meaningfully over time: the government responds to the public’s preferences for changes in spending, and the public, in turn, reacts to the government’s response and adjusts its preferences accordingly – when the public wants expenditures raised, the government raises them, and when the public is satisfied, it ceases asking for increases (Wlezien 1995, 2004; Soroka and Lim 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2005). Other studies point in the same direction (see, e.g., Brooks and Manza 2007; Erikson et al. 2002; and the reviews in Weakliem 2005 and Wlezien and Soroka 2007). There is even some evidence that public opinion matters when other forces (such as interest organizations, the party balance, and elites’ activities) are taken into account (Burstein 2003a: 34–35). So convincing is the evidence that sociologists, long doubtful about the public’s influence on government, have come to take opinion seriously (e.g., Agnone 2007; McAdam and Su 2002; Soule and Olzak 2004; see also Burstein 1998a; Weakliem 2005).

It may be argued, however, that the “strong effect” conclusions rest on a weak foundation. For one thing, Page (2002) argues, our studies find opinion strongly affecting policy because we have public opinion data mostly for issues on which government responsiveness is especially likely – issues important to the public (see Page and Shapiro 1983; Burstein 2003a, 2006). Our conclusions are based on a biased sample of issues. To improve our estimate of the impact of opinion on policy, we need an unbiased sample.

Unfortunately, no one has ever studied such a sample. But one study comes closer than any other, and it is instructive to describe it. That is a study of a stratified random sample of 60 bills (or “policy proposals”), excluding those dealing with appropriations, introduced into the 101st congress, 1989–1990 (Burstein et al. 2005). Some of the policy proposals dealt with matters of great public importance, including the savings and loan bailout and the rights of the disabled. Others were of middling importance, including proposals on the transport of solid waste, and health care for veterans. And some mattered to relatively few people, such as proposals concerning tariffs on specific products, the transfer of naval vessels to the Philippines, and patents on inventions developed in outer space (see the list in Burstein 2006: 2278–2279).

As Page surmises, survey data were available for most of the 26 proposals important to the public – defined as salient to at least 1% of the public – but not for most of the remaining 34 (Burstein 2006: 2278–2279). If we estimated the impact of opinion on policy only for those proposals with public opinion data – and what else could we do? – we would surely find a stronger relationship than if we had public opinion data on all 60.

But what if the public had been surveyed specifically on all 60 policy proposals – that is, if the public had been asked about the particular proposals, not just the typical questions about policy in some very broad domain?

There have been long and enlightening debates about how much people know about politics, how much information they need to express policy preferences meaningfully, and the extent to which the information they have has been manipulated by elites (see, e.g., Althaus 2003; Brooks 2006; Converse 2000; Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; on a specific recent issue, the Bush tax cuts, see Bartels 2005, 2007, 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Lupia et al. 2007). One thing is very clear: Most people know very, very little. The implicit subject of the debates, therefore, is essentially whether conventional views of democracy can be saved. Perhaps individuals are not as ignorant and unsophisticated about politics as they appear to be; sometimes, they are able to make quite sophisticated judgments about complex policy alternatives (Hansen 1998; Lupia 1994; Arceneaux 2005). Even if they are generally ignorant and unsophisticated as individuals, perhaps their opinions are rational in the aggregate (Converse 2000; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; Page and Shapiro 1992; also see Zaller 1999). Perhaps people don't need to know much to act sensibly in their own interests; they can use heuristics to make adequate sense of a complex political world (Brooks 2006; Matsusaka 2005; Zaller 1992). Perhaps parties provide information and keep options so simple that voters' choices make sense (Snyder and Ting 2002).

These debates, however, ignore the implications of the sampling bias described above. Studies that find people *very poorly* informed focus on the issues on which they're actually *best* informed – the major issues most often asked about by polling organizations.

This has very important implications for debates about the impact of public opinion on public policy. The proponents of all the approaches to democratic responsiveness described above share a key assumption – that people have opinions. The proponents of democratic theory hypothesize that opinion determines policy; their opponents hypothesize that powerful groups get the government to adopt policies other than those the public wants.

But, what if people don't have opinions? On some of the 60 proposals, most people probably would have had opinions – for example, on the Americans with Disabilities Act, the savings and loan bailout, and establishing a Department of Environmental Protection. On many, though, they wouldn't. It's hard to imagine most people having opinions on vehicle weight limitations on highways, interstate transport of solid waste, standardizing the measurement of bolts, or transferring programs to the Rural Development Administration; people don't even know the issues exist.

Thus, if we asked the public for its opinions on all 60 policy proposals, or any unbiased sample of issues, we would find the government less responsive to public opinion than some recent studies claim, as Page suggests, because the government is less likely to respond to the public on issues the public doesn't care very much about. But we would also find that on a great many issues, the government won't respond to public opinion because it can't – public opinion doesn't exist (Althaus 2003; Zaller 1992).

This presents a problem for the conventional way of deciding how well the democratic political process is working – the extent to which, in Page's words, there is "close adherence

of policy to the preferences of ordinary citizens.” In this view, politics is zero-sum. Either the public gets what it wants, and (allegedly) powerful groups don’t, or the powerful groups get what they want and the public doesn’t. If the public wins, the democratic process is seen as working well; if it loses, the process is working badly.

What if the government doesn’t respond to public opinion because public opinion doesn’t exist? From a conventional standpoint – high responsiveness good, low responsiveness bad – we would have to conclude that democracy is not working. But such a conclusion seems misguided. It’s not as though the public is losing to special interests; the public simply doesn’t know or care what Congress does. The conventional standard is irrelevant.

At this point, something must be said very briefly about two common arguments about public opinion and public policy – that the public’s ability to get what it wants is limited by the ability of the powerful to keep issues off the legislative agenda, and that strong relationships between opinion are more apparent than real because public opinion is manipulated by elites.

It is sometimes said that the powerful often get what they want by keeping policy proposals they oppose off the agenda entirely (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz 1962). To be convincing, the proponents of this view have to show that the public favors particular policy proposals, that the proposals are kept off the agenda, and that this happens often enough to matter. There seem to be no studies that do this. Researchers sometimes assume issues are off the legislative agenda when in fact they’re being considered (see the exchange between Block (2003) and Burstein (2003b)). Researchers may also presume that the public favors a particular policy without having data to support their claim. Presumptions without data cannot be taken seriously.

Do elites manipulate public opinion? Certainly they try. But do they often succeed? A great deal of research shows that it’s very difficult to manipulate public opinion (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989: Chap. 8; Neuman et al. 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Riker 1982: Chap. 9; Zaller 1992: Chap. 12; 1994). Claims that particular policy debates were affected by the manipulation of public opinion sometime prove to be unfounded (for example, on the Clinton health care plan, see Blendon et al. 1995). And the difference between manipulation and education often seems subjective. We want people to be open to new information about policy alternatives. At what point do attempts to provide information shift from education to manipulation? No one has ever been able to establish a bright-line rule that would distinguish between the two. This is not to say that manipulation never succeeds; but evidence that it does so frequently is scarce.

Thus, starting with what seems like a methodological issue – sampling bias – we are led to important conclusions about the normative framework that underlies so many studies of the impact of opinion on policy: it’s a mistake to use perfect responsiveness, explicitly or implicitly, as a standard for deciding what our findings mean. We need to stop expressing gloom when we find responsiveness less than perfect (e.g., Page 2002: 342–343) and exultation when it appears that responsiveness is extremely high (Erikson et al. 1993: 80; Stimson et al. 1995: 557).

But the public does have opinions on many issues. And even when the public has no opinion about specific policy proposals, people can have broad opinions about the direction they want policy to go – for example, more or less conservative, or for more or less spending in a policy domain. When we consider policies on which the public does have opinions, the differences between theories become relevant, and we do need to ask how strongly public opinion affects public policy. Then, we have to ask how well we are served by the conventional approaches to measuring public opinion, public policy, and the relationship between them.

GAUGING THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON PUBLIC POLICY

In one of the most influential articles ever published on the relationship between public opinion and public policy, Page and Shapiro (1983) examined congruence in the movement of public opinion and policy in the USA between 1935 and 1979: Does policy move in the same direction as public opinion, in the opposite direction, or not at all? They sorted through hundreds of surveys (before electronic databases existed!) to find over 3,300 questions about policy preferences, and then narrowed their research down to 357 issues for which questions had been asked repeatedly and there had been significant opinion change. Of 231 cases in which opinion and policy both changed, there was congruence – and policy moved in the same direction – for 66% (p. 178). This degree of congruence they interpret as “rather substantial” (p. 179). “Opinion changes,” they conclude (with standard academic caveats, p. 189) “are important causes of policy change.”

Their conclusion depends completely on how they measure opinion and policy, and define and operationalize “congruence.” Do they use a strict standard, in which the public is asked its preferences about a specific policy, and that specific policy changes in the same direction as opinion? Or do they use a looser standard, in which the public is asked about some fairly broad policy area, and some specific policy among many within that area changes generally in the same direction as public opinion? When Page and Shapiro wrote, there were no conventional standards for matching public opinion and policy. They had to develop their own.

Here is how they describe what they did (pp. 176–177): “Our change-oriented design... permits simple, ordinary measurement of policy.... The analysis in this article is based on the full 357 instances of opinion change [reduced to the 231 in which policy changed for their final analysis], for all of which we have been able to code covariational congruence (or noncongruence) using at least one suitable measure of government policy. In many cases (57 percent), the best available measure is identical to the theoretically ideal measure agreed upon by both senior investigators on the precise wording of each survey item.” Page and Shapiro did not list their measures of public opinion or their measures of public policy, or describe how they matched the two. Their “techniques of policy measurement” (p. 177) were never published. It’s therefore impossible to evaluate their findings.

This failure to spell out the procedures upon which the article’s conclusions depend was not uncommon when Page and Shapiro published, and before the development of the World Wide Web it was not very practical to make raw data and details of the analysis process widely available (though they did invite interested persons to write them). But more recent studies addressing many policies are similarly vague. Monroe (1998: 11) does not detail his procedures, stating simply that the task of matching survey items to policies was not problematic “because most of the survey items dealt with what proved to be very specific policy proposals that were under consideration.” Brettschneider’s (1996: 296) analysis of opinion and policy in Germany is vague as well. Thus, if we want to check on the basis for conclusions about the relationship between opinion and policy, we find that we can’t.

Page (2002) rightly points out that decisions about measurement affect our conclusions about the relationship between opinion and policy. When we consider measurement closely, what do we find?

Measuring Public Opinion

There are two standard ways of analyzing the relationship between public opinion and public policy. Researchers interested in particular policies begin with measures of policy and then try

to find relevant measures of public opinion, while researchers interested in the impact of public opinion begin with measures of opinion and then look for relevant measures of policy. For example, researchers who are interested in congressional action on the Vietnam war focused first on what Congress did and then sought measures of what the public wanted (Burstein and Freudenburg 1978; McAdam and Su 2002), while Page and Shapiro (1983), primarily interested in the overall impact of opinion on policy, first found measures of opinion and then sought relevant measures of policy.

Both sets of researchers hope to find measures of public opinion on specific policies – that is, they'd like to know exactly what the public wants the government to do. Unfortunately, the public is seldom asked whether it favors or opposes specific policies (Burstein 2006); rarely, it is asked to choose among competing policy proposals on the agenda at a particular time (for examples, see Blendon et al. 1995; Lupia 1994). This presents researchers with a dilemma. If they study only the issues on which the public has been asked its preferences about specific policies, they will be able to study very few issues; but if they want to study other issues, they will have to use the measures of public opinion arguably related to the issues, but not to specific policy proposals (see Burstein 1998b: Chap. 3).

The Vietnam War provides a good example of this dilemma. American involvement in the war became intensely controversial; there was a lot of protest against it, and it affected congressional elections (Burstein and Freudenburg 1977). It's important to know if Congress responded to public opinion when ending American involvement.

Two major articles (Burstein and Freudenburg 1978; McAdam and Su 2002) claim to show how public opinion affected congressional action on the war. Ideally, the authors would have found that the public was asked repeatedly what it wanted Congress to do, and related the public's preferences to what Congress did. But the public wasn't asked what it wanted. Instead, respondents were asked repeatedly only if the USA made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam, and if they approved of how the president was handling the situation there (Burstein and Freudenburg 1978: 107; McAdam and Su 2002: 707).

Similar examples abound, even in studies that are very carefully and thoughtfully done. For example, Brooks and Manza (2007: 40) gauged the impact of public opinion on social welfare expenditures in 16 democratic countries, but they had no data on public opinion about expenditures; they considered instead the impact of opinion about the government's responsibility to provide jobs and reduce income differences between the rich and poor. Soule and Olzak (2004) estimated the impact of public opinion on ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment by state legislatures, but they had no data on public opinion about ratification, or even about the Equal Rights Amendment; they used instead the public's responses to a question about whether men and women should have equal roles in society. Agnone's (2007: 1598) analysis of the number of laws "favorable to the goals of the environmental movement" didn't include opinion about the enactment of any particular law, or environmental laws in general; instead, it asked about federal expenditures on the environment. And so on.

Thus, our measures of public opinion are often very poor, in the sense that they don't gauge opinion on the policies at issue, but rather on some arguably related topics. This makes it difficult to interpret our findings. What if we find no relationship between opinion and policy? Is that because there's no relationship, or because the question wasn't really about the policy in the first place? And if the two are related, what do findings about the strength of the relationship mean?

Of course, it's no secret that public opinion data don't exist for most policies legislatures consider. Many researchers deal with this problem using data not on the policy at issue, but on related topics, as just described. Others shift focus from opinion on particular policies to

opinions on broad types of policies, or even on politics in general. There are three common ways of doing this.

The first and probably most popular because of its simplicity, is to gauge public opinion with a question about self-proclaimed political ideology: do respondents think of themselves as conservative, moderate, or liberal? Most people are willing to answer this question, and their responses seem both reliable and valid – their answers are quite consistent over time and correlate with other relevant variables in predictable ways (Erikson et al. 1993: Chap. 2; among the studies using this or very similar measures are Fording 1997; Grattet et al. 1998).

The second approach is similar to the first conceptually, in that public opinion is described in broad terms, but is at a very different level methodologically. Stimson's "policy mood" is a measure of the public's "global preferences for a larger, more active federal government as opposed to a smaller, more passive one across the sphere of all domestic policy controversies" (except for abortion; Stimson et al. 1995: 548) – basically, whether the public wants federal policy to move in a liberal direction or a conservative one; see also Erikson et al. 2002: 193). But the measure is not based on a single question about ideology. Instead, it's based on an analysis of scores of questions about domestic policy asked repeatedly of Americans over several decades by multiple survey organizations – questions about race, taxes, the death penalty, medical care, jobs, education, and many other subjects – and Stimson's conclusion, after very extensive and careful analysis, is that many measures of public opinion cohere into one overall measure (Stimson 1999).

Finally, the third approach describes opinion at a level between the very specific – opinion about particular policies – and the very general. Wlezien and others use time series data to describe public opinion on government expenditures – "are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount?" – in broad policy domains, including defense, welfare, education, the environment (Wlezien 2004: 5; see also Soroka and Lim 2003; Soroka et al. 2005).

All three approaches have significant advantages over trying to link opinion and policy on specific issues. They enable researchers to study the opinion policy link when there are no public opinion data on specific policies; it doesn't even matter if most people have no opinion on specific policies. But the link between opinion and policy becomes hazy. Numerous policies in an area can be construed as liberal (Amenta et al. 2001: 225), and there are many ways to spend money in every policy domain. These measures of public opinion, however, provide no information at all as to what specifically the public wants.

It's hard to believe that findings about the impact of opinion on policy aren't affected by the decisions about how to measure public opinion. But, the impact of those decisions on our findings has never been seriously analyzed (though Brace et al. (2002) provide a promising start).

Measuring Public Policy

Describing and analyzing public opinion on policy issues is complex, but it takes place in an area that is very sophisticated, theoretically and methodologically. There are organizations devoted to collecting data on public opinion and ensuring and improving their quality (the National Opinion Research, the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, and many others); there have been academic journals devoted to public opinion for decades (the *Public Opinion Quarterly* began publication in 1937); a great deal of effort has been devoted to standardizing opinion measurement cross-nationally; and numerous experts survey aspects of the field on a regular basis (Glynn et al. 1999; Schaeffer and Presser 2003).

Almost none of this is true for public policy. Researchers often devote considerable effort to measure policy in their own studies (good examples include Erikson et al. 1993; Gray et al. 2004), and there has been progress in standardizing data on public expenditures as measures of policy (Brooks and Manza 2007). But there are no organizations devoted to measuring policy in the way organizations focus on public opinion, no experts on policy measurement in the way there are experts on public opinion, and no summaries of the literature aimed at systematizing and improving the policy measurement. However problematic measures of public opinion might be, measures of policy are much worse.

To begin with, measures of policy are much more heterogeneous than measures of opinion. As with public opinion, some measures have the virtue of simplicity, merely tabulating whether laws of a particular type have been enacted (e.g., Grattet et al. 1998 on hate crimes; Burstein 2002 on labor market discrimination; Mooney and Lee 2000 and Erikson 1976 on the death penalty; Agnone 2007 on the environment). Some researchers develop more complex indexes of various aspects of laws on issues like abortion (Wetstein 1996) or the environment (Hays et al. 1996). Some measures have the virtue of comprehensiveness, describing policy across many policy domains (e.g., Erikson et al. 1993, 2002). Seeking good quantitative measures, many researchers focus on a key type of policy output, namely government expenditures (or something analogous, like expenditures on a per capita basis; e.g., Bartels 1991; Hartley and Russett 1992; Wlezien 1996; 2004; Hill et al. 1995; Brooks and Manza 2007; Devine 1985). And some researchers argue for using legislators' votes or opinions as proxies for policy (e.g., Burstein and Freudenburg 1978; McAdam and Su 2002; Jackson and King 1989; Jacobs and Page 2005).

Most measures are developed on an ad hoc basis, and are unique to particular studies or the work of particular researchers. Very few (most notably the state policy measure developed by Erikson et al. 1993) are used as a resource for multiple studies (e.g., Gray et al. 2004; Radcliff and Saiz 1998). We might imagine that the characteristics or quality of such measures affect researchers' findings; for example, trends in the budgets of federal agencies look very different, depending on which budget measures are used (Gist 1982), and Page (2002) argues that using highly aggregated measures leads to overestimating the impact of opinion on policy.

What's more, the choice of measures might affect findings about the impact of forces other than public opinion on public policy. Interest organizations most often focus on policies of specific types – the Chamber of Commerce on business, the Sierra Club on environmental policies, AIPAC on policies pertaining to Israel (on the range of policies addressed by interest organizations, see Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Laumann and Knoke 1987: 376–377). Some measures of opinion and policy are very broad however. A broad measure of ideological liberalism may correlate strongly with a policy liberalism index based on policies in education, criminal justice, legalized gambling, tax progressivity, and other issues (Erikson et al. 1993). But the index is not likely to be affected by lobbying by any specific organizations – the organizations won't even be trying to affect most of the policies. The decision to use a broad measure of policy almost surely reduces the likelihood of finding that interest organizations affect policy as much as opinion does.

Even though researchers measure policy many ways, they almost never try, or even discuss, one approach that seems potentially very important: measuring what policy proposals or laws actually say, in any degree of detail. Serious attempts to do so have had almost no impact on measurement generally (e.g., Steinberg (1982) on labor law, Meyer et al. (Boli-Bennett and Meyer 1978) on constitutional provisions in many policy domains). I suspect that researchers fail to measure what laws say for a simple reason: doing so is very, very difficult (for a discus-

sion of some aspects of the problems, see Burstein et al. 2005). But there will be no progress without effort.¹

It's hard to believe that findings about the impact of opinion on policy aren't affected by decisions about how to measure policy. But the impact of those decisions on our findings has never been seriously analyzed (Gray et al. 2004: 420 do consider this briefly).

Deciding When Opinion and Policy Agree

If we want to improve our estimates of the impact of opinion on policy, we need to consider not only how opinion and policy are measured, but how the relationship between them is conceptualized and measured as well. Returning to Page and Shapiro (1983), surely the criteria for deciding whether opinion and policy were congruent affected their conclusions about the impact of opinion on policy.

A good example of the impact of research design may be found in one of the studies that finds the strongest relationships between opinion and policy (Stimson et al. 1995, and Erikson et al. 2002; see also Erikson et al. 1993). Erikson et al.'s (2002) measure of opinion – policy mood – was based on opinions about policies that could be described as liberal or conservative, and excluded opinions about foreign and agricultural policy. Their index of policy liberalism, in turn (Erikson et al. 2002: 374–380), began with a list of laws described as especially important (Mayhew 1991), but they then excluded from their index laws not readily described as liberal or conservative, and those in policy domains not relevant to their concerns, including foreign, defense, and agricultural policy, as well as laws seen as more local than national in scope – a total of 43% of the laws on the original list. They left out all laws considered relatively unimportant that is, most laws, and all proposals considered by Congress that didn't become law. That they find opinion strongly affecting policy should not be taken for granted, but it's clear that the correlation depends significantly on how they matched issues included in the mood measure to those in the policy measure. It's possible to figure this out from information they provide – they're not hiding anything – but they don't discuss the relationship between measurement decisions and results in as helpful a way as they might.

Probably, the work that best combines rigor with transparency when it comes to measurement is that of Wlezien and colleagues (Wlezien 1995, 2004; Soroka and Lim 2003; Soroka et al. 2005), who carefully trace how the public's opinions about expenditures in various policy domains influence actual expenditures, and how those expenditures in turn affect public opinion. Here, it's very clear that there's a close conceptual match between independent and dependent variables (opinion and policy), so that strong results can be taken seriously, and weak ones can be seen as real rather than as the product of measurement error.

Then there is the question of how the relationship between opinion and policy is measured. Weissberg (1976: Chap. 5) and Wlezien and Soroka (2007) describe four ways in which preferences can be related to policy to see if they are in agreement. The “majoritarian”

¹Public policy may be thought of in terms of implementation, rather than laws or even expenditures. Unfortunately, there are relatively few studies of the impact of public opinion on implementation. Those who study implementation are often not interested in public opinion, while those who study public opinion are seldom interested in implementation (Burstein 1998b: ch. 6).

approach (Weissberg 1976: 83) sees opinion and policy as agreeing if a majority of the public prefers the existing policy. The “policy consistency” approach (Wlezien and Soroka 2007, drawing on Monroe 1979, 1998) shifts the focus to change: opinion and policy are consistent if a majority of the public says it wants a policy change, and policy changes. The “covariation” approach also focuses on change, but adds comparisons across time or space. Either the public in a particular political unit is asked about the same policy more than once, or publics in different political units (such as US states) are asked about the same policy. If differences in policy preferences over time or across political units are associated with comparable differences in policy, then opinion and policy are said to covary; opinion is seen as potentially having affected policy. Finally, the “dynamic representation” approach (Wlezien and Soroka 2007, called the “satisfying” approach in Weissberg 1976: 84) focuses on the mutual relationship between opinion and policy. If policy changes in response to opinion, does opinion then respond to the changes in policy and in turn affect the subsequent changes in policy? – for example, does a preferences for increased defense expenditures lead to a rise in such expenditures, and does that rise in turn reduce the public’s demand for further increases (since the previous increase satisfies some people)?

Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. The majoritarian approach is the simplest and most consistent with commonsense ideas about democracy: is the government doing what a majority of the public wants? But researchers seldom use it, partly because most people don’t know what current policy is – for example, how much the US government spends on defense – and couldn’t choose sensibly among alternatives, and partly because responses often depend heavily on question wording (e.g., Best and McDermott 2007). The consistency approach can be problematic because we don’t know how sustained demands for change might be. In the covariation model, if change in public opinion leads to change in public policy, that suggests responsiveness in direction, but says nothing about level. Defense spending could go down when the public wants it to go down, but the level of expenditure could still be two or three times what the public wants (Page 2002: 330). And the dynamic representation approach may not be very useful for policy changes that are discontinuous (enacting an antidiscrimination law, for example, as opposed to changing expenditure levels).

Unfortunately, debates about the merits of each approach tend to be abstract; researchers acknowledge that there are multiple approaches and they claim that the one they’ve decided to use is best. But, they don’t try multiple approaches and compare the findings. We therefore don’t know how the choice of approach affects our findings and our understanding of democratic politics.

Given all these problems in measuring opinion, policy, and the relationship between them, what can we say about the impact of public opinion on public policy for those policies about which public opinion may be said to exist? Overall, the finding that opinion influences policy is amazingly robust – most studies show opinion affecting policy regardless of how opinion, policy, and the relationship between them is measured. It’s not possible to say anything very meaningful about how strong the relationship is, or how the strength depends on circumstances. Because better measures are often associated with finding stronger relationships (Hyslop and Imbens 2001; King et al. 1994: 157–68), it may be that the current approach to measuring public opinion leads us to underestimate its impact on policy.

Now, we turn to Page’s third criticism of much work on opinion and policy – that it overestimates the impact of opinion because it pays insufficient attention to the impact of other forces.

PUBLIC OPINION VERSUS OTHER FORCES

Everyone agrees that policy may be influenced by a variety of forces – public opinion, the activity of interest organizations, election results, party ideology, the mass media, relevant events, and so on. Yet, many studies of the impact of opinion ignore everything (or almost everything) other than opinion itself, including variables that might be related to both opinion and policy. This, according to Page (2002: 326–331), is likely to lead to overestimating the impact of opinion on policy. If we included such variables, we'd find that part of the influence now attributed to opinion would prove to be the product of other forces.²

What Page says is no doubt correct, up to a point. It's essential to include as many theoretically relevant variables as possible in the analyses of policy change, and doing so may lower our estimates of the impact of opinion on policy – but not necessarily. Page's view seems to be that as the influence of one factor goes up, the influence of others must go down. But, there are at least three other ways of thinking about how opinion, policy, and other variables may be related.

First, instead of viewing analyses of policy change as essentially a contest between variables – which is more important, public opinion or interest organizations? – the analyses could be seen as focusing on a contest between political opponents. What determines who wins – the opinion, interest organization activity, campaign contributions, media coverage, etc., on one side, versus all those forces on the other side? Often political struggles do not pit the public (whose preferences are gauged by public opinion) against, say, corporate interests. Instead, some parts of the public may share the policy preferences of some corporate interests, in opposition to other parts of the public and other corporate interests (see, e.g., Glasberg and Skidmore 1997; Kollman 1998). And sometimes it will be impossible to gauge the relative influence of different forces because almost everyone is on the same side (Smith 2000: 200). It is both common and tempting to see democratic politics as a zero-sum struggle, but there is no need to do so (Kollman 1998: 156; Soule and Olzak 2004: 493).

Second, possible determinants of policy may interact. Instead of policy being affected by public opinion or interest organizations, perhaps it's influenced by both, with each enhancing the impact of the other. Agnone (2007: 1606), for example, finds that the impact of public opinion on environmental policy is enhanced by environmental protest; Burstein (1998b: 115–116) discovers that public opinion on equal employment opportunity interacts with the activities of congressional leaders, with each increasing the impact of the other; and Soule and Olzak (2004: 491–492) find the impact of public opinion enhanced by the intensity of electoral competition between parties. More generally, a review (Burstein 2003a: 35) of the modest number of studies that include multiple determinants of policy shows that the inclusion of interest organizations, parties, and elite activities does not reduce the estimated impact of public opinion on policy, contrary to what Page plausibly expects (see also Gray et al. 2004).³ (Other interactions are possible, too. In their study of old age assistance at the state level, Amenta et al. (2005) find social movement organization activity more effective when the Democrats hold power. Wright and Schaffner (2002) contend that parties enhance public control over public policy.)

²It's easy to understand why researchers would focus only on a few variables. Particularly when a line of research is new, it can be difficult enough to theorize about relationships and collect data for a handful of variables, without taking on additional burdens; see Page and Shapiro (1983) on public opinion and Gamson (1975) on social movements.

³Many of these studies are problematic in ways already discussed, in terms of measurement, for example; but they do provide the soundest findings available.

It is fairly clear, upon reflection, why possible determinants of policy change would interact – they may affect the legislative action as part of a system rather than in isolation. Public opinion isn't going to influence a legislature automatically; legislators must be aware of it, and their response must be organized, most often, one would expect, by their own leaders (Burstein 1998b: Chaps. 4 and 5; see also Burstein and Hirsh 2007). While the policy process no doubt regularly operates as Page and others surmise – interest organizations defeat the public, in a zero-sum contest – we may also expect that often the process isn't zero-sum at all, that different actors may work together.

Third, and finally, are the many policies on which public opinion doesn't exist. Of course, those studying the impact of opinion on policy won't consider such policies, but we know there are a great many of them (see the discussion in Burstein 2006). When public opinion doesn't exist, forces other than the public get what they want, but there's no meaningful sense in which they may be said to have prevailed against the public.

Unfortunately, we can say very little about the influence of public opinion in opposition to, or in interaction with, other forces, because so few studies consider a wide range of likely determinants of policy change or analyze the determinants from a perspective other than "either it's this or it's that" (see Burstein and Linton 2002; Burstein 2003a).

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

Social scientists began studying the relationship between public opinion and public policy in large measure because they felt that at its best, democracy meant government responsiveness to the public. The advent of scientific public opinion polling gave them the opportunity to find out what the public wanted and see if the government did indeed respond. If the answer was yes, democracy was working; if no, it was not. And much of the study of the determinants of public policy has been organized around this view ever since: public opinion *or* special interests, public opinion *or* the power elite, public opinion *or* government bureaucrats – rule by the many, or rule by the few.

If we want to move forward in our understanding of public opinion and public policy, we must abandon this view.⁴ If the public has opinions, seldom will they be so well-known and understood, and so clearly linked to the public's likely voting behavior at the next election, that they will be transformed into policy directly. The public's preferences will be organized and transmitted through organizations. Most often, the political struggle won't be organizations against the public, but rather some organizations and some part of the public against other organizations and other parts of the public. And on most issues the public can't be said to have any opinions at all. Then, organizations will often be pitted against each other; on some issues, there may be organizations wanting change on one side, and no opposition on the other (Baumgartner and Leech 2001). Organizations can't be said to prevail over the public if the public doesn't care.

This doesn't mean we abandon the study of public opinion and public policy. Responsiveness still matters; but it's important to have realistic expectations and to design studies that more effectively get at the relationship between opinion and policy.

What would this mean? It would mean, for a start, overcoming sampling bias, measurement problems, and a tendency to ignore forces other than public opinion.

⁴As Kollman (1998: 162) writes, some of our findings about public opinion and other forces influencing policy are "hard to evaluate using a well-accepted standard of democracy."

As Gamson (1975) pointed out almost 35 years ago, we can't generalize about the impact of social movement organizations without defining a population of such organizations and sampling them. Similarly, if we want to understand the determinants of public policy, we need to define a population of policies and sample from it. Unfortunately, we don't even have a universally accepted definition of policy, much less a population of policies from which to sample (Burstein et al. 2005). It may not be desirable or even possible to settle on one "true" definition, but the development of a good operational definition and its use in generating a population and then a sample is essential – even multiple definitions, populations, and samples, provided everyone is clear about what they're doing.

We need to develop standardized ways to measure policy, public opinion, and the relationship between them. This won't be easy. Indeed, with regard to policy, surely one of the reasons we have made so little progress in conceptualization and measurement is that doing so is extremely difficult. To move forward most efficiently from where we are now, we need at least to consider how our various approaches to measurement influence results.

It has to be a bad idea to measure public opinion's impact on a policy by using whatever survey items are around, however loosely they may be connected to the policy in question. Ending this practice will mean abandoning much of the data we now have, but some current work successfully matches measures of opinion to measures of policy (notably the work of Wlezien and his collaborators and colleagues, e.g., Wlezien 2004; Soroka et al. 2005). We know that survey questions can be written and administered in ways that link them closely to policies on the agenda at the time (Hansen 1998; Lupia 1994; Blendon et al. 1995). It will be expensive to do this, but if we're going to make progress, we must do so.

And it has to be a bad idea to measure the relationship between public opinion and public policy by taking policy measures of uncertain quality along with opinion measures of uncertain relevance, and then assessing the match between them in ways that are either mostly intuitive, or stop with a finding that the relationship between them probably is not zero (which is what findings of statistical significance, the chief concern in so many studies, amount to; Burstein 2003a; Burstein and Linton 2002).

What will we find about the impact of opinion on policy if we proceed in this way? Using the conventional shorthand way of stating hypotheses, we would probably find that public opinion has no impact on most policies, because opinion won't exist; that with regard to policies on which opinion does exist, opinion will exert a fairly powerful influence, especially as organized by, or channeled through, interest organizations; and that general trends in public opinion (not on specific issues) will constrain policy in a general way (as in the neopluralist perspective described by Lowery and Gray 2004).

But we would hope to learn a great deal more: about the circumstances in which public opinion may be said to exist; how better to measure opinion, policy, and the relationship between them, and to assess how measurement decisions affect research findings; how responsiveness to public opinion varies across policy domains and political units; how to take into account more satisfactory relationships between public opinion and other forces influencing policy; and, finally, what it's reasonable to expect of democratic political systems once we stop using impossible-to-meet normative criteria. If this path is pursued, the study of opinion and policy will look very different in 20 years than it does today.

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CHAPTER 5

Democracy, Professions and Societal Constitutionalism

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The entire early sociology of professions, from its founding in the 1930s to the end of functionalists' domination of this subfield, in the late 1970s, revolved around two central premises. One was that professions are unique among occupations in the economy and their associations are unique among intermediary associations in civil society or, on the Continent, among direct or indirect agencies of the state. The other premise was that the presence of professions and their associations uniquely helps to establish and consolidate an advanced democracy. Quite remarkably, however, this insight at a conceptual level in the literature of professions was never brought centrally, by Talcott Parsons or anyone else, into the literature of comparative politics. Subsequently, following the eclipse of functionalism in this subfield, the putative connection between professions and democratic quality largely dropped out of sight in the professions literature.

Taken together, this trajectory of scholarly developments accounts for why today's burgeoning literature devoted to comparative democracy rarely mentions professionalism or professions at all, let alone incorporates them as a set of variables central to either democratic consolidation or democratic quality.¹ What we demonstrate in this paper is that if one takes seriously the professions–democracy interrelationship, this yields a typology of “institutional designs” of state–civil society structures and institutions that differs substantially from those typical in the field. These typologies focus narrowly on characteristics of the polity, state or regime, not the factors encompassing intermediary associations in civil society.

One result of bringing the professions–democracy interrelationship centrally into play is a societal constitutional approach to democratic consolidation and democratic quality. Such an approach emphasizes the importance to advanced democracy of certain structures in civil society, such as professional associations (and corporate governance structures of a certain kind), as opposed to either more specific groupings of politicization (social movements) or more amorphous cultural supports (whether putative civic cultures or putative popular legitimation).

¹Rare exceptions simply mention professions, for instance when discussing how professionalism may provide an antidote to corruption; as examples, see Manzetti and Wilson (2007:957), Levitsky and Way (2005), Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000), Schedler (1999:22) and Perez-Diaz (1993:50–51). These works do not incorporate this insight into typologies of democracy.

In demonstrating the uniqueness of a societal constitutional approach, it is not relevant to review the sociology of professions to identify why and how the interrelationship to democracy was introduced and then why and how it dropped from sight. What is important is to review the major received typologies of democracy and then to show how differently these types can be identified and arranged when structures of civil society are taken into account.

A review of the literature of comparative democracy is also apposite in another respect. At the very outset, it brings into stark relief a central point which outsiders of this literature are likely to find surprising. The very enterprise of endeavoring to distinguish types (and then subtypes) of democracy, as opposed to the distinguishing types (and then subtypes) of polities, states or regimes more generally, is remarkably a recent development. It dates from the mid- or late 1980s at the earliest.

Prior to this development, the most pathbreaking contribution to the entire literature of comparative democracy, by far, had been a single type identified by Arendt Lijphart (1968), that of consociational democracy. Even with this, typologies of democracy continued for over two decades to be both rare and crude. We can readily appreciate the importance of Lijphart's type, and then the dramatic contributions made by recent typologies, by taking a step back in time and considering briefly the sorts of typologies available to comparativists during immediate pre-war and post-war decades.

EARLY TYPOLOGIES: FROM CONSTITUTIONALISM TO STABILITY

Before and during World War II, Carl Friedrich and other comparativists typically operated with a single distinction (e.g. Friedrich 1941):

- Between absolutist government and constitutional government.

The central concern was to identify and categorize the extent or degree of state autocracy or arbitrariness and, correlatively, the scope and effectiveness of institutionalized restraints on the state. Moreover, because this distinction is at once polar and ideal-typical, it left enormous ground in the middle. Friedrich was explicit, for instance, that no government in the West, whether in Germany, the U.S. or elsewhere, is strictly constitutional. Rather, any government can "oscillate between constitutional and unconstitutional periods" (1941:124).

Subsequently, during immediate postwar decades, the central concern of comparativists shifted notably. Comparativists no longer endeavored to identify the degree or extent of state autocracy or constitutionalism. Now considering this issue intrinsically normative, they instead turned behaviorist. They endeavored to identify and categorize the existing democracies, defined strictly formalistically, by their stability or instability. That is, comparativists focused on the vulnerability or invulnerability of formal electoral democracies to either autocratic turns (coups and military rule) or factional disorder (ethnic, religious or ideological strife). Their goals were causal explanation and, ideally, empirical or behavioral prediction.

To this end, within the broad, formalist category of electoral democracy, comparativists drew one or more of the following sorts of distinctions:

- Between Anglo American democracy and Continental European democracy (Almond 1956).
- Between parliamentary cabinet democracy and presidential-congressional democracy (Friedrich 1963).

- Between unitary democracy and federalist democracy (Friedrich 1963).
- Between two party democracy and multi party democracy (Neumann 1956), with the latter then subdivided into tri party, quadri party and polyparty (Duverger 1959; Sartori 1966).

Thus, Gabriel Almond's thesis in 1956 is that Anglo American democracy is more stable than the Continental European democracy because it rests upon a more "homogeneous" political culture. With this, Almond endeavors to grasp at least minimally some relationship between the state and civil society. That is, he defines and operationalizes cultural "homogeneity" by the extent to which citizens develop overlapping memberships across various associations in civil society. He then characterizes the political cultures of Continental European democracy as "fragmented," because citizens are more encapsulated in or compartmentalized by fewer associational memberships.

By comparison, the thesis shared by Maurice Duverger (1959) and Giovanni Sartori (1966) is more narrowly focused on polity, state or regime, and thus more consistent with the future trajectory of the literature. They argue that the essential dividing line empirically between stable and unstable electoral democracy is that between four party and five party political systems (Duverger 1959:234–39; Sartori 1966:153–55). No mention is made of citizens' associational memberships or, for that matter, of interest group activity.

LIJPHART'S CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND AFTERMATH

Lijphart broke new ground in 1968 by identifying consociational democracy as a distinct type of stable electoral democracy, and he did so by drawing attention to an unambiguous empirical deficiency in Almond's distinction between Anglo American and Continental democracy. Lijphart pointed out (1968:14) that even among *stable* electoral democracies of the day Almond's two types of states or regimes hardly exhaust the range of existing alternatives, let alone the broader range spanning less stable electoral democracies. Lijphart asked: Where do Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Switzerland and Austria belong? After all, the political cultures of these electoral democracies are fragmented and their political systems are multiparty, and yet they have been and remain remarkably stable. Were comparativists simply to disregard *all* such cases as "deviant," and thereby place them in some residual category?

In endeavoring to classify at least some of these cases within a positively identified type, Lijphart proposed consociational democracy. He defined this new type as: "Democracies with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism and instability which are *deliberately* turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures" through grand coalitions or elite pacts (1968:20). With this, Lijphart added a third distinct type of stable electoral democracy to Almond's earlier polarity. Moreover, the remarkable stability of consociational democracies has indeed stood the test of time ever since (see Andeweg 2000).

It should nonetheless be noted that Lijphart's type, like Almond's polarity, simply sidesweps Friedrich's earlier distinction between constitutionalism and absolutism. This seemed appropriate to comparativists because, presumably, Friedrich's distinction manifestly fails directly to address the empirical issue of whether any given constitutional democracy is stable or unstable. It instead seemingly directs the literature to a patently normative issue, whether a state exercises power arbitrarily or not. Postwar comparativists considered this issue prone intrinsically to subjective interpretation or partisan politicization, utterly incapable of being operationalized for purposes of replicable cross-national comparison, let alone causal explanation and behavioral prediction.

Still, Lijphart proposed consociational democracy as a distinct type not only because it addresses seemingly deviant cases of democratic stability. He also proposed it, and explicitly so, because this type simultaneously introduces additional factors for comparativists to consider in their broader efforts to grasp variations in democratic *quality* beyond stability alone. And here Lijphart raised a specter.

The same sort of elite pacts which yield consociational democracy can just as well produce yet a fourth type of democracy, which Lijphart labeled *depoliticized democracy*. He considered this fourth type of stable democracy to be more deficient in quality than the first three (identified by Almond and Lijphart together). Where grand coalition politics in consociational democracy abandons strictly competitive (or majoritarian) electoral competition in order to mollify the ethnic or confessional tensions in a fragmented society, grand coalition politics in depoliticized democracy does so for a completely different reason. It does so in support of elite accommodation and perpetuation of a prior convergence among themselves (then others) around social welfare policies, agendas and ideologies. Within this fourth type of stable democracy, that is, “interests simply merge,” perpetually expanding welfare state (*Sozialstaat*) services and transfer payments. As a result, the entire arena of policymaking and political competition constricts substantially (1968:39).

Taking Lijphart’s major type, consociational democracy, together with his more imprecise or vaguely described alternative, depoliticized democracy, we can add the following tripartite distinction to the polar distinctions listed previously:

- Between consociational democracy, depoliticized democracy, and majoritarian electoral democracy.

Lingering Discontent

Even with this contribution by Lijphart, both mainstream comparativists and their leftist critics have continued to appreciate for two decades a major deficiency in the democracy literature. From 1968 through the late 1980s, they agreed that available typologies of democracy still remained largely phenomenal, disappointingly crude or primitive at a conceptual level. Three diverse illustrations of this understanding suffice to demonstrate how widely shared it was.

In 1977, leftist critic Goran Therborn chastised both mainstream political scientists as well as Marxists for a general lack of “serious research” devoted to democracy. One year later, the foremost mainstream theorist of authoritarianism, Yale political scientist Juan Linz, was equally critical of the democracy literature. Quite bluntly, he pointed out that aside from Lijphart’s distinction between consociational and majoritarian democracy this literature contains “no meaningful accepted typology of competitive democracies, nor any accepted measure or degree of democracy.” Finally, when Paul Burstein surveyed “The Sociology of Democratic Politics and Government” in 1981, he began by saying that he found “intellectual progress in many specific areas,” such as political party choice, social movements, elites, and others, “but not in political institutions.” He also proposed that this gap, which was separating sociology from political science as disciplines, was possibly a reaction by sociologists to the formalism of the comparative literature during the early twentieth century. However, whatever its source, Burstein lamented that it had led sociologists “to truncate our inquiries and therefore to neglect issues central to the study of democratic politics” (1981:291–92).

Rise of Iberian and Latin American Area Studies

In point of fact, the primitiveness of the democracy literature was already changing even as these criticisms were being published. In large part this was a result of publications across the 1970s by comparativists, including Linz, who were drawing theoretical generalizations from transitions between the authoritarian rule and democracy in Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula.² What Huntington in 1991 would call the Third Wave of democratization, looking retrospectively, was by now well under way. But, its scope and longevity was hardly evident to anyone at the time. Originating in Southern Europe during the mid-1970s, the Third Wave mid- and late 1980s it would extend to Asia (East, Southeast and South), then from the late 1980s forward to Eastern Europe and Central America, and finally from the 1990s forward to Africa and the Middle East. Whereas, during the mid-1970s there had been only around 40 democracies in the world, by late 1995 there would be either 117 or 76, depending on how one defined democracy (Diamond 1999:1–2).

Amidst the area studies at the onset of the Third Wave which were reassessing the prospects for democratic transitions outside the “originating democracies” of the West (to use a phrase from Guillermo O’Donnell), Philippe Schmitter presented a concept of interest group politics which not only disrupted received understandings of democratization in Southern Europe and Latin American. It simultaneously disrupted received understandings of stable political party competition and interest group politics *in the originating democracies of the West*.³ Schmitter argued persuasively that major institutions of public governance in Western Europe “intermediating” between the state and organized interests in civil society are more akin structurally to those in Southern Europe and Latin America than to those in the United States, the putatively “most advanced” democracy. These intermediating institutions, that is, are more neo corporatist than pluralist. Major organized interests in society are centralized at the apex of public governance, as monopolistic “peak associations,” thereby standing “along-side” political parties. They are not remaining dispersed “below” political parties, as noncompulsory, competing interest groups.

Schmitter’s discussion of neo corporatism kicked off an enormous debate, which continues somewhat even today.⁴ It also bore on the question of what any future social democracy, succeeding received welfare states and liberal democracy, would actually demand structurally and institutionally on the ground. Thus, we have an additional distinction:

- Between neo corporatist democracy and pluralist democracy.

THE SITUATION TODAY

Finally, from the late 1980s forward, as comparativists increasingly grasped the scope and longevity of the still unfolding Third Wave as well as the import of the neo-corporatism/pluralism distinction, the literature began teaming, rather suddenly, with neologisms of democracy types

²Prominent examples up to 1980, listed chronologically, include: Schmitter 1971; Stepan 1971; Linz 1973; O’Donnell 1973; Linz 1975; Malloy 1977; Linz and Stepan 1978.

³Schmitter 1974, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1995. The phrase “originating democracies” is taken from O’Donnell.

⁴Prominent early works in this debate other than Schmitter’s include: Malloy 1977; Harrison 1980; Fulcher 1987. For reviews of this literature, as the latter unfolded across the decades, see Panitch 1980 and Cox 1981. For more recent reviews, see Collier 1995 and Molina and Rhodes 2002.

and subtypes, nearly all of them phenomenal or crude. Rather than turning directly to this sea of “democracies with adjectives” (as Collier and Levitsky aptly called it in 1997), we may note that the literature now began drawing, at first implicitly, a generic tripartite distinction within the broad, umbrella topic of democratization. This development is important because this once nascent tripartite distinction has become institutionalized today as specializations of theorizing and research devoted to three distinct phases of democratization.

Rising Specialization

First, some comparativists today specialize in *democratic transitions*, those from autocracy to formal or electoral democracy. As such, they retain the postwar literature’s concern with democratic stability. Today, these comparativists literally call themselves “transitionologists,” “transition specialists,” and “the transition school.” Assessing this literature in 1999, Barbara Geddes failed to find any “parsimonious and compelling” explanation of transitions. She instead found explanations which “have been confusingly complicated, careless about the basic methodological details, often more useful as description than explanation, and surprisingly inconsistent with each other” (1999:117). Likewise, Gerardo Munck found 2 years later that comparativists define democratic transition in markedly different ways (2001:124).

Second, other comparativists are more concerned about *democratic consolidation*, and thus a second transition, that from strictly electoral democracy to stable juridical, liberal or “rights” democracy (*Rechtsstaat*). Here, they resume the concerns of Lijphart and others regarding conceptualizing qualities which distinguish these democracies from other states and regimes. Andreas Schedler (1998:92) refers to this specialty of research and theorizing as “the aspiring subdiscipline of ‘consolidology.’”

Originally minimalist, confined to describing how new democracies build resistance against sudden reversals (to autocracy or factional disorder), the lists of “problems of consolidation” today are just as expansive as those of “problems of transition” to electoral democracy. Such lists include: civil and political rights; popular legitimation; diffusion of democratic values; civic culture; neutralization of anti system actors; civilian supremacy over the military; elimination of authoritarian or mafia-like enclaves (what O’Donnell calls “brown areas”); nation, state and political party building; organization of functional interests; stabilization of electoral rules; routinization of politics; decentralization of state power; division of powers; introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy; judicial reform; broadened access to the courts; alleviation of poverty; and economic stabilization (see Schedler 1998:91–92, 95 for most, but not all, of these).

Excursus: Concept Disparateness

The problem with the sorts of listing just presented is not simply the sheer number of phenomenal or empirical items comprising it, their self-evident expanse and unmanageability. The greater problem is that the items are also intrinsically disparate at a conceptual level, rather than being even broadly concatenate. They lack any attributes of a category system or theory, such as definitional structure or conceptual core. This means there is no principled basis for comparing the items, let alone for weighting some items more or less than others. In addition, particular constituent items in the listing above elude intersubjective cognition or identification by comparativists and then, of course, elude replicable application; that is, they elude consistent

(or commensurable) qualitative identification and interpretation, let alone quantitative operationalization. This is evident even in particular case studies; when comparativists attempt to apply such items across cases, their intrinsic resistance (at a conceptual level) to intersubjective cognition and application is palpable.

Indeed, the items in the listing above are disparate in two different respects, each equally damning in itself. In one respect, they are not internally consistent at a conceptual level; more minimally at this level, they lack symmetry. That is, they are not even broadly concatenate, commensurable or mutually supportive because their breadth of empirical references is simply too expansive and grab bag. After all, the list above spans items which are variously:

- Strictly formalist or categorical, such as political and civil rights, division of powers, civilian supremacy, electoral rule stabilization, and state decentralization;
- Broadly qualitative or substantive normative, and thus intrinsically vulnerable to subjective identification and interpretation (rather than providing baselines for intersubjective cognition and understanding), such as popular legitimation, values diffusion, judicial reform, direct democracy; and
- Consequentialist or outcomes-based, such as anti system neutralization, “brown area” elimination, access to courts, poverty alleviation, and economy stabilization.

Curiously, the listing above notably lacks items which are potentially procedural normative or process-based and thus potentially bright line, such as “rule of law” or “due process.”

The result of these items’ substantive expansiveness and lack of symmetry at a conceptual level is that any and all efforts to identify or apply the items within or across cases are prone intrinsically to the competing or incommensurable interpretations by different observers. Of course, they are equally prone to partisan politicization on the ground, by participant citizens or officials. The only seemingly bright line threshold standards or “cut points” (also a phrase from O’Donnell), whether of democratic consolidation or of democratic quality, are strictly formalist.

By contrast, a listing that is both internally consistent and bright line at a conceptual level would be primarily proceduralist or process-based, not simply formalist or categorical and certainly not mainly qualitative and either substantive normative or outcomes-based. Procedural normative threshold standards can be supplemented with formalist items without losing their usefulness as cut points. They can also be supplemented with outcomes which are strictly measurable or quantifiable (such as GDP per capita). Outcomes of these sorts can resist at least somewhat subjective interpretation and partisan politicization. But procedural normative threshold standards cannot be supplemented with, let alone subordinated to, substantive qualities of any kind without losing intersubjective cognition and replicable application – generalization. Thus, they cannot be coupled with either whether substantive normative standards looking prospectively or qualitative outcomes looking retrospectively.

Beyond this, as noted earlier, there is a second respect in which Schedler’s listing of problems of consolidation and others like it is disparate. They are also pitched at, and thus can be applied to, two quite different levels of analysis, a structural and institutional level as well as a cultural and social psychological level. They are not confined exclusively to the first level alone. This is a second manifestation of disparateness in that only references to qualitative items of structural and institutional development – such as party building, interest organizing and state power decentralizing – are sufficiently specific to be potentially identifiable intersubjectively, even if demanding interpretation or evaluation. That is, structural and institutional qualities are potentially capable of securing intersubjective cognition and understanding by anyone, whether partisans on the ground or observing comparativists.

This is precisely why comparativists frequently identify the structural and institutional developments in replicable ways across cases and over time, such as the competitiveness of political parties or the general extent of interest group activity. But we will see that intersubjectivity is also greatly enhanced even at a structural and institutional level of analysis when the qualitative items being identified or applied are proceduralist or process-based.

By contrast, references to cultural and social psychological qualities – to putatively shared understandings and beliefs such as popular legitimation, values diffusion and civic culture – are invariably far more difficult to identify intersubjectively, and then to apply in replicable ways as standards of comparison. Being both more amorphous and more subject to (at times sudden) change than structural and institutional qualities, the relative presence of putatively requisite cultural understandings and social psychological beliefs is more prone to politicization by partisans on the ground – “our values are diffused, theirs are not” or “our understandings of democracy are legitimated popularly, theirs are not” – and then also to competing or incommensurable observations and interpretations by comparativists. When is a “civic culture” securely in place? And when is it being challenged or undergoing enervation? Moreover, at what point does *any* challenge to or enervation of *this* item actually harm a democratic regime or state – or a democratic society?

Procedural normative threshold standards are typically unavailable to help out, to secure intersubjectivity at such an amorphous level of analysis, whereas they are available and helpful at a structural and institutional level. That is, cultural and social-psychological developments are typically grasped – better, labeled phenomenally – with vague substantive normative standards, coupled with qualitative outcomes based assessments. As an illustration, Carsten Schneider and Philippe Schmitter define democratic consolidation “most generically” in substantive normative terms. They say it is “the process or, better, the processes that make mutual trust and reassurance among the relevant actors more likely” (2004:61). Then, consistent with this “generic” definition, they propose that the “challenge for democratic consolidators” can be identified and assessed in terms of a qualitative outcome: “[F]ind[ing] a set of institutions that embodies contingent consent among politicians and is capable of producing the eventual assent of citizens” (2004:62). This “challenge,” of course, is quite consistent with Schmitter’s earlier emphasis on the importance of elite pacts in establishing institutions of neo corporatist intermediation spanning the state and civil society. It is also consistent with Lijphart’s even earlier emphasis on the relationship between elite pacts and either consociational democracy or depoliticized democracy.

In relying on a substantive normative standard (of trust and reassurance) at a cultural and social psychological level of analysis (no particular structures or institutions are identified), and then coupling this with a qualitative outcome (of politician consent and potential citizen assent), it is highly likely, indeed predictable, that different comparativists will disagree about whether and when this standard and outcome are being met. Our general point is that *all* items – standards our outcomes – of cultural and social psychological development are like this: they are intrinsically difficult for comparativists to identify in common or with consistency even within any given case, let alone to apply in replicable ways across cases.

By contrast, when items of structural and institutional development are combined with democracy qualities that are primarily or mainly proceduralist or process-based, the result is the opposite. The items being used in analyses are now internally consistent conceptually and their combination yields bright-line threshold standards of comparison. As such, a proceduralist approach can support intersubjective cognition and understanding and then consistent or replicable application. As Wolfgang Merkel puts it, without seeing or proposing the combination just noted, a typology of democracy is “realist” rather than subjective or speculative

when “it is based exclusively on the institutional architecture of a democracy and does not use outputs or outcomes as defining characteristics” (2004:36).⁵ Thus, Merkel rightly rejects on conceptual grounds the use of any putatively desired policy outcomes as defining elements of democracy, whether a welfare state, an equitable distribution of economic goods, poverty reduction, or “social justice” (2004:36–37).

Complexities of Democratic Consolidation

For good reason, therefore, Schedler sees such vagueness and expansiveness in defining consolidation as being intrinsically normative (and thus exposed to subjectivity and partisanship). But, we can now see why this is the case: it introduces factors into the mix which are cultural or social psychological and both qualitative and substantive normative. Schedler says, correctly but more generally, that it is impossible to grasp all of the factors in the listing above that putatively contribute to democratic consolidation with any clear or bounded concept of democratic consolidation which can be applied with consistency, let alone operationalized. He then concludes that there is only one way comparativists can possibly resist or avoid “a plurality of concepts of democratic consolidation:” they must return to this specialty’s original minimalism.

However, Schedler acknowledges that even minimalism can be difficult for comparativists to grasp consistently at a conceptual level, because the idea of consolidation itself spans five different “concepts.” One concept, the original one, revolves around the problem of simply avoiding sudden regressions to autocracy or factional disorder. However, a second one, proposed first by O’Donnell (1992), revolves around a quite different problem, that of resisting gradual erosion of democracy toward semi-democratic rule, a delegative democracy (with an absence of civilian control over the military or a presence of significant “brown areas”) or a *democradura* (a repressive façade democracy). Yet a third concept of consolidation, defined more positively, revolves around grasping the “completing” of democratization, the successful traversal of what O’Donnell also called in 1992 a “second transition.” This is the transition from a democratic government or state of the day to an ongoing – institutionalized – democratic *regime*, which has removed all lingering legacies of the laws, structures and practices of autocracy.

Moreover, there are two additional concepts of consolidation, both even more positive and vaguer still. A fourth concept revolves around the problem of “organizing democracy,” of institutionalizing not only formal constitutionalism or basic juridical structures at a regime level but also specific rules and organizations of constituent “subsystem” practices and activities. In 1992 and 1996, Schmitter referred to this as the “partial regimes” of democracy, a phrase which Wolfgang Merkel (2004) has since developed with his notion of “embedded democracy.” Truly consolidated democracy, that is, cannot be grasped at a conceptual level as a single regime of one kind or another. Rather, it can only be grasped as a composite of subsystems, partial regimes. “No single set of institutions/rules (and, least of all, no single institution or rule) defines political democracy” (Schneider and Schmitter 2004:62).

Finally, there is a last concept of consolidation, the grandest and vaguest of all, called “deepening democracy.” This revolves around the problem of pushing all subsystems or

⁵Merkel’s focus is on defining constitutional democracy in particular, but his conceptual point applies equally, in our view, to any more general typology of democracy.

partial regimes toward the qualities of those in advanced democracies and then, if possible, even further, beyond the liberal democracy to some (idealized) social democracy (Schedler 1998:95–100).

Schedler's prescription for placing democratic consolidation on firmer conceptual footing is, again, for comparativists simply to return to the original focus, on state and regime survival. This means, more specifically, that he encourages comparativists to return to the first two, least ambitious concepts above: securing democracy against autocracy or factional disorder whether by sudden reversal or gradual erosion. Such a return is consistent with the following statement by Schneider and Schmitter, even as it, too, is cast vaguely at a cultural or social psychological level of analysis: "The transitional period is over when virtually all of those who are active in politics agree that a regression either to the *status quo ante* or to any other form of autocracy is highly improbable" (2004:67).

Democratic Quality

The three most ambitious concepts of consolidation above get us to the last, most recent, and thorniest, specialty in comparative democratization today, that of *democratic quality*. Some comparativists are becoming specialized in researching and theorizing items of advanced democratization which, as such, span not only the quality of consolidation in new democracies of the Third Wave but also the quality of institutionalization in originating liberal democracies of the West. These comparativists endeavor to grasp, first, degrees or extents of liberalization or democratization across all states or regimes and then, second, and more radically, any practicable alternatives which exceed the subsystem practices and activities of liberal democracy.

However, as with the transition and consolidation literatures, the literature of democratic quality has hardly operated with shared concepts or even shared definitions of the basic terms or standards. Schneider and Schmitter found in 2004, for instance, that "the process of liberalization has [not] been consistently conceptualized, much less operationalized, in the literature on democratization." They add that the Freedom House Index, the most frequently used annual survey of global political rights and civil liberties, "is seriously deficient and distorted, especially when used to measure variation across regions or over time in the same country" (2004:60).

Regardless, this most recent specialization among mainstream comparativists stems from notable antecedents. It was stimulated initially not only by Schmitter's thesis of the 1970s regarding neo corporatism in Western Europe, but also by general observations of impending crises or transformations within the advanced societies and increasing criticisms of originating democracies.⁶ In addition, whether stated explicitly by proponents or not, the most radical inquiries into democratic quality typically resume and revitalize even longer-standing debates over the meaning and goals of social democracy in particular. In any event, comparativists specializing in democratic quality seek criteria by which to identify distinctions *between* liberal democracies, including differences in these states' or regimes' trajectories of governmental and political change.

⁶Such observations and criticisms through the 1980s, listed chronologically, include the following: Bell 1973; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975; Hirsch 1976; Bell 1976; Dahl 1982; Miliband 1982; Korpi 1983; Barber 1984; Przeworski 1985; Esping-Anderson 1985; Bobbio 1987; Sartori 1987; Dogan 1988.

MAJOR TYPOLOGIES TODAY

One outcome of the literature since 1990, which now spans these three quite different sets of research and theory specializations, was a rather rapid proliferation of strictly phenomenal democracy types and subtypes, exposed intrinsically to a subjective interpretation and partisan politicization. It is noteworthy in this light that *Journal of Democracy* began publishing in January 1990 and *Democratization* in spring 1994 (with two issues that year).

Looking retrospectively, however, the watershed that turned out to burst the neologism floodgates actually came somewhat earlier, during the mid-1980s, with two notable publications. One was an influential four-volume collection of 1986 devoted to democratic transitions edited by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. The other, a year later and far more slight in length but nearly as influential, was a journal article (with only four references) by Richard Sklar titled "Developmental Democracy."

In these works and many more which followed comparativists began coining a plethora of terms to designate democracy types and subtypes. But, this lexicon spans two very different sorts of types and subtypes. Some identify types and subtypes in which even minimalist formal democracy – electoral democracy – is deficient.⁷ Others identify types and subtypes of stalled or deficient democratic consolidation, those intermediate between established formal democracy (successful democratic transition) and established liberal democracy (institutionalized consolidation). Within this second set of states or regimes, electoral competition is relatively well institutionalized but one or more qualities considered vital to liberal democracy is lacking, whether extensive political participation and representation (vertical accountability), a socio economically secure middle class, a civic culture (however, defined), civil liberties, or sufficiently transparent horizontal accountability, including by a division of powers that includes an independent judiciary. Thus, whether explicitly or implicitly, this second set of states of regimes spans the specialties of democratic consolidation and democratic quality.

Comparativists today are typically clear when they are moving beyond issues of democratic consolidation to more abstract discussions of democratic quality. But, when addressing deficient democracy they are often unclear about whether a new type or subtype denotes a sub- or non-democratic case or an intermediate one, beyond established electoral democracy. As examples, is it self-evident where the following terms fall in the spectrum from autocracy to formal democracy to liberal democracy?: developmental democracy, delegative democracy, protected democracy, tutelary democracy, associative democracy, hybrid democracy, illiberal democracy, authoritarian democracy, neopatrimonial democracy, proto-democracy, restrictive democracy.

Another problem, somewhat related, is that in trying to identify whether any qualities first of transition and then of consolidation are present in any particular case of democratization, comparativists cite and rely upon different sources of data. This extends not only to qualitative data gleaned piecemeal from different area studies and country studies, but also to the quantitative data compiled by different cross-national surveys. Larry Diamond (1999) and many others, for instance, use Freedom House variables of political rights and civil liberties.⁸ David Beetham (2004) uses data on democratic assessment (by in-country respondents and assessors) organized

⁷ O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, for instance, coined the neologism *democradura* to denote illiberal formal democracy.

⁸ Wolfgang Merkel calls Freedom House the "preferred source of data about democratization" but adds that it does not take into account whether elections are actually conducted fairly and correctly (2004:34). Regardless, Merkel and Kruck 2004 rely on this data in exploring the relationship between democratic quality and social justice.

and compiled by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Others use the Polity I–IV dataset of political competitiveness and accountability, and still others use data from Gasiorowski (1996), Vanhanen (2000), the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003), Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and others.

Given all of this, it is hardly surprising that by the mid-1990s so many different adjectives had already been added to the noun “democracy,” with the pace accelerating, that many comparativists became concerned. They raised the specter of the cross-national study of states or regimes not simply losing parsimony, but degenerating into a lexical “Babel.” The most notable line of criticism along these lines came in a 1997 review essay by David Collier and Steven Levitsky in *World Politics*, aptly titled “Democracy with Adjectives.”⁹ Finding over 550 subtypes of democracy in 150 *mostly recent* studies,¹⁰ Collier and Levitsky took a step back to assess the conceptual and substantive merits of this rather sudden lexical proliferation. Their related goals were to make this sea of terms “more comprehensible” by raising and addressing “basic issues of analytic differentiation and conceptual validity” (1997:433).

Diamond’s Baseline Typology

Two years after the Collier and Levitsky critique, Larry Diamond presented a typology of regimes or states which arguably became the most influential in the literature and remains so today.¹¹ As co editor of *Journal of Democracy* (with Marc Plattner) and collaborator with both Linz and Lipset, Diamond is particularly conversant not only with the major theoretical developments in the enormous literature of comparative democratization to that point. He is equally familiar with the empirical challenges to received theories, including findings in studies of democratization which bear on larger conceptual issues. Moreover, because his 1980 Stanford doctorate was in sociology, not political science, Diamond can appreciate the importance, at least in principle, of moving beyond typologies of states or regimes to typologies of state civil society structures.

One major result of Diamond’s literature overview and assessment of 1999, as noted above, was the following four-part typology of “political or governmental democracies,” presented as the centerpiece of a five-part classification of “polities,” “political systems” and “national political regimes” – terms Diamond uses interchangeably (1999:17):¹²

- non-democracy;
- pseudo-democracy;
- electoral democracy;
- intermediate democracy;
- liberal democracy.

⁹The concerns expressed by Collier and Levitsky have hardly disappeared from the literature since. See, for example: Collier and Adcock 1999; Geddes 1999; Armony and Schamis 2005.

¹⁰This is Larry Diamond’s assessment of the full listing of subtypes in the unpublished version of the Collier and Levitsky paper (Diamond 1999:7).

¹¹More recent typologies tend to be less expansive, focusing more exclusively on distinguishing either deficient subtypes intermediate between formal-electoral democracy and consolidated liberal democracy (e.g. Merkel 2004; Merkel and Croissant 2000; also Schmitter 1996) or quality subtypes within liberal democracy (e.g. Morlino 2004; also Schmitter and Karl 1991).

¹²Freedom House, upon which Diamond relies for cross-national data, classifies regimes somewhat similarly into five types: consolidated authoritarian, semi-consolidated authoritarian, transitional or hybrid, semi-consolidated democracy, and consolidated.

As we can see, Diamond uses a residual category – non-democracy (autocracy) – as his point of departure. From this baseline he then proposes four general types of democracies. However, we can also see that two of Diamond’s categories, electoral democracy and liberal democracy, are nondescript. They hardly mark an advance beyond the earlier literature to which Lijphart, Therborn, Linz and Burstein had reacted so negatively.

Even worse, rather than keeping the category of electoral democracy scrupulously minimalist (as regularly held elections absent any significant charges of massive fraud or intimidation) Diamond adds all sorts of qualifiers even here. He mentions not only the formalist political rights and civil liberties, but also qualitative outcomes such as “maximized self-determination” and citizen “moral autonomy.”¹³

Given such breadth of qualification, and thus vagueness, in describing even the baseline type, when Diamond turns to identifying intermediate and then liberal “components” or “conditions” of democracy, he becomes utterly expansive. He ends up with a listing of eleven items of democratic quality (1999:11–12). Being disparate at a conceptual level in both of the respects discussed earlier, this listing is intrinsically vague because it spans items (and thus standards or outcomes) which are:

- formalist or categorical, such as constrained executive power, hypostatized rights, equality under the law, and “constitutional supremacy;”
- substantive normative, such as judicial independence and protections for both political party formation and minority cultural expression; and
- outcome-based, such as absence of “brown areas” (of mafia-like control), robust interest group pluralism, and “societal vigilance.”

More important for our purposes, Diamond’s listing also includes at least one item (and standard) which could be defined strictly procedural normatively, but Diamond fails to adopt this conceptual strategy:

- proceduralist, respect for “rule of law.”

Instead of keeping his references to rule of law scrupulously proceduralist, however, and thereby operating (at least potentially) with some bright line threshold standard at least for this item, Diamond instead needlessly adds intrinsically vague substantive normative or consequentialist qualifiers even here. For instance, he talks about “rule of law” protections from “unjustified” internment – as if the latter is somehow readily identifiable independently of proceduralist standards of legal integrity.

Taken as a whole, therefore, Diamond’s approach to democratization is simply phenomenal or descriptive, and thus intrinsically exposed to the subjective interpretation and partisan politicization. The same is true of a listing of five items of consolidated democracy presented by Linz and Stepan 3 years earlier (1996:3–15; see also Ciobanu 2009):

- civil society based on freedom of association and communication;
- political society based on free and inclusive electoral contestation;
- economic society based on an institutionalized market system;
- rule of law based on constitutionalism; and
- a state apparatus based on rational legal and bureaucratic norms.

¹³The best case for adding qualifiers to electoral democracy is by O’Donnell (2001); a recent, compelling case for keeping criteria of electoral democracy minimalist is by Storm (2008).

In both listings above as well as many others like them (including those in O'Donnell 2004b; Morlino 2004; Merkel 2004), too many of the defining items of democratic consolidation and democratic quality are (a) cultural and social psychological rather than strictly structural and institutional and (b) disparate conceptually rather than primarily or mainly proceduralist.

Returning to Diamond's typology, his most important contributions at a conceptual and theoretical level are his effort to identify the state or regime types which fall short of the two received, nondescript categories noted earlier, formal democracy and liberal democracy. On one side, "pseudo-democracy" is Diamond's term for political systems which hold elections only nominally, and thereby fail truly to qualify even as electoralist due to fraud, tampering or intimidation. Indeed, three years later, in discussing "hybrid regimes," which he defines generically as combining democratic and authoritarian elements (2002:23), Diamond presents the following subtypes of deficient electoral democracy (2002:25–26):

- Electoral authoritarian democracy, pseudo-democracy or hybrid democracy. These are formal democracies which permit "multiparty electoral competition of some kind" but otherwise fail truly to qualify as "democratic."
- Competitive electoral authoritarian. These are regimes which are authoritarian even as nominally "multiparty electoral competition" is permitted; that is, a ruling party is entrenched.
- Uncompetitive or hegemonic electoral authoritarian.
- Ambiguous regimes: a residual category.

The problem is that these permutations of deficient electoral democracy are equally strictly phenomenal or descriptive, and for the same two reasons at a conceptual level noted above. They are not really self-evidently distinguishable either analytically (as sets of invariant distinctions) or empirically (as ideal types). Indeed, precisely because the boundaries between the first three types of deficient democracy are themselves so indiscernible, even as they are putatively defined positively rather than residually, Diamond is compelled to add a residual category as his last type: "ambiguous regimes."

For instance, the boundary between electoral authoritarian democracy and electoral authoritarianism is problematic on its face (2002:27). It hinges on comparativists gauging in common or broadly similar the qualities of elections in particular lands, beyond the minimalist standard noted above. Beyond an absence of significant charges of fraud, tampering or intimidation, they must gauge whether elections are "free, fair, inclusive and meaningful." Likewise, the boundary between the competitive and uncompetitive electoral authoritarianism is equally problematic. It hinges on comparativists judging in common or similarly whether "opposition forces" can "challenge or weaken" autocrats at particular sites or venues, for example in the judiciary, or mass media, or local elections, or the legislature (2002:29–31).

Scanning all four of these new subtypes of 2002, it is not even clear *where* they fit within Diamond's earlier, broader typology of 1999. Are all of these categories truly the subtypes of pseudo-democracy, of deficient electoral democracy? Or do some qualify as electoral democracy to some minimalist extent but otherwise are sufficiently deficient they don't qualify fully as intermediate types? Or, finally, are any of these subtypes possibly ones of intermediate democracy?

For our purposes, we will see that this entire line of inquiry, the effort to identify various deficiencies in electoral democracy by any criteria *beyond* the most minimalist baseline places two unnecessary obstacles in the way of the entire typological enterprise. One unnecessary obstacle is that it obscures the minimalist baseline, as opposed to preserving it as a bright line, albeit strictly formalist, threshold standard demarcating at least one distinct institutional design, no matter how primitive, spanning a regime or state and civil society. The other unnecessary

obstacle is that this obscuring at the baseline discourages the effort to identify any other bright line threshold standards or “cut points” by which to demarcate any other distinct institutional designs.

Our point now is that if this line of criticism holds true, then this means, after all is said and done, Diamond’s most notable contribution to the democracy literature is a single type, “intermediate democracy.” Moreover, this is a residual category, not a positively defined type. Intermediacy is defined, ultimately, by qualities of liberal democracy that are lacking, not by qualities in evidence unambiguously beyond the qualifiers already attributed to electoral democracy.

Further complicating matters, Diamond frequently alludes at times to “democratic *society*” without providing a definition. Here is yet another type, one which presumably possesses *societal* qualities of democratic-ness exceeding those typical of a liberal democratic *polity*. With this, Diamond is thereby keeping a line open to his sociological training, to any effort (including Almond’s (1956)) to bring into play types of state civil society structures. Thus, Diamond typically refers to the democratic society, and thus to the advanced democratic quality, by noting broadly, and vaguely, two areas in which it putatively exceeds a liberal democratic polity. On one side of the ledger, in the areas of opportunity and participation or representation, it “ensures equality” more broadly; on the other side, in the areas of outcome and accountability, it “solves social and economic problems” more effectively (1999:18, 288 note 51).¹⁴

Our point is that because Diamond adds qualifiers even to the baseline type of electoral democracy, his characterizations of “intermediate democracy” are then invariably just as vague as his subsequent characterizations of “democratic society.” In both cases, he lacks threshold standards or cut points which are proceduralist and bright line. In addition, as noted, “intermediacy” itself is a residual category, and all such categories are intrinsically vague. Yet, unlike his occasional references to the democratic society, this residual category is far more important for Diamond’s purposes at both a conceptual or theoretical level and in empirical application. After all, this category’s potential scope of application is extraordinarily expansive. It can potentially include nearly every established or consolidated democracy in the world as well as many new democracies.

Subtype Proliferation and Disparateness

Given its breadth, many comparativists both before and after Diamond’s formulation of 1999 have proposed, and today continue to propose, neologisms in an effort to identify the distinct types within intermediacy. Diamond himself proposed two such subtypes in 2002, “illiberal democracy” and “deficient democracy.” Other prominent efforts are by Schmitter, Wolfgang Merkel and Leonardo Morlino.

Schmitter (along with O’Donnell) first distinguished broadly between *dictablanda* (liberalization without democratization) and *democradura* (democratization without liberalization). Years later, Carsten Schneider and Schmitter presented three sets of “indicators” or “components” of democratization: seven of “liberalization of autocracy,” eight more of “mode of transition,” and then another twelve of “consolidation of democracy” (2004:63–66). It is notable, given our discussion above regarding the pitfalls of both concept disparateness and a cultural and social psychological level of analysis that the first item on the first list is both

¹⁴See Merkel and Kruck (2004) for a recent quantitative cross-national comparison of the relationship between degrees of democraticness and social justice.

cultural and formalist: “significant public concessions at the level of human rights.” Aside from the most extreme cases, at both poles, how can different comparativists possibly identify in common whether “significant concessions” regarding formalist rights or anything else are increasing or decreasing popularly, among an amorphous public, culturally or social psychologically at any given time in any particular case?

Also in 2004 Wolfgang Merkel proposed four types of “deficient democracy:” exclusive democracy (lacking universal suffrage), illiberal democracy (lacking rule of law), delegative democracy (lacking executive checks and balances) and enclave democracy (lacking civilian control over the military or juridical control over “brown areas”) (2004:49–50; also see Merkel and Croissant 2000). In the same year Leonardo Morlino proposed five types of “deficient democratic quality:” ineffective democracy (lacking effective legal systems and judiciaries); irresponsible democracy (lacking electoral alternatives or strong intermediary structures); deficiently legitimated democracy (due to “diffuse disenchantment”); reduced democracy (limited social rights and restricted political rights); and unequal democracy (due to “deep economic problems” and insufficient “solidarity and social justice”) (2004:27–29).

Even with the brief descriptions in parentheses, we already find in these typologies the same combination of concept disparateness and a cultural or social psychological level of analysis that yields vagueness, and thus incommensurable interpretations and applications by comparativists. This is reflected, for instance, in it not being clear *where* the particular subtypes above are to be located within Diamond’s baseline typology of 1999. Which subtypes are intended to identify regimes – or states, or regime state combinations – that do not yet truly qualify even as electoral democracies? In turn, which subtypes are instead intended to identify the distinct variations of intermediacy, all of which putatively exceed electoral democracy unambiguously but otherwise fall short of liberal democracy in one respect or another? Liberal democracy, of course, is a much loftier standard than intermediacy, but then vagueness is also intrinsic to the transition from liberal-democratic consolidation to democratic quality. Of course, one might trace the confusion regarding where typological schemes “fit” within Diamond’s 1999 baseline not to these schemes but to the baseline itself. We pointed to these earlier.

CONCEPT DISPARATENESS TODAY

The state of the ambitious literature of democratic quality is fairly represented by one of the three most prominent recent efforts to identify (and then either standardize or operationalize) items of democratic quality, that by O’Donnell (2001, 2004a, b).¹⁵ O’Donnell’s listing of items is too vague to secure the intersubjective cognition and then to orient replicable application because it suffers from the two problems of concept disparateness discussed earlier: an absence of symmetry and, in places, a cultural and social psychological level of analysis. For our purposes, this is revealed most tellingly by how O’Donnell deals with “rights” and, even more, “rule of law.”¹⁶

On the one hand, he accords both of these items the most prominent place in his listing of democratic qualities, as do the other comparativists. For instance, Diamond and Morlino recently asserted: “The rule of law is the base upon which every other dimension of democratic

¹⁵The other two are by Morlino (2004) and Merkel (2004). All of the points below directed to O’Donnell apply also them, as demonstrated elsewhere.

¹⁶Three years earlier, when bringing the concept of “horizontal accountability” too much needed prominence, O’Donnell treated rule of law as utterly central – noting that here is where liberal and republican traditions “converge.” But he failed to define the concept or to cite any references (1998:114,119).

quality rests” (2004:23). In addition, “rights” are typically the very first item on comparativists’ listings of valued democratic qualities. On the other hand, O’Donnell, like the other comparativists, also uniformly combines this formalist item – rights - with definitions of or repeated references to rule of law that are not kept strictly proceduralist but instead are disparate conceptually: some references are proceduralist but others are patently substantive normative and still others are consequentialist.

Focus on Rule of Law

Indeed, this pattern in the literature today was largely set by O’Donnell in 2001 and 2004 when he relied on a conceptually disparate definition of rule of law taken from British legal positivist Joseph Raz (1977/1979). O’Donnell did not appreciate that a conceptually consistent definition had been provided earlier by the “greatest proceduralist in the history of legal theory,” Lon Fuller (1964/1969).¹⁷ Indeed, by rather casually privileging a disparate concept of rule of law over a scrupulously proceduralist one, he failed entirely to see what was at stake, for purposes of critical or analytical comparative inquiry. Morlino, Merkel and other comparativists then follow this lead, whether directly, by citing and using O’Donnell’s works, or independently.¹⁸

By taking two steps, we can appreciate that Fuller’s proceduralist “*desiderata*” of rule of law are mutually consistent at a conceptual level whereas Raz’s positivist criteria are disparate. First, we simply present each listing in turn, with brief commentary. Second, we then consider briefly where O’Donnell’s use of Raz’s listing led him (and then also Morlino, Merkel and others).

FULLER’S PROCEDURALIST DESIDERATA. By Fuller’s accounting (1964/1969:46–84), dispersed addressees, whether citizens *or officials*, can only possibly recognize and understand in common what positive laws or rules of any kind demand – whether statutes or contracts; whether rules of corporate or associational governance – when law-making and law-interpreting bodies keep laws or rules consistent with eight proceduralist qualities. This holds true irrespective of what laws or rules demand of addressees in substance. Thus, heterogeneous individuals and competing groups cannot possibly cognize and understand in common the demands of laws or rules when the latter fail:

- to apply generally, not in *ad hoc* circumstances;
- to be publicized, knowable in advance by everyone affected;
- to be (with rare exceptions) prospective, not retroactive;
- to be clear and understandable, at least to specialists;
- to be free from contradiction, from demanding opposite or repugnant actions by individuals;

¹⁷ The quotation is from Robert Summers (1982), who during the 1960s and 1970s had been fiercely critical of Fuller and, literally, founded a “school” of legal positivism in late 1966, that of “pragmatic instrumentalism.” By 1982 Summers nonetheless acknowledged in print that he and other positivists (which includes Raz) had been mistaken and Fuller had been right – a quite unusual event in contemporary scholarship. “No positivist appears to have understood the broad implications of” Fuller’s proceduralism constraining “the kinds of specific purposes officials can pursue through law” (Summers 1984:28).

¹⁸ More generally, I have not seen any comparativists who challenge O’Donnell’s basic analysis here, at a conceptual level. Rather, comparativists simply challenge the rule of law standard that results from it, for they point to this standard’s ambiguity and vagueness (without seeing its source in conceptual disparateness) and then exposure to subjective interpretation and partisan politicization (e.g. Karl 2004; Whitehead 2004).

- to be possible to perform;
- to be relatively stable, not frequently changed; and
- to be congruent with actual enforcement, administrative or governance behavior.

All of these items are qualitative and, except for the last, all are also strictly proceduralist; taken in combination, these desiderata provide everyone – whether participants or observers – with a bright line threshold standard of rule making and rule enforcing behavior. The last item, congruence, is by definition outcome-based in part and thus somewhat substantive normative rather than strictly proceduralist. As such, it is more exposed to competing interpretations in everyday life in any democracy (which courts or administrative agencies adjudicate). Yet, in extreme or unusual cases even incongruence is literally self-evident.

A shorthand way of characterizing Fuller’s bright line, proceduralist threshold standard of legal integrity or lawfulness is to say that laws or rules which are intersubjectively cognizable and understandable as well as enforceable with consistency are *clear and possible to obey*. They are clear at least to those trained in the law, and they can be obeyed by addressees, whether citizens or officials, with modest or typical effort, as opposed to demanding unusual or heroic effort. This shorthand description encompasses all of the other proceduralist desiderata because, as examples, retroactive rules, unpublicized rules, rules frequently changed and rules not applied to all relevant situations are simultaneously unclear; as a result, they are less capable of guiding behavior even with heroic effort.

At first glance, this proceduralist threshold standard of clarity and possibility is so bright line that it may seem trivial, self-evidently legitimating all modern legal systems, let alone all democracies. However, quite the opposite is the case. In the first place, autocratic legal systems routinely encroach against the desiderata, for instance in lacking transparency (let alone promulgating official policies). The same is true, in turn, of many legal systems in new democracies in the East and South. As examples, laws are directed to particular groups rather than general, and some laws contradict others or are changed frequently or are not understandable. Moreover, even in originating democracies we find not only periodic or one shot encroachments against the proceduralist threshold, in specific legislation or judicial rulings. We also find systemic pressures of drift toward a general or ongoing enervation. Renowned American political scientist Theodore Lowi has been warning about such drift in the U.S. since 1969, with the publication of *The End of Liberalism*, and continues to do so: see *The End of the Republican Era* (1995).

We may convey the structural and institutional significance of procedural legality metaphorically: The proceduralist integrity of law places a quite flimsy white picket fence around the Leviathan. Literally, any untoward twitching of the whale’s tail, fin or snout can obliterate great swaths of this fence. Moreover, the whale (state legislatures or administrative agencies or courts) may twitch entirely nonchalantly, unthinkingly, rather than purposefully with malice of forethought.¹⁹ Likewise, some observers of the twitching (leaders of social movements) may acclaim the beast for “liberating” itself from “bourgeois” niceties or formalities.

¹⁹One of the greatest threats to proceduralist legality in all democracies today comes ironically from the highest courts. Rather than focusing first and foremost on whether new legislation, and then their enforcement, exhibits procedural integrity, constitutional courts today instead more and more frequently engage directly in substantive legislative (and then administrative) activities. Their rulings launch policy *initiatives*, whether in abortion or medical treatment, narcotics, gender, housing, wages and sexual preference. This is as true of the U.S. Supreme Court as it is of Constitutional Courts from Germany to Colombia. For instance, even legal scholars who favor the substantive outcome of *Roe v. Wade*, which legalized abortion in the U.S., agree that Court reasoning here lacked procedural integrity (e.g. Sunstein 2005). The Colombia Constitutional Court, established in 1991, is a literal archetype of legislative overreach from the bench and thus of proceduralist breakdown (Faundez 2005; Uprimny and Garcia-Villegas 2005).

They thereby confuse state formalism – “right conduct” or “rectitude” (*Rechtsstaat*) – which is context- or situation sensitive, thus intrinsically negotiable or variable, with proceduralist integrity, which is entirely independent of such factors. Whether done nonchalantly or in earnest, *any* destruction of the fence is always an unambiguous event on the ground, because the presence or absence of *any part* of the fence is bright line.

RAZ’S DISPARATE LISTING. Instead of defining the rule of law in terms that are conceptually concatenate and symmetrical that is, scrupulously proceduralist, which then combine into a bright line threshold standard of law making and law enforcing behavior, O’Donnell defines it in terms of a conceptually disparate listing taken from British legal positivist Joseph Raz (1977:214–18). This listing, ironically, also contains eight “principles.” But unlike Fuller’s desiderata, Raz’s items are disparate in that they span qualities of lawfulness which are: formalist (or strictly categorizing), substantive normative, and consequentialist, as well as proceduralist (with the latter largely adopted from or recapitulating some of Fuller’s items). Indeed, Raz himself conveys his listing’s disparateness by saying “many principles” of rule of law are available from which to select, but he chose the following eight as “some of the more important ones:”

- laws should be prospective, open (adequately publicized) and clear in their meaning rather than ambiguous, obscure, or imprecise;
- laws should be relatively stable, so people can have sufficient knowledge of their content to plan long term;
- the making of particular laws should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules, and themselves be stable, clear, etc.
- the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed and, in turn, courts must adjudicate – apply the law – rather than “act for some other reasons;”
- “principles of natural justice must be observed,” that is, judicial hearings must be “open and fair” as opposed to being “biased;”
- courts should have limited review powers over implementing other principles, namely strictly to ensure the conformity to rule of law; this includes their review of both subordinate and parliamentary legislation and of administrative action;
- courts should be easily accessible because long delays, excessive costs, etc. can convert even enlightened law into a dead letter, and frustrate citizen guidance; and
- the discretion of crime preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert law, whether courts or police (in neglecting crimes by allocating resources) and prosecutors (in neglecting certain crimes or classes of offenders).

Raz concludes this discussion by repeating that the listing above is “very incomplete,” “merely” illustrative of the “formal conception of the rule of law,” and the items vary in their “validity or importance” depending on “particular circumstances.” Raz is nonetheless confident that “the doctrine [of rule of law] rests ultimately” on the “basic idea” of “*effective* guidance” (my emphasis).

These concluding remarks well reflect the conceptual disparateness of Raz’s listings, and Fuller would react negatively to all of them. Fuller in fact was explicit that the basic idea of rule of law is not *effective* guidance. This outcome based standard confuses a legal order with what Fuller called “managerial direction” (1964/1969:207). The latter, not law, is an enterprise of attaining particular ends effectively – including those in Raz’s listings – by providing “a detailed set of instructions for accomplishing specific objectives.”

By contrast, the basic idea of rule of law in Fuller's strictly proceduralist sense is instead *clear and possible* guidance, thus reasoned governance and reasoned compliance, whether effective *or not* in securing particular ends. The rule of law is "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules" by "furnish[ing] a baseline for self directed action." A law abiding citizen, that is, does not *apply* legal rules to serve the specific ends set by the state, by any lawgiver. He instead *complies with* legal rules, exhibits behavioral fidelity to them, in the conduct of his own affairs. It is then presumed in this proceduralist approach that the private interests served by lawful behavior benefits rather than harms the society generally (1964/1969:Chap. 3).

O'Donnell's "Democratic" Rule of Law

Rather than concerning ourselves further with how Fuller would likely respond to Raz's listing, we can see the fruits of the latter's conceptual disparateness – as well as of O'Donnell's casual affiliating of Fuller's proceduralism with such disparateness – in how O'Donnell characterizes and uses the phrase "rule of law." For instance, he quotes Fuller saying that judicial independence, an outcome-based standard, requires "that those charged with interpreting and enforcing the laws [must] make them with primary seriousness" (1964/1969:162). O'Donnell interprets this as justifying judicial activism, quite unlike any argument to this effect to be found in Fuller. "To this I would add that the stewards of law must hold themselves ready to support *and expand* that very democracy which, in contrast to the old authoritarian order, confers upon them such independence" (2004a:35, my emphasis).

Such an assertion about "rule of law" literally invites from the bench not simply judicial activism but sheer demagoguery; it is unFullerian in that it is entirely perfunctory on proceduralist grounds. Indeed, O'Donnell cites in support of his interpretation above only two articles in Spanish, both by Ernesto Garzon Valdes. For Fuller, by contrast, the key to rule of law is that courts, and particularly appellate and constitutional courts, seek to ensure the judiciary's own procedural integrity. They do not encourage any particular substantive outcomes from judicial rulings, whether those putatively advancing democracy or those putatively obstructing it – as partisans (or observing comparativists) happen to characterize them.

Consider in this light Raz's fourth principle, that courts must be independent and, correlatively, must apply the law rather than legislate, create new law. How can judges, who are dispersed and specialized, as well as partisan claimants, the general public, and observing comparativists possibly recognize and understand in common when particular constitutional courts or the judiciary in general are retaining or losing independence in this consequentialist sense? This becomes a possibility only by relying on the bright line threshold of Fuller's strictly proceduralist desiderata. It is not a possibility using Raz's disparate listing.

Failing to appreciate how and why a strictly proceduralist threshold standard of lawfulness resists partisanship and politicization from any quarter whereas Raz's listing cannot, the rest of O'Donnell's discussions of rule of law tacks freely between the proceduralist qualities of law and outcomes or other substantive qualities O'Donnell happens to favor or disfavor personally – or on some unstated partisan ground. That is, O'Donnell literally and rather facilely collapses "rule of law" as such into what he calls "*democratic* rule of law" (2004a:32, 36, 41–44; 2004b:188–90). He fails to appreciate that on proceduralist grounds this is already oxymoronic. A melding at a conceptual level of democracy (or majoritarianism or leveling) with rule of law (as proceduralist lawfulness) results in subordinating at this level, directly and

in substance, the procedural integrity of law making and law interpreting to an ever greater robustness of partisan or interest group competition.

This explains the confusion with which O'Donnell concludes (2004a:43–45; also see 2004b:188–90). He acknowledges the “difficulties” intrinsic to identify “empirical indicators (variables or standards)” with which to assess the rule of law and its linkages with democracy and democratic quality. He suggests, therefore, that we become minimalist. We “should begin,” he says, “by defining a point below which, though there may be some rule *by* law, there is no rule *of* law,” a “cutting point.”

But O'Donnell's listing, like Raz's on which it is based is conceptually disparate, and in both senses noted earlier. It spans indicators which are formalist, substantive normative or outcome-based, and the proceduralist; it also moves back and forth across factors or developments which are structural and institutional (and thus potentially cognizable intersubjectively) and others which are cultural or social psychological (and thus amorphous, intrinsically vague) (2004a:43–44):

- the degree to which a legal system extends “homogeneously” across state territory, rather than leaving “brown areas;”
- the degree to which a legal system deals in a “respectful, considerate manner” with indigenous communities and their legal systems and cultures;
- generalized recognition of the supremacy of the constitution, and a supreme or constitutional court that “effectively” interprets and protects it;
- a judiciary free of “undue” influences from executive, legislative and private interests, which also does not “abuse” its autonomy by pursuing narrowly defined corporate interests, but which does recognize the international covenants and treaties;
- prison conditions “adequate” to human dignity;
- beyond rights to associate in directly political organizations, civil rights (and, eventually, labor rights) must be upheld and there should be “diverse social organizations” functioning as mechanisms of vertical societal accountability;
- foreigners should have the “same” civil rights as citizens.

It is a mystery how O'Donnell or anyone else can identify directly in substance these indicators, factors or developments of “democratic rule of law” (among others not included above). For that matter, it is equally a mystery why O'Donnell considers them all minimalist, rather than idealized.

AN ALTERNATIVE: PROCEDURALIST, STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

The baseline typology presented below is partial (elaborated on elsewhere, including expanded beyond three and fitted with subtypes). But, it is sufficient to demonstrate that it differs from others in the literature in two fundamental respects: first, it is minimalist in three related ways and, second, it can be applied exclusively at a structural and institutional level of analysis.

Regarding the typology's minimalism: First, and most important, it takes seriously Merkel's point that any “realist” concept of democracy must be “based exclusively on the institutional architecture of a democracy,” rather than using “outputs or outcomes as defining characteristics” (2004:36). Second, it retains the most minimalist formalist baseline, that of electoral democracy, in identifying the first democracy type. This is a baseline of the minimalist vertical accountability. Third, it adds to this, in identifying the next two types of democracy,

a baseline of strictly proceduralist horizontal accountability, applied first to the state and then to the major intermediary associations in civil society.

Taken together, these baselines, applied strictly at a structural and institutional level of analysis, provide comparativists with an eminently generalizable point of departure in identifying and evaluating *analytically* the qualities or deficiencies of any democracy, whether originating or new, whether historically or today. More grandly, these same baselines and level of analysis provide a grounded, invariant, bright line analytical standard against which to distinguish not simply basic types of democratic states or regimes but rather basic types of *institutional designs* spanning the state and civil society.

We define a quality democracy as one that extends rule of law as procedural legality from state agencies, and thus public governance structures, to major intermediary associations in civil society, and thus private governance structures. Such major intermediary associations include professions and publicly traded corporations in particular, not voluntary associations, nonprofit enterprises or social movements.²⁰ We do not then propose that some particular substantive qualities fill these governance structures or that the latter yield some particular consequences or outcomes. These are intrinsically policy issues, the very substance of democratic politics itself. Comparativists' subjective interpretations or partisan preferences here are nothing more than that: at best, they contribute another set of inputs to the political process. Elected officials, political party leaders and other political participants (including social movement leaders) are free to ignore, consider or disregard these inputs, like others, as they see fit; these inputs from comparativists about the substance of politics are not somehow more privileged or "informed" than inputs from others.

Thus, once a generic threshold is crossed to a different institutional design, all sorts of variations of "quality" are then possible within it, variations of lesser or greater "quality." The key, however, is to identify the central structural characteristics which clearly and unambiguously distinguish each institutional design from the others, those "below" and those "above" it.

A Baseline Typology

FORMAL DEMOCRACY. We begin trivially: Unlike any autocracy, a formal democracy institutionalizes regularly held elections in which, at minimum, it is possible, not necessarily unproblematic, for a governing party or coalition to be replaced. With this first type we eliminate from the umbrella category of democracy only *extreme* cases of electoral fraud, abuse or obstruction. We give the benefit of doubt to every state or regime holding elections, and thereby place the onus of proof on dissidents to make their case for deficiency. O'Donnell (2001:15) says, rightly, there is no theory here, no clear threshold, but only inductive judgments. So why should any comparativist pretend otherwise? If a particular state or regime is playing games in an effort to maintain an illusion of electoral competitiveness, is not such game playing significant structurally and institutionally in itself? Is not the illusion itself an

²⁰The reason for this distinction is theoretical and technical, and beyond the scope of this paper to discuss. However, the key is whether any intermediary association contains what are called structured situations, those in which positions of power and positions of dependence are both entrenched. Such is the case with corporate managers and corporate stakeholders and also with professional practitioners and clients. When structured situations are present, then procedural legality is vital to promote governance quality; when they are not, this is not relevant, let alone vital.

important restriction on state electoral activities, sufficiently important to qualify it minimally as a formal democracy?²¹

Of course, we are also drawing attention to the severe limitations of this baseline type: the strict formalism of electoral democracy can be in evidence unambiguously even as public authorities, to say nothing of private elites, resort to one-sided or arbitrary uses of force, threats or incentives to maintain order. As the case of Mexico well illustrates, both before and after the elections of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon, electoral democracy is quite compatible with both arbitrary government and what we can call an imposed social order. In Mexico an imposed social order revolves around the patron-client networks stretching from centers of government and the economy to the lowliest public positions in the state and private positions in civil society. In other countries, an imposed social order can revolve around corporatist peak associations or plural sectional associations (whether ethnic, confessional or other) (e.g. O'Donnell et al. 1986; Diamond 1999; Merkel 2004).

LIMITED GOVERNMENT. Limited governments share the formalism of electoral democracy, but go further structurally and institutionally. They institutionalize the rule of law as proceduralist lawfulness within and around the state, *public* governance structures, and thus within and around all three branches of government. They institutionalize at least within and around the state the proceduralist threshold standard of clear and possible rule making, interpreting and enforcing. This stems public one-sidedness, public arbitrariness and abuse. A bright line threshold standard instructs everyone – from public officials to citizens and interested observers – regarding what publicly enforced rules (whether contractual, statutory or constitutional) require of *anyone* procedurally in exercising public authority. This *quality* of public governance and judicial (or administrative) oversight of it exceeds unambiguously the *institutional design* of formalist electoral democracy. Thus, it marks a unique *institutional design*, that of limited government.

However, we are still left with a part of the problem we identified with formal electoral democracy: Limited government may well institutionalize public lawfulness, but this institutional design, too, nonetheless remains compatible with arbitrary exercises of collective power in civil society, by intermediary associations, organizations and networks. Thus, it remains compatible with an imposed social order. Japan illustrates this well, in the eyes of many area specialists. The same is true of Europe and the United States, at least in certain sectors of their respective civil societies (Diamond and Morlino 2004; O'Donnell et al. 2004).

Consider, for instance, the susceptibility across the Continent to one-sidedness and abuse in civil society stemming from institutions of “neo-corporatist interest intermediation.” Corporatism today continues to revolve around employment issues (wage bargaining, labor market regulation) and forms of routinized bargaining between the state, major employers and trade unions. But it also extends to “social pacts,” which deal with the new economic turbulence of globalization, “neo-liberal” challenges to the earlier welfare policy consensus (which Lijphart found constricting), and postindustrial policy arenas such as education, health care,

²¹ Our distinction between formal democracy and limited government means that the former type spans a distinction which Collier and Levitsky and others draw. All formal democracies qualify by “procedural minimum” definitions of “classical subtypes” of democracy, the latter including presidential and parliamentary systems. We are adding that they also qualify by “expanded procedural minimum definitions of democracy,” which point to whether elected governments possess or lack effective power to govern (in the face of legacies of military rule). A “protected” or “tutelary” democracy, wherein the military retains an “inordinate degree of political power,” is hardly a limited government. But it may well qualify robustly as a formal, electoral democracy.

and environmentalism (Molina and Rhodes 2002:306–9). It is an open, empirical question whether, when and which types of corporatist bargaining exhibit any of Fuller’s proceduralist criteria of rule of law, as opposed to being manifestations of what Fuller calls “managerial direction.” It is equally open whether the private governance structures of major employers or trade unions (and then of “social pact” participants) institutionalize the procedural legality. Continental corporatism (and then also clientelism) is essentially an institutional substitute for or alternative to professionalism.

The open question in the Anglo American world follows from this: when and where do the private governance structures of professions and publicly traded corporations institutionalize procedural legality? The literature here can support various interpretations, including Susan Shapiro’s (2003) lengthy discussions of “conflicts of interest” within five professions, including law and medicine, and then also a nonprofessional occupation, journalism. At times professions govern themselves consistently with Fuller’s desiderata; at others they do not. In turn, judicial oversight is uneven in demanding the procedural integrity. Indeed, numerous examples of one-sidedness in structured situations run through the continental literature of *Bildungsbürgertum* (cultivated middle classes) and the Anglo American literature of professions (Burrage and Torstendahl 1990; Torstendahl and Burrage 1990; Sciulli 2005).

DEMOCRATIC LAWFUL SOCIETY. The lingering problem of one-sidedness and abuse in civil society gets us to another broad distinction between institutional designs, that between limited government and democratic lawful society. The latter shares with limited government proceduralist restraints on public one-sidedness and then goes further structurally and institutionally. It also institutionalizes the same proceduralist restraints within and around the *private* governance structures in civil society, which thereby stems private one-sidedness and abuse.

Here, courts (or administrative agencies) endeavor ceaselessly to extend from public to private governance structures proceduralist restraints on one-sided exercises of power. They thereby instruct corporate officers as well as administrators of professional associations and other major intermediary associations (including universities, hospitals and law firms) regarding what existing rules of governance and conduct require of them procedurally (Shapiro 2003). Thus, private one-sidedness enervates the institutional design of a democratic, globally competitive society in two ways simultaneously, whereas it has no such effect on either limited government or formal democracy. On the one hand, it enervates lawfulness in civil society, by permitting one-sided exercises of collective power in private governance structures. On the other, it holds hostage to local loyalties a society’s commercial competitiveness in a global economy.

One way of identifying the subtypes within each of the baseline types of institutional design is to introduce one or more of the literature’s traditional distinctions, which are formalist or directed to a structural and institutional level of analysis (or both): parliamentary cabinet and presidential congressional; unitary and federalist; two-party and multiparty; consociational, depoliticized and majoritarian; and neo-corporatist and pluralist.²² What is vital in identifying subtypes is to avoid all of the traditional distinctions which are substantive, outcome-based or directed at a cultural and social psychological of analysis. All of these introduce unnecessary vagueness, and thereby invite subjectivity and partisanship.

²²There are other, more analytical ways of distinguishing subtypes, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to introduce them now.

IMPLICATIONS AND LITERATURE SUPPORT. Our three part baseline typology brings the comparative study of democracy back to the early concern of Friedrich (and others, such as Hannah Arendt) to distinguish absolutism from constitutionalism. But it does so by rendering this issue analytical and bright line rather than leaving it normative and vague. It also establishes a linkage with the writings not only of Fuller but also of Jurgen Habermas and Talcott Parsons. It moves cross national inquiry from a political science focus on the structural characteristics of state and regime to a broader, more sociological analysis of structural characteristics of the civil society and, more particularly, of major intermediary associations. With this, our baseline typology finally introduces into comparative politics the original concerns of the sociology of professions, to broaden democracy typologies from the polity to include major intermediary associations in civil society.

We see support across the comparative literature for this new breadth of analysis based upon concept symmetry, brightline thresholds, and structural and institutional minimalism. Aside from support in Merkel's insistence that democracy be defined by "institutional architecture" and Schedler's insistence that consolidation criteria be kept minimalist, we also see support in O'Donnell's emphasis in 1996 and 1998 on horizontal accountability. Richard Sklar was certainly correct in 1999 when he anticipated that O'Donnell's then recent discussions of horizontal accountability might foreshadow a revival of constitutional thought as a branch of comparative politics.

Second, we see support in Diamond and Morlino. Despite their acceding to type relativism, they are nonetheless sufficiently confident to assert: "The rule of law is the base upon which every other dimension of democratic quality rests" (2004:23).

Third, we see support in Catalina Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti (2000) on "societal accountability" (and earlier, in Sciulli 1992 on "societal constitutionalism;" also see Teubner 2004). However, they define societal accountability both too narrowly and too vaguely: "a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism of control that rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizens' associations and movements and on the media, actions that aim at exposing governmental wrongdoing, bringing new issues onto the public agenda, or activating the operation of horizontal agencies." Where they key this concept on an amorphous, formalist "right to petition," *we focus on the restraints imposed on the state structurally by the presence of procedurally lawful private governance structures in civil society, led by those in professions and publicly traded corporations.*

Finally, we see support in Robert Rohrschneider's (2005) discussion of "institutional quality" in advanced democracies. He points out that while the essence of liberal democracy is to represent citizens, comparativists know surprisingly little about how citizens actually evaluate the representative capacity of national institutions on the ground. Most prior studies assume that, in the words of Dalton (2002:217), "citizen-elite agreement is the normal standard for judging the representativeness of a democratic system." This pushes comparative analysis to a cultural or social psychological level of analysis, to the putative "legitimation" of elite pacts which Schmitter and others emphasize.

By contrast, Rohrschneider takes a quite different approach (2005:850–51), one entirely consistent with but more limited in scope than our proceduralist turn. He proposes that the procedural integrity of "arbitrating institutions," such as the bureaucracy and judiciary, is in two ways "more relevant to citizen perceptions of representation than a country's regime type" (such as whether electoral systems are proportional or majoritarian). One way in which such proceduralism is more relevant is that in helping to adjudicate and regulate a multitude of conflicting interests, the bureaucracy and judiciary inform citizens about how seriously a regime takes their preferences. Another way, equally important, is that arbitrating institutions'

own procedural integrity “provides citizens with a foundation to evaluate how well the ‘input’ institutions of a regime – parliaments and governments – account for their interests.” We add to Rohrschneider’s focus on the public bureaucracy and judiciary a broader view, one which encompasses the procedural integrity of private governance structures in civil society.

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CHAPTER 6

Power, Politics, and the Civil Sphere

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The state is the source of coercion in modern societies, but politics and power are about much more than states. The state provides an umbrella for modern politics, but so does the civil sphere. Politics originates in the civil sphere; it aims to push state power in a certain direction, making it work on behalf of this end rather than another. These ends are set by communicative conflicts in the civil sphere. To articulate these ends with state power – that is the aim and reward of modern politics.

WHAT IS POLITICS?

Before an overflow audience of Munich students in 1918, in the highly unstable and polarized atmosphere of the just defeated German nation, Max Weber spoke about the meaning of modern politics. In the years since, this lecture, “Politics as a Vocation,” has become famous. Weber stressed the dignity of politics and its distinctive nature. He also wanted to remind his radically inclined students – who represented both rightist and leftist extremes – that politics can be effectively conducted within the framework of the state.

What do we understand by politics? The concept is extremely broad and comprises any kind of *independent* leadership in action. One speaks of the currency policy of the banks [or] of the strike policy of a trade union; one may speak of the educational policy of a municipality or a township, of the policy of the president of a voluntary association, and, finally, even of the policy of a prudent wife who seeks to guide her husband. Tonight, our reflections are, of course, not based upon such a broad concept. We wish to understand by politics only the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership, of a *political* association, hence today, of a *state*. (Weber 1958a: 77, original italics)

In the context of a state, politics is about gaining or losing power, which Weber defined in a realistic, not an idealistic manner. It is “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1978: 53).

“Politics” for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state ... He who is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as “power for power’s sake,” that is, in order to enjoy the prestige-feeling that power gives. (Weber 1958a: 78)

Politics pulls us away from the impersonality of bureaucracy, from the modern emphasis on rationality and efficiency. It seems to bring us back to private interests and resources. It certainly moves political analysis from the impersonal to the personal, from state to party, from commands to persuasion, from rules to votes, from organizations to individuals. It also allows us to think about the cultural images and about symbolic manipulation.

AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMATION

While power may be defined as the ability to carry out one's will regardless of any resistance, it is easier and more effective to exercise power if one takes the will of the other into account. Insofar as another person obeys you, not from fear but from respect, one exercises not only power but authority. Authoritative power possesses legitimation. According to Weber's classic definition, now accepted by virtually all political thinkers, there are actually three different types of legitimate authority, what Weber called "inner justifications" for the exercise of power. The first is tradition, which Weber describes as "the authority of the 'eternal yesterday,' i.e., of the mores sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform" (Weber 1958a: 78–79). Quite the opposite of this traditional form of authority, which defined patrimonial power in premodern times, is the rational-legal mode of legitimation that defines the modern state.

There is domination by virtue of "legality," by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional "competence" based on rationally created *rules*. In this case, obedience is expected in discharging statutory obligations. This is domination as exercised by the modern "servant of the state" and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him. (Weber 1958a: 79)

Finally, power can be legitimated in much more personal terms, by reference to a leader's charisma.

There is the authority of the extraordinary and personal *gift of grace* (charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism or other qualities of individual leadership. This is "charismatic" domination, as exercised by the prophet or – in the field of politics – by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian [i.e., popularly-elected] ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader. (Weber 1958a: 79, original italics)

POSTMODERN AUTHORITY: CHARISMA AND CULTURE

Weber thought charisma would wither away in the face of modern rationalization. Its inspiring, volatile, innovative, and sometimes dangerous subjectivity would be no match for the rational-legal power of the bureaucratic machine. It has not turned out that way. For at least two centuries, democratic and nondemocratic nations have sustained the public spheres whose structuring has depended upon mass media. Both democratic and nondemocratic politicians, then, depend upon mass media to construct their charismatic power; and in postmodern societies, political strategists have become increasingly self-conscious about the mass mediated production of their image. Though always symbolic and cultural, in postmodern societies public political action has become increasingly reconceptualized as political "performance" (Alexander et al. 2006). Those who struggle for power, whether conservative, liberal, or radical, strive to project powerful symbolic images on the public stage, and to control their interpretation. And political journalism has become increasingly concerned with evaluating this performative task.

Intellectual critics and critical sociologists often decry the emphasis on “symbolic politics” as manipulative and propagandistic, as a turning away from reality to pretence, simulation, and spectacle. Political practitioners speak simply about getting out truthful information about their message or their candidate.

In contemporary society, the politics of image-making – public relations and advertising – has become fundamental to public life, whether the intent is to inform or to deceive, to liberate or to repress. In the 1960s, the new rules of the political game were already emerging, but the media were not yet covering campaigns from the performative point of view. Back in 1968, after Richard Nixon triumphed over Hubert Humphrey in a critical presidential election, a former Republican strategist named Joe McGinniss published *The Selling of the President*, and the “scandalous” tell-all book became a controversial, runaway best seller. At one point in his account, McGinniss revealed the contents of a secret strategy memo that had been prepared for Nixon before Robert Kennedy’s assassination, when the telegenic “Bobby” looked to be Nixon’s future democratic opponent. The aim of the Republican staff memo was to convince Nixon to recast his public image. Its self-serving but still revealing subtext was that mass mediated charisma that had triumphed over reasoned political debate.

The Bobby phenomenon; his screaming appeal to the TV generation. This certainly has nothing to do with logical persuasion; it’s a total *experience*, a tactile sense Thousands of little girls [*sic*] who want him to be president so they can have him on the TV screen and run their fingers through the image of his hair ...

Reason pushes the viewer back, it assaults him, it demands that he agree or disagree; [by contrast,] impression can envelop him, invite him in, without making an intellectual demand, or a demand on his intellectual energies ...

When we argue with him we demand that he make the effort of replying. We seek to engage his intellect, and for most people this is the most difficult work of all. The emotions are more easily roused, closer to the surface, more malleable. Get the voters to like the guy, and the battle’s two thirds won. (quoted in McGinniss 1968: 187–189)

SOCIAL POWER AND POLITICS

As this insider’s account suggests, the struggle for charismatic power is fuelled, sometimes invisibly, by other forms of social power. (Mann 1986, 1993). The very idea of “selling” a President suggests that the struggle for charismatic power is enabled and also constrained by economic and intellectual power. It is both expensive (economic power) and strategically demanding (intellectual power) to mount a convincing political campaign, whether Presidential or parliamentary. Effective politicians are, of course, usually talented strategic thinkers themselves. But professional strategists must also be hired, and the salaries of speech writers must be paid. The politician who strives for charismatic power must purchase television time, and she will hire, if she can, professional spin doctors and other experts at public relations. Those who possess economic power can, in this way, exercise great influence over who gets power, and how much.

This layered complexity of power, its visible and its invisible parts, was explored in an influential manner by the three-dimensional model developed by Steven Lukes. The one-dimensional view of power, Lukes writes (1974: 15, original italics), “involves a focus on *behavior* in the making of *decisions* on issues over which there is an observable *conflict of interests*.” While he criticizes this approach, Lukes acknowledges that it does capture one level of modern politics, the level that is directly observable and that involves policy preferences and political participation. The two-dimensional view goes deeper into the less visible

aspects of social power, into “the question of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which the potential issues are kept out of the political process” (Lukes 1974: 21). The three-dimensional approach carries this search deeper still, exploring how power can be exercised without any overt participation in political institutions and without engendering any open political conflict. In this third dimension, hidden social powers ensure that a particular political agenda will be pursued, even while the forms of political legitimacy remain intact and the autonomy of the state seems to be maintained.

It is with the second and the third dimensions of power that Lukes points to the influence of social as compared to merely political elites. Social elites operate outside the political domain framed by the state and the political institutions of party and government. These elites try to “wire” politics, using their social power to control political power, largely in private ways.

THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE: THE POWER ELITE?

Suspicious about social elites controlling political life are nothing new. They are the cynical response to disappointment about the possibilities for equality and democracy in the capitalist society. Karl Marx articulated a particularly strident and powerful vision of hidden social control in his class theory, which held that the state is really nothing more than the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, the wealthiest economic class. Writing a century after Marx, C. Wright Mills developed this class model in the more subtle form that has become a model for critical, neo-Marxian analysis ever since. Mills published *The Power Elite* (1959) in the waning days of the conservative political administration of President Dwight Eisenhower and in the shadow of the most virulent phase of the Cold War. He gave voice to the frustrations of those who had been excluded from political decisionmaking and to those who were becoming increasingly pessimistic about the ability for average people to effect any substantial political change:

The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in which they live, yet even in these rounds of job, family, and neighborhood they often seem driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern. “Great changes” are beyond their control, but affect their conduct and outlook none the less. The very framework of modern society confines them to projects not their own ... The men and women of the mass society ... accordingly feel they are without purpose in an epoch in which they are without power. But not all men are in this sense ordinary. As the means of information and of power are centralized, some men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women. They are not made by their jobs; they set up and break down jobs for thousands of others; they are not confined by simple family responsibilities; they can escape. They may live in many hotels and houses, but they are bound by no one community. They need not merely “meet the demands of the day and hour;” in some part, they create these demands, and cause others to meet them. Whether or not they profess their power, their technical and political experience of it far transcends that of the underlying population. (Mills 1959: 3)

In opposition to the traditional Marxian view, Mills developed a seemingly more pluralistic and Weberian model. He discussed elite power, not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and the military spheres, insisting that it is the control of institutions, not wealth per se, that defines the elite position. Rather than pure economic control, elite domination is defined by three different forms of social power:

We do not accept as adequate the simple view that high economic men unilaterally make all decisions of national consequence. We hold that such a simple view of “economic determinism” must be elaborated by “political determinism” and “military determinism” [and] that the higher agents of each of these three domains now often have a noticeable degree of autonomy ... Those are the major reasons why we prefer “power elite” to “ruling class.” (Mills 1959: 277)

Despite these theoretical reservations, however, Mills claimed that in his empirical analysis he had discovered that, in practice, the three different elites closely coordinate their actions, that “at the top of this structure, the power elite has been shaped by the coincidence of interest between those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of violence,” “the corporate chieftains and the professional warlords” (Mills 1959: 276). While the power elite thesis thus seems to resemble the Marxian theory that was rejected by Mills, it differs in exploring how cultural processes shape an elite’s sense of itself. One must investigate the power elite’s life style, its “psychological affinities,” to “grasp the personal and social basis of the power elite’s unity” (Mills 1959: 278).

Sociologists influenced by Mills have confirmed that there is, indeed, an economic elite in the U.S. Wealth is vastly concentrated in the top one per cent of the American population, and a large part of this wealth is inherited at birth. Many large stock holding families, in fact, remain actively involved in controlling the direction of major corporations through family offices, investment partnerships, and holding companies. Researchers such as William Domhoff (1967) have also confirmed Mills’ claim that elite domination involves, not only shared economic interest, but shared collective identity. The product of private cultural institutions, shared elite socialization generates a sense of trust. The super-rich go to school, socialize, and recreate in institutions to which ordinary people hardly have access. So, they are linked not only economically, through business transactions and corporate interests, but also socially, through shared culture and marriage. Middle class people who rise to become members of the power elite gain not only great wealth but access to the life styles of America’s relatively invisible privileged class. There is, in other words, cultural assimilation into the American upper class.

DOES THE ECONOMIC ELITE CONTROL POLITICS?

Mills and his followers have demonstrated that social power is distributed unevenly, and that the economic elite is particularly powerful. But they have never succeeded in making a good case for their most ambitious claim – that the economic elite actually controls the state. To the contrary, it has been relatively easy to demonstrate that the state retains a very real autonomy from social power. In the often fiercely fought political struggles to influence state power, social elites fail time after time to exercise compelling control over the discourse or ultimate success.

One way to see this is to set side by side the biographies of those who wield great political power. The career of Vice President Richard Cheney would seem to prove the power elite thesis. Mr. Cheney moved from being a Wyoming congressman to Defense Secretary in the first Bush administration, then to become chief executive of the multibillion dollar Halliburton (oil) company and finally to being Vice President under the administration of President George W. Bush. Yet, right alongside Vice President Cheney sat Secretary of State Colin Powell, one of the most powerful cabinet members in the same administration who, albeit unsuccessfully, opposed the Vice President in central areas of social policy. Born into the African American working class, Powell achieved military power as a four star general and later as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For every scion of inherited wealth and Ivy League provenance who becomes President, like those named Bush or Roosevelt or Kennedy, there is a brilliant political strategist from humble origins, named Lincoln, Johnson, or Clinton, who achieves the Presidency through charisma and hard work. For every giant corporation, like Enron, exercising backroom influence on government policies, there is the counter-influence of the charismatic outsider, like Martin Luther King, who brought an exploited minority to

significant political power, or Ralph Nader, who forced safety and environmental concerns onto the national political agenda.

Power elite theorists try to explain away such obvious examples of state autonomy and political pluralism. Mills (1959: 231), for example, makes the following claims:

- “The simple, old-fashioned sense of being elected up the political hierarchy” simply no longer exists;
- Politics has become “more of an appointed than an elected career;”
- An “inner circle of political outsiders” representing the corporate rich “have taken over the key executive posts of administrative command,” excluding figures from electoral politics and political parties.

If such assertions were true, then the public and open contestations for power that appear to characterize contemporary societies would be entirely without effect. Public opinion would be powerless, and social movements initiated by those outside the power elite would be doomed to fail.

Mills was aware that power elite theory had to respond to these challenges. The central empirical question for understanding modern politics, he agreed, is “the degree to which the public has genuine autonomy from instituted authority” (Mills 1959: 303). If there does exist “the free ebb and flow of discussion,” then there exist “possibilities of answering back, or organizing autonomous organs of public opinion, [and] of realizing opinion in action” (Mills 1959: 298). Whether or not there is a concentration of institutional power, in other words, ends up not being critically important. If “the power elite ... is *truly* responsible to, or *even exists in connection with*, a community of publics, it carries a very different meaning than if such a public is being transformed into a society of masses” (Mills 1959: 302, italics added).

Mills asserts that the public has, in fact, been transformed in just this way. The same social forces that have created the new power elite, he claims, have turned the once critical and independent public into a manipulated, dependent mass. Elites, he suggests, are “centers of *manipulation* as well as of authority.” The public is “rather passively exposed to the mass media and rather helplessly opened up to the suggestions and manipulations that flow from these media” (Mills 1959: 305, italics added). The mass media have committed “psychical rape,” and public opinion has been eliminated as a challenge to the power of the elite (Mills 1959: 309).

Such assertions about the transformation of the modern public into a pliant mass are central to arguments for the domination of political by social power. They define the vital research questions for social scientists interested in whether or not democracy continues to be a viable possibility in contemporary societies. Is the public in democratic societies really manipulated in this way? Are the media fundamentally controlled by corporate wealth, or do they also provide a space for oppositional groups to broadcast alternative ideas? Can charismatic power serve anti-elite movements? Is the culture of political life merely the replication of class culture? Does democratic political culture contain ethical aspirations that draw from noneconomic and nonelite sources?

CITIZENSHIP, PUBLICS, AND THE CIVIL SPHERE

Less than a decade after Mills articulated his sociological pessimism about democratic publics, President Lyndon B. Johnson, a politician who had risen from the provincial poverty of south-central Texas, signed into law the *Civil Rights Act of 1964*. He did so in response to a social

movement of working class African Americans whose grandparents had been slaves in the American south. Their charismatic leader, Martin Luther King, had created vast waves of sympathy among the privileged Northern whites in the course of challenging the power of the white racist Southern state. He did so by organizing a series of powerfully affecting performances on the stage of American public life (Alexander 2006: 293–391). These black social dramas projected radical, anti-racist challenges to established power. They were transmitted by a sympathetic mass media dominated by white journalists and controlled by vast corporate wealth. This supportive public opinion was transformed into political power through the votes of American citizens, both black and white.

CIVIL SOLIDARITY AND PUBLIC LIFE

Political struggles in contemporary societies are not determined by the power of social elites and state bureaucracies. They are deeply affected by moral ideas about citizenship and human rights. Between social power, on the one side, and state power, on the other, there sits a cultural and institutional space that can be called the “civil sphere” (Alexander 2006: 53–192). The civil sphere is defined by legal norms that guarantee rights to individuals. It is also defined by feelings and values that stress solidarity with every other member of society, no matter what their status or power. Being a citizen does not only mean being part of a state. It also means being a member of the civil sphere, part of the imagined solidarity of the civil community that defines a democracy.

You are born a full citizen only in the narrowly legal sense. Your citizenship can actually become full only if those who are already citizens believe, feel, and acknowledge that you have the capacity for civil behavior. This considered evaluation is reflected in a negative way by the fact that children and convicted felons are not allowed to vote. Differential access to full citizenship is reflected in the struggles of subjugated and excluded groups for political power. For such political struggles are not only about power, but about recognition of civil qualities. Social movements demand power, but they also work to present themselves in a civil way, as potentially good citizens. To be seen as a potentially good citizen, one must present oneself inside the “discourse of civil society,” as rational and honest, trusting but critical, open not secretive, cooperative but also independent. Those who strive to achieve political power must strive to represent themselves in terms of these civil qualities. To do so, they need the mass media. Their audience is the public of citizens. Their goal is to influence the public’s opinion.

The civil sphere is highly idealized. It reflects the aspirations and hopes crystallized by charismatic democrats like Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King. It rests upon philosophical foundations that stretch from Socrates, who died for political and intellectual freedom in ancient Greece, to thinkers like John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who resisted the divine rights of British and French kings, to the American founding fathers who created the Constitution and Bill of Rights. These ideals can sometimes have real teeth. Civil society is composed not only of beliefs, but of institutions. These institutions create real rewards for civil behavior and punishments for uncivil action.

Full members of the civil society possess a wide range of highly material rights. Contract law punishes dishonesty, the failure to disclose pertinent information. Criminal law provides severe sanctions for violence, indeed for coercion of any kind, which is the prototype of anticivil behavior between two people. The material powers that accrue to fully realized membership in civil society extend to voting, the process of selecting and discarding those

who control the state power. If you are a member of the civil sphere, you also have the right to meet with other people in public, to keep your private life invisible to state authorities, to form organizations, and to mount political campaigns and demonstrations. Fully recognized citizens have the right, in other words, to trigger and to alter the great tides of public opinion. One of the most important political theorists of democracy, Hannah Arendt, wrote that “everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity” (Arendt 1958: 50). Members of the civil sphere have the right to publish newspapers and books, to produce and distribute movies and songs. They can start their own radio and television stations. They can raise money to fund pet projects. They can start social movements to raise issues, to redirect political and social power, to be critical of any and all the powers that be.

To the degree that there is democracy, the civil sphere has some autonomy from social powers and state bureaucracy alike. When citizens mobilize themselves, when they become concerned and demanding citizens, then the state governs *for* them, and bureaucratic power is distributed in *their* interests. When opinion is fervent, elites offer compromises to co-opt aroused publics and reforms to calm them down. In such times, those who control the political power offer to share it with charismatic civil leaders, and those who control social power offer to spend it on their behalf. Arendt emphasizes this potential conflict between private social power and public political power. She writes, “the term ‘public’ signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it” (Arendt 1958: 52).

The civil sphere defines an open space of public contention. Jurgen Habermas, brought this element to light in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1991). Habermas describes how this new institution of democratic life first emerged in the eighteenth century. He believes that it emerged when the bourgeoisie struggled for political power against the aristocracy that exercised traditional authority:

The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing [social] relations The medium for this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason. (Habermas 1991: 27)

Within the public space of the civil sphere, Habermas claims, the simple force of the better argument sometimes wins. This is a non-bureaucratic, more democratic version of “rational-legal” authority as the *sine qua non* of legitimacy in the modern epoch.

After the cultural turn, however, we must understand “better argument” in a much more symbolic way. Those who aspire to exercise public power in democratic societies rely less on reason and intellectual argument than upon symbolic representation. Civil qualities are constructed through images, codes and narratives broadcast to the public audience of citizens. And it is not only outsiders who must navigate the shoals of public opinion and mass media. The same applies to the powers of social elites and even to the highest powers of the state. Corporations do not exercise some kind of automatic control over public life. No matter how much they would like to, at important moments they cannot control the political agenda. Particularly at moments of crisis, the publics of democratic societies – composed of lower, middle, and upper classes – can turn against corporate power and force it to become regulated in a more responsive way. This civil indignation can be heard, for example, in the anger that U.S. Senators broadcast during the Enron crisis. They fired off withering salvos at the corporation’s former top executive who appeared before a Congressional panel.

Senator FITZGERALD: Mr. Lay, I've concluded that you're perhaps the most accomplished confidence man since Charles Ponzi. I'd say you were a carnival barker, except that wouldn't be fair to carnival barkers. A carnie will at least tell you up front that he's running a shell game. You, Mr. Lay, were running what purported to be the seventh largest corporation in America.

Senator KERRY: ...As we fight a war on terrorism, and as we talk about holding other systems accountable, so we can follow the flow of money, we have – all of us – in this Congress allowed to stand for too long a system that undermines our capacity to do that, and that's offshore subsidiaries and tax havens.

Senator HOLLINGS: Well, much has been said about the development of a culture of corporate corruption, but there's also the culture of political corruption. And maybe we can get some good out of this whole situation, in that there's no better example than "Kenny Boy" of cash-and-carry government. I mean, I hope that this shames us into acting over on the House side and then on the Senate side, and sends a campaign reform bill to the president. We've got to clean up our own act, and maybe that's the good we'll get out of this situation. (Oppel and Kahn 2002)

Senator DURBIN: After all of the sound and fury of these investigations, the bottom-line questions are: Is Congress willing to amend the law to rein in the greed of the next Enron? Are we willing to concede that the genius of capitalism can result in ruthless behavior without our oversight and the protection of law? Can we save pensioners and investors – who were outsiders believing in the fairness of the market – from the corporate insiders who walk away from these colossal business train wrecks with their pockets full and without a scratch? Over 100 million Americans who own stock and 42 million who own 401(k)'s will be watching to see if these hearings and many others on Capitol Hill are about more than face time on the nightly news. To me, this national debate is about more than a failed corporate giant. It is about the values of our nation. Enron is a big story not just because of its bankruptcy. Sadly, bankruptcies occur everyday. Enron is a big story because it reminds us of our vulnerability. It reminds us that without the enforcement of fair and just laws, the average American doesn't have a fighting chance. (Stevenson and Gerth 2002)

Civil indignation is the silver lining in the scandals that so regularly rock public spheres. It is this public and democratic face of government that *Newsweek* highlights in its blazing and outraged coverage of the conviction of Enron's chief executive officers.

Instead of making the world safe for capitalism, the Enron Era set off a corporate scandal wave that leapt the species barrier, morphing from a business-pages-only story into a national psychodrama. We saw crying Enron employees whose jobs and life savings both vaporized when Enron melted down [and] Enron's close ties to George W. Bush, our first M.B.A. present, which lent a decidedly political aspect to the scandal. Enron became grist for the 24-hour news cycle, and was seared into then national consciousness like no other business story since the Great Depression ... The Enron epic, already the subject of a TV movie, got a made-for TV ending last week when former chief executive Ken Lay was convicted on all 10 conspiracy and fraud charges the government brought against him, and Jeff Skilling, a second former Enron CEO, was convicted on 19 of 28 counts ... The FBI's Enron task force examined the astounding total of more than four terabytes of data – equal to about 20 percent of all the information stored in the Library of Congress ... Enron seems like a fever dream, an illusion from the past that business unfettered could solve all problems, that all we needed to do was get out of the way of corporate titans ... and let them work their magic on behalf of all of us. The convictions of Lay and Skilling write *finis* to that delusional era. (Sloan, 2006)

Those who possess great wealth and social power must win the battle of public opinion if they are to exert power in the civil sphere. In order to do so, they create vast public relations machinery. They justify their environmental records in the civil sphere, apologize for chemical spills, and portray themselves as deeply respectful of nature. When a well-known commercial product, like the Ford Explorer, is exposed as dangerously unstable, companies like Ford rush publicly to pledge themselves to expensive structural reforms. Corporations buy advertising space in newspapers and television to burnish rough spots in their corporate image. They do not, however, always succeed.

PRESIDENTS AND PUBLICS

Nor do the highest and the most powerful politicians who, in purely bureaucratic terms, control the state. In his classic study, *Presidential Power* (1960), the political scientist Richard Neustadt described just how difficult it is for Presidents to get their way. Neustadt had himself been a personal advisor to Presidents Truman and Kennedy. He knew from direct experience, and not only from scholarly research, that even a President's direct orders – to military officers, to Cabinet secretaries, to their own staffs – are often not followed, or are creatively misinterpreted in ways that amounts to disobedience. It is not command but persuasion that allows an American President to exercise power. Whether he has his way is determined neither by his formal powers of office, nor by his ability to generate social or military control. It is a matter of his political prestige. Prestige defines a President's ability to persuade. It is determined by a President's standing in the civil sphere.

What and who are the President's publics? According to Neustadt, they are "as diverse and overlapping as the claims Americans and allied peoples press on Washington" (Neustadt 1960: 86–87). They start with members of the Washington D.C. community, the "Washingtonians" who are lobbyists and citizens, governmental bureaucrats and Congressmen, journalists and Congressional staff, think tank members, social hostesses, and gossip columnists. But the opinion of this "inside-the-beltway" public is deeply affected by their estimates of the opinions of publics outside itself:

The Washingtonians who watch a President ... have to think about his standing with the public outside Washington. They have to gauge his popular prestige. Because *they* think about it, public standing is a source of influence for *him*, another factor bearing on their willingness to give him what he wants They anticipate reactions from the public. Most members of the Washington community depend upon outsiders to support them or their interests. The dependence may be as direct as votes, or it may be as indirect as passive toleration. Dependent men must take account of popular reaction to their actions. What their publics may think of them becomes a factor, therefore, in deciding how to deal with the desires of a President. (Neustadt 1960: 86, italics added)

In assessing the wider public's opinions, Washingtonians are looking beyond the desires of elites. They need to know the opinions of the proverbial "man in the street," the "average everyday citizen." To the degree that power is democratic, the ability of a President to sustain and deploy his prestige ultimately depends upon making his case in the civil sphere:

How do members of the Washington community assess a President's prestige with the American public? They talk to one another and to taxi drivers. They read the columnists and polls and news reports. They sample the opinions of their visitors and friends. They travel in the country and they listen as they go [and] they watch Congress. (Neustadt 1960: 89)

THE STRUGGLE FOR FULL CITIZENSHIP

When the modern state first emerged, despite its commitments to bureaucratic formality and its aspirations to rationality and legality, most people were actually excluded from the political power. Men without significant property could neither vote nor form associations, such as trade unions, to improve their economic position. Women were allowed neither to vote, hold property, nor exercise any public office. Because Jews were not considered citizens, they could not own land, or vote, or use any public services like hospitals or schools. Nonwhite persons were also sharply segregated from public life. Subject to high levels of poverty, they could neither vote nor exercise civil liberties.

The story of democratic political life over the last 200 years is less about the continued exercise of elite power than about how the space of the civil sphere has allowed such domination gradually to be overcome. It is a political story about how these subordinated groups have struggled to make good on the promises of citizenship. To understand this story, we must see that these groups view themselves, not just as unequal and subordinated, but as excluded from the civil sphere. As Judith Shklar emphasizes in *American Citizenship* (1991: 14), they see themselves as “members of a professedly democratic society that was actively and purposefully false to its own vaunted principles.” As a result, the excluded have demanded not only power but “civil repair” (Alexander 2006: 193–209). Along the way, they have suffered humiliation and repression, but they have often succeeded in gaining control over state power. This process – the gradual expansion of civic membership – illustrates how the civil sphere opens up a space between state control and social power.

Voting is typically the most taken-for-granted dimension of citizenship. Yet it expresses membership in civil society in a particularly vivid and important way, for voting transforms civil recognition into state power. As Shklar (1991: 2) puts it, “the ballot has always been a certificate of full membership in society, and its value depends primarily on its capacity to confer a minimum of social dignity”:

People who are not granted these marks of civic dignity feel dishonored, not just powerless and poor. They are also scorned by their fellow-citizens. The struggle for citizenship in America has, therefore, been overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion [and] an effort to break down excluding barriers to recognition. (Shklar 1991: 3)

The working class struggle for voting rights during the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century Britain demonstrates how closely the recognition of civil capacity and the granting of political citizenship are intertwined. “The civic position of the common people,” Bendix (1977) found in his extensive study, “became a subject of national debate.”

Faced with the inequity of their legal position and a public debate over their civic reliability. [Social reformers] comment[ed] on the feeling of injustice among the workers, on their loss of self-respect, on the personal abuse which the rulers of society heap[ed] upon them ... and on the workers’ feeling of being an “outcast order” in their own country. (Bendix 1977: 65–66)

Against such denial of their civic capabilities, working class organizations loudly and publicly proclaimed their civic virtue. In 1818, in Manchester, England, a leaflet protested that labor was “the Cornerstone upon which civilized society is built,” objecting that labor is “offered less ... than will support the family of a sober and orderly man in decency and comfort” (quoted in Bendix 1977: 66). Protests such as these eventually won workers not only the right to organize but the right to vote.

Once the right to vote was granted to the laboring classes, a process that extended from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, political parties formed to represent them. Since the 1920s, politicians representing trade unions have, in fact, exercised extensive state power in Europe and North America. It is through this political struggle that the social dimension of citizenship has become an increasing reality. The elite view of politics – that it is a simple reflex of economic power – fails to capture this critical feature of democratic societies. In his discussion of the debate over capitalism and citizenship, Bryan Turner has highlighted this failure:

Why does modern capitalism depart from the economic model of capitalism which we find in Marx’s economic sociology? Part of the answer is to be found in the extension of social citizenship over the last hundred years as a consequence of working-class struggles, trade-union organizations and the effects of social democracy. In other words the full force of the market place is not felt by the working-classes because the institutions of social welfare to some extent regulate the market and compensate for income inequality, poverty and unemployment. (Turner 1986: 5)

Despite the long struggle to achieve them, political rights are not consistently exercised, and social citizenship remains partial as well. In his fundamental work, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (1964), T. H. Marshall outlined the stages of this struggle for inclusion. He defined citizenship as consisting of three related, but separable dimensions. Civil rights refer to the “liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” Political rights refer to the ability to cast your vote, which allows your citizenship to directly enter into control of the state. Social citizenship refers to the economic and cultural benefits that the exercise of such political rights might bring, ranging from “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1964:78). While each of these forms of citizenship amplifies membership in the civil society, today we would also consider cultural citizenship – the recognition of ethnic, racial, gender, and sexual difference – as essential for civil incorporation.

POLITICAL PARTIES

As part of these struggles for political and social citizenship, the political party emerged as a new organizational form. Seymour Martin Lipset once described elections as “the democratic class struggle” (Lipset 1960: 230). He called the class struggle democratic because the framework of citizenship allows economic cleavages to be debated in the public sphere. This debate informs voting. But citizens do not vote directly on particular economic policies. They cast their votes for members of political parties who have promised to represent their divergent interests.

Parties are ideological organizations. They specialize in transforming public debate into votes, and votes into state power. They develop slogans and candidates, organize and fund political campaigns, and provide the strategic expertise to make them successful. Weber wrote that “parties live in a house of power” (Weber 1958b: 194). It is typically parties, not individuals per se, that vie for political power, that control legislative majorities, and that place their political-ideological representative into the top position in the state. Parties form because the civil sphere of democratic societies gives interest groups the opportunity to get together and to make a public, political stand. When parties representing outgroups are successful, they extend social solidarity. Yet, parties themselves are partisan and one-sided organizations. They specialize in developing a particular ideology, one that effectively represents the interests of their own groups. “The rationale of the party system,” wrote Robert MacIver in *The Web of Government* (1947: 215) “depends on the alignment of opinion from right to left.” During modern industrial society, this ideological split was primarily understood as a division that was determined by economic class.

The right is always the party sector associated with the interests of the upper or dominant classes, the left the sector expressive of the lower economic or social classes, and the center that of the middle classes ... The conservative right has defended entrenched prerogatives, privileges and powers; the left has attacked them ... Defense and attack have met, under democratic conditions, not in the name of class but in the name of principle; but the opposing principles have broadly corresponded to the interests of the classes. (MacIver 1947: 215)

Subsequent studies of party ideology and voting have demonstrated that the left/right cleavage is more complicated. It is more than a matter of higher and lower class. Groups do not define their interests in only economic terms.

The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issues; they favor more welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated income taxes, support of trade-unions, and so forth. But when liberalism is defined in non-economic terms – as support of civil liberties, internationalism, etc. – the correlation is reversed. The more well-to-do are more liberal, the poorer are more intolerant (Lipset 1960: 92)

This contrast between the social and economic dimensions of political ideology explains a great deal of contemporary voting and party politics. As economies have moved from industrial to postindustrial forms, the professional and managerial segments of the middle class have become more powerful voting publics than the old working classes. Not only have the sheer numbers of these publics grown in size, but their members vote at much higher rates. Whether this new middle class is conservative and committed to the status quo, or whether it is liberal and oriented to expanding rights and supporting change, is an increasingly critical question, both practically and intellectually. Brooks and Manza (1997) have discovered that this new middle class is hardly homogenous. Managers have remained solidly Republican, but professionals have increasingly moved into the ranks of the Democratic Party. This division is not the result of income differences between the two groups, but a matter of their orientation to social issues. For most of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party was voted into power by the overwhelming nature of its working class support. As the old working class has withered in size, the Democrats have increasingly relied, not on the economic liberalism of the workers, but on the social liberalism of highly educated professionals.

Our analyses demonstrate that socially liberal attitudes have critical explanatory value in understanding important trends in middle-class political behavior. Not only does social issue liberalism explain the recent trends and differences in the voting behavior of professionals and managers, it has increased among professionals in both magnitude and to a more limited extent in political salience. We can think of no firmer demonstration of the specifically *political* importance of socially liberal attitudes than a strong association with vote choice in presidential elections. Moreover, liberal views on social issues such as abortion, women's roles, and civil rights are the principal reasons behind professionals' realignment with Democratic candidates and their widening differences vis-à-vis managers. Without this specific ideological base of support, our analyses show that Democratic presidential candidates would have lost considerable ground ... The long-term shift in voting behavior among professionals [is] a shift which is particularly remarkable when viewed from the perspective of their solidly Republican voting patterns in the 1950s ... Increased liberalism on social issues has been sufficient to drive a wedge through the middle-class and move professionals out of their earlier Republican alignment. (Brooks and Manza 1997: 204–206, original italics).

THE DISCOURSE OF DECLINE

Compared with “realist” arguments for state autonomy and cynical arguments about power elites, the focus on public sphere and civil society sets a high moral standard for democratic societies to meet. Civil society is, by definition, an unfinished project. Its very existence reflects an idealism about the possibilities of democratic life.

For many of those who participate in civil life, whether as political activists or secular or religious intellectuals, the quality of contemporary democracy never seems to be high enough. There is never enough “true” publicness, never enough “real” civility in the civil sphere, never enough solidarity in the democratic community's political and cultural life. These pessimistic evaluations do not seem persuasive. Despite the vast difficulties and setbacks that have marked the modern political life, the civil sphere has deepened and expanded. At every step along the way, however, it has been subject to the persistent criticism that civil society and public life are in decline.

In 1750, Rousseau already lamented that “we no longer have citizens” (Rousseau 1987: 17). In the second volume of *Democracy in America*, in 1840, Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that American democracy produced, not liberty and political equality, but merely the tyranny of the majority and mass conformity. In 1925, in *The Phantom Public*, Walter Lippmann lamented the victory of political propaganda and public relations over reason and public spiritedness. In the post-war period, such critical intellectuals as Mills, Arendt, and Habermas all have warned that mass society, fuelled by the rise of advertising and the media of mass communication, had eroded the democratic capacities of the public sphere. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed in a famous speech that American society suffered from a “malaise” that heralded political and moral decline. In the mid-1980s, Robert Bellah and his colleagues articulated this pessimism in their best selling *Habits of the Heart* (1985), which argued that American culture had drifted from civil solidarity into individualistic self-absorption.

The decline argument has recently been refurbished by Robert Putnam’s influential claim that Americans are, for the first time, “bowling alone.” Putnam (1995, 2000) claims that the famous American propensity to start up and join voluntary organizations is withering away. He points to the decline of such hands-on groups as the Boy Scouts and the P.T.A. and the rise of giant “check book” organizations like Green Peace or the American Civil Liberties Union. Americans have even stopped bowling in teams, and now were much more likely to go bowling alone. Putnam suggests that developments such as these, along with the increasing time Americans spend watching television, explains the lower voting rates that characterizes later-twentieth century American society and, more generally, its moral and political decline.

The discourse of decline is hardly an accurate description of American political and cultural life. Yet, paradoxically, it remains a vital moral component of American democracy. In persistently proclaiming the high ground of moral principle, it adds energy to the force of the moral obligations idealized by civil society. In their lament about democratic decline, critical public intellectuals are helping to make sure that it will not come about.

THE DEEPENING OF THE CIVIL SPHERE

In the latter decades of the twentieth century, there has been, if anything, a marked deepening of the democratic current in American life. This has been so despite the periods of conservatism and backlash that have followed hard upon the periods of social opening and political reform. Underneath these inevitable periods of “shifting involvements” (Hirschman 1982), civic culture and its institutions have strengthened. The quietism and conservatism of the post-war era were shattered by the immensely powerful black movement for civil rights. In *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life*, Michael Schudson places the civil rights movement at the center of what he calls the “profound revolution in rights” (Schudson 1998: 242) that marked that last decades of the twentieth century.

The civil rights movement provided a model and inspiration for a wide array of new social movements and political organizations. This bold example, even for those who did not participate in it, galvanized a new egalitarianism in American culture at large. It’s radiating influence made litigation a tool of social change, it secured direct action and nonviolent demonstrations as weapons of protest, and it fixed a rights-centered citizenship at the center of American civic aspiration. (Schudson 1998: 255–56)

One way of measuring the scope of this rights revolution is to look at the shifting nature of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In 1935, only two of the Court’s 160 opinions cited questions of civil liberties or civil rights. In 1989, by contrast, 66 out of 132 decisions were justified in

this way (Schudson 1998: 249). But this silent revolution was not some top-down movement initiated from within one part of the state. It started with the civil rights movement broadening the cultural understanding of civil rights, and this bottom-up expansion has quickened in the years since.

Lawyers not only initiated suits against hospitals that sought to reduce medical services to the poor, against landlords using evictions in ways prohibited by law, and against private companies seeking to defraud the poor, but also against government agencies, especially those responsible for providing welfare benefits. This work led to landmark cases that expanded citizens rights to welfare and to fair hearings and due process inside the welfare bureaucracy. (Schudson 1998: 257)

The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of one social movement after another, each demanding a fuller recognition of civil status (Schudson 1998: 265–274). It is not only racial minorities like Hispanic and Asian Americans who have demanded civil repair. It is also students protesting for their rights against administrations and faculty; native Americans demanding respect for long-neglected treaties; employees organizing for social rights in the workplace; women demanding fundamental reform at work and at home; and handicapped persons calling for the restructuring of the legal, social, and material environments that have been constructed by “abled” people. There is no sign that these challenges to the various forms of social power are going to die down anytime soon. As Schudson (1998: 290) remarks, “scarcely a day passes without the media bringing news of another individual who crafts a social issue from a personal grievance and builds a community from a sense of a right denied.”

CONCLUSION

Governments and states obviously play distinctive and uniquely powerful roles in the contemporary society. Such political institutions do not exist in more traditional societies, or at least are much more closely tied in to religious, familial, and economic groups than they are in more modern times. Small agricultural communities were pre-political. With growing size and cultural and economic development, the need for more formal and centralized control arose. The state emerges for the first time, closely tied to the interest of a dominant aristocratic class. The first states are military and administrative dictatorships, which gradually become more impersonal and bureaucratic in order to achieve more efficient control. As large cities form, cultural life becomes more vibrant, and secular intellectuals appear, and the possibility for a new kind of “public” realm emerges. Ancient Greece possessed the first such “polis,” which became submerged by the Roman Empire and disappeared during the middle ages. The public sphere rose again during the Renaissance, with self-governing city-states like Florence and Venice, in which elite citizens openly discussed public policy, rotated the control of offices, and voted for government officials. The secular democratic revolutions that began in America and France in the late eighteenth century sought to give such publics the constitutional power to control states and other forms of social power generated by economic and religious elites.

With the rise of industrial capitalism, these historical opportunities for democracy, and the liberal and republican theories that sought to explain and legitimate them, were sharply challenged by the concentration of economic power in the great corporations, as well as by the polarization of economic classes that threatened the tenuous solidarity and “fellow feeling” upon which the public sphere relies. Whether dominant classes and power elites make democracy simply an empty promise remains a matter of intense debate today. Pessimistic predictions ring out from every corner of public life. Scandals abound, exposing the corruption not only

of business leaders but of government officials. Is it possible to understand these criticisms and scandals, no matter how lamentable, as indications of the continuing vitality of the public sphere? That is the proposition that we have entertained here.

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CHAPTER 7

On the Origins of Neoliberalism: Political Shifts and Analytical Challenges

NITSAN CHOREV

One could think of neoliberalism as an ideological platform, which can then be described without regard to how faithfully it is implemented into laws and policies, or one could describe neoliberalism as concrete laws and policies, no matter how far removed those might be from their theoretical inspirations. If it is the latter we are interested in, then neoliberalism stands for laws that attempt to bring about economic growth by minimizing state intervention in the market and otherwise ease capital's profitability and investment. Such policies include – deregulation of business practices, including laws concerned with environmental and labor issues; privatization of state enterprises; tax cuts; budget cuts, leading to reduction in welfare and other social provisions; monetarism; elimination of protectionist policies; and liberalization of financial and foreign exchange markets.¹

Starting in the 1970s, a large number of countries have adopted at least some of the policies listed above. The first countries that implemented monetary policies were Latin American countries, including Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. Even more consequential was the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism in the United Kingdom and the United States. Over the years, many more countries followed suit, including many other Western European countries, South Africa and New Zealand, and almost the entire Soviet bloc after the collapse of the Soviet Union; moves toward neoliberalism occurred even in Sweden, India, and China (Harvey 2005).

This widespread, albeit uneven, embrace of neoliberal policies presented social scientific scholarship with the challenge of analyzing radical transformations in the making. Among a long list of new puzzles, one significant debate concerned the question of *origins*. As few social scientists accepted Thatcher's slogan, that "there is no alternative," it was important to understand the conditions under which the rise and spread of neoliberalism was made possible.

¹Neoliberal policies share some policies in common, but usually go beyond, what has been referred to as the "Washington Consensus," that is, those policies that various institutions in Washington DC – including the U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank – agreed were desirable (Williamson 1990, 2003).

In this chapter, I review some of the competing explanations utilized for resolving this puzzle. I show that the explanations offered reproduce two analytical divides common in political sociology: (1) a divide between national and international explanations and (2) a divide between agents and institutions. In the second part of the chapter, I suggest possible strategies to overcome these two divides as a – means to think more comprehensively on the origins and diffusion of neoliberalism.

COMPETING VIEWS ON THE RISE AND DIFFUSION OF NEOLIBERALISM

There are at least four analytically distinct accounts on the origins of neoliberalism.² As I elaborate below, the distinction I make between the competing accounts is founded upon two criteria: what analytical priority each account gives to domestic *versus* nondomestic explanatory factors, and what analytical priority each account gives to political actors *versus* institutional factors.

From the Bottom-Up: Domestic Origins of Neoliberalism

What were the origins of neoliberalism in Chile? How to explain the “Reagan Revolution” in the United States? And Thatcher’s in the UK? One line of scholarship attempted to explain the neoliberal turn by focusing on its “domestic components” (Harvey 2005: 9). Looking mostly at the early “model” cases, the three most common factors that are employed in this literature include: a shift in state interests, political struggles (including class-related struggles, intra-class struggles, and nonclass-related struggles), or the triumph of neoliberal ideas.

Statist accounts point at the role of state actors. In a study on the attempt to dismantle the welfare state in the U.S. and the UK, for example, Paul Pierson (1994) considers the Reagan administration and the Thatcher administration, respectively, the main agents of change. In other studies, the spotlight falls not on ideologically driven elected officials, such as Reagan or Thatcher, but rather on state technocrats. The literature on Chile, for example, has commonly attributed the turn to neoliberalism to the “Chicago boys,” a group of economists who provided General Pinochet with a revolutionary economic project (Valdés 1995). In Mexico and New Zealand, neoliberalism was similarly embraced under the supervision of state-employed economists (Babb 2001).

Societal accounts revealed the social conflicts that had underlined the shift in state ideology. According to David Harvey (2005), for example, the rise of neoliberalism in the United States was the result of a deliberate project of class restoration. The American Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable and other business associations, together with think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation and the Hoover Institute, established a new ideological platform that the Republican Party *then* embraced as its own. Others attributed the rise of neoliberalism to *intra*-class struggles. For example, Silva (1993) has argued that in Chile, shifting coalitions of businessmen and landowners played an important part in the neoliberal outcome.

²The review below does not attempt to offer an exhaustive consideration of the scholarship on the rise of neoliberalism, but instead to offer a sample of representative studies on that topic. As it is often the case, there are alternative ways to analytically differentiate the competing views.

At least some neoliberal policies, such as tax cuts and financial deregulation, have been supported by popular social movements not necessarily affiliated with the dominant capitalist class. Tax cuts in the United States started with hundreds of thousands of homeowners, “from all walks of life,” rebelling against the local property tax (Martin 2008). Greta Krippner (forthcoming) shows that it was consumer protest, alongside the mobilization of finance elites, which brought interest rate deregulation in the 1970s.

Some of the accounts described above attribute an important role to neoclassical economic *ideas*. According to Harvey, the neoliberal turn “required the prior construction of political consent” (Harvey 2005: 39). Harvey, like many others, “traced market fundamentalism’s extraordinary influence to the enormous investments its supporters have made in propagating their ideas through think tanks, journals, and policy networks” (Somers and Block 2005). Somers and Block (2005), in contrast, attribute the extraordinary political influence of neoliberal ideas not to the material capacities of their carriers, but to their “epistemic privilege.” Neoliberal ideas prevailed because they were better equipped with internal claims to veracity than competing theories.

What sets these analyses apart from other approaches is not necessarily the concern with domestic factors, which other analyses share, but viewing these domestic factors as the *original* triggers for neoliberalism. According to this approach, it was “homegrown” factors that led to the rise of neoliberalism in particular countries. The second approach takes the exact opposite view, viewing external factors as the most consequential ones.

From the Top Down: Global-Economic Origins of Neoliberalism

While a domestic approach may provide a convincing analysis for the emergence of neoliberal policies in a given state, it cannot address one of the more puzzling aspects of neoliberalism: the fact that it was embraced by very *many* states. How to explain this apparent convergence? Political economists pointed at global economic transformations as the cause for common political shifts at the national level.

Scholars argued that a new global economic system, centered on cross-border flows and global telecommunications (Sassen 1996), has fundamentally weakened the bargaining leverage of states vis-à-vis capital, which could now easily shift investments elsewhere and could therefore play-off one government against another in their search for concessions (Ohmae 1995; Callinicos 2001). Referring to the “structural power” of capital, Gill and Law (1993) have argued that businesses could now compare the “investment climate” across countries – including legal freedoms, production costs, labor relations, political stability, and financial concessions offered – and governments were therefore increasingly constrained in their freedom of maneuver by the economic policies of *other* states.

In addition to the material advantages of business, there were corresponding ideational elements. Robert Cox (1987) describes a “collective effort of ideological revision,” which was undertaken through various unofficial agencies, such as the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg conferences, and the Club of Rome, then endorsed through more official agencies like the OECD, and finally taken by states, which adapted their policies so that they were compatible with the consensus.

In short, convergence occurs because governments are similarly exposed to the structural power of capital and to the pressures of interstate consensus, and react in a similar fashion to those constraints and pressures.

Sideways: Across-State Diffusion of Neoliberalism

Like the previous approach, this one also rejects the implicit suggestion of the domestic approach that each state had its own unique trajectory into neoliberalism, independent of other states' adoption of similar policies. Unlike the global-economic argument, however, the "diffusion" approach suggests that the convergence to neoliberalism has not been simply the result of a common experience to which states responded in a similar fashion; rather, convergence has been the result of inter-dependent state behavior (Simmons et al. 2006: 782; Henisz et al. 2005).

Focusing on inter-state relations rather than on states' relations with global capital, scholars have looked at "how a given country's policy choices are affected by the prior choices of other countries" (Simmons et al. 2006: 782). In this literature, several distinct mechanisms of diffusion were identified, namely, competition, coercion, and learning/emulation.

First, diffusion may have occurred due to *competitive pressures*. If a neoliberal policy choice gave a country an edge in attracting foreign investment or in selling to export markets, competitors had incentives to follow suit – for fear of large-scale losses of investment and jobs (Simmons et al. 2006: 792; Simmons and Elkins 2004). This is a somewhat similar argument to the one presented by the global-economic approach, but the analytical emphasis is different: while the former approach focuses on the structural power of capital, here capital is assigned a passive role, and states are the actors competing with each other over that capital.

Diffusion may have also occurred as a result of *coercive* measures. Powerful countries imposed their neoliberal preferences on other countries, either directly or indirectly, through the international governmental and nongovernmental organizations they influence (Simmons et al. 2006: 790).

Finally, scholars hypothesized that diffusion may have also occurred by way of *learning*, that is, by changing policy makers' beliefs in light of the experience of others. Studies have shown, however, that government officials rarely engage in "rational learning." Rather, they engage in "bounded rationality." Instead of scanning all available information, they look at *relevant* information, that is, information that is available or near at hand (in geographical, cultural, or historical terms) (Meseguer 2005). In addition, and possibly more likely, government may have *emulated* other countries simply because they were peers, or because these were high-status countries that were considered to know best (Meseguer 2005; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005).

The literature on diffusion suggests an alternative interpretation of the events analyzed using a domestic approach. For example, the "Chicago Boys" in Chile – named that way because they all went to the University of Chicago for postgraduate studies – are no longer a Chile-specific factor, but rather a "remarkable case of ideological transfer," from the United States to Latin America (Silva 1996: 519; see also Dezalay and Garth 2002). At the same time, concentrating on inter-state diffusion, as this literature does, may overlook networks of influence that, at least initially, bypassed states altogether. After all, neoliberal ideas were developed by the Mont Pèlerin Society, which was a "transnational meta-discourse community" of economists from a variety of states (Dieter et al. 2006).

Institutionally-Mediated Global Factors

The assumption of convergence was soon challenged, however, by scholarship that showed that states adopted unique forms of neoliberalism, which greatly diverged from each other.

Scholars argued that this divergence was possible because the economic pressures associated with globalization, as identified by the global-economic approach, were *mediated* by state-specific factors (Weiss 1998).

Most often, the domestic factors identified as playing a role in mediating external pressures and shaping neoliberal policies were *institutional legacies*. The institutions considered included, inter alia, state–capital–labor relations (Guillén 2001; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002), decision-making structures and procedures (Prasad 2006), as well as states’ level of autonomy and embeddedness (Evans 1995; Weiss 1998), and their degree of institutional fragmentation (Swank 2002).

These types of institutions explain, for example, why Chile and Britain adopted an ideologically-driven form of neoliberalism, whereas France and Mexico adopted a pragmatic version of neoliberalism (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002); or why the British and the American responses to the economic crises of the 1970s were different from the responses in Germany and France (Prasad 2006). According to Prasad (2006), in the latter cases, the decision-making structure subordinated political conflict to either academic expertise (France) or corporatist decision-making structures (West Germany), which allowed the two governments to resist the social pressures arising from the oil crisis. In the U.S. and the UK, in contrast, the political-economic structure, which defined labor and capital as adversaries and the middle class and the poor in opposition to one another, provided the potential to ally the majority of voters with market-friendly policies, leading to more rigid versions of neoliberal policies.

In this way, this approach takes us back into considering the role of domestic factors in the rise of neoliberalism, but it maintains the role of exogenous factors and, in regard to the domestic factors, it emphasizes institutions over actors.

OVERCOMING ANALYTICAL DICHOTOMIES

In comparing the four approaches above, two analytical divides can be detected. One divide is between domestic and international/global factors; the other involves the kind of domestic factors that matter: present actors or past legacies. In what follows, I identify the limits of such dichotomies, and strategies to bridge them.

On National and International Factors

The tendency to view domestic explanations and international/global explanations as mutually exclusive is not unique to studies on neoliberalism. While attempts were certainly made to detect the various ways in which domestic and international factors are analytically integrated (Putnam 1988; Clark 1998; Chorev 2007a), most scholars in political sociology and political science reproduce this “Great Divide” (Clark 1998).³

The case of neoliberalism makes the need to develop a more integrative approach to policy-making particularly urgent. As the approaches discussed above reveal, neoliberalism combines converging forces, which are often from above, together with diverging tendencies, which are usually domestic, and both types of forces need to be included for an accurate analysis.

³In political sociology, the importance of external factors has been mostly a concern of world system analysis and world polity analysis, and, in both cases, at the expense of domestic factors (Wallerstein 1974; Meyer et al. 1997).

How do the different approaches manage the quest for a domestic–international integrative approach? The domestic analysis focuses almost exclusively on domestic factors. The global economic approach, in contrast, focuses on global factors alone. The fourth approach, which explicitly affirms the interplay between global economic pressures and “mediating” domestic institutions, seems to be more promising. However, like the domestic approach, it ultimately treats the national level as an isolated unit, as if the experience of external pressures in one state existed independently of the experiences of other states. According to this theoretical framework, France’s reaction to economic pressures had little to do with Germany’s reaction to similar pressures. However, while we may agree that domestic factors had great impact on France’s reaction, an integrative approach would suggest that Germany’s reaction to the pressures has also played a role.

This is exactly the challenge that the literature on diffusion takes as its central concern, looking for mechanisms that would explain how France’s reaction to global economic pressures are partly shaped by Germany’s reaction. What seems to me to be slightly misleading in the discussion on diffusion, however, is that the literature holds an image of a state with *fully formed* policies, which are then imposed on others, imitated by others, and so on. While this certainly occurs, in other cases we can *reverse* the order of events – it is not that fully formed neoliberal policies traveled from one state to another. Rather, it was by traveling from one state to another that policies were formed.

Indeed, it is quite extraordinary that all of the approaches described above maintained a perfect correspondence between states and policies. Policies emerge from below, are imposed from above or are imitated sideways, but in all cases, the policies are taken in toto. We can think of an alternative model that complicates our understanding of diffusion by showing that policies are formed and institutionalized by way of traveling. In a relatively simple scenario, we can show how a policy, which is imposed on others, *travels back* and causes a change in the policy in the original state (below, I will use the case of international trade policy to demonstrate such a scenario). In a more complex case, we can show how policies get formed by traveling from one country to the other (below, I will use the case of access to anti-AIDS drugs to demonstrate such a scenario).

This understanding of diffusion offers a new way to integrate the national and the international in the study of neoliberalism. Neoliberal policies, I demonstrate below, were partially shaped by some countries, adopted by other countries, possibly decoupled or challenged by those countries, and then readopted by the original countries or by third parties, including international organizations and other international actors.⁴

TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES. An analysis of the history of trade policy formation in the United States from the 1930s to the present suggests that trade policies were largely the outcome of ongoing domestic struggles between competing economic interests – internationally competitive U.S. industries on the one hand and protectionist industries and their workers on the other (Chorev 2007b). The process of trade liberalization was the result of internationalists prevailing in those struggles. (I will discuss in the next section *why* U.S. internationalists prevailed).

⁴The current literature on the rise of neoliberalism assigns active role to policy-makers, transnational capital, and intellectuals. However, other national and international actors, including lobbyists, international organizations officials, NGOs, and businesses, have played an equally important role.

As soon as the U.S. government adopted a trade-liberalizing agenda, it engaged in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, the latter under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under GATT, U.S. negotiators systematically imposed liberal measures on other countries (Steinberg 2002; Wilkinson 2000; Jawara and Kwa 2003). Over the course of five decades, GATT Contracting Parties (since 1995, WTO members) lowered their tariffs of manufactured goods, then standardized and minimized nontariff barriers to trade (including import licenses and quotas, “buy-national” procurement regulations, product standards, and government subsidies), and, most recently, agreed to the liberalization also of investment and services and to the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR).

While multilateral, reciprocal negotiations inevitably require concessions even from the more dominant states – the U.S. government has often sacrificed protectionist interests while negotiating trade agreements – it was generally the case that the United States managed to shield its most politically valuable industries, such as apparel and textiles, steel, and many agricultural sectors, from the process of liberalization. For example, U.S. negotiators constantly blocked the inclusion of the textiles sector into the GATT negotiations, and prevented significant modification of U.S. domestic laws addressing unfair-trade practices, such as antidumping and countervailing duty laws.

However, inter-state trade relations have not been simply a case of diffusion by coercion. The United States was not just imposing its will on others, but found itself having to change its own rules as a result. Perhaps the most effective example for such “reverse” diffusion is the impact the strengthening dispute mechanisms had on protectionist policies in the United States (Chorev 2005a).

During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which was concluded in 1994 and established the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States pressed other countries to introduce “new issues” into trade negotiations, including the liberalization of services and investment and the protection of intellectual property rights. Realizing that it would be particularly difficult to enforce the implementation of these new obligations, U.S. negotiators also pressed for strengthened dispute settlement mechanisms. Initially, many other countries, including Japan and members of the European Commission, strongly opposed the initiative. But when U.S. Congress threatened to introduce laws that would improve the ability of the U.S. government to enforce international obligations *unilaterally*, other countries concluded in favor of multilateral procedures.

As planned, the strengthening of the judicial proceedings greatly benefited internationally competitive industries in the United States, which enthusiastically utilized the new proceedings to enforce old and new international obligations on other governments (Raghavan 2000; Smith 2004; Busch and Reinhard 2002).

Importantly, the strengthening of the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms also had a “second-order” effect on trade policies in the originating state, as other countries used the strengthened judicial mechanisms in cases in which the United States attempted not to play by the rules that it had itself imposed. In one famous example, eight states filed a complaint at the WTO against President Bush’s imposition of high tariffs on steel imports. When the WTO panel ruled that these tariffs were illegal, and the complainants threatened trade sanctions with value of more than \$2 billion, Bush lifted the tariffs. Following various other negative WTO decisions, the U.S. executive also reversed country-of-origin rules that intended to limit imports of textiles and apparel, lifted duties on imports based on WTO-incompatible decisions by the Department of Commerce, and amended some environmental regulations, which WTO panels had ruled were incompatible with U.S. trade obligations (Chorev 2005a, 2007b).

Hence, a slightly different process of policy diffusion emerges, which involves both the national and the international levels. U.S. trade policy formation was not a solely domestic event, but the international influences were of a unique kind: imposing rules on others, by way of international laws, led to the modification of U.S.' own trade rules.

ACCESS TO ANTI-AIDS DRUGS. The case of access to anti-AIDS drugs is an even better illustration for my argument that neoliberal policies are formed by traveling from one site to another, with these sites being both national and international.

The starting point of this example, as in the example above, is the WTO: addressing the wishes of U.S. companies with an interest in intellectual property protection, the U.S. government insisted on rigid intellectual property rights as part of the 1994 multilateral trade agreement. In spite of the opposition of developing countries, the WTO Agreement ultimately included an agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which regulated the manufacturing and trade in products such as films, music recordings, books, computer software, and medicines (Sell 2003).⁵

When the TRIPS agreement was signed, in 1994, the only available drug therapy against AIDS was AZT. But in 1996, researchers announced that a cocktail of antiretroviral substances had spectacular treatment results for HIV/AIDS patients. At the time, the cost of the new drugs was on average more than \$10,000 per person per year (Schwartländer et al. 2006). Given the new international obligations to respect intellectual property rights, which provided pharmaceutical companies a lengthy market monopoly around the globe, patent-holders of anti-AIDS drugs could expect to keep this level of prices. But this was not the case. Instead, a diffusion of policies re-interpreting the relations between intellectual property rights and public health, across national and international sites, led both to the radical reduction in the price of anti-AIDS drugs – to as low as \$89 per patient per year – and to the modification of the original WTO obligations.

The first catalyst was South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 ("Medicines Act"), which permitted the health minister, under specified conditions, to revoke pharmaceutical patent rights, to order compulsory licensing (that is, permit the manufacturing of patented drugs to a third party without the consent of the patent-holder), and to order parallel importation of drugs (that is, import a patented product from another country without the consent of the patent-holder).

Thirty-nine multinational drug companies, together with the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa (PMA), challenged the law in court, arguing that it violated the South African Constitution as well as TRIPS. This legal challenge provoked the mobilization of many AIDS activists in South Africa, including Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the country's leading AIDS pressure group. During the first day of hearings in March 2001, a major demonstration was held in Pretoria. Inside the courthouse, Judge Bernard Ngoepe determined the fate of the case by allowing TAC to join as *Amicus Curiae* ("friend of the court") in support of the South African government's defense (Heywood 2001).

But this was far from being a domestic affair. Rather, this contestation transformed political and economic opportunities of actors in other countries as well, with long-term implications across the globe.

⁵Some see intellectual property rights as a prominent element in neoliberalism. Others, however, argue that IPR violate neoclassical economic principles and that IPR laws are an example for the inconsistency, and interested nature, of the neoliberal project.

First, the legal challenge to the Medicines Act reoriented AIDS activism in the United States, ultimately leading to a dramatic reversal in U.S. policy. Initially, the U.S. government, acting on behalf of U.S. pharmaceutical companies, pressed the South African government to withdraw or amend the offending provisions (Bond 1999). But in 1999, ACT UP, which until then was concerned with domestic issues alone, joined Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) in mobilizing against the position of the U.S. government.

They targeted, in particular, Vice-President Al Gore during his presidential campaign. Under this pressure, Gore changed his position, and so did President Clinton. The Clinton administration first withdrew its objections to the South African law. Then, in 2000, Clinton issued an Executive Order that declared that the United States would not seek any revision of intellectual property policy in sub-Saharan African countries if that policy promoted access to HIV/AIDS medications and remained consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Hence, a legal dispute over intellectual property rights in South Africa led to an American reconsideration of its position. The change in U.S. policy weakened the political position of pharmaceuticals in South Africa. And it opened new legal opportunities for other sub-Saharan African countries. Ultimately, this also had an effect on U.S. position towards AIDS policies in middle-income countries, such as Brazil. In 2000, the U.S. government filed a complaint at the WTO against Brazil, challenging Article 68 of the Brazilian industry property law, which required local production of a patented invention as a condition for enjoying exclusive patent rights. By June of that year, following activists' pressure, the U.S. government withdrew the case.

Second, the legal debate in South Africa opened economic and political opportunities for generic manufacturers in India, Thailand, and Brazil. In 2001, Cipla, an Indian manufacturer of generic medicines, announced that it would ask the South African government for permission to sell generic versions of 15 anti-HIV drugs that were used in varying combinations (Sell and Prakash 2004: 162–3). Cipla said it could offer an AIDS regimen for \$600 per year per patient. It offered to sell the HIV/AIDS cocktail to the humanitarian organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for only \$350 per year (Schwartländer et al. 2006). Other generic manufacturers from India, including Ranbaxy and Hetero Drugs, soon offered similar prices, and a competition among them led to further reduction in the prices they offered.

The likelihood of a negative court decision, the loss of support from the U.S. government, and the realization that the case has turned into a public-relations debacle finally convinced the pharmaceutical companies to withdraw their case against the South African government (Heywood 2001: 19). Furthermore, in response to the potential competition from generic manufacturers, in attempt to amend their public reputation, and under strong pressure from international organizations, such as the Joint United Nation Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and from AIDS activists, pharmaceutical companies also started offering discounts for their branded drugs in poor countries. These discounts, however, were initially modest, and covered only a small number of states and a small number of patients (Gellman 2000a, b).

The developments in South Africa, the United States, and India, affected policy developments in other countries. In 2001, Kenya passed a law that would enable the import of generic drugs, and Nigeria reached a deal with Ranbaxy to buy generic AIDS drugs. It certainly encouraged the policy innovation by the Brazilian government, which was searching for its own political and economic strategies to afford anti-AIDS drugs. The 1988 Constitution granted basic medicines as a constitutional right, and in the late 1990s, Brazil started producing generic AIDS medicines and distributing them to patients, free of charge. The 1996 Brazilian patent law protected drugs only if they were commercialized after 1997, so anti-AIDS drugs patented before 1997 could be manufactured legally, but drugs patented after 1997 could not.

In attempt to reduce the price of patented drugs, Brazil headed a movement, at the international level, calling for more lenient IPR obligations.

Brazil headed various initiatives across a variety of international organizations, including the WTO, the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN General Assembly, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Of great consequence was the role Brazil, together with India and others, played in re-negotiating TRIPS. The timing was perfect, since the South African case and the global activism it generated had led to a change of heart around the globe. In November 2001, WTO member-states signed a Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the “Doha Deceleration”), which stated that “the TRIPS Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” The Declaration also confirmed that the TRIPS Agreement had room for flexibility with regard to the determination of the grounds for compulsory licensing and the admission of parallel imports. The question of how states lacking sufficient manufacturing capacities could make effective use of compulsory licensing was not resolved until 2003. Then, a Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 (the “30 August Decision”) spelled out the circumstances and conditions under which countries without pharmaceutical capacity could make use of compulsory licensing to *import* generic versions of patented drugs.

By calling for international statements, Brazil protected its policies from legal challenges. It also helped the diffusion of similar practices in other countries, such as Thailand, as well as in international organizations and private foundations. In 2002, the WHO and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria both supported the purchase of generics. More reluctantly, The United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) agreed to the purchasing of generic drugs in 2004. In 2003, the Clinton Foundation began providing business advice for generic manufacturers in attempt to make their drugs even cheaper. The Clinton Foundation has also been involved in arranging bulk purchases of generic drugs.

Brazil and other countries used the threat of compulsory licensing or parallel imports to negotiate lower prices with drug manufacturers. Often, drug companies agreed to sharply reduce their prices, so as not be replaced with generic versions. In other cases, compulsory licensing was utilized, initially in poor countries, including Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Zambia, Mozambique, and Indonesia. Thailand was the first middle-income country that issued a compulsory licensing. Other middle-income countries followed suit, including Brazil.

Of course, this was far from being the end of the story. The U.S. government has strongly opposed any attempts to review TRIPS and has used bilateral trade agreements to introduce so-called “TRIPS-plus” provisions, which required the trading partner to implement intellectual property protection more strict than the one required by TRIPS (Abbott 2004). Middle-income countries were obliged to implement TRIPS by 2005, and the Indian Patent Act that was passed that year has had a potentially negative effect on the supply and pricing of generic drugs, particularly of recently patented, second-line drugs. In short, the process of diffusion of IPR policies has not been finalized just yet.

This complex case illustrates a different process of policy diffusion, which involves an intricate interplay between the national and the international. The policy question – of how to deal with access to drugs in developing countries – traveled from one site to another, with each site offering a partial contribution to the shift. An emerging convergence into a particular balance between public health concerns and intellectual property protection has been the outcome of a process of negotiated diffusion, in which countries were influenced by rules and

strategies of other states and of international organizations, and instead of merely imitating them, they experimented with them, challenged them, and often ended up offering a slightly different version for further diffusion.

This case shows that domestic policies are often dependent on and influenced by domestic policies in other countries. Neoliberal policies are not the outcome of isolated domestic developments. Rather, states shape and reshape their position in response to policies initiated by other countries; but when they imitate other countries' policies, they often do so in an innovative way.

To conclude, the link between national and international factors occurs in a process of negotiated diffusion, in which policies emerge and get formed *in the process of traveling across different national and international sites*.

On Political Struggles and Institutions

In addition to the divide between the national and the international, the literature on the rise and spread of neoliberalism has also reproduced a divide involving domestic explanatory factors, namely, the divide between agents and institutions. The first approach puts strategic actors at the center of the analysis. According to this “from the bottom up” approach, action by carriers of interests and/or ideas – including governmental officials, state-appointed technocrats, scholars and intellectuals, or business elites – explains the shift in policies that conformed with the neoliberal vision. The other domestic approach, by contrast, highlights “cognitive and institutional legacies” (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). Scholars here have argued that social structures and state institutions mediated global economic pressures, and thereby led to state-specific policy outcomes. These social structures are inherited from the past, and it is their uniqueness that explains the divergent reaction of states to similar pressures.

The disagreement between the two approaches reproduces an existing divide in the broader political sociological literature between the so-called “society-centered” and “state-centered” approaches (Evans et al. 1985). As with the national/international divide, I suggest that our understanding of the emergence of neoliberalism would improve if we bridged between the two approaches.

One way to bridge between actors and institutions is suggested by empirical studies that have shown that political struggles leading to the rise of neoliberalism were not solely over the content of specific policies, but also over the nature of the state institutions themselves. Political actors could introduce neoliberal policies by *transforming the institutions in place*. Indeed, it is the change of state institutions, not only a difference in particular policies, which marks the radical difference between Keynesianism and neoliberalism. Hence, unlike the literature that emphasizes institutional legacies, the approach offered here emphasizes institutional innovation, made by strategic actors. Neoliberal policies have not been introduced within a given institutional context. Rather, state institutional arrangements were *negotiated* and *transformed* to facilitate the policy shift.

There are abundant examples of institutional innovations that accompanied the rise of neoliberal policies. Among the most interesting are transformations that involved the restructuring of previous hierarchical orders. For example, as part of the neoliberal project, state power shifted away from agencies tied to domestic social forces, such as ministries of labor, commerce, education and health, and towards agencies, such as finance and trade ministries, treasuries, and central banks, which are in closest touch with sectors connected with global enterprises and which are directly linked to transnational bodies (Cox 1996; McMichael

1996; cf. Sassen 2006). The state's own position in the political hierarchy has also changed, with the establishment of decentralized partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental organizations (O'Riain 2000), the increased authority of international organizations (Goldstein et al. 2000; Slaughter 2004), and so on. These institutions contributed to the policy shift by strengthening the political influence of state officials and economic actors who supported neoliberalism, and by weakening the political influence of those who opposed the new vision.⁶

An approach that emphasizes institutional innovation points at a particular interplay between social forces and institutional arrangements. While emphasizing political struggles, this approach also suggests that some of the most consequential political struggles are not over substantive laws, but institutional changes. While suggesting that institutions matter, this approach also raises the possibility that institutional legacies do not always survive new situations. Again, the case of trade liberalization clearly illustrates this particular interplay between past institutions and current actors, since it shows how the change in substantive policies was an outcome of political struggles over the institutional arrangements in place. A second example, of current forms of international health governance, shows that institutional changes have shaped not only the domestic, but also the international political domain.

TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES. Trade liberalization in the United States was the outcome of political struggles between internationalists and protectionists. The most consequential political struggles were not over substantive laws, but rather over the institutional arrangements in place. Concretely, internationalists managed to change the site of authority over trade policies from Congress to the executive and then to the WTO. In this way, they transformed the structure of the state, making it increasingly bureaucratized, judicialized, and internationalized (Chorev 2007b).

The first institutional innovation, which turned the tide in favor of supporters of trade liberalization, occurred early, in 1934. In the context of the Great Depression, technologically advanced manufacturing and extractive industries and major commercial and financial banks, which were potential beneficiaries of trade liberalization, strongly resented the protectionist agenda that Congress had systematically promoted. With the support of the State Department, these industries managed to convince Congress to delegate its authority over the setting of tariffs to the executive (Chorev 2007b). This institutional innovation radically improved the ability of the executive to reduce tariffs. In the 90 years before 1934, the executive initiated only 21 bilateral trade agreements, of which the Senate rejected 18 (Schmietz 2000: 433). By contrast, in the 11 years after 1934, the State Department successfully concluded 28 reciprocal trade agreements. Consequently, U.S. tariffs fell from an average of 59.1% in 1932 to 25.5% in 1946 (Pastor 1980: 93–4; Haggard 1988: 92).

Another significant institutional innovation occurred in 1974. In reaction to increased protectionist sentiments in Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. manufacturers dependent on access to foreign markets sought institutional changes that would further weaken Congress's control over protectionist measures. Consequently, they called for the strengthening of *executive* authority over protectionist claims. Concretely, the Trade Act of 1974 included provisions that made the escape clause, antidumping laws, and countervailing

⁶On the role of institutions in policymaking see, for example, Steinmo et al. (1992), Hall and Taylor (1996), Pierson and Skocpol (2002), Thelen (2004), Streeck and Thelen (2005), Campbell (2004), and Chorev (2007b).

duty laws more lenient.⁷ With the strengthening of these so-called “trade remedy laws,” protectionist industries were asked to forego their reliance on Congressional support and refer to executive measures instead. This shift of authority from Congress to the executive branch quite dramatically transformed the strategic opportunities of protectionist industries. From then on, industries asking for protectionist measures had to conform to quasi-judicial processes, which required the petitioning industries not only to show economic distress but to also provide evidence that their hardship was a result of (often, illegal) practices of international competitors. As a result, protectionism was further restrained (Chorev 2005b).

The third institutional innovation involved the strengthening of the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO, which I refer to in the discussion above. As part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, U.S. internationalists supported strengthened judicial procedures, to improve the disciplinary measures available to the U.S. government against other countries. By strengthening the judicial proceedings of the WTO, the U.S. government in effect delegated some of its authority to the international organization. At the time, U.S. executive officials insisted that this would not have negative effect on trade laws and practices in the United States, since no WTO rules could apply to the United States without congressional approval (Gigot 1994). As Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen and other activist movements that opposed the WTO agreement predicted, however, the strengthening of the dispute settlement mechanisms did lead to changes in U.S. domestic law, as I described above.

In short, the liberalization of U.S. trade policies was a result of political struggles over the institutional arrangements in place. It was thanks to new institutions, which shifted authority from a protectionist Congress to a liberal executive and an ultra-liberal international organization, that protectionist policies were replaced with liberal ones.

The most recent institutional innovation, involving the delegation of authority from the U.S. executive to judicial panels at the WTO, shows that neoliberal institutional innovations led to structural transformations beyond the state. In the case of trade policy, it was not only that the WTO adopted increasingly anti-protectionist measures, it was also that the delegation of authority from national governments to the international level improved WTO’s capacity to impose such anti-protectionist policies on disobeying states. More generally, the neoliberal era features institutional transformations at the international realm as well. While some recognize a general strengthening of the international realm at the expense of national authorities, a more accurate depiction would suggest, instead, that some international authorities (e.g., the WTO) have been strengthened at the expense of others (e.g., the United Nations specialized agencies). Other institutional innovations at the international level involve the introduction of forms of authority other than the traditional inter-governmental structure, including private authority (Strange 1996; Slaughter 2004). The field of international public health serves as a particularly rich illustration for several new forms of authority that have recently emerged.

THE NEW GLOBAL HEALTH ARCHITECTURE. A brief analytical mapping of former and current international bodies that are responsible for the development, production, and distribution of drugs for developing countries illustrates the great number of alternative authorities that function today at the transnational level, with great impact on the policies that emerge.

⁷The escape clause allows the imposition of higher duties if the industry in question demonstrated to a quasi-judicial panel that it had suffered injury due to imports. The antidumping law allows the imposition of punitive duties if the industry demonstrated that the imports had been illegally dumped, that is, sold in prices lower than the prices they are sold at home. The countervailing duty law allows imposition of duties if the industry demonstrated that the imports had benefited from illegal subsidies.

The first international initiative on AIDS was launched in 1986, when the WHO established the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA). In spite of some unique characteristics, the GPA's structure by and large mirrored the way other departments at the WHO were organized. In 1996, however, the GPA was replaced with an organization of a very different kind, a *Joint United Nation Programme on HIV/AIDS*, or UNAIDS. The Programme has several co-sponsors, including, in addition to the WHO, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Office of Drugs and Crime, the International Labor Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Bank. By creating an umbrella organization that coordinates between, but is also autonomous of, different UN specialized agencies, UNAIDS challenged the traditional structure of international initiatives, but it nevertheless maintained a UN focus.

In 2002, another global institution was established, with a very different organizational structure. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria moved away from exclusive reliance on governments as members. The Global Fund is a foundation, and its board includes representatives of donor and recipient governments, as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations, the private sector (including businesses and foundations), and affected communities. The WHO, the World Bank, and UNAIDS are represented, but only by nonvoting board members. The Global Fund raises funds, which are distributed to counties, to help them implement health policies to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria. Currently, the Global Fund channels around two-thirds of the total international funds for malaria and tuberculosis, and around 20% of the total international funds for HIV/AIDS.

As was the case with AIDS programmes, some malaria current initiatives have a multi-agency structure. For example, the Roll Back Malaria programme (RBM), which was launched in 1998, is coordinated by the WHO in conjunction with the World Bank, UNDP, and UNICEF. However, alongside this more conventional structure, the WHO also developed a different program, the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV). Intended to encourage development of more effective anti-malaria drugs, this is a public/private partnership. Initial co-sponsors of the MMV included UN agencies (WHO, the RBM Partnership, World Bank, the Global Forum for Health Research), governmental agencies (British, Swiss, and Dutch), private foundations (the Rockefeller Foundation, and later also the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), as well as the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Associations (IFPMA). Like its structure, the mission of the MMV was also far from traditional: developing and registering new anti-malarial drugs, as well as negotiating drug-licensing agreements to make the drugs affordable for low-income populations (Aginam 2002).

In addition to MMV, the Gates Foundation supports many other public/private partnerships. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), for example, was formed in 1999 by UNICEF, the WHO and the World Bank with an initial 5-year grant of \$750 million from the Gates Foundation. GAVI "co-opted" the leading vaccine manufacturing pharmaceutical companies as full partners (Birmingham 2000). GAVI also developed a new method of distribution of the vaccines, later adopted also by the Global Fund, which is based on countries submitting proposals for using the funds to supplement existing vaccine initiatives or to begin ones (Waldholz 2000).

The Clinton Foundation also plays an important role in international health policies. Unlike the Gates Foundation, which mostly supports scientific innovation, the Clinton Foundation made its main impact, as I have already mentioned, in negotiating prices with generic manufacturers.

In other cases, pharmaceutical companies sought cooperation with UN agencies. In the context of the South African legal case and after long negotiations, five UN organizations (UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, and UNAIDS) entered into a partnership offered by five pharmaceutical companies to work together to increase access to HIV/AIDS care and treatment in developing countries. The Accelerating Access Initiative (AAI) provided a framework for individual companies to enter discount agreement with specific countries.

Finally, even activists, usually more comfortable with an adversarial role, entered into partnerships for drug development. The Drugs for Neglected Diseases *initiative* (DNDi), intends, like the MMV, to develop new drugs, but of neglected diseases other than malaria or tuberculosis. This partnership brings together one humanitarian organization (MSF), five public research institutions (from Brazil, India, Kenya, Malaysia, and France); and one international research organization, the UNDP/World Bank/WHO's Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), which acts as a permanent observer.

In short, at the international level as at the national level, the institutional arrangements governing policy-making have radically changed, replacing a traditional authority structure, which prioritized nation-states, with new structures that challenge the traditional relations among UN specialized agencies, as well as the relations between UN specialized agencies and nongovernmental entities, including philanthropists, humanitarian organizations, and business.

The new authority structures lead to a new configuration of conflicts. For example, the new structures change the relations between the UN specialized agencies and business from potentially adversarial – as it was with infant formula manufacturers as well as pharmaceutical companies in the 1980s, and as it currently is with tobacco companies – to cooperative. While this has productive effects, like the willingness of pharmaceuticals to lower drug prices or their contribution to the development of drugs for neglected diseases – it also makes anti-business initiatives, including issues regarding intellectual property, increasingly unlikely. The greater role of private foundations, particularly the Gates Foundation, was also found to be a cause both for celebration, and for concern. Some have welcomed the foundation's commitment to providing money for health causes. At the same time, others are worried that the shift from public to private finances have negative consequences, especially when the private finances come mostly from one source (McNeil 2008).

The shift from a WHO-centered global health structure to what the global health community refers to as the “global health architecture,” involves many new actors, including UN specialized agencies, donors and recipients, the private sector, private foundations and activists, and offers new procedures, strategies and policies for managing health in developing countries. This shift suggests that the transformation in policies, also at the international level, involves not only political action within a given institutional context, but institutional transformations as well.

CONCLUSION

Neoliberalism is a complex set of structures and actions, both at the national and the international levels. In this chapter, I mapped the literature on the origins and spread of neoliberalism by looking at the position different scholars take on two issues: national *versus* international/global factors and political action *versus* political institutions. I suggested that it is possible, and analytically productive, to bridge each of these two dichotomies.

In contrast to initial analyses of the rise of neoliberalism – which emphasized either the particularistic, local conditions of the countries that have adopted neoliberal policies *or*

the common, exogenous conditions that have forced countries to shift their policies – more recent analyses have emphasized the interplay between local and exogenous factors. One such approach suggested that exogenous pressures are mediated by state-specific factors. While identifying the mechanisms of interplay between common international factors and local factors, this approach overlooked the possibility of interplay between different localities. The literature on international diffusion helpfully identified mechanisms that would explain the spread of policies from one state to the other. Drawing upon those insights, I suggested that inter-state influence can explain not only the spread of existing policies across both domestic and international sites, but also their emergence and transformation. The case studies of trade liberalization and of access to AIDS drugs, which I could only briefly describe here, illustrate how policies have not emerged only “from the bottom up” or “from the top down,” but also by traveling “sideways,” with countries adopting other countries’ policies, but also changing them along the way. These changes affected third parties, as well as the originating countries, leading to the institutionalization of policies that are substantially different than the original policies.

The second dichotomy prevalent in studies of neoliberalism is one between agents and institutions. While some scholars emphasized the role of political actors – such as interest groups, think tanks, or, in other cases, state officials – as agents of change, other scholars relied, instead, on institutional legacies, to suggest that change, however radical, is commonly restrained by existing legacies. In contrast, I argued that the rise of neoliberal policies has often involved political actors fighting for the transformation of the institutions in place. This institutional innovation involved putting in place rules and procedures that would favor a neoliberal logic. Referring again to trade and health policies, I demonstrated the quite radical change in the relevant institutional structures, and therefore in the location of authority, both at the domestic and the international levels. While the case of trade suggests a process of de-politicization by way of internationalization and judicialization, the case of health suggests a process of de-politicization by way of quasi-privatization. Combined, they illustrate how institutional innovation has been an important element in the prevalence of neoliberal policies.

My goal in combining these “competing” explanatory factors – domestic vs. international factors, agents vs. institutions – was not simply to show that “everything matters,” which is not a very satisfying sociological claim, but to show that looking at the interplay of those factors reveals aspects of policy-making – such as negotiated diffusion or struggles over institutions – that would be missed if one approach is chosen over the other. This also allows for a nuance analysis that does justice to competing tendencies, such as convergence *and* divergence, or consistence *and* incoherence, which the world of neoliberalism inevitably possesses.

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CHAPTER 8

Transboundary Politics

JASON BECKFIELD

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews contemporary research on the causes and consequences of politics and polities that cross national boundaries. The study of “globalization” exploded in the social sciences in the 1990s (Hargittai and Centeno 2001; Fiss and Hirsch 2005), and the rapid expansion of this emergent field continues as of this writing. Indeed, the pace of growth presents challenges to researchers interested in the political dimension of “globalization,” not only because of the discipline-crossing quality of the emerging field, but also because of a general lack of conceptual clarity and consensus in the literature (see the recent reviews by Brady et al. [2007] and Guillén [2001]). The analysis of globalization stands at what can be characterized as a basic conceptual and descriptive stage: if there is a kernel of truth in the intuition that something political is going on at a level above, between, or among nation states, how is it to be understood? Which of the concepts “transboundary,” “transnational,” “international,” “non-national,” “post-national,” “de-nationalizing,” “globalizing,” and “regionalizing,” are most helpful, why, and how would we know? With the goal of providing a framework for this sprawling literature, I argue that network theory and analysis offer useful ways of thinking about what has been characterized as globalization, as well as fruitful techniques for identifying its causes and effects.

Globalization can be conceptualized as a multidimensional process of network formation (among states, organizations, individuals, and others) across the national boundaries (Beckfield and Brady 2008). Thus, in the most general form, the politics discussed in this chapter can be described as “transboundary” (Sassen 2006). The language of formal network analysis offers a systematic way of thinking about and studying globalization that, while not without limitations, offers researchers multiple opportunities to intervene in significant debates over contemporary politics. A network can be thought of as a set of nodes, the ties among the nodes, and the relations that define ties (Carrington et al. 2005; Wasserman and Faust 1994). For instance, the recent network turn in the international relations (IR) field of political science treats states as nodes in a network where ties are formed by, for instance, the relations of militarized international disputes, co-membership in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and international trade. Of course, many other relations more or less in the political domain also form connections among nation-states, and the International Networks Archive

(Centeno 2008) and the Correlates of War project (Diehl 2008) are just two of the major data collection efforts that are making such network information available to the research community.

The network metaphor is a useful heuristic in part because it clarifies the scope of any given study of “globalization.” For example, in this chapter, the focus is on what could be called “political globalization,” or the formation of ties among political actors like states, parties, policy institutes, and social movement organizations, and ties on overtly political relations like war and the international diffusion of human rights norms. This differs from the bulk of research on globalization, which tends to emphasize economic relations like trade and investment. Economic networks, social networks, and cultural networks are, of course, important, and hardly devoid of politics, but these are outside the scope of this chapter.

The network metaphor also helps to differentiate between different spatial conceptualizations of what can be called, in very general form, cross border interactions. For example, in an influential work on globalization, Held et al. (1999) define globalization as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks” (16). Thus, globalization can be distinguished from regionalization, or “the construction of international economy and polity within negotiated regions” (Beckfield 2006). In turn, both globalization and regionalization can be clearly distinguished from transnationalization, which is the formation of cross border networks among non-state actors such as social movements, without respect to geography (Kay 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the importance of the spatial dimension, then, transnationalization falls between regionalization and globalization, as the transnational can be, but need not be, global or regional.

Why bother to distinguish among these different forms of transboundary networks? One reason is that transnationalization, regionalization, and globalization might have different effects that would be overlooked if the concepts were conflated (Beckfield 2006). For example, globalization and regionalization likely have different effects on the politics of the welfare state. Another is that, depending on the relations of interest, transnational, regional, or global networks might be better developed (Katzenstein 2005; Smith and Wiest 2005). For instance, there is evidence that networks of international organizations are particularly dense within regions (Beckfield 2008). Moreover, an appreciation of these differences can aid in understanding some of the anomalies in, for instance, research on the decoupling of policy from practice in world polity research (see below).

In the remainder of this chapter, I carry this distinction among network formations through to a discussion of general theoretical approaches to “globalization” and politics, highlighting the differences between realist and institutionalist traditions. Next, I review new research on several forms of transnational, regional, and global politics, including international organizations, international relations, transnational social movements, and transnational class conflict, focusing on research on Europe, but also incorporating research on other world regions. In the penultimate section of this chapter, I discuss some of the alleged effects of “globalization.” Finally, I conclude by outlining new opportunities for research on transnational, regional, and global politics.

THEORIZING TRANSBOUNDARY POLITICS

Two broad classes of contemporary theoretical approaches to globalization can be distinguished: realism and institutionalism. Realist approaches, common to both sociology and political science, include rationalism, intergovernmentalism, world-systems theory, and conflict the-

ory. Institutional approaches, which also bridge political science and sociology, include liberal institutionalism, historical institutionalism, world polity theory, constructivism, and field theory. Given the constraints of space, I offer brief overviews of each theoretical approach to globalization; for more detailed treatments, I refer the reader to some of the major statements, referenced below (see Katzenstein et al. [1998] for a helpful review of the intellectual history of the international relations field, and Hall and Taylor [1996] for a more general review of institutionalisms). To illustrate each approach, I apply it to the case of regional integration, or the formation of regional political economies like the European Union (EU). The EU is an ideal illustrative case because it exhibits some of the properties of transnational, regional, and global politics, and, because it represents an advanced form of political institutionalization, it heightens the contrasts among the theoretical traditions.

Realist approaches tend to focus on relations among states in the international system. In the realist vision, the international system is chaotic rather than orderly, and states use international relations and international organizations to pursue their rational interests (Jacobson 1979; Waltz 1979). Generally, then, transnational, regional, and global politics are conceptualized by realists as epiphenomenal of rational interests and material resources – here, a regional polity like the EU is more likely to appear as explanandum than explanan. For instance, rationalism, currently a dominant approach to international relations and comparative politics in political science, uses insights from game theory to understand the patterns of relations among states. A game theoretic approach specifies a set of actors, a set of choices, and a set of payoffs from each choice that predict the choices of actors. In this conception, then, EU dynamics can be understood as outcomes of iterated games, where actors develop strategies that result in cooperation rather than defection (Axelrod 1997). With realist foundations, liberal intergovernmentalism, pioneered by Andrew Moravcsik (1998), explains a prominent form of regional politics, the formation of a regional intergovernmental organization like the European Union (founded as the European Economic Community by the 1957 Treaty of Rome), as a function of bargains worked out through traditional statecraft. Importantly, this approach allows for relatively little causal impact of regional politics like the EU, net of domestic politics and national interests.

World-systems theory is arguably the dominant realist tradition within sociology. It extends Marxism to the global level, and conceptualizes states and nations as locked in the conflict over scarce resources, and, crucially, embedded in unequal patterns of international exchange. A key assumption of world-systems theory is that the world economy is fundamentally a whole entity. Within the world economy, then, are states that compete for advantage within the capitalist structures of accumulation: core states exploit periphery states by extracting raw materials and using cheap labor, while semiperipheral states also exploit the periphery but are simultaneously exploited by the core. According to world-systems theory, transnational, regional, and global politics are governed by the “world order,” or the rules of the game that are established by and for core states (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000). Thus, the European Union can be understood as an attempt to reinforce the world capitalist order and advance the exploitation by core countries of periphery ones (cf. Zielonka 2006). Or, in the language of Boswell and Chase-Dunn, the EU and organizations like it are “boards of directors for ruling states” (2000: 238).

What is missing in the world-systems account is a theory of how norms and policies diffuse in and through international organizations. This is the real strength of the institutional approaches, reviewed below. Before turning to these institutionalisms in greater detail, I note that many efforts have been made to synthesize insights from realist and institutionalist

approaches. For example, a “conflict model” of regional polities like the EU conceives the EU as one of many international organizations that are objects of and vehicles for symbolic and material struggle among national states and societies (Beckfield 2003). Drawing on world polity theory (see below, and Chap. 24 on NGOs.), international organizations and their members form a “world polity,” where materially and symbolically powerful states and societies hold privileged positions. This structural privilege affords substantial power to shape the culture developed in the world polity. Drawing on network theory, this culture diffuses through world polity ties. Because structural privilege brings influence over policy scripts, powerful states seek to maintain their privileged positions in the global stratification order. Dominant states may maintain or extend their structural power in this order in at least three ways: by forming new international organizations, dominating the membership of existing ones, or excluding less powerful nation-states from membership. Each of these mechanisms has important implications for the structure of transboundary political networks.

In contrast to the realist approaches, institutionalist approaches conceptualize transnational politics as a cultural and organizational domain with durable and causal norms, which may themselves be rational or irrational, efficient or inefficient. Institutional approaches tend to be non-rationalist, in conceptualizing interests as heterogeneous even within states, at least partly endogenous to international regimes, and socially constructed and historically contingent. For instance, a constructivist approach to the EU is able to account for the various influences of the EU on EU member states, as instances of social learning and norm diffusion (Checkel 1999). In institutionalist alternatives to realist approaches using game theory, actors are conceptualized as constituted by institutions. If a regional polity like the EU sets the rules of the game, it also defines the actors and their interests, and actors are transformed in the course of “playing the EU game.” Strongly constructivist versions of institutionalism also theorize the contingent emergence of interests and norms (Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999).

Liberal institutionalism focuses on the “international regimes” (Keohane 1984) that facilitate cooperation among states in the international system. Like the conflict model of the world polity (see above), it allows for a key causal role of power and interests, but it emphasizes that international institutions makes global politics possible by establishing a framework within which states cooperate. Applied to the case of the EU, liberal institutionalism effectively explains the development of deeper forms of cooperation among EU member states (cf. Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). In contrast, historical institutionalism argues that transnational, regional, and global politics is best understood as a path-dependent historical process that unfolds through time and generates unanticipated consequences, sunk costs, and unforeseen interests. Applied to the case of the EU, an historical institutionalist approach problematizes the ongoing institutionalization of the regional polity and accounts for the mechanisms (e.g., path dependency) whereby regional politics is transformed (Pierson 1996).

World polity theory offers a different understanding of historical change, one that focuses on global politics and international organizations, and accounts for the surprising (from the view of realism) similarity among nation-states as organizational forms. World polity theory holds that states embedded in a singular world polity receive “policy scripts” that prescribe legitimate action (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) create, carry, and embody the world culture in the world polity, and diffuse policy scripts to states. Importantly, world polity theory views the network structure of global politics as relatively flat and nonhierarchical. The world polity is said to be universal and nonhierarchical: membership in international organizations is “a social imperative” (Boli et al. 1999: 56) and “practically compulsory” (76), and world polity theorists expect “ever greater parity in the breadth of INGO participation

among residents and countries of the world” (77). This “ever greater parity” produces global convergence, as states around the globe adopt similar policies. Applying this approach to the EU, world polity theory explains the EU as a cause and consequence of the diffusion of global scripts: rather than an instance of separate regional politics, the EU is but one case of an IGO that responds to and produces global policy scripts.

Another influential approach to transnational, regional, and global politics in sociology is field theory, which develops Bourdieu’s notion of the “field” as “a group organized around a common stake” (Dobbin 2008: 55; cf. Martin 2003). Fligstein, for instance, understands regional politics as establishing regional fields, or regional social orders, where individuals and groups increasingly organize their efforts at a regional level. In the case of politics in the EU, this means that corporations, social movement organizations, and political parties orient themselves according to a regional field of social action (Fligstein 2008) and increasingly view their interests in “European” terms. At stake for actors operating in a field are the definition of the field itself, and the stratification order of the field. This perspective predicts significant debates over what “Europe” is or should be, whose systems of meaning will prevail, and how the stratification order of the field is shaped as the incumbents and insurgents struggle for position within the new social order. In this way, Europe as a field is as much about rules and institutions as it is about power.

FORMS OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLITICS

Contemporary research on transboundary politics focuses on four political relations: interstate relations, international organizations, transnational social movements, and global class conflict.

If globalization, regionalization, and transnationalization can be understood as network formation, then relations among states in the international system form part of the ties that constitute these networks. For instance, the militarized international dispute has been examined as a type of tie among states that varies depending on the attributes and affiliations shared by dyads in this sort of “interaction” (Oneal and Russett 1997). The liberal intergovernmentalist claim that state dyads sharing democracy, trade, and involvement in international organizations should be less likely to enter into militarized international disputes continues to spark a great deal of controversy, much of it surrounding method (Ward et al. 2007; cf. Gartzke 2007). Wimmer and Min (2006) question the bounded nature of this research tradition, and instead examine how the very creation of a state boundary can lead to war, because of ethnic conflict over the nationalist definition of the nation-state, or because of attempts by an ethnic group in control of a state to protect an out-of-power ethnic group in a neighboring state.

International organizations are central to the account of global politics drawn from world polity scholarship. Intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations have grown exponentially in number since the 19th century (Boli and Thomas 1997), and a number of quantitative studies show that memberships in these organizations drive the adoption of progressive human rights policies and neoliberal economic policies that accord with global norms (see section below on the “Effects of Transboundary Politics”). In world polity scholarship, research on the morphology of the world polity has been overshadowed by the large volume of research on its effects. In its associational form, the world polity is said to be: “A world of Durkheimian and Simmelian integration” (Meyer et al. 1997, p. 175), a “decentralized world” (Meyer et al. 1997, p. 164), “a unitary social system, increasingly integrated by networks” (Boli and Thomas 1997, p. 172), and “a rapidly growing web of global links that envelop the world without regard for local topography and conditions” (Boli et al.

1999, p. 77). It is important to note that the actors connected in these networks, especially the IGO network, are often policymakers, bureaucrats, and judges, who have important influence over the operation of nation-states (Slaughter 2004).

In light of these strong claims about the form of transboundary politics, it is surprising that there is relatively little work on the form of the world polity (Beckfield 2008). Before making the case that the form of the world polity does matter, I acknowledge that an argument could be made that our understanding of transboundary politics would not be altered if this assumption of an increasingly densely integrated world political structure were unrealized. That is, it could be argued that assuming a cohesive social structure is unnecessary for world polity research, given that there are robust empirical associations between states' ties to that structure (whatever it might be) and national policy. In other words, it could be the mere act of "plugging in" that matters (cf. Gartzke et al. 2001; Ingram et al. 2005).

But I argue that the structure of the world polity should still matter for understanding transboundary politics, for at least six reasons. First, a more complex structure might account for some of the anomalies of world polity research, which has shown contradictory effects of involvement in human rights organizations (Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Second, accounting for structure might enable a more accurate rendering of the mechanisms through which the world polity impacts states (for example, regional organizations might intervene in the process of policy diffusion). Third, the social structure of the world polity might offer a partial account of decoupling (for example, practice may be more tightly coupled to policy in regional polities that are more densely tied together). Fourth, if it is the intensity of involvement in the world polity and not its social structure that matters for states, then it could be that some third factor explains both involvement in international organizations and the adoption of relatively progressive policies in the domains discussed above. Fifth, if worldwide models, or global "policy scripts," are generated in a world society of international organizations, those policy scripts may cohere better and diffuse more easily among densely interconnected regional organizations (implying highly structured heterogeneity among policy scripts). Indeed, studying the world polity as a network could contribute to a better understanding of alternative processes of policy diffusion by getting closer to the proposed network mechanisms of world polity theory (Dobbin et al. 2007; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Valente 2005). Finally, the structure of the world polity is important because the work of governance is increasingly carried on through transboundary networks of state policymakers, and so, "if 'global government networks' are in fact only partial government networks, they will ultimately fail" (Slaughter 2004: 228).

While world polity and international relations research often emphasizes the top-down forms of globalization, research on transnational social movements serves as a useful corrective by exploring "globalization from below" (Della Porta et al. 2006) and "counter-hegemonic globalization" (Evans 2004). The idea here is that activists engage in social movement organizations that span national boundaries and frame their politics in transnational terms, creating a form of "globalization" that promotes global democracy and develops a transnational civil society that attempts to "re-embed" transnational corporations and undemocratic international organizations. Interestingly, these "bottom-up" forms of transnational politics seem responsive to the creation of regional polities like the European Union (Marks and McAdam 1996) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (Kay 2005). Indeed, labor movement organizing seems to track the global movements of capital, resulting in waves of economic globalization followed by waves of labor activism (Silver 2003). All this suggests that as a form of cross border politics, social movement organizing might

be best characterized as another dimension of regionalization, rather than globalization (Smith and Wiest 2005).

The final, and perhaps most controversial, form of global politics reviewed in this chapter is global class conflict (Sklair 2001). It should come as no surprise that the disputed ontological status of class should re-emerge when the concept of class is extended beyond the bounds of the national society. In the world-systems conception of transboundary class conflict, the story of globalization is the story of immobile states chasing after ever more mobile capital (Boswell and Chase Dunn 2000). Thus, the formation of international regimes and international organizations can be understood as a transboundary expression of the democratic class conflict (Korpi 1983). The sketch is that capital bounces from place to place in the race for accumulation, with labor constantly seeking citizenship rights and economic regulation through the actions of national states, which join together in a variety of transboundary, and even global, politics. This sketch is largely consistent with evidence that corporations direct capital investments away from the most generous welfare states, and theory that economic globalization can be conceptualized as a “labor control device” (Alderson 2004).

At a lower level of abstraction, there is a raucous debate over the very existence of transboundary networks that could be called a “transnational capitalist class,” much of it focusing on the presence and meaning of board interlocks among transnational corporations (see Staples [2008] for a current review). Once again, there is evidence that geography still matters and the world is far from flat: Staples finds that there is more evidence for a “Trans-European Business Class” than for a global capitalist class, based on an investigation of transboundary merger and acquisition data for 148 transnational corporations over the 1995–2004 period. This maps rather well to Fligstein’s (2008) finding that the European Union has generated a regional social field where professionals and other mobile elites operate in and disproportionately benefit from the emergence of a European field. One of the important conclusions Fligstein reaches is that the class bias of European integration has the potential to undercut further efforts at EU widening and deepening, as people who do not benefit from the EU come to view it as increasingly against their interests. To generalize, much like political globalization, political regionalization has not broken free from social stratification.

EFFECTS OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLITICS

The effects of transnational, regional, and global politics are closely contested. A central debate concerns the nature of the welfare state in the context of transnational forces. In addition, there are also new debates over the effects of globalization in a variety of domains, including the environment, human rights, women’s political representation, and economic regulation.

The “great welfare state debate” in political sociology centers on the advanced welfare states of the OECD countries, and especially the welfare states of Northern Europe, which are still, on average, the most generous providers of the “social rights of citizenship” in the world. A general debate concerns postnational citizenship itself. On the one hand, the prevalence of transnational migration in Europe has arguably produced postnationalism on the part of migrant movements, as these movements increasingly appeal to human rights discourse and international norms in making claims on the nation-state. In this way, it is argued, national sovereignty is eroded and postnational forms of citizenship gain prominence (Soysal 1994). On the other hand, citizenship claims remain framed in terms of the nation-state (Koopmans and Statham 1999), and international migrants remain “bi-local” in their politics and civic attachments (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004), both of which strongly support the continuing

political relevance of the nation-state in the face of transboundary forces. At least in Europe and North America, then, it is clear that the nation-state remains the locus of citizenship, although there is survey-based evidence that while Europeans' citizenship attachment to the EU is limited, these attachments are formed in similar ways in different EU member states (Dan 2008). Much more work needs to be done on these pressing questions, especially outside the bounds of Europe and North America (see, for instance, Moghadam [2005] on the impact of transnational feminist networks). The effectiveness of transboundary politics for generating postnational forms of citizenship remains an open empirical question.

Turning from postnational citizenship to the postnational state, many have argued that the state's capacity for social provision has changed as a result of transnational, regional, and global politics (Brady et al. 2005; Korpi and Palme 2003). Again, this debate centers on Europe (in part because of data restrictions; in part because European welfare states have been characterized as candidates for cutbacks). Welfare state scholars cite the classical liberal character of the EU in implicating European integration in the retrenchment of Western European welfare states, although the association between integration into the EU and welfare state retrenchment is rarely measured (Korpi 2003). The European Union may be described as a liberal project, in its emphasis on free trade, common markets, and tight monetary policy. Since at least its neoliberal turn in the 1980s, the EU has been a market-led project where "negative integration," or the removal of barriers to trade and market regulations, surpasses "positive integration," or regional regulations that correct market dysfunctions (Scharpf 1999). Very generally, the EU advances liberal, market-centered policies, such as deregulation, privatization, tax competition, and "market compatibility requirements." For instance, Huber and Stephens (2001) reference "the move to financial deregulation that had begun in the early 1970s [that] was essentially completed in western Europe by the beginning of [the 1990s] due to the Europe 1992 [single market] project" as a force for retrenchment in the 1990s.

Further evidence of the liberal character of EU politics and policy is that the Single European Act, which revived European integration in the 1980s by implementing qualified majority voting on the Council of Ministers for matters concerning the internal market, was an initiative of the European Commission, urged by multinational capital (Bornschiefer 2000). Capitalists and the Commission also drove the Single Market Program, the collection of legislation under the "Europe 1992" banner that liberalized trade (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996). The goals of the single market program were to "promote trade, increase competition, and promote European-wide economies of scale and scope by eliminating non-tariff trade barriers, such as differences in taxes, regulations, and health and safety standards" (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996: 9). The European Union thus takes many social policy options off the table, restricting state sovereignty in the area of social policy (Pierson 1996).

If the average effect of regional integration on the European welfare state should be negative, this effect might be conditional on the institutionalization of the welfare state itself. That is, more expansive, strongly institutionalized welfare states with established constituencies for social programs should resist the pressures of regional integration (Brooks and Manza 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001). Public opinion may make welfare retrenchment untenable in these states, or there may be such strong support for social programs – from both employers and labor in coordinated market economies – that the state is not pressured for retrenchment. Furthermore, states with more expansive social policies may be reluctant to expose themselves to the pressure of regional integration (witness Sweden's rejection of the Euro common currency, and Finland and Sweden's late accession to the EU in 1995). Also, policymakers in states where the EU is less popular may avoid welfare cutbacks to preserve popular consent to the integration project. This suggests that the effect of regional integration on the welfare

state might actually be dampened in the most generous welfare states, which could account for some of the contradictory findings of recent scholarship in this area (Brady et al. 2005).

Perhaps owing to the prominence and global framing of the environmental movement, there is a significant debate over its effects (cf. Buttel 2000; Frank et al. 2000). Buttel (2000) argues that the adoption of pro-environment policies by states at the behest of the transnational environmental movement may reflect mere “window dressing” that has no impact on the environment itself. World polity researchers have marshaled evidence to counter these claims, showing that involvement in international organizations improves actual environmental quality (Schofer and Hironaka 2005), but the debate continues in light of vast inequalities among states in resources and power (Beckfield 2003). Researchers in the world polity tradition (and the new network research from IR scholars that assesses related hypotheses) have also elaborated more complex statistical models in an attempt to control for some of the domestic political and economic factors that matter for the creation, modification, and adoption of policy scripts (Buttel 2000). Nevertheless, the claim that transboundary forces like the world polity matter above and beyond domestic politics is still a controversial assertion that continues to generate important new research.

The global human rights discourse has also attracted attention as a significant object of political sociological scrutiny. Much of the debate addresses how human rights movements and international agreements can have effects on actual human rights practice, and why states would choose to enter into human rights obligations in the first place. Cole (2005) finds that states with better human rights practices are most likely to sign the international agreements that have stronger enforcement mechanisms, while embeddedness in the world polity itself has little effect, except insofar as international conferences encourage states merely to assert their commitment to global human rights norms. Consistent with the seminal statement of world polity theory (Meyer et al. 1997), there would appear to be much decoupling between policy and practice, except in cases where states already exhibit practices that conform to global norms. In contrast, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) find that world polity embeddedness does matter, because international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) provide “the enforcement mechanism that international human rights treaties lack” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005: 1385) and use the global legitimacy of the human rights regime to lobby governments to improve their practices. In this way, INGOs produce tight coupling between policy and practice, despite weak international agreements. This argument for tight coupling is consistent with the growing literature on “transnational advocacy networks” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and “transnational feminist networks” (Moghadam 2005), which finds that activists can pressure their government by bypassing it and instead leveraging the material and cultural resources of activists in other states – the “boomerang effect.” Connections along these lines, when targeted against neoliberalism, arguably form a counter movement against globalization (Della Porta et al. 2006; Moghadam 2005; cf. Bob 2005; Tarrow 2005) that is often framed in terms of human rights.

Again perhaps reflecting movement prominence, the impact of the international women’s movement has also been examined. Following the logic of world polity theory (see above), Paxton et al. (2006) demonstrate that the international women’s movement has delivered a range of positive political outcomes for women, including voting rights, the first female parliamentarian, and higher levels of representation in legislatures, by institutionalizing first formal political equality and later political representation, as a formal part of world society. As the women’s movement has become institutionalized in global norms, and as the transboundary connections through women’s international nongovernmental organizations have grown, women’s rights have advanced. Nevertheless, the impact of the women’s movement varies in different national contexts, even when national movement organizations share

transboundary connections. For instance, Viterna and Fallon (2008) argue that change in the gendered state in developing countries depends on the character of the democratic transition, the timing of women's mobilization, resonance of the feminist frame with the transition frame, and the combination of international support with local independence. Since transboundary connections both constrain and enable changes in the gendered state, the quality of the connections as well as their overall shape are determinative, and Viterna and Fallon find that regional organizations are especially important. In a different context, Walby (1999) also emphasizes a regionalized transboundary politics, and shows how the European Union has altered gender relations. Zippel (2006) focuses on sexual harassment as an element of transboundary feminist discourse, and demonstrates that the EU has been a vehicle for feminist mobilization and policy change. This suggests that the impact of transboundary politics may actually be domain-specific, and more forceful in the area of gender claims (cf. Moghadam 2005; Viterna and Fallon 2008) than in the area of citizenship claims (cf. Koopmans and Statham 1999). Theorizing the possible domain-specificity of "globalization effects" is a significant opportunity for future work on transboundary politics.

Finally, international neoliberalism has attracted attention as an important effect of global politics. Chorev (2005) argues that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has institutionalized a liberal trade regime, in part through the "judicialization of inter-state relations," and Babb (2007) explains how neoliberalism developed in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which later imposed liberalization requirements on states receiving IMF loans (Henisz et al. 2005; Polillo and Guillén 2005). The evidence that economic neoliberalism and human rights liberalization both result from transboundary politics suggests the intriguing possibility that there may be some sort of relationship between them, but this possibility has yet to be explored in a systematic way. An especially promising approach would be to combine cross-national quantitative evidence on the diffusion of political and economic policies with case-based evidence that could shed light on the links between domains. Such research could also generate insights into the potential connections among the forms of transboundary politics outlined above.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON TRANSBOUNDARY POLITICS

As an emerging area of inquiry within political sociology, the transnationalization, regionalization and globalization of politics offers political sociologists an array of opportunities for new research. My goal in this concluding section is to highlight some of the most pressing questions that could guide theoretical and empirical development in this lively literature.

The question of how transnational politics relates to social inequality is a critical one with a host of theory- and policy-relevant implications (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). For instance, connections between institutionalist theory and stratification theory in sociology could be developed by exploring how international institutions – the "rules of the game" that govern transnational politics through organizations – have distributional implications. For instance, by constraining welfare states and creating greater labor competition by establishing regional markets, the EU has increased income inequality within European countries (Beckfield 2006). And, as Fligstein (2008) shows, the institutionalization of Europe has disproportionately benefited the professional and the mobile, and the future of European integration may be limited by this class bias if middle- and working-class Europeans increasingly view the EU as against their interests. Shifting to the global level, there is also evidence that the very international organizations that are supposed to represent the formation of a global civil society are increasingly stratified by global economic inequality and richly structured by geography and culture (Beckfield 2003, 2008).

If transboundary politics – especially in the form of international organizations – is stratified in morphology and in effects, then case studies are likely to provide important insights into the mechanisms, or processes, through which transboundary politics relates to social inequality. For instance, Babb (2007) shows how neoliberalism became the taken-for-granted policy script within the International Monetary Fund, Chorev (2005) examines policymaking within the World Trade Organization, Caporaso and Tarrow (2007) explore how EU social politics can be conceptualized as an attempt to re-embed the regional market, and Armingeon and Beyeler (2004) demonstrate how the OECD has shaped contemporary European welfare states. Critically, the development of nongovernmental standards-setting organizations can also be understood as a political process (Bartley 2007), blurring the boundary between governmental and nongovernmental organizations in transboundary politics.

It is important to emphasize that research on the relationship between transboundary politics and inequality should not skirt the issue of transboundary inequality. Firebaugh and Goesling (2004), for instance, argue that globalization has reduced between country income inequality by transferring technology from rich countries to poor ones, but the possible political dimension of this transfer is left unexamined. This is surprising, given the importance of national institutions to economic development (Evans and Rauch 1999). There is an opportunity to push research on economic development beyond its typical focus on national politics (Gourevitch 2008), to an understanding of how transboundary political forces matter. For instance, Schofer et al. (2000) argue that participation in international organizations (in this case, scientific organizations) constrains growth in the short term by encouraging scientific research activity in political domains. Research on the impact of transboundary politics on national economic development and between country economic inequality and economic convergence would offer a useful complement to the existing development research that has tended to focus on the role of foreign direct investment and international trade. A theory of development that emphasizes embeddedness in transboundary politics as well as economics would be especially welcome.

New work on transboundary politics also suggests that new political-cultural conflicts are raised by the emergent forms of transnational, regional, and global politics (Berezin and Schain 2003; Turner 2007). This is a promising direction for future research, because it may demonstrate the historical contingencies, if not the self-limiting qualities, of “globalization.” For instance, Berezin (2008) argues that the continuing institutionalization of the European Union has opened a political opportunity for right-wing nationalists by weakening the bonds between national cultural attachments and the political institutions of the state. Schmidt (2006) also identifies potential political consequences of the EU, in demonstrating how the EU challenges national democratic discourses. In the domain of social policy, Ferrera (2005) shows how the EU redraws the boundaries of the welfare state in ways that may put downward pressure on social provision. Research that compares the political-cultural consequences of regional polities has great potential to generate new insights, and may help to account for domain-specific effects of transboundary politics (Duina 2005).

More generally, the connections between transboundary politics and economics should be explored. Such research is essential, as it would help shed light on the causes of “globalization.” For instance, Beckfield (2008) finds that the structure of the world polity has evolved toward sparseness and centralization from 1950 to 2000, which contradicts the finding that the international trade network grew increasingly dense and de-centralized between 1959 and 1996 (Kim and Shin 2002). This contrast suggests that political globalization and economic globalization may not necessarily be reinforcing processes (cf. Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002), and it supports Guillén’s (2001, p. 255) call for more research

on the relations among the various dimensions of globalization. Ultimately, the potential correspondence between political globalization and economic globalization is an important open empirical question with a number of theoretical implications for political sociology.

Future research on transboundary politics should also investigate the connections between economic liberalization and political liberalization (Simmons et al. 2008). Previous work on transboundary networks of international organizations, including both IGOs and INGOs, has successfully shown that as nation states become more involved in these networks, they liberalize political rights by granting the vote to women, freeing same-sex sexual relations, and following human rights norms, while at the same time liberalizing the economy by granting independence to central banks, and removing trade and investment regulations (see the research cited in Beckfield [2008]). Political scientists have tended to focus on economic liberalization, while sociologists have tended to focus on the progressive political outcomes, resulting in an unfortunate discipline-bound disconnect between these two literatures. Is the simultaneous extension of political rights and economic deregulation a coincidence, or is it evidence of a world-political consensus on the “proper” place of the state? It might be useful, for instance, to conceptualize global policy scripts as packages. The generation and diffusion of these packages, and their relation to the global geography of stratification, remains a central question for political sociology.

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CHAPTER 9

Elite Theory and Elites

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Elite theory's origins lie most clearly in the writings of Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Robert Michels (1876–1936), and Max Weber (1864–1920). Mosca emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities out-organize and outwit large majorities, adding that “political classes” – Mosca’s term for political elites – usually have “a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority” over those they govern (1923/1939: 51). Pareto postulated that in a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals; but in actual societies, elites are those most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections (1916/1935: 2031–2034, 2051). Pareto sketched alternating types of governing elites, which he likened, following Machiavelli, to foxes and lions (see Marshall 2007). Michels rooted elites (“oligarchies”) in the need of large organizations for leaders and experts, in order to operate efficiently; as these individuals gain control of funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational functioning, power becomes concentrated in their hands (1915/1962; see Linz 2006). Weber held that political action is always determined by “the principle of small numbers, that means, the superior political maneuverability of small leading groups. In mass states, this Caesarist element is ineradicable” (1978: 1414).

Emphasizing the inescapability and relative autonomy of elites, all the four theorists viewed efforts to achieve any large measure of democracy as futile. An elite-dominated democracy is the most that is possible. In it, there are elected parliaments and other elected offices, but voters do not really choose their representatives; rather, professional politicians and other power seekers impose themselves on voters or have their friends impose them. According to Mosca and Michels, democracies can never be more than competitions between elites who greatly narrow voters’ choices and grossly distort their interests. Weber hoped that distinctive “leader democracies” marked by the domination of charismatic leaders over professional parliamentary politicians, party machines, and state bureaucracies might emerge (1978: 241–271, 1111–1155, 1459–1460; see Körösiényi 2005). Pareto was less hopeful: There can, at most, be a “demagogic plutocracy” in which an alliance of fox-like politicians and profit-seeking capitalists rules through deception, demagoguery, and the bribing of diverse interests. However, according to Pareto, such maneuvers and tricks involve allocating instead of creating wealth, so that a demagogic plutocracy gradually “kills the goose that lays the golden egg” (1901/1968: 62). When the goose is effectively dead, a leonine elite prepared to

use force to reverse economic decline and the social decadence accompanying it ascends to power and transforms the demagogic plutocracy into a “military plutocracy.” But the leonine elite eventually over-reaches in its “warlike activities” and is outwitted by a new fox-like elite that creates another demagogic plutocracy, thus starting the “plutocratic cycle” over (Pareto 1921/1984: 55–62). Attempts to break the cycle are pointless.

Many democrats and social radicals have rejected the early elite theorists’ “futility thesis” (Femia 2001). They have sought to demonstrate that particular elites are not those with superior endowments or organizational capacities, but merely persons who are socially advantaged in power competitions. Adherents of this view have argued that the existence of elites can be terminated either by removing the social advantages that some people enjoy or by abolishing the power concentrations that spur competitions among them – remedies that often go hand-in-hand. There are no historical instances, however, where these remedies have been successfully applied in a large population for any significant length of time.

The writings of Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and Weber constitute a paradigm from which a general theory of elites and politics might be derived (Field and Higley 1980). But efforts to produce such a theory have not been conspicuously successful. Linking elites causally to major regularities in politics remains elusive; there is no accepted typology of elites and no accepted specification of the circumstances and ways in which one elite replaces another; political interactions between elites and nonelite populations are captured only piecemeal. Nevertheless, political scientists and sociologists pay much attention to elites and their key roles in democratic transitions and breakdowns, revolutions, political regimes of all kinds, mass movements, democratic politics, globalization, and many other political phenomena. By outlining a general treatment of elites and politics, this chapter seeks to provide elite theory and the attention paid to elites with more coherence and direction.

ELITES

Elites derive from a fundamental and universal fact of social life, namely, the absence in any large collectivity of a robust common interest. While it is true that most large collectivities rest on a base of social and cultural understandings, these tend to be ambiguous and rough. The satisfactions some of their members seek are only partly compatible with the satisfactions sought by other members. Constantly, some members claim statuses and other valued goods for themselves, their kin, friends, and allies that others do not accept as fully legitimate. Acceding to these claims is often more a matter of judging that it is dangerous or inexpedient to resist them, than of recognizing that the persons and groups making the claims have the right to do so. In large collectivities, common interest is fairly minimal and must be supplemented by authoritative decisions that dissenters and opponents dare not or find it inexpedient to resist.

Common interest is even more limited as regards the detailed features of any large collectivity’s functioning. Its operations involve day-to-day decisions, and thus, allocations and re-allocations of tasks and statuses. Merely for a large collectivity to survive, “intelligent” and “objective” decisions that transcend individual interests must regularly be taken. But there can seldom be any firm consensus among a collectivity’s members about the rightness of these decisions, partly because only a few are in positions that afford a relatively comprehensive view of the collective effort and its present location in time and space relative to its goals. Yet, such a view is usually necessary to know if a particular decision is “right.” Moreover, the need for constant decision-making deprives members of the time they would need to reach agreement about how their interests apply to current problems and needs. Even a relatively

unimportant decision changes the line-up of influence for the next decision, so that the details of a collectivity's structure and needs are always different today from what they were yesterday. This means that any incipient consensus among its members necessarily focuses on yesterday's structure and needs.

These aspects of large collectivities give to elites their importance in political and social theory. Collectivities of any size and complexity require decisions by persons who happen to be strategically located in them. Because such collectivities are concentrations of power in the wider society, these decision-makers have disproportionate societal power and influence, and they nearly always enjoy disproportionate privileges and protections. If we call them elites, we can say that large and complex collectivities necessarily create elites. In this sense only are elites an inherent feature of societies; all other reasons for the existence of elites are less persuasive and more debatable. Recognizing this is not, however, merely to echo Michels' dictum that "Who says organization says oligarchy." For oligarchy, aristocracy, and other euphemisms for elites imply or impute specific structural and behavioral features. Whether elites are cohesive, conspiratorial, self-conscious, and so on is answerable only through empirical investigation. While elites are the inescapable consequence of conflicting interests in all large and complex collectivities, their configurations vary according to political and social circumstance.

Elites may be defined as *persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially*. Put differently, elites are persons with the *organized capacity* to make real political trouble without being promptly repressed. They consist not only of prestigious and "established" leaders – top politicians, important businessmen, high-level civil servants, senior military officers – but also, in varying degrees in different societies, relatively transitory and less individually known leaders of mass organizations such as trade unions, important voluntary associations, and politically consequential mass movements. "Counter-elites" are subsumed by this definition because they clearly have the organized capacity, although perhaps mainly through negation, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially.

It is important to stress that this is a limited and specifically political definition of elites. It is restricted to persons who are at the top of the pyramid or pyramids of political, economic, and social power (Putnam 1976: 14). It does not consider all those in a society who enjoy high occupational, educational, or cultural statuses to be elites in a political sense. As defined, national political elites are not large in number. Geraint Parry (1969/2005) has observed that the entire British elite could be seated with ease in a soccer stadium. Using strict organizational and positional criteria, as well as data about sizes of elite networks, researchers have estimated that the national political elite in the United States numbers less than ten thousand persons (Dye 2002), roughly half this number in countries like France (Dogan 2003), Australia (Higley et al. 1979) or Germany (Hoffmann-Lange 1992), and about fifteen hundred in small countries like Denmark (Christiansen et al. 2001) and Norway (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad 2002). The last estimate of fewer than two thousand persons is probably the most plausible for all countries during the early modern historical period, and all but the most populous developing countries today.

ELITES AND POLITICAL STABILITY

The presence or absence of stable political institutions is one of the major differences between political systems that can be explained on the basis of differences between elites. It is unusual for political power to be institutionalized effectively, as it has been for many years in Great

Britain, the United States, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and a few other, mostly Western countries. Stable political institutions are marked by the *absence* of irregular seizures of government executive power or obvious military influence in policy-making through threats of military intervention. Every 4 years since 1789, a president has taken office in the United States on the basis of election and has served out a term, until death or resignation, as the more or less effective head of the American political system. In Britain, over an even longer time span, prime ministers and cabinets have regularly succeeded each other as the chief political authority in accordance with principles and rules that, in spite of being largely informal, are well known.

The personalized manipulation of political institutions through individual and direct control of military and police forces has been, and is, much more common. Typically, there is a distinct elite group that effectively commands organized coercive forces and is prepared to act arbitrarily no matter what existing institutions prescribe. It is of little consequence analytically if this group centers on a traditional monarch, is a civilian coalition tied closely to professional military commanders, or an overt military junta. What is consequential analytically is that elites, no matter what their partisan inclinations may be, see power as personalized and directly dependent on the support of organized coercive forces. Elites critical of current social organization, for whatever reason, necessarily view political change in terms of removing or altering the group that effectively commands those forces. In their eyes and the eyes of their opponents, power flows from gaining at least temporary control over the principal means of coercion. Attempts to seize government executive power by force are seen by all as plausible, even probable, eventualities.

This is the basic aspect of a *disunited elite*. For long periods, as in Spain, Portugal, and Latin America, during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, governance oscillates between “dictatorial” and “democratic” poles. These oscillations are transitory and circumstantial manifestations of the political system’s inherent instability, so long as elite persons believe that the hold on government power is subject to sudden and forcible change. Overwhelmingly, the historical record shows that politics in most countries normally approximate an unrestrained struggle among mutually distrustful elites to defend and advance their interests with little regard for cost or propriety.

Of supreme interest in political analysis, therefore, are the relatively few countries in which political instability is not the order of the day. For, as noted, a few countries have displayed patterns of institutionalized authority and procedure that have been respected and perpetuated over long periods. In them, irregular seizures of government power by force are unknown, and informed observers consider such seizures highly unlikely. Elite theory holds that these deviant cases are explicable *only* in terms of elite behavior. More specifically, the historically normal situation of political instability has been abrogated in countries only when a *united elite* has formed and stabilized existing institutions or created new ones that it has then kept stable.

There are, however, two markedly different types of united elites and, consequently, two quite different forms of political stability. One type is an *ideologically united elite*, which is marked by its members’ uniform profession of a single and defined ideology. All persons holding elite positions avoid taking conflicting positions in public about current policies and political beliefs, and they foster assiduously the image of a homogeneous leadership group. But given the conflicting interests that exist in any society, this image is more apparent than real. To some extent, it arises from the determination of uppermost leaders imbued with a specific ideology to afford no opening for the intrusion of “unsound” outsiders into policy-making. But even for elite insiders the ideological uniformity is, in part, coerced. Behind the public profession of more or less complete agreement about current policies and goals – behind the

expression of a single ideology – there exists an apparatus of power sufficient to force existing and aspiring elite members to harmonize their public statements with the views that are currently orthodox. Defining what is orthodox is the task of individuals in the highest elite positions, and adhering to this orthodoxy obviously blocks the expression of divergent interests.

The content of the single ideology that marks an ideologically united elite is of little analytical importance. It must be sufficiently diffuse and removed from present conditions to permit flexibility in interpreting always changing realities. It must focus on some future, imaginary social condition toward which society is allegedly moving. It must, in short, be substantially utopian. But analytically speaking, whether the ideology promises a classless society or one in which eternal salvation or pastoral contentment for all will be realized is of little consequence for the enforced unity that prevails among elite persons. Because the only permissible public position for organizing endeavors is defined and monopolized by those in power, political institutions can be centralized to a degree unknown elsewhere. Individuals and groups who want to alter those institutions can be identified easily, and they possess few means with which to appeal for public support. Evidence indicates that, once established, institutions operated by an ideologically united elite are stable for long periods.

The other type of united elite, a *consensually united elite*, does not entail all elite persons taking essentially the same political position in public. There is no single and defined ideology to which all must adhere. Instead, persons with power and influence take clearly divergent positions on public matters. These positions often accord with opposing ideologies, as in the long conflict between conservatives and liberals within British and Swedish elites during the nineteenth century, and the subsequent conflict between liberals and socialists within the same elites during the first half of the twentieth century. The striking aspect of these conflicts is that they occur under a set of rules that is nowhere comprehensively codified but is tacitly and widely understood to remove serious personal danger from elite contests and competitions. The informal rules embody a structuring of power that gives elite persons and groups sufficient access to key decision-makers, so that it is in their collective interest to avoid seriously disruptive actions and keep the political situation manageable. Although elite members disagree and oppose each other in limited struggles for ascendancy, power is distributed so that they have enough influence on political decisions to deter them from translating oppositions into attempts to seize government power by force. Political institutions are, accordingly, stable for long periods.

Distinguishing basic types of elites and linking them to political regularities such as stability and instability is hardly a settled matter. Writing in 1950, Raymond Aron distinguished between “Western” and “Soviet” elites, although he simultaneously acknowledged profound differences between such Western elites as the British and the French, and he mostly ignored elites in developing countries (Aron 1950). By combining the modal political orientations and social compositions of elites during the hundred years that followed Germany’s national integration in 1871, Ralf Dahrendorf (1967) distinguished between successive authoritarian, totalitarian, and “cartel” elites, although his focus on German affairs has militated against wider use of his distinctions. Putnam (1976) combed many studies of political elites and in them discerned what he called consensual, competitive, and coalescent types, which Putnam tied, respectively, to communist, stable democratic, and multiethnic regimes. Other scholars have distinguished broadly similar types of political elites (e.g., Etzioni-Halévy 1993; Giddens 1974; Keller 1963; Welsh 1979).

It is useful to highlight how distinctions between disunited and the two types of united elites – ideologically or consensually united – overlap but also differ from earlier typologies of elites. In a disunited elite, persons and factions are clearly divided and separated from each

other, they disagree fundamentally about political norms and institutions, they adhere to no single code of political behavior, and they engage in unrestrained, often violent struggles for dominance that have a zero-sum or “politics as war” character. In both types of united elites, by contrast, dense and interlocked networks of communication and influence, along with a shared code of political behavior, knit elite persons and factions together. But in an ideologically united elite, the networks are sharply centralized; they run through a single party or other hierarchically organized movement; and the shared code of behavior involves upholding a single ideology or belief system that is allowed public expression. A consensually united elite displays essentially the opposite configuration. Networks are dense and interlocked, but no single faction or sector elite dominates; persons and factions regularly and publicly oppose each other on ideological and policy matters; their actions over time indicate a voluntary, mostly tacit code of behavior that involves respecting each other’s interests, according each other significant trust, cooperating to contain explosive conflicts, and competing in ways consonant with a positive-sum “politics as bargaining” (see Higley et al. 1991; Weingast 1997).

ORIGINS OF ELITE TYPES

Ideologically united elites originate in revolutionary circumstances that enable a movement dogmatically expressing a specific ideology or creed to suppress and supplant previously existing elites. Examples are Russia 1917–1921, Italy 1922–1925, Germany 1933–1934, North Korea 1946–1948, China after 1949, Cuba 1959–1961, and Iran 1979–1981. Ideologically united elites may also originate when an external power possessing such an elite imposes its clone on a conquered or otherwise subordinated country, as the Soviet Union did on East Germany and other East European countries after World War II. By contrast, consensually united elites sometimes originate through dramatic and sudden changes in the situations and attitudes of the key groups that have constituted a disunited elite, changes that are usually preceded by a long, costly, but inconclusive struggle for power. This amounts to an *elite settlement* in which warring elite camps bring their major disputes to a close and establish a basis for mutual cooperation and trust (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Burton 2006). The first historical instance of an elite settlement occurred in England’s “Glorious Revolution” of 1688–1689, and it is worth recalling its basic features.

English elites had been bitterly and deeply disunited, as evidenced by the Civil Wars and Interregnum between 1642 and 1660 and the elite standoff that followed. In 1660, the monarchical system was restored, albeit with some shifting of positions and blurring of lines between elite camps. Thereafter, one main camp, the Tories, sought to exploit their association with the monarchy, while the other main camp, the Whigs, maintained their antimonarchical stance. The Tories were thoroughly identified with the religious doctrine and institutions connected to the Church of England. But when in 1685, the birth of a son to James II, who professed both Roman Catholicism and an absolutist version of monarchical power, made an indefinite Catholic succession to the throne likely, the Tories were as discomfited as their Whig rivals. Fearing a resumption of civil war, key leaders of the two elite camps conspired to invite the successful military intervention of the Dutch *stadtholder*, William of Orange, and the camps subsequently agreed, in early 1689, to establish William as king under terms that effectively guaranteed them joint political influence. Occurring in a predominantly agrarian society, where the elite stratum was small and exclusive, these events marked the beginning of the limited and restrained political contests with understood informal rules that have characterized the British polity ever since (for a fuller account and the English settlement’s ramifications

for American elites and political stability, see Barone 2007). Essentially, similar events and processes constituting elite settlements occurred among Swedish elites in 1809 after a century of infighting (Higley and Burton 2006: 68); Swiss elites, in 1848, following a brief civil war between opposing elite camps (Tilly 2004: 168–205); and, more debatably, among Mexican elites in 1928–1929, when they created an omnibus party, eventually known as the PRI, to operate a stable presidential system after a long and bloody civil war that no elite camp clearly won (Knight 1992).

Consensually united elites have also originated in the attainment of independence by former colonies in which local or “native” elites were able to practice a limited and restrained home-rule politics while waging unifying struggles for independence. As illustrated by elites in Britain’s North American colonies, both American and Canadian, local elites in partially self-governing colonies may develop a high-enough level of mutual trust, when resisting the colonial power’s interventions and seeking independence that they are consensually united from the date of independence, or the grant of full home rule. In addition to the U.S. and Canada, this was the experience of elites in Australia and New Zealand during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and of Indian, Malayan, and white South African elites during the twentieth century’s first half (Higley and Burton 2006: 107–138). It is worth noting that Dutch elites became united in this manner before and during their successful struggle for independence from Spain late in the sixteenth century, although full integration of the seven Dutch provinces did not occur until after the Napoleonic Wars.

In cases where consensually united elites formed as an outgrowth of colonialism, colonial governments had active representative institutions that afforded elites a considerable practice of limited and restrained politics. But this was not the situation in the Latin American colonies of Portugal and Spain, where, moreover, there was little clear understanding of territorial boundaries when independence was won early in the nineteenth century. Consequently, military leaders and local political bosses (*caudillos*) tended to predominate in Latin America at independence and for long periods thereafter. Nor were the political experiences of elites under colonial rule and when struggling for independence propitious for the formation of consensually united elites in more than a few of the scores of ex-colonies that achieved independence during the decades following World War II. Except in India, Malaya (later Malaysia), Senegal, and a handful of other ex-colonies, such as Jamaica and Barbados, independence brought with it disunited elites and long-lasting political instability.

To summarize, there have been two ways in which disunited elites were replaced by ideologically united elites historically: (1) through revolutionary upheavals won by a doctrinaire elite group; (2) through impositions by a foreign power already possessing such an elite. Likewise, there have been two ways in which disunited elites became consensually united historically: (1) through basic and sudden elite settlements in societies at relatively low levels of socioeconomic development; (2) through colonial home rule and independence struggles where local elites had already received or obtained in the course of their struggles experience in political bargaining and restrained competitions.

How likely are any of these origins and transformations of elites in today’s world? As discussed below, revolutions that give rise to ideologically united elites have been exceedingly rare historically, and there is no firm basis for believing that they will become more frequent. Except possibly for Iran, there is, after the Soviet Union’s demise, no country with an ideologically united elite capable of imposing its clone on neighboring countries, though one might speculate about China’s eventual capacity to do this, assuming that its ideologically united elite remains intact. Regarding the origins of consensually united elites, basic elite settlements have been as rare historically as the revolutionary upheavals that occasionally produced

ideologically united elites. The deep and continuing impasse among Iraqi elites following the US invasion in 2003 has dramatized the difficulties of engineering a settlement that overcomes mutual elite suspicions and hatreds in today's conditions. As for the origin of consensually united elites through colonial home rule and unifying independence struggles, the conditions on which this depends are not seriously present in today's postcolonial world.

These observations raise the question of whether there may be another way in which consensually united elites form. To address this, let me outline briefly what might be termed an *elite convergence*. In countries that have transited to democratic elections, the opposing camps and factions that constitute a disunited elite may begin to converge if *some* of the opposing elites form a broad political coalition that mobilizes enough voters to win elections repeatedly. This enables the coalesced elites to dominate government executive power and obtain the greater security that it provides. The elite convergence proceeds if factions hostile to the winning elite coalition conclude that seizing power by irregular means is not a realistic possibility and they must beat the winning coalition in election contests if they are to escape permanent political subordination. This means acknowledging the value of elections and promising to accept their outcomes. The elite convergence is completed when the formerly hostile and losing factions gain government executive power in an election and govern in a way that is respectful of established institutions and tacit live-and-let-live reciprocities with the previously dominant elite coalition. As happens more clearly and quickly in elite settlements, through convergences, elites gradually reach an underlying consensus about the norms of restrained political competition, so that political institutions become stable.

Elite convergences can be said to have occurred in several European countries and in Japan during the twentieth century's second half (Higley and Burton 2006: 139–181). All were at a relatively high level of socioeconomic development and general prosperity when the convergences took place. The four clearest cases were France, once General de Gaulle's associates formed a winning electoral coalition after his return to power in 1958; Italy, once the "organic" Christian Democrat – Socialist winning coalition took clear shape in 1963; West Germany, after the Christian Democrat – Christian Socialist – Free Democrat coalition began scoring repeated victories in 1953; and Japan, after 1964 when the Liberal Democrats and centrist parties created an electoral juggernaut. In each of these countries, dissident and hostile elite camps eventually came to see that they had no real political alternative to moderating their stances in order to compete effectively in elections, and in each, what had previously been a disunited elite gradually became consensually united: by 1981 in France, when the previously dissident Socialists won power and governed with moderation; during 1979 in Italy, when the "revolutionary" Communist Party cooperated with the dominant Christian Democrats to repress extra-parliamentary terrorist groups; in West Germany, when the Social Democrats, who had jettisoned most of their dissident baggage in 1959, entered into a "grand" governing coalition with their previous nemesis, the CDU-CSU coalition (minus the Free Democrats) in 1966; and in Japan, once the Socialist Party repudiated its Marxist shibboleths during the mid-1980s.

ELITES AND DEMOCRACY

Although an elite theorist's personal preference may be for democratic politics, he or she does not believe that in most countries and circumstances a practical and stable form of democratic politics can be achieved. Meaningful, democratic institutions and practices depend upon the type of elite that a society has. No type of elite is compatible with the full democratic ideal,

and only one of the three types, a consensually united elite, is conducive to stable democratic politics of the kind that are practiced in Western countries and a few others today. However, a consensually united elite is not *reliably* conducive to even this limited form of democracy.

The most common political situation, that of disunited elites, has the basic feature of institutional instability. While institutions operated by some part of a disunited elite may, at times, have a formally democratic façade, the institutions are hardly worth much promotion or defense, because they are unlikely to survive a serious political crisis. Commonly, any substantial increase in normal political tensions leads, with or without a military coup, to a more repressive government. Although this government may eventually mellow or be replaced by a more democratic one that has the tacit consent of the elite veto group associated with the military, such an improvement is likely to be merely an interval in a succession of more or less repressive governments. Unremitting fears, hatreds, and desires for revenge characterize disunited elites. In them, insecurity is the overriding aspect of elite status, with persons and factions seeking to ensure their survival in ways that collide, often violently, with the survival efforts of other persons and factions.

The circumstances in which disunited elites become ideologically or consensually united are unlikely to appeal to people with democratic sentiments. When consolidating power, an ideologically united elite does not allow competitive politics, and so long as the elite persists meaningful actions motivated by democratic sentiments are nearly impossible. The basic settlements in which a few consensually united elites originated historically had, as their principal features, substantial elite autonomy from mass pressures and the sacrifice of deeply held political principles for which opposing elites and their supporters had long stood. Both features offend democratic sentiments. The colonial origins of consensually united elites involved empires odious to convinced democrats and are, in any case, no longer feasible politically and economically. Where opposing camps in disunited elites have gradually converged, those who have most liked to consider themselves genuine democrats have found that they are consistently in the minority, while more conservative and traditional persons who are part of the majority to which winning coalitions appeal may, for considerable periods, merely pretend that they are democrats (Alexander 2002; Power 2000). Moreover, although a consensually united elite may eventually emerge and open the way to a stable democratic regime, the convergence process depends on socially radical groups becoming disillusioned with their democratic ideals and abandoning their radicalism.

It is also the case that stable political institutions created and operated by a consensually united elite may not, in fact, be very democratic. They can be based, as in most historical cases, on a highly restricted suffrage. The long dominance of a high-handed chief executive and even a period of “emergency rule” – Indira Gandhi in India and Mathathir Mohamad in Malaysia come to mind – are possible. More fundamentally, practical democracy depends upon the ability of a consensually united elite to keep political tensions moderate. Where such an elite exists, the problem for people imbued with democratic ideals is deciding how much public attention they should try to center on issues that they consider morally right but that are also potentially explosive. The champions of such morally charged issues are likely to find that members of a consensually united elite distort, partially suppress, or simply confuse the issues if doing so seems necessary to maintain institutional stability. Morally charged issues will be subject to “benign neglect” if elites conclude that the issues have reached a threshold of articulation and antagonism beyond which political stability is endangered.

Should those who cannot get the hearings that they believe their moral causes deserve acquiesce in such elite actions? If it is correct that consensually united elites are ordinarily quite capable of managing political tensions, the question is without significance. Yet, suppose

that the elite cannot quite do this in the face of embittered demands and vehement mass demonstrations. On the assumptions of the approach to elites outlined here, this would break up the elite and, in all probability, create a disunited elite with the usual consequence of covert or overt military rule and the suppression of political dissent. Would it be right for staunch democrats to help bring this outcome about on behalf of a high moral cause? The answer is obvious.

Elite theory teaches that a mature and experienced advocate of democracy must always settle for a political order that is considerably less than ideal. An elite that is consensually united, or one that approaches this condition, is necessary for practical democracy. Only such an elite will effectively manage conflicting interests whose open and dogmatic expression would create disastrous internal conflict. Where an elite does this over the course of many years, representative political institutions guided by reasonably competitive and influential elections are possible, though not inevitable. But where groups within the elite fully and openly reflect and express conflicting non-elite interests, then at some point political freedom for considerable numbers of elite and non-elite persons alike will be suppressed, or the polity will not survive. Elite theory rejects the fashionable but fatuous notion that the most desirable political system is one in which the divergent interests of a population are clearly represented and forcefully articulated at the elite level. Posing “a real choice, not an echo” in practical democratic politics, threatens to weaken a consensually united elite and concomitant institutional stability. Recognizing this, persons who accept the premises of elite theory cannot feel compelled to pursue the democratic ideal in all circumstances and at all costs.

ELITES AND REVOLUTION

There is no agreed definition of revolution that attaches the term to a clearly specified political event or process. It is sometimes used to mean almost any irregular and forcible seizure of power, thereby covering the many coups and sporadic uprisings that occur where elites are disunited. “Revolution” is also often used to label civil wars and wars of liberation that center on dynastic, ethnic, regional, or religious divisions. This definitional vagueness makes it a matter of subjective judgment whether to call a regime, movement, or violent conflict “revolutionary” – a judgment that is, indeed, frequently made after the fact, as happened with the so-called Cuban Revolution that established the Castro regime. When they were fighting the Batista dictatorship, Castro’s insurgents portrayed themselves as, and were widely believed to be, liberal and populist, not revolutionary. It was only after a year or two in power that Castro and his associates proclaimed themselves “revolutionaries,” and a Cuban Revolution was widely perceived. By not distinguishing between many kinds of violent upheavals, “revolution” has lacked the precision required of a concept that can be utilized seriously in an elite theory of politics.

There is, however, one special kind of upheaval with features that are objectively different from those of coups, civil wars, secessions, and popular outbursts. This is an upheaval that begins when normal government authority, most manifest in disciplined military and police forces, suddenly and dramatically collapses. During the shorter or longer interval that follows, maintaining order against riot or pillage becomes highly problematic until government authority and military and police discipline are either restored or built anew by some victorious group. One cannot say that an elite of any of the three types distinguished here exists during this interval. Power resides, as radicals like to say, “in the people” or, more precisely, in persons who assemble fairly spontaneously, usually under arms, and respond to immediate propaganda and

oratory with mass actions. Such assemblages typically include bodies of rank-and-file troops who have either liquidated their officers or are simply ignoring their commands.

As Pareto clearly saw (1916/1935: 2056–2057), an upheaval of this kind eventually brings a substantially different body of persons to elite status, and it changes political and especially economic institutions in fundamental ways. But before such sweeping alterations become apparent, whoever attempts to restore or construct a semblance of organized power in the area where government authority has collapsed usually comes under attack from areas to which the collapse did not extend. To survive this attack, the new power organizers must quickly create some degree of bureaucratic centralization accompanied by disciplined military and police units. Sooner than later, the popular assemblages that have held forth are policed and suppressed. When this happens, the observer can again speak of a regime operated by one or another type of elite. In the English and French upheavals of 1642–1645 and 1789–1794, respectively, the elite that emerged was again disunited. But after the upheaval in Russia, 1917–1921, the new elite was ideologically united as a consequence of the victorious Bolsheviks' tight organization and doctrinal coherence during the upheaval.

If for purposes of conceptual order and terminological consistency “revolution” refers only to an upheaval involving the collapse of government authority and an ensuing interval when coercive power is located in more or less spontaneous popular assemblages, it is a rare and unlikely event (Brinton 1938). A revolution in this sense can probably occur only in societies at low levels of socioeconomic development, that is, largely agrarian or peasant societies. In more bureaucratized societies at higher development levels, the widespread collapse of government authority and disciplined military and police forces seems even more implausible today than it did when proponents of revolution counted, for the most part mistakenly, on large numbers of citizen-soldiers turning on governments after hardships and defeats in large-scale warfare. Indeed, advances in military technology, especially nuclear weaponry, suggest that wars fought by mass armies may now be relics of history (Mueller 2004).

Whether or not they are any longer likely, do revolutions in the present sense of the term bring political improvements? From the standpoint of democratic and liberal criteria, the answer is an emphatic No. Because of the searing enmities and political scars they create, revolutions never eventuate in consensually united elites. Their consequences are either disunited or ideologically united elites, neither of which is congenial to reliable democratic practices. Although much has been heard from persons outraged by what they regard as fundamental moral deficiencies of contemporary political regimes, not least Western democracies, the sweeping “revolutionary” changes that these persons have demanded lie well beyond what elite theory depicts as possible; they are just dreams and wishful thoughts that, viewed through the lens of elite theory, are deeply imprudent.

ELITES AND NON-ELITES

How does elite theory treat non-elite populations and link them to elites? The bulk of Pareto's million-word *Treatise on General Sociology* was an attempt to answer this question and it is self-evident that no satisfactory answer can be offered here. The question requires conceptualizing a dynamic relationship between elites and non-elites in which, under specifiable conditions, elites override non-elites, but under different and equally specifiable conditions non-elites override elites. Where elites prevail, a theory must be content to specify the *outer limits* of possible elite behavior and, thus, of political outcomes. Where non-elites prevail, political

outcomes can be forecast with greater certainty. Specifying the changing predominance of elites and non-elites theoretically is, therefore, the crucial task.

To illustrate how this might be tackled, consider the proposition that at low levels of socioeconomic development, a leftist or leveling propensity is potentially widespread among non-elites, if for no other reason than that most non-elites have little or nothing to lose. In extreme political circumstances, this propensity may eventuate in a revolutionary collapse of government authority and military discipline of the kind just discussed. But such leveling revolutions appear possible *only* in an early phase of development, and even then, they are exceedingly rare: the English, French, and Russian revolutions are the classic instances and all three occurred in preindustrial conditions. Much more normally in preindustrial societies, bodies of peasants and artisans are not greatly aggravated by the encroachments of elites, and their fundamentally leftist or leveling propensity is not strongly activated.

Non-elite propensities become more enflamed, however, when societies reach the industrial stage of development. In this stage, manual industrial workers, who are numerous, hold consistently to egalitarian sentiments and a hostile view of elites, clearly articulated by the powerful trade unions and leftist parties that mobilize them. Bureaucratic and service workers, who are also numerous, tend to accept the presence of elites, even if they do not condone all of their actions and features. Diminished and now more or less comparable numbers of artisans and ex-peasants, who in industrial conditions, typically own small enterprises and farm properties, are ambivalent about elites and elite actions: they resent elite interferences in their artisan and farming endeavors but are inclined to support those elites who seek to check leveling forces. In extreme political circumstances, an anti-egalitarian and possibly “fascist” upheaval aimed at crushing leveling forces is possible: northern Italy in the 1920s; Weimar Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s; Spain in the late 1930s; strong fascist movements in Austria, Belgium, France, and most other European countries during the interwar period (Paxton 2004). Normally in industrial societies, however, the large numbers and political influence of nonmanual bureaucratic and service workers, augmented by politically ambivalent artisans and ex-peasants, are sufficient to prevent strongly egalitarian mobilizations of manual industrial workers from gaining government power. If elections are held, the latter are simply outvoted.

There is an important caveat. In societies that are late-comers to socioeconomic development and in a handful of mostly small societies with large petroleum reserves, it is clear that today’s production and communication technologies greatly accelerate the conversion of workforces from an overwhelmingly peasant and artisan composition to one that consists predominantly of bureaucratic and service workers. In these accelerated and technologically more sophisticated circumstances, manual industrial workers are at once fewer in relative numbers, and perhaps because of their smaller numbers and more sophisticated work tasks, their outlooks appear to be less intransigently egalitarian and hostile toward elites. The main political problem in societies coming late to socioeconomic development may, consequently, reside less in the composition of their rapidly changing workforces than in the inability of these workforces to provide employment for large parts of swollen and mostly young non-elite populations.

The illustrative point, in any case, is that non-elite configurations, sketched here as distinct workforce compositions and concomitant mixes of orientations toward elites, rule out certain elite actions and political outcomes at different stages in socioeconomic development, but they do not determine what elites will do and what political outcomes they will produce. Thus, early in socioeconomic development, non-elites tend toward a hostile view of power exercises by elites, and their impoverished situations give non-elites little reason to fear a general

leveling of existing hierarchies. If elites are exceptionally incompetent or unlucky, however, a collapse of government authority that triggers a leveling revolution is possible. But elites may circumvent this by couching effective appeals for non-elite support in terms of religious and other traditional beliefs. In socioeconomic development's industrial stage, a shift to harshly authoritarian-cum-fascist rule is possible, although entrenched elites may circumvent it by holding elections in which leveling forces simply lack sufficient numbers to prevail. What is not possible in industrial societies – in other words, what is precluded by the non-elite configuration – is a successful leveling revolution, and *pace* Marx, none has occurred.

ELITES AND NON-ELITES IN POSTINDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS

The pervasiveness of nonmanual bureaucratic and service workers in socioeconomic development's postindustrial stage (Bell 1973: 121–164) rules out *both* the dramatic leveling and anti-leveling political changes that are possible in earlier stages of development. By the 1950s and 1960s, all of the Western countries that displayed this workforce configuration – the Anglo-American, Scandinavian, and Benelux countries, plus West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria (where elites in 1945–1946 settled deep interwar divisions by fashioning the power-sharing *proporz* system) – had consensually united elites and stable political institutions. Disunited elites in several countries that just reached the postindustrial stage of development during the 1970s were becoming more consensually united: French, Italian, and Japanese elites via convergences; Spanish elites via a dramatic elite settlement in the wake of the *Franquist* regime (Gunther 1992; Linz and Stepan 1995).

Initially, in the 1950s and early 1960s, postindustrial conditions seemed to accentuate the political stability that consensually united elites produce. This was because the preponderance of bureaucratic and service workers blurred class lines and weakened customary partisan alignments among non-elites. Consequently, elites needed less recourse to ideologies, such as socialism and liberalism, in order to justify their statuses, policy positions, and governing actions. Elite political discourse shifted to discussing affluence and the welfare state as solvents of historic discontents and problems. Observers avidly discussed the “end of ideology,” a thesis that is probably best seen in hindsight as rationalizing blandly the optimistic views of the postindustrial landscape, especially as viewed by sub-elite commentators. With high productivity and nearly full employment, the absence of serious economic downturns, a shrunken working class acquiring middle-class life styles, and no other large and obviously discontented collectivities in sight, there was the appearance of considerable harmony among non-elite populations (e.g., Beer 1965). Elites, accordingly, adopted a more blatantly managerial posture, and they voiced a complacent belief that mere “fair” treatment of individuals and groups would ensure social progress and tranquility (Thoenes 1966).

With the passage of time, however, the greater non-elite harmony and elite complacency that appeared to be principal political effects of postindustrial conditions diminished. Increased crime, narcotics use, and other deteriorating social conditions became apparent in many cities; a seemingly intractable form of poverty spread in urban slums and rural backwaters; immigration was creating large and culturally distinct communities whose assimilation and future political allegiance could not be taken for granted; and many young people with essentially privileged family backgrounds displayed considerable alienation and discontent. These trends suggested that postindustrial conditions could be more difficult politically than they first seemed.

Postindustrial conditions are in important respects the terminus of socioeconomic development. They complete the conversion of workforces that consisted overwhelmingly of

peasants and artisans at development's outset into workforces pervaded by bureaucratic and service personnel. It is quite unlikely that some further stage of development, conceived in terms of new basic kinds of work and new workforce components, lies beyond the postindustrial stage. If this is so, it must be asked whether postindustrial societies can, over the longer haul, remain viable politically without the sense of progress and spread of hope that development engendered historically. Crudely put, can postindustrial societies "stagnate" indefinitely in their non-elite configuration without suffering major political upheavals?

One concern is the increased empathy between elites and non-elites that occurs in postindustrial conditions. The preponderance of bureaucratic and service work intermingles previously distinct social strata. Persons more frequently and routinely ascend to elite positions from non-elite origins and locations than happens in more rigidly stratified societies at earlier development levels (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007). As a consequence, not a few persons holding elite positions in postindustrial conditions see themselves as one of a kind with non-elites, among whom they frequently have intimate personal associates and for whom they have considerable empathy. These close and empathetic ties to non-elites help ensure that elite persons are better able to determine measures that at least partially assuage non-elite discontents and aspirations. But what may happen if it is not possible to assuage non-elites? Presumably, actions and measures ranging from deception to discouragement to outright repression will be more reviled by non-elites and more anguishing for elites to take.

A still wider difficulty confronts elites in postindustrial conditions. In all earlier stages of socioeconomic development, political action was not generally required to keep most persons steadily engaged in the performance of necessary work. For the most part, internalized attitudes and customary social controls supplied by families, neighbors, and work mates sufficed. In postindustrial conditions, however, such close social controls, along with most religious and other traditional belief systems, attenuate greatly. In earlier stages of socioeconomic development, moreover, most persons worked diligently in order to stave off dreadful personal circumstances – dismissal, eviction, hunger, etc. – and a significant proportion worked ceaselessly, because they could plausibly believe that by doing so their strong personal ambitions would be realized. In these earlier societies, only a small number of specially favored persons – mainly the offspring or friends of the rich and powerful – were unmotivated to work in disciplined ways and were inclined toward a self-indulgent, if perhaps esthetically satisfying, leisure.

It is easy to see that the proportion of people who are unmotivated for steady work increases markedly in materially affluent and empathetically indulgent postindustrial conditions. It is useless to ignore this by holding that modern technology greatly reduces the need for human labor. Responsible work is not readily parceled out in little pieces in any society. Some tasks must still – and presumably must always – be performed with care, diligence, and forethought, and those who perform them will not allow a large body of essentially idle people, however decorative they may be, to receive substantial rewards for their idleness. This disjunction between the diligent and the idle signals a growing clash between segments of non-elite populations in postindustrial societies, although it is uncertain if this clash will have a magnitude that consensually united elites are unable to manage.

ELITE THEORY'S LIMITS

Elite theory's predictive pretensions are necessarily modest. Elite behavior cannot be inferred, let alone projected, from knowledge of non-elite configurations and propensities. For instance,

neither the creation nor persistence of a consensually or an ideologically united elite is discernibly linked with non-elite propensities. The probability of a united elite of either type forming and creating stable political institutions can only be guessed at from knowledge of recent elite history. Does this history – like that of English elites in the 1640s and later – display long and costly, but essentially inconclusive warfare between disunited elite factions who may, in consequence, be disposed toward a basic settlement of their disputes? Have elites – like those clustered around Russia’s tsar during World War I – suffered a defeat so grave that the way may be open for a well-organized but previously peripheral group to seize and consolidate power in revolutionary circumstances? The difficulty is not merely that elite behavior is poorly understood; it always contains enough arbitrariness, capriciousness, and contingency to defy deterministic explanation. Thus, while societies have displayed similar non-elite configurations during socioeconomic development, no such regularities in the behaviors and configurations of their elites can be identified. Any theory that recognizes this disjunction between elites and non-elites must allow considerable leeway for political accidents and unpredictable elite choices, so that its explicative claims must be quite modest.

It must also be recognized that elite theory is distasteful to many because it rules out the more ideal aims and outcomes that are regularly voiced by intellectuals, mass movement leaders, and even loosely predicted by social scientists. Elite theory has no place for idealized visions of democracy or social revolution, nor does it have a place for the spread of new values that dispose human beings toward a consistent and thorough altruism. Human conflicts inevitably dilute social cohesion and constitute political problems that elites must manage as best they can. However well or poorly they accomplish this task, elites are the central actors in politics, but the theory that centers on them is unlikely to have many enthusiastic adherents.

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CHAPTER 10

Conflict Theory

A. OBERSCHALL

This essay covers three broad topics. First, there has been renewed debate about human nature and the roots of intergroup violence and warfare in evolutionary biology, in psychology, and in anthropology. The “ordinary man” hypothesis explains why and how humans justify and participate in violence and atrocities. Second, in addition to interstate wars, political scientists have been studying insurgencies, ethnic cleansing, civil wars, genocide, ethnic riots, and other modes of violence called “new wars.” Based on hundreds of case studies, comparative research and large quantitative data sets, they have theorized about the root causes and dynamics of these conflicts, and about prevention, deterrence, conflict management, and peace making. Third, the social movement and collective action field in sociology developed a mobilization theory for explaining why and how relatively powerless groups confront regimes, how the dynamics of confrontations escalate to civil strife, what outcomes result, and whether violence was necessary for change. All three research traditions contribute insights and findings for conflict theory. In the conclusion, I argue that a theory of conflict should integrate group with state/regime centered analysis (micro with the macro), give more weight to dynamics than to root causes, and make conflict management an equal partner with violent conflict.

HUMAN NATURE AND WARFARE

The psychologist Robert Hinde writes that (1997) “Certain behavioral propensities, including the capacity for aggression, are common to virtually all humans. This does not mean that they are genetically determined ... humans have a capacity to be both aggressive and altruistic ... the behavior shown depends on a host of developmental, experiential, social and circumstantial factors.” Although sociobiologists assume that genes exist for specific behavioral dispositions, like “self-sacrificial bravery in warfare” (Tiger and Fox 1971), no such genes have been identified, and behavior in warfare and group conflict situations has been explained in other terms. For example, Jews in Nazi Europe put up little resistance to the Holocaust. Were they genetically lacking in self-sacrificial bravery in warfare? The Jews who emigrated to Palestine belonged to the same gene pool, yet fought aggressively and successfully for the creation and defense of the state of Israel in 1946–1948 and in subsequent wars. Helen Fein (1979) has explained the lack of resistance during the Holocaust with a gradual entrapment model of the Jews by the Nazis. It started with the legal definition of Jew, followed by stigmatization,

stripping of citizenship and property, segregation from nonJews, isolation in ghettos, and ending in labor and extermination camps. These differences in the behavior of Jews cannot be explained by sociobiology.

Controversy on the biological versus cultural dimensions of human nature compares primate social organization and behavior with those of preliterate, low technology human communities (Rodseth et al. 1991). Compared to primate mating, humans have marriage and kinship. In human bands, there is a relative absence of male dominance and hierarchy, and more equality among adult males on resource sharing, sex, and leadership. Systematic violence between closed social groups is rare. Avoidance is the dominant mode of conflict management among simple foragers. In summary, according to Bruce Knauft et al. (1991), "Simple human societies constitute a major anomaly for models which propose evolutionary similarity between great apes and prestate human patterns of violence."

There are differences among archeologists and anthropologists on human warfare in prehistory (Keeley 1996). According to Ferguson (2006 pp.495–6), analyses of human skeletons for signs of lethal wounds, and studies of human settlements for indicators of warfare, such as fortifications and defensive walls and specialized weapons, find no firm evidence of war for thousands of years during Paleolithic times: "There are numerous regions in the world where good archeological data are available for centuries or even millennia before any suggestion of war appears...Although episodes of war are possible any time in human prehistory, there is no convincing evidence of collective intergroup violence any time before 10,000 years ago... and in many parts of the world much more recently than that." How did relatively peaceful hunters and gatherers in the distant past turn into war-prone societies of recent centuries? One cause was in the shift from nomadic to sedentary life, where people had an interest in defending their land, food stores, and fishing sites. Avoidance was not possible and an aggressor had an opportunity to gain from warfare (Cohen 1984). Other conditions were the emergence of social ranking, increased population and resource degradation, state formation, and the spread of war from states to nonstate people.

Warfare became institutionalized and diffused when those who were attacked or threatened took defensive measures and developed their own institutions for war. Once institutionalized, the primary motivation of soldiers stemmed "from duty associated with the role occupied in the institution of war" (Hinde 1997) and not from aggressiveness. The performance of the groups, organizations and social units that make up a complex institution rest on the authority of command, the responsibility to obey orders, cooperation and bonding among peers, an esprit the corps that sharpens the insider-outsider boundary, loyalty to the organization, covering up mistakes and crimes, and ostracism for whistleblowers. Within society, there are collective beliefs and myths justifying the mission and actions of the institution (patriotism, security, defense, law and order, etc) and its claims on societal values and resources.

The literature on collective violence, on mass killings, on genocide and on terrorism show that they cannot be blamed on blood thirsty, sadistic, psychopathic perpetrators nor on some dark streak in human nature. The evidence supports the "ordinary man" notion expressed by Browning (1992), Atran (2003), Staub (1989), and Mann (2005, p.5) that "under particular circumstances most people have the capacity for extreme violence and destruction of human life," and "ordinary people are brought by normal social structures into committing murderous ethic cleansing."

What of atrocities, savagery, and extreme cruelty in some collective violence? For cultural materialists and ecological determinists, like Marvin Harris, the Aztecs' annual fifteen thousand human sacrifices by tearing out their hearts while still alive and ritual cannibalism were a side-effect of the competition for resources in extreme scarcity. Harris (1980, pp. 332–340)

argued that the Aztecs suffered from a “uniquely severe deprivation of animal protein” and that the ruling class rewarded soldiers in war with the flesh of their captives after ritual sacrifices to their gods instead of keeping them as slaves.

Harris’ protein deficiency hypothesis has been challenged on factual grounds by Ortiz de Montellano (1978), and there are better cultural explanations. Robert Edgerton writes (2000, p.131): “Humans ...are capable of empathy, kindness, even love and they can achieve astounding mastery of the challenges posed by their environment. But they are also capable of maintaining beliefs and values and social institutions that result in senseless cruelty, needless suffering, and monumental folly in their relations among themselves, as well as with other societies...” Aztecs believed that the gods give fertility to humans only if they are nourished by human beings. With human sacrifice, the Aztecs expected to tip the battle of supernatural forces between evil and good in their favor. The major reason for war was to capture enemy soldiers for ritual sacrifice.

Harris’ materialism does not accept mass murder on a grand scale in the pursuit of an ideology, as was true of the Cambodian genocide under the Pol Pot regime (Kiernan 1996) and in other instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing. In the cultural view, mass murder of civilians and extreme cruelty is justified in some belief systems that label victims as a dangerous threat to group survival, demands total conformity and loyalty in a crisis, glorifies criminal and cruel behaviors against victims as heroic and necessary, and lifts normal restraints against excesses. The core of an explanation becomes how a regime with such beliefs gains power and manages to get the majority of people to comply with its lethal actions. The psychology and anthropology of warfare find that many of the same qualities and relationships that make ordinary men cooperative and their leaders capable of organizing peaceful group activity – conformity to authority and peer groups, solidarity and self-sacrifice when the group is threatened, identification with group members – are the same motivations, qualities and relationships that under other circumstances organize ethnic conflict and war, and account for their excesses.

NEW WARS, CIVIL WARS, ETHNO-POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Since World War Two armed conflicts within states increased, and they surged after the end of the cold war when many expected a “peace dividend.” (Hewitt et al. 2008). Unlike wars between states, these “new wars” (Kaldor 2001, Balancie and Grange 2005) are undertaken by organized armed groups against their governments or other groups with guerrilla tactics, bombings, hostage taking, and population expulsion. The combatant –non combatant distinction in the laws of war becomes blurred; the number of civilian casualties and displaced persons from the fighting is enormous; the combatants want compliance or expulsion of the population rather than territory.

Violent large scale conflicts are many and varied. In the first decades after WW II, some movements against colonial domination (Vietnam, Algeria, Kenya, Palestine, Cyprus, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique) turned violent. Elsewhere, the aftermath of independence set off violent rivalry for control of the state or for secession of a region (Uganda, Congo, Nigeria, Malaya, Angola, Mozambique). Ethnic, national and religious self-determination movements sprouted everywhere, including Western Europe (Basque, Northern Ireland, Balkans), Asia (Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, Sri Lanka) and North America (Quebec). There were rebellions against oppressive regimes (e.g. in Eastern Europe, in Central America, China in 1989, Nepal, Iran). Authoritarian regimes turned against their own people in genocides and mass purges (Cambodia and Rwanda genocides, Kosovo, East Timor, China’s Cultural Revolution).

No single theoretic framework can be expected to encompass all these conflicts. About some, such as the Rwanda genocide, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Northern Ireland conflict, to name but three, dozens of books have been written and hundreds of articles in both scholarly and popular journals. Government agencies, think tanks and INGOs such as the International Crisis Group (www.icg.org) monitor and update these conflicts on a continuous basis. There are encyclopedic compilations and analyses on recent civil wars and ethnic conflicts (Rudolph 2003; Balancie and Grange 2005), and in depth monographs on particular countries (Olzak 1994; Beissinger 2002) testing theories of ethnic conflict. Because states are the actors in world affairs, when substate identities and loyalties undermine the legitimacy and stability of states and insurgencies spill over from weak states to neighbors, international conflict management of the state system is at risk. Foremost among these destabilizing substate entities are ethno-political, ethno-national and ethno-religious movements (referred to simply as “ethnic” in this essay).

Five theories about new wars have been formulated. They are not mutually exclusive. All assume that in the post World War Two era of anticolonial, self determination and human rights discourse, ethno-national groups enjoy legitimacy for pressing claims to cultural and territorial autonomy and group rights, and that these claims inevitably clash with the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty in international relations. These theories also recognize that under some not infrequent conditions – demographic shifts, weak state institutions, threat of external attack, disintegration of multinational states, a domino effect of self-determination claims – conflict management between regimes, minorities, and other adversaries is vulnerable to breakdown and at high risk of armed conflict.

Ancient Hatreds (AH) assumes ethnic group membership, boundaries and identities are rigid, long-standing, and primordial – they resist assimilation and erosion from education, secularization and modernization (Kaplan 1994). Contentious issues and grievances are endemic in ethnic group relations because they are burdened with culturally transmitted memory of past violent conflicts, myths, fears and hostile emotions. Even after long periods of accommodation and ethnic peace, ethnic incidents can rapidly escalate to destructive violence. The theory is pessimistic about preventing, stopping and managing these conflicts through policies and reforms. Secession, territorial separation, and separate institutions are more likely to make for ethnic peace (Kaufmann 1996).

Identity Politics (IP), also known as *Symbolic Politics* (Huntington 1997; Kaufman 2001) holds that in multiethnic societies, the root cause of ethnic conflict is a threatened change in the prevailing ethnic hierarchy of dominance and subordination. Skeptical of primordial ethnic identities, IP holds that social construction of group identities is explained by the social psychology of intergroup relations. There is a cultural tendency toward ethnocentrism and group self defense that is evolutionarily favored, i.e. it is a normal, not a pathological aspect of group relations. Leaders create national and ethnic identities with powerful symbols and myths that have emotional appeal. Violence breaks out during ethnic rivalry over control of territory and governance amid exaggerated fears of extinction. Unless ethnic relations are properly managed, divisive ethnic myths, symbols, stereotypes, suspicions, and fears resonate in the population and get activated in ethnic cleansing, massacres, and atrocities.

Social psychological theory about social identity and intergroup conflict (Tajfel 1979) supports Identity Politics. Experiments find that in-group preference (ethnocentrism) derives from social categorization as such, even without competition, hostility or rejection of other groups. Self esteem, social identity, and ethnocentrism are validated in social interactions with like-minded persons. When group membership becomes salient in conflict, social boundaries sharpen, individual relations across groups become depersonalized and stereotyped, and

intergroup behavior becomes more aggressive and competitive than interpersonal behavior (Hewstone and Cairns 2001). Competitive and provocative public display of group identity symbols sets off rioting and violence as social tensions rise. To lower competition and uncertainty in ethnic relations, Identity Politics favors language and cultural autonomy, power sharing, diminishing the salience of ethnic identities and boundaries, and promoting a shared identity.

Manipulative Elites (ME) assumes fragility in ethnic group relations and social construction of identities, as Identity Politics does (Gagnon 1994/95), but highlights top-down more than bottom-up mobilization. Elites contend for power by manipulating social divisions and blowing them out of proportion with threat, fear and hate discourse and propaganda, and with no-compromise, aggressive, crisis politics. ME is an opportunity centered conflict theory in as much as elites create opportunities with issues and crises to advance their interests and goals. Conciliation is difficult when rival leaders demonize their adversaries as opponents who can never be trusted and must therefore be defeated, dominated or ethnically cleansed. Pressure and sanctions by external states and international agencies on ethno-national leaders for conciliation should be applied.

Economic Roots (ER) (Collier et al. 2003) locates root causes in a failed economy and a weak state, typically a poor country with an unequal distribution of incomes run by an authoritarian regime. War lords and violence entrepreneurs organize unemployed youths into armed groups. They may initially be motivated by political goals, but over time they tend to resort to criminal activities for financing rebellion, which becomes entrenched as a way of life. Facilitators of rebellion are mountains and rainforests and a weak and corrupt government. The greatest prize to combatants comes from appropriating revenues from diamonds, petroleum, timber and other export commodities, which finance the civil war and stimulate demands for secession. Once started, armed fighting has a tremendous momentum based on positive feedback that the authors refer to as the “conflict trap”: “the best predictor of whether a country will be in a civil war next year is whether it is at civil war now” (Collier et al. 2003, p.79). ER holds that ethnic divisions have been over rated as root causes of civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003); they occur in underdeveloped countries with weak governments that also happen to be ethnically divided.

ER builds on a decade of work on the economics of new wars and the “greed and grievance” research (Jean and Ruffin 1996) which emphasize greed and opportunity on the supply side of conflict over grievance on the demand side. For ER, violence has to be contained, anarchy (war lord and criminal mafia rule) prevented, and security for life and property provided before peace and reconstruction can take root. In conclusion, the World Bank authors write (Collier 2003, p.53): “The key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development...in the absence of economic development, neither good political institutions nor ethnic and religious homogeneity ...provide significant defense against large scale violence.”

Contention for Power (CFP) associated with Tilly and his coauthors and associates (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 2003; Tilly 2005; Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Tarrow 1998) does not claim to be a comprehensive theory of large scale collective violence. CFP develops tools for answering some fundamental questions about group relations (Tilly 2003, pp. 24, 225) e.g. “how and why do people who interact without doing outright damage to each other shift rapidly into collective violence, and then ...back into peaceful relations?” The core idea is contentious politics, i.e. a collective political claim that impacts on the interests of rivals and adversaries. Groups excluded from the polity, the challengers, contend for power, equality, dignity, religious freedom, workers’ rights, and oppose corruption, exclusion, unfair taxation,

and oppressive government. For claim making, the challengers seize opportunities and exploit weaknesses in the regime and other adversaries. Most of the episodes of contention analyzed are from Western Europe and the United States.

Tilly (2003) refers to large collective violence as “coordinated destruction.” These conflicts (p.224) “arise from tyrannies large and small that flourish in low capacity undemocratic regimes”. In *Contention For Power*, issues, ideologies, and agents take the backseat to “relational explanations” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p.215) like “brokerage,” which is “new connections between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites,” and “boundary shift,” which is “changes in the persons and identities on one side or another of an existing boundary.” These changes in social relations explain the modes of collective violence (violent rituals, brawls, coordinated destruction, etc). Tilly writes (2003, p.20): “When examining different types of violence and regimes in which they occur we will pay some attention to variations in ideas but mainly seek explanations elsewhere...Motives, incentives, opportunities and controls receive more attention than ideas ...but still do not constitute the nubs of explanations...we will focus our attention on interpersonal processes that promote, inhibit, or channel collective violence and connect it with nonviolent politics.”

The theories discussed can be faulted for neglecting a dynamic view of conflict. In the dynamic view, whatever the original causes, issues change, the cast of players and adversaries changes, the strategies of confrontation change, the conflict management capability of the polity changes, as the conflict ranges from conventional politics to armed fighting and eventually to negotiations and peace making or to repression (Posen 1993; Olzak 2006; Oberschall 2007). Because of these changes, Kaufmann observes that (1996, p.137) “Solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes...restoring civil politics in multiethnic states shattered by war is not possible because the war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation.” Whether or not AH are a root cause, whether or not manipulative leaders instigate conflict, whether or not poverty and a failed state are causes, whether or not divisive myths, symbols and identities fuel violence, protracted violent conflict generates hatred, manipulative extremist leaders gain power, the economic and political underpinnings for stable life are destroyed, identity politics flowers at the expense of shared identities, and conflict management weakens.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES

For some conflict analysts, mobilization capacity and opportunity for collective action are at the core of explanation for civil war and collective violence, in particular the territorial concentration and mixing of majorities and minorities (Kaufmann 1996). John Coakley and associates (2003) explore the consequences of territorial location and mixing of ethnic minorities for ethnic tensions and minority demands for cultural rights, political recognition, power sharing, and more radical demands for autonomy and secession. Monica Toft’s (2002/2003) study of minority settlement patterns finds that for ethnic groups in territories where they are a concentrated majority, the chances of rebellion and civil war are the highest because they have both the capability for mobilizing and the legitimacy for demanding independence.

Michael Mann (2005) researched ethnic cleansing, mass purges in totalitarian regimes, and genocide. His theory highlights ideas and ideologies, agents, relationships, opportunity and the dynamics of mobilization. The pivotal issue in extreme collective violence is the political power relations of rival ethnic and national groups when adversaries both lay claim to their own state over all or part of the same territory. An alliance of radical elites heading party-states, armed formations, and a supportive ethnic constituency triggers violent ethnic

conflict in reaction to perceived threats and fears to its privileged position. Mann writes that (2005, p.6 and p.23) “Murderous cleansing is rarely the initial intent of the perpetrators” and occurs in “governments continuing to exercise some degree of control.” It is that conjunction of top-down and bottom-up mobilization that provides capacity for murderous mass killings and ethnic cleansing.

Benjamin Valentino (2004), Norman Naimark (2001), and Chirot and McCauley (2006) also research mass violence. For Valentino as for Mann, mass killings are undertaken as a last resort by political and military leaders who want to suppress an insurgency or other real and imagined threats, or implement a radical or racist state policy (e.g. achieve a homogeneous nation-state purged of other peoples), when other means of dealing with these threats and adversaries are unsuccessful. On mobilization of the adversaries, Valentino puts the emphasis on top down leaders, cadres and activists who perpetrate most of the killings, as in *Manipulative Elites*. The majority of citizens become complicit bystanders due to regime propaganda. For Chirot and McCauley as well, core variables are racist and extreme nationalist ideologies advocated by leaders who manipulate perceived threats, fears and hostility against victims and who persuade “ordinary people” to become complicit in mass political murders. Naimark finds that regime leaders label minorities as disloyal to the homeland and a threat to very existence of the state before attacking them. Peacetime justice and accountability are replaced by crisis social control which lifts inhibitions against aggression and law violation in group relations.

Some conflict theorists analyze microdynamics, i.e. ethnic riots or collective reprisals and revenge killings during insurgencies, rather than an entire civil war, insurgency, or ethnic cleansing. For Kalyvas (2006), in the Greek civil war, loyalties, partisanship, revenge killings, torture of suspected collaborators, and collective reprisals result from coercive control of local territory and people to obtain information that is the key to success in insurgency and counterinsurgency. Horowitz (2001) researched deadly ethnic riots around the world, “the most common form of collective violence in the twentieth century” responsible for many deaths, much property damage and the displacement of populations. As in *Identity Politics*, the root cause is an alteration of the prevailing ethnic hierarchy of dominance and subordination or claim making by subordinate groups which create uncertainty in group relations. Past history of conflicts, animosity, and lack of trust trigger fears, threats, and hostile encounters. Public events that display group symbols will be perceived as a challenge to the status quo – be it a funeral, an election rally, a religious procession. A small incident, like insults and rock throwing, can escalate into full scale ethnic rioting. Although Horowitz’s confrontation dynamic puts the accent on grassroots animosities (2001, p.194, p.230): “target choice ...the group selected to receive violence are those that are disliked, feared or felt to be threatening...” he also finds that “the organization of the most serious deadly riots emanate from political parties, paramilitaries, extremist organizations, and secret societies, some or all of which are linked.”

Conflict theories find that “regimes that embark upon democratization in a multiethnic, populist, nationalist environment are more at risk of mass violence against minorities than stable autocracies” (Mann 2005, p.4). For Jack Snyder as well (2001, p.318) “...only thickly embedded liberal polities are well insulated from the risk of developing belligerent, reckless forms of nationalism in the course of democratization.” Quantitative studies also find that “partial democracies,” “low income democracies” and “anocracies” (a mixture of autocracy and democracy) are more politically unstable and at higher risk of civil war than stable democracies and autocracies (Collier et al. 2003, pp. 64–65; Hewitt et al 2008, p.13; Fearon and Laitin 2003, pp. 81, 84–85).

External resource support and public opinion for insurgency and civil war is important. Economic Roots and Manipulative Elites recognize that violence entrepreneurs and insurgents manipulate international public opinion, humanitarian NGOs, governments and scholars with a grievance and victimization discourse in order to justify their violent actions and to obtain support. Not infrequently they succeed in creating transnational support organizations and an international conscience constituency that state leaders cannot ignore when they consider sanctions and other conflict management measures (Olzak 2006). Much external third party intervention is for increasing the fighting capability of adversaries and increases the duration of civil war (Hironaka 2005).

Prevention, deterrence, and conflict management are major topics in conflict theory (Crocker et al 2001; Darby and Mac Ginty 2000; Wallenstein 2002). External intervention against sovereign states that turn on their people with lethal force raises fundamental issues about just wars, humanitarian intervention, an international legitimating mechanism for sanctions and military intervention, and effective delivery of military and other assistance to the victims (Walzer 1997). Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) measure success in peace building with cessation of violence and other measures of reconstruction. They find that hostility (proxied by civil war casualties) is negatively related to success, state capacity is positively related, and UN peace operations have a positive peace building impact, although the UN has intervened in only 27 of 121 civil wars, and most end with unilateral military victory and amidst failures in peace attempts.

International assistance to adversaries during peace negotiations and for providing security after a peace settlement are indispensable, e.g. security guarantees for combatants to turn in their weapons (Walter 1997), “cutting the rebel financial jugular” (Collier et al. 2003 pp. 141–143), and containing spoiler and criminal violence (Darby 2006). Virginia Gamba writes that (2006, p.55–56): “Ultimately conflict and peace are interrelated. Nowhere is this more evident than in the complex environment of demobilization, disarmament and reconstruction...in the grey period between war and peace lies the roots of a successful transition or the making of a failed state.” Peace building research once again highlights the importance of strong capacity for governance and conflict management in conflict theory.

A central topic in international relations and security studies is how to manage an international order of some two hundred states many of which are unstable and vulnerable to internal civil strife, and whose ethnic wars and insurgencies spill across frontiers to destabilize other states (Huntington 1997; Kaldor 2001, chapter7).

Peace building entails external assistance with peace operations; forging a vigorous civil society and economic institutions that cut across ethnic divisions; the social construction of identities that are shared; collective goods attainment that is in the interest of all groups; political institutions of power sharing, federalism, cultural autonomy (Sisk 1996); policies against discrimination and for inclusion; diplomatic pressures and sanctions against regimes that oppress minorities, and a lot of international reconstruction help that spans economic aid and reforms to build a justice system and local government institutions (Noel 2005; Oberschall 2007, chapter 7).

QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Several data sets have been assembled for the quantitative study of large scale violent conflicts. The original “correlates of war” (COW) organized by Singer and Small at the University of Michigan tracked both international and civil wars starting from the early nineteenth century

(www.icpsr.umich.edu). The International Peace Research Institute in Oslo and Uppsala University created the Armed Conflict Data Project (ACDP) which monitors and updates interstate conflicts, civil wars and state formation conflicts in addition to interstate wars (www.prio.no). The State Failure Task Force at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CICDM) at the University of Maryland tracks genocides and politicides, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and adverse regime changes. These data sets have information on many violence variables (casualties, duration of conflict), the adversaries (size, composition), the society and state in which they take place, conflict events and dynamics, and outcomes. To be included in the data set, there are minimum casualty requirements – e.g. one thousand accumulated combat deaths, one hundred per year, at least one hundred for both adversaries, etc. although ACDP has lower thresholds for “minor armed conflicts.” Researchers supplement the available data sets with information on explanatory variables from demographic, economic, political, human rights and other sources.

Minorities At Risk (MAR) started by Ted Robert Gurr at CICDM (www.cicdm.umd.edu/inscr/mar), tracks 285 ethnic, racial and religious minorities that are politically active in defense or promotion of their interests in states with over half a million population. MAR collects huge amounts of data on these groups, states, and the conflicts they engage in (Gurr 1993; Marshall and Gurr 2003). It distinguishes indigenous peoples, ethno-nationalities, ethnoclasses (often immigrant groups), communal contenders and militant sects. It provides analytic summaries of group histories and has information on communal riots, massacres, and terrorist attacks. Because the high threshold for civil war and insurgency casualties excludes some high profile conflicts – e.g. during most of the Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinians conflict, the annual threshold of one hundred deaths is not met – some researchers add them to their data.

The quantitative data sets for violent conflict are not without problems. Except for MAR, they select cases on the dependent variable (magnitude of casualties), which means that successful containment and conflict management that avoids escalation to the threshold level cannot be studied. There are severe measurement problems on important explanatory variables for comparing “roots of conflict” explanations such as Economic Roots against Identity Politics. The “religious factionalism” index (RFI) in Collier et al. (2003) omits divisions between “Orthodox” Christians and others, between Sunni and Shia within Islam, and between secularists entrenched in military regimes and fundamentalist who seek to overthrow them. Problems also exist for measures of “ethno-linguistic factionalism” which overlook territorial concentration and mix, and for “state capacity” which equates low income per capita with a weak state. Rwanda is a low income state, but its regime mobilized hundreds of thousands down to the village level for mass murder.

Civil wars are found in the low income states, a zone of turmoil in the African continent and a broad swath from the Balkans through the Middle East and Central Asia to India and Indonesia, with some small patches in Central America (Gleditsch et al 2002; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008). MAR found that of 285 politically active religious and ethnic minorities, 148 pursued some self-determination goals, of which 70 at some time waged an armed conflict, that is 25% of all active groups (Quinn and Gurr 2003). Comparing those who pursue self determination and autonomy by politics alone with those who engage in coercion, armed fighting is associated with a past history of fighting, repression, deprivation of political and civil rights, or similar current grievances. Important facilitating variables for both adversaries are external military support and assistance from foreign governments. The longer these movements last, the more difficult it is to contain and to settle them, which is confirmed by Collier et al (2003). The average duration of civil wars studied by Collier was

7 years; any such number depends on how cessation of hostilities is defined, and whether restart of fighting by the same adversaries after a lull is counted as the same or as a new civil war or insurgency.

On the controversy between Economic Roots and Identity Politics, David Laitin (2007) argues that when compared with the large number of possible ethnic conflicts in African states, very few actually happen. His methodology is however arbitrary: he counts civil wars as one event, although many of them are a series of ethnic armed conflicts and massacres between a changing and large cast of ethnic groups. The World Bank (Collier et al. 2003, p.59) findings on ethno-national and religious divisions as root causes of civil war are mostly negative, as are the findings of Fearon and Laitin (2003), but both use questionable measurement for ethno-national and religious factionalism. Also, instead of ethnic balance of power and threats to stratification, they focus on ethnic heterogeneity (i.e. variance in group size). Their findings are contradicted in other quantitative research. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found that 64% of 124 civil wars are ethnic or religious. Fearon himself (2003 p.15) classifies 55% of civil wars as “ethnic” and another 17% as having an ethnic component; he also finds that these last longer than other civil wars. Other studies show these wars are less likely to be settled by negotiations rather than unilateral military victory and that their peace settlements are more likely to break down. After a comprehensive review Sambanis writes that (2004 p.848) “...there is a very strong relationship between ethnic heterogeneity (in a state) and an aggregate indicator of armed conflict, and much less with civil war.”

How to explain these apparent contradictions? The World Bank/Collier team and Fearon and Laitin both find that at all levels of ethnic diversity in a state, the incidence of civil war declines with rising levels of prosperity and measures of state capacity for delivering law and order. In low income states with low social control and conflict management capacity, ethnic conflict tends to escalate into civil wars whereas in high income strong states, they are contained at a low level of casualties and hence are not included in the “civil war” data sets of Collier and Fearon and Laitin. As terrible as these conflicts are in South Africa, Northern Ireland, the Basque region, the population goes to work, children go to school, people shop, transportation operates, although daily routines are episodically disrupted by fighting in particular locations. Unlike Darfur, hundreds of thousands of people do not become displaced and don’t end up in camps; unlike Colombia and Sri Lanka, entire provinces are not controlled by insurgents. Ethnic conflicts do occur in strong, high income states, but they are contained and managed at a lower level of violence than in low income, low capacity states. This explanation is supported by a study of civil wars from 1816 to 1997 (1000 or more annual deaths) which found that they are due to the weakness of states as measured by economic and military capabilities and public goods delivery rather than the strength of ethnic groups (Hironaka 2005).

A dynamic conflict theory explains some paradoxical findings. State capacity, manipulative elites, grievances and hatreds, and standard of life do not remain constant for the duration of the conflict, but change endogenously during conflict dynamics. Confrontations with its own people can change a regime from high to low capacity by eroding its legitimacy. The East German communist regime had a high capacity for surveillance and control of its people, yet it melted away facing unarmed, peaceful, democracy demonstrators in 1989. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was a strong middle income state. As communist organizations became discredited and nationalist parties and groups filled the institutional vacuum, it became a weak state. Local authority in mixed ethnic districts was usurped by armed ethnic crisis committees; many soldiers and officers deserted the armed forces;

the police became partisan; citizens armed; manipulative ethno-national leaders beat moderates in elections; ethnic threats, hate speech and fears flooded the mass media; and shortly organized ethnic civil war erupted, which destroyed the economy.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Despite some “paradigm wars” (Goodwin and Jasper 2004), a theory of conflict has coalesced in the past 30 years in social movement and collective action research in sociology. Ethnic movements and conflict is but one of many social divisions studied. Others are based on social class and inequality, youth, gender, religion, culture, and life styles, war and peace, and environment protection. The theory consists of five components: issues, framing, mobilization, confrontation and outcomes.

1. *Issues.* In a regime or government, organized groups with low cost privileged access to political institutions are members of the polity, but less privileged groups and diffuse publics are excluded (Tilly 2003; Tarrow 1998). A contentious issue between members and excluded groups might be a war necessitating taxes and drafting soldiers; self-determination or equality; compulsory schooling mandated by a modernizing state that stirs up language of instruction conflicts in a multilingual province; immigration of ethnic strangers who become competitors for jobs and services; religious and cultural issues that offend the adherents to traditional religion (e.g. on abortion, homosexuality, religious symbols banned in public places, etc.).
2. *Framing.* As dissatisfaction and discontent mount, adversaries frame the issue within rival belief systems, shared folk knowledge, and ideologies – self-determination for minority nationalities, inequality, human rights, national security, respect and dignity for one’s group. The frames resonate within a familiar culture and are communicated in the mass media and proximate social milieus to partisan publics (Gamson 1992). The organizing frames transform individual discontent into shared public grievances and call for relief through public actions. The adversaries organize around identity symbols expressed in slogans, songs, dress and hair styles, uniforms, flags, colors, and other visible markers for identity and commitment. A partisan conscience constituency emerges from an initially indifferent or uninformed bystander public and provides important resources, financial, electoral and public opinion support, to the challenger, whereas others provide it for the counter-movement (Zald and McCarthy 1987). Contentious politics has started.
3. *Mobilization.* Competitive mobilization erupts with leaders and activists formulating an agenda for change and with modes of resistance by the opposition. Because social movements advocate on behalf of large groups (women, minorities, citizens impacted by health hazards from pollution, etc.) and their goals are collective goods (legislation, reform, regime change), they are vulnerable to free riders, i.e. those who expect the benefits but do not contribute to the cost of attaining the goals (Olson 1965). Free riding is critical for the challenger because of participation costs (e.g. arrest) whereas the authorities foot the costs of protecting targets.

Obstacles have been overcome in a variety of ways (Klandermans 1997). The capacity for mobilization rests on strong communal and associational ties and solidarity within a social formation, and weak controls exercised by regime elites and state authorities (Oberschall 1973, chapter 4). Religious, ethnic and tribal communities, and patriotic, literary, veterans’ professional associations, and especially the two combined, have accounted for successful

mobilization of African nationalists against colonial rule (Zollberg 1966), the Nazi movement, the Southern civil rights movement, the New Christian Right (Oberschall 1993, chapter 13), and many others. Identity based on religion, ethnicity, ideology and issue advocacy is not vulnerable to free riding because it is earned through recognition of one's peers with participation and commitment, and cannot be acquired vicariously.

Small groups of activists bonding in close knit social milieus emerge as pace-setters and leaders and bear the highest cost for participation in long campaigns, and inspire a larger groups of part-time activists (called "transitory teams") for short and low-cost events (week-end demonstration), and an even larger sympathetic public (called a "conscience constituency") who contribute funding but are not exposed to any physical danger or risk of arrest. In other settings, activists radicalized in one movement become activists in related movements that advocate for the same or similar issues, and bring leadership skills, tactical know-how and a political culture, thus diffusing radicalism.

Adversaries keep looking for opportunities for alliances with groups both within and without the polity, internal as well as external to the country itself (Tarrow 1998). Many nongovernmental organizations (human rights, environmental) have become truly international in organization and scope (Olzak 2006). Although some maintain this is a new development due to globalization, most political and religious movements in modern times have had an international dimension – the Protestant reformation, antislavery, republicanism after the French Revolution, socialism, communism, fascism, African nationalism, and radical Islam.

A shared culture can coordinate action in large groups without prior leadership and organization, a process called tacit coordination by Schelling (1963). Tilly's (1975) and Rude's (1964) research into popular protests in modern French history established a limited collective action repertoire that ordinary people more or less spontaneously and episodically resort to, and which create a loosely structured grassroots movement that spreads to nearby localities and locations. People share a protest repertoire from a common culture and knowledge of their traditions. In a time of political tensions, without planning, huge crowds gather in historic squares in their capital on anniversaries of momentous events and chant the same slogans and display the same national symbols and demand leadership or regime change, and the process triggers similar confrontations in provincial cities and towns.

Diffusion starts when a pace-setter becomes the focal point for tacit coordination, signaling to other sites and groups expectations as to participation, protest tactics, and social control responses. Out of local collective actions more permanent leadership and organization is forged, rather than the other way around. It happened when the sit-ins against segregated facilities in the South in 1960 spread from North Carolina black colleges to other cities and when campus building occupations in the late 1960s were triggered by highly visible and publicized confrontations at prestige campuses such as Columbia. It occurred at the overthrow of Eastern European communist regimes in 1989, as it had on numerous other occasions, e.g. the revolutions of 1848 (Oberschall 1973; 1993, chapter 8; 1996; Tarrow 1998).

4. *Confrontation* is characterized by the tactics and strategic actions the adversaries use for reaching a favorable outcome. A pivotal variable of confrontation is violence because it is likely to change the issues, players, strategies and other parameters of the conflict. An election campaign, a funeral procession, a march celebrating a historic event, and other collective actions are not in themselves violent. But, when political tensions and social divisions are acute, the probability of violence at these events is increased, and can lead to polarization and further violence.

Faced with disruption, the authorities are under pressure to restore orderly routines in daily life. The authorities' response becomes a new issue: if the authorities ban marches, it is a free speech, freedom of assembly issue for the banned group; if the authorities intervene coercively, they risk being accused of police brutality. Protests to free those "unjustly" arrested and for punishing the police who "repressed" peaceful demonstrators become a new confrontation campaign. Amid rival accusations and framing of the confrontations, by-stander publics and external stakeholders become partisans, and competitive mobilization strains conflict management. In sum, collective violence leads to new issues, new players, new tactics in confrontations, with a risk of further escalation.

A variety of tactics, both conventional politics and unconventional protest, are engaged in confrontations as the challengers and their adversaries test each others' strengths and weaknesses and the public responds. McAdam's (1983) account of the Southern civil rights movement in the 1960s highlights a succession of campaigns the challengers undertook which were met by a variety of social control tactics by the Southern authorities and segregationist support groups. Some challenger tactics were calculated to focus mass media attention on brutal treatment and inequities, and shame the federal government to step in to protect black citizens when state and local government failed to do so. Counter-tactics were designed to exhaust the mobilizing capacity of the civil right forces by mass arrests and high court costs.

5. *Outcomes.* Though outcomes have been a somewhat neglected dimension of collective action, a recent overview of the topic (Giugni et al. 1998) identifies a multitude of impacts. Measures of success distinguish "acceptance" (also called "recognition") of the challenger from advantages gained (also "goal achievement") (Gamson 1990; Oberschall 1973, pp.342–3). Acceptance is usually measured by elected officials in legislatures and appointed officials in the executive and judicial branches, or some other mode of power sharing. Acceptance can be diminished by the adversary with such practices as gerrymandering of electoral districts and blocking appointments. Advantages are straightforward for the short run – specific gains on voting rights increase voter participation and translate into elected officials – but long term impacts of collective action are difficult to measure because conflict is a dynamic system and the adversaries will react to temporary setbacks. For instance, after blacks got the vote in the South, white voters massively defected to the Republican Party, restored their control of Southern politics for the most part, and enabled Republican victories in national elections.

When favorable changes in public policy and legislation occur, the social movement input is one component of a larger coalition of political groups, lobbies and supportive publics, all of which were crucial for success (Burstein 1998). There is a gap between policies, laws and implementation: what look like impressive legislative victories, as on environmental issues, can be gutted by lax enforcement and permissive regulatory practices. Implementation is much more difficult to measure than policy statements and legislation. For all these reasons, causal attribution of success is an elusive enterprise (Giugni et al. 1998).

An important debate is the extent to which disruption, including low levels of violence, are necessary for movement success. Both Gamson (1990) and Piven and Cloward (1977) find that disruption has positive effects on challenger gains, but their findings have been contested and rest on limited U.S. data. Opportunity turns out to be a pivotal variable in success: when powerful targets are vulnerable (e.g. they might be under pressure from multiple challengers), they are more likely to negotiate (acceptance) and compromise (advantages).

The "new wars" (NW) and social movement (SM) theories come at conflict from opposing directions. NW theory starts with states and regimes as its units of analysis, and descends to

ethnic groups, political organizations, and insurgents. SM theory begins with small groups, networks, crowds, leaders, activists, and ascends to ethnic groups, social movement organizations, and regimes. SM has a sophisticated theory of mobilization and confrontation for a challenger, consisting of social infrastructure, repertoires, campaigns diffusion, framing, polarization, and escalation, but views the state and regime mostly as a social control apparatus. In NW, the state and regime capacity for collective action and for conflict management is highlighted, but grassroots mobilization of state adversaries remains underanalyzed. SM views contentious politics as necessary for social change and reforms. Claim makers advocate equality, human rights, environmental protection and cultural issues which can be accommodated without risking major social turmoil. For NW, contentious politics can spin out of control, usher in protracted violent conflicts, cause major human tragedies, and spread to neighbor states.

NEW DIRECTION: CONFLICT DYNAMICS

New Wars would profit by including the microlevel mobilization and confrontation dynamics of Social Movements, and Social Movements could enrich its one dimensional conception of regime social control with New War's insights into regime actors, institutions, and strategies. Both theories would benefit from more attention to conflict dynamics rather than root causes that initiate conflict: how contentious issues and politics tips to either containment and conflict management or to destructive and escalating conflicts Political leaders and adversaries make choices. Some draw on a history of accommodation and institutions for cooperation to contain and manage conflict. Others manipulate divisions and tensions and are willing to risk collective violence when it serves their purpose. A catastrophic outcome is not inevitable. We need more knowledge of the institutions and dynamics of contention that integrates conflict, conciliation and conflict management.

Relatively stable periods when conflict is managed are upset when an adversary escalates issues to confrontation and a crisis mode. Salient issues, key players, and strategies change as the conflict changes from conventional politics to armed struggle and later to a mixture of fighting and peace making. Bystanders become active participants; moderates become extremists or are killed and driven into exile; adversaries split into rival factions and new alliances form; external players (states, NGOs, insurgents) intervene. Issues change. At the start, core issues may be stateness or autonomy, but as conflict winds on, new issues emerge: how to contain and wind down an armed conflict, security concerns about disarming and integrating combatants into civilian life, reducing the culture of violence, and building viable state institutions become prominent. Specific mechanisms that drive issues, players and strategies in conflict can be identified and studied empirically. Among these are issue accumulation, the mobilization dilemma, framing, the security dilemma, the coercion paradox, and the paradox of peace making (Oberschall 2007 chapter 1).

Issue accumulation explains the protracted character of many conflicts. New issues arise out of the violent confrontations and pile on top of the original core issues, e.g. whether the security forces used excessive violence against demonstrators and whether some protesters initiated and provoked violence. The mobilization paradox refers to the strategy of exaggerating grievances, threats, fears and stereotypes and of promoting collective myths and group solidarity, which will be countered by the adversary's propaganda, falsehood, and threats. The paradox is that success in mobilization of one's constituency makes conciliation and peace more problematic. Framing legitimizes adversarial positions and actions. It seeks to

explain how the same events and actions are perceived and experienced in opposite ways by adversaries, and what blocks mutual understanding and meaningful dialogue. The security dilemma explains how ordinary people who are not initially partisan in a conflict become adversaries when state institutions cease to protect their life and property and they commit to an adversaries for security reasons. The coercion paradox is that repression is intended to suppress opposition, but it also stimulates more of it. The paradox is that over a wide range of repression, it is hard to tell *ex ante* which effect will prevail. The paradox of peacemaking is that rejectionists (of peacemaking with the adversary) and conciliators become rival factions within each adversary, and that these internal rivalries add additional conflicts on top of the original, which results in more complex and problematic conflict management than earlier. It is hoped that research on these and additional mechanisms of conflict dynamics that have been identified in “New War” and “Social Movement” studies will in time be integrated into a robust theory of conflict dynamics.

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CHAPTER 11

When and Where Class Matters for Political Outcomes: Class and Politics in a Cross-National Perspective

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INTRODUCTION

Class conceptualization and measurement greatly influence the discovery of class effects in empirical models of political outcomes. As Wright (1997) and Sorensen (2000) demonstrate by providing convincing examples, different research questions imply different, equally legitimate definitions of class. We agree with the view that plurality and diversity of concepts of class is an essential part of discourse in social sciences, and there are no intellectual reasons to limit it. However, in each research instance, it is important to clarify the meaning of the concept of class and explain its main properties and relations with other concepts pertaining to structured social inequality.

In this chapter, we discuss both universal class schemas (particularly useful for cross-national research) as well as time/space specific class schemas (particularly useful for country-focused research). Surveying contemporary literature, we set explicit criteria for assessing the relevance of class on political outcomes. The class literature is vast, ranging from studies of class as collective action to accounts of how class membership influences individual thoughts and actions. While we are mindful that group processes are relevant for class analysis, a full survey of the class and politics literature in its entirety is not feasible for a single book chapter. Thus, we deliberately focus on the influence of class membership on political attitudes and behaviors, with individuals as the units of analysis, leaving group processes, such as collective action, for the discussion section.

Although in practice, the conceptualization and measurement differ from study to study, we opt for such a theoretical approach that proved to be particularly useful in detecting the

consequences of the location of individuals in the social structure. This approach also allows us to demonstrate links between social class and social movements.

In his fundamental study, Ossowski (1963) argues that social classes are frequently defined by complex criteria that blur their hierarchical location in the social structure. In our view, ownership of the means of production, the share in political power, control over production and distribution of goods, control of the labor power, and skills relevant to the labor market provide the basis for distinguishing social classes. According to these criteria, social classes constitute entities that are only *partially* ordered by their definitional criteria. For example, in the control over labor power, managers are obviously higher than office workers and technicians; however, it is less clear what managers' positions are in comparison to those of business owners or the self-employed or even members of professional groups. Business owners are at the top according to the "ownership of the means of production" criterion, but how they compare with professionals on the "skill" dimension depends on many specific factors. The placement of farmers and factory workers on one dimension could be different than on other class-defining dimensions. Therefore, social class should be treated as a *nominal* rather than *ordinal* variable.

We find it useful to distinguish between social class and social stratification, although these concepts are frequently confused in the literature. Assuming that social class should be treated as nominal rather than ordinal variable, we note that social stratification position – usually indicated by a combination of formal education, occupational status, and earned income – implies social hierarchy. Of course, members of diverse social classes differ with respect to the level of their education, social standing of their jobs, or the amount of their income. In this sense, education, occupational status, and income are the *secondary characteristics* of social class. Under this understanding, we can legitimately ask about the hierarchy of social classes according to the external criteria of the extent of participation of their members in the pool of unequally distributed goods. Thus, we pose the question of "how social classes are stratified" as an empirical one. We believe that this is a more useful approach than declaring a priori the hierarchy of classes by naming them "upper class," "middle class," or "lower class."

We agree with classic and contemporary scholarships that class relations shape class outcomes. Class interactions, whether at the group or individual level, influence the political attitudes, behaviors, and fortunes of individual class members. We do not take sides in the debate over the nature of the interactions – whether these interactions are characterized by exploitation, some other dominance/subordination process, or even contractual relations (e.g. Wright 2002; Goldthorpe 2000). Rather, we argue simply that the link between class and politics is rooted in conflicts over distribution of scarce and valued resources. Such conflicts are found in a variety of situations, ranging from conventional political debates to violent protests and social revolutions.

We rely on theoretical premises of sociological discussions concerning the class structure of contemporary societies since at least the mid-twentieth century (e.g., Giddens 1973 and Hamilton 1972). According to these premises, in the course of macrosocial changes, some class indicators are of universal nature and apply equally well to a diverse set of countries, while others increase or decrease in their importance for particular time and space; they are country-specific. We begin with providing examples of universal class schemas used for a variety of industrial and postindustrial countries of the Western world. Then we give some examples of analysis in which social class is contextualized within particular historical circumstances. These examples pertain to the communist and postcommunist European societies.

CLASS SCHEMAS IN CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Economic classes, usually considered in cross-national research, are based on employment relations and characteristics of jobs. The well-known CASMIN schema, initially developed by Erikson et al. (1979), which we will refer to as the “EGP” schema (for the authors’ surnames), relies on several criteria that are rooted in the differentiation of labor contracts. In contrast to this neo-Weberian approach, the neo-Marxian notion of class relies primarily on ownership of the means of production and authority relations that are of an antagonistic nature. Eric Olin Wright (1985), a proponent of the conflict approach, included a degree of expertise as well as of exploitation in his class schema. Wright’s schema (WRT hereafter) became popular in theoretical discussion and empirical analysis. The third schema used in cross-national research, developed by Esping Andersen (1993) – referred to as ESP in the literature, (see Leiulfsrud et al. (2005)) – mostly represents the institutional school and an “Adam Smithian world of unfettered markets” (Esping Andersen 1993: 8).

All three schemas, EGP, WRT and ESP, are based on similar criteria, although conceptualizations of these criteria and weights attached to them differ significantly. Following Leiulfsrud et al. (2005), we summarize how the five basic criteria function in each of the schemas:

1. *Property, and profit from capital.* In the EGP schema, this criterion serves mainly to single out capitalists, part of the “top” class, but also – in combination with other criteria – it is used for distinguishing the self-employed. Ownership of the means of production is of crucial importance in the WRT schema, since on this basis, the two categories of capitalists and the self-employed are separated from employees. This criterion does not enter in any meaningful way into the ESP schema.
2. *Control over labor power.* In the EGP and ESP schemas, this is a criterion used in parallel with other criteria since managers and supervisors are lumped together with other categories. In the WRT schema, the managerial and supervisory positions belong to the decisive factors classifying people into social classes; in addition, work independence is assessed to classify semiautonomous employees.
3. *Skills.* Skills are measured by the degree of expertise, proficiency, and know-how as a function of education, apprenticeship, and experience. This criterion is used in all three schemas, although it is crucial in EGP and ESP schemas and it plays a secondary role in the WRT schema. In all three schemas, routine nonmanual employees are divided according to a “higher” and “lower” grade, and skilled manual workers are distinguished from unskilled manual workers.
4. *Type of work and/or sector of economy.* This criterion enters the EGP and ESP schemas in different ways. In the former, farmers are included among the self-employed, and the manual/nonmanual distinctions are made. In the latter, the three sector division into primary, industrial (Fordist), and postindustrial is crucial, and only within the last two sectors are specific classes – mainly based on skills – distinguished. This criterion is not used in the WRT schema at all.
5. *Life chances.* In the EGP schema, it is a supplementary criterion to differentiate jobs with typical middle-class trajectories. It is also implicitly included in the ESP schema but not in the WRT schema.

In [Tables 11.1–11.3](#), we list social classes for all three schemas with labels usually applied in cross-national research. The data come from the 2006 European Social Survey (ESS), and

include 25 countries, itemized below each table, with the division into West and East Europe, symbolizing the developed capitalist part of the continent and its postcommunist counterpart.¹ In distinguishing social classes, we use codes provided by Leiulfsrud et al. (2005). Each table is constructed in the same way and provides information on distribution of the working population, aged 18–65, according to the class schema, social stratification position, and soft protest behavior. Here is the summary of the results:

In both West and East Europe, the distributions of the working population, according to the EGP and WRT schemas, are closer than each of them and the distribution of the same population according to WRT schema. Symmetric measures of the proportional reduction in error are as follows: for the EGP and ESP schemas 0.597 in West Europe and 0.684 in East Europe; for the EGP and WRT schemas 0.357 in Western Europe and 0.362 in East Europe; and for ESP and WRT schemas 0.319 in both parts of Europe.

Social stratification position, as measured in Tables 11.1–11.3, is a linear combination of education, occupation, and income. In the case of education, we rely on years of schooling, corrected for some cross-national inconsistencies. In particular, we noted that in some countries, tertiary education exceeded its equivalent in other countries, so we put a limit of 18 years of schooling, reserving 24 years for the PhD degree as an exception. For the best synthetic indicator of occupation, we experimented with SES and prestige scores, finding that having a job in skilled nonmanual occupations is most indicative for the social standing, thus taking SES (Ganzeboom and Treiman 2003). Finally, we included household income transformed into midpoint cumulative distribution of all descriptive categories of the ESS. Generally, all three indicators are highly correlated with the factor loadings: education (0.818), occupation (0.776), and income (0.635). Eigenvalue of the factor equals 1.676, and the proportion of common variance 55.8%.

Results presented in Tables 11.1–11.3 clearly demonstrate that the EGP, WRT, and ESP schemas are differently related to the social stratification index. Generally, the schema that has the greatest explanatory power is EGP, followed by ESP. However, the WRT schema makes a distinction between certain classes – managers and supervisors, in particular – that is blurred by other schemas. We also note that for each class schema, social classes are differently stratified in West Europe and East Europe. For example, according to the EGP schema, self-employed are below routine nonmanual workers in West Europe but not in East Europe. Moreover, in the EGP and ESP schemas, position of farmers and farm workers is much lower in East Europe than in West Europe; the similar pattern of inter-regional differences applies to the position of skilled and unskilled workers in the WRT schema.

In the last two columns of Tables 11.1–11.3, we provide the percentage of people who participated in at least one of the following forms of soft political protest: legal demonstration, signing a petition, and contacting government officials.² In each of the three class schemas – EGP,

¹The *European Social Survey* (ESS) is a multicountry biennial survey. The first round of the ESS was carried out in 2002 in 22 countries, the second round (2004) embraced 26 countries, and in the third round (2006) 25 countries participated. The questionnaire includes a “core” module that remains relatively constant from round to round. It focuses on political orientations (public trust, political interest, governance and efficacy) and social values and economic attitudes (primarily those toward well-being). Additional modules focus on particular issues such as immigration or gender roles. See: www.europeansocialsurvey.org

²Soft political-protest is similar to “conventional” protest, said to include legal demonstration and signing petitions (Jenkins and Form 2005). We add here contacting a politician, government or local government official, since we must take into account that soft political-protest might be exercised in alternative forms in various countries. In particular, in one country signing a petition can be treated as a functional equivalent of contacting a politician or official in another country. This seems to be especially relevant for countries with weak petition-signing culture, as is the case in new democracies (see Inglehart and Catterberg 2002).

TABLE 11.1. Distribution of Working People According to the Class Schema of Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (EGP), the Mean Values of Stratification Position, and the Percentage of Persons Involved in Soft Political Protest for West and East Europe, 2006

Social classes (EGP) ^a	Percentage distribution of working people among classes ^b		Mean value of stratification position in each class ^c		Percentage of people involved in soft political protest in each class ^d	
	West (range)	East (range)	West	East	West	East
	Professionals, administrators, and managers – higher grade (I)	5.7–23.8	6.4–17.7	1.40	1.39	50.3
Professionals, administrators, and managers – lower grade (II)	10.5–33.1	14.3–19.7	0.89	0.89	49.8	31.3
Routine nonmanual employees – higher grade (IIIa)	5.5–16.4	5.8–13.2	0.31	0.23	42.5	25.7
Routine nonmanual employees – lower grade (IIIb)	8.0–20.1	7.3–17.4	-0.20	-0.02	43.4	15.8
Small proprietors and employers (IVa)	2.0–9.9	2.4–5.8	0.14	0.45	39.4	30.4
Self-employed (IVb)	1.1–7.2	0.7–4.2	-0.02	-0.16	40.0	13.2
Lower level technicians and supervisors of manual workers (V)	1.9–6.7	1.8–5.9	-0.20	-0.51	37.8	19.2
Skilled manual workers (VI)	7.6–20.6	15.1–22.4	-0.46	-0.56	28.9	14.6
Non skilled manual workers (VIIa)	5.8–20.5	11.2–25.1	-0.72	-0.81	28.6	10.5
Agricultural workers (VIIb)	0.6–2.0	0.6–4.6	-0.62	-1.26	35.6	4.7
Farmers (VIIc)	0.7–4.2	0.1–7.4	-0.60	-1.06	50.0	16.7

^aOriginal symbols of EGP schema are provided in parenthesis.

^bWest European countries include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. East European countries include: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

^cDue to comparability of data, we restricted our sample of West Europe to Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom, and Netherlands; data on East Europe pertain to Poland and Slovenia. Social stratification position is expressed in a standardized metric, with mean value 0 and standard deviation 1.

^dSoft political protest refers to participation in at least one of the following forms of activity: legal demonstration, signing a petition, and contacting government officials.

TABLE 11.2. Distribution of Working People According to the Class Schema of Wright (WRT), the Mean Values of Stratification Position, and the Percentage of Persons Involved in Soft Political Protest for West and East Europe, 2006

Social classes (WRT) ^a	Percentage distribution of working people among classes ^b		Mean value of stratification position in each class ^c		Percentage of people involved in soft political protest in each class ^d	
	West (range)	East (range)	West	East	West	East
Capitalist – employers with ten or more employees (1)	0.1–1.3	0.2–1.5	1.02	0.88	38.9	13.6
Proprietors – employers with 3–9 employees (2)	2.4–8.6	2.1–4.9	0.38	0.32	46.3	31.3
Self-employed (3)	4.9–11.4	2.3–11.0	0.45	-0.36	44.9	15.1
Managers – experts (4)	1.2–9.3	1.6–7.5	1.36	1.33	53.8	42.9
Managers – highly skilled (5)	3.3–14.1	2.8–9.8	0.57	0.63	55.4	37.6
Managers – lowly skilled (6)	2.9–7.3	1.6–6.2	0.14	-0.12	57.6	36.5
Supervisors – experts (7)	0.5–6.7	0.6–3.8	1.42	1.62	48.8	34.8
Supervisors – highly skilled (8)	4.8–14.7	4.1–8.4	0.66	0.41	48.6	32.8
Supervisors – lowly skilled (9)	6.5–17.5	5.3–9.0	-0.08	-0.20	43.1	23.6
Experts (professionals) (10)	2.0–7.4	1.9–7.3	1.49	1.35	35.3	16.4
Skilled workers (11)	10.2–24.0	21.3–31.0	0.29	-0.08	35.1	18.1
Unskilled workers (12)	13.4–35.6	21.8–43.7	-0.24	-0.41	33.5	12.9

^aOriginal symbols of WRT schema are provided in parenthesis.

^bWest European countries include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. East European countries include: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

^cDue to comparability of data, we restricted our sample of West Europe to Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom, and Netherlands; data on East Europe pertain to Poland and Slovenia. Social stratification position is expressed in a standardized metric, with mean value 0 and standard deviation 1.

^dSoft political protest refers to participation in at least one of the following forms of activity: legal demonstration, signing a petition, and contacting government officials.

TABLE 11.3. Distribution of Working People According to the Class Schema of Esping Andersen (ESP), the Mean Values of Stratification Position, and the Percentage of Persons Involved in Soft Political Protest for West and East Europe, 2006

Social classes (ESP) ^a	Percentage distribution of working people among classes ^b		Mean value of stratification position in each class ^c		Percentage of people involved in soft political protest in each class ^d	
	West (range)	East (range)	West	East	West	East
Managers and employers with four or more employees (2a)	1.7–13.0	1.9–8.5	1.12	1.22	50.4	40.9
Managers and proprietors – employers with three to nine employees (2a)	1.5–8.3	0.7–5.4	0.42	0.73	42.2	24.2
Self-employed (3)	0.7–4.1	0.7–2.6	-0.08	-0.32	45.1	12.1
Professionals (3a)	4.6–15.1	5.3–12.3	1.58	1.58	47.8	30.3
Technicians (3b)	2.1–10.0	2.6–5.8	0.66	0.40	44.5	28.6
Semiprofessionals (3b)	5.9–14.5	7.2–13.7	0.85	1.04	56.1	37.0
Skilled service workers (3c)	3.6–6.1	3.2–5.6	0.05	-0.27	42.1	22.5
Unskilled service workers (4)	8.0–17.9	4.5–16.5	-0.70	-0.82	38.8	11.6
Clerical workers (2b)	8.0–21.3	6.0–14.9	0.32	0.29	42.3	25.1
Sales workers (2b)	4.6–21.3	7.0–11.7	0.35	0.21	41.2	18.9
Skilled manual and craft workers (2c)	7.5–19.1	14.3–22.7	-0.43	-0.56	29.4	15.3
Unskilled and semiskilled manual production workers (2d)	3.5–11.4	8.6–15.7	-0.60	-0.75	25.7	10.3
Primary sector workers (1)	0.7–2.0	0.6–4.6	-0.62	-1.26	35.6	4.7
Farmers	0.7–4.2	0.1–7.4	-0.60	-1.06	50.0	16.7

^aOriginal symbols of ESP schema are provided in parenthesis.

^bWest European countries include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. East European countries include: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

^cDue to comparability of data, we restricted our sample of West Europe to Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom, and Netherlands; data on East Europe pertain to Poland and Slovenia. Social stratification position is expressed in a standardized metric, with mean value 0 and standard deviation 1.

^dSoft political protest refers to participation in at least one of the following forms of activity: legal demonstration, signing a petition, and contacting government officials.

WRT and ESP – the differences between the class-maximum and class-minimum exceed 20% in the case of West Europe and 30% in the case of East Europe, although, on the average, the level of participation is higher in the former than in the latter. In East Europe, the class-minimum is particularly low: 4.7% among farm workers (EGP and ESP) and 12.9 in the case of unskilled workers (WRT). However, neither for West Europe nor for East Europe, it would be easy to decide which schema is better, since each has some advantages. For example, in the case of West Europe, the highest percentage of soft political protesters is found among professionals, administrators, and managers – higher grade (EGP), low skilled managers (WRT), and semiprofessionals (ESP). The EGP schema well distinguishes the privileged classes, while both the WRT and ESP schemas provide more subtle, albeit different solutions for delineating classes in the middle of the scale on control over the labor power or skills.

Class differences in the political behavior stem to considerable extent from their location on the stratification ladder (cf. Leiulfsrud et al. 2005, Table 7.1–3). Using the same 2006 ESS data, we demonstrated elsewhere (Dubrow, Slomczynski, and Tomescu-Dubrow 2007) that the advantaged stratification position leads to a higher likelihood of soft political-protest behavior. The increase in stratification position by one standard deviation boosts the chances of undertaking soft political protest by at least 15–20%, in some cases even 50%. Thus, the hypothesis stating that stratification position positively influences the probability of people's soft political protest is strongly confirmed.

The results presented in [Tables 11.1–11.3](#) have profound implications for interpretation of the class effects on political attitudes and behaviors due to of the empirical relationship of class to stratification. For some countries, the EGP schema would have a strong explanatory power, since it captures basic social inequalities. For others, the WRT or ESP schemas would be a better choice for the same reason.

TIME-SPECIFIC AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CLASS SCHEMAS

Contemporary empirical literature on class analysis often assumes the time-invariant class schema, like in mobility studies, in which for the period between two generations, that is for time span of more than 30 years, the same class schema is used (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Breen 2005; see also Weakliem 1992). However, Western democracies changed in the last 50 years, in terms of their economic structures and institutional arrangements affecting social classes. In particular, due to increasing deindustrialization and the pace of globalization, we cannot assume that the economic conditions of the 1960s in the United States and Europe are comparable to those of the 1990s or early 2000s. Also, one could point out large intercountry differences in economic structures and institutional arrangements even among the most developed countries in the world; such differences are undeniable (Tilly 1984).

If no one could seriously argue that countries have shared exactly the same economic, political and cultural conditions and that these conditions remained constant over the course of their histories, why should we use the same class schema for all industrialized countries, not even mentioning the case of underdeveloped countries? Using the same class schema across European countries, we demonstrated that there is great variation in class composition. Part of these intercountry differences – in concert with relations among classes – stem from the neglect of country-specific class divisions in the overarching grand class schemas.

For example, before 1989, the class structure in Central and Eastern Europe was rooted in political segmentation of the labor market and the consequences of “forced industrialization.” Reviewing the literature, we found strong arguments that the basic criterion of class structure

of capitalist society, the ownership of the means of production, had very limited consequences in Central and Eastern Europe. Only in Poland and Yugoslavia, *farmers* succeeded in maintaining the ownership of the means of production (on the interests of this class, see Gorchach and Mooney 1998). The *petty bourgeoisie* was a residual class, constituting less than three percent of the labor force. However, its link to traditional economic activities and an increasing role of the “second economy” during the late socialism (Galasi and Sziraczki 1985) justified its inclusion in the class schema. Party leaders formed a distinct class, *Nomenklatura*, that controlled access to economic and political resources.³

Under communist rule, two groups exercised control over labor: managers and supervisors. *Managers* formed a group that was directly involved in the process of economic planning. At the same time, managers had to ensure that economic decisions remained subordinate to ideological goals, which affected the group’s interests in relation to other classes. *Supervisors* possessed immediate control over others, but lacked any decision-making power over the production process.

In a state-owned economy, the mental component of performed work differentiated non-manual workers from all manual workers. Production work set *factory workers* at the core of the working class, differentiating them from all other types of manual workers. Economically, manual factory workers were central to socialist industrialization. Politically, their concentration, and the means of resistance through potential demonstrations and strikes that such concentration allowed for, made this group the main bargaining force with the government, especially in countries like Poland.

It has been demonstrated that, in Poland, this kind of country-specific schema explains social inequality better than the most popular universal schemas of EGP and WRT (Slomczynski et al. 2007). The similar class-schema proposed by Eyal et al. (2001) takes also into account subtle changes through time in all of Eastern Europe. Actually, these authors show in detail how the class structure evolves from the preSecond-World-War period, through the typical communist era and reform phase, to the postcommunist transformation. The work of these authors is an excellent example of an attempt to focus on temporal and systemic specificity, rather than universalizing tools for studying structured inequality. In explaining political attitudes and behaviors, this approach should not be neglected.

CLASS ANALYSIS AND ITS CRITICS

Over the last half century, social scientists have debated the relevance of class for political attitudes and behaviors. The modern debate began with Nisbet’s (1959) assertion that class does not matter much in modern society.⁴ The debate was continued in Clark and Lipset’s (1991) macabre speculation, “Are Social Classes Dying?,” and culminated in Pakulski and

³*Nomenklatura* in itself is simply “a list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of duties of each office (Harasymiv 1969: 122)”. However, in reality, it carried significant status and power in all communist countries because appointments to these positions required ratification by an appropriate party committee. It served as “nervous system of the party” extending to all levels of society, and enabling the part-state to penetrate all layers of the social system (Lewis 1985).

⁴One of the earliest oppositionists to the thesis on diminishing role of social classes in the United States was Richard F. Hamilton (1972) who documented that supposed malaise of the “lower-middle class” and the presumed intolerance and political incapacity of blue-collar workers had no empirical foundation.

Waters' (1996) outright pronouncement of the *Death of Class* and in Kingston's (2000) *Classless Society*. All of these views – what we term the dying/dead class thesis – argue similarly that as the twentieth century progressed, the class declined in relevance.

We will briefly discuss two of the major works in the field that are emblematic of the dying/dead class thesis. Pakulski and Waters' (1996) extremist formulation of the problem is centered on the degree of “classlessness” of modern societies. They argue that when social class is defined as rooted in property and market relations containing members who have at least a minimal awareness of their class position, empirical studies show that class has ceased to matter for modern political life. In their view, the phenomena of class – ideologies, cultures and political organizations – are just history. They try to develop a theoretically-based argument that social classes are replaced by modern social cleavages – ethnicity, gender, status and consumption, to name a few – which derive their importance from divergent ideologies and cultural interests.

The main problem with this argument is Pakulski and Water's neglect to consider the obvious option that new cleavages – especially those of consumer behavior and life styles – are rooted in the current class structure defined by the well-established class-criteria “who controls whom?": employers vs. employees, managers and supervisors vs. production workers, and so on. On empirical grounds, their analyses were severely criticized. Thus, this and Kingston's (2000) work opens discussion, rather than gives the definite test of the dying/dead class thesis.

The Breakdown of Class Politics, a much cited, edited volume by Clark and Lipset (2001), similarly as *The End of Class Politics?* (Evans 1999), essentially focuses on class voting. The main argument Clark and Lipset start from is the following: from the view of objective interests, the working class should vote for left-wing parties; when they do not, class becomes irrelevant for political behavior. However, the left-wing parties are so thoroughly institutionalized as “catch-all parties,” that they no longer pursue the working-class interest in promoting radical economic redistribution.

Much of the controversy pertaining to the effects of class on voting lies on whether the Alford Index is a worthy measure of class and political parties. In a succinct definition, this index “is easily calculated from social survey data, that is, by taking the percentage of the working class who vote for left-wing parties and then subtracting from this percentage of those not in working class who vote for such parties. The larger the index, the stronger, it is supposed, is the class-vote link” (Goldthorpe 2001:110). Goldthorpe goes on to argue that the Alford's index is essentially a Marxist schema: “the index directly reflects, and is indeed entirely dependent upon, the idea of a simple class dichotomy – working class versus a residual nonworking class – taken together with a corresponding party dichotomy – left versus residual nonleft... [if] more than two classes or more than two kinds of party are recognized, then the Alford Index simply cannot be used” (110). Much of Hout, Manza and Brooks's work on the subject is a rejection of the Alford Index and an embrace of the CASMIN schema.

On the side of the Alford Index debate, Nieuwbeerta (2001) begins with a modification of the Alford Index – what he calls the Thomsen Index – that measures relative class voting through a log-odds-ratio as a measure of the class-vote link: “the log-odds-ratio can also be regarded as the log-odds for manual workers voting for left-wing political party rather than a right-wing party minus the log-odds for nonmanual workers voting in this way” (124). Using the CASMIN schema for a subset of countries, he finds similar results to the modified Alford Index. In his estimation, class is losing its relevance (see also de Graaf et al. 1995). In sum, for those who argue for the Alford Index, class is dying; for the others, class is thriving.

The foundations of the dying/dead class thesis rest on problematic assertions. First of all, this thesis is usually argued referring to class divisions and class schemas that are deficient for class analysis. As Scott (2002: 23) points out, we observe “not so much the death of class as

a restructuring of class relations.” The conceptual deficiency of the large part of the research stems from relying on the outdated class criteria or confusing classes with stratification position. The more inadequate the class schema, the easier is to demonstrate empirically that class does not matter for political outcomes.⁵

In addition, the proponents of the dying/dead class thesis do not provide criteria for the refutation of their thesis. We cite two conditions that should be clearly specified in all analysis of this type (Slomczynski and Shabad 2000):

Condition 1. About the mean values or proportions: Social classes differ considerably in the average values or proportions of essential characteristics under study. If the difference between the average values or proportions for some pairs of classes is statistically significant, then there is a basis for rejecting the null hypothesis of no-effect for social class.

Condition 2. About the variance or variability: The between class differentiation of essential characteristics under study is substantially larger than within-class differentiation. Again, statistical significance of an F statistic or its analogs for ordinal and discrete variables is an appropriate base for rejecting a null hypothesis about no-effect of social class.

For both conditions, the size of the interclass differences matter – not only the statistical significance. Critical reading of the results of studies on the death of class thesis should take into account the consequences of the reported interclass differences, or lack of thereof, for the functioning of a given society. We also note that this thesis was not tested in the international labor market, especially in the increasingly integrated labor market of the European Union, where mobility between countries calls for considering at least some classes – like managers or unskilled workers – as crossing traditional national borders.

SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

As Sidney Verba and collaborators point out, political participation is stratified (Verba et al. 1978; APSA 2004). The most consistent finding in this literature is that the advantaged, more privileged members of society tend to participate in political life more than its disadvantaged, less privileged members. Most explanations of class effects are resource based: class inequality in human, social, and cultural capital influences the costs of political participation, enabling some to engage in politics and stopping others from doing so. Indeed, class has such strong effects that it can attenuate the effects of rival variables (Verba et al. 1993). Strong class identity, measured in terms of self-identification in both quantitative and qualitative studies, influences the propensity to participate (Walsh et al. 2004; SurrIDGE 2007 Gerteis and Savage 1998).

Electoral Participation

In the debate over the effects of class on political behavior, voting behavior receives a particularly robust attention (see the chapters by Redding et al. and Brady et al. in this volume). Since we mentioned some aspects of the debate in the context of discussion of the dying/dead class thesis, we point out here that class effects on voter turnout are strong: Undoubtedly unskilled manuals and other members of the working class tend to vote less frequently than owners, managers, and professionals (APSA 2004; Gallego 2008). In the United States, making it

⁵ Using bad class schemas, researchers arguing “against class” have a tendency of committing an error of not rejecting the null hypothesis H_0 while H_0 does not reflect the reality. In statistics this situation corresponds to the Type II error.

easier to register to vote, such as election-day registration, does not necessarily reduce this inequality (Knack and White 2000; see also Gronke et al. 2008). Class effects on the act of voting remain large and stable over time, regardless of electoral context (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Shields and Goidel 1997).

Class voting implies that classes have definite and distinct political interests that, when realized, improve the life chances of class members (e.g. Brint, 1985; Hout et al. 1995; see also Achtenberg and Houtman, 2006). However, extant research neglects the problem of whether voting according to class interest actually benefits the voter. To what extent do the life chances of those who voted for the “right” party improve? At the macro level, we can consider the gains of voting according to class interests for the entire class, especially visible through changes in legislation and policy concerning economic redistribution. At the micro level, class interest could be defined on the individual level. For each individual worker, it is in his or her interest to vote for a working class party because of expected personal benefits. Thus, the question is about the individual return for voting according to class interests.

Nonelectoral Political Participation

Gallego (2008), using the European Social Survey and the EGP class schema, finds that disadvantaged groups are less likely than their advantaged counterparts to participate in any of diverse political acts. Owners, the service class and nonmanual workers are more likely to vote, work with parties and action groups, and boycott than manual workers. Unlike the service class and nonmanual workers, owners are less likely to attend public demonstrations since they tend to defend *status quo*. Gallego’s (2008) findings align with studies from the United States (e.g. Wallace and Jenkins 1995; Jenkins and Wallace 1996). Contemporary European countries are similar to the United States, in that economic hardship depresses propensity for voting, providing evidence of social and political convergence of industrial societies.

Social movement and political protest participation are also impacted by class. Studies of student protestors found that they come mainly from middle class backgrounds (Sherkat and Blocker 1994; Westby and Braungart 1966). Educated salaried professionals from socio-cultural and public sectors are more likely to express civil disobedience (Jenkins and Wallace 1996). Transitioning from adolescence to adulthood, middle class protestors from the 1960s tended to continue their sense of rebelliousness (Franz and McClelland 1994).

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL CLASS

Class consciousness is assumed to be a foundation of class action (Mann 1973; Brooks 1994; Evans 1992, 1993; Weakliem 1993; Wright, 1989). Classes vary in the degree to which they possess class consciousness and thus vary in the degree to which they act – i.e., transform their views of political interests into specific political battles. However, as Rose (1997: 462) notes: “Class does shape consciousness, but no particular political content can be read from one’s position in the class hierarchy.” Class consciousness is formed as a reaction to events determined by class position. Korpi’s (1983) power resource theory well explains that class relations, including class consciousness, are an outcome of the “democratic class struggle” in the political sphere. In this sense, the class consciousness is an equivalent of class ideology. Simultaneously, the mobilization of class struggle affects the degree to which lower class positions are related to lower class identifications. In consequence, class consciousness is historically contingent on class struggle. We return to this point at the end of this chapter.

Social psychology of social class is concerned with how individuals' class membership and their class interests influence their orientations toward society. The simplest mechanism is of learning generalization: people from different classes experience the world in a particular way and generalize it on other aspects of their life (Kohn and Schooler 1983). Generally, people from advantaged social classes are more intellectually flexible, value self-direction more highly for their children, and have more self-directed orientations to self and society than people from disadvantaged social classes (Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Kohn 2006). The mechanism for this relationship lies with class-based activities, characteristics of people's jobs in particular. People from advantaged social classes are more intellectually flexible, value self-direction more highly for their children, and have more self-directed orientations to self and society because they are engaged in self-directed types of work and generalize this experience to nonoccupational domains. How do conditions of life affect attitudes toward democracy and welfare state? We try to answer this question balancing the learning generalization hypothesis with the hypothesis about class interests.

Class Attitudes Toward Democracy

Class matters support for democracy because this type of regime provides people with differentiating choices, dividing the citizenry into winners and losers on various measures, from economic resources to political gains and cultural values. Managers, entrepreneurs, professionals, and other upper-level white collars are in advantageous position to reap the rewards and minimize the deleterious effects of risks built into the "democratic game." It is these classes, as opposed to the working class, unskilled manuals, and peasants that are more likely to support democracy. Measuring class as a function of occupation, education and income, Moreno (2001) finds that in Latin America, class contributes significantly to support for democracy. Semiskilled and unskilled blue collar workers are less likely to support democracy than skilled nonmanuals. In Poland, support for elections among women, the younger generation, and members of the working class and peasantry is weaker than it is among men, the middle-aged, and members of privileged classes (Slomczynski and Janicka 2004).

There is considerable debate over the proper measures of support for democracy (Canache et al. 2001; Mishler and Rose 2001; Slomczynski and Shabad 2002; Linde and Ekman 2003). Mishler and Rose (2001), for example, argue that so-called idealist measures of democratic support – in terms satisfaction with the general framework of this kind of regime – are not appropriate for citizens of new democracies and transitional regimes with little direct experience with democratic norms and ideals. Applying a three-category class schema based on self-identification to the World Values Survey data from thirty eight countries, Mishler and Rose find class effects for realist measure rather than idealist. Overall, there are theoretically and empirically sound reasons to maintain the distinction between endorsement of the fundamental principles of democracy and evaluation of the performance of a particular regime (Slomczynski and Shabad 2002).

Class Attitudes Toward the Welfare State

There are two main explanations for class attitudes toward the welfare state invoking class interests: (1) class politics, emphasized by Korpi (1983), shaping attitudes at key junctures in the history of class struggle, and (2) rational choice, emphasized by Lipset (1963), according

to which the working class members support a strong welfare state and economic redistribution because such policies benefit them directly (cf. Papadakis 1993). Variation in class differences across time and space has many causes. Policies that are more clearly aligned with class interests, such as employment and wages, are more likely to have large class differences than policies relatively distant to class interests (Svallfors 2004; Van de Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004). Welfare state policies, such as health care and living standards for the elderly, do not have clear-cut class interests and hence, the class differences in attitudes toward these policies are not very large. Cross-national variation in class determinants of attitudes toward welfare policies depends on (a) the results of previous political power struggles and (b) type of welfare state regime, conceptualized according to Esping-Andersen's (1990) well-known typology: social democratic, liberal, and conservative-corporatist (Svallfors 1993; 2004).

Country-specific research suggests additional explanations for the class-welfare state policy attitude connection. In the United States, Brooks and Manza (1997) suggest that rising economic satisfaction leads to changes in attitudes toward the welfare state. They note that professionals remain liberal, but there is a declining support for the welfare state among unskilled workers. Derks (2004), writing about Flanders, argues that the members of underprivileged classes are not leftist in their welfare policy orientation, but rather economic populist. In Poland, the populist tendencies among the working class and farmers are documented (Kunovich 2000). Poles belonging to nonmanual classes have a propensity to be the least supportive of welfare state policies. It is interesting that the self-employed are like laborers, revealing populist tendencies, probably because of uncertainties built into their current status.

REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL CLASSES IN POLITICAL ENTITIES

The extent of class hegemony of the legislative body translates into a situation in which a specific class controls, directly and indirectly, the parliament and the state apparatus. When one class dominates the legislature, voices of other classes are muted (APSA 2004); when one class dominates the state apparatus, it biases policy in favor of itself (Domhoff 2000). The issue of class hegemony is often discussed in the context of political representation.

Are various segments of social structure appropriately represented in the parliament? Literature on the subject distinguishes two types of representation: compositional representation – also known as descriptive, proportional, or statistical – and delegate, or group-interest representation. If public and politicians express some concern when the percentage of women elected to the parliament drops below a certain threshold – for example 15 or 20% – they have in mind compositional representation. There are some persuasive normative arguments that, under certain conditions, disadvantaged demographic categories – as in the case of gender should have a parliamentary representation in some reasonable proportion to the share in the population (Young 1990; Mansbridge 1999). The same notion of representation applies to social classes, disadvantaged classes in particular.

Descriptive representation in the parliament can be a critical factor in whose voice is heard, when, and how loud in the legislature (Mansbridge 1999; Swers 2002). Representatives from various segments of social structure translate shared group experiences into substantive representation – i.e., representation of interests. It is in the political interest of all groups, including social classes, to enhance their own descriptive representation in the state apparatus.

It is well established that in modern democracies the classes with greatest access to and acquisition of economic resources have proportionally more of their own representatives than

their relative share in the class structure. This is evidenced by these classes' most favorable ratio of the percentage of its parliamentarians to the percentage of its members in the entire society. In this sense, the privileged classes control the legislature and indirectly the state apparatus. In practice, legislation and policy tend to reflect their interests more than the interests of other, lesser-resourced classes (Bartels 2002; Hill and Leighly 1992).

Five major factors through which political inequality in descriptive representation arises have been identified. At the individual level, there are the following factors: (1) voters' recognition of descriptive representatives (Dubrow 2006, 2007; Domanski 2007), (2) being politically active through campaign contributions and other forms of political participation (Gallego 2008; APSA 2004), and (3) associating with politicians and other members of the state within elite networks, in order to influence members of the state's political elite (Domhoff 2000). At the organizational level, additional factors are distinguished: (1) controlling the party apparatus through gate keeping and control of the supply of descriptive representatives of certain classes (see Paxton and Kunovich 2003) and (2) forming class-based political organizations, such as unions, social movement organizations, and political parties (van den Berg and Janoski 2005). All of these factors could be included into a general model of descriptive representation – a model in which the role of the interest of disadvantaged classes is crucial. However, as it has been noted, workers are not always unified in their interests, nor are their interests always at odds with those of their employers (Hall 1997).

FUTURE RESEARCH

Accepting a diversity of approaches in class analysis, we consider four fundamental issues as necessary for further progress in this area. The first conceptual issue deals with multidimensionality of class and an extension of this concept to political and cultural spheres. As it has been noted, historically class “in its social sense of the term denotes large groups among which unequal distribution of economic goods and/or preferential division of political prerogatives and/or discriminatory differentiation of cultural values result from economic exploitation, political oppression and cultural domination, respectively” (Wesolowski and Slomczynski 1993: 81). In recent years, most research pertained to economic classes. Political classes are based on their share of the control over laws, bureaucracy, and other political means. Because of institutional arrangements of the state bureaucracy between rulers and the ruled, there exist groups with different, sometimes antagonistic, interests (for cross-national review, see Borchert and Zeiss 2003). In addition, cultural classes, distinguished by production, distribution, and consumption of information, play a more important role (e.g. Eder 1993 and Hechter 2004). The fitting of classes to societal context is necessary because economic, political, and cultural conditions change rapidly in the world subject to globalization (Friedman, 2000).

The second issue deals with a problem well explicated by Sorensen (2000): the relationship between social classes understood as formations of interests and social classes understood as conditions of life. Analytically, this distinction is sound but there is a need for empirical studies on the mechanism by which classes as formations of interests shape conditions of life. In a sense this is the counter part of much more researched impact of life conditions on class interests and their articulation.

The third problem pertains to the relationship between individual political outcomes and group processes. Collective action implies micro-macro linkages between individual class members and their class collective. Class members are “nested” in the class collectives, so

that macrolevel class characteristics provide a context influencing individual attitudes and behaviors (Parkin 1979). Technically, detecting this impact calls for application of multilevel analysis with hierarchically structured data.

Empirical research on this type is scant, but promising. In multilevel models examining the micro-macro class link, both individual and contextual social class effects on voting are present and stable over time (Andersen and Heath 2002; Andersen et al. 2006). More empirical research using multilevel models with both individual and contextual social class variables should (a) estimate the impact of person-level class characteristics and class structure-level characteristics on a greater variety of political outcomes and (b) specify the mechanisms that link them. The underlying mechanism is rooted in the social, economic and political struggles between social classes that influence their ability to collectively and effectively express their class interests. For example, if class voting is in decline somewhere, the mechanism may not only be left-wing party disengagement from the working class. The mechanism can also be related to collective action relatively independent of the actions of political parties. In particular, class-based protest and other forms of political participation can influence whether and how individual class members think and act politically.

On the final note, we stress the relevance of class-based parties and movements not only for day-by-day policy-making, but also for formulating long term goals and scenarios. A recent work of Korpi and Palme (2003) shows that the initial increase in social rights after second World War has been turned into a decline and that in several countries significant retrenchment of the welfare state provisions has taken place in the period 1975–1995. In addition, Korpi and Palme demonstrate that partisan politics remains a significant factor for shaping welfare state policies, providing relevant material for the Przeworski's (1985) thesis about the flexibility of class compromise in democratic regimes. Indeed, according to this thesis, (a) social classes are not given as empty places in social structure but result from an interplay of collective actors, political parties in particular, (b) once leftist parties begin to take part in elections, the industrial workers lose their revolutionary leadership and pursue consumption aspirations, (c) since they gain in material sphere, they do not protest, contributing to the growth of economy from which they benefit. Thus, the thesis on positive class compromise can also help explain the electoral politics leading to welfare retrenchment.

The theoretical questions arise about the prospects of reaching class compromise by political parties and movements under conditions of such profound economic crises in which the production-consumption foundations of the compromise could be broken. It seems that after the fall of communism, the option of revolutionary or evolutionary solutions in the direction predicted by Marx – considered by proponents of the class compromise thesis – is slender. Could the legitimization of a capitalist democracy, on the part of the working class, be withdrawn without this option? Are new options theoretically available as means of class struggle? Are class-based parties interested in formulating such options? To what extent could national traditions of class struggle influence the articulation of redefined interests of classes not only in the Western countries but also in the countries with less or no experience in democracy? A confrontation of the extant line of research on class peace in the recent past with the rapidly changing economic reality of the capitalist system justifies these new questions.

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PART II

**Political Change
and Transformation**

CHAPTER 12

Social Movements and Contentious Politics

DAVID S. MEYER AND DAISY VERDUZCO REYES

On May 1, 2006 immigration rights activists staged rallies across the United States. Immigrants and their supporters spilled out into the streets of most major American cities, reacting against a bill under consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives. The so-called “Sensenbrenner Bill” (H.R. 4437) proposed austere immigration policies, including the construction of a 700-mile fence along the U.S.–Mexico border and the detention and criminalization of undocumented immigrants. In Los Angeles, the “March 25 Coalition,” comprised of more than 100 political and immigrant rights organizations, planned a demonstration which brought an estimated one million people to the streets (Archibold 2006; *March 25 Coalition*). Protesters wore white t-shirts, and carried signs that read: “Si Se Puede/Yes We Can,” “We are America,” “We are not Criminals,” and “We have a dream too.” Some carried American flags. Organizers also announced a boycott, with the intent of demonstrating the consumer and labor power of immigrants and their supporters through a “day without immigrants” (CNN.com 2006).

The May 1st rallies attracted numerous protesters with diverse backgrounds and interests, who united to make claims for more humane and just immigration policies. Of course, they differed on just what constituted just immigration policy. Some demanded amnesty, a path to citizenship, or family unification laws, while others made bolder claims, calling for no borders, no fences, no criminalization, and no stricter enforcement practices. Meanwhile, local unions saw the immigration issue as a vehicle for making broader claims about the rights of workers (Narro et al. 2007; *We Are America; March 25 Coalition*).

Moreover, advocates of immigrants’ rights and welfare were not the only ones protesting. Members of the Minuteman Project, a group that supports strict border vigilance and harsh treatment toward illegal immigrants, organized a May 1st countermobilization (Arellano 2006). The Minutemen used similar tactics to the immigrants’ rights organizers, chanting and holding signs. They also organized vigilante patrols at selected spots along the Mexican border, promising to inform appropriate immigration authorities about unusual activities they might observe, orchestrated a cross-country caravan to protest illegal immigration, and sponsored several candidates for elective office.

The mobilization and countermobilization on immigration during 2006 presents an interesting case that illustrates the phenomena of social movements and contentious politics.

First, both sides in the immigration debate are comprised of diverse interests, working together on one set of issues while, at least temporarily, papering over other potential differences. Since participants in each movement differed on what comprises just immigration policy, this case displays how meaning-making processes, including framing and narrative evolve within movements. Second, through the use of American flags, white t-shirts to signify peace, and civil rights movement slogans, the immigration movements show how activists employ symbolic politics to portray themselves and their claims – just as the nomenclature of a “Minuteman” project conspicuously tries to tie its partisans and its claims, at least rhetorically, to the rebels who staged the successful American revolution more than 200 years earlier, evoking positive associations. Third, the immigration marches, keying off perceived threats and opportunities in national politics, responding to, and ultimately stalemating, a debate in Congress, show the clear connections between movement politics in the streets and more institutional politics and public policy.

The recent activities of social movements concerned with immigration provides an excellent illustration of major issues involved in understanding this particular form of claims-making and social organization, but they are by no means unique. In this chapter, we will review the development of the scholarly literature on social movements, highlighting selected major theoretical contributions in the field, and identifying a few issues that should spur further work. We begin by defining social movements and why they matter, with particular attention to differences based on the context in which they take place. Next, we explore when social movements occur and the forms movements take by looking at organizations, resources, strategies, and tactics. We also assess the role of social movements on the individual level, discussing why people join, how movements recruit, and the role of collective identities. Finally, we consider the effects of movements on participants’ lives, organizations, other movements, conventional politics, public policy, and culture.

DEFINING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Scholars have long debated not only how movements work, but even just what they are. These disagreements are rooted, at least partly, in the types of phenomena observed and described as “social movements.” Scholars who focus on the cultural components of protest movements, for example, such as identity practices (Snow 2004), and those who focus on political claims directed at matters of policy, like old-age relief (Amenta 1998), argue about what constitutes a social movement target. Others differ in their interpretation of how extended a challenge must be in order to qualify as a movement, arguing about the relationship of particular episodes to larger campaigns.

Tarrow (1998: 4) offers a concise and useful definition, seeing social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” This definition implies collectivities engaged in a dispute with actors in power over a prolonged period of time. Even here, however, critics have extended the range of phenomena they wish to consider as social movements. Snow (2004), for example, argues that movements can challenge a wide range of “systems or structures of authority,” contending that challenges to (or within) nongovernment targets, such as organizations, religious orders, and cultural norms, can also usefully be considered as movements. He argues that the same basic questions and mechanisms are at work in challenges that occur well outside the range of state attention. Indeed, ultimately Tarrow agrees with extending the conceptual reach of the field. In recent collaborative work (McAdam et al. 2001), he contends

that the same dynamics and mechanisms at work in social movements' political challenges can be observed in all sorts of political contention.

The other important extension is regarding the continuity and visibility of social movement challenges. Verta Taylor (1989; also see Rupp and Taylor 1987) argues that challengers persist in cultivating and spreading their beliefs during times of apparent quiescence, such that there are important connections between ostensibly separate episodes of contention, even separations that may last decades. Her observations come from the women's movement operating in the United States (also see Whittier 1997), but we must posit similar dynamics in other contexts, thinking about revolutionary campaigns that extend over decades, as well as the seemingly spontaneous eruption of activism and organization that emerges when authoritarian government weakens, as in the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 (Meyer and Marullo 1992; Havel 1985).

We agree that the concepts developed in social movement theory offer useful analytical leverage in understanding a range of political phenomena not always recognized as social movements. These theories often vary by context, especially between research about the Global South and in advanced industrialized democracies.

In the Global South, for example, revolutionary movements appear far more visible – and potentially more significant – than the more modest reformist campaigns that tend to emerge in Western democracies. Movement actors in the Global South may communicate their disenchantment with conventional politics by employing noninstitutional tactics. Frequently, they lack institutional alternatives for making claims. In contrast, challengers in advanced industrialized states that feature some form of liberal democracy, will often also employ any available institutional means to affect public policy, thus (at least implicitly) supporting the political system. It makes sense that challenges about issues like, water quality, for example, would take different forms in different contexts. In Bolivia, for example, we see the Cochabamba water wars that veer to challenge the regime (Dolinsky 2001). In Western democracies, in contrast, challengers with somewhat analogous concerns may be circulating petitions and testifying at hearings (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

Boudreau (1996: 180) describes differences between movements in the North and Global South by distinguishing between grievances about productive resources versus those dealing with the “currency of policy.” Social movements in the South frequently seek control of the state, almost naturally morphing into revolutionary campaigns. Importantly, authorities in non-democracies and less wealthy states frequently – and appropriately – view challenging social movements as threats to the survival of their regime. Their responses to these threats often entail explicit repression, and the patterns of repression shape the development of their challengers (Boudreau 2004).

In contrast, in the liberal democratic systems that govern most wealthy nations, dissatisfied constituents making claims on matters of policy has become a routine element of mainstream politics. The sometimes successful efforts of previous social movements to enhance institutional political leverage have encouraged a wide range of claimants to augment their institutional strategies with tactics associated with social movements, including mass demonstrations, petition campaigns, and even (limited) illegal protests (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Social movements in liberal states are more likely to seek sustained influence and organizational survival than control of the state. In liberal contexts, movements have become part of *normal* politics, and authorities generally work to incorporate some portion of their claims or constituents.

Thus, scholars attach the term “social movement” to such diverse phenomena as clandestine revolutionary campaigns in the South and more visible and routine politics about topics like water quality or food labeling in advanced industrialized democracies. We believe that as different as these phenomena appear, similar dynamics of claims-making and interaction with

authorities characterize both, and that we can devise more general theories that consider the influence of context. Here, we will consider the context in which protest emerges, the forms social movements take and the kinds of claims-making they employ, and finally, the effects they sometimes exercise.

WHEN PEOPLE ENGAGE IN MOVEMENTS: OPPORTUNITIES

Most people have a range of concerns outside politics, and are likely to engage in social movements only if and when they believe such participation is necessary for them to get what they want, and at least potentially effective (Meyer 2007). Although individuals make these calculations about their political needs and prospects differently, external circumstances dramatically affect the urgency or promise of particular issues as well as the apparent viability of different strategies of influence. Social movement actors look to the political climate for cues on when to mobilize and on what issues (Tarrow 1998).

Scholars use the term “political opportunities” to refer generally to the world outside a social movement, and use the concept to examine how that context influences the politics within a movement and the interaction of a movement with the world around it (Meyer 2004). Although there is a broad recognition in the field about the importance of context, scholars differ on what elements of the structure of political opportunities affect social movements and how (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Typically, scholars focus on the grievances of public policies and the openness of authorities, institutionally and dispositionally, to challengers. The challenge, of course, is that opportunities and grievances of concern to one set of claimants are different from those that concern others, and welcomes from institutional elites can provoke either institutional action or protest, depending upon where the constituency is in relation to the political system. Similarly, sometimes an apparent closing of political access can lead claimants to augment institutional politics with extra-institutional mobilization. In this way, both promises and threats can invigorate social movements.

This literature springs from pioneering work by Peter Eisinger (1973), who sought to explain why *some* American cities faced urban riots in the 1960s. Focusing on local political context, Eisinger concluded that cities that afforded dissatisfied residents *some* access to mainstream institutions were most likely to face riots; cities with more institutional access preempted riots, while those without institutional openings repressed or discouraged them. Tilly (1978) raised this insight to analysis of national politics, and Doug McAdam (1982) used the ideas to trace the development of African-American activism in the United States. McAdam (1982) concluded that activists responded to institutional openings, and his findings seem to apply to longitudinal studies of some other identity-based movements (e.g., Costain 1992). These key works traced movements that waxed and waned in response to political openness, which is the only one sort of opportunity for mobilization. Other scholars (e.g., Meyer 1990; Smith 1996) have found movements respond to the withdrawal of institutional access. If we return to an older insight, activists need to believe that protest is both necessary, and at least potentially effective, we can make sense of this apparent paradox. Simply, some groups need openings to see the possibility of influence, whereas others need to be excluded to recognize the necessity of social movement activity.

Earlier, policy-oriented, work on social movements emphasized that movements often crest not in response to institutional openings, but in reaction to real or imagined threats to their interests. For poor people, Piven and Cloward (1977) write, large-scale protest only occurs when the structures that support daily life (e.g., work, transfer payments) erode,

making a move to the streets appear as the only prospect for making life better. For other sorts of movements, often comprised of middle-class people, a potential threat to well-being or erosion of preferred policies can help organizers underscore the urgency of their claims and mobilize larger numbers of people. Activists – and indeed most political figures – understand this, often painting their opponents in dramatic and Manichean terms and emphasizing the possibilities of significant losses without mobilization (e.g., Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

Tilly's early formulations (1978) on the effect of context on mobilization stressed the need to consider threat. Later, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) contended that opportunity and threat comprised distinct factors that could coexist, driving mobilization. The former represented potential gains, while the latter, prospective losses. Either – or both – could engage activists, and organizers often mix both in making a pitch for mobilization (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Zuo and Benford 1995; Boutcher et al. 2008). Threats can come from government authorities who plan unwanted policy initiatives as well as from opposing movements which appear to be making gains (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Boutcher et al. 2008). We see both threats and political openings as components in the larger structure of political opportunities activists face, comprising the raw material activists use to make appeals for action.

More broadly, political opportunities affect a social movement's potential to mobilize, advance particular claims, cultivate alliances, employ particular strategies and tactics, and influence mainstream institutional politics and policy (Meyer 2004). The puzzles remain, however, as openings that encourage protest mobilization sometimes line up with opportunities for policy influence, yet at other times, protest opportunities occur precisely when the prospects for policy influence is most distant (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). This is, at least partly, a function of whether activists mobilize in response to prospective gains or prospective losses. In the latter case, "winning" may comprise little more than stalling unwanted changes. In this regard, both the immigrant rights and anti-immigrant movements mentioned at the outset of this chapter could claim defeats or victories: neither side got what it wanted.

Scholars examine how activists respond to changes in the political context. Taylor (1989), for example, focuses specifically on constricting political opportunities in her study of the women's movement. She finds that when opportunities are scarce, social movements can enter what she describes as an "abeyance" phase, sacrificing outreach in order to maintain values and the connections among the faithful. Although the activists Taylor describes halted their public actions, they did so in response to external factors beyond their control, a "shifting constellation of factors exogenous to the movement itself" (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1633).

Scholars have also emphasized that opportunities need to be perceived in order to be meaningful. Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue that activists play the critical role of drawing public attention to potential opportunities for mobilization. Kurzman (1996), in his analysis of the Iranian revolution, contends that public perceptions of the possible are actually *more* significant for mobilization than real changes in political alignment, most importantly emphasizing potential connections between perceptions and material circumstances.

Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) emphasize that movements are not unitary actors challenging the state, but are shifting alliances of individuals and organizations, frequently responding to still other activists, often including countermovements comprising of activists trying to block their opponents from influence. They contend that movements may alter their own opportunities in the future, through strategic choices and effective mobilization, and also the opportunities of their opponents.

More recently, scholars have pointed to the international nesting of political opportunities. With increased constraints on many states due to economic, political, and military globalization processes, we need to consider the constraints on local authorities in responding to

insurgent movements. A state's capacity to provide solutions to its own domestic challengers is closely linked to its location within the world hierarchy (Smith 2004). By joining global institutions, states subordinate themselves, which often places their governing powers outside their state boundaries. This most often happens to countries of the Global South whose decisions are often made by members of the Global North. Rothman and Oliver (1999) have used the term "nested opportunity structures" to describe the political opportunity structure for movement actors in a globalized context (also see Meyer 2005). They contend that "local opportunity structures are embedded in national opportunity structures, which are embedded in international political opportunity structures" (Smith 2004: 317). Savvy activists can use the international arena as another place to exercise leverage on local or national authorities, making claims that resonate outside their local context, and activating potentially powerful allies (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005).

HOW PEOPLE PROTEST: ORGANIZATIONS, RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS

Although protest may appear spontaneous, it rarely is. Instead, activists employ a variety of organizational forms to invoke and coordinate the mobilization of supporters, to make appeals to elite public sympathizers, and to promote social change (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Organizations, rather than isolated individuals, promote most social movement action, and also comprise the sites in which activists devise strategies for mobilization and influence. Following McCarthy and Zald (1977), much research puts formal organizations at the center of analysis, even while recognizing that organizations themselves depend upon the external environment. The availability and flow of resources affect how organizations develop, which subsequently affects how people can mobilize and what impact they might have.

Scholars disagree about how organizations affect the social movements they participate in. Piven and Cloward (1977), in an historical study of social protest by poor people and state responses, argue that by coordinating dissent membership organizations effectively stifle dissent and minimize its impact. They caution activists to be wary of creating organizations, developing memberships, and seeking institutional channels for grievance making, and laud "cadre" organizations which focus on stoking mobilization. They further contend that organizations focused on making political gains and ensuring their own survival develop professionalized leadership to cultivate stable relationships with funders and authorities, and that the pursuit of these relationships ultimately undermines the only potentially effective resources poor people have – social disruption. They see political institutionalization as the endpoint for potentially effective political mobilization.

The work by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Piven and Cloward (1977) ignited a continuing scholarly debate on the influence of organizational forms on social movement politics. We think it makes sense to recognize that the effects of professionalization and institutionalization will be contingent upon both context and constituency. Looking at the abortion rights movement, for example, Suzanne Staggenborg (1988) finds advantages in formalized organizations with professional staff. A professional staff can become expert in not only the politics of an issue, but also the politics of process, quickly identifying and responding to political openings that grassroots activists might miss, and nimbly generating effective responses. Membership, often less informed, committed, or proficient, provides resources for collective action, sometimes only by writing checks. The membership often tends to be more conservative than the professional staff, and some contemporary movement organizations have developed organizational structures to minimize their influence (Kretschmer and Meyer 2007.)

Any organization faces the existential challenge of balancing multiple objectives and audiences. In order to survive, an organization must be attentive to maintaining sufficient support, financial and otherwise, to operate; in order to exercise political influence, its leaders must be attentive to political circumstances, the demands of the political arena, shifts in the salience of issues and the alignments of allies. Often different audiences make demands that are antithetical (Meyer 2007). Organized groups develop different strategies to balance these often conflicting demands. The National Organization for Women, for example, developed variegated institutional structures at the local level that afforded activists interested in political action and those interested in consciousness raising separate sites and institutional structures for collective action (Reger and Staggenborg 2006).

At once, organizations are a site in which activists aggregate and deploy resources including “human time, effort, and money” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). But resources can also be moral, cultural, and social. Some resources are fungible and can be hoarded, while others, such as cultural legitimacy, are context-dependent and often ephemeral, although sometimes activists can use them to leverage more tangible resources. Resources of all sorts often come with restrictions linked to their character and their source. Indigenous resources (Morris 1984), that is, those that come from within a movement’s core constituency may come only with a demonstrated commitment to that community, and are not always sustainable over a long period of time. When states or other authorities grant recognition and rewards, along with the promise of a stable flow of resources, accepting those benefits can channel activist efforts toward less controversial issues and less disruptive tactics (Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). The nature and availability of resources affects strategies for organization, mobilization, and for influence (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

Because indigenous and exogenous resources often come together, it is difficult to sort out the independent effects of community support and outside recognition. For example, Jenkins and Perrow’s (1977) study of farm worker mobilization ascribes the success of the United Farm Workers (UFW) to external support from elites who tolerated the boycott and organized labor and well-established liberal allies, who supported it (also see Jenkins 1985). In contrast, Ganz (2000) looks at the same case and emphasizes the personal histories, commitments, and strategic choices of a leadership firmly embedded in the Chicano community in California. This authenticity afforded the leadership with access to information, mobilization networks, and an extensive repertoire of collective action. The organizers also included activists schooled in other social movements, including the civil rights and consumer movements, and brought distinct networks that helped publicize and generate support for the boycott. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive explanations. Activists employed a strategy to take advantage of both outside and indigenous resources, and their efforts both reflected and affected their opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996).

The role of strategy in mobilizing resources is obviously critical, but social movement scholarship is just beginning to address strategy more systematically. We see strategies as choices about claims, issues, allies, frames, identity, resources, and tactics that movements can draw on (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007). Opportunities, resources, values, and identities often shape tactics and strategies. For example, while Piven and Cloward (1977) may be right that disruption is the best route to political influence *for poor people*, other constituencies with more varied pathways to influence may have better options; rich people, for example, *don’t* generally march on Washington.

Although activists make strategic decisions, they do not control the context in which they do so; both external and internal factors influence strategy. McAdam (1983), for example, saw strategic shifts in the civil rights movement as resulting from activist interactions with authorities. When police found ways to counter movement initiatives, activists tried

new approaches, innovating new political tactics and simultaneously invigorating all sorts of movement efforts. But activists are also guided, or constrained, by internal factors. In her study of the suffrage movement, for example, McCammon (2003) found that organizational diversity, decentralization, and interorganizational conflict affected strategic decisions within a movement. Importantly, although a wide range of strategic approaches are *theoretically* available, in practice activists employ a very narrow tactical repertoire (Tilly 1978). They are constrained not only by resources, but also identity. A collective sense of identity and value forecloses many options, for example, whether or not to consider violence. When activists make choices about what to do, they are also making statements about who they are (Polletta and Jasper 2001).

When one group demonstrates success with a particular approach, other claimants are likely to emulate it (Meyer and Boutcher 2007). Different constituencies learn about and imitate a sit-in, boycott, petition, or demonstration style from initiators who may be engaged with completely different claims, potentially even including political opponents. In effect, a tactic diffuses across geographic space and movement constituency. Soule (2004) observes that tactical templates are transmitted and adopted through social ties and established communication channels. In this way, a tactic or style of organization becomes divorced from the group that developed it, and could be picked up by other collective actors with different, potentially even oppositional, concerns. Tarrow (1998) describes this portability as “modularity.” We observe that this applies not only to tactics, such as the mass demonstration or the sit-in, but also styles of presentation of self. In this way, it is not surprising that Black Panthers’ success in winning attention led to the development of the Brown Berets (representing Chicanos) and the Gray Panthers (representing senior citizens). Organizations recruit and represent individuals using the prevalent templates of the time and place.

WHY PEOPLE JOIN: RECRUITMENT AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Early social movement literature explains participation in movements by looking at social-psychological factors. Based on Durkheim’s (1984, [1893]) concept of anomie, analysts pointed to social disintegration as a cause for people joining social movements (Kornhauser 1959). Essentially, they saw social movement participation as a departure from other forms of politics, and as a sign of social dysfunction or individual pathologies. Although this assumption persists, particularly in popular discourse, it has not stood up to empirical examination, which has consistently demonstrated the opposite. Studies of movement participants consistently find activists, particularly leaders, to be more socially and psychologically integrated than their less active colleagues (e.g., Kenniston 1968; McAdam 1988).

The question remains, however, about how and why some people sometimes get involved in activism. The recognition that better connected and more socially integrated individuals were more likely to participate in movement politics led scholars to examine the nature of those social ties and networks (Diani 2004). People mobilize, generally, only after being asked to do something and social networks provide a mechanism for recruitment (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Organizers first recruit the people they know. People who are more active and engaged in social life are more likely to be recruited.

Initial engagement in movement activity must deepen an individual’s commitment to a cause or community in order to spur sustained participation. Snow et al. (1980) attribute sustained participation to “alternative networks and intense interaction with movement members.” Activists make links between identities and movement causes in order to recruit participants (McAdam and

Paulsen 1993). These identity–movement linkages build social ties and deepen individual commitments, such that the rationale and motives for participation are emergent and interactional (Snow et al. 1980). Individuals may choose to mobilize because a movement identity resonates with their own, but their participation also shapes their emergent identity, creating a link between interest and identity (Whittier 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001).

Hunt and Benford (2004) distinguish between *identification of a collectivity* and *identification with a collectivity*; the first points to externally created social categories, while the latter emphasizes more or less deliberate affective and intellectual choices. These externally created social categories are often based on ascriptive characteristics such as gender and race. The second category is identified by Hunt and Benford as the site for mobilizing mutuality and solidarity. A woman recognizes herself – and is recognized by others – as a woman, for example, not necessarily as a women’s rights or feminist activist. Being a woman is not typically volitional, but identifying, as a feminist is inherently political. This volitional commitment, in concert with external or real social and material circumstances, creates collective identities.

Taylor and Whittier (1992) note that activists construct solidarity and collective identities in at least three ways. First, activists use externally created boundaries that “establish differences between challenging and dominant groups” to organize and mobilize people (Taylor and Whittier 1992: 111); they build upon and activate existing racial and social categories in order to provoke collective identity, and thereby, action. Second, activists employ and invoke an “interpretive framework” or consciousness to define themselves as being apart from others, including opponents, and employ ascribed characteristics to forge affective ties and feelings of solidarity. Third, activists create or appropriate symbols that signify the relationship of their group to others and signify internal solidarity and social life. Thus, organizers build collective identity by recognizing and emphasizing pre-existing boundaries, stoking consciousness that connects a group’s structural position and identity, and developing an interpretive process that allows participants to reinterpret aspects of daily life and make them matters of contest (Taylor and Whittier 1992). Importantly, insurgent identities can be based on belief (e.g., vegetarianism, opposition to taxation, environmentalism) as well as more obvious social categories.

The external environment also affects collective identity formation by setting the terms of engagement when activists approach identity work. Political opportunities and critical events affect collective identities by shifting how salient activists’ preferred issues are (Meyer 2004; Staggenborg 1993). We know, for example, that careless environmental policy enhances the prospects of people identifying as an environmentalist, and that aggressive foreign policy triggers the prospects for mobilizing peace activist as a salient identity. In addition to government policy, society-generated events can also be critical. For example, in 1982, two unemployed autoworkers in a Detroit suburb killed Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, in an expression of frustration at the Japanese auto industry’s success in American markets. Chin’s death provided instant credibility and political salience for activist organizations that had spent more than a decade trying to promote an Asian-American political identity (Espiritu 1992; Zia 2000). More generally, the world outside a movement provides the raw materials activists use to construct and mobilize a collective identity, but once created, such identities respond to both external events and activist experiences.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY MAINTENANCE AND EROSION

Constructed collective identities are inherently unstable; activists work hard to maintain them, and sometimes even hard work is not enough. Both external and internal factors can erode

collective identities. Political, social, and economic factors affect which collective identities will remain salient and survive. At the same time, activists have a diverse set of tactics at their disposal to keep communities intact when political opportunities shift. We can outline the processes in which collective identities erode. Here, we will focus on the circumstances that lead to identity erosion. Next, we will highlight the tactics many activists employ.

The apparent reduction of threats or opportunities, either political or personal, makes it harder for activists to maintain a distinct identity. We can draw from the literature on ethnic identity to understand how social and economic factors, including demographic shifts, may affect identity cohesiveness. Ethnic identity scholars often address assimilation processes by assessing dominant groups' acceptance of ethnic minorities. They see exogamy as an indicator of a group's social acceptance and a predictor of ethnic identity decay. When interethnic couples begin to have children, those children frequently do not share the same feelings of ethnic solidarity as their parents (Lee and Bean 2007). Reduced discrimination lessens apparent threats that might maintain a collective identity. Residential and occupational desegregation and a lessened commitment to distinctive language or cultural practices often come with out-marriage. All told, ethnic identity becomes a less powerful predictor of life chances, and a less salient basis for collective identity and mobilization, and not inherently political.

Of course, exogamy is hardly a reliable factor for assessing groups that mobilize more directly on the basis of belief. For groups that mobilize on the basis of belief, government policy is likely to be more significant than social acceptance. Reduced regulation of toxic waste, an accident at a nuclear plant, or enhanced reports about global warming, for example, can lead an identity as an environmentalist to supersede other competing identities. Political salience promotes personal identification. For such identities, political institutionalization takes the place of social acceptance. When government accepts some portion of activist claims as legitimate and offers some faction of a movement a role in government or the policymaking process, it is more difficult for activists to mobilize movement activity (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Political incorporation effectively emphasizes the differences within a movement community, rather than between that movement and authorities. When political salience diminishes, groups can turn to other ways to define themselves. For example, ethnic groups that once mobilized to make political claims about social acceptance or civil rights may shift to focus on preserving cultural traditions (Tuan 1998).

The mainstreaming of movement symbols or icons can also contribute to identity erosion. Decontextualized symbols no longer function as signifiers for movements and lose their potential to mobilize people. These symbols become universal, no longer exclusive to a particular movement, and hence no longer powerful signifiers. Heroic icons, Martin Luther King or Pete Seeger, for example, become the property of mainstream culture, and thus, no one's in particular (Bromberg and Fine 2002). Posthumously, King has been claimed and quoted by political actors who opposed him during his life and promoted policies he would likely find anathema. Still living, Pete Seeger is perhaps more difficult, but in the process of being transformed into an American icon, public understanding of his background and politics is pushed to the back burner, at most (Bromberg and Fine 2002). Other examples abound – the mass production and consumption of items with Che Guevara's face printed on them make the revolutionary into a fashion icon, displayed by people with no necessary commitment to his politics.

Unambiguous victories and defeats can contribute to identity erosion for movement communities. We know that people are likely to mobilize when they believe their efforts are necessary (threat) and at least potentially effective in getting what they want (opportunity) (Meyer 2007). Victories that make mobilization appear unnecessary or defeats that make it

appear futile both undermine the maintenance of a movement identity. Paradoxically, this often seems to happen as groups make institutional inroads. As example, the reform of rape laws in the 1970s, accompanied by government support for victim services and rape crisis centers, professionalized (and depoliticized) the centers (Matthews 1994; Gornick and Meyer 1998). Thus, substantial victories contributed to a demobilization and redefinition of a feminist identity.

Government action shifts the salience of political identities by ameliorating or stoking grievances. At the same time political organizations employ different tactics to maintain their group solidarity. First, activists may broaden the agenda by extending the movement's scope and claims. They can do this by connecting the group identity to salient issues in the mainstream political arena. For example, feminists who claim victories in addressing workplace discrimination can shift their attention to college sports; environmentalists who stall the development of nuclear power can address climate change. Additionally, groups may also create bridges to other movements and more salient issues through coalition work. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Organization for Women both participated in the movement against the Iraq war through Win without War, even although connections between foreign and military policy and their core concerns were hardly obvious (Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Second, activists may turn inward by reducing outreach and focusing on maintaining commitment and connection among core activists. Taylor (1989) terms this turn inward "abeyance," when movements generally retreat from the public arena to cultivate internal solidarities and counter identity erosion. In an effort to maintain loyal members, movements in abeyance may push less committed members out. Additionally, movements in abeyance are less likely to create coalitions and alliances, foregoing opportunities to expand to focus on maintaining what they have (Sawyers and Meyer 1999).

Third, activists may find and construct threats in order to maintain a sense of urgency among constituents and sympathizers. When the policy process and society do not produce overt threats, activists can highlight potential threats or maintain the memory of previous discrimination and collective responses. Activists on both sides of the abortion issue eagerly and publicly interpret each Supreme Court decision as a potential threat (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), while ethnic activists focus on commemorating (and not forgetting) the Armenian genocide, the Japanese internment, or the Holocaust. Today, Latino educational activists recall the high school walkouts during the Chicano student movements in 1968 to draw attention to current Latino educational grievances (Torres 2008).

Fourth, activists may create and draw on existing symbols and work to redefine them to their own purposes. For example, at the onset of the immigration movement in 2006, activists waved flags of various countries at demonstrations; they shifted over time to highlight the American flag and make a claim for the immigrants' status in the United States and endorse a call for incorporation. CODEPINK claimed a traditionally feminine color and made it a signal for aggressive (feminist) activism. Both efforts contest the meaning of existing symbols and deploy a vital activist collective identity.

HOW MOVEMENTS MATTER

Activists and authorities act as if movements *may* matter; we need to take their potential influence seriously. But the conditions that promote movements also lead to social change through other means, making it hard to pinpoint influence (Amenta 2006; Amenta and Young 1999). And, partly because movements are comprised of diverse coalitions with a range of

goals, movements *never* get all they want or ask for (Meyer 2006). We can see movement outcomes on several distinct, but interrelated outcomes, including public policy, culture, movement organizations, and the individuals who participate in movements (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Meyer et al. 2005).

Most movements make claims on matters of policy, but assessing influence is no simple matter. Gamson (1990) examined a random sample of “challenging organizations” in the United States prior to World War II, and looked to see if any portion of their demands were adopted by government in the next 15 years. He sought to identify the organizational and strategic elements of the successful groups. The obvious challenge, however, is that these groups were rarely alone in the policy process, and it is hard to pinpoint which group influenced what policy and how. More likely, a range of groups mobilizing a variety of related claims through diverse tactics exercise a synergistic effect on the policy process.

Most subsequent studies are less ambitious in the range of policies studied. Garrow (1978) carefully traced one event, the passage of Voting Rights Reform, to a set of civil rights protests in Selma, Alabama. Through process tracing, he makes a persuasive claim that racist violence against the demonstrators helped sway public opinion in favor of civil rights action, and that President Lyndon Johnson was eager – and able – to exploit the reform sentiment by appealing to public opinion and lobbying individual legislators. We learn how movements can work from this study, as collective action polarized opinion and mobilized outside support in Congress. This is not, however, a template recipe for movement influence, nor is there one. The components of policy responses, however, are recurrent; political authorities execute policy changes in efforts to quell or exploit collective action from a constituency that has the potential to matter. Sometimes, these constituencies matter by threatening the survival of the regime; sometimes, they matter by offering political advantages in more conventional politics. Just as social movements respond to threats and opportunities, they also create threats and opportunities for authorities.

Political authorities employ a broad range of responses to social movements, including repression, substantive policy reforms, and symbolic inclusion. Movements can exercise influence without getting what they want. McAdam and Su (2002) find that antiwar activism during the Vietnam era spurred repeated Congressional consideration of anti-war measures, but not victories. They suggest that the movement failed to find more effective ways to balance threat and persuasion. On the other hand, in response to the movement, President Nixon ended the military draft, a small part of what activists demanded, and for the following 30 years, American presidents avoided extended military engagements abroad, at least partly to avoid their political fallout. Movements can exercise unforeseen influence over a long period of time, partly through relationships with institutional actors (Amenta 2006; Meyer 2005).

A social movement’s success in getting what its partisans want is highly dependent upon the political and policy context (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). In looking at the ratification of the Equal Rights Movement in the United States, for example, Soule and Olzak (2004) emphasize the contingency involved in each state’s ratification of the amendment. They explain the timing of ratifications with reference to both activist efforts within that state and the local political context, particularly public opinion and organized opposition. Raeburn (2004) makes a similar argument about the effectiveness of gay and lesbian activists working within American corporations. The company had to be open to change, but activists still had to mobilize.

Amenta et al. (2005) defines the nature of political contingencies in terms of movement organization matching their claims and tactics with the political context, employing assertive strategies when institutional political supporters are weak, and more moderate approaches when their allies are strong. In looking at American states responding to calls for old-age pensions,

they look at the nature of democratic rules and practices in each state, the nature of the party system, the strength and alignment of the state bureaucracy, and the political alignment of the governing coalition. Strong social movements create new organizations that frequently outlive the high point of protest mobilization (Wilson 1995; Minkoff 1995). Groups, such as NOW, NAACP, and Greenpeace, developed through earlier peaks of feminist, civil rights, and environmental activism. When active mobilization for any of these causes fades, the organizations continue their efforts, monitoring public policy, engaging in public education, and trying to exploit new opportunities for mobilization (Staggenborg 1988). These groups serve as important resources for new episodes of social movements, and also for new efforts in more institutional politics (Andrews 2004).

Social movements also carry new norms, attitudes, and cultural artifacts into the broader culture. Even as social movements draw from mainstream discourse and symbols to promote their causes, activists and sympathizers transform those symbols to create the world they want. These symbols outlive the movements that spawn them and represent new norms in society. As example, the honorific, “Ms.,” advanced by feminists in the 1960s, is accepted in the style books of mainstream media today, and affords women the same privacy about marital status that men had long enjoyed. Of course, the social norms that small change reflects are much broader. Although the explicit political struggle takes up a large share of activist attention, cultural changes may be longer lasting (Earl 2004; Rochon 1998).

Finally, the people who make movements are also influenced by them. Indeed, they carry commitments and capacities to effect social change in the future. Activists forge new identities in political struggle, and alliances that continue beyond a particular campaign. They develop the sense of efficacy to see themselves as agents of change, as well as organizational and personal connections that facilitate subsequent action. Activists interpret their past and their present experiences politically, and see the reach of politics in both movement contexts and everyday life (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Whittier 1997). Activists bring the experiences and connections of past movements into new campaigns on a range of other issues. Veterans of the Freedom Summer civil rights campaign, for example, became leaders in the peace, student, and feminist movements of the 1960s (McAdam 1988). Activists schooled in the environmental, peace, and feminist movements reinvigorated local union chapters in the 1990s (Voss and Sherman 2000). The larger point, however, is that social movements exercise influence in a wide range of venues through an even larger number of mechanisms. Influence can persist over a very long period of time, and often includes effects that activists did not directly seek.

CONCLUSION

Social protest movements are an important feature of modern social and political life, one that simultaneously attracts and frustrates scholarly analysts. Because social movements are a dynamic political form that links institutional and extra-institutional actors, and includes conventional and unconventional political behavior, the field has been slow even in developing a consensual definition of the phenomenon under study. In addition to an unavoidable definitional blurriness, social movements rarely have discrete beginnings and endings. We find even apparently sudden and spontaneous campaigns in debt to activists, organizations, and ideas from past campaigns, and that both visible and less visible social movement challenges leave behind their own policy, organizational, and activist legacies.

Visible challenges emerge when large numbers of people see that protest mobilization is both necessary and *potentially* effective in protecting their interests. These judgments, necessarily imprecise and uncertain, are made with an eye on mainstream politics and policy, and are subject to constant readjustment. In the course of developing a challenging movement, activists develop a sense of themselves as agents in history, and develop an affiliation with others who are like-minded. This affiliation, or collective identity, also reflects both subjective judgments about objective reality. And, like the sense of possibility, the sense of collective identity is dynamic, responding to both exogenous circumstance and activist efforts. Organizers work to build both efficacy and identity in the context of a larger environment they can only sometimes influence.

If the study of these slippery phenomena brings certain frustrations, surely they are no greater than those activists on a wide range of issues confront daily. They steel themselves with the recognition that their efforts might bring about a better world. We continue in pursuit of a better understanding of that world as it emerges.

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CHAPTER 12

Social Movements and Contentious Politics

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On May 1, 2006 immigration rights activists staged rallies across the United States. Immigrants and their supporters spilled out into the streets of most major American cities, reacting against a bill under consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives. The so-called “Sensenbrenner Bill” (H.R. 4437) proposed austere immigration policies, including the construction of a 700-mile fence along the U.S.–Mexico border and the detention and criminalization of undocumented immigrants. In Los Angeles, the “March 25 Coalition,” comprised of more than 100 political and immigrant rights organizations, planned a demonstration which brought an estimated one million people to the streets (Archibold 2006; *March 25 Coalition*). Protesters wore white t-shirts, and carried signs that read: “Si Se Puede/Yes We Can,” “We are America,” “We are not Criminals,” and “We have a dream too.” Some carried American flags. Organizers also announced a boycott, with the intent of demonstrating the consumer and labor power of immigrants and their supporters through a “day without immigrants” (CNN.com 2006).

The May 1st rallies attracted numerous protesters with diverse backgrounds and interests, who united to make claims for more humane and just immigration policies. Of course, they differed on just what constituted just immigration policy. Some demanded amnesty, a path to citizenship, or family unification laws, while others made bolder claims, calling for no borders, no fences, no criminalization, and no stricter enforcement practices. Meanwhile, local unions saw the immigration issue as a vehicle for making broader claims about the rights of workers (Narro et al. 2007; *We Are America; March 25 Coalition*).

Moreover, advocates of immigrants’ rights and welfare were not the only ones protesting. Members of the Minuteman Project, a group that supports strict border vigilance and harsh treatment toward illegal immigrants, organized a May 1st countermobilization (Arellano 2006). The Minutemen used similar tactics to the immigrants’ rights organizers, chanting and holding signs. They also organized vigilante patrols at selected spots along the Mexican border, promising to inform appropriate immigration authorities about unusual activities they might observe, orchestrated a cross-country caravan to protest illegal immigration, and sponsored several candidates for elective office.

The mobilization and countermobilization on immigration during 2006 presents an interesting case that illustrates the phenomena of social movements and contentious politics.

First, both sides in the immigration debate are comprised of diverse interests, working together on one set of issues while, at least temporarily, papering over other potential differences. Since participants in each movement differed on what comprises just immigration policy, this case displays how meaning-making processes, including framing and narrative evolve within movements. Second, through the use of American flags, white t-shirts to signify peace, and civil rights movement slogans, the immigration movements show how activists employ symbolic politics to portray themselves and their claims – just as the nomenclature of a “Minuteman” project conspicuously tries to tie its partisans and its claims, at least rhetorically, to the rebels who staged the successful American revolution more than 200 years earlier, evoking positive associations. Third, the immigration marches, keying off perceived threats and opportunities in national politics, responding to, and ultimately stalemating, a debate in Congress, show the clear connections between movement politics in the streets and more institutional politics and public policy.

The recent activities of social movements concerned with immigration provides an excellent illustration of major issues involved in understanding this particular form of claims-making and social organization, but they are by no means unique. In this chapter, we will review the development of the scholarly literature on social movements, highlighting selected major theoretical contributions in the field, and identifying a few issues that should spur further work. We begin by defining social movements and why they matter, with particular attention to differences based on the context in which they take place. Next, we explore when social movements occur and the forms movements take by looking at organizations, resources, strategies, and tactics. We also assess the role of social movements on the individual level, discussing why people join, how movements recruit, and the role of collective identities. Finally, we consider the effects of movements on participants’ lives, organizations, other movements, conventional politics, public policy, and culture.

DEFINING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Scholars have long debated not only how movements work, but even just what they are. These disagreements are rooted, at least partly, in the types of phenomena observed and described as “social movements.” Scholars who focus on the cultural components of protest movements, for example, such as identity practices (Snow 2004), and those who focus on political claims directed at matters of policy, like old-age relief (Amenta 1998), argue about what constitutes a social movement target. Others differ in their interpretation of how extended a challenge must be in order to qualify as a movement, arguing about the relationship of particular episodes to larger campaigns.

Tarrow (1998: 4) offers a concise and useful definition, seeing social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” This definition implies collectivities engaged in a dispute with actors in power over a prolonged period of time. Even here, however, critics have extended the range of phenomena they wish to consider as social movements. Snow (2004), for example, argues that movements can challenge a wide range of “systems or structures of authority,” contending that challenges to (or within) nongovernment targets, such as organizations, religious orders, and cultural norms, can also usefully be considered as movements. He argues that the same basic questions and mechanisms are at work in challenges that occur well outside the range of state attention. Indeed, ultimately Tarrow agrees with extending the conceptual reach of the field. In recent collaborative work (McAdam et al. 2001), he contends

that the same dynamics and mechanisms at work in social movements' political challenges can be observed in all sorts of political contention.

The other important extension is regarding the continuity and visibility of social movement challenges. Verta Taylor (1989; also see Rupp and Taylor 1987) argues that challengers persist in cultivating and spreading their beliefs during times of apparent quiescence, such that there are important connections between ostensibly separate episodes of contention, even separations that may last decades. Her observations come from the women's movement operating in the United States (also see Whittier 1997), but we must posit similar dynamics in other contexts, thinking about revolutionary campaigns that extend over decades, as well as the seemingly spontaneous eruption of activism and organization that emerges when authoritarian government weakens, as in the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 (Meyer and Marullo 1992; Havel 1985).

We agree that the concepts developed in social movement theory offer useful analytical leverage in understanding a range of political phenomena not always recognized as social movements. These theories often vary by context, especially between research about the Global South and in advanced industrialized democracies.

In the Global South, for example, revolutionary movements appear far more visible – and potentially more significant – than the more modest reformist campaigns that tend to emerge in Western democracies. Movement actors in the Global South may communicate their disenchantment with conventional politics by employing noninstitutional tactics. Frequently, they lack institutional alternatives for making claims. In contrast, challengers in advanced industrialized states that feature some form of liberal democracy, will often also employ any available institutional means to affect public policy, thus (at least implicitly) supporting the political system. It makes sense that challenges about issues like, water quality, for example, would take different forms in different contexts. In Bolivia, for example, we see the Cochabamba water wars that veer to challenge the regime (Dolinsky 2001). In Western democracies, in contrast, challengers with somewhat analogous concerns may be circulating petitions and testifying at hearings (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

Boudreau (1996: 180) describes differences between movements in the North and Global South by distinguishing between grievances about productive resources versus those dealing with the “currency of policy.” Social movements in the South frequently seek control of the state, almost naturally morphing into revolutionary campaigns. Importantly, authorities in non-democracies and less wealthy states frequently – and appropriately – view challenging social movements as threats to the survival of their regime. Their responses to these threats often entail explicit repression, and the patterns of repression shape the development of their challengers (Boudreau 2004).

In contrast, in the liberal democratic systems that govern most wealthy nations, dissatisfied constituents making claims on matters of policy has become a routine element of mainstream politics. The sometimes successful efforts of previous social movements to enhance institutional political leverage have encouraged a wide range of claimants to augment their institutional strategies with tactics associated with social movements, including mass demonstrations, petition campaigns, and even (limited) illegal protests (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Social movements in liberal states are more likely to seek sustained influence and organizational survival than control of the state. In liberal contexts, movements have become part of *normal* politics, and authorities generally work to incorporate some portion of their claims or constituents.

Thus, scholars attach the term “social movement” to such diverse phenomena as clandestine revolutionary campaigns in the South and more visible and routine politics about topics like water quality or food labeling in advanced industrialized democracies. We believe that as different as these phenomena appear, similar dynamics of claims-making and interaction with

authorities characterize both, and that we can devise more general theories that consider the influence of context. Here, we will consider the context in which protest emerges, the forms social movements take and the kinds of claims-making they employ, and finally, the effects they sometimes exercise.

WHEN PEOPLE ENGAGE IN MOVEMENTS: OPPORTUNITIES

Most people have a range of concerns outside politics, and are likely to engage in social movements only if and when they believe such participation is necessary for them to get what they want, and at least potentially effective (Meyer 2007). Although individuals make these calculations about their political needs and prospects differently, external circumstances dramatically affect the urgency or promise of particular issues as well as the apparent viability of different strategies of influence. Social movement actors look to the political climate for cues on when to mobilize and on what issues (Tarrow 1998).

Scholars use the term “political opportunities” to refer generally to the world outside a social movement, and use the concept to examine how that context influences the politics within a movement and the interaction of a movement with the world around it (Meyer 2004). Although there is a broad recognition in the field about the importance of context, scholars differ on what elements of the structure of political opportunities affect social movements and how (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Typically, scholars focus on the grievances of public policies and the openness of authorities, institutionally and dispositionally, to challengers. The challenge, of course, is that opportunities and grievances of concern to one set of claimants are different from those that concern others, and welcomes from institutional elites can provoke either institutional action or protest, depending upon where the constituency is in relation to the political system. Similarly, sometimes an apparent closing of political access can lead claimants to augment institutional politics with extra-institutional mobilization. In this way, both promises and threats can invigorate social movements.

This literature springs from pioneering work by Peter Eisinger (1973), who sought to explain why *some* American cities faced urban riots in the 1960s. Focusing on local political context, Eisinger concluded that cities that afforded dissatisfied residents *some* access to mainstream institutions were most likely to face riots; cities with more institutional access preempted riots, while those without institutional openings repressed or discouraged them. Tilly (1978) raised this insight to analysis of national politics, and Doug McAdam (1982) used the ideas to trace the development of African-American activism in the United States. McAdam (1982) concluded that activists responded to institutional openings, and his findings seem to apply to longitudinal studies of some other identity-based movements (e.g., Costain 1992). These key works traced movements that waxed and waned in response to political openness, which is the only one sort of opportunity for mobilization. Other scholars (e.g., Meyer 1990; Smith 1996) have found movements respond to the withdrawal of institutional access. If we return to an older insight, activists need to believe that protest is both necessary, and at least potentially effective, we can make sense of this apparent paradox. Simply, some groups need openings to see the possibility of influence, whereas others need to be excluded to recognize the necessity of social movement activity.

Earlier, policy-oriented, work on social movements emphasized that movements often crest not in response to institutional openings, but in reaction to real or imagined threats to their interests. For poor people, Piven and Cloward (1977) write, large-scale protest only occurs when the structures that support daily life (e.g., work, transfer payments) erode,

making a move to the streets appear as the only prospect for making life better. For other sorts of movements, often comprised of middle-class people, a potential threat to well-being or erosion of preferred policies can help organizers underscore the urgency of their claims and mobilize larger numbers of people. Activists – and indeed most political figures – understand this, often painting their opponents in dramatic and Manichean terms and emphasizing the possibilities of significant losses without mobilization (e.g., Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

Tilly's early formulations (1978) on the effect of context on mobilization stressed the need to consider threat. Later, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) contended that opportunity and threat comprised distinct factors that could coexist, driving mobilization. The former represented potential gains, while the latter, prospective losses. Either – or both – could engage activists, and organizers often mix both in making a pitch for mobilization (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Zuo and Benford 1995; Boutcher et al. 2008). Threats can come from government authorities who plan unwanted policy initiatives as well as from opposing movements which appear to be making gains (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Boutcher et al. 2008). We see both threats and political openings as components in the larger structure of political opportunities activists face, comprising the raw material activists use to make appeals for action.

More broadly, political opportunities affect a social movement's potential to mobilize, advance particular claims, cultivate alliances, employ particular strategies and tactics, and influence mainstream institutional politics and policy (Meyer 2004). The puzzles remain, however, as openings that encourage protest mobilization sometimes line up with opportunities for policy influence, yet at other times, protest opportunities occur precisely when the prospects for policy influence is most distant (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). This is, at least partly, a function of whether activists mobilize in response to prospective gains or prospective losses. In the latter case, "winning" may comprise little more than stalling unwanted changes. In this regard, both the immigrant rights and anti-immigrant movements mentioned at the outset of this chapter could claim defeats or victories: neither side got what it wanted.

Scholars examine how activists respond to changes in the political context. Taylor (1989), for example, focuses specifically on constricting political opportunities in her study of the women's movement. She finds that when opportunities are scarce, social movements can enter what she describes as an "abeyance" phase, sacrificing outreach in order to maintain values and the connections among the faithful. Although the activists Taylor describes halted their public actions, they did so in response to external factors beyond their control, a "shifting constellation of factors exogenous to the movement itself" (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1633).

Scholars have also emphasized that opportunities need to be perceived in order to be meaningful. Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue that activists play the critical role of drawing public attention to potential opportunities for mobilization. Kurzman (1996), in his analysis of the Iranian revolution, contends that public perceptions of the possible are actually *more* significant for mobilization than real changes in political alignment, most importantly emphasizing potential connections between perceptions and material circumstances.

Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) emphasize that movements are not unitary actors challenging the state, but are shifting alliances of individuals and organizations, frequently responding to still other activists, often including countermovements comprising of activists trying to block their opponents from influence. They contend that movements may alter their own opportunities in the future, through strategic choices and effective mobilization, and also the opportunities of their opponents.

More recently, scholars have pointed to the international nesting of political opportunities. With increased constraints on many states due to economic, political, and military globalization processes, we need to consider the constraints on local authorities in responding to

insurgent movements. A state's capacity to provide solutions to its own domestic challengers is closely linked to its location within the world hierarchy (Smith 2004). By joining global institutions, states subordinate themselves, which often places their governing powers outside their state boundaries. This most often happens to countries of the Global South whose decisions are often made by members of the Global North. Rothman and Oliver (1999) have used the term "nested opportunity structures" to describe the political opportunity structure for movement actors in a globalized context (also see Meyer 2005). They contend that "local opportunity structures are embedded in national opportunity structures, which are embedded in international political opportunity structures" (Smith 2004: 317). Savvy activists can use the international arena as another place to exercise leverage on local or national authorities, making claims that resonate outside their local context, and activating potentially powerful allies (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005).

HOW PEOPLE PROTEST: ORGANIZATIONS, RESOURCES, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS

Although protest may appear spontaneous, it rarely is. Instead, activists employ a variety of organizational forms to invoke and coordinate the mobilization of supporters, to make appeals to elite public sympathizers, and to promote social change (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Organizations, rather than isolated individuals, promote most social movement action, and also comprise the sites in which activists devise strategies for mobilization and influence. Following McCarthy and Zald (1977), much research puts formal organizations at the center of analysis, even while recognizing that organizations themselves depend upon the external environment. The availability and flow of resources affect how organizations develop, which subsequently affects how people can mobilize and what impact they might have.

Scholars disagree about how organizations affect the social movements they participate in. Piven and Cloward (1977), in an historical study of social protest by poor people and state responses, argue that by coordinating dissent membership organizations effectively stifle dissent and minimize its impact. They caution activists to be wary of creating organizations, developing memberships, and seeking institutional channels for grievance making, and laud "cadre" organizations which focus on stoking mobilization. They further contend that organizations focused on making political gains and ensuring their own survival develop professionalized leadership to cultivate stable relationships with funders and authorities, and that the pursuit of these relationships ultimately undermines the only potentially effective resources poor people have – social disruption. They see political institutionalization as the endpoint for potentially effective political mobilization.

The work by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Piven and Cloward (1977) ignited a continuing scholarly debate on the influence of organizational forms on social movement politics. We think it makes sense to recognize that the effects of professionalization and institutionalization will be contingent upon both context and constituency. Looking at the abortion rights movement, for example, Suzanne Staggenborg (1988) finds advantages in formalized organizations with professional staff. A professional staff can become expert in not only the politics of an issue, but also the politics of process, quickly identifying and responding to political openings that grassroots activists might miss, and nimbly generating effective responses. Membership, often less informed, committed, or proficient, provides resources for collective action, sometimes only by writing checks. The membership often tends to be more conservative than the professional staff, and some contemporary movement organizations have developed organizational structures to minimize their influence (Kretschmer and Meyer 2007.)

Any organization faces the existential challenge of balancing multiple objectives and audiences. In order to survive, an organization must be attentive to maintaining sufficient support, financial and otherwise, to operate; in order to exercise political influence, its leaders must be attentive to political circumstances, the demands of the political arena, shifts in the salience of issues and the alignments of allies. Often different audiences make demands that are antithetical (Meyer 2007). Organized groups develop different strategies to balance these often conflicting demands. The National Organization for Women, for example, developed variegated institutional structures at the local level that afforded activists interested in political action and those interested in consciousness raising separate sites and institutional structures for collective action (Reger and Staggenborg 2006).

At once, organizations are a site in which activists aggregate and deploy resources including “human time, effort, and money” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). But resources can also be moral, cultural, and social. Some resources are fungible and can be hoarded, while others, such as cultural legitimacy, are context-dependent and often ephemeral, although sometimes activists can use them to leverage more tangible resources. Resources of all sorts often come with restrictions linked to their character and their source. Indigenous resources (Morris 1984), that is, those that come from within a movement’s core constituency may come only with a demonstrated commitment to that community, and are not always sustainable over a long period of time. When states or other authorities grant recognition and rewards, along with the promise of a stable flow of resources, accepting those benefits can channel activist efforts toward less controversial issues and less disruptive tactics (Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). The nature and availability of resources affects strategies for organization, mobilization, and for influence (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

Because indigenous and exogenous resources often come together, it is difficult to sort out the independent effects of community support and outside recognition. For example, Jenkins and Perrow’s (1977) study of farm worker mobilization ascribes the success of the United Farm Workers (UFW) to external support from elites who tolerated the boycott and organized labor and well-established liberal allies, who supported it (also see Jenkins 1985). In contrast, Ganz (2000) looks at the same case and emphasizes the personal histories, commitments, and strategic choices of a leadership firmly embedded in the Chicano community in California. This authenticity afforded the leadership with access to information, mobilization networks, and an extensive repertoire of collective action. The organizers also included activists schooled in other social movements, including the civil rights and consumer movements, and brought distinct networks that helped publicize and generate support for the boycott. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive explanations. Activists employed a strategy to take advantage of both outside and indigenous resources, and their efforts both reflected and affected their opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996).

The role of strategy in mobilizing resources is obviously critical, but social movement scholarship is just beginning to address strategy more systematically. We see strategies as choices about claims, issues, allies, frames, identity, resources, and tactics that movements can draw on (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007). Opportunities, resources, values, and identities often shape tactics and strategies. For example, while Piven and Cloward (1977) may be right that disruption is the best route to political influence *for poor people*, other constituencies with more varied pathways to influence may have better options; rich people, for example, *don’t* generally march on Washington.

Although activists make strategic decisions, they do not control the context in which they do so; both external and internal factors influence strategy. McAdam (1983), for example, saw strategic shifts in the civil rights movement as resulting from activist interactions with authorities. When police found ways to counter movement initiatives, activists tried

new approaches, innovating new political tactics and simultaneously invigorating all sorts of movement efforts. But activists are also guided, or constrained, by internal factors. In her study of the suffrage movement, for example, McCammon (2003) found that organizational diversity, decentralization, and interorganizational conflict affected strategic decisions within a movement. Importantly, although a wide range of strategic approaches are *theoretically* available, in practice activists employ a very narrow tactical repertoire (Tilly 1978). They are constrained not only by resources, but also identity. A collective sense of identity and value forecloses many options, for example, whether or not to consider violence. When activists make choices about what to do, they are also making statements about who they are (Polletta and Jasper 2001).

When one group demonstrates success with a particular approach, other claimants are likely to emulate it (Meyer and Boutcher 2007). Different constituencies learn about and imitate a sit-in, boycott, petition, or demonstration style from initiators who may be engaged with completely different claims, potentially even including political opponents. In effect, a tactic diffuses across geographic space and movement constituency. Soule (2004) observes that tactical templates are transmitted and adopted through social ties and established communication channels. In this way, a tactic or style of organization becomes divorced from the group that developed it, and could be picked up by other collective actors with different, potentially even oppositional, concerns. Tarrow (1998) describes this portability as “modularity.” We observe that this applies not only to tactics, such as the mass demonstration or the sit-in, but also styles of presentation of self. In this way, it is not surprising that Black Panthers’ success in winning attention led to the development of the Brown Berets (representing Chicanos) and the Gray Panthers (representing senior citizens). Organizations recruit and represent individuals using the prevalent templates of the time and place.

WHY PEOPLE JOIN: RECRUITMENT AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Early social movement literature explains participation in movements by looking at social-psychological factors. Based on Durkheim’s (1984, [1893]) concept of anomie, analysts pointed to social disintegration as a cause for people joining social movements (Kornhauser 1959). Essentially, they saw social movement participation as a departure from other forms of politics, and as a sign of social dysfunction or individual pathologies. Although this assumption persists, particularly in popular discourse, it has not stood up to empirical examination, which has consistently demonstrated the opposite. Studies of movement participants consistently find activists, particularly leaders, to be more socially and psychologically integrated than their less active colleagues (e.g., Kenniston 1968; McAdam 1988).

The question remains, however, about how and why some people sometimes get involved in activism. The recognition that better connected and more socially integrated individuals were more likely to participate in movement politics led scholars to examine the nature of those social ties and networks (Diani 2004). People mobilize, generally, only after being asked to do something and social networks provide a mechanism for recruitment (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Organizers first recruit the people they know. People who are more active and engaged in social life are more likely to be recruited.

Initial engagement in movement activity must deepen an individual’s commitment to a cause or community in order to spur sustained participation. Snow et al. (1980) attribute sustained participation to “alternative networks and intense interaction with movement members.” Activists make links between identities and movement causes in order to recruit participants (McAdam and

Paulsen 1993). These identity–movement linkages build social ties and deepen individual commitments, such that the rationale and motives for participation are emergent and interactional (Snow et al. 1980). Individuals may choose to mobilize because a movement identity resonates with their own, but their participation also shapes their emergent identity, creating a link between interest and identity (Whittier 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001).

Hunt and Benford (2004) distinguish between *identification of a collectivity* and *identification with a collectivity*; the first points to externally created social categories, while the latter emphasizes more or less deliberate affective and intellectual choices. These externally created social categories are often based on ascriptive characteristics such as gender and race. The second category is identified by Hunt and Benford as the site for mobilizing mutuality and solidarity. A woman recognizes herself – and is recognized by others – as a woman, for example, not necessarily as a women’s rights or feminist activist. Being a woman is not typically volitional, but identifying, as a feminist is inherently political. This volitional commitment, in concert with external or real social and material circumstances, creates collective identities.

Taylor and Whittier (1992) note that activists construct solidarity and collective identities in at least three ways. First, activists use externally created boundaries that “establish differences between challenging and dominant groups” to organize and mobilize people (Taylor and Whittier 1992: 111); they build upon and activate existing racial and social categories in order to provoke collective identity, and thereby, action. Second, activists employ and invoke an “interpretive framework” or consciousness to define themselves as being apart from others, including opponents, and employ ascribed characteristics to forge affective ties and feelings of solidarity. Third, activists create or appropriate symbols that signify the relationship of their group to others and signify internal solidarity and social life. Thus, organizers build collective identity by recognizing and emphasizing pre-existing boundaries, stoking consciousness that connects a group’s structural position and identity, and developing an interpretive process that allows participants to reinterpret aspects of daily life and make them matters of contest (Taylor and Whittier 1992). Importantly, insurgent identities can be based on belief (e.g., vegetarianism, opposition to taxation, environmentalism) as well as more obvious social categories.

The external environment also affects collective identity formation by setting the terms of engagement when activists approach identity work. Political opportunities and critical events affect collective identities by shifting how salient activists’ preferred issues are (Meyer 2004; Staggenborg 1993). We know, for example, that careless environmental policy enhances the prospects of people identifying as an environmentalist, and that aggressive foreign policy triggers the prospects for mobilizing peace activist as a salient identity. In addition to government policy, society-generated events can also be critical. For example, in 1982, two unemployed autoworkers in a Detroit suburb killed Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, in an expression of frustration at the Japanese auto industry’s success in American markets. Chin’s death provided instant credibility and political salience for activist organizations that had spent more than a decade trying to promote an Asian-American political identity (Espiritu 1992; Zia 2000). More generally, the world outside a movement provides the raw materials activists use to construct and mobilize a collective identity, but once created, such identities respond to both external events and activist experiences.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY MAINTENANCE AND EROSION

Constructed collective identities are inherently unstable; activists work hard to maintain them, and sometimes even hard work is not enough. Both external and internal factors can erode

collective identities. Political, social, and economic factors affect which collective identities will remain salient and survive. At the same time, activists have a diverse set of tactics at their disposal to keep communities intact when political opportunities shift. We can outline the processes in which collective identities erode. Here, we will focus on the circumstances that lead to identity erosion. Next, we will highlight the tactics many activists employ.

The apparent reduction of threats or opportunities, either political or personal, makes it harder for activists to maintain a distinct identity. We can draw from the literature on ethnic identity to understand how social and economic factors, including demographic shifts, may affect identity cohesiveness. Ethnic identity scholars often address assimilation processes by assessing dominant groups' acceptance of ethnic minorities. They see exogamy as an indicator of a group's social acceptance and a predictor of ethnic identity decay. When interethnic couples begin to have children, those children frequently do not share the same feelings of ethnic solidarity as their parents (Lee and Bean 2007). Reduced discrimination lessens apparent threats that might maintain a collective identity. Residential and occupational desegregation and a lessened commitment to distinctive language or cultural practices often come with out-marriage. All told, ethnic identity becomes a less powerful predictor of life chances, and a less salient basis for collective identity and mobilization, and not inherently political.

Of course, exogamy is hardly a reliable factor for assessing groups that mobilize more directly on the basis of belief. For groups that mobilize on the basis of belief, government policy is likely to be more significant than social acceptance. Reduced regulation of toxic waste, an accident at a nuclear plant, or enhanced reports about global warming, for example, can lead an identity as an environmentalist to supersede other competing identities. Political salience promotes personal identification. For such identities, political institutionalization takes the place of social acceptance. When government accepts some portion of activist claims as legitimate and offers some faction of a movement a role in government or the policymaking process, it is more difficult for activists to mobilize movement activity (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Political incorporation effectively emphasizes the differences within a movement community, rather than between that movement and authorities. When political salience diminishes, groups can turn to other ways to define themselves. For example, ethnic groups that once mobilized to make political claims about social acceptance or civil rights may shift to focus on preserving cultural traditions (Tuan 1998).

The mainstreaming of movement symbols or icons can also contribute to identity erosion. Decontextualized symbols no longer function as signifiers for movements and lose their potential to mobilize people. These symbols become universal, no longer exclusive to a particular movement, and hence no longer powerful signifiers. Heroic icons, Martin Luther King or Pete Seeger, for example, become the property of mainstream culture, and thus, no one's in particular (Bromberg and Fine 2002). Posthumously, King has been claimed and quoted by political actors who opposed him during his life and promoted policies he would likely find anathema. Still living, Pete Seeger is perhaps more difficult, but in the process of being transformed into an American icon, public understanding of his background and politics is pushed to the back burner, at most (Bromberg and Fine 2002). Other examples abound – the mass production and consumption of items with Che Guevara's face printed on them make the revolutionary into a fashion icon, displayed by people with no necessary commitment to his politics.

Unambiguous victories and defeats can contribute to identity erosion for movement communities. We know that people are likely to mobilize when they believe their efforts are necessary (threat) and at least potentially effective in getting what they want (opportunity) (Meyer 2007). Victories that make mobilization appear unnecessary or defeats that make it

appear futile both undermine the maintenance of a movement identity. Paradoxically, this often seems to happen as groups make institutional inroads. As example, the reform of rape laws in the 1970s, accompanied by government support for victim services and rape crisis centers, professionalized (and depoliticized) the centers (Matthews 1994; Gornick and Meyer 1998). Thus, substantial victories contributed to a demobilization and redefinition of a feminist identity.

Government action shifts the salience of political identities by ameliorating or stoking grievances. At the same time political organizations employ different tactics to maintain their group solidarity. First, activists may broaden the agenda by extending the movement's scope and claims. They can do this by connecting the group identity to salient issues in the mainstream political arena. For example, feminists who claim victories in addressing workplace discrimination can shift their attention to college sports; environmentalists who stall the development of nuclear power can address climate change. Additionally, groups may also create bridges to other movements and more salient issues through coalition work. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Organization for Women both participated in the movement against the Iraq war through Win without War, even although connections between foreign and military policy and their core concerns were hardly obvious (Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005). Second, activists may turn inward by reducing outreach and focusing on maintaining commitment and connection among core activists. Taylor (1989) terms this turn inward "abeyance," when movements generally retreat from the public arena to cultivate internal solidarities and counter identity erosion. In an effort to maintain loyal members, movements in abeyance may push less committed members out. Additionally, movements in abeyance are less likely to create coalitions and alliances, foregoing opportunities to expand to focus on maintaining what they have (Sawyers and Meyer 1999).

Third, activists may find and construct threats in order to maintain a sense of urgency among constituents and sympathizers. When the policy process and society do not produce overt threats, activists can highlight potential threats or maintain the memory of previous discrimination and collective responses. Activists on both sides of the abortion issue eagerly and publicly interpret each Supreme Court decision as a potential threat (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), while ethnic activists focus on commemorating (and not forgetting) the Armenian genocide, the Japanese internment, or the Holocaust. Today, Latino educational activists recall the high school walkouts during the Chicano student movements in 1968 to draw attention to current Latino educational grievances (Torres 2008).

Fourth, activists may create and draw on existing symbols and work to redefine them to their own purposes. For example, at the onset of the immigration movement in 2006, activists waved flags of various countries at demonstrations; they shifted over time to highlight the American flag and make a claim for the immigrants' status in the United States and endorse a call for incorporation. CODEPINK claimed a traditionally feminine color and made it a signal for aggressive (feminist) activism. Both efforts contest the meaning of existing symbols and deploy a vital activist collective identity.

HOW MOVEMENTS MATTER

Activists and authorities act as if movements *may* matter; we need to take their potential influence seriously. But the conditions that promote movements also lead to social change through other means, making it hard to pinpoint influence (Amenta 2006; Amenta and Young 1999). And, partly because movements are comprised of diverse coalitions with a range of

goals, movements *never* get all they want or ask for (Meyer 2006). We can see movement outcomes on several distinct, but interrelated outcomes, including public policy, culture, movement organizations, and the individuals who participate in movements (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Meyer et al. 2005).

Most movements make claims on matters of policy, but assessing influence is no simple matter. Gamson (1990) examined a random sample of “challenging organizations” in the United States prior to World War II, and looked to see if any portion of their demands were adopted by government in the next 15 years. He sought to identify the organizational and strategic elements of the successful groups. The obvious challenge, however, is that these groups were rarely alone in the policy process, and it is hard to pinpoint which group influenced what policy and how. More likely, a range of groups mobilizing a variety of related claims through diverse tactics exercise a synergistic effect on the policy process.

Most subsequent studies are less ambitious in the range of policies studied. Garrow (1978) carefully traced one event, the passage of Voting Rights Reform, to a set of civil rights protests in Selma, Alabama. Through process tracing, he makes a persuasive claim that racist violence against the demonstrators helped sway public opinion in favor of civil rights action, and that President Lyndon Johnson was eager – and able – to exploit the reform sentiment by appealing to public opinion and lobbying individual legislators. We learn how movements can work from this study, as collective action polarized opinion and mobilized outside support in Congress. This is not, however, a template recipe for movement influence, nor is there one. The components of policy responses, however, are recurrent; political authorities execute policy changes in efforts to quell or exploit collective action from a constituency that has the potential to matter. Sometimes, these constituencies matter by threatening the survival of the regime; sometimes, they matter by offering political advantages in more conventional politics. Just as social movements respond to threats and opportunities, they also create threats and opportunities for authorities.

Political authorities employ a broad range of responses to social movements, including repression, substantive policy reforms, and symbolic inclusion. Movements can exercise influence without getting what they want. McAdam and Su (2002) find that antiwar activism during the Vietnam era spurred repeated Congressional consideration of anti-war measures, but not victories. They suggest that the movement failed to find more effective ways to balance threat and persuasion. On the other hand, in response to the movement, President Nixon ended the military draft, a small part of what activists demanded, and for the following 30 years, American presidents avoided extended military engagements abroad, at least partly to avoid their political fallout. Movements can exercise unforeseen influence over a long period of time, partly through relationships with institutional actors (Amenta 2006; Meyer 2005).

A social movement’s success in getting what its partisans want is highly dependent upon the political and policy context (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). In looking at the ratification of the Equal Rights Movement in the United States, for example, Soule and Olzak (2004) emphasize the contingency involved in each state’s ratification of the amendment. They explain the timing of ratifications with reference to both activist efforts within that state and the local political context, particularly public opinion and organized opposition. Raeburn (2004) makes a similar argument about the effectiveness of gay and lesbian activists working within American corporations. The company had to be open to change, but activists still had to mobilize.

Amenta et al. (2005) defines the nature of political contingencies in terms of movement organization matching their claims and tactics with the political context, employing assertive strategies when institutional political supporters are weak, and more moderate approaches when their allies are strong. In looking at American states responding to calls for old-age pensions,

they look at the nature of democratic rules and practices in each state, the nature of the party system, the strength and alignment of the state bureaucracy, and the political alignment of the governing coalition. Strong social movements create new organizations that frequently outlive the high point of protest mobilization (Wilson 1995; Minkoff 1995). Groups, such as NOW, NAACP, and Greenpeace, developed through earlier peaks of feminist, civil rights, and environmental activism. When active mobilization for any of these causes fades, the organizations continue their efforts, monitoring public policy, engaging in public education, and trying to exploit new opportunities for mobilization (Staggenborg 1988). These groups serve as important resources for new episodes of social movements, and also for new efforts in more institutional politics (Andrews 2004).

Social movements also carry new norms, attitudes, and cultural artifacts into the broader culture. Even as social movements draw from mainstream discourse and symbols to promote their causes, activists and sympathizers transform those symbols to create the world they want. These symbols outlive the movements that spawn them and represent new norms in society. As example, the honorific, “Ms.,” advanced by feminists in the 1960s, is accepted in the style books of mainstream media today, and affords women the same privacy about marital status that men had long enjoyed. Of course, the social norms that small change reflects are much broader. Although the explicit political struggle takes up a large share of activist attention, cultural changes may be longer lasting (Earl 2004; Rochon 1998).

Finally, the people who make movements are also influenced by them. Indeed, they carry commitments and capacities to effect social change in the future. Activists forge new identities in political struggle, and alliances that continue beyond a particular campaign. They develop the sense of efficacy to see themselves as agents of change, as well as organizational and personal connections that facilitate subsequent action. Activists interpret their past and their present experiences politically, and see the reach of politics in both movement contexts and everyday life (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Whittier 1997). Activists bring the experiences and connections of past movements into new campaigns on a range of other issues. Veterans of the Freedom Summer civil rights campaign, for example, became leaders in the peace, student, and feminist movements of the 1960s (McAdam 1988). Activists schooled in the environmental, peace, and feminist movements reinvigorated local union chapters in the 1990s (Voss and Sherman 2000). The larger point, however, is that social movements exercise influence in a wide range of venues through an even larger number of mechanisms. Influence can persist over a very long period of time, and often includes effects that activists did not directly seek.

CONCLUSION

Social protest movements are an important feature of modern social and political life, one that simultaneously attracts and frustrates scholarly analysts. Because social movements are a dynamic political form that links institutional and extra-institutional actors, and includes conventional and unconventional political behavior, the field has been slow even in developing a consensual definition of the phenomenon under study. In addition to an unavoidable definitional blurriness, social movements rarely have discrete beginnings and endings. We find even apparently sudden and spontaneous campaigns in debt to activists, organizations, and ideas from past campaigns, and that both visible and less visible social movement challenges leave behind their own policy, organizational, and activist legacies.

Visible challenges emerge when large numbers of people see that protest mobilization is both necessary and *potentially* effective in protecting their interests. These judgments, necessarily imprecise and uncertain, are made with an eye on mainstream politics and policy, and are subject to constant readjustment. In the course of developing a challenging movement, activists develop a sense of themselves as agents in history, and develop an affiliation with others who are like-minded. This affiliation, or collective identity, also reflects both subjective judgments about objective reality. And, like the sense of possibility, the sense of collective identity is dynamic, responding to both exogenous circumstance and activist efforts. Organizers work to build both efficacy and identity in the context of a larger environment they can only sometimes influence.

If the study of these slippery phenomena brings certain frustrations, surely they are no greater than those activists on a wide range of issues confront daily. They steel themselves with the recognition that their efforts might bring about a better world. We continue in pursuit of a better understanding of that world as it emerges.

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CHAPTER 13

Political Violence as an Object of Study: The Need for Taxonomic Clarity

EDWARD CRENSHAW AND KRISTOPHER ROBISON

INTRODUCTION

Taxonomies are essential to science because they represent the way human minds work. As Pinker (2002: 203) notes, “intelligence depends on lumping together things that share properties, so that we are not flabbergasted by every new thing we encounter.” The bedrock of our sciences, and especially the social sciences, is neither methodology nor causal modeling, but rather taxonomy (or, more specifically, the construction of variables within a theory-driven schema), for both our methods and our models may produce deeply flawed conclusions if our theoretical objects are poorly constructed or specified. As Lenski (1994: 1–2) points out, “Comprehensive taxonomies that are grounded in careful observation – even when incomplete or incorrect in earlier formulations – provide both a foundation for the formulation of basic theory and a spur to innovative research.”

Social science has long lacked a consensus on taxonomic classifications of political violence and, more generally, political action. What exactly constitutes a “war?” Is “terrorism” a political act or simply a crime? Is the use of violence the only dimension separating the terrorist from the social movement activist, and if not, what deeper kinship exists between the two? All of these questions are complicated by the general lack of consensus on the meaning of terms like “activism,” “terrorism,” “warfare,” and “guerilla activity.” Such questions bedevil the empirical literature to the point that data clearinghouses often offer multiple categories of a phenomenon in order to cater to the varying taxonomic tastes and theoretical needs of their clientele.

Of all forms of politically inspired violence, the most contentious is clearly “terrorism.” Aside from the oft-quoted saw that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter,” the main problem with the term is that it elicits emotion – essentially, it is immediately pejorative. Neither “terrorists” nor their sympathizers embrace the term when applied to themselves, opting instead for more neutral (or even ennobling) terms like “insurgent” or “guerilla.” Moreover, most modern nations have at one time or another oppressed or “terrified” a subject population, and when added to the fact that many nations actually sponsor terrorist-like activities in other countries,

the waters become very murky indeed. Scholars who want to emphasize this state-centric role in covert and illegal acts of violence (Chomsky's "wholesale terrorism") naturally object to restricting the term to sub-state organizations, while empirical researchers (sometimes motivated by the strictures of existing databases, others by theoretical concerns) want to define the term strictly as non-state (or "retail") violence. Regardless, terrorism as a term holds such currency in both academic and policy circles that conjuring up a more neutral term to replace it seems unlikely. The terms "terrorism" and "terrorist" are likely here to stay, and so the real question is how we define it in a way that is sensible, useful, and relatively free of double standards.

A useful first step is to separate the action from the actor. Much as Simmel (1950) advocated the study of pure (or ideal) forms of "sociation" analytically separated from both agency and social structure, a taxonomy of political action should probably focus on the nature of the action rather than the characteristics of the agents/organizations responsible for it. As Tilly (2004) points out, it is important not to reify "terrorism," which is a *strategy* rather than an organizational form. There is much that recommends this approach; even a cursory examination of terrorism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries demonstrates that today's terrorist organizations often become tomorrow's political parties (e.g., the Irish Republican Army, Hamas, and the Irgun). Indeed, most of the large "terrorist" organizations of the Middle East could just as easily be characterized as sizeable social movement organizations that happen to employ terrorism as a strategic choice. We might also add that, while the size and political strength of an organization may shape its choice of political tools, such factors are more properly considered causes of different forms of political violence rather than actual elements of those forms. Thus, we should not conflate the attributes of actions with the attributes of actors.

In this chapter, we will attempt to provide the beginnings of an empirical and theoretical taxonomy of political action, with a focus on political violence in general and terrorism in particular. Of course, there have been many such attempts in the past, and others more recently (Tilly 2004; Goodwin 2006; Ganor 2008). Nonetheless, as Cooney and Phillips (2002) point out, good typologies/taxonomies should be *powerful, theoretical, general/universal, and parsimonious*. Unfortunately, we find that most current schemes require either too much information to be useful for cross-national research or, more frequently, make rather bold assumptions about organizational size, structure, and relationships to broader social environments. For reasons we hope to demonstrate, we lean toward universality and parsimony.

CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTION

Figure 13.1 depicts our continuum of political action. Arranged from most to least violent, the key concept here is that the attributes of organizations and broader social environments are relegated to causal variables – they are not included in the definitions of the political actions themselves. By separating acts from actors, we hope to improve our models of political activism and thereby increase our explanatory power.

Before moving on to our distillation of the essential differences between the principle forms of political violence, and indeed before we contrast these with the peaceful activities of social movement organizations, we need a more expansive discussion of how each form of violence is characterized in the literature. Scholars and other observers note that various occurrences of violence throughout the world are given different and specific labels to denote properties unique to each form. While terms such as coup d'état, guerilla war, riots, and




FIGURE 13.1. A continuum of political action

terrorism are commonly used in discussions about various violent forms, one feature that each shares is that each is indeed *political* in nature. For the sake of argument, then, we set aside the notion that terrorism is simply crime and instead place it solidly on the continuum of politically motivated action.

In addition, we doubt whether there is any way to successfully combine the so-called state terrorism and non state terrorism in a single, comprehensive definition. Given that the *modi operandi* of the two forms of terrorism are utterly different (aside from the single commonality of seeking to *terrify*), we opt to exclude Robespierre's reign of terror as well as more modern instances (e.g., Saddam Hussein's Iraq) from our formal definition of "terrorism." So-called "state terrorism" has any number of alternative terms, such as oppression, repression, politicide and genocide. On the other hand, state-sponsored terrorism (or terrorist cells organized and subsidized by formal states) is relatively indistinguishable from typical substate terrorism, and so we make no distinction in this regard.

Having said this, three forms of political violence have dominated scholarly discussions in recent decades: terrorism, civil war and guerilla war. While some view these three as differing both categorically and analytically, drawing clear distinctions between them can be difficult given the amorphous and ambiguous properties of political violence, as well as the fact that these forms of violence often nest together (e.g., the American Civil War).

At some level, all three phenomena are violent social interactions comprised of an exchange of socially meaningful information between two parties. In these transactions, two coherent social organizations are facing off, making incompatible claims against each other over various resources, offices, and identities. One organization is typically the state and its attendant polices and practices (although it can be an entire society/culture), while the other is a non state or rival state organization that is attempting to displace the social influence of the state either completely or in a specific territory.

Furthermore, an act of violence is generally embedded within a social context and thus has little meaning other than the socially situated content of the message. This is clearly the case when considering forms of violence in developing nations that we in the West consider bizarre, such as beheadings or physical maiming. Essentially, an act of violence is an infliction of physical pain by one person (or social group) upon another in socially interpretable (and variable) ways as a form of communication meted out to compel specific reactions the aggressor desires. This social aspect of violence is especially evident in terrorism, as drama or performance of violence wreaked upon highly public, vulnerable and socially labeled innocent (and thus symbolic) targets is its central component. Even though terrorism, guerilla war, and civil war are similar in that they are social practices conveying meaningful political information, they are commonly considered to be different forms of violence because of this

degree of “theater,” the symmetry of the power of contending parties, and the selection of targets (all of which are intertwined, of course).

BUILDING TAXONOMIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

While there are variations in degree, scope and quality of political violence, we narrow the focus of this study to two forms of “asymmetric violence”: guerilla war and terrorism (we will later bring in social movement activism/anti-government protest). While the definition and causal structure of civil war remain contentious (Sambanis 2004), we believe that the blurred lines between the various asymmetric forms of political action require the most exposition and, of those, guerilla war and terrorism are the most often confused with one another.

Table 13.1 provides our analytical breakdown of the important components often used to define guerilla war and terrorism. In general, we often think of guerilla organizations as larger, more organized, more likely to directly confront the state, less likely to target noncombatants, and based in inaccessible rural or mountainous areas. This stereotype has much to recommend it, coming down to us from the days of Che Guevera and the Latin American revolutionary. Terrorism, on the other hand, is often viewed as small and cell-oriented, less organized, less likely to directly confront the state, more likely to target noncombatants, and based in urban (i.e., anonymous) areas. Again, these stereotypes are inherited from the so-called “third wave” of terrorism (Rapoport 2004), or the leftist terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s. While we find nothing inherently wrong with these profiles, the fact remains that they mostly key on attributes of actors/organizations rather than on actions per se. How does such a classification scheme help us make sense of the Nord-Ost Seige of 2002, when a mixed group of Chechen “guerillas” and “terrorists” (i.e., The Black Widows) took Moscow theater goers hostage? Was this part and parcel of the ongoing Chechen civil war, and therefore a military (or guerilla)

TABLE 13.1. The Different Dimensions of Two Forms of Violence: Terrorism and Guerilla War

	Social dynamics		Strategy and tactics			
	Power symmetry relative to state	Organization	Socio-political goals	Target selection	Tactics	Spatial locations
Terrorism	Few numbers and resources	Leaderless resisters; focused cell group; networks of civilian supporters	Discrediting the state by inducing repression	Civilian or symbolic targets	Single acts of anonymous public violence	Urban; little to no rural presence or territorial acquisition
Guerilla War	Somewhat larger number of members and greater resources	Focused group units or columns under a general command; networks of supporters	Removing state influence over territory	Non-civilian; police or military (state agents more broadly)	Hit and run, low visibility; sabotage and disabling	Rural; some territorial acquisition

action, or simply an act of terrorism? For that matter, was 9/11 a pure act of terrorism, or does the attack on the Pentagon count as something else? Our point is that focusing on the attributes of organizations or their resource bases may not provide the kind of clarity necessary for empirical social science. In our view, the most accurate and useful component of stereotypical views of guerilla war and terrorism is *target*, and (not coincidentally) it is generally the datum we can most rely on in reports of political violence.

While it may be true that organizational size and strength drive the strategic choice of guerilla war versus terrorism, making such organizational or territorial characteristics part of the definitions of these forms of political violence is unwise. Although we would like to think that small terrorist cells are incapable of true “guerilla” activity, this may not be the case (particularly with force-multiplying weaponry). Moreover, there is nothing about being large and better organized that precludes the use of terror tactics (e.g., the Tamil Tigers). Thus, if the purpose is to examine the determinants of political violence or activism, the focus should rest on the characteristics of the *target*, for they best indicate the purpose of the perpetrators.

Therefore, in our view, the best definitions of terrorism tend to focus on the act itself. After a long review of definitions, Schmid and de Graaf (1982) end up defining terrorism as:

and anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (target of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

This definition is about as comprehensive as any devised, but it lacks a degree of parsimony. We can take elements out of this definition, however, and distill from it a terser version:

(Non-state) terrorism is the use of lethal violence by clandestine (sub-state) individuals or groups against symbolic (i.e., civilian) targets in order to induce political outcomes (via psychological coercion) from a real (and typically larger and more powerful) audience/population.

On the other hand, guerilla warfare is:

Organized smaller-scale violence where the less powerful (typically non-uniformed) party restricts its use of force to agents/organs of the state.

These relatively simple definitions allow us to clearly differentiate forms of small-scale political violence. For instance, Timothy McVeigh’s attack of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was not an act of terrorism – it was a guerilla attack. When asked about the innocent children he had killed, he termed them “collateral damage,” a consistent point of view found among guerilla fighters throughout history. Just so, 9/11 was a mixed act of political violence. The attack on the Twin Towers was a clear act of terrorism – substate actors using lethal force against symbolic targets in order to send a political message to multiple audiences. On the other hand, when American Flight #77 slammed into the Pentagon, that was an act of (guerilla) war – a clear attack on a state organ. And what of the Nord-Ost Seige? While a supposed tactic to “win” a separatist war, the act was essentially terrorism – no agents of the Russian state were held hostage, and the victims were clearly symbolic tools of psychological coercion.

THE KINSHIP OF GUERILLA WAR, TERRORISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVISM

That social movements and terrorist organizations share a number of features in common has not gone unnoticed (Beck 2008). Indeed, “terrorist” organizations are simply (violent) subsets of social movement organizations. As Fig. 13.2 suggests, there is a strong family resemblance between our three focal forms of political action. All are politically inspired, their ultimate goals being to derive some kind of political or social advantage for the group or groups they claim to represent. Moreover, all suffer from a relatively sharp asymmetry of power. Their true targets/audiences are all more powerful in terms of political clout, coercive capacity, and general legal authority. This general asymmetry of course explains the next comparative dimension: clandestiness. Size may explain the higher visibility of guerillas over terrorists, but their choice of target may also strongly determine this visibility. Guerilla warfare is *direct* communication with the state, and as such guerilla leaders and their forces must often adopt a higher profile. Negotiations with the state, mass recruiting, and connections/contact with other governments often require *semi*-clandestine activities. Terrorism, on the other hand, is different. Here, the nature of the target as well as the continued effectiveness of the strategy dictate secrecy. Social movement activism is different in yet another way. Here, the political action must be very public, and the identity of the “perpetrators” clearly known, for the strategy involves *persuasion* rather than coercion. Naturally, then, the *modi operandi* of the three forms of political action also differ. Guerilla fighting typically involves military-style discipline and tactics, whereas terrorist violence mixes unconventional violence (kidnappings, skyjacking) with public display. Here, we see the deep kinship between terrorism and social movement activism – while one uses violence and the other typically does not, both require this element of public display to convey




FIGURE 13.2. Comparing forms of asymmetric political action

their messages. For both, the “frame” is important; reading Bin Laden’s *fatwa* of 1996 clearly demonstrates that public “spin” is necessary for both terrorism and social movement activism. The final dimension, the choice of targets, also differs across these forms of political action, although here the kinship between terrorism and social movements is also in evidence. While guerilla forces generally kill members of the enemy state, terrorist violence creates a bloody message-laden spectacle using unsuspecting civilian members of the offending polity. Essentially, terrorism is violent theater (Weimann and Winn 1994). The same is generally true of social movement activism, *sans* the violence and selection of symbolic victims. The nature of the spectacles differs far more than the nature of the political messages being conveyed. Thus, the *strategies* (rather than tactics) of both social movement activists and terrorists groups are virtually identical; both are trying to accomplish political or social change by framing injustices or problems in symbolic and dramatic public displays that grab the attention of potential constituents and oppositional groups, including the state (McAdam and Snow 1996).

MEDIA AS A DETERMINANT OF POLITICAL ACTION: PROOF-OF-CONCEPT

Taxonomic accuracy becomes important when theoretical models are developed to explain why some types of social action occur and others do not. If various forms of social action are mixed or muddled in a single dependent measure, this unobserved heterogeneity may be mistaken for measurement error (or simply ignored). Either way, the conclusions of the research are liable to be distorted.

Our partial taxonomy allows us to make theoretical predictions based on the nature of different political forms. Foremost, we note that the need for public display is more prominent for strategies using terrorism or social anti-government protest. In turn, public display is useless without some means of amplifying the message to audiences that are not physically present. Conversely, direct violence against the state (such as guerilla war or civil war) brings perpetrators and their audiences together directly; the need for third party communication (i.e., a force multiplier) is greatly reduced. Therefore, our taxonomy of political action predicts that the presence of *international media* (i.e., media not directly controlled by an “enemy” state) will be more predictive of both terrorism and social anti-government protest than it will be for more direct forms of confrontation.

DATA AND METHODS

We test the media and violence hypothesis using a large sample of the world’s nations (approximately 143 nations) for the 1984–2002 time period. We use pooled cross-section time-series regression (negative binomial and logit) to maximize the sample size and to better capture the causality by including temporal variations in the data.

Our dependent variables for both terrorism and guerilla war come from the same data source (*International Attributes of Terrorism* or ITERATE database); terrorism is the annual number of attacks on civilians within a nation, whereas guerilla war is defined as the annual number of attacks on military and state personnel within a nation. Additionally, the dependent variable for anti-government protests comes from Arthur Bank’s *Cross-National Time-Series* archive (2008). Anti-government protests are defined as “any peaceful public

gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.” Our civil war variable comes from PRIO’s Armed Conflicts Database (2006) and is operationalized as a dummy indicating when an intra-state conflict has achieved at least 1,000 battle deaths in a given year. The differing nature of the dependent variables requires us to use different analytic techniques; we use a negative binomial regression technique for our terrorism, guerilla war and anti-government anti-government protest dependent variables as all three are numeric count variables, whereas we use a logit regression analysis for the dummy civil war measure.

The generic model can be specified as follows:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta Y_{i,t-1} + \beta X_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{i,t-1}$$

In our models using the count dependent variable, we include on the right hand side of the equations a 1-year lagged dependent variable. First, it is theoretically likely that a nation’s level of violence in the preceding year encourages subsequent violence for several reasons. Needless to say events in a single year are generally part of a longer campaign of violence – a built-up reserve of war skill, experience and capital (e.g., weapons) from previous attacks obviously raises the chances that further violence will occur. Also, during terrorist campaigns competing groups will take advantage of the immediate attention devoted to initial attacks, thus feeding into a larger and more widespread outburst of violence. Swarming behavior may also ensue among terrorists as they attempt to maximize the damage and attention a first attack generates. Second, including a lagged dependent variable partially accommodates serial autocorrelation. We also lag all of the independent variables to more accurately capture the causality over time.

For the civil war model, prior investigations argue for the inclusion of the number of peace years prior to war onset following from a previous conflict in place of a lagged dependent variable. In brief we cannot use a lagged dependent variable for a binary outcome variable analysis such as this as an adequate corrective for serial correlation. The peace years variable simply counts the number of years between outcome onsets (binary outcome = 1 for true events, 0 = false). This also allows one to partial out the value of years between outcomes (wars), as closeness in proximity to one another is clearly associated with the lingering available of arms, war-skills, and grievances. Following Tucker’s recommended correctives for temporal duration problems in these kinds of models (1999), we employ three cubic spline variables that serve as effective temporal correlation controls (virtually the same as including temporal fixed effects dummies).

For our media hypotheses, we include two variables – one measuring media dependency (or news flow) and the other measuring international media capacity (news generating offices or bureaus). First, we use the (logged) number of annual newspaper stories originating from a country as a direct measure of news flow, derived originally from annual country counts of Reuters news briefs extracted from Lexis Nexis (*Protocol for the Analysis of Nonviolent Direct Action* (PANDA) and the *Integrated Data for Events Analysis* (IDEA)). We include this because, as Drakos and Gofas (2006) note, our knowledge about political violence is dependent on media sources, and so there is a built-in or artifactual relationship between news flow and political events. Our first media variable, which we simply term *news stories*, is meant to control for this artifact. Second, we employ a variable that counts the number of Western press bureaus present within a country year. A press bureau is a Western (e.g., North American or Western European) media-owned or operated office within a nation that

employs journalists and engages in routine press activities. Typically, this requires a business decision that there is sufficient news worthy of reportage, linking this loosely to the number of news stories coming from a particular country. This measures organized Western media operations within a country and suggests that nation's place in the global news hierarchy (i.e., its suitability as a "theater" for violence such as terrorism). Most countries have somewhere between zero and eight Western media bureaus while a handful of others have more than ten or eleven. Data for this variable was pulled from media outlet addresses found in the *Europa World Yearbook*.

We also include measures for population size from the World Bank (2006), democracy (political rights) from *Freedom House* (2008) and development (GDP per capita) also from the World Bank (2006). We test for both linear and curvilinear effects of democracy and development (separate equations), a common practice in the empirical literature derived from political modernization theory.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

As discussed earlier, it is our hypothesis that the presence of the Western press should predict terrorism and anti-government protests but not guerilla war and civil war because of Western media's usefulness as a global stage for political "theater." [Table 13.2](#) presents evidence testing this hypothesis by comparing the effects of our media variables (press bureaus and news story counts) across models examining civil war, guerilla war, terrorism (labeled here as attacks on civilians) and anti-government protests.

Models 1 and 2 present the effects of our media variables net of development and democracy on the occurrence of civil warfare. Neither of our media variables are statistically significant predictors of war with the single exception of news stories (i.e., our control for simple media flow/dependency) when the quadratics for development and democracy are introduced in model 2. The lack of findings in model 1 would initially suggest that rebel organizations fighting a civil war are less interested in using Western media as a stage upon which to present or perform violence than they are in simply and directly attacking the regime head-on without the use of mediating high-profile symbols. Similarly, the insignificant effect of news stories/flow in model 1 also infers that the construction of the civil war measure is not dependent upon news story accounts of violence (the artifact mentioned above) – in short, the large-scale nature of civil war is acknowledged and reported so widely by multiple non-media sources (e.g., embassies, state governments, non-governmental organizations among others) that it may obviate media dependency. On the other hand, the significant coefficient for news stories in model 2 suggests some dependence upon news flow once development is properly specified, meaning once the proper effect of advanced development is controlled for (i.e., developed nations are less likely to have internal war), the true dependency of war reportage on media is exposed. We conclude that our understanding/coding of civil wars is somewhat dependent on media accounts.

Regardless, we find no evidence here that the *Western* press influences the chances for civil war. Similarly, the presence of Western press bureaus does not predict guerilla war (models 3 and 4), although such violence is dependent on news reportage (i.e., the statistically significant coefficient for news stories). In other words, guerrilla or civil war organizations do not commit acts of violence for the world stage as a means of elevating their contests to sympathetic global audiences but instead rely upon direct confrontation with the state. This is evidentially not the case for terrorism and anti-government protest organizations, however.

TABLE 13.2. The Effects of Media on Political Action

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Civil War		Guerrilla Warfare		Civilian Attacks		Anti-gov- ernment	Protests
Time since previous Civil War	-0.767*** [6.18]	-0.732*** [6.21]						
Guerrilla War (t-1)			0.978*** [5.15]	0.967*** [4.97]				
Terrorism (t-1)					0.173*** [7.68]	0.170*** [7.67]		
Anti-government Protests (t-1)							0.288*** [10.22]	0.248*** [7.90]
Pop (log) (t-1)	0.300* [1.88]	0.336** [2.10]	0.141 [1.63]	0.173* [1.88]	0.229*** [3.77]	0.239*** [3.86]	0.172*** [2.92]	0.241*** [3.98]
GDP/c (log) (t-1)	0.369** [2.28]	5.310** [2.46]	0.026 [0.28]	1.68 [1.54]	0.053 [1.02]	0.748 [1.64]	-0.136** [2.10]	1.467** [2.30]
GDP/c Squared (t-1)		-0.412*** [2.67]		-0.108 [1.59]		-0.045 [1.57]		-0.101** [2.44]
Political Rights (t-1)	-0.137 [1.21]	0.279 [0.52]	0.072 [0.97]	-0.046 [0.13]	-0.031 [0.80]	-0.015 [0.08]	0.029 [0.69]	0.603*** [3.51]
Political Rights Squared (t-1)		-0.052 [0.78]		0.015 [0.39]		-0.002 [0.07]		-0.069*** [3.30]
News Stories (t-1)	601.692 [1.61]	789.651* [1.82]	679.579** [2.00]	740.530** [2.27]	453.084** [2.34]	489.278** [2.41]	303.910** [2.52]	424.061*** [3.97]
Western Press Bureaus (#s) (t-1)	0.163 [1.59]	0.12 [1.28]	0.041 [0.66]	0.022 [0.35]	0.093*** [2.89]	0.083*** [2.49]	0.117*** [3.10]	0.082** [2.26]
Constant	-3.919 [1.45]	-24.097*** [3.17]	-5.337*** [3.74]	-11.678** [2.28]	-4.703*** [4.61]	-7.421*** [3.32]	-3.383*** [3.07]	-11.347*** [4.01]
Observations	1658	1658	1658	1658	1658	1658	1649	1649
Number of Countries	166	166	166	166	166	166	165	165
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Robust z statistics in brackets

*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

We find confirmation in models 5 through 8 of our hypothesis linking Western press bureaus with terrorism and anti-government protests. For terrorism, as Western press bureaus multiply, the average number of terrorist attacks a nation will experience in a given year increase by about 0.09 for every Western press bureau present in the country, and the effect is about the same for anti-state protests net of other factors. These findings lead us to conclude that acts of pure terrorism as well as non-violent anti-government protests are much more media-driven than are violent anti-state attacks. Also, media dependence (news stories) predicts both terrorism and anti-government protests, suggesting that the indicator aptly taps the likelihood that such attacks will be reported in the database. These findings persist in the presence of other important predictors such as development and democracy.

Some other interesting insights follow from this table. First, the significant findings of the main effects and polynomials of political rights and GDP on anti-government protests (model 8) suggest that anti-government protests appear to rise with development and

democratization in the early phases but subsequently reach a tipping point in which they soon begin to decline, likely because citizens are granted satisfying and co-opting levels of political access/participation and civil liberties and are bought off by substantive increases in affluence. A similar statement can be made about development's curvilinear effects on the probability of civil war onset. Civil war is more prevalent at the middle levels of development where economic expectations are high and yet further advancements are stalled and also where societies are fairly split between the modernizing forces of society on the one hand and premodern, traditional forces on the other. Yet, the most important observation we take away from this analysis is that terrorists and anti-government protest activists differ from their more direct and violent cousins by virtue of their tendency to go for demonstration effects set upon a global stage. Terrorists, in particular, are truly living the doctrine of "propaganda by the deed" by relying upon international media to broadcast their violence – and message – to the rest of the world. For the current work, the salient point is that *many empirical analyses of international terrorism have unwittingly combined guerilla warfare and terrorism; both of our small-scale violence measures are derived from the same database, and have often been combined in a single dependent variable representing "terrorism."*

CONCLUSION

Taxonomic clarity is critical for both theory building and statistical modeling. We have demonstrated that abstract forms of asymmetric political action share a deep kinship, but it is their *differences* that can most fruitfully aid empirical testing. Nonetheless, we agree with many students of social change that social movement theory can aptly be applied to the study of terrorism. The overarching point here is that understand one's dependent variable is crucial in developing a theory to explain it. Just as importantly, we will never be able to redeem "terrorism" as an empirical term until there is some consensus on its meaning and measurement.

The second major thrust of this chapter is the importance of defining political action in terms of the action itself rather than the actor or the actor's environment. Our measures of both terrorism and guerilla war come from the same database on terrorism, and yet differentiating those attacks by target using our refined taxonomy reveals a different theoretical structure. Using the targets of violence tells us volumes about the purpose of those attacks, whereas relying on organizational attributes and environmental contexts might well lead us astray. In short, conflating cause and effect will always lead to errors in research, and this is particularly acute in the study of political activism. While we have little doubt that larger and more powerful organizations are more likely to engage in guerilla war as opposed to terrorism, there is nothing intrinsic about the strategic violence that requires the characteristics of actors or environments to be built into the definitions of such violence. The scholarly community should move toward definitional agreements in the study of *asymmetric* violence/activism, and in our view, those agreements should restrict themselves to the nature of the act rather than the nature of the (non-state) actor or the social situation.

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CHAPTER 14

Corporations, Capitalists, and Campaign Finance

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Financial contributions to political parties and candidates are an important source of political influence in many societies. This is, perhaps, nowhere more true than in the United States, where candidates' need to raise and spend vast sums of money is accentuated by a system of weak and decentralized parties, single-member-district elections, nomination by party primaries, limited public funding, and media intensive campaigns that emphasize image and personality over clear policy differences. Given the vast inequalities in wealth in the U.S., rich contributors – including wealthy capitalists and giant corporations – play a dominant role in campaign finance and, thereby, exercise disproportionate influence over politics and public policy (Clawson et al. 1998; Domhoff 2006; Mills 1956).

Money may be the “mother’s milk” of politics, as former California State Assemblyman Jesse Unruh famously quipped. But, precisely, owing to its universality, money can also be seen as a “tracer element in the study of political power” (Alexander 1984). Transfers of money in the political arena are not always transparent; however, they are potentially measurable in a way that many other forms of political action are not. This has made the study of campaign finance an important topic for social scientists who are interested in understanding the flow of power and influence within the political system.

In this chapter, I present an overview of the social scientific research on campaign finance, with a focus on the implications of different patterns of political contributions for theorizing the relationship between corporations, capitalists, and the state. In the first section, I begin with a brief discussion of the role of money in American politics, historical changes in the laws regulating political contributions, and some of the pioneering studies of corporate involvement in campaign finance. The second section takes up the most extensive subgenre of recent campaign finance research: studies that analyze the contributions of corporate sponsored political action committees (PACs) and the relationship between the growth of corporate PAC spending and the “right turn” in U.S. state policy in the late 1970s and 1980s. The third section examines the research on non-PAC political contributions by individual corporate officers and shareowners and how these differ from (and complement) the political spending of corporate PACs. The fourth section reviews the research findings on the legislative impact of corporate (and other) PAC contributions. The concluding section addresses some of the limitations of existing studies and potential areas for future research.

MONEY AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Money provided by candidates themselves, together with assessments levied on federal officeholders, was the main source of funding for America's earliest election campaigns (Overacker 1932). Following the Civil War, however, contributions from large corporations and the officers and shareowners of large corporations became the leading source of political money. This trend was accelerated by the passage of Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, which restricted the solicitation of campaign funds from federal officeholders. Public concern over the corrupting influence of political contributions from powerful corporations and wealthy capitalists was a recurrent theme in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, leading to numerous initiatives for campaign finance reform. These included the Tillman Act of 1907, which banned corporations from directly contributing to political campaigns, and subsequent legislation that established disclosure requirements and limits (later overturned) on the amount that candidates could spend on their own campaigns. These reforms had little effect on the flow of corporate cash to political parties and candidates, other than to drive some contributions underground and redirect others into alternate channels. Between the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907 and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, contributions from wealthy industrialists and financiers remained a key source of campaign funds. Corporations, although prohibited from making direct contributions to candidates for federal office, faced little difficulty in channeling donations through gifts given in the name of individual officers or shareowners, substituting in-kind contributions for monetary payments, laundering donations through bogus fees paid to politically connected law firms or public relations firms, or simply making clandestine contributions.

The earliest social scientific research on corporate involvement in campaign finance originated in the 1930s. One of the pioneers in the field was Lundberg (1937), who assembled and analyzed data on campaign finance to document the dominance of corporate interests over American electoral politics from the 1890s through the 1930s, as well as the competition among different segments of capital for political advantage. Overacker (1933, 1937, 1941, 1945) assembled and summarized data on corporate affiliations of major contributors to the Republican and Democratic parties in each of the presidential election years between 1932 and 1944. Heard (1960) reported selected data of this kind for the 1952 and 1956 elections, as did Alexander (1962, 1966, 1971, 1976) in a series of monographs on the financing of presidential campaigns, beginning with the 1960 election and continuing through 1992. Domhoff (1972) used campaign finance data from the 1960s to analyze elite support for the Democratic Party. With the exceptions of Lundberg (1937) and Domhoff (1972), these early studies tended to be mainly descriptive, although the data they assembled have been useful to later researchers with stronger theoretical ambitions (Allen 1991; Ferguson 1995; Webber 2000).

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and subsequent amendments transformed both the nature of corporate involvement in campaign finance and the possibilities for research on the relationship between business and the state. The legislation imposed limits on campaign contributions by private individuals, but it also created a major loophole in the Tillman Act by sanctioning the use of corporate funds to establish and administer political action committees. The full implications of this legislation were only made clear through a series of amendments, court decisions, and administrative rulings that occurred between 1971 and 1976. Under the new system, corporations are allowed to solicit donations from company executives and supervise the distribution of that money to candidates. By establishing payroll deduction plans that skim off a small fraction of the lavish salaries of top managers, large corporations are thus

able to amass huge war chests for campaign spending. Although it is still illegal for businesses to donate money to candidates *directly* out of corporate funds, it is legal for them to pay all of the expenses of a political action committee, including the salaries of employees who work on PAC business as part of their company duties. The decision as to which candidates will receive company support is typically made by a committee appointed by and responsible to the top officers of the corporation. Hence, PAC contributions can be taken as representing the political will of those who control the corporation, rather than simply the choices of individual employees.

From the mid-1970s to the present, corporations and capitalists have thus had two main channels for contributing money to political campaigns. The first is through contributions collected and distributed by corporate political action committees. Under current law, PACs can donate up to \$10,000 to an individual candidate and \$30,000 to a national party committee in each 2-year election cycle, with no limit on total contributions. The second is through contributions made by individual corporate officers, shareowners, and other wealthy persons. As of 2008, individuals are able to donate up to \$4,600 to an individual candidate and \$57,000 to a national party committee in each 2-year election cycle, up to a limit of \$108,200 in total contributions (limits that are indexed to inflation). In this chapter, I discuss research on each of these two main forms of what are known as “hard-money” contributions – i.e., money that is used directly by parties and candidates to influence the outcome of the election. Other channels for contributing to electoral campaigns also exist. Corporate PAC expenditures are matched by nearly equal expenditures by PACs operated by trade and business associations. For much of the recent period, loopholes in the law have also allowed virtually unlimited donations to political parties in the form of “soft money.” This is money that is purportedly used only for party building or get-out-the-vote activities rather than the election or defeat of specific candidates, although the distinction is easily blurred. Following the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform of 2002, much of this soft money has been redirected from political parties to nominally independent “527 groups,” which circumvent federal election regulations under the pretext that they promote only issues rather than specific parties or candidates. However, none of these alternate channels of political spending have been researched as extensively as the two main types of hard-money contributions coming from corporate PACs and wealthy individual donors. In the case of 527 groups, this can partly be attributed to weak and poorly enforced disclosure requirements that have made it extremely difficult to obtain systematic data on contributors.

CORPORATE PAC CONTRIBUTIONS

Following the campaign finance reforms of the 1970s, the number and size of corporate PACs increased dramatically. In 1974, there were only 89 corporate PACs registered with the Federal Election Commission (FEC). By 1980, there were 1,206 and by 1984 there were 1,682. Since then, the number has fluctuated slightly from one election to the next and now stands at roughly 1,600. Corporate PAC expenditures grew steadily from \$31 million in 1980 to \$101 million in 1990 to \$158 million in 2000, and then mushroomed to \$278 million in 2006 (Federal Election Commission 2008). The biggest share of this money has always gone to candidates for the U.S. House and Senate, where contributions from corporate PACs typically account for 8–10% of the total money raised by candidates. Business affiliated trade association PACs account for another 6–8%. These percentages are small compared with the

amount of money candidates receive in large donations from individual corporate elites and other wealthy persons; however, the impact of corporate PAC dollars is magnified by the strategic manner in which it is distributed and the coordination between PAC spending and lobbying activities.

The largest corporations were typically among the first to form PACs and tend to contribute more money to political campaigns than smaller firms. Among large corporations (commonly defined as *Fortune* 500 firms), additional factors have been shown to influence the level of PAC activism. Generally speaking, firms with the greatest stake in governmental action were among the early leaders. In the 1970s and early 1980s, firms in highly regulated industries were among the first to establish PACs. So also were firms in highly concentrated industries, where the dominance of a few giant corporations with common interests in state action affecting their industry reduced the temptation to free riding (Andres 1985). Among corporations that have formed PACs, firms with a pronounced material interest in state action have also been among the biggest PAC spenders. These include major defense contractors, firms with high levels of regulatory violations, and firms most exposed to anti-trust sanctions because of an aggressive history of mergers and acquisitions (Boies 1989).

Apart from studying which firms have organized PACs or how much they spend, the greater part of corporate PAC research has been concerned with examining which candidates receive support from which corporations. This question has been addressed from two complementary angles: (1) How unified are large corporations in the candidates they support? and (2) When spending patterns diverge, how is that divergence manifested and what underlying factors cause firms to adopt one spending strategy rather than another?

Researchers quickly recognized that corporate PACs tended to follow one or another (or some combination) of two basic strategies in deciding which candidates to support (Handler and Mulkern 1982). The historically more prevalent strategy can be described as *pragmatic*. Corporations adopting this strategy contribute heavily to likely winners in the hope of gaining privileged access to legislators for lobbying purposes. This results in a profile of PAC spending that is weighted toward incumbents (since incumbents win the vast majority of congressional races) and includes nontrivial donations to Democratic incumbents and not just Republicans. The second strategy can be described as *ideological*. Corporations adopting this strategy place a lower priority on legislative access and show a greater willingness to oppose incumbents with the aim of altering the composition of Congress in a direction more favorable to the *general* interests of business. This results in a profile of PAC spending that contributes almost exclusively to Republicans and targets incumbent Democrats for defeat by providing substantial sums to Republican challengers, including many on the far right of the political spectrum. Many corporate PACs adopt a mix of these two strategies, making nuanced choices about which incumbent Democrats are most vital for them to support, but also willing to back Republican challengers if and when the costs are low or the prospects for victory promising.

In its origins, the distinction between pragmatic and ideological PAC strategies presumed and appeared to support a pluralist view of the role of business in American politics. The pluralist view is premised on the idea that, despite the overwhelming economic and political resources at the command of large corporations, their competing interests and conflicting strategies often cancel out, thereby preventing big business from being the dominant force it might be if it were more politically unified. However, a closer examination of the alignment of corporate PAC spending casts doubt on the pluralist view – at least with regard to the period of the early growth of corporate PACs in the late 1970s and 1980s. Despite undeniable variation in the mix of strategies adopted by different firms, these two strategies are sufficiently

compatible and spending decisions are sufficiently coordinated among firms that corporations rarely *oppose* one another in the candidates they support. In the 1980 election, for example, 90% or more of corporate money went to the same candidate in three out of four congressional races; in only 7% of congressional races did less than two-thirds of corporate money go to a single candidate (Clawson et al. 1986).

Although corporate PACs rarely oppose one another in the candidates they support, the extent to which they unite behind the same or similar candidates varies across the corporate community. Pragmatic considerations tend to unify numerous small and overlapping clusters of firms in support of the same or similar candidates. For example, firms located in the same state or region often overlap in the candidates they support, at least partly because of their shared pragmatic interest in maintaining good relations with local incumbents (Mizruchi 1989, 1992). Firms in the same industry also share pragmatic interests that lead them to support similar candidates. These geographic or industry-based clusters may not be sharply opposed to one another in the candidates they support, but neither do they generate any large subgroups of corporations that are strongly united behind a common slate of candidates. Wherever this occurs, it is mainly a result of the strength and pervasiveness of *ideological* motives in the choices firms make about which candidates to support. For example, in the 1980 election the single, most cohesive subgroup of any size within the business community (encompassing roughly 40% of large corporations) was defined neither by region nor industry nor any other discernable basis of shared pragmatic interests, but by a common commitment to an ideological strategy of supporting right-wing, Republican challengers (Neustadt and Clawson 1988). This ideological bloc grew rapidly in both size and the intensity of its partisan commitment in the years between 1976 and 1980 – a trend that can be seen as an integral part of the broader, right-wing political mobilization of business in that period and a key factor in explaining the electoral and legislative victories of conservatives in the early Reagan era (Su et al. 1995).

Understanding which corporations follow a pragmatic PAC strategy and which follow a more ideological strategy has been a key question for corporate PAC research. In these studies, pragmatism is commonly measured in terms of support for incumbents, support for Democrats, or support for candidates favored by liberal groups, whereas commitment to an ideological strategy is measured in terms of support for Republicans, especially Republican challengers, and support for candidates favored by ultraconservative groups. By analyzing such variations in PAC spending, researchers have hoped to learn more about broader political alignments within the corporate community and also to identify which segments of big business were most instrumental in financing the rightward turn of American politics in the late 1970s and 1980s.

For guidance, this research has drawn on a range of theories that purport to distinguish the more moderate from the more conservative fractions of the capitalist class. One of the more popular such theories is the theory of “corporate liberalism,” which argues that pragmatism and political moderation are more characteristic of the economically dominant segment of corporate capital (Kolko 1963; Weinstein 1968). According to this view, the economic security of large, oligopolistic, capital-intensive firms gives them the luxury of being able to compromise on issues of government regulation, unions, taxation, and social spending, whereas smaller, competitive, labor-intensive firms confront more stringent economic constraints that push them to be more militantly conservative on these issues. In multiple studies, using different samples and measures, none of the firm characteristics cited by corporate liberalism theory have proven significant in differentiating the more pragmatic and more ideologically conservative corporate PACs (Burriss 1987; Burriss and Salt 1990; Clawson et al. 1985; Clawson

and Neustadt 1989). Whatever the validity of this theory in other contexts or historical periods, it has thus proven to be of little value in predicting corporate PAC behavior.

A related theory is the theory of the corporate “inner circle” (Useem 1984). This theory also distinguishes between the dominant or central firms and the subordinate or peripheral firms. However, rather than defining dominance in terms of size, market power, or capital-intensity, the inner-circle theory classifies firms by their prominence within intercorporate networks. Firms that are highly interconnected with other firms through director interlocks are hypothesized to follow a political strategy that is more sensitive to the “classwide” interests of business as a whole, whereas less connected firms are thought to embrace a narrower, company-specific set of political priorities. In its original formulation, a classwide perspective was understood as one that was less preoccupied with short-term profits, more attentive to long-term concerns of the stability and legitimacy of the economic system, and therefore, more *pragmatic* and open to compromise (Useem 1984). Others advanced the contrary argument that, in the context of the late 1970s and 1980s, a classwide perspective was one that was less preoccupied with company-specific access to legislators and more willing to follow an ideologically *conservative* strategy that sought to alter the composition of Congress and restructure business-state relations on terms more favorable to capital generally (Clawson et al. 1986). Several studies have found that firms with the greatest number of director interlocks are more pragmatic and less conservative – thus lending support to the first interpretation – although these findings are sensitive to variations in sampling and model specification and readily lend themselves to a number of alternative interpretations (Burris 1987, 1991; Clawson and Neustadt 1989).

Another popular theory is the “Yankee-cowboy” theory, which argues that extreme, right-wing partisanship is mainly characteristic of rising Sunbelt firms of the South and West, whereas more established firms of the East and Midwest tend to adopt a more moderate and pragmatic political stance (Davis 1981; Dye 1995; Sale 1975). The ultraconservatism of Sunbelt firms is attributed to the cultural climate of the region and the distinctive conditions of capital accumulation in key Sunbelt industries like oil exploration, aerospace, discount merchandising, real estate, and construction. This theory has received mixed support in the research on corporate PACs. Some studies report modest support for the regional differences hypothesized in the theory (Burris 1987; Burris and Salt 1990), whereas others find none (Clawson and Neustadt 1989). The best evidence suggests that region may, indeed, be a factor differentiating between more pragmatic and more ideologically conservative firms, but that the regional alignments proposed by the Yankee-cowboy theory are simply mistaken (Salt 1989). Eastern firms do appear to be more pragmatic than average and southern firms are more conservative, but mid-western firms are among the most ideologically conservative of any region, and western firms occupy an intermediate position on the spectrum between pragmatic and ideological spending. The magnitude of these differences, however, is relatively small.

If there is any generalization to be drawn from this checkered pattern of research findings, it is that the distinction between pragmatic and ideological PAC strategies is not reducible to differences between moderate and conservative political views or predispositions. Theories that originated to account for the latter have therefore proven to be of limited value in explaining the former. Across numerous studies, only two factors have *consistently* been shown to differentiate between more pragmatic and more ideological corporate PACs. These are the extent of government regulation and corporate dependence on defense contracts, both of which increase the likelihood that corporations will adopt a pragmatic PAC strategy (Burris 1987, 2001; Burris and Salt 1990; Clawson et al. 1985;

Clawson and Neustadtl 1989). In both cases, firms that have the greatest economic stake in the details of governmental action are constrained to seek favor with incumbents and eschew contributions that might jeopardize their good relations and privileged access to key legislators. The officers and directors of these pragmatic firms may be no more moderate or less conservative than those of corporations that follow an aggressively ideological strategy; they simply confront a different set of opportunities and constraints in seeking to advance the interests of their firm. Differential exposure to these constraints, rather than any underlying differences in political preferences or ideologies, appears to be the strongest factor influencing the campaign strategies followed by corporate PACs.

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL CAPITALISTS

The research on campaign contributions by individual capitalists and corporate elites can be summarized in terms of the same questions that I examined in connection with corporate PAC spending: (1) Who contributes to political campaigns? (2) How unified are individual elites in the parties and candidates they support? and (3) When patterns of elite political spending vary, what are the underlying correlates or sources of this variation? To explore these questions, researchers have drawn upon many of the same theories and explanatory variables used in the PAC research; although, given the difference between individual and corporate actors, additional factors have also been incorporated in the analysis. Because of the major changes in campaign finance laws enacted in the early and mid-1970s, it will be helpful to divide the discussion of the evidence on these questions into two parts. First, I discuss those studies that deal with elections prior to the mid-1970s; then, I turn to the research on more recent elections.

Among the research on the earlier period, two particular elections have received the most scrutiny. The 1936 election has attracted considerable attention because of its importance as an indicator of elite reaction to the New Deal and because of the centrality of the New Deal to broader theories of capital-state relations. The 1972 election has also been widely studied, owing to the fact that it was the final election conducted without any limits on the size of individual contributions and because of the relative completeness of contributor data on this election, which was the subject of the Watergate investigations.

The 1936 election was examined in some of the classic studies of campaign finance, but it has also been a focus of more recent research. All of the research indicates that 80% or more of capitalists who made political contributions supported the Republicans in 1936, but judgments vary on which capitalists supported Roosevelt and the Democrats. The consensus of the early literature was that the New Deal was supported mainly by capitalists in light industries like department stores, textiles, cigarettes, food, and beverages, whose revenues depended on state efforts to prop up the retail market; whereas, big banks and heavy industries like steel, auto, oil, chemicals, mining, and utilities were overwhelmingly opposed to Roosevelt and the New Deal by 1936 (Lundberg 1937; Overacker 1937). This view was challenged by several contemporary scholars, who advanced an interpretation more in line with the theory of corporate liberalism (Ferguson 1984, 1995; Ferguson and Rogers 1986). In the latter view, capitalist support for the New Deal was strongest among internationally oriented, capital-intensive firms – partly due to party differences over free trade, but mostly because capital-intensive industries were less sensitive to changes in labor costs and, were therefore, more able to make concessions to organized labor. By the same logic, labor-intensive industries, especially those that were dependent on the domestic market, were seen as the main opponents of the New Deal.

The most rigorous research on capitalists' contributions in the 1936 election provides much stronger support for the classic view, although it also paints a more complex picture. One study of 589 of the most powerful capitalists of the New Deal era found stronger support for the Democrats among those associated with consumer-goods industries, but not among those linked with monopoly-sector or capital-intensive industries (Allen 1991). A second study, using a different methodology, came to similar conclusions; however, it also demonstrated that these industry differences largely disappeared once controls were introduced for region and ethnicity (Webber 2000). Specifically, the evidence suggested that capitalist support for the Democrats in 1936 was strongest among southerners and ethnic minorities like Catholics and Jews – two groups that were relatively marginal to the predominantly northern and Protestant national elite structure and who invested in the Democratic Party as the only channel of political influence open to them. Additional patterns identified in the 1936 election included the fact that corporate CEOs and members of the corporate “inner circle” (capitalists who held directorships in four or more major corporations) contributed relatively more to Republicans than did other capitalists.

Studies of 1972 election yield surprisingly similar findings to those of the New Deal era, but also explore a number of additional issues. On the question of which individual capitalists were most involved in campaign finance, the evidence shows that wealthy entrepreneurs donated more in 1972 than the inheritors of family fortunes, and that capitalists who were corporate directors or foundation trustees contributed more than those who were less active or less visible in economic or civic affairs (Allen and Broyles 1989). Capitalists who were officers, directors, or major shareowners of firms in highly regulated industries or firms with large government contracts also contributed more (Allen and Broyles 1989; Pittman 1977). However, in contrast to the findings on corporate PAC contributions, individual capitalists associated with these industries were no more pragmatic or bipartisan in the candidates they supported (Burris and Salt 1990). As during the New Deal, southern and Jewish capitalists contributed relatively more to Democrats in 1972 than non-southern or non-Jewish capitalists (Allen and Broyles 1989), and members of the corporate inner circle contributed relatively more to Republicans than did other capitalists (Burris 1991; Burris and Salt 1990). The expectations of corporate liberalism theory received no more support in 1972 than in 1936. Capitalists associated with larger and/or more capital-intensive firms contributed more heavily to Republicans in 1972 than did capitalists associated with mid-sized or more labor-intensive firms (Burris and Salt 1990).

The research on campaign contributions by individual capitalists in elections after 1972 is relatively sparse. With the legalization and rapid growth of corporate PACs in the 1970s, much of the research on capitalist involvement in campaign finance has shifted from individual contributions to PAC contributions. The relative dearth of research on individual capitalists' contributions in recent elections is unfortunate for several reasons. First, despite the growth of corporate and other PACs, large contributions from individual donors remain the single biggest source of campaign money in most elections. In congressional races, large individual donations account for roughly 35–40% of the money raised (Francia et al. 2003); in presidential primaries they account for 70–90% of candidates' receipts (Brown et al. 1995). Second, it has become clear that, under the campaign finance laws enacted during the 1970s, political spending by corporations and by individual capitalists follow different logics as a result of the different legal, institutional, and strategic contexts in which they occur (Burris 2001). Research is therefore needed on both forms of political spending if we are to form a comprehensive and balanced view of corporate and capitalist involvement in campaign finance.

Evidence on political spending by individual elites in more recent elections comes from two kinds of studies: random samples of political contributors, and targeted studies of wealthy individuals and/or top corporate officers. Studies of the first type provide some sense of the disproportionate influence that persons of great wealth exercise over campaign finance. For example, in a random sample of donors to the 1996 congressional election, 78% of all donors of \$200 or more had annual incomes in excess of \$100,000 and 38% had incomes in excess of \$250,000 (Francia et al. 2003). Narrowing the focus to donors who made aggregate contributions of \$8,000 or more to all congressional races combined, nearly half had annual incomes of more than \$500,000 and almost all had incomes above \$250,000, suggesting that top corporate officers and other capitalists were heavily represented among this elite group.

Changes in the campaign finance laws made in the 1970s may have altered either the propensity or the motives of individual capitalists to contribute to political campaigns. Under the old system, corporations seeking political influence had little choice but to funnel contributions through donations made in the names of individual officers or shareowners, whereas now they can contribute more directly through a corporate PAC. Formerly, there was no limit on the size of donations that individuals could make, whereas now there are contribution limits that are sufficiently restrictive (especially for donations made directly to individual candidates) that one might question how much influence a contribution to a particular candidate might buy. One study directly compared presidential campaign contributions by 590 members of 100 wealthy capitalist families before and after the campaign finance reforms of the 1970s and found that there was a decline in the propensity to contribute in 1984 compared with 1972, especially to Democratic Party candidates (Allen and Broyles 1991). More research is needed before we can conclude that this pattern applies to other elections and other types of candidates, but the fact that Democratic contributions (which are more likely to be pragmatic) declined relative to Republican contributions (which are more likely to be ideologically motivated) suggests that capitalists under the new system may be less likely than before to make individual contributions for purely pragmatic reasons.

This interpretation is consistent with other research that shows that campaign contributions by individual capitalists tend to be much less pragmatically motivated than the contributions by corporate PACs. The clearest evidence of a divergence between the spending strategies pursued by corporate PACs and those followed by individual capitalists comes from a study that directly compares the PAC contributions of 394 large corporations in 1980 with the individual contributions of 592 top officers of those same corporations (Burris 2001). Compared with corporate PACs, which contribute mainly to congressional races and spread their contributions over a large number of candidates, individual capitalists direct a larger share of their contributions to presidential primary candidates and to both party and nonparty (e.g., ideological and single-issue) committees. On average, individual capitalists' contributions are more skewed toward Republicans, whereas corporate PAC contributions are more bipartisan. These patterns reflect the fact that corporations are typically more interested in buying access or influence with incumbents, whereas individual capitalists are more concerned with bolstering the election prospects of favored parties and candidates. Factors that predispose a corporation to adopt a pragmatic PAC strategy, such as dependence on defense contracts or being in a highly regulated industry, have no similar impact on the campaign spending of the top officers of those same corporations. For example, in an election year in which Democrats controlled Congress, many of the biggest defense contractors gave 60% or more of their PAC dollars to Democrats, whereas the presidents and CEOs of those same firms gave 95–100% of their individual contributions to Republicans (Burris 2001). The first pattern reflects the pragmatic interest of firms with large government contracts to maintain good relations with incumbents

of both parties, whereas the second reflects the partisan interest of defense industry executives to favor candidates who are ideologically committed to high military spending.

There are other instances in which seemingly similar factors yield opposite effects on the contributions of corporations and those of individual corporate officers. For example, as noted earlier, there is modest but relatively consistent evidence that corporations that are most strongly embedded in director interlock networks tend to adopt a more pragmatic PAC strategy. The most plausible explanation for this is that highly networked firms are positioned to extract the biggest benefits from legislative lobbying (Burris 2001). On the other hand, inner-circle members – i.e., capitalists who hold directorships on multiple corporate boards – have consistently proven to be less bipartisan and more ideologically conservative in their campaign spending than other capitalists. This pattern has not only been demonstrated for 1980 and 1984, but also for 1972 and 1936 (Allen 1991; Broyles 1993; Burris 1991, 2001). On the assumption that inner-circle members are more in tune with the hegemonic view of what defines the collective interests of capitalists as a class, we can only assume that political liberalism or moderation have rarely been strong elements in that hegemonic view.

Because corporations and individual capitalists are different kinds of political actors, research on the latter has identified a number of influences on the campaign contributions of individual capitalists that are either irrelevant or inconsequential for the PAC spending of corporations. For example, contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is strong evidence that capitalists who are members of the old-rich, upper social class tend to be more uniformly conservative in their campaign contributions than new-rich entrepreneurs (Burris 2000, 2001). The relatively stronger propensity of Jewish capitalists to support Democrats in 1936 and 1972 has remained robust through the 1980 election, although it must be stressed that this is a *relative* propensity and that the majority of Jewish capitalists' individual campaign contributions go to Republicans. The relatively stronger propensity of southern capitalists to support Democrats in 1936 and 1972 also persisted through the 1980 election. This is best understood as a lingering remnant of the tradition of Bourbon Democracy and not as an indication of greater liberalism. When southern capitalists support Republicans, they tend to favor the more extreme, right-wing candidates to a degree that is matched only by the traditionally arch-conservative capitalists of the Midwest (Burris 2001). Whether the longstanding pattern of stronger Democratic support among Jewish and southern capitalists has persisted beyond the 1980s has not been studied.

Compared with the research on corporate PAC contributions, there has been relatively little research on the degree of *unity* in campaign contributions by individual capitalists and the factors associated with greater or lesser unity. On the relatively easy-to-measure question of party unity, we know that individual corporate elites give more consistently to Republicans than do the corporations with which those elites are affiliated. From this standpoint, it might appear that capitalists as individual donors are more unified than corporate PACs. There are several reasons why this conclusion is likely mistaken. As previously noted, corporate PACs donate mainly to individual congressional candidates, and, by choosing which races to contribute to, they are generally able to avoid supporting opposing candidates. Individual corporate elites contribute proportionally less to Democrats, but they also target much of their money to presidential candidates and party committees, where it is almost certain that their donations will be used to oppose candidates supported by other corporate elites. Equally important, we have only limited information on the contribution patterns of capitalists who are not themselves top corporate officers, and what evidence we have is skewed toward capitalists of extreme wealth (Allen and Broyles 1989, 1991; Burris 2000). Such evidence as we do have indicates that a nontrivial minority of wealthy individuals contribute heavily to Democratic

candidates, and not just out of a pragmatic interest in securing access but as an expression of partisan commitment and liberal ideology. For example, a study of the *Forbes* 400 richest Americans identified such billionaires as Hollywood mogul David Geffen and investors George Soros and Warren Buffett as both major Democratic Party donors and supporters of numerous liberal causes (Burris 2000).

Although it would be hazardous to speculate about whether individual capitalists are more or less unified in their political spending than corporate PACs, we do have evidence on some of the factors that contribute to greater or lesser unity in the candidates supported by individual elites. As with corporate PACs, geographic proximity and common industry are positively associated with similarity of campaign contributions among individual elites (Burris 2005). More interesting is the fact that interpersonal networks appear to have stronger effects on the similarity of political spending among corporate elites than inter-organizational networks have on the similarity of corporate PAC spending. Specifically, whereas director interlocks among firms have limited effects on the likelihood that firms will contribute to the same or similar candidates, and even then only for particular types of director interlocks (Mizruchi 1992), board ties among individual corporate elites have very pronounced effects on the similarity of those elites' campaign contributions. For example, the fact that two elites are connected through a board interlock has 20–25 times as strong of a positive effect on the similarity of their political spending as either geographic proximity or common industry (Burris 2005). This suggests that further progress in understanding the sources of unity or cleavage in the campaign spending of individual capitalists is likely to come through a deeper study of social networks and not just through research framed in terms of rational calculations of economic interest or ascriptive social characteristics.

THE IMPACT OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

Much of the research on corporate and capitalist involvement in campaign finance uses monetary transfers as “tracer elements” to reveal underlying patterns of political partisanship and the articulation of capitalist class interests within the arena of electoral politics. Obviously, campaign contributions are also important from the standpoint of their impact on political outcomes of one kind or another. There is an immense literature on this topic, and I shall limit myself here to research that most directly bears on the political impact of campaign contributions by corporations and wealthy capitalists. Four types of evidence will be discussed: (1) evidence on the impact of money on election outcomes; (2) surveys of individual campaign contributors about the motives and perceived benefits of their contributions; (3) interviews with corporate PAC officers that help flesh out the notion of “access” and the benefits it confers; (4) analyses that seek to measure the impact of PAC contributions on the votes cast by members of Congress.

It is a truism that money, including money from big business or wealthy capitalists, does not automatically determine the outcome of elections. For example, Roosevelt defeated Landon in 1936 despite the opposition of most wealthy capitalists and being outspent by a ratio of more than 3-to-2. In both presidential and congressional contests, additional factors, such as the power of incumbency, the state of the economy, voter turnout, and coat-tail effects of other candidates or issues on the ballot play a key role in election outcomes. When these conditions are right, however, a major shift or infusion of money from corporations and wealthy capitalists can have a significant impact on election outcomes. This appears to have happened, for example, in the unusually high number of Democratic incumbents who were defeated in the

congressional election of 1980, giving Republicans control of the Senate (Ashford 1986). More commonly, however, donations by corporations and wealthy capitalists have their greatest impact at the prenomination stage, during the primaries or before, where access to early money can boost the visibility and credibility of candidates, especially nonincumbents, who would otherwise never have become viable candidates (Alexander 1984). This same dynamic also places a premium on a candidate's ability to finance his or her own campaign, thereby increasing the number of multi-millionaires among major party candidates.

Surveys of individual campaign contributors consistently find that large majorities of donors emphasize the goals of influencing the outcome of an election and bolstering the election prospects of ideologically appealing candidates as the main motives for contributing (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). A lesser, but still substantial, number mention pragmatic goals such as the expectation of receiving more sympathetic treatment for their business or industry, and the proportion who mention pragmatic goals increases among high-income donors. What impact an individual contribution may have on the actions of a particular legislator is a matter for speculation. What is undeniable, however, is the *cumulative* impact that money and fundraising activities have on constraining the range of people and viewpoints that legislators regularly encounter (Francia et al. 2003). Large donors represent a narrow cross-section of the public that is overwhelmingly affluent and disproportionately from business backgrounds. As fundraising activities come to absorb an ever larger portion of the typical legislator's job, it follows that they will spend ever more of their time interacting with this narrow segment of the public, listening to their concerns, and seeking to appeal to their interests. Large donors are much more likely than other citizens to contact members of Congress; a majority are personally acquainted with their congressional representative; and roughly half know one or both of their senators personally. As a class, therefore, campaign donors have vastly greater access to members of Congress, creating a representational distortion that tends to marginalize other voices and points of view.

Compared with individual donors, corporate PACs are more pragmatically oriented. Although some target their contributions with the aim of influencing the outcome of elections, a majority are more interested in achieving access for lobbying purposes. Both anecdotal evidence and more systematic research suggest that investments in candidates can reap benefits in terms of altering votes on legislation before Congress. However, interviews with PAC officials and lobbyists suggest that the more important and reliable benefits of access occur elsewhere. Campaign contributions by pragmatically oriented corporate PACs are viewed as long-term investments that, together with ongoing social contact between corporate lobbyists and congressional staff, create a symbiotic relationship of trust and reciprocity (Clawson et al. 1998). Pragmatic corporations recognize that legislators are constrained by obligations to party and constituents and will not always be able to vote the way the company wants, least of all on high-visibility issues. Behind the scenes, however, there are many things that legislators will do to please a corporate supporter: insert an amendment or loophole into legislation as it moves through committee; maneuver to prevent a bill from coming up for a vote; lobby colleagues to vote in a way consistent with the contributor's interests; or voice a concern on behalf of the company to a regulatory agency (Clawson et al. 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990). Just as important are the many things that legislators refrain from doing – namely, pushing for legislative action on issues they know will strain relations with corporate supporters.

Whether and how often corporate PAC contributions achieve more than the benefits enumerated earlier and actually cause members of Congress to alter their votes on proposed legislation is a matter of debate. Numerous studies have examined this question (for both

corporate and non-corporate PACs) and come to different conclusions. The obvious problem for empirically adjudicating this question is that corporate and other PACs, although they are often willing to support legislators with whom they have disagreements on policy or ideology, tend to contribute more heavily to candidates they perceive to be sympathetic to their interests. When a legislator votes in a manner that is consistent with the interests of a PAC supporter, the question arises as to whether the PAC contribution can be seen as influencing the vote or whether, conversely, the contribution was made because of the perception that the legislator was already sympathetic to the interests of the contributor. Studies have employed a variety of methods to control for “friendly giving” in assessing the relationship between PAC contributions and roll call votes. Usually this involves introducing controls for such factors as the legislator’s political party, ideological rating, or characteristics of their constituency – either in a single multivariate model or in some variant of two-stage modeling. One recent review identified 33 such studies that collectively produced 357 tests of the contributions-roll call link (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Of these, 36% yielded a significant association between PAC contributions and roll call votes, even after controlling for friendly giving – a percentage that was relatively consistent across different methods and model specifications. This suggests that legislators modify their position in deference to the interests of PAC contributors in slightly more than a third of roll call votes; although, it should be stressed that these studies address the effects of both corporate and non-corporate PAC contributions and typically address only the votes of individual legislators, rather than the passage or defeat of the legislation in question. Another approach has been to use network analysis to compare the *similarity* of PAC support between dyads of legislators with the similarity of those legislators’ roll call votes (Peoples, in this volume). This research also supports the conclusion that PAC dollars can influence roll call votes even after controlling for other factors that might promote similar voting behavior. Additional research shows that industries that are strongly unified in their PAC spending are more effective in achieving their legislative goals (Mizruchi 1992). Finally, individual case studies show that a concerted campaign of corporate PAC spending combined with intensive lobbying can turn the tide in favor of legislation that initially faced majority opposition both in Congress and in the electorate. A good example of this is the corporate sponsored campaign to secure passage of permanent normal trade relations with China in 2000 (Public Citizen 2000). However, such cases also demonstrate the more general principle that corporate PAC spending has the impact it does only because of the hegemonic position big business occupies within the political arena and the other forms of political pressure it is able to bring to bear on the legislative process.

CONCLUSION

Research on campaign spending by corporations and capitalists has made important contributions to our understanding of patterns of political alignment within the capitalist class and the articulation of capitalists’ interests within the arena of electoral politics. Systematic and quantifiable data on campaign contributions has allowed for the testing of various theories of the politics of the capitalist class, the extent and sources of its political unity, the reach of its political influence, and the dimensions along which segments of capital sometimes compete for political advantage. In the process, some theories that were once widely accepted on the basis of anecdotal evidence or selective case studies have been disproved or modified, while others have gained additional credibility. Despite these impressive gains, the literature on this topic remains limited in a number of important respects.

One of the chief limitations of the research on corporate PAC spending is the small number of elections that have been studied. The legalization of corporate PACs in the 1970s, together with the strengthening of disclosure requirements and easier access to machine-readable, campaign finance data beginning in 1978, led to an outpouring of new research on corporate PACs. The greater part of this research was published between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s and deals almost exclusively with elections between 1978 and 1986. Given the exhaustiveness with which corporate PAC spending was studied in this period, there has been an understandable fall-off in new research in the area. However, even if one assumes that the most fruitful topics for research have all been explored, this is still an unfortunate development. Replicating existing studies is not highly valued in social science, but there are reasons to believe that revisiting some of the questions examined in the existing literature would yield new and important findings. By all indications, the late 1970s and 1980s were a relatively distinctive period in terms of the intensity corporate political mobilization. Since the 1980s, there have been major changes in the campaign finance laws, as well as changes in the issues that have been at the top of the corporate political agenda. Many of the existing findings on corporate PAC spending are likely to be replicated for more recent elections, but it would be a mistake to assume that no important changes have taken place in the last two decades.

Despite its limitations, the existing research on corporate PAC spending is arguably more extensive and detailed than the research on other channels of political contributions. As noted previously, research on campaign contributions by individual capitalists in post-1972 elections is extremely sparse. Corporate and capitalist contributions to state and local campaigns have also largely been neglected. And there is, as yet, almost no systematic research on soft-money contributions by corporations and capitalists, despite the fact that this has been a major channel of campaign finance for the last 20 years. Until recently, these gaps in the research might have been explainable in terms of the substantial barriers to assembling data on individual campaign donors, state-level campaign contributions, and soft-money contributions. In recent years, however, the availability of machine-readable data on each of these channels of campaign spending has improved greatly. Comprehensive databases of individual campaign contributors are now no more difficult to obtain from the Federal Election Commission than data on PAC contributions. Many states have strengthened disclosure requirements and made data on campaign contributions available online (National Institute on Money in State Politics 2009). Soft-money 527 groups have thus far eluded regulation by the FEC, but they have become subject to stricter reporting requirements by the Internal Revenue Service, and campaign watchdog groups have mined these IRS filings to create more comprehensive databases of soft-money contributions than were ever available before (Center for Responsive Politics 2009). In sum, there are many unexplored questions and much that remains to be known about corporate and capitalist involvement in campaign finance, and the data for exploring these questions has never been more plentiful.

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CHAPTER 15

States and Economic Development

MATTHEW LANGE

Economic development was a primary interest of the founding figures of political sociology and remains an important focus of political sociologists today. Although this literature investigates diverse aspects of the interrelationships between politics and the economy, numerous analyses explore the role of the state in promoting economic growth and industrialization. Indeed, scholars of economic development played an important role in “bringing the state back in” to political sociology during the 1980s, and the subfield has continued to grow over the past quarter century.

Within this large literature, there is a strong consensus that states are vital to economic growth. In fact, diverse scholars from different theoretical traditions are so convinced about the centrality of states that they claim state building should be the focus of economic policy (Bates 1989; Evans 2005; Fukuyama 2004; Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005; Wolff 2004). There remain important points of contestation, however. In this chapter, I review the literature on states and development and focus on the two dominant views. The liberal, or neoclassical, perspective is most common in economics. It suggests that states promote development when they uphold the market mechanism but limit economic growth when they interfere with it. Alternatively, the developmental state perspective is the dominant view within political sociology, and suggests that state administrative interference with the market mechanism can have either positive or negative effects on economic growth. Through a comparison of both perspectives, this chapter highlights commonalities as well as discrepancies and describes important debates and new areas of study within the literature. It suggests that both views provide important insight into the effects of states on development but describes how the developmental state perspective offers two advantages: it recognizes that states can coordinate diverse actors to promote national economic growth in ways that markets cannot and sheds much more light on factors that determine whether state economic interference is developmental or developmentally destructive.

THE NEOCLASSICAL VIEW

Back in the heyday of Reaganomics, a number of right-wing academics, intellectuals, politicians, and business people demanded as minimal a state as possible. They used Anne Krueger’s (1974) economic theory on rent seeking to justify their position, claiming that it is rational

for state officials to abuse their positions for personal gain and that the state therefore causes enormous inefficiencies when it regulates economic activities. Despite her influence, Krueger was bypassed as the symbol for this antistate movement in favor of Adam Smith, a more recognizable economist who championed the market and whose likeness appeared on the neckties of various antistate and promarket supporters. Given his undeniable influence on liberal economic theory, the popularity of Smith among these circles is hardly surprising. If one actually reads Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776/1993), however, one discovers that he was not as opposed to state interference as some of his tie-wearing supporters believed. In fact, Smith recognized that states can help limit market externalities and provide a number of public and collective goods that promote economic expansion. These include military defense, justice, commercial infrastructure, currency, and education (393–432). For example, Smith claimed that law was necessary for economic development because it provided a means for people to maintain their property and, thereby, spur production and exchange. He writes:

It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in security.... The acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil government. (408)

Today, most neoclassical scholars who follow the Smithian tradition are better versed in these aspects of his writings and believe that states have very important effects on economic development. Most focus on state regulation and suggest that the protection of property rights lays the institutional foundation for economic development. One of the first individuals to repopularize this view is Nobel Laureate Douglass North. In *Structure, Change and Economic History* (1981), he helps bring the state back into economics by describing how the protection of private property is one of the most basic necessities of capitalist development. He claims that economists inappropriately assume that transaction costs – or the costs incurred while making an exchange – are zero. Exchanges, however, can be very risky and expensive and potentially impede trade, investment, and economic growth. By providing effective legal protection of property and contracts, North believes that states can reduce transaction costs and thereby spur development.

Several additional works continue in this tradition. Acemoglu et al. (2003), for example, analyze the determinants of Botswana's successful economic development and propose that the state's effective protection of property rights is the most important cause of the country's surprising economic growth. In a broader cross-national analysis, they (2001) provide evidence that state enforcement of property rights helps to explain variation in long-term economic development.

Despite hailing states as developmental necessities, these and other neoclassical scholars believe that there are two sides to the state coin. While state legal protection makes possible market exchange, they believe Krueger's fear of rent-seeking state officials is real and claim that the scope of state activities must be limited to creating a sound institutional environment for capitalist development. According to this view, state intervention in the economy promotes unproductive economic activities instead of efficient exchanges based on supply and demand. Greater state involvement in the economy, for example, allows state officials to exploit their positions for personal gain, promoting bribery and patronage politics rather than investment or production. Equally damaging, state protection of markets from external competition creates rent havens that remove incentives to increase the quality of goods, reduce costs, and develop new technologies. While state elites can act independently as patrons and rent seekers, they frequently collaborate with corporate elites, political supporters, lobbyists, and other non-state actors in these unproductive activities.

As evidence, proponents of this neoclassical view often point to excessive state intervention in different parts of the world. Among Latin Americanists, a number of scholars blame the region's relative economic stagnation on the states' attempts to promote economic development through import-substitution industrialization (ISI). According to this view, ISI protected producers from competition in an attempt to spur industrialization, an effort that failed because producers had no incentive to manufacture quality goods at low prices. Even Raul Prebisch, whose work inspired dependency theory, severely criticized ISI:

As is well known, the proliferation of industries of every kind in a closed market has deprived the Latin American countries of the advantages of specialization and economies of scale, and owing to the protection afforded by excessive tariff duties and restrictions, a healthy form of internal competition has failed to develop to the detriment of efficient production. (Prebisch 1963: 71)

In a classic analysis of state involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, Robert Bates (1981) makes similar claims. He describes how state control over marketing boards allowed political elites to extract excessive rent from the rural economy, which was either embezzled by officials or used in failed attempts to promote industrialization in urban areas. The end result was decreasing agricultural production with no sustainable industrial expansion.

The Developmental State View of Economic Development

Although venerating Smith, proponents of the neoclassical position could just as easily trace the origins of their position to Max Weber. Indeed, having earned a doctorate in law, Weber described how states make possible market exchange through the rational enforcement of property rights and contracts, two factors that he believed promoted capitalist development in Europe by reducing the risks involved in contracts, exchange, investment, and production (see Trubek 1972). On this issue, Weber (1983) writes:

Among those [factors making possible the rise of capitalism] of undoubted importance are the rational structures of law and of administration. For modern rational capitalism needs, not only the technical means of production, but also a calculable legal system and an administration based on formal rules. Without them, an irregular, shady, speculative and purely commercial capitalism as well as other kinds of politically involved capitalisms are possible, but no rational enterprise under individual initiative, with fixed capital and certainty of calculations. Such a legal system and such administration have been available as a framework for economic activity only in the Occident. (1983: 28)

Despite Weber's obvious insight and his early discussion of state regulation and transaction costs, the neoclassical perspective largely ignores his contribution. The reason is almost certainly that Weber did not stop with a regulatory state. Instead, as the quote above shows, he believed that both state regulation and administration are vital to economic development and even proposed that state administrative interference can be economically advantageous. Given Weber's extreme influence in modern political science and sociology, he has received due recognition in disciplines other than economics (although he has yet to decorate ties). Indeed, the developmental state literature within political sociology generally reveres Weber as its founding figure.

While recognizing the developmental impact of legal regulation, active state management of the economy is the focus of the developmental state perspective. Most basically, scholars holding this position believe that state economic management can promote development by making possible collective action in pursuit of industrialization. Indeed, because markets do not allow diverse economic actors to act collectively in pursuit of national economic development,

states can facilitate industrialization by pursuing and coordinating a coherent national strategy for economic development.

Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) provides an early example of this perspective. He was interested in late development and proposed that countries could overcome their backwardness and catch up to early developers by copying technologies. For this to be successful, he believed the state needed to play an active role. Specifically, the state administration can coordinate diverse actors in pursuit of national economic development by transferring resources to leading industries, providing “entrepreneurial guidance,” and offering protection from foreign competition (354). In this way, when countries lack entrepreneurs and investment capital and face stiff overseas competition, states can actively promote economic development through administrative intervention.

Gerschenkron was interested in late industrialization in Europe, but most subsequent works that follow his lead focus on Asia. Chalmers Johnson (1982) was among the earliest scholars to analyze state-led development in Asia and coined the phrase “developmental state.” He analyzes the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and describes how it helped manage Japan’s economy and thereby drive its phenomenal economic expansion after World War II. According to Johnson, MITI served as the architect of industrial policy and focused its energies on strengthening Japan’s industrial base. Unlike the communist variety, the Japanese developmental state did not endow the state with centralized control over the economy but instead worked with private economic producers in order to increase technological investments, protect domestic producers from foreign competition, and acquire licenses for foreign technology. Possibly of greatest importance, Johnson describes how the Japanese administrative state was able to influence investment patterns and production through its control over finance.

Since Johnson, a number of works have continued in this tradition. Alice Amsden (1989), Manuel Castells (1992), Peter Evans (1995), Robert Wade (1990), and Meredith Woo-Cumings (1991) all use the developmental state model and find that it helps explain rapid economic expansion in Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere. All authors provide strong evidence that state economic management promoted economic dynamism and point to diverse mechanisms. Comparing the east Asian tigers, Castells (1992) concludes that active state intervention proved vital to economic growth through the “production of high-quality labor and its subsequent control, the strategic guidance through the hazardous seas of the world economy, the ability to lead the economy in periods of transition, the process of diversification, the creation of a science-and-technology base and its diffusion in the industrial system” (55). Evans (1995) also suggests developmental states can take multiple roles and provides general categories: by regulating social relations, by producing public and private goods, by assisting the rise of entrepreneurs, and by cajoling and assisting private entrepreneurs to adapt to market conditions (13–14).

The Enduring Influence of States

Both neoclassical and developmental state perspectives agree that states can be influential causes of economic development. Even more, recent works in both literatures focus on temporal aspects of social processes and suggest that states reinforce long-term developmental trajectories. According to these “path-dependent” arguments, state institutions last for long periods of time, have continuous institutional effects, and thereby have the potential to reinforce processes over long periods. Neoclassical and developmental state scholars, therefore, propose that analyses of states and economic development must take a historical perspective.

North (1990) was among the first to make historical claims about the impact of states on economic development. He investigates why economic inequality between countries is not diminishing, something that convergence theory in economics suggests should occur. He proposes that states provide the answer. Specifically, effective state enforcement of property rights was a major determinant of economic expansion among early developers, whereas late developers stagnated due in no small part to their failure to protect property. And, because these state institutions have generally reproduced themselves with only minor changes, the early developers continue to have effective states, and the states of late developers remain ineffective. Thus, because of constant state institutional effects, the early developers continue to have superior law enforcement and, thereby, economic growth.

Acemoglu et al. (2002) also take the neoclassical perspective and make similar claims. They provide evidence that a developmental reversal of fortune occurred over the past 500 years among colonized regions whereby the most underdeveloped areas became the most developed and vice versa. The authors propose that colonialism caused this reversal, and their argument focuses on European colonists. They suggest that Europeans settled in regions with relatively low levels of precolonial economic development and established effective legal institutions to protect their property. Effective legal institutions, in turn, made possible sustained economic development over the past several centuries. Alternatively, when regions were relatively developed prior to colonialism, the colonial powers constructed extractive forms of rule in order to exploit such wealth and thereby failed to institutionalize legal institutions that protect property rights. According to the authors, the lack of legal protection, caused a trajectory of economic stagnation and decline.

The developmental state literature also provides evidence that states can be historical causes of development. The contributors to *States and Development: Historical Antecedents to Stagnation and Advance* (Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005), for example, provide theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to make a strong case that states enforce long-term developmental trajectories. Similar to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, a number of developmental state scholars also find that colonialism sparked different developmental trajectories by institutionalizing different states. Atul Kohli (2004) provides a comparative-historical analysis of Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Korea and finds that each have postcolonial states with different capacities to manage the economy and promote industrialization. Moreover, he finds that colonialism was a formative force that shaped each state's capacity to promote economic development, thereby suggesting that colonialism had long-term effects on economic development through its effects on state institutions. Matthew Lange (2009) makes similar, yet, broader claims in his analysis of uneven development among former British colonies. Through quantitative and qualitative methods, he shows that the extent of direct or indirect colonial rule affected the capacity of the colonial state to provide diverse developmental goods, with former directly ruled colonies having much greater capacities than former indirectly ruled colonies. Because of the general maintenance of these different capacities since independence, former directly ruled colonies have had much higher levels of economic and human development over the past 40 years.

Discrepancies Between the Neoclassical and Developmental State Perspectives

Although the neoclassical and developmental state literatures agree that states affect economic development in influential ways and can reinforce long-term developmental trajectories, their theoretical perspectives also diverge in important ways. In fact, scholars of both perspectives

often overlook their common ground and emphasize discrepancies. Most importantly, the neo-classical and developmental state perspectives disagree over the theory of comparative advantage and the centrality of the market mechanism. As a consequence of both, they provide very different policy prescriptions for state involvement in the economy.

The neoclassical position accepts the theory of comparative advantage. According to this view, all countries should produce goods for the international market based on their particular geographical, human, and technological endowments. When this occurs, the theory suggests that countries benefit from trade even if they have no absolute advantage in production. Alternatively, if producers from a country specialize in goods based on the market value of products, the whims of elites, or any other consideration besides factor endowments, they will be less able to compete with other producers who have comparative advantages and will, therefore, gain less through trade.

Whereas the theory of comparative advantage is a central element of neoclassical economics, developmental state theorists often reject it in favor of the Prebisch–Singer Thesis. According to the latter, international trade is characterized by unequal exchanges. The production of certain high value-added goods, for example, is more advantageous than the production of goods with much more limited value added. As a consequence, the theory suggests that state economic policy should focus on expanding the production of high value-added goods, such as cars and computers, even if a country has a comparative advantage in producing low value-added goods, such as bananas or simple textiles.

The developmental state literature points to several reasons for rejecting the theory of comparative advantage. For one thing, high value-added goods fetch higher prices and, therefore, have the potential to be much more profitable. In addition, the prices of high value-added goods are generally more stable, and the producers of high value-added goods are usually better equipped to change production in accordance with market demand. As a consequence, they are less prone to the harsh economic impact of erratic fluctuations, stagnant prices, and falling demand. Finally, high value-added goods generally require numerous components and can promote complementary industries both up-stream and down-stream. Alternatively, such complementarities are much fewer with the production of primary products.

In addition to their differing views on comparative advantage, neoclassical and developmental state scholars also hold the market mechanism in different regard. According to the neoclassical position, the market mechanism must be promoted and protected at all cost, as it is the most efficient means of production and exchange. From this perspective, state interference with the market mechanism only distorts prices and necessarily causes resources to be used in less productive ways. Consequently, neoclassical scholars claim that states need to exert their energy protecting markets, not disrupting them.

Alternatively, the developmental state literature believes that the market mechanism is vital to economic expansion but suggests that state interference can actually spur economic growth by coordinating diverse actors and combining their efforts to pursue national economic development. For example, a state can use its power and resources to steer economic production towards relatively high value-added goods when private producers are unwilling or unable to do so independently. In this way, states can change opportunity costs in order to guide economic production into more profitable areas. In a similar vein, developmental state scholars suggest that state interference can promote growth through the state's ability to harness knowledge and discipline business. Amsden (2001), for example, builds a strong case for active state management. Her analysis focuses on the role of technology and knowledge that is largely specific to the context of firms and cultures as well as based on tacit, implicit, "local" ideas. She proposes that institutional patterns shape and mobilize this knowledge and

shows that the successful late industrializing countries developed systems of conditional subsidies and careful performance monitoring. These “reciprocal control mechanisms” allowed substantial state interventions – even interventions that significantly distort the workings of the market – in ways that coordinated diverse public and private actors in pursuit of national strategies of industrialization.

THE DETERMINANTS OF EFFECTIVE STATES

Because of the prominence of both perspectives and their different policy prescriptions, each perspective has had to react to the other’s argument and critique. They have done so in very different ways, however. While neoclassical scholars use counterfactual evidence and dogmatically deny that state interference can benefit the economy, the developmental state perspective is more empirically oriented and investigates factors that cause some state intervention to be developmental and others to be developmentally destructive.

Neoclassical scholars consistently and strongly reject developmental state findings and maintain the orthodox position that state intervention deters growth. As such, they counter developmental state findings that state intervention in Botswana, Singapore, South Korea, and elsewhere promoted economic growth by claiming either that their spectacular developmental records would have been even more outstanding if the state had not mingled in economic affairs or that state intervention was actually very minimal in these countries. Given that these countries experienced among the most impressive economic growth rates the world has ever seen, claims that growth could have been much greater seem unlikely. Moreover, arguments that these states did not intervene in the economies are simply incorrect, as there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The neoliberal perspective, therefore, finds itself on weak empirical grounds.

Alternatively, developmental state scholars generally accept aspects of the neoclassical critique and increasingly recognize that state interference can have very deleterious effects on economic growth. They suggest that state action can be predatory and kleptocratic and point to state interference in Zaire under Mobutu and in Zimbabwe under Mugabe as examples. The literature on developmental states has, therefore, readjusted the focus of earlier works, which analyzed the advantages of state intervention, to explore factors that make state intervention either beneficial or destructive. These works highlight five key factors: bureaucratic organization, autonomy, state-society relations, export-oriented industrialization, and international pressure.

In exploring why some states are developmental and others destructive, most developmental state scholars follow Weber’s lead and claim that the extent of state bureaucratization is the most critical element. Although bureaucracy is never a fail-proof means of subordinating officials to state interests and coordinating large numbers of people (Perrow 1972), it is the most efficient means of corporate action on a large-scale and helps to endow state officials with the capacity to implement broad and complex policy by disciplining and coordinating numerous and dispersed actors. Indeed, the six basic components of bureaucratic organization outlined by Weber – formal rules prescribing the duties attached to positions within the bureaucracy, hierarchical organization, record keeping, meritocracy, full-time employment, and salary-based compensation – promote these two requirements in a number of ways.

Formal rules defining duties and coordinating agents make possible an organizational structure that facilitates effective state action. In the extreme formulation of the model of bureaucracy, organizational rules create a gapless institutional framework dictating how

agents act under all possible circumstances and thereby making state agents impersonal cogs within a preprogrammed organizational machine. Filing and record keeping are central to bureaucracy's rational character – they create organizational memory and allow actors to monitor the functioning of the organization and the performance of agents through the constant collection of data. Similarly, hierarchical organization establishes a chain of command and thereby endows officials with the authority to preside over certain organizational functions or to oversee the agents performing them, or both. In this way, hierarchical organization provides a formal means of decision-making as well as a check on the seeking of individual gain. Full-time employment and salary-based compensation provide additional limits to insubordination by making state agents dependent on their positions for their livelihood. At the same time, they support the autonomy of the organization from the surrounding society, and autonomy helps to prevent individuals with common class, religious, or political loyalties from usurping the state apparatus to serve these loyalties. Such autonomy, in turn, helps to ensure that agents act with organizational interests in mind. Meritocracy, while obviously enhancing effectiveness, also promotes a special kind of group coherence that strengthens organizational autonomy.

Within the developmental state literature, several analyses provide evidence that bureaucracy promotes effective developmental action by states. Johnson (1982), for example, describes MITI as extremely bureaucratic and, as a consequence, very capable of formulating and implementing complex policy. Alternatively, Ben Ross Schneider (1999) finds that Latin American states were organized much less bureaucratically than their East Asian counterparts and that state intervention in Latin America was, less effective and promoted much greater rent seeking. Combining elements of Johnson and Schneider, Peter Evans (1995) provides a comparative analysis of Brazil, Zaire, India, and South Korea and makes even stronger claims:

Predatory states lack the ability to prevent individual incumbents from pursuing their own goals. Personal ties are the only source of cohesion, and individual maximization takes precedence over pursuit of collective goals. Ties to society are ties to individual incumbents, not connections between constituencies and the state as an organization. Predatory states are, in short, characterized by a dearth of bureaucracy as Weber defined it.

The internal organization of developmental states comes much closer to approximating a Weberian bureaucracy. Highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards create commitment and a sense of corporate coherence. (12)

Elsewhere, he and James Rauch (1999) provide cross-national statistical support to these qualitative findings. They operationalize the extent to which state hiring and promotion practices are based on bureaucratic criteria and find that their “Weberianness scale” is significantly and positively related to economic growth.

In addition to bureaucracy, several developmental state scholars claim that state autonomy is vital to successful economic management (Johnson 1982; Koo 1987; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999). Drawing on Marxist theory, they suggest that state officials must be sufficiently autonomous from powerful societal interests in order to implement necessary economic policy despite resistance from strong societal actors. This is vital because economic development often requires policy that negatively affects particular groups in the short-term but has positive effects on the national economy in the long-term. Autonomy from traditional landed elites, for example, is often seen as a requirement for state-led development and to have made possible industrialization in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In this way, class structures can affect the developmental capacity of states.

In his discussion of state autonomy, Evans (1995) downplays the importance of class structure and suggests that autonomy is based more on the state's capacity to act corporately than the power of societal groups, going so far as to equate autonomy with bureaucratization itself.

In parting from the Marxist tradition, his interpretation helps reconcile state autonomy with a third factor that developmental state scholars commonly believe determines whether state intervention has positive or negative effects on growth: the ties between state and society. According to this view, states are necessarily embedded within society and interact to different degrees with societal actors, and these relations affect state effectiveness. Given its interest in industrialization, this literature focuses on the density and form of relations between state officials and business elite and suggests that active relations between state officials and economic actors allow state officials to harness the participation, initiative, and know-how of societal groups and make possible positive-sum relations between state and economic actors (Amsden 2001; Evans 1995, 1996; Lange 2003, 2005; Onis 1991; Weiss 1998; Wang 1999). These analyses find that active and collaborative relations between state and society promote development by exploiting the state's central control and permanence to guide economic production and the market's ability to discipline production and engage a large number of individuals. As Ziya Onis (1991) remarks,

Key to rapid industrialization is a strong and autonomous state, providing directional thrust to the operation of the market mechanisms. The market is guided by a conception of long-term national rationality of investment formulated by government officials. It is the "synergy" between the state and the market which provides the basis for outstanding development experience. (110)

Alternatively, when state relations with society are either lacking or completely top-down, states can have inappropriate information about local conditions and the needs of economic producers (Callaghy 1984; Evans 1995; Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005). As James Scott (1998) describes, such a disjuncture not only limits the ability of the state to exploit the resources and effort of societal groups but can cause the heavy-handed implementation of policy that is both inappropriate and socially destructive.

Strong ties with economic actors potentially promote economic development in another way: they help limit the ability of state elites to rent-seek. Reviewing major developmental state works, Xu Wang (1999) remarks that dense ties with economic actors constrain the state "so that its policies do not simply follow state elites' own interests" (237). For these ties to promote state discipline instead of corruption and cronyism, however, relations with the public must be transparent and must engage a number of actors. Moreover, Evans (1995), Schneider (1999), and others recognize that state bureaucratization helps limit corrupt relations between state and society and, therefore, suggest that state-society relations help discipline state actors most effectively when in combination with bureaucratic organization.

Fourth, developmental state scholars suggest that particular policy prescriptions can limit rent-seeking behavior. Most importantly, the economic policy of the most successful developmental states has been oriented toward exportation, not domestic consumption, and export-based growth absolutely requires the efficient production of quality goods. In order to be internationally competitive, developmental states constantly prod producers to improve the quality of their output and lower production costs. To do this, the states can use their control over finance and foreign trade as both a carrot and a stick. In South Korea during its first decades of state-led industrialization, for example, the state helped finance chaebols for the production of goods for export and gave them protection from foreign competition. At the same time, it threatened to cut the financing of chaebols if they did not reach specific production goals and gave them only a limited period of protection. As a consequence, developmental state action did not create the same inefficiencies as ISI in Latin America, as producers were forced to eventually compete internationally.

Finally, a number of developmental state scholars note that external threats and competition can limit rent seeking and promote a strong state commitment to national development.

Johnson (1982), for example, describes how Japanese concerns over international security spurred nationalist development efforts. Strong nationalism, in turn, strengthened the corporate coherence of the Japanese state even further and helped subordinate the interests of individual state officials to the national interests of the state. Similarly, both Taiwan and South Korea experienced external communist threats that helped discipline state actors and thereby limit any rent-seeking behavior (Doner et al. 2005; Onis 1991: 116; Wade 1990: 338; Woo-Cumings 1999).

Thus, the developmental state literature points to bureaucratization, autonomy, state-society relations, export-oriented policy, and external threats as factors that help to discipline state actors and enhance the effectiveness of state economic intervention. In combination, they help to explain why some states are able to promote economic development while others directly deter economic growth. The neoclassical perspective, on the other hand, rarely questions the determinants of effective states, proposing simply that some states provide a rule of law while others do not. While this omission is not surprising given the neoclassical rejection that state administrative intervention can positively affect economic growth, the legal institutions of countries vary greatly in their capacity to protect property rights, and the issue of state effectiveness is, therefore, very important for neoclassical scholars as well.

The few works within the neoclassical literature that explore this important issue generally ignore the state institutional factors highlighted in the developmental state literature. Instead, they usually focus on interests and policy decisions given that most neoclassical scholars generally accept rational choice theory. Acemoglu et al. (2003) support this view but also claim that diffusion helps to explain the unequal legal capacities of the world's states. In particular, the authors suggest that European settlers transplanted legal institutions from their sending countries and that regions with histories of European settlement have more effective institutions than regions without European settlers. LaPorta et al. (1999) also support diffusionist claims but place more emphasis on the overall structure of the legal system. They find that a state's legal tradition – British, French, German, etc. – shapes the extent to which it protects property rights.

Given that legal regulation depends on the capacity of the state to enforce laws, it is somewhat surprising that the neoclassical perspective overlooks this potential cause of variation in property right enforcement. The developmental state literature, however, offers insight into this issue. From the Weberian perspective, the implementation of law requires that state actors are both disciplined and organized and thereby capable of regulating social relations. Weber (1920/1968) himself noted an elective affinity between a rule of law and bureaucracy and suggested that both reinforce one another. In addition, Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) focuses on the physical presence of law enforcement officials throughout the state's territory and suggests that state infrastructural power is needed for a rule of law. When infrastructural power is low, state agents cannot regulate society because they are not physically present throughout large stretches of the territory. As a consequence, laws are unenforceable, and individuals are free to pursue their interests in violent and self-serving ways, something that encourages the violation of property rights and promotes dependent and exploitative social relations. When the state is present throughout the territory, on the other hand, state agents are able to interact with the population, monitor their actions, and sanction individuals who break laws.

STATES AND GLOBALIZATION

One issue that has gained increasing attention in the literature on states and economic development over the last decade is globalization, a broad term used to describe the cultural, political, and

economic integration of the world. One common claim is that growing global integration reduces the capacity of states to shape economic development because powerful international actors are able to exert considerable influence over domestic processes. Because neoclassical and developmental state scholars disagree about the impact of states on economic development, they also hold very different views on globalization.

In general, neoclassical scholars do not believe that globalization limits the ability of the state to promote economic development. For one thing, they suggest that globalization does not prevent the state from providing law and order. In fact, the mobility of capital and the nature of the global economy make a stable economic environment all the more important. As a consequence, globalization might actually encourage state enforcement of a rule of law and thereby state institutional isomorphism.

Second, neoclassical scholars commonly propose that globalization promotes economic growth by expanding the market mechanism and limiting undesirable state interference. Specifically, they believe that globalization expands international trade and finance. In so doing, global institutions, multinational corporations, and the free movement of capital all pressure states to limit their involvement in the economy. As a consequence, states lose their ability to interfere and must yield to the market mechanism. Along these lines, Kenichi Ohmae (1995) claims that the nation-state is an anachronism that is eroding quickly and that markets are quickly expanding beyond national borders. Given his views that states are frequently involved in “wealth destruction” through their interference with the market mechanism and his positive view of markets, he believes that this trend is highly desirable.

From the developmental state perspective, the potential effects of globalization are more mixed. To the extent that globalization limits the state’s ability to interfere with economic relations, both the capacity of states to promote economic development and the potential for destructive state action decline. Despite this mixed bag, most developmental state scholars are interested in how state intervention can promote growth and, therefore, focus on the negative impact of globalization. Demonstrating this view, Joseph Stiglitz (2002) finds that the IMF, World Bank, and other global institutions promote the expansion of neoliberal policy prescriptions and suggests that this has had very negative effects on development in some countries by limiting the extent of state economic management. In particular, Stiglitz claims that powerful global institutions push policies that limit the extent of state intervention and pressure countries to pursue such policy prescriptions through both advice and loans. This, in turn, limits the ability of states to implement policy that is best suited to their particular circumstances.

At the same time, Stiglitz does not believe that globalization requires that states follow neoliberal policy – it only pressures them to do so. He describes that some states continue to successfully promote economic development through market intervention. Even some countries that depended on the IMF and World Bank for loans have been able to maintain active states that successfully managed their economies. Mauritius, for example, is a tiny country dependent on foreign trade and investment and implemented five IMF standby arrangements and two World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programs in the 1980s. The globalization hypothesis therefore suggests that it should have a very non-interventionist state. Yet, the Mauritian government successfully lobbied their position and modified the structural adjustment packages to respect the particular needs and interests of the state and the population (Gulhati and Nallari 1990: 39). Thus, the state was able to maintain spending on social programs and continue to actively intervene in the economy, and state intervention has propelled the Mauritian economy, which has grown rapidly over the past three decades and earned the country the nickname “the African tiger” (Brautigam 1997; Meisenhelder 1997).

Similarly, Linda Weiss (2003) and contributors provide consistent evidence that globalization transforms but does not impede state economic management. Weiss concludes, “however much globalization throws real constraints in the way of state activity, most notably in the macroeconomic arena, it also allows states sufficient room to move, and thus to act consonant with their social policy and economic upgrading objectives” (298). Even more, the volume provides evidence that globalization might actually enhance the effectiveness of state economic management by promoting interaction and collaboration between state and economic actors.

Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1999) make a similar argument. They recognize that a number of institutions – local, national, and international – make possible economic governance in an increasing integrated world. Although claiming that states can no longer be omnipotent demiurges, they believe that globalization creates a new and important role for states: they must link diverse institutions in order to create a coherent system of governance.

The nation-state is central to this process of “suturing”: the policies and practices of states in distributing power upwards to the international level and downwards to subnational agencies are the ties that will hold the system of governance together. Without such explicit policies to close gaps in governance and elaborate a division of labour in regulation, then vital capacities for control will be lost. Authority may now be plural within and between states rather than nationally centralized, but to be effective it must be structured by an element of design into a relatively coherent architecture of institutions. (270)

In this way, the role of the state is changing but not diminishing, and developmental state scholars firmly believe that claims about the death of states are highly exaggerated. Indeed, as Lange and Rueschemeyer (2005) note, states are multipurpose institutions that “can directly provide solutions or activate collective action once a goal has been determined” (6). In an ever-changing and globalizing world with new and complex problems, the effectiveness of such multipurpose problem solvers is all the more important.

CONCLUSION

In reviewing the large literature on states and economic development, this chapter outlines two dominant theoretical perspectives – neoclassical and developmental state – and highlights major similarities and differences between the two. Both agree that states are among the most important determinants of economic development and propose that states can enforce developmental trajectories over long periods of time. In addition, both, knowingly or unknowingly, draw on Weberian theory and provide important insight into the determinants of economic development. The perspectives differ markedly, however, in how they believe states promote development. According to the neoclassical perspective, state economic interference is tantamount to inefficiency, as it distorts prices in ways that cause resources to be used in unproductive ways. As a consequence, states should promote development by creating an institutional environment in which the market mechanism can flourish. Alternatively, the developmental state perspective claims that state intervention can – but does not necessarily – have very positive effects on economic development. These scholars do not deny the importance of the market mechanism but suggest that states can supplement it by providing resources and information to private producers, producing goods when the private sector cannot, disciplining and guiding private producers, or some combination of the three. At the heart of their argument is the belief that national economic development requires coordination that markets are unable to provide because of their dependence on self-motivated, individual action but that states – through their

organizational capacities – can implement. The developmental state literature, therefore, takes a more moderate and conciliatory view than the neoclassical position, suggesting that markets are vital to production and exchange but are much more poorly equipped than the state to promote collective action among diverse economic actors.

Because of these differences, both views also disagree over the impact of globalization on economic development. The neoclassical view suggests that globalization cannot impede economic development but provides opportunities for economic expansion in two ways: it offers states incentives to provide greater protection to property and limits the ability of states to interfere in the economy. Alternatively, developmental state scholars are more fearful of globalization because of its potential to limit the ability of states to interfere in the economy. Yet, most suggest that globalization does not prevent states from managing their economies and might actually create new and important roles for them. In this way, they believe that states are potentially more important than ever.

Besides their different perspectives on state economic intervention and globalization, the neoclassical and developmental state literatures also differ in their analytic focuses. Although both sides recognize that some states are more effective than others and that this has important effects on economic development, the neoclassical view largely overlooks the causes of state effectiveness and defectiveness. The developmental state literature, on the other hand, actively investigates factors that account for the different developmental effects of states. The literature commonly points to five factors: bureaucratization enhances state capacity by disciplining and coordinating state actors, autonomy frees the state from pursuing particular interests, state-society relations allow state officials to draw on information and resources from societal actors, export-oriented industrialization allows states to pressure domestic producers to enhance productivity and quality, and foreign pressure can limit rent seeking by encouraging both economic and state actors to pursue nationalist economic goals.

In addition to shedding light on factors that affect whether states are developmental or developmentally destructive, this insight also helps developmental state scholars counter neoclassical critiques. Indeed, in showing that the most dynamic developers have had actively interventionist states and that these states had certain characteristics that increased the states organizational capacity and limited rent seeking, the developmental state literature provides strong evidence against blanket claims about the negative impact of state interference. Alternatively, neoclassical faith in the market mechanism appears to cause an uncompromising position that prevents it from explaining why certain countries with highly interventionist states have been the world's most dynamic developers over the past half century. Even more, neoclassical scholars do not explore why some places have more effective legal institutions than others, suggesting that it is simply the result of institutional choice or diffusion. This is an important area for future research and – given the groundwork already complete – one in which the neoclassical literature can turn to the developmental state perspective for insight.

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CHAPTER 16

Gender, Politics, and Women's Empowerment

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The literature on gender, women, and politics has examined both the gendered nature of political processes and women's participation patterns. Whether cast in terms of a variable or as an integral element of the social structure, gender is seen as pervading the realm of politics in that it reflects the distribution of power and reinforces notions of masculinity and femininity, and it influences the patterns of political participation by women and by men. Thus it is the social relations of gender – and the ways in which gender dynamics operate in the family, the labor market, and the polity – that explain why women have been historically marginalized from the corridors of political power, why feminists refer to “manly states” and “patriarchal politics” (Enloe 1990, 2007; Tickner 1992; Peterson and Runyan 1993), and why an essential policy prescription for enhancing women's political participation at both national and local levels is the electoral quota. By the same token, the operations of gender help us recognize the strategies for women's political empowerment, such as the formation of women's movements and organizations that have become prominent in civil society.

This chapter takes a global perspective to examine the gendered nature of politics and patterns of women's political participation in formal politics and in civil society, including involvement in web-based “virtual activism.” It presents research findings and policy debates on gender and politics, and provides data on women's political participation. It comes in four parts. In the first, we survey the feminist literature on gender and politics, including the identification of enabling factors and persistent obstacles. In the second, we examine the patterns of women's political participation in national and local government, political parties, and as heads of government or state. In the third, we review research on women and gender in civil society, social movements, transnational advocacy, and democratic transitions. The fourth section discusses the broad implications and impact of women's political participation.

GENDERING POLITICS: WHAT IS AT STAKE?

Political scientists have developed a prodigious body of work arguing that in order for historically marginalized groups to be effectively represented in institutions, members of those

groups must be present in deliberative, or decision making, bodies (Weldon 2002). These would include political parties, parliaments, and national and local governments. And yet, across history, culture, and societies, *women as a group* have been excluded from key decision making arenas in the government sector (national and local government) and the leadership of political parties, as well as in the other domains.¹ This is indicative of the gendered nature of politics.

Gender refers to a structural relationship between women and men – which historically has manifested itself as a relationship of asymmetry, domination and subordination – or to unequal power relations between men *as a group* etc. women in decision making would suggest that the changes in gender relations constitute a structural shift. Here we distinguish the structural/collective from the individual. Across recorded history, individual women may have been more powerful than individual men, but in no society were women as a group more powerful than men as a group. It stands to reason, therefore, that the involvement of larger numbers and proportions of women in decision making both reflects and reinforces the changes in gender relations as a structural shift, one characterized by the *empowerment of women as a group*.

As this chapter will demonstrate, women's participation in formal politics has been increasing, though in variable ways. There was, for example, a precipitous decline in the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union following the collapse of communism and the emergence of liberal democracies in the early 1990s. In a number of regions, quotas – constitutional, electoral, and political party quotas – have been installed to ensure equitable representation by women. Women have been elected heads of government or state, and across the globe their proportion of parliamentary seats is about 18-20%. And yet, formidable obstacles remain, although these are being addressed by the global women's rights agenda,² women's movements, and some national governments. Today, feminist social scientists argue that a polity is not fully democratic when there is not adequate representation of women (Phillips 1991, 1995; Eschle 2000; Moghadam 2004). The Beijing Platform for Action (UN 1996, para 181) states that: "Achieving the goal of equal participation of women and men in decision-making ... is needed in order to strengthen democracy and promote its proper functioning."

If women's representation in the corridors of formal politics has been limited, their involvement in extraparliamentary politics has been extensive. Women have played important and visible roles in the great social revolutions (French, Russian, Chinese, Iranian), in Third World liberation and revolutionary movements (e.g., Vietnam, Algeria, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, South Africa), and in all manner of social movements (e.g., the Civil Rights movement in the United States, and the peace, environmental, anti-nuclear, and animal rights movements). With few exceptions, women's roles were long unacknowledged in official histories or popular accounts. Since the 1970s, however, this historical amnesia and women's political marginalization have been corrected first by feminist scholarship across the disciplines (e.g., history, sociology, political science); secondly by the recog-

¹ Other domains include civil society (including professional associations and trade unions), the judiciary, academia, the media, and corporate boards.

² The global women's rights agenda is found in a number of international instruments sponsored by the United Nations. The key ones are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted in 1979, in force in 1981); the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (September 1995), which calls for women's empowerment and human rights in the family, economy, and polity; and Security Council Resolution 1325, on women, peace and security (October 2000). Goal 3 of the eight Millennium Development Goals, adopted by the international community in the year 2000, pertains to ending gender inequalities in literacy, employment, and decision-making.

nition of women as major political actors, voters, constituents, and candidates in numerous countries; and thirdly by the emergence of feminist movements, women's non governmental organizations (NGOs) of all kinds, and transnational feminist networks, along with the visibility of women leaders in the global justice movement. In turn, this contributes further to women's empowerment.

The literature has tended to view power in a largely negative way, that is, in terms of the power of some over others, or the capacity of the powerful to exert their will over those without power.³ In the second edition of his classic study on power, political philosopher Steven Lukes (2005) argues for a broader definition of power that should not be limited to asymmetric power relations, and admits that not all power is negative and zero-sum. He updates his definition of power to include agents' abilities to bring about significant effects, specifically by furthering their own interests or affecting the interests of others, whether positively or negatively. Lukes' position parallels one argued by feminist scholars who emphasize the empowerment of previously marginalized or powerless people (Carroll 1972; di Marco 2005). In order for democracy to be broadened and deepened, Graciela di Marco argues, the norms, values, and social relations on which unequal power relationships are based must be deconstructed, delegitimized, and finally reconstructed in a democratic form. This requires the acquisition of women's authority in the polity, as well as in the family, the community, and the workplace. In other words, women's empowerment serves not only women as a group, but the entire society. It is essential to democratization and development as well as to gender equality.

In this connection, *gendering* democracy and political participation matters, in at least three ways. First, as Ann Phillips (1995) has explained, women have interests, experiences, values, and expertise that are different from those of men, due principally to their social positions. Thus, women must be represented by women. Second, if the core of democracy is the regular redistribution of power through elections, then attention must be paid to the feminist argument that gender is itself a site and source of power, functioning to privilege men over women, and to favor masculine traits, roles and values over feminine equivalents in most social domains.⁴ Third, women are actors and participants in the making of a democratic politics. One can hypothesize a connection between women's participation and rights, on the one hand, and the building and institutionalization of democracy on the other. Evidence comes from Latin America and South Africa, where women's participation was a key element in the successful transitions.⁵ Indeed, it has been suggested that the longstanding exclusion of women from political processes and decision making in the Middle East and North Africa may be key to understanding why the region has been a "laggard," when compared with the other regions, in democratization's third wave (Moghadam 2004).⁶ Attention to women's participation and rights, therefore, could speed up the democratic transition in the region.

³This has been true of the major contributions on the subject, including of Machiavelli, Clauswitz, Max Weber, C. Wright Mills, and Steven Lukes. Michel Foucault viewed power largely pessimistically as almost totalitarian, while Karl Marx recognized power as a class phenomenon that was subject to change (e.g., the power of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, and the capacity of the proletariat to empower itself through revolution).

⁴Here power is understood not as an individual trait but in structural terms as deriving from and inhering in social relationships. See Mackinnon (1989); Connell (1987); Lorber (1994).

⁵The literature is growing: Alvarez (1990); Waylen (1994, 2007); Jaquette (1994, 2001); Jaquette and Wolchik (1998); Zulu (2000); Tripp (2001); Fallon (2008).

⁶For the prospects of democratization in the Middle East – but without attention to gender issues – see Diamond et al. (2003); Brumberg (2002a); Carothers and Ottaway (2005).

Enabling Factors and Persistent Obstacles

Data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS 1999–2004) – a large international dataset based on public opinion polls surveying attitudes toward women’s participation and rights as well as an array of political and cultural issues – suggest a “rising tide” of gender equality transforming many aspects of men’s and women’s lives and cultural values. On the basis of their interpretation of the results of various waves of the World Values Survey, and in a new version of modernization theory, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003), who have been closely associated with the WVS, argue that the gender gap in political participation is often the greatest in poorer developing nations and often diminished or reversed in the post-industrial societies.⁷ The more developed – indeed, post-industrial – a country, the more likely that value orientations in general, and gender equality norms in particular, move in an egalitarian direction. By extension, the more developed a country, the greater the likelihood of women’s political representation and participation. Testing this hypothesis through international datasets reveals that the greater a country’s human development (as measured, for example, by the UNDP’s Human Development Index), the more likely that women are able to attain higher decision making positions (as measured by the Gender Development Index, or GDI and the Gender Empowerment Measure, or GEM).⁸ Expanding further on this thesis, one could argue that the contemporary shift of the global economy toward a service and knowledge-based economy may be more conducive to women’s involvement in decision making, inasmuch as it rewards educational attainment with well-remunerated opportunities for professional women. The world economy does not benefit all countries or citizens in the same way, but the “Fordist” regime of manufacturing and industrial production arguably was more advantageous to men *as a group* than to women *as a group*, in terms of economic participation and access to power.

By the same token, a country’s adherence to “world culture” or the “world polity” creates a national and policy environment conducive to women’s participation and rights (Paxton and Hughes 2007). When governments ratify international treaties and conventions, and when international organizations are present in countries, an enabling climate is created which affects an array of outcomes, including women’s access to civil society, the public sphere, and leadership roles across domains.

At the same time, the data suggest a lag effect in the arena of political participation and representation. Women continue to be less politically active in most countries. Broad, long-term structural change is certainly a major determinant of women’s political participation, but policy also matters. This is why some developing countries have higher rates of women’s political participation in formal political structures than does the United States. The application of quotas – whether constitutional, policy party, or electoral quotas – explains why Argentina has a 35% female share of parliament, when compared with the 16% share found in the United States (data for 2008).

Besides quotas, other institutional changes and reforms are needed to expand women’s public presence. Childcare centers, paid maternity leaves, and paternity leaves could level

⁷ See also <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

⁸ Since 1995, international datasets have sought to capture women’s participation in decision-making, including involvement in formal political structures. The UNDP’s annual *Human Development Report* contains such measures. In addition to its thematic discussion, each report includes statistical tables that rank countries according to levels of human development (HDI): high, medium, and low. In turn, these rankings are corrected for gender equality/inequality (GDI). The GEM is an index that measures women’s empowerment in the economy and the polity.

the playing field, allow women to catch up to men, and compensate for past marginalization and exclusion (Phillips 1995; Lister 1997). Research shows that women need to be at least a large minority to have an impact, and women's issues receive more support when women attain a "critical mass". The UN now recommends a benchmark of at least 30% female representation.

Research and advocacy have thus focused on a number of factors enabling women to advance within organizations and social institutions, be these political parties, parliaments, or governments: the nature of legislative structures and electoral systems; the strength of civil society organizations; the adoption of women-friendly work policies; electoral quotas; and social capital and women's networking. The macro- and meso-level factors appear to work in tandem: the broad structural changes have resulted in a growing population of educated and employed women with the capacity to enter the political process or to organize and mobilize around specific grievances or goals; and women's movements and organizations lobby governments and advocate publicly for women-friendly policies, more rights, and equitable representation. At least two transnational feminist networks, along with numerous nationally based women's groups, have launched campaigns for gender parity in the political process globally. The Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) joined forces with another U.S.-based international network, the Women's Learning Partnership for Development, Rights, and Peace (WLP) to launch the 50/50 campaign, whose objective is to increase the percentage of women in local and national politics worldwide to 50%. Since its inception in June 2000, the campaign has been adopted by 154 organizations in 45 countries (Paxton and Hughes 2007: 179).⁹

The confluence of the global women's rights agenda and women's movements has created a global opportunity structure conducive to the adoption of policies, programs, and resources in support of women's participation in decision making. And yet the persistence of obstacles and challenges cannot be denied. For many parts of the world, the chief macro-level barriers are economic, political, and cultural. Underdevelopment, poverty, and conflict are barriers to women's political participation, and prevent the creation of an adequate supply of women political actors or leaders. Gender-based gaps in educational attainment, employment, and income impede women's access to economic resources, creating obstacles to funding political campaigns. Another barrier lies in the nature of political systems: authoritarian regimes are more likely to be shaped by patriarchal norms and less likely to involve women in political participation. In such countries, discriminatory laws may prevent women from attaining leadership positions in governance. Social and cultural views about women in society – or traditional gender ideology – continue to exert a strong influence on women's access to leadership and decision making. The persistence of the sexual division of labor – as both ideology and a form of social organization – is remarkable, given women's increasing educational attainment and social participation. Family responsibilities are consistently cited as major stumbling blocks for women's career advancement in politics and in other domains, especially in the absence of adequate institutional policies.

Last but not the least, risks associated with public and leadership roles should be noted. In many countries, ascension to positions of power or public visibility carries with it various risks, from harassment and loss of privacy to physical attacks, kidnapping or assassinations. In the most conservative societies, women who dare to enter the public domain without conforming to certain patriarchal norms may face substantial risks.

⁹See also www.wedo.org and www.learningpartnership.org

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION: GOVERNMENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND PARTIES

A large literature now exists that examines women's roles in formal politics, especially in national parliaments, and women's political participation and representation are measured in a number of international datasets, including those of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the UNDP's *Human Development Report*, and the UN's statistical database, *The World's Women: Trends and Statistics*.¹⁰ These datasets provide general support for the hypothesis linking women's political participation to high human development or to the application of quotas, at least since the early 1990s. Thus, the Nordic countries have consistently ranked highest in terms of both human development and women's political participation – and most of them also have adopted quotas to ensure women's participation in political parties, parliamentary elections, and cabinets. In contrast to the United States' 16–17% female parliamentary participation, the Nordic countries have had a roughly 41% female share for at least a decade and up to December 2008. Research on Latin America shows that the wave of national quota legislation since the 1990s improved women's political situation in some countries. In 2007, Argentina, the first country in the world to adopt a national quota law, led the region with 36% women in its lower house.

At the opposite end of the spectrum lie the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, with historically low levels of female participation in formal politics. The average 10% female representation is evidence of the masculine nature of the region's political processes and institutions. Yet even there, differentiation should be noted; according to IPU data for 2008, Tunisia had the highest female proportion in the region, with a 23% female share of parliamentary seats. Comparing Tunisia to other countries, Tunisia's share was higher than that of Uruguay and Chile (12%), Mexico (16%), the Philippines (18%), and Israel (13%), though lower than Argentina's (36%) or South Africa's (30%). Enabling factors in Tunisia included a relatively high rate of female labor force participation, the existence of strong women's organizations and networks, and a government that, while authoritarian, presents itself as a champion of women's rights (Moghadam 2003).¹¹

Elsewhere in the so-called Muslim world, variations in women's parliamentary representation suggest differences in political histories, social structures, and state policies; hence the disparate rates, as of 2008, of Azerbaijan (11.4%), Indonesia (11.6%), Tajikistan (17.5% lower house; 23.5% upper house), Pakistan (22.5%), and Nigeria (7.0%). Interestingly, Muslim women do better in the parliaments of the European democracies. Research by Melanie Hughes (2008) shows that while minority women's political representation is generally low across the globe, women of Muslim and especially North African extraction are over-represented in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden. Among other factors, Hughes explains, quotas help the minority women.

The election of women as heads of state or government does not seem to follow any particular pattern. Of course, the Nordic countries have had strong representation of women at the highest levels of government, including president, prime minister, and cabinet members.

¹⁰ See: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm>; <http://hdr.undp.org/en/>; <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm/wwpub2005.htm>

¹¹ Some Moroccan parties have introduced a quota. Iraq introduced a 25% quota, which Iraqi women activists welcomed (though they had asked for 30%), but the continuing conflict and lack of security prevent women from fully participating in the political process.

But, when one considers other women leaders – e.g., Indira Gandhi of India, Golda Meir of Israel, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua, Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom, Tansu Ciller of Turkey, or Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines – there appears to be no correlation with economic/human development or the strength of the women's movement. Instead, such women leaders come up the ranks through dynastic family connections (Gandhi, Bhutto, Chamorro) or through exceptional pathways in a political party (Meir, Thatcher, Ciller, Arroyo). On the other hand, the election of women presidents in Finland, Ireland, Chile, and Sierra Leone is at least partially explained by the strength of women's mobilizations in those countries, along with the prominence of the individual women elected as leaders. Increasingly, one observes prominent women in political party leadership, from Segolène Royale, who was the French Socialist Party's presidential candidate in 2006, to Louisa Hanoun, who leads the Socialist Workers' Party in Algeria and has been her party's presidential candidate. In the United States, Hillary Clinton's attempt to be the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in 2008 reflected a number of influences: family ties (her husband was former president Bill Clinton), white women's mobilizations, and her own record as senator from New York.

Local Governance

The arena of local governance and of women's roles within it is less researched than that of the national politics and governance. Participation of women in local governance is important, however, because decisions are made regarding everything from taxation and social spending to quality of life, including local schools, street lighting, housing, sanitation, zoning, transport, and policing. These are decisions that directly affect women, children, men, and families; as such, it is important that women be well represented. Data collected by the United Cities and Local Governments, a network created at a meeting in the Republic of Korea in 2004, suggest that women are largely excluded from mayoralties, though they do better as local councilors.¹² Other sources of data for participation in local governance come from the United Nations' regional commissions and from the country reports submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.¹³

Some countries show a large gap between women's representation in local and national governance. In South Korea, women's participation in local governance is almost negligible; the 2002 local elections resulted in a 3.1% female share in the regional councils and a 1.9% female share in the city/county/district councils. In contrast, at the national level, women were 13.7% of those elected to the 2004–2008 National Assembly.¹⁴ In Brazil, between 1999 and 2003, just one out of 27 Governors was a woman (4%), and between 1997 and 2001, some 303 out of 2,205 mayors were women (3.4%). In 2000, just 11% of municipal councils in Brazil were made up of women (Htun 2000). At the national level in 2008, Brazilian women had 9% of parliamentary seats in the lower house and 12.3% in the upper house.

¹² See <http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/ucfg/index.asp?pag=wldmstatistics.asp&type=&L=EN&pon=1>

¹³ The UN regional commissions are: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), and Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA). CEDAW reports are submitted periodically to the committee charged with monitoring compliance, and may be obtained through the UN website.

¹⁴ CEDAW Report for Korea, C/KOR/6, 5 March 2007, p. 21.

Available data for Sub-Saharan Africa shows high levels of women's representation in local governance in South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, which are consistent with their national-level representation and appear to be related to the presence of quotas. In Tanzania, for example, women constituted 35.5% of councilors at the local level in 2004. At the federal level, their share was 30.4%. In both cases, high representation was the result of "special seats" reserved for women.¹⁵

Among the Arab countries, while a growing number of women are running for local (as well as national) office, only Tunisia and Yemen appear to have registered a significant female presence in the local governance. In Yemen's first-ever local elections held in February 2001, some 120 women ran as candidates with 35 winning seats, representing a surprising 29% female share in this conservative and low-income country.¹⁶ In 2004, Tunisia's female share of municipal seats was about 20%.¹⁷

Elsewhere in the Middle East, Iran appears to be one case whereby women are more active at the municipal than at the national level. While women occupy only 8 out of 286 parliamentary seats, or a mere 2.8% share, the municipal elections of December 2007 brought more than 5,000 women to local governance in about 3,300 councils across the country. Women did exceptionally well, and better than male candidates, in Shiraz, Arak, Hamedan, Zanjan, and Ardebil; and they won a large number of seats in Urumiyeh and Qazvin (Ghammari, 2008).

India represents a striking example of high female representation in local governance, due to a 33% "reservation" or quota that was established for women's participation across Indian states. While efforts to achieve reserved seats at India's state and national levels have stalled, two constitutional amendments passed in 1992 require that one-third of all seats in both rural and urban councils must be filled by women. The 73rd Amendment also granted more powers over governmental services and projects to the three tiers of the rural councils – *panchayats*, at the village, block and district level (Nanivadekar 2005).¹⁸ While most Indian states have at least 33% women as a direct consequence of reservation, some states have even exceeded the 33% quota.¹⁹ In 2005, Karnataka had a representation as high as 45%, 42% and 38% in the village, taluk/block and district panchayats respectively. In Kerala and West Bengal, 35–36% of elected women representatives at the local bodies were women. In Uttar Pradesh, 54% of the Zilla Parishad Presidents, and in Tamil Nadu, 36% of the Chairpersons of Gram Panchayats were women.²⁰ In contrast, the female share of parliamentary seats at the federal level was just 9.1% in 2008.

In Europe, data for the period 2000–2005 from the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) show that only in Moldova is women's participation at the local governance level very high – and at 57%, perhaps the highest in the world. In Latvia, Finland, Norway, and France, women represent 30–42% of municipal councils and local governing bodies. Everywhere else, for which there are data, the figures are below 30%.

¹⁵ CEDAW Report for Tanzania, C/TZA/6, 16 April 2007, p. 17

¹⁶ <http://www.accessdemocracy.org>

¹⁷ <http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp?pag=wldmstatistics.asp&type=&L=EN&pon=1>

¹⁸ These amendments also have provisions for representation of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in local assemblies; the 1/3 reservation for women also applies for these reserved seats.

¹⁹ CEDAW Report for India, C/IND/2–3, 19 October 2005, pp. 52–55.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/572/16/PDF/N0557216.pdf?OpenElement>, See also Government of India (2006).

²⁰ CEDAW Report for India (ibid.)

Given the data inadequacies, it is difficult to draw conclusions about women's participation in local governance. The world average for women's parliamentary representation is 21% (IPU, circa 2008) and for women councilors it is similarly 21% (UCLG, circa 2003–2004). Regionally, women are less represented at the local than the national level in the Middle East and North Africa (2.1% versus 9.7% female shares), and in the Nordic countries (Finland has the highest percentage of women councilors, but at 34% it is less than the Nordic parliamentary average of 41% female share). For other regions there appears to be more symmetry, although it may be the case that in sub-Saharan Africa, women are actually better represented at the local level than at the national (as Fallon (2008) found for Ghana), at least as far as councilors are concerned. This is clearly an area that requires further investigation

WOMEN IN MOVEMENT: CIVIL SOCIETY, TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS, AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

The arena of civil society is a democratic space for the flourishing of associational life that also acts as a buffer between the citizenry, on the one hand, and the state and the market on the other. This is where much of women's modern public activity and their "social capital" have been observed, in charities, churches/religious institutions, parent-teacher associations, neighborhood clubs, and local initiatives. In recent decades, the exponential growth of women's presence in various NGOs, professional associations, and of course women's organizations has seen significant collective impacts, as women's organizations have become highly effective pressure groups. Civil society experience can be a pathway to senior positions in other domains, including national and local governance. And increasingly, women are found in what has become known as the sphere of global civil society, as they have become politically active in social movements, international organizations, and advocacy networks of all kinds.

Using World Values Survey data, Inglehart and Norris (2003, Table 5.2) show that women's participation in civic associations exceeds that of men. Reported participation rates are 53% female and 47% male (data for 2001). Those where women are 50% or more are the following: conservation, environment or animal rights; third world development or human rights; education, arts, music or cultural activities; religious or church organizations; voluntary organizations concerned with health; social welfare for the elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; women's groups. Women make up between 42 and 49% of members of peace movements, professional associations, labor unions, local community action groups, and groups working with youth.

Feminist scholars of the Middle East and North Africa have analyzed the "gradual feminization of the public sphere" and have noted the growing involvement of women in an array of civic associations (Moghadam and Sadiqi 2006).²¹ Seven types of women's organizations have been identified: women-led charitable associations; women's wings of political parties; professional associations (e.g., associations of women lawyers); development research centers and women's studies institutes; development and service-delivery NGOs; women's rights organizations; worker-based women's organizations associated with trade unions (Moghadam 1998). Examples are feminist organizations such as l'Association Tunisi-

²¹ See also *Al-Raida*, special issue on Women's Centers in the Arab World (vol. XVII–XVIII, no. 90–91, Summer/Fall 2000), published by the Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World, Lebanese American University, Beirut.

enne des Femmes Démocrates, l'Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines (ADFM), Algeria's SOS Femmes en Détresse, Iran's Cultural Center for Women and the Change for Equality Campaign, and Turkey's Women for Women's Human Rights International; development NGOs such as Egypt's Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW); think tanks such as CAWTAR and CREDIF of Tunisia, and the Palestinian Women's Research and Documentation Center; and women's studies centers and institutes at universities such as Birzeit in Ramallah, the West Bank; the Lebanese American University in Beirut; and the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. As a whole, these groups and units engage in research and advocacy for egalitarian family laws, nationality rights for women, criminalization of domestic violence, greater economic participation, and political rights.

A major objective of Lebanese women's organizations has been increased political representation in parliament. Jordanian women have protested impunity of men in the so-called honor killings. Turkish women leaders in civil society secured amendments to the Civil Code and protested loudly when the government wanted to return adultery to the criminal code. Egyptian women's groups campaigned for the issuance of individual identity cards for women and for women's right to a *khul* divorce.²² In 2008 a major campaign revolved around sexual harassment of women in the streets, with women's groups insisting on prosecution. Iranian feminists seek an overhaul of the penal code and an end to the punishment of stoning for adultery. They also desire what their sisters in Morocco obtained in 2004, which was a more egalitarian family code. The One Million Signature Petition drive, so important to the Moroccan women's movement in the early 1990s, has been adopted in Iran as well (Joseph 2000; Moghadam 2003; Naciri 2003). In demanding an end to discrimination, gender inequality, and human rights violations, such women's groups draw on what we might call world values (including the global women's rights agenda) as well as their own cultural understandings.

In the countries of the Persian Gulf, where women have been long excluded from political decision making, there has been a significant increase in women's NGO leadership roles. In turn, these roles have led to engagement with the political process. Research on Kuwait has shown that women's networking and involvement in professional associations is a strong predictor of engagement with the political process (Meyer et al. 2002).

In some cases, the growth of women's participation in NGOs is the result of state or development failures. Mary Osirim (2001) discusses the important role of women's NGOs in Zimbabwe in addressing women's social welfare and human rights concerns – in particular, HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence – and in establishing social networks as a way to empower women in an otherwise untoward economic and political situation. Despite the increasing participation of women in civic associations throughout the world, decision making roles outside of women's own organizations remains largely the province of men. This is especially poignant in countries where women played important roles in the democratic transitions. Sociologist Seungsook Moon (2002) documents the marginalization of South Korean women from civil society leadership, despite the important roles they played in the 1970s labor movement and the 1980s democracy movement. In the Philippines, women's NGOs were active in the anti dictatorship movement of the 1970s and 1980s and thus assumed an important role in the post-Marcos period in shaping the state policies to further women's status and rights. When aid agencies entered the country after Marcos, women's NGOs were

²² A *khul* divorce allows a woman to obtain a divorce but forfeit her *mahr* (the dowry given by the groom).

already prominent and well placed to access official ODA and to take the lead in a number of civil society organizations, including women's organizations (Angeles 2003). However, a mixed picture emerges with respect to professional associations and the other civic associations.²³

Despite the obstacles, women civil society leaders have become agenda setters, inserting feminine voices and women's issues onto the public sphere. Along with the increase in women's parliamentary representation, women's civic activism has led in some cases to changes in the "gendered balance of power". For example, in South Africa, many women involved in the anti-apartheid struggle went on to leadership roles in local and national government and in the judiciary. In Rwanda, after the war and the 1994 genocide subsided, activist women were well positioned to assume leadership and decision making roles (Paxton and Hughes 2007: 170). In many Latin American countries, electoral quotas and legislation on domestic violence have followed women's civic activism. In Northern Ireland, the Women's Coalition entered the political process, and the other political parties adopted quotas for gender parity. In Algeria, the feminist movement that emerged in the 1980s first to protest the government's introduction of a new and very conservative Muslim family law and then to oppose the rising Islamist movement went on to demonstrate remarkable resilience during the 1990s civil conflict and terrorist campaigns. For this, activist women were rewarded in the summer of 2002 with an unprecedented five cabinet posts, representing 25% of cabinet seats at the time (Moghadam 2003).

The arena of conflict, peace, and security – long considered a male domain – has seen notable interventions by women's groups. Of course, women have been long involved in peace movements. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) was founded in 1915 by 1,300 women activists from Europe and North America opposed to what became known as World War I (Enloe 2007: 14). Two WILPF leaders were awarded Nobel Peace Prizes: Jane Addams in 1931 and Emily Greene Balch in 1946. WILPF remains active to this day, and recently formed PeaceWomen as an information and monitoring website – a form of virtual activism – on women, peace, and security issues.²⁴ The activities of anti-militarist and human rights groups such as WILPF, Women Strike for Peace (U.S.), the Women of Greenham Common (U.K.), and the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Argentina) are well known. Research has documented women-led peace initiatives in Northern Ireland (for which Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan received the Nobel Peace Prize), Bosnia and Herzegovina (which saw activism by Women in Black), Israel-Palestine (through the Jerusalem Link as well as Women in Black), and Rwanda (through the Rwandan Women's Network) (Moghadam 2007). In the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, women were both the majority of peace activists and the first to lead protests against the war (Hunt 2004; Paxton and Hughes 2007: 170). In Burundi, women's presence at the Arusha peace talks was facilitated by Nelson Mandela; in Northern Ireland, the Women's Coalition, which crossed sectarian lines to press for peace, took part in the first post-conflict elections (Fearon 1999; Burke 2001). In the 1990s and into the new millennium, transnational feminist networks such as Women for Women International emerged to focus on conflict, peace, and security. After the invasion of Iraq, anti war U.S. women took leading roles in new peace movements and

²³ According the 2004 CEDAW Report, 8 of the 22 national officers (36%) in the Philippine Medical Association are women, although the ratio is much lower at the provincial level. But in the Philippine Dental Association, only 9% of the officers are women, even if 68% of the total membership is female. CEDAW/C/PHI/5-6 (2004).

²⁴ <http://www.peacewomen.org>

organizations, such as United for Peace and Justice, and they created Code Pink: Women for Peace. Other important transnational feminist networks working on conflict, peace, and security issues are MADRE, the Women's Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace (WLP), and the newly formed Nobel Women's Initiative (Moghadam 2009).

The role of women and feminist issues in the global justice movement and the World Social Forum (WSF) has been the subject of some discussion (Eschle 2005; Vargas 2005; Moghadam 2009). Studies now show that women are probably the majority of attendees at the WSF, and that the Feminist Dialogues attract a large number of participants. Transnational feminist networks such as DAWN and the Marche Mondiale des Femmes are among those represented on the WSF's International Council. The global justice movement and the WSF is known at least partially for their prominent women, including Arundhati Roy, Vandana Shiva, Naomi Klein, Virginia Vargas, Susan George, and Medea Benjamin. In calling for peace, economic justice, women's human rights, and human development, the women of the global justice movement also help to engender the path to global democracy.

Engendering Democracy

Historically, paths to democracy have differed, and, as Barrington Moore (1966) showed, there were varied and divergent paths in the Western world. Moore famously identified a modernizing – or revolutionary – bourgeoisie as key to the advent and sustainability of democracy. Even so, democratization was a slow, gradual process in the Western world. In the United States, for example, democracy was enjoyed first by property-owning white males, then extended to all men, and finally to women. In the southern states, blacks remained disenfranchised until well into the second half of the twentieth century, when the civil rights movement and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended the infamous Jim Crow laws that prevented American blacks from exercising political rights of citizenship. By that time, most of the world's women had received formal political rights, that is, the right to vote and stand for elections; in terms of international law, this was codified in the 1954 UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women. However, women remained a small proportion of those who enjoyed the benefits of democracy, such as political participation and representation. Moreover, despite the political rights, the gap between formal and substantive equality has been large – and especially large for women.

Democracy is assumed to serve women well, but the historical record shows that democratic transitions do not necessarily bring about women's participation and rights. Relevant examples are Eastern Europe in the early 1990s; Algeria and the elections that brought about an Islamist party (FIS) in 1990/1991; and Iraq and the Palestinian Authority, where elections in early 2006 brought to power governments committed more to religious norms than to citizen or women's rights. One reason for this "gender-based democratic deficit" is that existing definitions and understandings of democracy tend to focus on procedures and institutions. Liberal democracy is the model that is being touted in the contemporary era of globalization, as it is presumed to be the most compatible with liberal capitalism. Here, a high degree of political legitimacy is necessary, as is an independent judiciary and a constitution that clearly sets out the relationship between state and society, and citizen rights and obligations. In practice, however, "democracy" is often equated with "free and fair elections". The problem is twofold. First, the distribution of political resources or power through competitive elections is an overly narrow definition of democracy; it obscures the importance of institutions, state capacity, and constitutional guarantees of rights no matter which party

wins an election. Secondly, it occludes the gendered nature of politics and the longstanding exclusion of half the population. "Free and fair elections" may perpetuate the inequitable representation.²⁵

When and where are women's interests served by democratization, and democratization served by women's participation? Democratic transitions, like other types of social change, are influenced by internal and external factors and forces. How women fare during and after the transition similarly depends on a number of factors, including social structure, collective action, and the dominant ideology. Drawing on the gender and revolution literature (Moghadam 1997; Kampwirth 2002; Shayne 2004), one can identify the following: pre-existing gender relations and women's legal status and social positions before the transition; the extent of women's mobilizations before and during the transition, including the number and type of women's organizations and other institutions; the ideology, values, and norms of the ruling group; and the state's capacity and will to mobilize resources for rights-based development. This analysis finds its complement in Georgina Waylen's (2005, 2007) discussion of key variables shaping women's experiences with democratic transitions: the nature of the transition; the role of women activists; the nature of the political parties and politicians involved in the transition; and the nature and institutional legacy of the non-democratic regime. In addition, research has found that party-list proportional representation systems, and countries where one of the primary political parties is leftist, have significantly more women in political decision making positions (Htun 2000; Paxton and Hughes 2007).

World polity theory can be helpful in explaining the salience of external factors: transnational links or the promotion of women by international organizations, for example, can positively affect the gender outcomes. World polity research has demonstrated that connections to the world society, which may be measured through treaty ratification or through the presence of international NGOs, impact a range of state-level outcomes including women's political citizenship (Ramirez et al. 1997).

These factors may help explain the variable outcomes for women in a number of democratic transitions. In Latin America, women's movements and organizations played an important role in the opposition to authoritarianism and made a significant contribution to the "end of fear" and the inauguration of the democratic transition. Here, women organized as feminists and as democrats, but also as mothers of the disappeared, and often allied themselves with left-wing parties. Especially in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, women's groups met, marched, and demonstrated for human rights, women's rights, and democracy. Though they were not the key actors in the negotiated transitions, they received institutional rewards when democratic governments were set up and their presence in the new parliaments increased. As Jane Jaquette (2001: 114) observes:

"[F]eminist issues were positively associated with democratization, human rights, and expanded notions of citizenship that included indigenous rights as well as women's rights. This positive association opened the way for electoral quotas and increased the credibility of women candidates, who were considered more likely to care about welfare issues and less corrupt than their male counterparts."

²⁵ Recent history suggests that elections operate differently in mature democracies than in immature ones. For example, women lost out politically in the first set of "democratic" elections in post-communist Eastern Europe. In Algeria, an overly quick transition from "Arab socialism" to free elections in 1990 led to the victory of the Front Islamique du Salut, which promised to institute Sharia law, enforce veiling, and end competitive elections. In Iraq and Afghanistan, elections under conditions of conflict, occupation, and weak state capacity have hardly changed the "facts on the ground", including Shia domination in Iraq, high illiteracy in Afghanistan, and women's insecurity in both countries. This also has rendered the gender quotas ineffectual in both countries.

In contrast, East European women were not able to influence the transition and lost their key rights, as well as levels of representation, when the democratic governments were set up (Heinen 1992; Matland and Montgomery 2003). East European feminists coined the terms “male democracy” and “democratization with a male face” to describe the outcome of the transition from communism to liberal democracy, when women’s representation in parliaments dropped dramatically from an average of 30% to 8–10%. The East European case showed that liberal democracy is not necessarily women-friendly and could in fact engender a male democracy, privileging men and limiting women’s representation and voice. Although women had been mobilized before and during the transitions, the dominant ideology of the opposition movements and the new states were not consistent with an expanded definition and inclusive form of democracy.

In Algeria, the quick transition unsupported by strong institutions did not serve women well. Algeria had been ruled by a single party system in the “Arab socialist” style since its independence from France in 1962. The death of President Boumedienne in December 1978 brought about political and economic changes, including the growth of an Islamist movement that was intimidating unveiled women, and a government intent on economic restructuring. The urban riots of 1988 were followed quickly by a new constitution and elections, without a transitional period of democracy building. The electoral victory of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) alarmed Algeria’s feminist organizations. That the FIS went on to initiate an armed rebellion when it was not allowed to assume power following the 1991 elections only confirmed the violent nature of that party (Bennoune 1995; Cherifati-Merabtime 1995; Messaoudi and Schemla 1995; Moghadam 2001).

A more positive example comes from Morocco, where women’s groups were central actors in the country’s democratization during the 1990s. Indeed, the feminist campaigns for the reform of family laws, which began in the early 1990s, should be regarded as a key factor in the country’s gradual liberalization during that decade. When Abdelrahman Yousefi, a socialist and former political prisoner, was appointed prime minister in 1998 and formed a progressive cabinet, women’s groups allied themselves to the government with the goal of promoting both women’s rights and a democratic polity (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006; Skalli 2007).²⁶ Subsequently, Moroccan feminist organizations strongly endorsed the truth and justice commissions that were put in place to examine the years of repression. A number of Moroccan women leaders previously associated with left wing political groups (e.g., Latifa Jbabdi) gave testimony about physical and sexual abuse (Slyomovics 2005). In Morocco, these developments have enhanced the prominence of women activists. More generally, the Moroccan case confirms the democratic nature of women’s movements.

Another positive example comes from Turkey. In the 1980s, at a time when Turkey’s civil society was under tight military control, the new feminist movement helped to usher in democratization through campaigns and demands for women’s rights, participation, and autonomy (Arat 1994). The important role of women in the anti-apartheid and democratic movement of South Africa is yet another historic example (Tripp 2001). In South Africa as well as in Northern Ireland, Burundi, and Rwanda, women’s roles in the democratic transitions were acknowledged and rewarded with political party quotas, gender budgets, and well-resourced women’s research and policy centers. In turn, such initiatives to support and promote women’s participation and rights reinforce and institutionalize the democratic institutions.

²⁶The minister of women and family affairs in the Yousefi cabinet, Mohammad Said Saadi, a communist, was an ardent supporter of women’s rights and of the reform of the family law that the feminist organizations were promoting.

Women, Gender and Politics in the Middle East

There is a lively debate among political scientists regarding the relations among Islam, attitudes toward women and gender equality, and the democracy deficit. The World Values Survey's fourth wave included a number of Muslim-majority countries, and among its principal findings were high support for democracy and for Islam, but low support for gender equality.²⁷ The Muslim Brothers of Egypt, for example, call for "the freedom of forming political parties" and "independence of the judiciary system", but they also call for "conformity to Islamic Sharia Law," which is not conducive to gender equality or the equality of Muslim and non Muslim citizens in all domains (Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottaway 2006).

Commentators emphasize the need to establish "the core of democracy – getting citizens the ability to choose those who hold the main levers of political power and creating checks and balances through which state institutions share power" (Carothers and Ottaway 2005: 258). Such commentators envisage a scenario in which political parties are allowed to form and compete with each other in elections, and they have focused on the participation (and transformation) of Islamist parties as key to the transition to democracy. However, they tend to overlook what are in fact a key constituency, a natural ally, and social base of a democratic politics – women and their feminist organizations. In the Arab region and Iran, questions of democratization and questions of women's rights have emerged more or less in tandem. They are closely intertwined and mutually dependent, and the fate of one is closely bound to the fate of the other. There are at least two reasons for this claim.

One is that women in MENA – and especially the constituency of women's rights advocates – are the chief proponents of democratic development and of its correlates of civil liberties, participation, and inclusion. The region's feminists are among the most vocal advocates of democracy, and frequently refer to themselves as part of the "democratic" or "modernist" forces of society. For example, a Tunisian feminist lawyer has said: "We recognize that, in comparison with other Arab countries, our situation is better, but still we have common problems, such as an authoritarian state. Our work on behalf of women's empowerment is also aimed at political change and is part of the movement for democratization."²⁸ In 2008, a prominent Tunisian feminist organization, AFTURD, issued a statement declaring "that no development, no democracy can be built without women's true participation and the respect of fundamental liberties for all, men and women."²⁹

A second reason is that women have a stake in strong and sustainable democracies, but – as we have seen – they can be harmed by weak or exclusionary political processes. Women can pay a high price when a democratic process that is institutionally weak, or is not founded on principles of equality and the rights of all citizens, or is not protected by strong institutions, allows a political party bound by patriarchal norms to come to power and to immediately institute laws relegating women to second class citizenship. This was the Algerian feminist nightmare, which is why so many educated Algerian women opposed the FIS after its expansion in 1989. Thus, Middle Eastern feminists are aware that they can be harmed by an electoral

²⁷ See, for example, El-Braizat (2002); Tessler (2002); Inglehart and Norris (2003); Rizzo (2005); Jamal (2005). The Arab Human Development Report 2005 reported more encouraging findings, on the basis of its own survey – which, however, has been called methodologically flawed (Mark Tessler, personal communication, Washington D.C., 26 October 2008).

²⁸ Bochra Ben Hmida of Femmes Democrat, in a conversation with the author, Helsinki, Finland, 9 September 2004.

²⁹ AFTURD, *Declaration: Fighting Against Attempts at Regression*, issued on the occasion of Tunisian Women's Day, 26 September 2008. (Received by the author from the organization.)

politics that occurs in the absence of a strong institutional and legal framework for women's civil, political, and social rights of citizenship. Hence, their insistence on egalitarian family laws, criminalization of domestic violence, and nationality rights for women – along with enhanced employment and political participation.

There is evidence that women, and more precisely employed women, have different political preferences from men, with a tendency to vote in a more leftward direction, in particular supporting public services (Manza and Brooks 1998; Huber and Stephens 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003). A plausible connection also may be made between the sustained presence of a “critical mass” of women in political decision making and the establishment of stable and peaceful societies. If the Nordic model of high rates of women's participation and rights correlates with peaceful, prosperous, and stable societies, could the expansion of women's participation and rights in the Middle East also lead the way to stability, security, and welfare in the region, not to mention an effective democratic governance?

Whereas the modernizing bourgeoisie was the lynchpin of democracy in Barrington Moore's schema on the transition from agrarian to industrial society, an argument can be made that today it is the “modernizing women” of the Middle East and North Africa who are the principal agents of democratization (and of cultural change) in the region. An increase in their social participation, especially in decision making, may very well accelerate the democratic transition. As Ann Phillips has theorized and women's rights groups have argued, a democratic system without women's human rights and gender equality is an incomplete and inferior form of democracy.

There is evidence that those in and around the Arab Human Development Report understand this, even though the 2004 report on freedom lacked strong gender insights while the 2005 report on women lacked attention to the democratic deficit.³⁰ Nonetheless, the 2004 Report's definition of “good governance” (a term it prefers to “democracy”) is consistent with the argument made above, as it underlines the importance of “first-rate institutions”, the safeguarding of freedoms, “full representation of the public at large”, and a separation of powers.³¹

And what of women's groups in the region? How do they view opportunities for political participation and for democratic development? A workshop that took place in Amman, Jordan in December 2005 assembled women's rights activists from an array of countries in the Gulf, the Maghreb, and the Mashrek, some of whom were current members of parliament (e.g., in Iraq's National Assembly) and others were preparing to run in upcoming elections (e.g., in Kuwait and in Jordan).³² Below are some representative quotes:

“The community gives women the role of sister and mother. We say that yes, we are sisters and mothers, but we are more than this.” [Kuwait]

“Women have allies in the government, sometimes. But the government also defends violent Islamists who attack women. The government is never a strategic ally for women – it is not committed to women's rights. Governments work with the Islamist movements against us.” [Kuwait]

“We are in favor of democracy. All countries went through a difficult stage of building democracy. Islamists should come to power and show themselves to be capable of doing good or of being incompetent. Let the Islamists join the parliamentary process. They will get exposed as having no program or plan. The problem in our country, though, is that too many people are selected and appointed.” [Jordan]

³⁰ See UNDP 2004, 2006. See also <http://www.arab-hdr.org/about.asp>

³¹ AHDR, 2004: *Towards Freedom in the Arab World*, p. 8.

³² Middle East Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, conference on “Strategizing Women's Role in Influencing Legislation”, Amman, Jordan, 2–5 December 2005.

"The performance of both men and women in the parliaments has been inferior. In general the political parties are weak. Only the Islamic ones are strong. We need and we want a culture of democracy." [Jordan]

"Too often, the wives of kings, presidents and sheikhs take a leading role, rather than grassroots organizations. In my country we have a façade of change, but no real change. Women have been going backwards, in terms of family, education, religion, and political participation." [Egypt]

"Democracy should be discussed at all levels – micro, meso, macro. Not just national politics, but also family, organizations, enterprises." [Morocco]

"My party [YSP] did not nominate me even though I'd been with them for 35 years. Instead, it nominated a man. So I decided to run as an independent. This needed to be endorsed by 300 people. But in one week I got 450 signatures. Some said I should start a new political party, which by law requires a minimum of 250 people." [Yemen]

"My political party list includes a cross-section of society. I am in my party's central committee, but the party does not have women in senior political positions." [Kurdistan, Iraq]

"Women's rights and children's rights are not a priority in the national agenda. Many of the women who came to parliament did not have political experience. We could not form a women's lobby because the process was so rushed. And in the National Assembly, we did not have any rooms to work in and meet as a caucus." [Iraq]

"In our country the judiciary will be important, because it will make many of the major decisions. But at the moment there are only 8 women judges compared with 468 male judges." [Iraq]

The same group discussed strategies for building democracy with women, and emphasized the following: working within the political parties to integrate women's rights into party platforms; coalitions between women's organizations, political parties, and trade unions; engaging in Islamic *ijtihad*; advocating for true democracy; working for equality clauses in constitutions; reform of family laws to ensure gender equality; working with media; advocating for a quota system; support for women candidates; international linkages.

Eric Hobsbawm (2005) has correctly noted that the conditions for effective democratic governance are rare: an existing state enjoying legitimacy, consent, and the ability to mediate conflicts between domestic groups. But, how to establish those conditions? How to prevent "democracy without democrats" (Salamé 1994), "autocracy with democrats" (Brumberg 2002), or "illiberal democracy" (Zakaria 2003)? The argument made here is that the road to democracy must be paved with programs for women's empowerment, institutions for gender equality, and policies to increase women's political participation in government, in political parties, in the judiciary, and in the civil society.

A gender analysis is needed for a deeper understanding of democracy and of the democratic transitions. Women arguably may need democracy in order to flourish, but the converse is equally true: democracy needs women if it is to be inclusive, representative, and enduring. If exclusion – including the exclusion of women – is part of the logic of the authoritarian state, as in the Middle East, then enhancing women's roles in the political process could help to change the nature of the state.

THE IMPACT OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

The question of what "difference" can be made by women's presence has been a subject of studies in the areas of management and organizational behavior, and has been popularized by Carol Gilligan's work on women's "different voice(s)". Hypotheses may be termed "optimistic" and "pessimistic." Gender standpoint theory would suggest that women – because of their social positions – bring a different experience and perspective into decision making and leadership. Hughes (2008) notes that a growing body of research shows that female legislators around the world articulate different policy priorities, introduce different bills, and

vote differently than their male counterparts. On the other hand, and in a more pessimistic vein, feminizing an institution or increasing the number of women in political positions could simply reinforce the prevailing power structure. Feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon (1983) argues that such incorporation without transformation is inevitable under conditions of patriarchy (or capitalism or authoritarianism), and especially in the domains of law and the judiciary. In other words, rather than transforming institutions, the women within those institutions would feel obligated to conform to the prevailing norms. This line of thinking is consistent with the theory of “the power elite” and with Marxian notions of class privilege (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006).

Nevertheless, an observed impact of women’s leadership roles has been in the area of policy and legal changes, institutional changes, and normative shifts. Three examples are offered here: (1) development policy decisions, (2) national and international legislation pertaining to violence against women, and (3) social dialogues and legislation pertaining to women, work, and family. We also examine research on attitudinal changes.

Development Policy Decisions

A growing literature has drawn attention to the impact of research and advocacy by transnational feminist networks and their allies in women’s policy agencies on broad policy dialogues and decisions pertaining to the role of women in development and specifically on gender, structural adjustments, and poverty (Meyer and Prugl 1999; O’Brien et al 2000; Moghadam 2005). Both “efficiency” and women’s rights arguments have framed the debates on women-in-development and gender-and-development, and a consensus now exists that economic and social development suffers when women are marginalized or insufficiently involved at various levels of the development process (Blumberg 1989; Karshenas 2001). International organizations and many government agencies acknowledge that the impacts of economic policy decisions are gender-differentiated and gender-specific, and that women as a group tend to bear heavy burdens in the realms of production and reproduction alike. Institutions such as the World Bank (2001) and the UNDP have integrated gender analysis into their own research products and policy advice. Gender budgets, gender audits, and gender mainstreaming are now standard discourses and mechanisms in international development circles and in many national contexts, and gender equality units exist in government agencies across the globe.

Impact on Violence-Against-Women Policy Decisions

Another body of research documents the impact of women’s participation and representation on legislation pertaining to violence against women (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Weldon 2002). A turning point came with the UN’s third World Conference on Women, which took place in Nairobi in 1985. The outcome document, *The Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies*, included violence against women as a priority for the international community, and the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women subsequently took on the issue. An expert group meeting convened in 1991 in Vienna, Austria and proposed a draft declaration on the elimination of violence against women. The confluence of women in decision making positions at the level of government (e.g., the women represented in the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women, as well as feminists in various government ministries across the globe) and at the level of the women’s movement and movement agencies

(e.g., the U.S.-based Campaign for Women's Global Leadership, spearheaded by the Center for Women's Global Leadership at Rutgers University) greatly influenced the deliberations at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. The results included both international legislation and nationally based laws to criminalize domestic abuse, sexualized aggression at times of war, and the other forms of violence against women. On the international front, Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security, adopted in October 2000, was a milestone in addressing violence against women in situations of armed conflict.

In Argentina, Chile, Brazil and elsewhere, women leaders have led the way with legislation on violence against women.³³ In November 2003, a law was enacted requiring both public and private health services throughout Brazil to notify the authorities of all cases of violence against women they treat. In March 2004, an Interministerial Working Group was established, with members representing both civil society (including women's groups) and government, to draft a law and set up additional instruments to tackle domestic violence against women. The Group drew up a legislative proposal that was submitted by the Executive Branch to the National Congress in the late 2004. In August 2006, Law 11.340 (also known as the Maria da Penha law) was adopted, establishing the measures for prevention, assistance and protection for women suffering from violence. It provides for the creation of Courts for Domestic and Family Violence against Women, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, as well as a specialized police service for women, in particular at Women's Police Stations that offer a variety of services to abused women (Jaquette 2009).

Elsewhere, Spain's Protection from Violence Act (*Ley Integral*) of 2004 was developed with strong involvement from women's organizations and contains a wide definition of violence including psychological forms of violence, such as sexual aggression, threat, compulsion, coercion and deprivation of free will. The law covers preventive and educational measures, as well as protection and assistance for victims and new sanctions against perpetrators. Mongolia's Domestic Violence Law, enacted in May 2004, was the result of a collaboration between two prominent Mongolian women's NGOs and the parliamentary domestic violence legislative task force.³⁴

Algerian women's rights activists associated with the country's main trade union, along with the results of a survey conducted by women's groups that highlighted the problem of domestic violence, helped effect a law to penalize sexual harassment, and established the country's first centre d'écoute, or counseling center, under the auspices of the country's main trade union, the UGTA. In India, women lawyers have presented arguments in the country's constitutional court pertaining to violence against women. They have argued for greater enforcement of laws criminalizing domestic violence, including the so-called dowry deaths (Saxena 2006).

Social Dialogues and Legislation Pertaining to Women, Work, and Family

Women's civic and political leadership has "engendered" public discourses, or inserted feminine voices or "women's issues" in social dialogues and policy debates. These include reproductive health and rights (e.g., in Latin America and the U.S.), women's rights to equality in the fam-

³³ For a listing of the relevant laws in Latin America and the Caribbean, see <http://www.oas.org/cim/English/LawsViolence.htm>

³⁴ *In-depth study on all forms of violence against women: Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/122/Add.1* (6 July 2006), paragraphs 308–309.

ily and in family law (e.g., the Middle East and North Africa), the right to work and earn a living (e.g., Bangladesh), the right to inherit property (Uganda and some other African countries), violence against women (all regions), and political participation and representation (all regions). Social dialogues have addressed the need for mechanisms to ban workplace sexual harassment, bring about a more “level playing field” for employed women, “break the glass ceiling”, ensure work family balance, and redistribute care work through paternity leaves, longer paid maternity leaves, and quality child care centers. In South Africa, hours for parliamentary debates were changed to accommodate the growing number of women MPs. Even in the United States, where social policies for working families are far less generous than in Europe, one analyst points to progress at the level of public discussions. She notes, for example, that every year, *Fortune* magazine names the “100 Best Companies to Work For” while *Working Mother* magazine ranks the “100 Best Companies for Working Mothers.” Benefits geared toward the family are at the heart of both lists.³⁵

Attitudinal Changes

The impact of women in politics also has been felt in terms of societal values and changes in public opinion pertaining to gender relations and to women’s political leadership. Results of the World Values Survey show a broad societal support for gender equality, albeit more so in some regions than in others. Thus, one impact of the trend toward greater participation and representation by women has been to change attitudes in a broadly egalitarian direction. For example, on the WVS question: *Men make better political leaders than women do*, the strongest disagreement – from other than Europe and North America – comes from Latin America, where nearly 60% of those surveyed either *disagree or strongly disagree* with the statement. Among women in the Latin American countries surveyed, the total in disagreement came to 66.6%.

Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa were notably different, and most of the publics surveyed agreed that men make better political leaders: total 60.6%, women 62%. The exception was South Africa, where 55% of those surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed, and among women, fully 66% disagreed. Responses in Asia tended to be on the conservative side, too, with more respondents agreeing (58%) than disagreeing. The most conservative responses on the question came from the Middle East and North Africa, where between 70% and 80% of the publics in Iraq, Jordan, Egypt; and Saudi Arabia agreed or strongly agreed that men make better political leaders than women. What these response patterns suggest is a certain causal relationship: as more women enter into positions of leadership, a positive impact on attitudinal changes follows.

The analysis of the World Value Survey’s data by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris finds that in many societies, women hold more left leaning values than men do in their attitudes toward the appropriate role of the state versus the market, favoring an active government intervention in social protection and public ownership. Employed women are more likely to support a kind of social democracy. The data also suggests a generational gap in which the younger generation is more “modern”, open to social change and left leaning. If this continues to be the case, the process of generational population replacement will continue toward more leftward values and decisions.

³⁵ Shelley MacDermid, director of the Center for the Study of Families at Purdue University, cited in Jugglezine, “The State of the Workplace: How much ‘family friendly’ ground have we gained?,” January 5, 2001 <http://www.bermanmiller.com/CDA/juggle/0,1516,64,00.html>

Women in National and Local Government: Making a Difference?

Some scholars argue that at a tipping point of 10% or 15%, women legislators feel free to express their distinctive concerns (Paxton and Hughes, 2007: 209). Others argue that issues of special concerns to female representatives permeate the legislative bodies as women's representation nears parity (30% or 40%). According to one view,

“Greater female political participation consistently leads to more even-handed policy-making. In Rwanda, where women hold nearly half of the seats in parliament, a desperately poor nation is close to achieving full healthcare coverage for its citizens. Across Scandinavia, the presence of women in prominent political roles has led to unprecedented investments in education and job training. World Bank studies now indicate that female political empowerment often leads to less corruption” (Ramdas 2008: 69).

In the mid 1980s, when the United States under president Ronald Reagan was well into a very conservative era in domestic and foreign policy and the Equal Rights Amendment had been defeated, groups of feminists in various locales decided to enter local politics to make a difference. For example, the Santa Barbara Women's Political Committee (SBWPC) has fielded candidates for local office since 1987. According to a recent article by a founding member, “women were more likely than men to vote for social programs, gun control, and arms and were against military expenditures and nuclear power” (Lindemann 2008).

One study of British female MPs found that nearly half of them spoke directly about women's concerns. As one female MP explained, “I've become increasingly aware that there are issues that affect women disproportionately and that unless women pursue them nobody else will.” About a third of the women interviewed said they felt their female constituents were more comfortable talking to them about women's issues. And what of the type of bills that female legislators support? The fairly limited research in this area shows that women may prioritize issues differently from their male colleagues. In Sweden, female members of parliament are more likely than men to give high priority to family policy, elder care, and health care. Similarly, in a survey of 292 MPs from Argentina, Columbia, and Costa Rica, 65% of female legislators stated “women's equality” as a very high priority, compared with only 25% of male legislators. And 43% of female legislators felt children's and family issues are a very priority, compared with 28% of men. In contrast, male legislators were more likely to prioritize agriculture and employment issues (Paxton and Hughes 2007: 193). However, one U.S. based study found that gender appears more important for “feminist” bills and less so for the bills categorized as “social welfare bills” (Swers 2002). Political culture continues to matter.

CONCLUSIONS

Feminists long have criticized the gap between formal and substantive equality, along with women's exclusion from political decision making. Since at least the Beijing conference, these issues have been placed on the global agenda, and various mechanisms, such as gender-based quotas, have been proposed to ensure and enhance women's political participation and representation.

Why women's political participation matters may be summarized as *equity* and *impact*. Social justice and gender equity require greater participation by marginalized or under represented social groups, one of which is *women*. Contemporary notions of equity have coincided with the emergence of social movements of various types, of which the women's movement has been especially prominent. The demands of the global women's movement have included

greater access to economic and political decision making to achieve equality, but also to make a difference in societies and in the world.

As for the impact that women in politics have made, the evidence shows that women's extraparliamentary political activism has contributed to major political, policy, and legal changes. From the democratic transitions to family law reform, women's political participation in civil society has indeed made a difference. Across the world, women's movements have been the vehicles by which states have become more democratic as well as more gender-equitable. In the realm of formal politics, the evidence is mixed: in some countries and in some periods, women legislators prioritize social welfare and the social dimensions of "hard" issues. This is especially true in the domain of local politics, but also appears to be the case in a number of European and Latin American countries. Elsewhere, however, women legislators and their voting patterns may reflect party positions – as well as the wider political culture.

In defense of the equity argument, however, political theorist Ann Phillips has explained that women have interests, experiences, values and expertise that are different from those of men, due principally to their social positions. At the very least, therefore, women must be represented in formal politics. As political philosopher Nancy Fraser has noted (Fraser and Naples 2004), the contemporary emphasis on women's involvement in decision making reflects the evolution of women's own demands from redistribution to recognition to representation. In fact, these three demands are not separate or mutually exclusive; certainly, today's call for representation is also a call for redistribution (of power and resources) as well as recognition.

TABLE 16.1. Women in Local Governance, 2005 (in Percent)

	Total	Africa	Asia and Pacific	MENA	Europe	Central America	Latin America
<i>Mayors</i>							
Male	91	87.8	94.4	99.2	89.5	95	94.5
Female	9	12.2	5.6	0.8	10.5	5	5.5
<i>Councillors</i>							
Male	79	70	82.5	97.9	76	76	76
Female	21	30	17.5	2.1	24	24	26

Note: Number of countries surveyed: Total mayors: 60, councillors 67; Africa 4; Asia/Pacific 12; MENA 8; Europe 27; Central America 8; Latin America 9; United Cities and Local Governments

Source: <http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp?pag=wldmstatistics.asp&type=&L=EN&pon=1>

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CHAPTER 17

Globalization and Collective Action

PAUL D. ALMEIDA

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 30 years, a new form of contention spread across the globe focusing on issues and grievances related to economic liberalization and integration. Besides ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts (Jenkins and Gottlieb 2007; Olzak 2006), economic-based protests may be mobilizing the largest numbers of participants in social movement-type activities. Recent examples abound from the mass-based mobilizations and riots that brought down Suharto in Indonesia in early 1998 in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, to strikes and demonstrations against public sector privatization in China, Colombia, India and South Africa in the early 2000s involving millions of workers, to the rising global food and fuel prices in 2008 driving street protests and disturbances in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa and even working-class immigrant neighborhoods in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The collective actions are largely defensive in terms of protecting existing rights and subsidies gained in the period of state-led development. This chapter explores the origins and political consequences of this historically emergent form of contention. In particular, I highlight recent literature on (1) the conditions associated with two distinct waves of popular mobilization driven by economic liberalization and (2) the policy and electoral outcomes that this unrest has generated. Specific attention is given to lesser-developed countries (LDCs) in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

THREATS AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES IN GLOBAL CONTENTION

Tilly (1978) and Goldstone and Tilly (2001) outline two primary incentives stimulating collective action: opportunity and threat. Opportunity centers on the notion that joint action is driven by situations which are more likely to “enhance the contender’s realization of its interests” (Tilly 1978: 133) or gain new advantages (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). In contrast, threat-induced collective action is motivated by negative incentives that would reduce the realization of a challenger’s interests. Political sociologists and social movement scholars have recently recognized that much more analytical attention has been given to opportunity

generated collective action and government responsiveness than threat-driven mobilization (see McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998, 2001; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; McAdam et al. 2001, Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Almeida 2003; Snow et al. 2005; Kousis 2005; Alini 2009; Inclán 2009). That is, research has tended to focus on a constellation of factors in the political environment whereby the incentive structure for collective challengers is stimulated by the possibility of acquiring new advantages or what David Meyer (2004) calls “good news” (e.g., new rights, higher wages, more benefits).

Threats are perceived as “bad news” by challenging groups (i.e., taking away existing rights, goods, and safety). Oppositional movements contesting neoliberal economic reforms provide a venue to better understand threat-induced collective action. Three types of threat that influence widespread contention in the developing world include: (1) state repression; (2) erosion of fundamental political rights; and (3) state-attributed economic problems (Almeida 2008a).

Repressive Threats, Loss of Fundamental Rights and Radicalization

For most of the twentieth century, regimes in the global South oscillated between liberalization and repression. Collective actions and social movements often radicalized their strategies and tactics when facing the political threats of liberalization reversals, which commonly involved increasing state violence against organized opposition and the nullification of basic associational freedoms and competitive elections. Especially strong revolutionary movements surfaced in dependent capitalist states ruled by exclusionary and repressive authoritarian governments such as in Angola, China, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Iran, Mozambique, and Nicaragua (Goodwin 2001; Foran 2005). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, on the eve of the “third wave” of global democratization (Huntington 1991), radical revolutionary type movements ascended throughout the developing world (Wickham Crowley 1991).

Economic-Based Threats, Globalization and State Attributions

While many developing countries that fail to democratize continue to be at the risk of revolutionary mobilization or unarmed insurrections (Schock 2005) driven by repressive threats (e.g., Burma, Egypt, Honduras etc.), in the current period of international economic integration, economic-based threats appear to be mobilizing more groups across the global South. For our purposes, the core threats related to economic liberalization and globalization center on social and economic costs that popular sectors perceive as “collective bads” that should be avoided by engaging in joint action. In a variety of cases and national contexts, policies related to economic globalization and liberalization are often widely interpreted as making subaltern groups worse off if they fail to act collectively, such as the loss of state-sponsored subsidies and services (Eckstein and Wickham Crowley 2003). Especially in terms of material and subsistence needs, oppositional groups jointly construe the policies as imposing new hardships (Shefner et al. 2006). Collective attribution of the negative economic change largely centers on the state as the entity most visible and immediately responsible for implementing economic policy (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Javeline 2003). Global economic integration supplies a whole host of state-attributed economic problems and hardships that may instigate campaigns of threat-induced collective action (Roberts 2008; Silva 2009).

Political Opportunities and Democratization

Economic threats alone do not suffice in explaining large-scale collective mobilizations and their outcomes in LDCs. Coinciding with the process of global economic integration over the past 30 years has been the process of democratization in the global South (Markoff 1996). Democratization processes provide “system wide” political opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) for groups mobilizing around the economic threats associated with neoliberal policy implementation and economic liberalization (Almeida and Johnston 2006). Hence, many countries in the developing world face a “hybrid” political–economic environment¹ of expanding opportunities with democratization (i.e., more institutional access, tolerance of nongovernmental organizations, legalization of oppositional political parties, and competitive elections) combining with the economic threats linked to the globalization process (i.e., rising consumer prices, privatization, loss of access to social services, and welfare state retrenchment). One would expect stronger and more enduring mobilization against economic threats in countries that have transitioned to democratic rule. More groups would have more freedoms to form civil society organizations and align with political parties to sustain collective action than under nondemocratic regimes. International nongovernmental organizations operating in democratic contexts in the Third World would also be afforded more associational freedoms to use their skills and assets for collective mobilizations (Smith and Fetner 2007). In the following section, I examine this particularly potent combination of democratization with economic threats in relation to the upswing in globalization-induced collective action in the late 1990s and 2000s. First, however, I situate categories of economic-based threat within the two stages of structural adjustment executed over the past 30 years.

STAGE I STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND POPULAR RESPONSE (1980–1990)

A global debt crisis emerged by the early 1980s linked to an unprecedented growth in foreign lending, rising interest rates, and falling commodity prices for LDC exports (Schaeffer 2005). International financial institutions (IFIs) stepped in to broker the crisis between northern banks and southern governments. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (and its regional banks such as Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank) negotiated future lines of credit, rescheduled payments and reduced overall debt in exchange for the borrowing countries’ willingness to adjust their national economic policy-making in more of a neoliberal fashion (i.e., reduce state price controls and intervention, remove import tariffs, and focus on export production). From 1955 to 1970, only six developing countries had signed such agreements with the World Bank and IMF. In the 1970s, about three countries per year entered into debt rescheduling. In the early 1980s, the number of debt reschedulings in LDCs rose dramatically from 23 between 1981 and 1982, to 65 in 1983–1984 (Walton and Seddon 1994: 13–17). The overall debt also mushroomed in this same time period. In 1970, LDCs owed \$64 billion to foreign banks and governments. The Third World debt grew to \$686 billion in 1984 and then to \$2.2 trillion dollars in 2000 (Walton and Seddon 1994; Robinson 2004). These conditionality arrangements came to be known as structural adjustment agreements between the IFIs and the indebted countries in the global South.

¹I thank Sharon Lean for suggesting the notion of a “hybrid” political environment.

Many of the most common economic measures enacted in structural adjustment agreements triggered the largest economic based protests in LDCs during the 1980s. These first stage economic stabilization measures usually focused on fiscal budget austerity, new taxes, currency devaluation, and curtailment of subsidies on basic consumer items (e.g., food staples, cooking oil, and public transportation). The protest campaigns in the first wave of structural adjustment were usually momentary and demanded a repeal of the unpopular economic measures (Auvinen 1997). For example, in Costa Rica in late 1982, the government signed a letter of intent with the IMF that included an escalating increase in consumer electricity rates. The measure went into effect in February 1983. By May 1983, a number of neighborhood-based groups coordinated a national campaign to demand a repeal of the measure and return prices to the December 1982 rates. Roadblocks spread across the major highways and roads of the country in early June until the government decided to negotiate with the movement (Alvarenga Venutolo 2005). In the larger Latin American region as a whole, ten out of the thirteen major campaigns of austerity protest between 1976 and 1987 documented by Walton (2001) involved *price increases* on basic consumer goods and services and nine out of the ten cases were linked directly to an IMF agreement (not counting the Costa Rican case).

Between 1977 and 1992 in North Africa and the Middle East, Walton and Seddon (1994) reported 25 popular outbreaks against structural adjustment in nine countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Turkey). They state, "In virtually all cases, significant increases in the cost of basic goods and services (or the threat of these) have preceded and effectively precipitated the outbursts of popular unrest" (ibid: 171). In a related study incorporating the universe of major austerity protests in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America between 1976 and 1987, Walton (1987) found that 19 of the 22 cases (86%) were triggered by dramatic increases in the cost of living. Hence, a large part of the initial austerity protest wave of the 1980s centered on the economic threat of rising prices when subsidies and price controls were removed from mass transportation, basic consumption items, and utilities in order to compensate for domestic budget deficits, trade imbalances, and interest payments on the foreign debt. The liberalization measures marked the end of the era of state-led development and import-substitution industrialization and opened the way to more intensified globalization (McMichael 2008).

Most of these episodes of popular protest were short-lived as responses to the first wave of major structural reform. Democratic transitions were just beginning to take place in the 1980s and national governments placed many political obstacles to prevent oppositional groups from launching longer term nonviolent campaigns against the measures. Many of the campaigns against structural adjustment, especially in Africa, involved violence by both the state and insurgents (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007) resulting in some cases in hundreds of deaths (Walton and Seddon 1994). Populations were not accustomed to these types of economic measures as governments transitioned to both free market and democratic reforms. Indeed, urban populations in LDCs experienced at least four decades of state-led development before the early 1980s whereby governments expanded fledgling welfare states and increased the subsidization of housing, food, education, health, sanitation, and social services benefiting large segments of the working-class. The shifting political and economic environment, moving unevenly toward economic and political liberalization, pushed entire social movement sectors off balance as challengers experimented with old and new forms of mobilizing strategies to attempt to prevent the unwanted economic changes. In total, Walton and Seddon (1994) identified 146 anti-austerity protests between 1976 and 1992 in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The number of such globalization-induced protests would grow even larger in the late 1990s and 2000s with a second generation of structural adjustment reform.

STAGE II STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND POPULAR RESPONSE (1990–2008)

By the early 1990s, the global debt crisis remained unresolved. For many Third World states, the amount of foreign debt accrued doubled or tripled since the onset of the crisis a decade earlier. Governments continued to sign conditionality agreements with the IFIs – in some cases their third or fourth agreements (Green 2003). The accords negotiated in the 1990s often included many of the conditions stipulated in previous agreements such as the removal of price controls, subsidy cuts, and new taxes. In addition, the structural adjustment packages also demanded the privatization of natural resources, government utilities, pension systems and social services (Pastor and Wise 1999; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Arce 2005; Tunç 2005). The newer conditionality agreements also often demanded labor flexibility laws that undermined labor rights and collective bargaining (Hershberg 2007). Privatization was also encouraged in the 1980s, but more often in government-run manufacturing industries and state operated enterprises (e.g., steel, mining, textiles, etc.), especially in the larger semi-peripheral and newly industrialized countries of the global South (Williams 2001). The second stage structural adjustment agreements of the 1990s and early 2000s differed by the increasing emphasis on outsourcing the management and provision of basic services, utilities, and natural resources to the private sector and transnational firms.

Empirical studies suggest two distinct waves of global contention over neoliberal economic policies in LDCs. The first global protest wave against economic liberalization (described above) peaked in the mid-1980s and subsided by the mid-1990s (Walton 1998). By the late 1990s, a second wave of economic globalization-induced collective action was ascending, incorporating new demands and grievances (Podobnik 2005; Almeida 2007). Whereas price increases on basic consumer items dominated the list of grievances in the first wave of global contention, privatization related mobilization has often been the largest form of resistance out of all economic liberalization policies in the second wave. For example, in a study of over 280 austerity protest campaigns in Latin America between late 1995 and early 2001, nearly 40% of the campaigns involved grievances related to the privatization of utilities, services, or natural resources (Almeida 2007).

Figure 17.1 displays information on the annual number of protest campaigns in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1996 and 2003 involving issues related to public sector privatization. By 2000, there were over 40 major protest campaigns in the region driven by issues related to privatization, several of which were some of the most immense collective mobilizations in the respective country's recent history such as electricity and telecommunications privatization in Costa Rica (Almeida 2008b), water and natural gas privatizations in Bolivia (Perreault 2006), railroad, telecommunications, and water privatizations in Paraguay, electrical power privatization in Peru, and public health care outsourcing in El Salvador (Almeida 2006).

In another listing of 179 major anti-austerity protests in Africa, Asia, and Latin America by the World Development Movement between late 1999 and 2004, 30% of all reported events were related to a privatization policy.² These included massive mobilizations and general strikes in India over banking privatization in 2001, in South Africa over telecommunications, electricity, and water privatization (in 2001 and 2002), in South Korea over the privatization of railroads, gas, and electrical power in 2002, and in Bangladesh over a string of planned privatizations in September 2003. During preparations for the mass strike in South Korea in

²See Woodroffe and Ellis-Jones (2000) and Ellis-Jones (2002, 2003) and World Development Movement (2005).




FIGURE 17.1. Reported anti-privatization protest campaigns in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996–2003.

Source: Resource Center of the Americas (2003).

February 2002, the leader of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions exclaimed to reporters that, “Public services are the property of the nation. It is not acceptable to sell people’s property without their permission or agreement” (quoted Ward 2002). Similar mobilization appeals can be found among labor leaders in Africa and Latin America. Between 2000 and 2004, the World Development Movement also reported large-scale anti-privatization demonstrations and/or strikes in Indonesia, Zambia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Lebanon, Thailand, Pakistan, Uganda, and Malawi.

In addition to conflict related to public sector privatization, bilateral and multilateral free trade treaties have surfaced as the latest round of liberalization measures inducing mass protests, potentially leading to a third stage of global adjustment in the early twenty-first century. Since the mid-1980s, the United States has sought out bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the number of FTAs signed between wealthy northern countries (i.e., USA, European Union, Japan, and Australia) and less well-off developing countries picked up pace. By 2006, 25 developing countries had signed an FTA with a more developed nation and over 100 developing countries were involved in free trade negotiations (Oxfam 2007). Regional and bilateral free trade agreements now cover more than 30% of global trade (ibid.). Beginning with the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas in 1994 over the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Inclán 2008), a series of protests over free trade treaties have erupted in the 2000s in South Korea, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, Colombia, Thailand, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama, and Honduras. The challenging groups feel threatened by an entire host of liberalization reforms if the treaties

are approved especially agricultural imports competing with local farmers, loss of labor rights and environmental protections, and the outsourcing of public services and utilities to transnational firms. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) produced two historical mass marches in Costa Rica in 2007 against the agreement, which both reached up to 150,000 participants, the largest demonstrations in recent historical memory (even larger than the mobilizations against privatization in 2000). The anti-CAFTA mobilizations forced the Costa Rican government to hold the first referendum in the country's history on the trade agreement. In Guatemala, in March 2005, students, public sector unions, NGOs, and pan-Mayan indigenous groups sustained a month-long protest campaign nationwide (involving simultaneous roadblocks of major highways and mass marches) as the parliament debated and eventually approved CAFTA.

These newer liberalization measures – privatization, labor flexibility, and free trade accords – are superimposed on the earlier types of austerity policies (e.g., subsidy cuts, mass layoffs, wage freezes, etc.) creating a multiplicity of economic threats that mobilize large numbers of groups in LDCs. Indeed, with an estimated 80% rise in food prices since 2006 (Associated Press 2008), major food protests and riots have been reported in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in 2008, demonstrating that mobilization is not only driven by the second stage economic reforms, but also by the general relaxation in price controls and food subsidies dating back to the austerity measures implemented in the 1980s (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003; Bello 2008; McMichael 2009).³

ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF THE OPPOSITION

Collective action is not likely to endure in the absence of organizational assets that connect groups with similar grievances (Jenkins 1983; Edwards and McCarthy 2004). In terms of the social sectors and organizations participating in anti-globalization-related events in the global South, there are two kinds of groups: (1) sectors that were initially established during the period of state-led development (1940–1980) and (2) social sectors that have recently formed with the onset of the third wave of global democracy (1970–present). The state-led development sectors include public sector labor unions, the educational sector, and agricultural cooperatives and groups benefiting from agrarian reform programs. The democratization sectors include nongovernmental organizations, new social movements, and oppositional political parties.

State-Led Development Sectors

Public sector unions have made a formidable presence in the opposition to economic liberalization (Eckstein 2002). They are a grouping, which both are threatened by austerity and privatization measures as well as have the organizational capacity to mobilize against unwanted economic policies. These groups retain organizational and mobilizing skills that were developed decades prior to the onset of the debt crisis. Indeed, most labor unions achieved legalization and reached their organizational zenith during the previous era of state-

³The recent outbreaks of protest over the rising costs of food have also been attributed to increasing demand for bio-fuels and the food import needs in the rapidly growing economies of China and India, climatic changes, and rising petroleum prices.

led development and important substitution industrialization (Eckstein 2002; Roberts 2007). Labor sector activists pass down mobilizing skills and organizing templates molded in earlier struggles to newer generations of workers. First and second stage structural adjustment measures threaten many segments of the organized labor force in LDCs. Economic stabilization measures that call for a reduction in government spending in order to reduce budget deficits often involve wage freezes, wage arrears, and mass layoffs in the public sector (Auyero 2006).

Labor unions in government utilities and services undergoing privatization also are threatened with union-decertification and job loss. In addition, labor flexibility laws associated with structural adjustment programs weaken the rights of public sector workers with benefits and collective labor contracts. Such labor flexibility laws often constitute part of structural adjustment agreements in the 1990s and 2000s (Cook 2007). In response to watering-down labor protections, public sector labor unions and federations convened several general strikes and demonstrations in Argentina (1999 and 2000), Colombia (2002), India (2002), Indonesia (2001), South Africa (2000), and South Korea (2002), contributing to the momentum of the second wave of globalization-induced mobilization.

In countries where records of longitudinal strike data exist, over the past 15 years public sector workers have held more labor strikes than in the private sector. This includes the cases of Argentina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, India, and Paraguay. In Walton and his collaborators' cross-national studies of austerity protests in LDCs, his team consistently finds labor unionization rates as one of the best predictors of high levels of austerity protest (Walton and Ragin 1989, 1990; Walton and Shefner 1994). Javier Auyero's (2002, 2006) rich ethnographic work on anti-neoliberal policy protest in Argentina from a "moral politics" perspective also uncovers that much of the popular contention in the provinces in the 1990s was led or supported by former and current public sector employees that often constitute a majority of the salaried workers in the interior of the country (as opposed to the private sector). In South Korea in the 2000s, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) coordinated several social movement unionism campaigns with other civil society organizations against privatization, neoliberal restructuring and free trade agreements with Japan, USA, and Chile (Gray 2008).

Lee (2007) finds similar processes in China's rustbelt industries. In 2002, the largest outbreak of social unrest (of any type) since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown occurred in the northeastern province of Liaoning. Tens of thousands of state employees and unemployed workers sustained a week of street demonstrations in the provincial capital demanding owed back wages, pension payments and unemployment insurance. The grievances of Chinese workers largely stem from the dramatic decrease in state-owned enterprise employment from 68.4% of all workers in 1990 to 36.3% in 2003 (Lee 2007: 40). Out of the 58,000 protest incidents documented nationally by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security in 2003, the Ministry estimated that 1.66 million workers participated accounting for 47% of all protest participants, the largest group (Lee 2007: 5). In another study of the second wave austerity protest in Latin America and the Caribbean in the late 1990s and early 2000s, workers participated in 56% of the reported campaigns, and public sector workers participated in nearly a quarter of all campaigns (23.5%), more than any other grouping (Almeida 2007: 129). Podobnik's (2005) worldwide study of 1,178 anti-globalization protest events between 1990 and 2004 found "workers" as the social group with the highest frequency of involvement, participating in 39% of all reported events.

In the educational sector, university and high school students, as well as public school teachers have participated with high regularity in anti-globalization protests. As public educa-

tion expanded at unprecedented levels in the 1950s and 1960s in the developing world at the height of state-led development, so did enrollments in high schools and universities. Austerity measures that affect financing of public universities and the subsidization of public transportation often bring students into popular contention. The high density of university students in large public universities in the mega-cities of the developing world provides them with the organizational capacity for rapid mobilization (Zhao 2001; Zeilig 2007). School teachers have been another educational sector component fighting pension system reforms, wage freezes, and budget cuts in public education (Murillo and Ronconi 2004). In many LDCs, public educator labor associations (along with public health care and hospital worker unions) constitute the largest labor unions in the country with the capacity to launch nationwide mobilizations (Cook 1996). In Central America in the 2000s, public school teachers have convoked some of the largest and most enduring strikes in the region, especially in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

Agricultural cooperatives and farmer and peasant associations established in previous decades also participate in mass demonstrations against privatizing communal lands, cheap foreign imports, increasing debt, and the cutting of subsidies from governmental agricultural programs, such as in Costa Rica in the 1980s and 1990s (Edelman 1999), and more recently in Colombia, Ecuador (Guerrero Cazar and Ospina 2003), India, Kenya, Mexico (Harvey 1998; Williams 2001), Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, and South Korea. Peasants also form part of the multi-sectoral coalitions against public sector privatization. In Paraguay, peasant associations act as the “vanguard” in struggles against economic liberalization (Riquelme 2004: 60). Out of the 49 major mobilizations organized by national peasant associations in Paraguay in 2002, 29 related to neoliberal policies, and 18 involved privatization of public sector institutes and services (Riquelme 2004: 61).

Democratization Sectors

The spread of the “third wave” of global democratization increases the potential scale of collective action. While many of the actions in the first upsurge of austerity protests during the 1980s took place in non-democracies or countries experiencing a democratic transition, many of the second stage austerity protests occur in more democratic contexts. Indeed, in the 1980s, Riley and Pafitt (1994) found that austerity protests and riots in sub-Saharan Africa likely sped up the pace of democratization. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, nearly two-thirds of the world could be considered nominally democratic (Puddington and Piano 2005), including West Africa (Umar 2007) and Latin America (Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005). These conditions provide system-wide opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) for mobilization by multiple groups, including those opposed to negative social aspects of economic reforms (Almeida and Johnston 2006).

Democracies tolerate and legalize more civil society associations and political parties while competitive elections place more accountability on state actors to restrain from repression and potentially respond to popular demands (Tilly 2007). For example, in contrast to studies that predict more social atomization, individuation, and civil society apathy in the face of market reforms and “low intensity democracy,” Arce and Bellinger (2007) report in a pooled cross-national time series of mass demonstrations in Latin America between 1970 and 2000, that the interaction of economic liberalization in the context of democratization leads to heightened political contention. Social groups especially benefiting from democratization in

the developing world include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), new social movements, and oppositional political parties.

Lechner and Boli (2005: 128–132) have identified a massive expansion in international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in the twentieth century, from less than 400 in 1909 to over 25,000 in 2000. There has been a concomitant growth in transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) over the past 50 years, from only around 100 in the early 1950s to over 1,000 by 2003 (Smith 2008: 121–122). Both INGOs and TSMOs fund a variety of local nongovernmental organizations with a multitude of issues and constituencies. These include gender and ethnic discrimination, health care, environmental conservation, and rural economic development, among many others (Harper and Leicht 2007).

While local level NGOs focus their activities on national level economic liberalization policies, they often come under the influence of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) where they share ideas, strategies and past struggles against neoliberal reforms (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Carty 2006). INGOs assist local movements in the global South build social capital by serving as bridges between domestic-based campaigns and international donor and solidarity constituencies in the global North (McCarthy 1997; Brown and Fox 1998; Bob 2005). Such bridges assist resource poor organizations battling structural adjustment locally to place pressure on international financial institutions and their home governments to alter socially damaging economic policies and development projects (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). INGOs such as Jubilee South, The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), and 50 Years is Enough, partner with dozens of local NGOs in developing countries where they assist in mounting transnational campaigns for debt relief and against future structural adjustment programs. Between 2002 and 2004, environmental organizations, especially those connected to the INGO Friends of the Earth, played a pivotal role in coordinating the multi-sectoral coalition that prevented the continuation of water and sewage privatization in Uruguay (Santos et al. 2006). Regional transnational structures and congregations such as the *Foro Mesoamericano*, World Social Forum, and the São Paulo Forum also play important roles for anti-neoliberal movements to send representatives to share past experiences and plan future actions and collaborations.

Some of the core NGOs fighting privatization and price increases of basic necessities have been consumer-protection organizations (Rhodes 2006). Consumer defense NGOs have rapidly spread from the global North to the global South and appear on the political scene in a number of LDCs. For example, every country on the Central American isthmus has at least one major consumer protection NGO, and the largest network of consumer defense groups in Nicaragua (the *Red Nacional de Consumidores de Nicaragua*) served as the organizational broker in several protest campaigns against water privatization and price hikes in electricity rates throughout the early 2000s.

Local nongovernmental organizations (often funded by INGOs) are rapidly playing a major role in the social movement sector in fighting economic liberalization throughout the developing world (Evans 2005). In South Africa in the early 2000s, NGOs such as the Anti-Privatization Forum and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee connected public sector labor unions, community groups, and pensioners in wider coalitions to resist further price hikes and privatization of basic social services (Buhlungu 2006; Egan and Wafer 2006). Governments are beginning to enact restrictions and laws to prevent NGOs from participating in politics (or even legally functioning within their territory) in Russia, Egypt, and Nigeria (Clark and Bensabat Kleinberg 2000). In nondemocratic contexts, NGOs fight an uphill struggle. The Indonesian government under Suharto's rule effectively suffocated an upsurge of NGO activity in export processing industries in the late 1980s and early 1990s via mass arrest campaigns in

the mid-1990s (Jones 2000). Bob and Nepstad (2007) found similar dynamics in Nigeria in the mid-1990s when the military government cracked down on environmental and human rights NGOs in ethnic minority regions fighting the pollution and contamination of their lands in the Niger River Delta by transnational firms. After the repression (arrest and execution of NGO leaders), the Nigerian movement nearly dissolved. Weist (2007) noted parallel processes in the Middle East and North Africa in the 1990s, whereby government suppression of NGOs in Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia greatly reduced their mobilizing capacities. Democratic transitions and more stable democracies provide more space for NGOs to operate and coordinate across regions. Activists often appropriate such fungible NGO infrastructures in mobilizations against economic liberalization measures.

New social movements (that are often sponsored by NGOs) also play an integral part in coalitions resisting neoliberal reforms. New social movements are no longer solely associated with post-industrial societies (Johnston et al. 1994). A plethora of new collectivities exist in the developing world in the early twenty-first century that were largely absent in the era of state-led development. This class of movements would include feminist and women-based SMOs (Liu 2006; Moghadam 2005; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Almeida and Delgado 2008), ecology and environmental movements, movements organized around sexuality and gay rights (Currier 2007), as well as the re-emergence of indigenous people's movements. Participant observers of Argentina's social movements confronting the economic crisis and currency devaluation in 2002 and 2003 found that women frequently accounted for between 50 and 75% of participants in mass demonstrations, which was undergirded by several women's-based NGOs and SMOs (Borland and Sutton 2007). In Latin American countries with large native populations, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru, indigenous communities have contributed large numbers of demonstrators in protests against privatization and free trade (Van Cott 2007).

Oppositional political parties also make a major presence in mobilizations against neoliberal policy reform Almeida (2010). Here is an excerpt from a report of a street march in El Salvador in later 2001.

Thousands of workers marched peacefully in San Salvador on November 21 [2001] to protest the layoffs of state workers, privatization of ports and airports, the planned elimination of subsidies for water service, and other government economic policies...The march was led by Legislative Assembly deputy Salvador Sánchez Cerén and San Salvador city council member Gerson Martínez, both of whom are seeking election to the national leadership body of the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN)⁴

The opposition political party the FMLN has often used its party structure to support anti-neoliberal protest campaigns to oppose neoliberal policies perceived as harmful. Oppositional political parties have played a similar role in Bangladesh against fuel and utility price hikes in the early 2000s. This same pattern has emerged throughout Latin America with opposition parties in Costa Rica, Uruguay, Ecuador and Bolivia using the party structure to mobilize massive social movement campaigns. Van Cott (2003) and Yashar (2005) describe this relationship in both Ecuador and Bolivia, whereby indigenous-based parties such as Pachakutik (MUPP-NP), the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), and the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (MIP) served as major coordinators of campaigns against privatization and free trade. In Costa Rica, a new left-of-center political party emerged in the early 2000s to battle official corruption and the dismantling of the nation's welfare state – The Partido de Acción Ciudadana (PAC). The PAC participated in many of the major protest campaigns, including street

⁴Source: (Agence-France Presse 2001).

marches, against the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2006 and 2007 and narrowly lost the 2006 presidential elections.

The relationship between the oppositional political party and social movement has been termed “social movement partyism” (Almeida 2006; 2010). Democratization throughout the developing world over the past 30 years allows more groups to tap into the organizational resources of a political party. Nationalist, populist, and left-of-center political parties tend to be the most likely candidates to enter such a campaign. Dominant parties in power are less likely to enter a partnership with a social movement (Stearns and Almeida 2004), and when leftist parties take power in large cities, they often experience more protest from their erstwhile civil society allies (Bruhn 2008). Several competing leftist political parties sponsored or supported various factions of the unemployed workers’ movement in Argentina (the largest in Latin America) during the foreign debt crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007). In a period of absolute decline in organized labor (Roberts 2007), oppositional political parties are often one of the only organizational units mobilized on a national scale that can offer their organizational assets of membership lists and office equipment to sustain a large-scale social movement campaign against neoliberal policy reform. Detailed case studies and comparative research are often the best strategies to empirically establish this relationship between parties and sectors in civil society (Snow and Trom 2002). Newspaper reports alone often fail to capture the behind the scenes mobilizing roles of groups such as NGOs, new social movements, and the political parties coordinating oppositional campaigns.

The state-led development sectors and the democratization sectors of NGOs, new social movements, and oppositional political parties may provide more precise empirical indicators for examining the likelihood of the timing and spatial variation in globalization-induced mobilization than the earlier “overurbanization” category used by Walton and his collaborators (Walton and Ragin 1990; see also Auvinen 1997). They used the measure as a proxy for a civil society’s organizational infrastructure. Some of the key actors and collectivities within the infrastructure are those outlined above.⁵ The growing body of scholarship accumulating over the past 15 years would predict more enduring and broader campaigns in societies that have democratized with a civil society characterized by strong oppositional political parties, vibrant public sector unions, large public education infrastructures, and a rich array of non-governmental organizations. At the same time, we would anticipate more violent and short-term protest campaigns (if they arise at all) in nondemocratic contexts (especially those that are not in a phase of liberalization) (see Musa (2008) for the case of Cameroon).

GLOBALIZATION-INDUCED PROTEST OUTCOMES

Movement Level Outcomes

Countries experiencing high levels of popular contention against economic liberalization often “spillover” (Meyer and Whittier 1994) into future rounds of mobilization against neoliberal policies. Negative experiences with economic liberalization provide sentiment pools for the first round of anti-globalization protest. Once communities and oppositional groups are organized and made aware of economic liberalization, they are more likely to participate in

⁵In Walton and Seddon’s (1994) more historical and qualitative work, they also discuss many of the groups outlined in this chapter as participating in austerity protests, especially urban-based collectivities such as students, workers, political parties, women, squatter communities, and informal sector workers.

subsequent companies of collective action as societal “demand” against such reforms increases (Klandermans 2004). Arce and Bellinger (2007) found that Latin American countries with later transitions to free market economies (i.e., post 1989), witnessed fewer anti-government demonstrations than countries with a longer term familiarity with liberalization measures. In El Salvador and Costa Rica, the communities, groups, and oppositional political parties that led the battles against privatization of public health care (El Salvador) and electricity and telecommunications (Costa Rica) in the early 2000s were the same groups leading the struggle against the Central American Free Trade Agreement later in the decade. In Argentina, the Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA) formed in 1993 as a labor confederation of largely public sector workers along with squatters, peasants and unemployed workers (*los piqueteros*). In the late 1990s and 2000s, the CTA coordinated several major nationwide campaigns against austerity programs (including general strikes). In short, the CTA effectively mobilized its affiliates on repeated occasions against austerity policies during the most extreme years of Argentina’s debt crisis. In Bolivia and Ecuador, oppositional political parties, indigenous people’s organizations, labor unions, and students have served as the vanguard of several rounds of anti-neoliberal contention in the early 2000s (Van Cott 2003; Yashar 2005).

Policy Outcomes

A core research question for political studies of economic policy-making centers on if the government enacts the liberalization measure or not. Most anti-neoliberal contention is based on particular economic policies that require parliamentary approval. These liberalization policies include privatization, ratification of free trade agreements, and pension system reforms. At one level, neoliberal reforms are usually enacted with little to mild public opposition from the sectors affected by the impending changes (Hellman 1997). Such macro-level changes characterize the shift from state-led development to the era of neoliberal globalization. During the first surge of policy change in the 1980s, some observers suggested that austerity riots and protests around the developing world resulted in *short-term* victories with prices reduced to end the rioting (Walton and Seddon 1994: 50). Podobonik (2005: 67) reported 54 events in his population of 1,178 anti-globalization protests whereby an IMF/World Bank project or austerity program was eased, delayed, revised, or cancelled in response to popular opposition. Nonetheless, despite some successful campaigns turning back austerity reforms and in a few cases the seizure of state power by anti-neoliberal political parties (Robinson 2008), by the early twenty-first century the developing world remains on a neoliberal trajectory.

For major neoliberal policy programs such as privatization, there is mounting evidence on some of the conditions associated with campaign success in overturning such policies. These conditions include widespread public opinion against the impending economic reform, large-scale mobilization by multiple social sectors, and a strong oppositional political party acting as a friend inside and outside of the polity. Unfavorable public opinion against a particular neoliberal measure often stems from negative experiences with earlier reform measures. If a majority of the general public perceives that the previous neoliberal reforms were enacted in a corrupt or non-transparent matter, they are more likely to oppose future similar reforms. Perhaps even more important, if previous rounds of structural adjustment and privatization resulted in higher consumer prices and a lowering in the quality and access to services, the general public mood will be much more skeptical about other reforms in the legislative pipeline. From this reservoir of public opinion, movement organizers can potentially recruit a larger cross-section of society to participate in particular campaigns against neoliberal policy

enactments. In addition, policy-makers in democratic contexts pay attention to public opinion (Burstein and Linton 2002).

Policy-makers more effectively implemented structural adjustment measures in the 1980s and early 1990s than in the second generation of reform. In the wake of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, LDCs were in a very weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the international financial institutions. In order to prevent more severe economic crisis and receive future lines of credit they needed to enter into conditionality agreements with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and related financial institutes (Walton and Seddon 1994). Since the third wave of global democratization was just beginning, many state managers could use their authoritarian legacies to impose socially damaging economic policies despite unfavorable public opinion and/or promise that these measures would be short-term and stimulate future economic growth and prosperity (Stokes 2001a). At other times, presidential candidates would hide their intentions of implementing harsh austerity measures until after taking office (Stokes 2001b).

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, economic liberalization measures were becoming institutionalized in world society as the appropriate strategy to organize developing economies (Babb 2005). This institutionalization can be observed by pro-neoliberal parties adopting free market policies without pressure from the international financial institutions as well as formerly populist, social democratic and democratic socialist political parties in power implementing such measures, such as in Argentina, Venezuela, and Costa Rica in the 1990s. Neoliberal reforms emerged as the new policy paradigm diffusing to would-be emulators in executive offices, economic cabinets and finance ministries throughout the developing world (Weyland 2004).

With growing levels of democracy and mixed levels of economic growth along with enduring social inequality, civil society groups and oppositional political parties began to challenge economic liberalization in sustained campaigns by the mid-1990s. By this time, most LDCs had experienced two decades of austerity-type reforms. Pro-neoliberal governments in the developing world began to use euphemisms for privatization of social services and utilities such as “state modernization” and “anti-monopoly” in order to persuade publics on the need to make the structural economic shifts. One effective strategy adopted by civil society to oppose the second generation reforms involved making horizontal linkages across social sectors.

A multi-sectoral opposition is more likely to lead to a government retracting a reform measure. In privatization cases, the mobilization process usually begins with a public sector union (in the institute threatened by impending privatization) initiating a campaign to halt the process. In many cases, the government will negotiate an indemnification package with labor leaders and no larger conflict erupts. In other cases, the labor union may only launch a campaign against privatization by itself or with other unions in the public sector. Because public sector workers’ associations are weakening and concentrated in a few of the largest cities (Barchiesi 2007), their mobilizations will likely be ineffective without the incorporation of several other sectors (Almeida 2008b). Especially effective are umbrella structures that coordinate mobilization among a diversity of groups, including labor, students, peasant associations, NGOs, and oppositional political parties (Schock 2005). Uba (2005) found that such large coalitions that used assertive and economically disruptive protest strategies were more effective in slowing down the pace of public sector privatization in India during the 1990s and early 2000s.

Oppositional political parties play a key role inside the parliament in pushing legislation into implementation (Stearns and Almeida 2004). In the context of anti-neoliberal protest campaigns, oppositional parties vote against neoliberal measures and try to persuade other parties to do the same. These oppositional parties are usually nationalist, populist, socialist, or social

democratic and most likely to enter a coalition with a social movement campaign. Oppositional parties also act outside of the polity by calling on rank and file members to join in collective action. That is, the party's organizational structure is fungible and can be used to mobilize social movement activities by multiple groups as well as voting and electoral campaigning (Almeida 2010). In sum, in the rare case whereby a neoliberal policy is reversed, there will likely be some combination of a majority of public opinion against the measure in question, nationwide mobilization by multiple sectors, and the presence of a strong oppositional political party advocating inside and outside of the polity against the economic reform package.

Electoral Outcomes

Not only have oppositional political parties engaged in anti-neoliberal contention, but they have also benefited from such protests with growing electoral strength. This trend manifests itself most prominently in Latin America during the second wave of globalization-induced mobilization (see Seddon and Zeilig 2005 for the case of Africa). In the early twenty-first century, nearly every left-of-center government in the region can partially trace its electoral success to major protest campaigns against austerity measures, privatization, or free trade policies, including Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The package of IMF reforms implemented in Venezuela in 1989 unleashed a wave of protests, riots, and coup attempts through the early 1990s. Oppositional political parties such as *La Causa Y* and Hugo Chávez's Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement (MBR-200/MVR) blamed the "paquete" for many of the country's social problems (López Maya 1997). These same oppositional parties would grow in force throughout the 1990s culminating in Chávez's electoral victory at the end of 1998 in the presidential elections with his *Movimiento Quinta República* (MVR) coalition party (López Maya 2005; Gott 2005).

In Uruguay in 2004, the left-of-center *Frente Amplio* party scored an unprecedented triumph in the presidential elections, ending the long dominant system of elite two-party rule by the Colorado and Blanco parties. In the two years prior to the elections, the *Frente Amplio* worked with a coalition of environmental NGOs and public sector unions to halt the process of water and sewage outsourcing to transnational firms. The mobilizations around water privatizations, which largely focused on collecting signatures to petition the parliament for a national referendum, resulted in a plebiscite on water privatization. The referendum and the presidential elections were held simultaneously in October of 2004. Both the anti-water privatization referendum and the *Frente Amplio* prevailed. The water privatization issue likely brought in more of the electorate to vote for the *Frente Amplio* following three years of economic crisis and IMF-sponsored austerity measures. The leftist president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, came to power in 2006 on the heels of major national mobilizations against free trade by indigenous groups, students, environmentalists, and public sector labor unions. During the presidential campaign, Correa promised the electorate that he would not sign a free trade agreement or a future structural adjustment agreement with the international financial institutions. In Bolivia, Evo Morales' socialist political party (MAS), also won presidential power after two major national mobilizations against natural gas privatization and export in 2003 and 2005 and a national referendum on the issue in 2004 (Postero 2007). The MAS organized these mobilizations as an oppositional party on the road to its stunning electoral victory at the end of 2005.

Similar processes of neoliberal contention converting into political capital for oppositional parties that eventuate in electoral triumphs of left-leaning governments can also be observed in Nicaragua in 2006 (preceded by mass protests against transportation and electricity price hikes) and Paraguay in 2008 (preceded by several rounds of protest against public

sector privatization). In some cases, an entirely new political party or electoral coalition forms in the aftermath of major mobilizations against economic liberalization; this was the pattern in Ecuador in 1995 (Collins 2004), Venezuela in 1997, and Paraguay, Ecuador and Peru in 2006. In other cases, political parties build from the ground up by winning local municipal elections and some parliamentary representation. It is at this level when they are most likely to partner up with social movements to increase their electoral strength. Often, the party-movement coalition coalesces around economic adjustment policies. This pattern has emerged in the early 2000s in Colombia (with the Polo Democrático Alternativo), El Salvador (FMLN), and Costa Rica (PAC). Future lines of research should examine more precisely the contribution of economic liberalization-induced mobilization to electoral outcomes at the local and national levels controlling for other conditions such as clientelism, official corruption, factionalism within traditional political parties, and regional economic structures.

CONCLUSION

Over the past 30 years, two waves of popular mobilization have taken place against globalization. The first wave peaked in the mid 1980s against the initial stage of austerity measures and structural adjustment agreements linked to the Third World debt crisis. The measures largely involved consumer price increases, subsidy cuts on food and basic necessities, wage freezes, and currency devaluations. The protests were largely short in duration and, at times, violent in regimes that had yet to democratize such as several cases in northern Africa. The second wave of protests in the 1990s and early 2000s ascended largely in response to a new stage of structural reforms that included the standard conditionality measures along with privatization and labor flexibility laws. The campaigns challenging the second generation reforms endure over longer time spans and involve deeper policy and electoral consequences than the first wave of contention in the 1980s. With the exception of occasional looting and price riots (Auyero 2007), the majority of second wave mobilizations involve nonviolent and assertive actions in the context of more countries experiencing democratic consolidation. In the absence of a global trend of democratization reversals and repressive state threats that was associated with radicalized collective action in the twentieth century, collective action by popular sectors will likely remain policy-oriented focusing on undesirable economic liberalization measures. In the early twenty-first century, a new upsurge of global contention may be emerging against bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. In addition, more “traditional” austerity-type protests have re-entered the political scene in the late 2000s over rising food prices.

The tremendous increase in campaigns and social movement-type activities in the developing world confronting the perceived negative social consequences and economic threats of neoliberal reforms presents new challenges to scholarship on the causes and political consequences of popular mobilization in the global South. Models and frameworks designed to explain political mobilization and its impacts in advanced industrialized democracies need to incorporate processes learned in these newer struggles stimulated by global economic integration. Students of collective action would benefit from more research and work on classifying the various forms of economic threats associated with the globalization process and under what conditions they are most likely to mobilize large numbers of people. More comparative research across countries and world regions would also enhance our shared understanding of the composition of the organizational infrastructure in civil society (including transnational civil society) that organizes against economic liberalization reforms and policies. Policy impacts are not exclusively about winning collective goods and new favorable policies

(Amenta 2006), but also involve the ability of mobilized groups to turn back or reverse unwanted policies such as public sector privatization and pension system restructuring. These reforms and their associated mobilizations reach so many segments of the population that the discontent may at times be captured by oppositional political parties to increase their political strength in local and parliamentary electoral bodies and even take executive power.

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CHAPTER 18

Cultural Analysis of Political Protest

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The study of social movements and protest has straddled the divide between structure and culture since its inception: in part a reflection of how protest studies straddle the disciplines of sociology and political science. If one looks back almost 50 years, when the subfield was emerging, one finds a blending of structural concepts (such as structural strain and structural conduciveness), cultural factors (generalized beliefs and emergent norms), and ideational elements from social psychology (relative deprivation and rising expectations).

Social movements and collective behavior, as the field was once called, gained prominence as an area of research when it began to focus less on the ideational and cultural aspects of mobilization and more on structural and material factors. Beginning in the late 1970s, researchers took notice of an important social trend, the growth of organized groups and formal campaigns to fight for social change – not unions or political parties, but the expansion of a civil-society sector that, while always present, seemed to be growing rapidly. By focusing on factors such as material resources and organizational capacity, variables more readily measurable and conducive to the systematic analysis of their effects on mobilization, the field began to expand its research agenda, breaking away from the conceptual and methodological imprecision that often characterized studies of collective behavior and riots. The resource mobilization perspective, as this theoretical shift was called, heralded important advances in our understanding of social movements and protest.

Yet, a cultural agenda was never far in the background. Several studies stressed the influence, diversity, and variation in culture (Fine 1985; Lofland 1985); and Swidler's tool box metaphor (1986), which suggested that culture can be thought of as a complex and varied resource for making sense of the world, offered a felicitous synergy with the organizational-strategic elements of the resource mobilization perspective, such that references to "cultural resources" and "discursive resources" were sometimes heard. Then, beginning in the late 1980s, the cultural turn in the social sciences began to penetrate social movement research, especially with the idea of the frame alignment (Snow et al. 1986), with far-reaching effects for the field. An early benchmark of cultural research was the publication of *Social Movements and Culture* (Johnston and Klandermans 1995), the first focused collection of cultural research, which combined new European and North America approaches. Since then, there

have been important additions to the cultural study of protest mobilization: Jasper (1997), Rochon (1998), Steinberg (1999), Stryker et al. (2000), Davis (2002), Young (2002), Ewick and Silby (2003), Goodwin and Jasper (2004), Johnston and Noakes (2005), Polletta (2006), to name a few. This ongoing work has developed into clear streams of cultural analysis in the protest studies field: narratives and stories, cultural resistance, social movement cultures, and cultural performance, and cultural artifacts – especially the use of music (Eyerman and Jamison 1998). And finally, there is the main source of cultural focus in the field, frame analysis.

Over the last decade, a great deal of research has been about how movements and/or movement organizations frame issues, with the implicit dependent variable being some form of mobilization success. The sheer volume of framing research has been partly due to what might be called a strong instrumentalist–structuralist orientation in the academic culture of protest studies. The current perspectives in the field’s theoretical discourse – political process and dynamics of contention approaches – emphasize state and institutional structures and the contentious and instrumental nature of protest campaigns. A large body of research has considered how social movements strategically frame their messages to optimize impact (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Benford 1993; Noonan 1995; Rothman and Oliver 2002; Hewitt and McCammon 2005; Kenney 2005; Valocchi 2005; Ferree et al. 2002, among others). It should not be surprising then that a focus on strategic framing has dominated cultural approaches to social movements, even though this is not how the concept was originally intended (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson et al. 1982).

There is no doubt that strategic framing is an important empirical phenomenon that deserves attention. The power of the idea is clearly seen as framing concepts are increasingly used by political consultants and the popular media (Lakoff 1996). Clearly, politicians, their handlers, and their campaign advisors do a lot of framing, just as do the leaders of social movements and protest campaigns – for their members, potential members, opponents, and the media. It is not surprising, then, that a large majority of social movement research falling under the cultural rubric has been about how movements and/or movement organizations frame issues, with the implicit dependent variable being some form of mobilization success (for reviews of framing see Snow 2004; Johnston and Noakes 2005; Benford and Snow 2000; Benford 1997). The goal of this chapter is to situate cultural analysis of political and social movements within the broader perspective of cultural studies and see what empirical insights there might strengthen our research programs. While the utility of the strategic framing perspective will remain, it is not the only way that culture finds its way into the social movements and protest campaigns, and indeed, future cultural insights to mobilization processes may lie elsewhere.

CULTURE AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS

A half-century ago, the view of culture that predominated in the social sciences stressed the interconnectedness of symbols, categories, and beliefs. Culture was a vast web and social actors were embedded in it, its influence seen in various rituals and everyday behaviors. This view was built upon a “myth of cultural integration” (Archer 1996: 2) that highlighted consistency of ideational orientations in social groups, specifically ones that speak the same language. Two generations of social scientists, nourished by Durkheim, Kroeber, Boas, Benedict, and Parsons, mostly adhered to this view of a uniform cultural fabric. But the concept of culture as it is used in today’s academic discourse is a more complex and fluid than this (Baldwin et al. 2006). Over the past 30 years, as the meaning of culture has come to embrace diversity and

conflict, its use and application also has become increasingly contested in the social sciences – appropriated by different academic discourses and used as a tool for different theoretical projects – in sociology, anthropology, political science, social psychology, communications, cognitive sciences, literary studies, and numerous subdisciplines, including protest studies. Archer's observation a decade ago holds to this day: "What culture is and what culture does are issues bogged down in a conceptual morass from which no adequate sociology of culture has been able to emerge (1996: 2). There is general agreement about where culture is located, namely, it is just about everywhere. Culture is the totality of a people's ideations, objects, and behaviors that are meaningful to others (Griswold 1994: 11).

Narratives, text, discourse, metaphor, rituals, actors, and performances, all these key themes cultural analysis seem to have little to do with explaining why social movements come into being, how they develop, and what they decide to do. Moreover, there is a thread in contemporary cultural theory that holds that, because culture pervades everything, social science too is embedded in unrecognized cultural assumptions, and is made possible only through the active complicity of the social actors who sustain those assumptions. Even if some degree of agreement about empirical relationships seems to be achieved, it's only a superficial performance, behind which lies power relationships, diverse interpretations, and active social praxis in maintaining the appearance of social science being accomplished. In her treatise on cultural analysis of politics, Ann Norton states, "Culture is not a 'dependent' or 'independent' variable. Culture is not a variable at all" (Norton 2004: 2). Her position is that because nothing is outside of culture, any given society, social process, social institution, or social movement organization cannot have more or less culture. Although a researcher may identify and describe in detail important cultural processes that shape behaviors, culture, being the medium of social life and meaning, cannot vary in its presence. What is more, its presence alone does not make it critical.

In the absence of factors that vary in their causal influence, there is little for the social scientists to do, but "describe, describe, and describe," as Norton reports (2004: 90). The rest of the statement, which she attributes to Theodore Lowi, is, "and then you have *explained* it." As important as description is, the most thorough and detailed description will not result in the kind of generalizable explanation that many social scientists typically seek. Regarding social movement research, given the instrumentalist-structuralist lens through which many issues of the field are seen, the search for causes of movement success and the variable development of movement trajectories, protest events, and state responses is not something that will be easily foregone. Demands for policy planning (by governments) and strategic decision making (by protest groups) mean that there is a demand for answers to these kinds of questions. More importantly, as social psychologists have long known, attribution of cause is a basic cognitive process. Everyone does it – everyday. All these observations point to the fact that the search for general explanations is here to stay.

Is it possible to view protest mobilization in ways informed by two decades of cultural theory yet preserve the field's focus on the causes of mobilization? Can we look at culture processes as ubiquitous and relativizing, diverse and complex, yet still see the determining influence of cultural factors? I suggest that there are several cultural approaches that are not only empirically justified, but which offer insights that the social movement research can seize upon to inform its analysis. The goal, of course, is to get it right, namely a view of the research enterprise that holds it *is* possible to accurately describe, or – more precisely – describe with increasing accuracy, the causes of movement success, failure, and variable trajectories, a view that rejects the more radical critique of the research enterprise mentioned earlier. On the other hand, part of this enterprise is to recognize that there are cultural influences, first, that

shape how research questions are defined and executed, and second, are not captured by our current theories. In the name of a better social science, it is necessary to take seriously culturalist insights.

CULTURE AS A MATRIX

A good place to begin is by asking if the field of protest studies can seize upon a more encompassing, more nuanced, and – as the fundamental goal – a more empirically accurate way of thinking about culture, one informed by 25 years of cultural studies. Traditionally, research in social movements, political sociology and political science has drawn upon the commonly held view that culture was a network of meaning, embodied in the beliefs, attitudes, and predispositions that were interconnected and encompassing (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Wildavsky 2006; Rochon 1998; Jasper 1997). The presumption was that taking measures of how these meanings are distributed in a population gives insight into the cultural fabric. Also, because all social action is preceded by an ideation, knowing how these meanings cluster gives insights into patterns of behaviors, both as explanations of the past and predictions of the future. Values, beliefs, identities, and attitudes, all elements of culture, have commonly been measured this way, with presumptions about their relation to social action.

As Norton in her manifesto of cultural analysis of politics observes (2004: 1–2), this approach is misleading. Culture is not a web of meaning, but a web of meaning making, a subtle distinction that, for her, has profound implications about how research is accomplished. The difference is seeing meaning as autonomous and isolable from its context versus seeing its production as always embedded in social action. The former view is presumed in the traditional approach described above, survey research aggregating individual meanings, or, for that matter, any research program that seeks to measure group values, orientations, ideologies, and organizational frames for action. Norton goes on to offer the notion that culture is better conceived as a matrix in which meaning always occurs in relation to a perspective. “No element of culture, no person, no event, no artifact can be isolated from this [matrix] without impairing our ability to see its significance.” (2004: 2). Rather than Geertz’s metaphor of culture as a web of meaning that covers us (1973: 89), viewing culture as a matrix stresses that the meanings are not as uniform as Geertz would have proposed, because they are embedded in social relations where agency, diversity, and opposition enter in.

A second insight, one that contrasts with ideological and political-values studies so frequently characteristic of past cultural foci, is that the main location of culture is in its performance. This is a view that stresses the collective character of culture, namely, how it is used socially, rather than how it is simply available as an ideation to the individual as a way of imputing meaning. The performative approach is emphasized by several strands of cultural theory, including Goffman’s interactional cynicism (1956), Bauman’s performance-oriented approach to folk-norms (1986); and, in linguistic analysis, Hymes’s and Austin’s pragmatic approaches to speech performance (Hymes 1964; Austin 1962). Swidler’s toolbox metaphor applied to social movements (1995), from which stories, symbols, values, and scripted behaviors are taken from a widely shared cultural stock and used to the movement’s advantage, clearly brings to the foreground the performative perspective. Recently, Alexander has developed a theoretical approach to social and political performances that draws, in part, on a macrosociological influences (Alexander 2006; see also his chapter in this volume). The strategic approach to framing has a strong performance-oriented emphasis. This contrasts with studies that describe frame content and correlate it with other movement variables (Gerhards and

Rucht 1992; Benford 1993; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Rothman and Oliver 2002; Hewitt and McCammon 2005; Kenney 2005; Valocchi 2005).

These first two insights from cultural studies form the baseline for much of the discussion that follows. Social movements are performances. Demonstrations, marches, protests, press conferences, presentations, and violent confrontations can all thought of as performances of collective actors geared to a variety of audiences – the media, authorities, countermovements, and the public. These occur at macro- and meso-levels of analysis, but the micro-level workings of movements also have performative aspects. The internal discussions and debates, planning sessions, conflicts among members, and narrative performances that are characteristic of protest movements all are smaller-scale performances that have their own internal audiences. When the analyst focuses on the actions of these various parties and how they are connected, the theatrical metaphor is not only apt but, more importantly, locates culture where it is actually taking place, in the interaction among participants, firmly grounding culture in its collective enactment.

For that reason, it makes sense to use the Norton's matrix concept in conjunction with a focus on performance. Mario Diani has persuasively argued for the network basis of social movements (Diani 1992, 1997; Della Porta and Diani 2005), that the complex panorama of activists, groups, and organizations can profitably be thought of in terms of network relationships of individual actors with some actors having more ties and therefore greater significance on the overall structure of the movement. A culturalist perspective might add that, while this structural description accurately captures the complex and reticulated relationships in a movement, absent – or merely implied – is the network of oppositional meanings and symbolism that overlays and animates these network relations (Mische 2003). Alberto Melucci (1989, 1996) has similarly stressed both the multiple and overlapping network basis of social movements and their process-oriented, performance-based construction of new meanings. In his view, this captures the essence of movements and social change in the postmodern age of information. To his observations, we might stress that although this complex and diverse web of meaning is created, read, and maintained by network members, there also are inputs from outside observers and oppositional matrices, and other members of the larger cultural matrix. The point is that both structure *and* meaning comprise a social movement, and the meanings are socially produced and affirmed in performances that have a network structure.

As a consequence, it is plausible to consider a protest movement also as a matrix of performances whereby individuals come together and discuss, debate, assert, narrate, and affirm. These gatherings are situations of interaction where meaning is made and remade. I am suggesting a perspective in which social movements have two basic – and familiar – dimensions. First, movements include networks of relations in which some individuals as gatekeepers or opinion leaders have more ties than others. Second, movements have a performative dimension, in which some situations of interaction have more participants than others and/or are more significant in meaning production, perhaps because, besides numbers, they include participants with greater social capital or occur at critical junctures in a movement's trajectory. Thus, a movement is a network structure of actors and a matrix of performances, but if the analyst wants to focus on meaning, the latter is the more appropriate target, especially insofar as it analyzes interactions that actually take place rather than reports on relationship density. The number and character of performance-based interconnections of actors are empirical questions, as is the symbolic content of the interactions, but the ideal-typical structure of a performance-based cultural matrix – greatly simplified for ease of presentation – would look something like Fig. 18.1.

The nodes of the matrix are the settings of the numerous performances where by culture of the movement is produced and affirmed. Note that some individuals may participate in




FIGURE 18.1. A hypothetical and simplified cultural matrix.

performances, but remain outside the social movement culture. These participants bring meaning-making contributions from other cultural matrices, perhaps of other movement groups, parties, or organizations, or from those not affiliated at all with the movement.

A third insight from cultural studies is that all cultures have oppositions. All cultures, writ large or small, contain their own internal critiques in varying degrees. For a national cultural matrix, a social movement – indeed, all movements, all claim making, all grievance articulation – represent inherent oppositions. Even groups and organizations within a social movement have internal resistances, as we see in cliques (where whispers are oppositional) within protest campaigns (in meetings where not everyone is invited) and, ultimately, in organizational schisms. Social movements also help give definition the larger institutional and political networks of society by challenging them and opposing their meanings and symbols. One reason for this is that, if we define culture as a broad matrix of symbols, symbolic performance, and actors, the very act of defining something as meaningful invokes its opposite by placing limits, in a sense defining what it is not (Lévi-Strauss 1963). Whether referring to a fundamental binary oppositions such as raw and cooked or sacred and profane, or more complex ones like Regan Republicans versus latté liberals, pro-life versus pro-choice, or socialism versus capitalism, oppositions are fundamental to culture, to the production of new meanings, and the elaboration of old ones. To define something one way also is an act of drawing boundaries to exclude what it is not.

Research in social movements has for some time recognized that there are free spaces (Polletta 1999), half-way houses (Morris 1984), oppositional subcultures (Johnston and Mueller 2001), and social movement “scenes” (Leach and Haunss 2009) that carve out islands

of freedom and resistance in the dominant society and from which social movements emerge. Billig (1995) and Johnston (2005) have pointed out that the inherent oppositional quality of culture is also apparent at the microsociological level, present in the prevailing discourses and in oppositional speech acts in institutional settings. While contention, dissent, and grievances permeate the dominant cultural matrix, social movements become phenomena of study for social science because they are characterized by a clustering of oppositional performances that are at greater variance and have relatively broader scope than those which, otherwise, are simply everywhere – such that those social actors making deeper critiques come see themselves as members of a “movement,” as do outside observers.

Another reason for culture’s self-opposition is that membership in a cultural community is navigated by individuals who experience and produce meanings that are never complete in comparison to the community’s templates (Norton 2004: 60), and therefore always idiosyncratic in some ways. A culture is always a community of outsiders – in varying degrees. Culture’s self-oppositional quality helps explain new social movements – ecology, animal rights, autonomen and antiracist punk – whereby agents of resistance are created by virtue of alienation from aspects of the dominant culture and through their own self-affirmation. It should not be surprising that some observers note that we live today in a social movement society (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Soule and Earl 2005) in which, by virtue of numerous media outlets and relative freedom of information flow, the fundamental contradictoriness of culture blossoms and becomes institutionalized. Offices of ombudsmen, public relations firms, congressional liaison offices, and professionalized movements all reflect nodes of oppositional performance that are integral parts of the broader cultural matrix. This pervasive contentiousness is nothing new. Past repertoires of contention are the concrete manifestations of a culture’s internal opposition specific to a historical time and place. Charivaris and social banditry were meaningful forms of opposition in preindustrial Europe but not in the modern cultures (Hobsbawm 1959; Tilly 1995).

A fourth insight from cultural studies reveals that a more nuanced and elaborated view of collective identity may be warranted. Under the rubric of the new social movement perspective, researchers have given increased attention to questions of identity – its construction, articulation, and confirmation – as a key theme of many contemporary movements. Numerous research projects have explored aspects of collective identity in both European and North American contexts, its relative emphasis, its “newness,” its social construction, role in mobilization and in movement solidarity.¹ Social psychologists have long recognized that there is a social component to self-identity (Tajfel 1981; Turner 1987), built up through group membership and based on what seems to be fundamental cognitive foundations of in-group versus out-group identification. However insights from cultural studies suggest that identity is more complex than this two-dimensional view of individual identity and collective identity.

First, people all have multiple identities, and because these identities are connected, it means that each one by himself/herself is only partial. Because of this fragmentation, cultural theorists often pose the question of whether it is accurate to speak of a unified, autonomous, individual self at all, a view that challenges the assumption that various identities are ultimately integrated into a consistent self concept. This is an empirical question – a difficult

¹ Collective identity has always been present in social movements, which suggests that the difference in the late twentieth century was the intentionality and relative emphasis on contemporary new social movements. Nevertheless, the literature is large. See, for example, Cohen 1985; Offe 1985; Melucci 1989, 1994, 1995; Johnston et al. 1994; Kriesi et al. 1995).

one at that – and one that lies beyond the scope of this chapter. The key insight for social movement research is that identity is more complex than the schematic of individual and collective identity. The tendency in cultural studies is to render identity increasingly complex in a way that is reminiscent of constructionist approaches to the social self and role theory in the symbolic interactionist tradition. This “complexification of identity” (Hage and Powers 1992) means that there may be different interests corresponding to different identities that motivate actions (Norton 2004: 59), raising the question of hierarchies of identities or the situational activation of them as predicates of behavior.

Second, identities are performed, often in the forms of narratives and self-narratives that give coherence and development to the events in ones lives. These narratives, as well as various other (nonverbal) identity-based behaviors, are performed for audiences who both shape them and confirm them in their reception – a view that intersects with the matrix model of culture. Our identities are specific to certain audiences, or “webs of interlocution” (Taylor 1989: 39). As we change identities we change our audiences. These audiences may occur in institutional settings, which impart a relatively greater degree of consistency to the performances, or they may occur in less structured collective settings. Either way, every identity, because it is performed, is by definition collective in some degree. This poses another challenge to the individual-collective bifurcation of identity common in social movement analysis, whereby the subject, namely, one’s collective identity as a woman, as a black, as an animal rights activist is pegged to activism. Because all identities are collective, they are all cultural, and part of the matrix of performance. There is a synergy between the performance of cultural meanings and the performances of who you are that probably resides in cognitive processes that we are just beginning to understand (DiMaggio 1997, 2002). Cognitive research suggests that different identities may be organized by separate domains linked by a self-schema that, research suggests, gives rise to emotional responses when activated.

The complexity of identity is another reason that all cultures have an inherently self-oppositional quality, namely, that the integration of individual members is never complete regarding any particular identity, and especially those associated with institutional settings. Regarding social movements, the multiplicity of identities provides resources for strategic innovation and institutional challenge. A well-known approach to strategic innovation is Lévi-Strauss’s idea of bricolage (1966), which is the work done by the French jack-of-all-trades handyman, the *bricoleur*. He is a workman, a tool user, but also an innovator in that he uses what’s available to him to make a repair. The demands of the moment drive creativity to make the best use of the tools and materials at hand. As we encounter situations that are new and unique and for which we do not have reliable cultural templates for action, we seize hold of other tools from other identity domains. Referring to Swidler’s toolbox metaphor, the multiplicity of identities means that there are a lot more tools available that we might recognize at any one time. Also, complex identities mean that new perspectives and innovation may spontaneously enter performances, absent of problem-solving challenges. From a culturalist perspective, rather than the constraining view of cultural ritual, innovation and creativity are inherent in culture as well, partly for the same reasons, namely, they reside in identity performance. In a cognitive sense, mental templates for action from other roles can be applied creatively outside those roles, with slight variations, should the need arise. In doing so, the actor has sown the seeds of cultural change, small seeds perhaps, but if they germinate others may acquire the practice or understanding and confirm its new application.

Thus, islands of independence and creativity exist, no matter how large the landmass of the collective belonging may be. This is obviously true in diverse and complex national cultures like the U.S., Canada, or the UK, but equally true in the minority-national cultures

such the performance of Tibetan identities in a Chinese state, or in social movements themselves, say, the ideoculture of the Black Bloc within the global justice movement. Also, social actors use the raw materials of dominant identity performances in creative ways. Sometimes activists take advantage of official gatherings, such as parades and commemorations, to stage counterdemonstrations. During the Solidarity period, Poland's Orange Alternative, a group dedicated to staging parodies of official culture to protest the communist government, used an anniversary celebration of the Civic Militia to perform a Soviet-style culture jamming. They carried signs and shouted, "Long live the military" and "Democracy is Anarchy," and "Youth is with the Party." Similarly on anniversaries of the October revolution, they marched in the streets, shouting "Lenin is with us" and "We love the police." Risks are minimized by offering up ritualistic performances but standing within alternative identities that are recognized by the other participants and by segments of the audience – both the public and the secret police. In other cases, activists may seize entire organizations and turn them to their own purposes, such as outing clubs during the Francoist period in Catalonia; or folklore clubs in the Baltic republics under the Soviet Union (Johnston 2006). Creativity mitigates risks typically associated with oppositional activities by taking them into locales not suspected by the regime. Such seizures of officially sanctioned groups and events are common weapons in the protest repositories against repressive regimes. They demonstrate a creativity reminiscent of Scott's analysis (1990) of peasant and slave resistance to their overlords, resistance that is unobtrusive yet innovative and which becomes part of the lore of collective identity.

DISCOURSE, NARRATIVES, AND TEXT

As part of the linguistic turn in the social sciences, the use of texts as data increased as a way to empirically ground cultural analyses, but the turn was slow to course its way to the study of protest movements. Among the early research, Wuthnow (1989) looked at the texts of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European socialism to trace the broad contours of discursive communities. Johnston (1991), in contrast, took a microscopic approach by analyzing from linguistically informed perspectives connected discourse from respondents as well as movement documents. In both cases, the methodology was to focus on representative texts, such as Luther's writings for the Reformation, widely distributed calls to protest, or commonly heard statements from activists. Using a different theoretical approach Steinberg expanded a discursive focus into dialogic analysis, but he continued a focus on documents that captured key movement issues, for example, his close analysis of the Wages Protection Act (1999: 114–117). For the analyst, discourse overlaps with a group's culture in that it is probably the main representation of culture available for study.

In application, the concept of discourse is conceptually close to the matrices of cultural performance discussed earlier. In theory, a group's discourse is the whole of its verbal production, in practice it is usually represented by concrete texts produced discrete points in a movement's trajectory. In its most general sense, discourse represents the communicative repertoire of a social group and symbolic space and structure of that repertoire. In social movements, it is common that oppositional discourse draws upon the conflicts, struggles, and political cleavages of the broader social and cultural environment, and articulates these elements to make the transformative power of the ideas both challenging and familiar. Discourse also contributes significantly to a group's collective identity by proposing "fundamental opposition of binary concepts" (Wuthnow 1989: 13) and establishing boundaries between a social group and other groups. It is plausible that all aspects of collective identity are or have been part of that group's discourse.

Also paralleling our discussion of how cultural matrices occur and overlap with other matrices, discursive analysts often use the plural form, *discourses*, to emphasize that what is being discussed and acted upon is never unanimous, but often challenged and negated by opposing groups. Contemporary discourse analysis often stresses the emergent and agentic character of textual production, variably called the discursive/rhetorical approach (Billig 1992, 1995), the rhetorical turn (Simon 1990), or the dialogic perspective (Steinberg 1999), in which all meaning is context-specific, multi-faceted, ever-evolving, contested.

Discourse analysis originated in the field of linguistics in response to what was perceived an overemphasis on grammatical analysis at the level of the sentence. Harris (1952) was among the first to recognize a great deal of meaning was conveyed at the levels beyond the sentence, making it necessary to consider nearby text in order to grasp fully how meaning is produced. The argument was that broader speech episodes in which themes and ideas were fully developed and brought to closure contained information that was critical to full interpretation. Since then, the basic principle that the holistic text is the proper unit of analysis has been embraced by historians, literary theorists, and social and political scientists of the “discursive turn” (or narrative turn, see, e.g., Somers 1992), and extended to include contextual factors residing in the social conditions of textual production. This brand of “macro” discourse analysis (as opposed to the micro-focus of linguistic discourse analysis, Johnston 1995) concentrates on the global meaning of texts, on their interpretation, and deconstruction according to social factors such as status, politics, and economic interests.

To study cultural influences on social movements, one must grapple with their discourses as they are textually represented. In practical terms, this refers to pamphlets, manifestos, minutes or recollections of meetings and strategy sessions, slogans, speeches, media coverage, public statements of leaders, actions of political demonstrators, in other words, the written and spoken production of a movement, plus the behavioral repertoires, which some analysts assert can be read as text. For the social movement researcher, common data sources are organizational documents and newspaper articles, but can also include the spoken words of social movement participants, leaders, opponents, and bystanders, which are audio-recorded, transcribed, and intensively analyzed. Some of these may be the narratives of social movement, a more bounded methodological concept that is subsumed by the more general term of discourse. As Francesca Polletta’s describes (2006), narratives are commonly about biographical elements of self-understanding, group affiliation, and identity formation. They typically give explanations of choices and behaviors, such as why a person joined a movement, or left a movement. Plumbing a movement’s discourse and sounding its members’ narratives are important research strategies to examine its culture.

Applied to social movements, there are different levels of discourse. The broadest are world-historical discourses (or *mentalités*) of the Reformation, Enlightenment, Islamism, neoliberalism, that span national and transnational levels. These are expansive ideologies that are particularly important when considering influences of change-oriented movements, and are often related to more movement-specific discourses, such as gay rights, liberation theology, or ecology. A common strategy to analyze these discourses is to focus on texts that are representative, such as documents that are widely recognized as seminal or definitive of a movement – the Port Huron statement, for example, as a text for the U.S. student movement, or Luther’s *Invocavit* sermon of 1522 for the Reformation (see Wuthnow 1989).

At a more specific level is the discourse of a social movement organization (SMO). When a movement is structured according to different SMOs, their textual production forms part of the polyphonous voice of a movement’s discourse. The producers of organizational discourse are its activists, committees, and functionaries at various levels of the SMO.

It is common that the discourse produced by intellectuals and movement leaders is taken as representative of organizational discourse. Rochon (1998) points out that this level often reflects discursive elements that resonate among the larger populace, akin to processes of frame alignment and frame bridging. Demonstrating this nesting phenomenon, that subordinate levels draw upon and reflect the essential elements of broader discourses, is a common research goal of in discourse studies.

At the most micro level, the researcher analyzes the individual production of text and speech by participants and activists. This focus is in line with traditional linguistic discourse analysis or narrative analysis (see the following section). It seeks to explain what is said by expanding the analysis to broader textual units such as the speech episode for spoken language and the complete text for written language. Both are defined by the development and resolution of themes, and by their own internal structures.

The relevant point for our purposes is that there is a relationship between the individual level of discourse and the more general levels because individuals usually produce texts. Even when a group of activists take part in crafting a statement or manifesto, the individual contributions are crucial. Key texts are partly shaped by writers' biographical context, the roles one occupies within the organization, and individual goals that may vary from organizational goals. Accurate interpretation of organizational or world-historical texts may require micro-data about the writer/speaker, as in Miethe's research (2009) that looks at the Goffman's notion of primary frameworks, the deeper biographical elements of a frame. But there are other kinds of micro data that are necessary to understand the relation between discourse and social movements.

Narratives

Texts, narratives, and stories, when recorded, become material artifacts of discourses and the means by which the analyst can plumb the meanings of cultural performances, but a focus on texts alone may tend to freeze and reify culture by failing to capture its creativity and ongoing praxis – in historical context, in interaction, and in performance. There has been a great deal of contemporary interest in narratives, stories, and their structures, but until the last decade, most has not been relevant to the study of protest movements. Gary Fine (1995, 2001, 2009) and Francesca Polletta (1998a, b, 2006, 2009) have been instrumental in showing how narratives play a role in movement politics.

In tracing analytical interests in the narrative, the scientific task began with the basics, namely, cataloging the forms and permutations found in nature (culture), propelled by linguists' search for fundamental narrative structures. We know that narratives are recapitulations of past experiences and events (Labov 1972: 359), given a temporal order (Ricoeur 1981: 52), in which a change of conditions is essential (Barthes 1977: 94) – these elements comprise the basic template. Narratives are reports of sequential and emplotted events, often of a conflictual or dilemmatic nature. Beyond this, we know that sequencing occurs according to certain principles of story grammar that provide a global schematic form (Abbot 1995), in some narratives there seems to be a typology of actors; and that there is a substructure to narratives that can be analyzed according to functions (Labov 1972: 370). Events are presented teleologically in that a narrative ending clarifies its sequencing and selection of events. Up until that point, understanding is tentative without the story's ending (White 1981). Successful narratives presume a degree of identification between the teller and the audience, and their moral point assumes shared normative orientations, as Klimova (2009) has shown in

her research on Russian protests. Also, they build upon presuppositions held by the audience that allows the teller to lead them to intended conclusions. These structural and functional elements of narratives may help the social movement analysis determine what makes a compelling story, but formal structure alone does not capture the performative aspects of narratives – on the part of both the speaker and hearer.

An important insight that has developed from the literary analysis of stories is the narrativity of the audience. Benford and Snow (2002) points out that ambiguity is often present in what he calls the “controlling myths” of social movements, stories that attract participants and maintain solidarity. Not only do these stories accommodate ambiguity to cast a wide net of adherence, but also ambiguity allows members to construct their own interpretations, in effect, making them participants in the narrative too. Narrativity refers to the ways that the audience is allowed to make connections that are left out of the story’s telling, allowing space for the hearers participation and creativity (Leitch 1986). Polletta (2009) draws on these insights in her analysis of stories in the battered women’s groups. She shows how the narrator creates a tension at the story’s climax created by a gap in the reasoning that the auditors of the story must fill. This gap requires that those hearing the story make the meaningful connections themselves, which, as narrativity theory holds, is central to what makes a good tale. In one instance, Polletta describes a narrator who had been in an abusive relationship and contemplated suicide. Her story tells of a beating at the hands of her boyfriend, and at a climactic point, “choosing life instead of death,” which, in this tale, led to her seizing a knife and attacking him. While the story itself is dramatic, the central tension comes from how her critical decision is simply offered up without explanation or analysis, necessitating that the auditor make the connections, in a sense, making the story by his or her own. Such narrative tropes allow listeners to cognitively appropriate the story in ways we don’t yet fully understand, but which seems to ride on their own agentic imputation of meaning. Without the creativity of the listener, what we are often left with is a boring moral lecture, which rarely motivates people to action. Or, if given too much information, it becomes obvious where the story is headed and listeners feel manipulated.

Also regarding social movements, I suggest that the audience’s narrativity allows them to engage in “cognitive praxis,” a consciousness raising function that is essential for mobilization at all levels of risk (McAdam 1982). By describing a situation that allows the audience to see things differently, breaking the old cultural templates of quiescence and making new connections, we have what has variously been called persuasion, resonance, diagnostic framing, conversion, and so on, with the end result being new participants coming to a movement or a protest campaign. The key insight is that the resonance can be in the telling, not only in the novelty of the idea itself. In a Goffmanesque fashion, the verbal performance – the way it creates tension and ambiguity – of the narrator’s epiphany counts as much as the epiphany itself. This is partly why textual analysis is important for the study of social movements. Texts are how new social change possibilities are communicated, but the effective communication – that is, to bring about consciousness raising or new collective action frames – must function according to various cultural rules of narrative structure and the use of metonymy, synecdoche, simile, and metaphor to bring the listener into meaning production. This is an element of persuasion that has been overlooked, for the most part, in the framing approach to participation. To the new student of culture, I would emphasize that these are more than just obscure terms. They have clear rhetorical functions important for protest mobilization by increasing the communicative power of an idea.

It would be incorrect to completely emphasize style over substance. I would suggest that some tales are so compelling that even a bad storyteller would probably be able to get

people's attention with it, say, the nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island or a loss of a child to a drunk driver. A gap is built into the sequence of events, derived from basic but unanswered why questions: Why did this happen? Who is responsible? Where is fairness in the world? Conversely, it is plausible that some tales are so bad that not even the best storyteller could engage an audience for long, much less encourage them to action with it ("That's all there is?"). To mobilize participants to action, you need both, the style and the substance. From linguistic research and literary criticism, a lot is known about how effective narratives are structured, perspectives changed, and rhetorical devices employed, and the use of these devices can enhance the effectiveness of narratives (Polletta 2006). But also the creative application of other identities and scripts from other cultural matrices, brought into the narrative by the storyteller, and combined in novel ways to give new insights, can also open eyes and minds of audiences where previously understanding had been blocked or limited. We should not limit our analysis of narratives to the structuring of good stories and plots, but include the creative reworking of the story itself to give new and compelling substance. There are both substantive and stylistic sides to narrative performances.

Culture as Text

There is strong empirical evidence that social action can be understood as text performed by social actors (Alexander and Mast 2006: 15). Research in a variety of settings has shown an interconnectedness and consistency in social action and how the connective tissue of symbolic action is a widely shared, background cultural text. Regarding social movements and protest campaigns, this means that the actions, artifacts, and shared understandings of members, while variable, are nevertheless interconnected. But specifically, why use the term, *text*? Why not simply refer to broadly shared and interrelated web of a movement's symbols and leave it at that?

There are several different answers to this question, ranging from superficial influences of academic fashion, to the linguistic and literary roots of cultural analysis, to more profound answers about cognitive processes and human consciousness. Empirically, cultures' textual quality refers to how people's actions – their everyday behaviors, what they say, what they wear, the purchases they make – are thoroughly symbolic in the dual sense that they are both performed by actors and "read" by audiences. It also refers to how this composition and reading are shaped by widely shared symbols, as in the lexicon of a language. I would also add that, like a language, there are understood rules about the combination of symbols, as in the application of grammatical rules to produce speech. Commonly, when a person buys a Hummer or a Mercedes S550 they are making a symbolic statement about who they are. Here, the symbolism is related to self-identity, but the understanding is thoroughly culturally embedded and culturally confirmed. It may be countered that not everyone who buys Hummer is projecting the same self-image or even intending to do so. These are empirical questions: perhaps, it is a purchase to protect one's family or to facilitate visiting off-road job sites, in which case the fact that it's tax-deductible enters into the decision. But while the meaning, instrumental and economic constraints, and intentionality of the representation may vary by actors, those who read symbolically will also have variable interpretations, but within limits as attributions are made by shared background understandings (Ricoeur 1979: 73–74), which at least confirm its symbolism to them, and makes owning a Hummer a cultural fact embedded in the interaction rather than in the psychological sense of self-image or instrumentality of the purchaser. Thus, like the narrativity of stories, the intentional use of the symbol is only part of the cultural

equation, the active imputation of meaning by the audience being the other part, as are the actions that their interpretations then may engender.

Norton (2004: 22–23) observes, “reading culture as a text is? what each of us does every day in order to live in the world.” We are active participants in the production of this symbolic language, as are those who read it, and we live in a dense and interconnected matrix of meaning. Like verbal and textual production, we create new meanings by putting symbols together in novel ways. And to further develop the metaphor, we use the symbols of the community we are born into, as portrayed by marketers, media, regional tastes and fashions, and so on. The clothes we wear, our piercings, body art, and cars we drive (or don’t drive) comprise the symbolic language we use; but these clothes are bought off the rack, and the body art is often replicated from magazines on television, and our automobiles are made by global corporations. As Wittgenstein (1953) observes regarding spoken words, we are all players in this language game from which we can’t escape. The same holds true for the symbolic language of everyday, popular culture. We are born into it and our performances either actively sustain and create it or are the objects whereby others do so.

Written and spoken texts are not random assemblages of symbols, but are structured according to grammatical rules for sentences, and story grammars for narratives. Moreover, the imputation of grammatical structure seems to be a fundamental human and cognitive attribute. This suggests that there may be some kind of rule-governed pattern – a grammar – that specifies how cultural texts are put together or used, a plausible hypothesis given that language lies at the foundation of all human groups and their actions. Language makes cultural transmission possible and lies at the heart of being human, just as does culture. Language is not only the medium of culture, but is also how aspects of our identities are organized – in great part by thinking about them and speaking about them – to ourselves and to others. Regarding social movements and protest, collective actions are plotted linguistically as activists discuss and debate ideas and courses of action, ideologies are articulated, frames negotiated and strategized. Reading these activities as text raises the possibility that they have an underlying structure that can inform the analyst’s approach to these behaviors. At a very general level, that there is a pattern to cultural concepts is not a new idea. The opposition of binary concepts – hot and cold, raw and cooked, sacred and profane – guided Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism, was one approach. But these fundamental structural patterns are static. Grammars, in addition to being fixed structures that, when given textual form, can be analyzed by function and position, also are possibilities yet to be realized because they specify ways that symbols can be put together in novel and creative ways to produce new meanings. This is central to the analysis of protest movements because, on the one hand, their *raison d’être* is all about criticizing existing structures and proposing new possibilities, and, on the other, the need for strategic flexibility in the face of changing political opportunities is fundamental.

Chomsky’s transformational grammar revolutionized linguistics by showing how deep grammatical structures guide the formation of ideas in sentential form. Probably because biologically based cognitive processes limit what is an acceptable human language, there are only so many ways that sentences can be formed – a finite number of ways to express an idea. These principles hold when we notch up the level of analysis to look at connected discourse. The analysis of narratives shows that, here too, there are fundamental story grammars that impose structure to the performance of verbal accounts, as we discussed earlier in the section on narratives. Again – probably too structured by cognitive processes – there are so many ways in which a successful narrative can occur. Shifting to an even more general analytical level, the level of interaction, structure may be harder to see, but, as Goffman has shown, grammatical principles – although he does not use the term – in the sense of patterned recurrences such as “cooling out” and “deference” seem to be functioning to shape how interaction occurs.

Concerning social movements, we have to broaden our perspective yet another step. It is plausible that group, organizational, and institutional performances are guided by fundamental grammars that are played out differently according to varying contextual elements of the event. These deep grammars – cultural logics, so to speak – operate among actors in given contexts, and evince a flexibility in how they are acted out as the contexts change, but nevertheless providing guiding principles for action. In this way, they function much like the deep structure of a language grammar, guiding how one actor verbalizes ideas according to basic rules that are held commonly with other actors, yet evincing a flexibility in putting together meanings. To put it differently, the notion of a deep grammar for a protest campaign means that it can only be structured in certain ways because of the “grammatical” constraints on how the main mobilizing symbols are invoked. Its cultural text has a deep structure that, like sentences and narratives, can be transformed in patterned ways according to historical, institutional, and/or situational contexts where other influences such as power and available resources, external threats, and so on, come into play, activating some transformations and limiting others. This is what a grammar does: it enables symbolic expression, but not any which way.²

Related to the notion of a grammar of protest actions, Roberto Franzosi has proposed analyzing protest events by their “story grammars” (1999, 2004). His idea is based on the fact that all action, at its most fundamental level, follows a simple grammatical structure comprised of <subject><action><object> and a variety of modifiers attached to each of these three components. The modifiers would be type, number, structure, or character for the <subject> and the <object>, and time, space, or type for the <action>. Franzosi conducted content analysis of newspaper accounts of collective action in Italy and coded them according to elementary three-branched structures, which he called a “semantic triplet.” He proposes a method of coding protest events based on the subject-verb-object triplets, thereby keeping the coding close to “the inherent properties of the text itself” (Franzosi 1999: 133). A basic grammar for any given protest campaign might be said to be represented by the more frequent triplets, in which “subjects are related to their actions, actors and actions to their modifiers, and subjects and objects (both social actors) related on one another via their actions” (ibid.). The modifiers of each component represent the more superficial and contextual elements of the actions, at the base of which lies the basic grammar, the motor source of collective action.

Franzosi’s method is an innovative way to analyze newspaper data to capture the basic structures of action, with the goal of moving “from words to numbers,” as he says. Although among his destinations are regression models and factor analysis, it is a method that also is thoroughly cultural in the sense that, by reducing a movement’s repertoire of actions to basic subject-verb-object relations, he too is identifying a movement’s basic grammars. The logic of Franzosi’s analysis, based as it is on frequency – a notion not often found in cultural analysis – a way to capture the dominant patterns of action whereby a protest culture is created. In my own research on the use of Islam in the Chechen–Russian conflict (Johnston 2009) and Palestinian–Israeli conflicts (Johnston and Alimi 2008), I have approached the deep grammar of a social movement by relying on various sources: historical texts, newspapers, literature, and area studies. In Chechnya, a deeply historical grammar could be identified in the form of the semantic

²There are parallels between the idea of a transformational grammar of action and Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*, a general system of individual predispositions, acquired through lived experience, that give a “feel for the game” of social life a second-nature quality. Like a basic grammar, *habitus* is not determining of social action in the strong sense, but rather an enabling factor upon which the actor draws to operate in daily life. Bourdieu also speaks of class *habitus* as the products of shared history and social conditions. This is internalized shared dispositions that make individual dispositions “structural variants” of broad social processes – the “present past” (Bourdieu 1990: 58).

triplet <Chechen nation><jihad><Russians>, that is, shared definitions of the Chechen people waging Islamic-based holy war against Russians, who are defined in binary opposition as non-Chechen, nonbelieving infidels, and oppressors of the Chechen people. While present, the basic grammar remained during glasnost perestroika in the late 1980s because of constraints in political context, but when there was the threat of Russian invasion in 1991, it immediately appeared. During Chechnya's de facto independence <jihad> was not a relevant verb of action because conflict with the Russians receded, which meant that Islam became the focus of contention between political factions rather than a unifying symbol against the Russians. Here too, the basic grammar was transformed according to changing political context, both constraining and enabling forms of contention. Later, when the Russians invaded in 1994, <jihad> was again invoked, but this time, the verb phrase was modified by global jihad influences, especially financial, material, and manpower resources flowing into the region from the Middle East and Afghanistan (see Johnston 2008).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented three basic perspectives on culture that are relevant to the study of protest movements: (1) culture can be thought of as a complex matrix of performances whereby social actors gather to produce meaning; (2) cultural analysis is strongly tied to the notion of texts. Because culture is mostly performed through verbal behaviors, texts are the primary methodological point of entry to meaning and meaning production. Beyond spoken and written texts, some cultural analysts also suggest that complex behaviors can be read as texts, insofar as actions have meanings and are structured in patterned ways. (3) I have elaborated this metaphor by suggesting that deep cultural patterns are like the transformational grammars, guiding behaviors according to a basic semantic structure, but played out as contentious politics in ways shaped by immediate political-contextual influences.

There are three ways of thinking about these elements of cultural analysis as they apply to protest mobilization. First, because they are embodied in all forms of social action, they can function as methodological principles to guide the analyst about where to look, namely at the unfolding of interaction among the various social actors in an episode of contention – the matrix of performances. Second, they guide us as to what to take as data, namely the textual production of protesters, countermovement players, and the state – their narratives. Third, protest episodes as objects of study become reframed. According to McAdam et al. (2001: 132), they are no longer simple reflections of shared interests and claims within a polity, but rather “clusters of previously connected persons among whom have circulated widely accepted stories concerning their strategic situation.” The authors continue by observing that these narratives are the media that describe the well known content of the protest studies field: “opportunities, threats, available means of action, likely consequences of those actions, evaluations of those consequences, capacities to act, memories of previous contention, and inventories of other likely parties to any action” (ibid.: 132). Moreover, these standard elements of protest mobilization are not created anew with each episode, but draw upon familiar scripts and routines embedded in their basic grammars. McAdam et al. continue:

Performances within repertoires do not usually follow precise scripts to the letter, they resemble conversation in conforming to implicit interaction rules [or grammars–HJ] but engaging in incessant improvisation on the part of all participants. (2001: 138)

Commonly, cultural perspectives have been seen as opposed to structuralist-instrumentalist perspectives that have predominated in the protest studies field. This may have as much to do with the culture of academic production as with how theories refocus the ways that we see the world. Yet, I have tried to show that the study of social and protest movements can take insights from culturalist perspectives that can help approximate more accurate models of social action. In fact, McAdam et al.'s (2001) enterprise to reassess the field's subject matter (to episodes of contention) and orientation (to relational dynamics among actors) suggests a much greater role for the cultural and interpretative influences elaborated here. In the past, the field of protest studies has faced methodological barriers in melding ways of analyzing cultural complexity with the parsimony of explaining action based on measurements of power, interests, and resources. Although this may be changing, I would like to close by suggesting two reasons why, this is perhaps a false opposition.

First, descriptions can lead to explanations. To take one example, Polletta's work on narratives and story telling (2006) identifies ways that stories are powerful in terms of convincing people, moving them, raising emotions, in other words, elements of mobilizing participants to action. There is a growing body of cultural research that identifies processes in social movements – the use of speech acts (Johnston 2005; Klimova 2009), metaphors (Ignatow 2009), success narratives (Meyer 2009) and deep grammars (Johnston 2008, 2009) – that point to directions whereby mobilization success and identity shift can be explained, not just described.

Second, cultural factors can be treated as variables. Although the elements of culture are different from more easily quantifiable measures such as fund raising, size of collective action events, or police presence, they still can be grouped, counted, and their influence analyzed. For example, work on framing strategies of the woman suffrage (Hewitt and McCammon 2005) shows how framing categories can be devised from the analysis of organizational texts and then tested for their effects on movement participation. Gerhards and Rucht (1992) have categorized frames according to interrelatedness and scope and show how they better mobilize participants. Several studies have shown the importance of frame consistency and resonance with the dominant culture for mobilization success (Williams 1995; Diani 1996; Williams and Kubal 1999). The coding of newspaper reports, movement documents, and archival records that go into these reports is surely cultural work, but if the categories stand the tests of coder reliability and if they make sense to peers and to informed observers that they are constructed categories does not undermine their reliability as meaningful descriptors of the social world.

While some cultural theorists emphasize that it is by our own symbolic actions we parse this world into meaningful categories, it should not be overlooked that our coming to terms with the world is not free-form, but rather is guided by (1) characteristics of the way the empirical world actually is: a chair is not a table, but it is perceptually closer to a table than, say, an automobile; and (2) by cognitive processes shared by mostly everyone that impose structure onto the world because of how the human brain works. The point is that the analytical categories of cultural analysis, while social constructions, are not arbitrary but rather guided by how we as human beings put together a world that, at some levels, we all share. Thus, even though culture is everywhere and the production of meaning is a continuous collective accomplishment, it can be parsed it into categories that both make sense and allow us to analyze the role of cultural factors. Our methodological decisions are also and practical ones. Everyday, we parse the flow of experience into categories thought to be relevant to others in order to exchange information about our worlds. Social scientists are compelled to do the same, that is, if anyone outside our own culture is going to listen.

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CHAPTER 19

Religion and Post-secular Politics

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A comprehensive review of recent work in the social sciences on politics *and* religion would be a herculean task and possibly of limited utility. To begin with, the meaning of the two terms is hotly contested. Across the literature, the analytical specification of these social spheres varies. What counts for religion includes multiple and varying value systems and what counts for politics includes widely different principles of power and influence. Compounding this complexity, empirical accounts of politics and religion present a bewildering array of particular concretions of these varied value systems and differing power principles. Adding another level of difficulty for reviewers, research into the intersection between religion and politics gained new popularity over the past few decades without clearing this analytical muddle. For much of the twentieth century, secularization theory dampened interest and research in the relationship between religion and politics, but this has all changed. First after 1979, then again after 1989, and September 11, 2001, the social sciences pulsed with new productivity addressing this intersection of social spheres. In short, as reviewers, we face an explosion of new work in a subfield with fuzzy lines of demarcation.

Not too long ago the lines demarcating religion and politics and the nature of the relationship between these spheres seemed very clear to most social scientists. Religion was withdrawing from public institutions into a private realm of personal faith. Political institutions were increasingly freed from religious authority. They were already or fast becoming secularized. These changes seemed progressive and ineluctable. Over the past three decades of stepped-up interest in religion and politics, however, many scholars have argued that given the facts on the ground, this kind of secularization theory ought to be junked now (see e.g., Stark and Iannaccone 1994). From their perspective, the self-evident persistence or resurgence of religion (and its political consequences) has falsified the theory. Still others have argued for the theory's continued utility, most especially in thinking through the relationship between religion and politics (see e.g., Chaves 1994; Gorski 2000). In our review, we mostly follow the latter view. Once the many aspects of secularization are specified and naive modernization assumptions discarded, the theory remains useful in explaining the intersection of religion and politics – even post 1979 (or 1989 or 2001).

Secularization, understood as the differentiation of religious and temporal institutional authority, is a not myth but a real historical process or set of processes, processes characteristic of modernity. “Equally, though,” as Craig Calhoun notes, the modern “attempt to make an overly sharp division between religion and public reason provides important impetus to the development of alternative or counterpublic spheres as well as less public and less reasoned

forms of resistance to a political order that seeks to hold religion at arm's length" (Calhoun 2005). Since 1979, it has become clear that we are living with the consequences of that blowback in many places around the globe.

In what follows, we review some of the more prominent consequences and implications of this unanticipated phenomenon and discuss their general significance. In the main sections of this chapter, we discuss a range of recent empirical works that speak directly to these complex interactions between the "sacred" and the "secular." We are guided by rough criteria that direct attention to instances in which religious changes or political events have mixed in unexpected, historically consequential, or theoretically significant ways. The review betrays our particular research interests as Americanists, but it also includes a selective discussion of recent research of times and places far removed from the United States. We look at cases with varying dynamics: cases where religion and politics interact in a tinder box, cases where religious publics interact with secular publics stabilizing civil and political institutions, and cases in between these limits. In short, we sample on the peril, the promise, and the prosaic of this resurgence.

We argue that the current intersection between religion and politics suggests a "post-secular" contemporary moment. To grasp the political and religious significance of this moment, social scientists must investigate the new dynamic between the ultimate values of secular and sacred frameworks. The outcomes of this dynamic are far from certain. What is certain is that our future neither holds a politics without religion as once predicted by social scientists nor a return to undifferentiated religious and political authority. But, between these two limits open up many possibilities including cold or hot war between secularizers and sacralizers; oppression by one side and resistance or resentful retreat by the other; and more hopefully an array of creative accommodations, negotiations, and transformations by both politics and religion.

Much of the contemporary political resurgence of religion occurs in interaction with historically new secular-political contexts and value systems. The shape this religious interaction takes in different societies, and even within societies, varies in large part according to the forms of secularization it confronts. To make some sense of this variation, we lift from Niebuhr five possible modes of religious reaction or interaction with processes of secularization: religion *in paradox* with the secular, religion *above* the secular, religion as *transformer* of the secular, religion *in or of* the secular, and religion *against* the secular (Niebuhr 1956). The cases reviewed here – evangelicals in the United States, Islam in the Middle East, Liberation Theology in Latin America, and global Pentecostalism – illuminate these analytical relationships in real, sociohistorical arrangements. A table summarizing these relationships and the empirical examples is provided below:

Niebuhr category	Religious response to secularization	Empirical cases
Religion and the secular in paradox	Creative tension	Evangelicals in the United States
Religion above the secular	Rejection	Islamism in the Middle East
Religion transformer of the secular	Transvaluation	Liberation theology
Religion in/of the secular	Accommodation	Latin American politics since 1980
Religion against the secular	Retreat	Global pentecostalism

From this relational view, the new religious political challenges are not a simple return of the repressed. In an important sense, after secularization, a return to "naïve" religion is not possible. Religious resurgence around the globe presents political challenges that must be understood in new contexts: the institutional contexts of differentiated authority, the new value conditions for religious belief, and the mode of religious interaction with these.

SECULARIZATION AS A CENTRAL MECHANISM IN RELIGIO-POLITICS

Although it sounds increasingly defensive to make this claim, theories of secularization have from the beginning been mainly about modern transformations of religion or changes in religion's scope and reach in society and not about religious decline per se. It is manifestly not the case that the religious traditions of Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism are disappearing, but their relationships with political institutions have changed, and in many societies dramatically so. These great sacral traditions continue to thrive and grow and that this religious flourishing holds great political significance is now scarcely doubted. But, exactly how they mix with politics is still very much a puzzle.

If today we are in some sense post-secular, as we argue, it is not because secularization did not happen, but because something subsequent and historic *has* happened. Revisiting theories of secularization helps make sense of this subsequent religious and political change. Much of the political resurgence of religion chronicled in the research we review in this chapter is first grasped at by its authors through some variety of secularization theory. As we aim to show, the general significance of this research may be better handled with a post-secular frame that does not junk secularization theories but builds on and beyond them.

Equating secularization theories with a theory of religious decline is a mistake. (Gorski 2000). Only some secularization theorists argue for the historical decline of religion (Tschannen 1991). Casanova (1994) usefully distinguishes among three “uneven and unintegrated” propositions within secularization theories: “secularization as *differentiation* of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as *decline* of religious belief and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a *privatized* sphere” (p.211). The second of these, according to Casanova, may be indefensible, but the first and the third propositions provide a framework for making sense of the contemporary political resurgence of religion as interactions with varying forms of secularization.

We begin with the first proposition as specified by Casanova – a claim that is as much political sociology as it is sociology of religion. Most secularization theories hold in common, a thesis of institutional differentiation (Gorski 2000; Tschannen 1991; Smith 2003; Casanova 1994; Chavez 1994; Young and Cherry 2005). From this common analytical angle, the central question is the impact of social differentiation on religious structures of authority. As Dobbelaere (1981: 31) argued decades ago, “secularization is basically a consequence of a differentiation process that results in a process of specialization of substructures.” In a classic formulation, Berger (1967: 39) argued that processes of differentiation freed “the norms of the various institutional areas from the influence of the originally superordinated ‘religious’ values.” The historical sociologies of Weber and Habermas, bookends of the twentieth-century grand theorizing of modern transformations, contrast “traditional” undifferentiated societies with modern societies structured around multiple institutions with autonomous purposes and logics (Weber 1946; Habermas 1987).

For secularization theorists, the differentiation thesis typically focuses on the institutional separation of political and religious structures of authority. In the familiar sweeping historical perspective, the idealized narrative flows through a series of abstract stages: from an undifferentiated state of kin-based authority, to a loose symbiosis between church and state during the Middle Ages, and to complete separation in the modern era (see e.g., Bruce 1996). As Smith (2003) argues, these theories of secularization and their use of differentiation as a central mechanism are overly abstract and completely lacking in human agency. The institutional separation of religious and political authority in societies around the

globe can and did take widely different paths, and these different paths help explain the religious politics we see today.

New research, focused on this first proposition of secularization as specified by Casanova, has altered our understanding of religious change with insights about power from political sociology. Secularization seen as a power struggle – either as a kind of social revolution (Smith 2003) or as elite contentious politics (Chaves 1994) – illuminates our understanding of both political and religious change. These studies view secularization as an outcome of conflict between discrete actors with divided interests over the public role of religion. Their findings are revealing. They show that secularization processes are real and where they take hold it is because activists fighting to expel religion from public institutions succeed. But these studies largely ignore immanent religious processes, and more generally, the significance of the third proposition in secularization theory as specified by Casanova. In a move to distance themselves from the secularization thesis of the decline of religious values and practices (Casanova's second proposition), some social scientists now avoid the historically and theoretically thorny issue of longer-term religious changes in meanings and values and their political consequences. This risks missing the changing symbolic force of religion and its political consequences (Young and Cherry 2005).

Casanova argues that modern transformations involved not just institutional differentiation of authority but marginalization and, more importantly, privatization of religion. These changes altered significantly the social meaning and value of religion. They did not affect a simple decline or diminishment of the significance of religion but transvaluations. Moreover, value changes central to modern transformations developed as processes immanent to religion, even as they went beyond religion, transforming or overcoming it (Blumenberg 1983). In many instances and places, the changing significance of religion was pushed intentionally and unintentionally by religious activists and authorities. Marginalization or more precisely privatization of religion often deepened and dispersed religious meanings in ways that are indispensable for understanding processes of secularization *and* religion's current political resurgence. In these contexts of secular transvaluation, religious political resurgence has come largely in the form of "life politics," to use Giddens' term, or new religious social movements defending the "lifeworld" from secularizing "systems rationalization" in Habermas' terms (Giddens 1991; Habermas 1987).

The first and third propositions of secularization are linked in important analytical and concrete historical ways. As Phil Gorski's work on European state formation and nationalism shows, this political (and apparently secularizing) history is not marked by religious decline so much as religious change (Gorski 2000). And this change had as much to do with shifts in values or meaning as it did with shifts in power or control over material resources. The "disciplinary revolution" and the rise of the modern state demonstrate how the concentration of (secular) political authority in the state can stem from the internalization of religious values (Gorski 2003). Aspects of the Reformation pushed religion inward, and this privatization or internalization and self-disciplining worked in some cases to augment the power of the state as "engineer of morals and social practice (Taylor 2007, p. 114):"

In secularization processes across Western Europe (and North America), critical value transformations altered the very conditions of religious belief. These changes are variously described by scholars. Casanova's (1994) account of the privatization of religion is the most prominent and theoretically developed in the social sciences. The recent book on secularization by the philosopher Charles Taylor (2007) draws heavily on the social sciences and on Casanova's work in particular, to specify the interiority of secularization. Taylor argues that a crucial aspect of secularization, linked to but not identical with the separation of political structures

from religion, is the changing conditions for religious belief and unbelief, conditions that go beyond the institutional differentiation of church and state and delve into personal and societal-level changes in ultimate values. Religious belief now appears in many societies as an option, and in some places as “an embattled option.” “Self-sufficing or exclusive humanism” which accepts “no final goals beyond human flourishing” is an increasingly plausible and in some places hegemonic ontology and pre-ontology (taken for granted and rooted in everyday dispositions) and believers and nonbelievers alike confront this secular reality or humanistic purpose when making sense of their own ultimate values. In this sense, secularization has brought a degree of reflexivity to religious belief. “Naive acknowledgement of the transcendent, or of goals or claims which go beyond human flourishing” is “now unavailable to anyone, believer or unbeliever alike (Taylor 2007: 21). A radical shift in the background, in the framework of the taken-for-granted, effects religious believers as well as nonbelievers. This radical shift marks the political resurgence of religion in characteristic ways. As evidenced in the empirical work we review, in this chapter the “reentry” of religion into public life often takes the form of self-reflexive, social movements developing within civil society around very intimate concerns.

RELIGION AND THE SECULAR IN PARADOX

American Evangelicals, “Embattled and Thriving”

The subcultural institutions of evangelical Christians in America have been central to their political influence from the early years of the New Republic (Carwardine 1997; Young 2006) to the present day (Diamond 1995; Smith et al. 1998; Lindsay 2008). From these subcultural institutions, evangelicals have launched political actions with wide-ranging goals varying from local civic acts such as protecting nativity scenes in town squares or stopping traffic on the Sabbath to forming a national political party or amending the Constitution. Over more than two centuries, the level of intensity, the regional spread, the forms and the popular resonance of evangelical political actions have varied profoundly. Given this great variety, social scientists are hard pressed to find a historical pattern or even a few social processes that might be generalizable across the long U.S. history of evangelical engagement and disengagement in politics. Nonetheless, there appear to be some interactive sequences between evangelical and political institutions that have recurred.

Smith et al. (1998) in their remarkable book on contemporary evangelicals identify a key interaction:

“[American Evangelicalism] possesses and employs the cultural tools needed to create both clear distinction from and significant engagement and tension with other relevant outgroups, short of becoming countercultural. And modern pluralism provides the environment within which that strategy works. By contrast, the classical American fundamentalist strategy of isolationist separatism, and the theologically liberal approach of radical accommodation appear to undermine those traditions’ religious strength” (p. 218).

As they suggest, creative tension with other public institutions including state institution explains much of the persistent political influence of evangelicalism through US history.

The coincidence of major Reformed and especially evangelical Christian movements and political events throughout American history suggest a dynamic relationship between the two. The Puritan errand into the wilderness, to use Perry Miller’s famous phrase, started the religious making of European political realities in America. This American beginning was

of course a response to an apparent political termination of the Puritan project in England. Never entirely left alone by the English, the Puritan errand nonetheless carved its own particular political-religious standing order. There was in fact more than one standing order in the American colonies: Rhode Island anticipating the country's future disestablishment of religion; a Quaker colony; and Anglican orders in between and further South.

In the mid-eighteenth century, the little theocracies of New England were centers of religious revivals that spread and linked the colonies across the Atlantic seaboard in the first American social movement, the Great Awakening. According to some historians, this evangelical pulse of inter-regional, mass collective action had a key role in the American Revolution. Historians and social scientists debate how cohesive the Great Awakening was and its political impact. And yet, John Murrin's (1983) qualified counterfactual "No Awakening, No Revolution" has its defenders and its plausibility. Murrin's causal claim points to a protean relationship between political and religious institutions predating the New Republic's innovative separation of church and state.

The secularization of American politics in the wake of the Revolution fueled and furthered the contentious religious differentiation that already existed in the colonies, not just in a pluralism of churches, but also within churches and in their tense engagement with public concerns. Since then, evangelicals have maintained, over more than two centuries, what might be described as a creative contestation of the institutional differentiation between church and state – a contestation leading to innovations in civil and political associations that go well beyond church and state institutions. Niebuhr's mode of *religion in tension and paradox with the secular* approximately describes this dynamic history. Evangelical Christianity's creative contestation has oscillated in its intensity of engagement with political institutions. In some periods, the fight has been overt and verging on collapsing the institutional distance. These periods have been regularly followed by disengagement from politics and withdrawal into civil and religious associations. In this fashion, evangelical Christians over the more than two centuries have alternated between political engagement and disengagement.

The period during and immediately after the Revolution was one of evangelical Christian declension and political withdrawal (Noll 2002). The upstart sects fought for disestablishment, the Baptists most militantly; but once this was won, they withdrew from the political fray for a period. They were not, however, inactive. In the aftermath of the disestablishment of religion they had fought for, these dissenting evangelical sects witnessed great gains (Finke and Stark 2005; Finke et al. 1996). Having mobilized politically to be left alone, for the first third of the nineteenth century they thrived religiously at a distance from the state. Baptists, Methodists, Disciples of Christ and other evangelical disestablishmentarians led the religious revivals of the early nineteenth century and what Mark Noll calls the Christianization of America (Noll 2002).

This would not be the last time that evangelicals would find in their distance from the state a popular fountain of faith, but this civic spring often propelled evangelical faith back into politics (Young 2006; Diamond 1995). Possibly the most important political outcome of the evangelical creative contestation is the special-purpose association: a form of voluntary association or para-church institution with no formal denominational link but closely tied to a network of evangelical churches. When special-purpose societies first emerged in the 1820s, it was an evangelical invention. The focus of these novel voluntary societies was missionary and, at first, not particularly interactive with the state. The American Temperance Society and the American Antislavery Society emerged as a part of a broad network of specialized missionary societies. Only after they worked through evangelical churches, gathering support, did they target political institutions (Young 2007).

In this development of para-church institutions with purposes that were primarily missionary as opposed to lobbyist in nature – political engagement was always potential but not always actual. Starting in the 1820s, evangelicals organized an impressive array of special-purpose, even single-issue, organizations. They did so at first without intent to engage political institutions. At their inception, voluntary associations to protect Sabbath observance, end alcohol consumption, eradicate prostitution, and abolish slavery operated as moral campaigns to persuade individuals and civil and religious institutions not the state. By the 1830s, evangelicals trained in these missionary societies were taking the lead in the first U.S. national social movements: the temperance movement and the abolitionist movement. These campaigns emerged within civil society and at a conscious distance from institutional politics as evangelicals sought to bear witness to moral, life-style, and identity issues rather than mobilizing for narrower economic and political interests (Young 2002). In many respects, these movements looked like the new social movements or life politics of the late twentieth century. Some of these moral reform purposes, however, made political action all but inevitable.

In the 1840s, these movements turned avowedly political in their actions and goals forming political parties and pushing new legislation. These evangelical causes along with Nativist attacks against Catholics would forge a northern political bloc providing the foundation for the Republican Party and a great push toward civil war. Many regional, economic, and political factors having little to do with religion pushed toward the same end. With evangelical re-engagements with politics in the temperance, nativist, and antislavery campaigns of the mid-nineteenth century, American politics became precociously post-secular. Warner (1993: [Table 1](#), p.1052) makes this point clear in his paradigm-shifting article on the sociology of religion.

If evangelical Christianity was not mainly to blame for the Civil War or to credit for emancipation, it showed some signs of withdrawing from the political field after the trauma of war and in the face of rapid urbanization and industrialization at the end of the century. The so-called great reversal lasted for decades, but evangelical Christianity was never vanquished from the field. Indeed, for no period in U.S. history have evangelicals completely disengaged from politics. Many historians argue that evangelical Christianity was close to the political establishment in the late nineteenth century before this reversal or “second disestablishment” (Casanova 1994: Chap. 6). But it was also cozy with challengers to this establishment. In fact, evangelicalism was itself splitting apart, and in so doing, it fed countervailing political movements. Liberal evangelicals and the Social Gospel fueled the politics of progressivism and secular state building. At the same time, an emerging fundamentalism led a pietist withdrawal out of politics and into a religious counterculture.

There were, however, evangelical political engagements that did not follow these routes. In the Populist movement, evangelical techniques of mobilization and moral messages of economic justice buffeted an anticapitalist movement and serious challenge to the two party system and state centralization. Mirroring a restorationist thrust in evangelicalism, the populist sought to restore a Jeffersonian producerism. As Joe Creech (2006) convincingly argues, the movement did not just borrow evangelical rhetoric and forms of organizing, although it certainly did do this (Williams and Alexander 1994), in parts of the South it actually fused religion and politics. In the movement for Prohibition, the long-standing evangelical temperance movement merged with progressivists, nativists, and women’s rights advocates to pull off a great political win. With the 18th amendment, this moral reform achieved a pyrrhic victory. A few years later, a similar defeat from victory in the Scopes trial sent the fundamentalist wing of evangelical Christianity into years of political exile and religious reorganization in

subcultural, counterinstitutions. With these single-issue victories, prohibition and creationism, evangelical politics neared collapse. It would not revive for over a half century.

Over this half century, secularization theories predicting the political demise of religion seemed to be on target. In the late 1970s, the signs of a great academic reversal in this prognostication followed the lead of another evangelical political resurgence. As it did in the early nineteenth century, evangelical Christianity returned to political prominence with the rise of the New Christian Right. The outcome of this new wave of evangelical politics has yet to be decided, but as in the early nineteenth century this reentry of evangelicalism into public and political life was triggered by life politics or a defense of a religious lifeworld – i.e., by perceived state incursions over issues of parental authority, education, sexuality, intoxicants, and gender roles (Casanova 1994: Chap. 6). The rise of grassroots movements and power elites within civil society over the past few decades have returned evangelicals and evangelical causes to contentious and institutional politics (Smith 2000; Lindsay 2007, 2008; Diamond 2000; Green et al. 2001; Jacobs 2006; Lienesch 1993; Guth et al. 2003).

The pattern of evangelical politics since the eighteenth century cannot be explained by a simple or general historical process. What is clear is that there is no linear process of decline. The political surge beginning in the 1970s is not the first time that evangelicals have returned from the political wilderness. Their political exile in the 1920s was not the first time they suffered political decline. In these oscillations of political influence, it is clear that evangelicals have benefited as much as suffered from the institutional differentiation of religion from other public spheres. Evangelical interpretations of the benefits or ills of secular politics have also historically varied. From the late eighteenth century on, evangelical politics has covered the gamut from a kind of pietistic withdrawal characterized by Baptists after disestablishment and the fundamentalist response in the mid-twentieth century to pyrrhic victories like the Scopes trial to fighting to overthrow secular political institutions as in the more contemporary case of Christian militia groups (Juergensmeyer 2000; Williams and Blackburn 1996). In the main, however, evangelical Americans over the centuries have thrived in tension with the world of secular politics. As in the past, today the majority of evangelicals approach political institutions with ambivalence (Smith 2000). There remain pietist strains of withdrawal from secular politics and theocratic strains seeking dominance over political institutions, but these are in the minority. For many generations, evangelicals have engaged in a self-conscious, reflexive way with a secular state and other secular institutions like academia, the media, and other commercial markets. In this embattled position, evangelical Christianity has pulsed with highly effective pressure politics, movement politics, and elite politics. And, there is every reason to believe that it will continue to do so. Since the early nineteenth century, American evangelicals have been in their politics post-secular.

RELIGION OVER AND ABOVE THE SECULAR

The Middle East and Islam

The political forms Islam has taken in the Middle East since the end of World War II are manifold and complex. These run the gamut from faith-based social movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood); participatory democracy (as seen in Turkey); to theocratic republics (such as Iran). The many different intersections of Islam, the state, and associational life in the Middle East expose the limitations of secularization perspectives and foundational social

scientific assumptions about economic development, democracy, and civil society. Vexing contexts such as these demand new modes of analysis.

The theoretical framework we employ here describes in formal terms a good deal of what has recently been dubbed “political Islam” (Esposito 1997). Put simply, these are characterized by defensive popular movements against secularization processes initiated largely by the ruling political elite affecting both public institutions and more private spheres of life. Using Niebuhr’s propositional categories to illustrate the relationship between religious and political spheres, this type of resistance to rapid secularization imposed by elites can be seen as an attempt by actors to (re)assert Islamic authority and elevate *religion above the secular*. Here, religio-political movements seek to (re)establish temporal dominance and align political, cultural, and economic relations with the dictates of premodern religious orthodoxy.

The first stage in this struggle is often a prolonged rejection of the secular state, its leaders, allies, and programs. Signal empirical cases include the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the rise of the political ideology of Islamism more generally through the region, but this patterning of the relationship between religion and politics is by no means peculiar to or simply characteristic of the Middle East; premodern Roman Catholicism and the so-called “Dominionists” of American conservative Christianity and their relationship with temporal power, for examples, exhibit a similar dynamic (Keddie 1998; Casanova 1994; Parsa 2000; Almond et al. 2003; Hanson 2006).

Mansoor Moaddel’s *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism* may be the most concise and influential effort to understand the various manifestations of Islam in modern Middle Eastern politics (Moaddel 2005). Moaddel develops an “episodic discourse” model to explain the emergence of these three political movements in a handful of key Islamic nations, namely Egypt, Syria, Iran, Algeria, Jordan, and to a lesser degree, India. Through the interaction of the *location* and the *discursive field* of ideological “targets,” wide variation in ideological production in selected societies may be explained, writes Moaddel, even predicted. Here, the invisible (secularizing) hands of modernity, and its discontents, emerge as important (yet only implied) forces. As he summarizes the argument, “the higher the level of intellectual pluralism in society... the higher the likelihood of the production of a universalistic discourse... the stronger the monolithic cultural environment, the stronger the likelihood of a fundamentalist discourse” (p.16). Likewise, “the greater the state’s intervention in culture, the higher the likelihood of the rise of political ideologies... the lower the state’s intervention in culture, the higher the likelihood of the rise of social ideologies” (p.17). Using this elegant conditional logic, Moaddel is able to convincingly synthesize a spectrum of forms Islam has taken in modern politics.

Contrary to all of the “reflection/correspondence” theorists and even most of their modern critics (such as Wuthnow), Moaddel ultimately argues that the overriding causal factor in shaping ideologies is not social structure but variations in discursive context and the extent of state intervention in culture. In each case examined, the authoritarian intervention by an aggressive secular state politicized religion, generating fundamentalist backlashes. This result was unnecessary, Moaddel suggests, as religion and the state could be separated without the total colonization of social life by secular worldviews (e.g., education, gender relations, law, etc.) and the relegation of religion to the underground. The state in many of these nations attempted to supplant religion with their own secular schemas, which outraged clerics and common people, creating the conditions for a fundamentalist response. Moaddel concludes, “Because under these regimes, qualified or partial opposition to the policies of the state meant total opposition, there could be only no opposition or total opposition... Oppositional ideologies unintentionally ended up developing into revolutionary ideologies questioning

the very essence of the state” (Moaddel, p.333). As scholars of nonviolent social change have observed, authoritarian regimes structure the conditions and choices of their resistance (Smithey and Kurtz 1999). Extreme repression can only give rise to extreme insurgency. Inversely, Moaddel also found, more moderate and open systems rarely produce revolutionary movements because resistance is channeled into a diverse network of outlets. The same might be said of processes of secularization.

RELIGIOUS TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECULAR

Global South

While in the West, secularization and laicization have affected all social strata, in Latin America and Africa, such trends have remained mainly restricted to elite classes. As David Martin observes in his landmark *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America*, while elites may have begun to abandon religious worldviews toward the end of the twentieth century, the societies they governed showed few signs of secularization. “The masses in Latin America stayed thoroughly ‘inspired,’” writes Martin, “and indeed in Brazil one has the impression that virtually the whole society stayed inspired” (Martin 1990).

Even among the top levels of governance and cultural institutions, religious influences apparently never disappeared with their values and political habitus still very much inflected with Roman Catholic sensibilities, as well as new religious perspectives. Paul Freston’s insightful research indicates that since the early 1980s, the proportion of evangelicals in politics in the Global South has grown steadily, with some obtaining executive level governmental positions (Freston 2001). Thus, the dominant process in Latin America and Africa has been one of “selective secularization.”

Our Niebhurian typology identifies Latin America prior to 1980 as a signal case of *religion transforming the secular*. This pattern is not unique to the region, however. In the United States, this impulse incarnated in figures such as William Lloyd Garrison, the Grimke sisters, Walter Rauschenbusch, and, more recently, James Dobson – that is, the evangelical traditions of American Protestantism. In Latin America, however, the near-hegemonic Roman Catholic culture has given rise to its own stock of revered change agents, such as Archbishop Oscar Romero, Paulo Friere, and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, among hundreds of others. The most famous instance, of course, is that of liberation theology, which is at once an example of religion as powerful agent of cultural transformation, and also a site of multiple contestation between radical clergy, their orthodox superiors, and an increasingly oppressive state. In the spirit of Gramsci’s “organic intellectuals,” Catholic priests and nuns convened small bible-study groups in villages and towns throughout the region. These “base ecclesial communities” encouraged a new, political reading of the Gospel that saw the poor as the favored people of God, and Christ as their emancipator. Liberation theology forever transvalued the secular political context by equipping the Latin American poor with an enduring sense of agency and political efficacy that resonated with but also redirected their existing religious and moral values. In some cases, this empowerment led to armed conflict with secular authority, further inciting criticism from Rome; more often though it was channeled into peaceful and gradual local transformation, including the development of parallel institutions, not unlike the ones initiated by the Catholic Worker movement in North America.

Contentious Politics

Since the late 1960s, religious forces in the Global South have played a major role in the arena of social movements and extra-institutional politics. Leading this greater engagement has been the new posture toward the state taken by the Roman Catholic Church. For centuries, the Vatican maintained one of two positions with respect to the political sphere: one of total congruence, where church and state officials were virtually indistinguishable, or one of Westphalian contempt, resigned to church–state differentiation, but maintaining the primacy of ecclesiastical authority over any civil entity. By 1962 and the convening of the Second Vatican Council, however, the Roman Catholic hierarchy had come to accept not only the permanence of such liberal notions as religious freedom and secular power, but to actually begin promoting them as well. The result was an unprecedented about-face in doctrine and institutional behavior. As Philpott stresses, within a decade of the adjournment of Vatican II, many countries formerly governed by authoritarian dictators or illiberal structures had undergone successful democratic transitions (Philpott 2004). Indeed, Huntington notes in his well-known *The Third Wave* that 75% of the 30 democratization movements he analyzed occurred in predominantly Catholic countries, a likely outcome of the shift in Vatican position.

It is well known, for example, that the Catholic Church, at both the official and lay level, supported the People Power movement in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, providing crucial material and moral resources for the Marcos opposition (Zunes 1999). Similarly in Chile, the Church helped foster human rights and democratic-advocacy groups in Chile to counter the dictatorship of Gen. Augusto Pinochet (Fleet and Smith 1997). Pope John Paul II alone represented the most powerful Catholic sparkplug for democratic change, himself viscerally familiar with the experience of an authoritarian state as a Polish citizen under Soviet control. He famously remarked, “I am not the evangelizer of democracy. I am the evangelizer of the Gospel. To the Gospel message, of course, belong all the problems of human rights; and if democracy means human rights, it also belongs to the message of the church” (Philpott 2004). Often the Vatican has been a direct source of democratic inspiration through the release of official declarations or encyclicals condemning practices considered counter to the Gospel. In Malawi in 1992, for example, a Lenten letter written by Catholic bishops was read in all churches in the nation. The Lenten pastoral letter is now widely regarded as having accelerated Malawi’s transition to liberal democracy by articulating the “climate of mistrust and fear” among those in governance and “the growing gap between rich and poor” (Mitchell 2002). It is also credited as helping elevate human rights to being the dominant language and frame in political discourse in many other African countries, such as Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia (Nyangabyaki 2001). In those nations, Catholics joined forces with mainline Protestants to create and sustain prodemocracy movements throughout the 1990s (Gill 2004).

Catholic political engagement, just as its Protestant cousin, cannot be easily generalized, however. The prevailing character of its activity in contentious and electoral politics has been one of unpredictability and uncanny flexibility. Nearly as often as it has been a prophetic force for democracy and human rights, as underscored by Philpott and Casanova, it has stood hand-in-hand with oppressive regimes or turned a blind eye to brazen atrocities. Despite Vatican II’s multiple proclamations in favor of free societies and the right of conscience, in actual local contexts the Church’s support for democracy has varied in form and intensity. To a large degree, the determining factors have been how (and if) official teaching is interpreted and implemented in specific nations, refracted as it invariably is through surrounding cultural idioms. For example, Catholic priests and laity in Argentina were hardly oppositional, with no demonstrable democratic activism until 1981 (Huntington 1993). In several African nations, though, bishops and

parish priests have been active and effective in the promotion of social justice, often in the face of considerable personal risk. The aforementioned Malawian pastoral letter, as well as sustained human rights advocacy in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia are just a few of the more notable cases in which Vatican teaching blossomed into grassroots and church-based movements. At the other end of the spectrum, however, are Uganda, Cameroon, and Rwanda, where not only was Church teaching ignored, but deliberately violated, resulting in the occasional participation of religion in the sanctioning and even perpetration of genocide (Gifford 1995; Philpott 2004; Rittner et al. 2004).

RELIGION IN AND OF THE SECULAR

Institutional Politics in the Global South

With the decline of liberation theology and ecclesial base communities (CBEs) in the 1980s due to Vatican suppression and growing competition from Protestant churches, a new religio-political process became ascendant in Latin America. Religion as transformer of the secular largely gave way to religion in and of the secular, in Niebuhr's terms. Here, the primary site of engagement shifted from civil society to the main arena of elections and party politics. Amidst full-paced differentiation processes and North American-modeled modernization programs, religious Latin Americans, both Catholic and Protestant, accommodated their religious values and visions to the increasingly pervasive logic of pragmatic politics and bureaucratic methods. Catholic participation in Latin American politics was nothing new; only the modalities had shifted. Without question, however, the most spectacular (and unforeseen) religious change in the Global South has been the explosive spread of Protestantism in Latin America (Stoll 1990). Most of this growth has been within the Pentecostal and charismatic family of Christianity, called by some observers the "renewalist" branch. Approximately 10% of Latin Americans are now Protestant, with roughly two of three being Pentecostal (Freston 2004). Increasingly, these fundamental shifts in the nature of Christianity worldwide have begun to have visible political effects (Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1997).

Paul Freston's (2004) outstanding survey of conservative Protestant political engagement in Asia, Latin America, and Africa indicated an overall general increase in openly evangelical politicians running for and winning high office in Brazil, Guatemala, South Korea, Peru, and even Nicaragua. Brazil, the largest country in South America, also has the fastest growing Protestant population, now estimated at greater than 17%. Evangelical Protestant political activity there has emphasized an unusual melange of rather populist issues including preservation of the traditional family, media ownership, and a sharp critique of free-market capitalists. Through 1995, Brazilian Pentecostal political leaders were stridently antileft, but have recently adopted more center-left positions, including vocal opposition of globalization and privatization. Today, Brazil is unique in fostering a considerable evangelical left. However, Freston observes that there is indeed some evidence of classic political Trojan horse tactics on display in Brazil recently, with secular militants converting to evangelical Protestantism for instrumental reasons, attempting to modify and tilt its value system toward their political ends (Freston 2004).

Central America, too, has shown remarkable openness to Protestant participation in electoral politics. In Nicaragua, Protestantism and evangelical political parties actually flourished under the Sandanistas due to a rather fortuitous mixture of political and religious dynamics. Though the dominant parties remained Roman Catholic or Marxist, the primary

opposition parties were Pentecostal, and garnered enough votes in popular elections to secure seats in the government. Guatemala is the most evangelical of all Latin American nations, with at least 20% of the population made up of practicing Protestants. The Guatemalan case illustrates well the unpredictable diversity of Protestantism in political life. Authoritarian leaders Efraín Ríos Montt and Jorge Serrano Elías both identified as evangelical and were supported by those constituencies during their tenures (Gill 2004). However, that same nation has seen one of its largest evangelical communities, the Full Gospel Church of God, develop an action-oriented social consciousness. Over the last 25 years, the church has worked vigorously for equal rights for the indigenous, in emergency and relief work, and against all forms of violence in Guatemalan society (Waldrop 1993).

Apart from the more obvious arenas of elections and public office, the everyday culture and experience of Pentecostal churches are themselves the crucible of significant long-term political change. David Martin observes that a central appeal of Pentecostalism in Latin America is its radical decentralization and emphasis on horizontal organizational structures. As a result, social groups formerly marginalized for centuries under Catholic hegemony – laity, the indigenous, women, and the uneducated – are valued as equal to clergy and political leaders. The personal empowerment offered by this belief system, Martin argues, is even more emancipatory and authentic than that of liberation theology, as it is led by the rural poor – rather than urban elite theologians – and enacted every day of their lives (Martin 1990).

Martin also stresses how Pentecostalism's unique spirited ritual allows a "tongue-tied" population to finally express and find balm for its suffering through glossalalia, healing, testimony, ecstatic singing and dance, and exhortation, similar to the experience of spirituals and gospel hymns in the black churches of North America. Combined with the rigid personal purity code of most Pentecostal communities, Martin concludes that Latin American Protestantism is today operating not unlike Calvinism during the formative stages of capitalism in early modern Europe; its effects are both personally and socially transformative. Only time will tell if it has the same kind of results on democratic and economic development there.

RELIGION AGAINST THE SECULAR

The possibility of real political implications emanating from renewalist Christianity is all the more surprising when one considers that almost without exception, the faithful of the movement have been resolutely apolitical since its very inception on Azusa Street in Los Angeles in 1906. The case of global Pentecostalism until very recently dovetails with Niebuhr's category of religion against the secular, a faith-motivated suspicion of and avoidance of politics as profane. Originating in an American strain of Protestantism characterized by pietistic withdrawal, the cosmology of Pentecostal and charismatic believers is by all accounts "other-worldly" in Weber's terms, emphasizing the sinful and corrupting nature of the temporal realm juxtaposed to the pure and righteous path of the Christian life. As a result, "they suspect the machinery and the processes of politics, though in that they are at one with many not of their faith.... Pentecostals have a strong respect for the 'powers' ordained of God, even those ordained of God in Nicaragua and Cuba." (Martin, p. 265). Englund (2000) points out that until recently Pentecostals were not interested in voting or really even in human rights, both of which they view as "superfluous"; all that is truly required is the moral remaking of the person, who then naturally shapes the world in the image of the virtue within. The renewalist "theory of social change," then, if one can call it that, has historically been thoroughly individualized and organic. Good societies are made from good individuals, according to Pentecostals, therefore,

the work of the church is constant remolding the soul of the believer, and calling them back to holiness. Consequently, Englund says, the work of “this-worldly” churches and progressive-minded social institutions is often made more difficult as renewalist movements spread. Frequently, their focus on the individual and their personal purity results in a default passive acceptance of rather brutal regimes.

Both in Africa and Latin America, Pentecostals until the 1980s could be counted on to keep a healthy distance from politics. Nyangabyaki (2001) writes that for decades, despite crushing poverty and political corruption, Ugandan churches were keenly focused on the spiritual, not material concerns of their members. Englund (2000) further notes that Malawian Protestants generally have expressed indifference toward politics, and many use word for “cunning” as synonym. Many believers argue maintain that they have no need for civic education “because no good Christian needs double lessons in honesty, integrity, humility, and peace” (Englund 2000). David Smilde (1998) excellent research on Pentecostalism in South America found that most evangelical Protestants there will only allow getting involved in the public sphere to either evangelize it (“to purify politics”) or to use state machinery to facilitate their evangelization work. Smilde describes how some believers feel that “pure Christians” can cleanse the world, and thus are more apt to run for public office, or mobilize others. However, this action must never jeopardize the primacy of their commitment to God. Political action is only in service of greater spiritual objectives.

POST-SECULAR POLITICS: THE SACRALIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

There is no general historical pattern to the relationship between religion and politics. Secularization theories predicting the political decline of religion are no longer credible. If there was any doubt about this, the apparent political resurgence of religion across the globe over the past thirty years has dispelled this myth. The institutional differentiation of political and religious authority, however, is not a myth. To the contrary, in varying forms and at a varying pace, institutional processes distinguishing sacred and political authority have transformed public and private spheres across the globe over the past few centuries. In different settings and times, religious forces have both advocated and resisted these processes of differentiation. Insofar as these secularization processes have taken hold, this has not meant a depoliticization of religion, but it has changed the politics of religion. Across the many cases reviewed earlier, a very broad tendency of religion in post-secular politics can be identified. In historically new secular contexts, religious politics often emerges as a social movement within civil society focused around the defense of a sacred lifeworld. Secularization processes have had the effect of privatizing religion but this has not necessarily marginalized it. To the contrary, in some contexts, it has deepened and dispersed its sacred salience. The political resurgence of religion post-secularization frequently starts with the politicization of the private for sacred reasons. Social movements emerging within civil society over issues confronting the family, sexuality, intoxicants, and similar lifeworld foci have propelled religion back into political prominence in national contexts across the globe.

This has repeatedly been the case in the United States, most dramatically in the 1830s and again in the 1970s. Across the Middle East, as well, defending sacred dimensions of the private sphere has justified the political re-entry of Islam. Islamist bids for political power have centered in no small part on education, gender roles, family law, and other “defenses” of the religious “lifeworld.” The civil society origins to religious politics in post-secular contexts do not necessarily limit religion to social movement activity. As was the case in the United

States in the 1840s and today, evangelicals have moved from contentious to institutional politics quite readily. These institutional transitions are also apparent in the late-twentieth century Latin American and Middle Eastern politics.

The case that does not fit this life politics trajectory – that of liberation theology – might serve as the exception that proves the rule. As a movement arising in civil society in defense of “conventional” (i.e., scarcity or materialist) twentieth century concerns such as class oppression, land rights, and distribution of national resources, liberation theology was explicitly Marxist in its theory and praxis. Its focus was squarely on the “system” rather than the life-world. Though the political impact of liberation theology is enduring, it is instructive to note that the movement today is but a shadow of its former self. As the case with many movements that flirted with Marxism, the post-1989 period has not proven favorable. In its place, however, are the many Pentecostal churches and networks, daily preaching on, studying, and praying for the rebirth of the sinner through the Holy Spirit.

The religious transformation brought on by the rapid spread of Pentecostalism in the Global South has yet to be matched by full extension into politics, but most observers think that this political turn is inevitable and it will likely take the form of life politics or moral reform movements emerging within civil society. The set of issues Pentecostals hold as most sacred – sexual restraint, abstention from drugs, alcohol, gambling, and similar matters of personal purity – suggest as much. Miller and Yamamoro note that giving up these indulgences of the flesh are among the first and most necessary rites that a new convert to Pentecostalism vows, particularly among men (Miller and Yamamori 2007:160). Apart from the obvious Weberian economic possibilities implied by such transformations, the political consequences are serious as well. What happens when these sacred lifeworld processes conflict with equally powerful processes of capitalist advance, stressing maximum individual freedom, gratification, and materialism? The patterns suggested by the cases reviewed above point to a high likelihood of Pentecostal lifeworld defense – political if need be – against just these type of secular trespasses.

Returning to Casanova’s (1994) useful distinction of varying forms of secularization, what the recent history of religion and politics suggests is that the consequences of the third form of secularization – the privatization of religion – will continue to move to reshape the first form – the differentiation of sacred and secular public authority. In short, the institutional differentiation of religious and political authority will continue to be challenged by religious movements empowered by the privatization of the sacred. The form these challenges take will vary according to different modes of religious interaction, including the full range of possible modes specified by Niebuhr. In this sense, we have entered an age of post-secular politics.

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CHAPTER 20

Space and Politics

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Social scientists have long been concerned with power and politics and with the geographic settings in which social life occurs. But these two concerns have evolved rather separately. In sociology, economics, and political science deductive traditions of the twentieth century stressed the importance of producing generalizations that were context invariant. If geographic context was brought in to these disciplines, it was largely with respect to variations between nation and states. Of course, geography has long directed its spatial imagination across a range of contexts. However, adding a critical view of power and privilege occurred rather late in the last century (Harvey 1973).

In recent decades, concern with the geographic aspects of social life has diffused throughout the social sciences. This spatial turn has ushered in an increased recognition of the importance of space and place in theorizing and in empirical research. Economists (Krugman 1991), political scientists (Sellers 2005), and sociologists (Lobao et al. 2007) have grappled with theoretical frameworks that incorporate space and the manner by which geographic context, particularly at scales other than the customary nation state, influences empirical outcomes. Over the same period, human geography too has experienced change. Geographers recognized that they had neglected the study of power (Allen 2003; Massey 1994) and social movements (Miller 2000) and saw new shifts such as neoliberalism transforming the political landscape (Peck and Tickell 2002). These changes have increasingly integrated the social sciences, linking attention to space and place with the study of politics, power, and the state across disciplines.

Taking a spatial lens to the study of political phenomena is important for a number of reasons. For theory aspatially framed generalizations may be challenged to take into account the inherent diversity within spatial settings. Conventional topics like political behavior can be reinvigorated by addressing territorially related questions, such as the degree to which income polarization across U.S. regions affects political affiliation and voting frequency. Geographic methodologies such as spatial regression analysis and GIS bring new ways of conceptualizing research questions and analyzing data. As social scientists increasingly scrutinize territorial-based state and public action, influence on public policy also can be expanded.

The spatial turn holds particular promise for the study of the state, a core political institution that is defined by geography: “A human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force *within a given territory*” (Weber 1946: 78, emphasis added), attention to space never disappeared completely. But, it would be fair to say

that scholars have frequently assumed that the state controls and homogenizes the space over which it claims dominion. Recently, geographers and others (Agnew 1994; Brenner 2001; Peck 2001a) have challenged this assumption. They question the degree to which: (1) the state possesses “sovereign control” over its borders, (2) the national scale is “the ontologically necessary foundation for political life,” and (3) the state is a “static, timeless territorial ‘container’ that encloses economic and political processes” (Brenner et al. 2003: 2). As a result, interest in the spatial aspects of politics has given rise to the interrogation of the state particularly in its national form which may enrich our understanding of politics in a number of respects (Leicht and Jenkins 2007).

In this chapter, we discuss the spatial turn and its influence on the study of power, the state, and political action. We focus on three issues: the evolution of the literature toward the incorporation of spatial thinking; conceptual contributions that a spatial lens makes to core areas of political research; and the contours of current spatially oriented political literature. To organize our review of the contemporary literature, we show how it is informed by the key concepts of space, place, and scale. In doing so, we attend to emerging literatures including studies centered on state “rescaling;” conceptual approaches that provide innovative links between space and political processes; and work that moves beyond the nation-state as a unit of analysis. We conclude with directions for the future. As spatial thinking has diffused in a broad manner across different literatures, we confine the coverage to the studies of politics that display a *direct interest* in geographic contexts and processes.¹

THE SPATIAL TURN

Space as a concept has a general, particularistic, and relational dimension. As a general concept, space is everywhere, an abstraction to be brought into research such as the concept of time. While attention to temporal or historical processes has long informed political research, spatial or geographic processes have been a more recent concern. The particularistic dimension of space is reflected in “place” as a distinct territorial unit and contextual setting for relationships. Places range from microsociological units such as the household to the macrolevel nation state and global system. The relational dimension of space is captured in location, the position of an area with regard to others situated in similar or different spatial scales (Lobao 1993). Because places are nested within others at different spatial scales, the household within the community, community within the region and nation, and nation within the global system, processes at one spatial scale influence those at another. The relational aspect of space is aptly illustrated by globalization, whereby global processes are articulated at the national and local levels and localized events move up the global chain. In sum, bringing in space demands consideration of related concepts such as place and spatial scale, concepts highlighted later in this chapter to denote contours of current research.

As noted previously, the incorporation of space into the study of power and politics has been problematic and given sustained attention relatively recently. At the outset, the roots of

¹That is, politically-oriented research often makes use of general spatial analogies, theories building upon spatial metaphors, and network analyses. While these spatially-related representations are valuable (see for example, Bourdieu 1977; Mohr 2005), this chapter is concerned with research that directly recognizes politics and political organizations as inherently grounded in territorial settings.

politically oriented work reflect the elevation of time and history over space and geography (Soja 1989). For example, sociology's classical founders were concerned with the transition from feudalism and subsumption of precapitalist societies to capitalist market relations. This concern centered attention to the temporal dimensions of political change and implied eventual leveling of geographic differences. A focus on space also conflicted with the world views of modern theorists, those whose work framed the study of power and politics in the post-World War II period (Soja 1989). Marxists considered spatial identities (regionalism, nationalism) as barriers to a united proletariat, while functionalists, state-pluralists, and other conventional theorists defended western modernization, assuming its benefits would extend to all regardless of place. Because the sovereignty of states has been taken for granted, spatial variations internal to nation-states were often seen as anachronistic legacies of the past destined to erode as governance of domestic society refined and deepened (Brenner et al. 2003). Finally, the intellectual priorities of twentieth century theorists centered on explaining modern capitalist development, a task which entailed grand theory and generalization (Storper and Walker 1989). The intrinsic specificity of different geographical settings muddled deductive research agendas in which aspatial covering laws were assumed to work out everywhere (Lobao 1993).

The increased attention to space in the study of power and politics represents both a project of revising conventional bodies of work within disciplines and a project of importing insights from human geography into other social science traditions. First, as noted above, interest in the territorial dimensions of social science processes – including politics – has expanded across disciplines. This shift stems partly from a cross-disciplinary movement away from deductive theory and a focus on context (spatial as well as historical) within which relationships occur – generalizations are increasingly seen as contingent upon time and place rather than context invariant. Attention to different spatial settings thus corresponds with this overarching shift in research strategies. It particularly allows analysts to observe how macrolevel social forces work themselves out at ground level, which in turn can modify and inform theory. For example, researchers increasingly scrutinize whether macrolevel (national or cross-national) theories of socio-political change apply isomorphically to subnational relationships (Grant and Wallace 1994; Lobao and Hooks 2003; Neilson and Alderson 1997).

Second, theoretical inroads within disciplines such as sociology ushered in greater concern with space. In the 1980s for example, ascendant sociological theories began to challenge rigid, top-down structural approaches by emphasizing the manner by which institutions of power and inequality are reproduced via interaction occurring in a variety of spatial contexts (Giddens 1981; Bourdieu 1989). This concern with spatial context was not only reflected in the reconsiderations of political institutions and states, but was also seen in literature emphasizing agency (Giddens 1981). The concept of human agency implied that political struggle was not to be found just in the factory (or point of production) but also at the point of consumption, in the spatial setting of the community, and evidenced in new social movements, such as environmental movement and political actions revolving around NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) issues. Attempts to link macrosocial forces to individual political attitudes and behavior were also increasingly grounded in spatial settings such as city and community (Oliver 2001).

Third, interest in culture and representation, to some degree spurred by postmodernism, has led to greater scrutiny of the role of space in politics. Cultural trends, often rooted in the specificity of spatial settings, have political implications, as noted in longstanding work on political culture (Elazar 1994) and more recent studies on the culture of voting blocs, such as rural Americans (Sperling et al. 2004). Representational strategies and discourses used by state and local elites to promote policy, such as welfare reform, are also studied (Schram 2006; Tickamyer et al. 2007).

Finally, theoretical and methodological innovations in geography have diffused to other disciplines, enriching political research traditions. Theorists in geography have now long demonstrated the compatibility of critical political economy approaches to power and politics with spatial issues, a linkage to earlier theorists had often rejected (Cox 1997; Harvey 1973, 1989). As social scientists empirically test hypotheses involving spatial data and relationships, they have increasingly drawn on spatial analytical methods and geographic information systems pioneered by geographers.

The aforementioned changes have contributed to a flourishing of spatial research on power and politics. However, although a spatially informed shift may be occurring, we caution that much current research remains aspatial. Remnants of deductive traditions remain in which generalizations are treated as if they are context invariant. Particularly, evident in routine research are cases in which, a set of universal predictor variables is used to test a hypothesis; when the hypothesis is not supported, the distinctive spatial setting is invoked as an ad-hoc explanatory device. More commonly, explicit discussion of spatial context and the scale at which presumed relationships are supposed to occur are simply bracketed out.

CORE CONCEPTS SEEN THROUGH A SPATIAL LENS: POWER, STATES, AND GLOBAL POLITICS

The incorporation of spatial thinking into political research follows the growing movement toward an emphasis on relational mechanisms and causal accounts (Emirbayer 1997; Tilly 1995; Urry 2000). In large measure, those who view politics through a spatial lens are also likely to adopt a relational view of social mechanisms and causal explanations. "Relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks; words such as ally, attack, subordinate, and appease give a sense of relational mechanisms" (Tilly 2001: 24). The spatial context works as an "environmental mechanism," that is, "externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life; words such as disappear, enrich, expand, and disintegrate – applied not to actors but their settings – suggest the sorts of cause–effect relations in question" (Tilly 2001: 24). Here, spatial context not only has an impact in its own right, but it influences the degree to which other relational mechanisms are dampened or amplified.

An emphasis on relations, processes and flows stands in contrast with an emphasis on taxonomy and the essential characteristics of social entities. A great deal of energy has been invested in creating and refining typologies that classify social life in taxonomic fashion, even though these taxonomies are poorly suited to understanding dynamic processes molding the social world. Where space is considered for purposes of taxonomy, it is often tacked on as a single categorical concept – such as urban or rural location – or viewed from the vantage of a fixed territorial unit. The result is that researchers miss the dynamic exchanges occurring within and between different units at various spatial scales. Tilly (1995), for example, criticizes the sociological account of state collapse because it has devoted too much attention to the inherent characteristics of states. Instead, he draws an analogy with hydrology and the study of floods, whereby hydrologists attempt to understand the failure of a dam in relation to the flow of liquids through a basin. In a similar vein, Tilly argues that state collapse can only be understood in terms of the relationship between a state and domestic processes and organizations and in a larger geopolitical context. Tilly's approach is rooted and lends momentum to the spatial turn. His analogy to hydrology shifts attention away from the state in the abstract to the intersection of a state and the spatial and historical context in which exists.

As with Tilly's reconceptualization of state collapse, valuable insights about the study of politics can be gained by adopting a spatial lens. In the following sections, we highlight studies

that contribute to the study of power, the state and global politics by bringing spatial issues to the fore. Our goal is to demonstrate that valuable insights can be gained when these core political concepts are approached with self-conscious concern for spatial context and processes.

Power

Bringing in geographic space contributes to a relational view that challenges conventional views of power as fixed between social actors. Max Weber's classic definition of power diverts attention towards resources at the disposal of an individual or organization: "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber 1947: 152). Although Weber's definition lends itself to consideration of the relationship between the actors involved, power has been frequently seen as something possessed in fixed form by a given social actor possessing more or less power than others. By contrast, attention to space draws attention to the manner by which relations of power are constituted and played out. For example, in his examination of power, Clegg (1989) points out that social action is channeled – sometimes constrained and sometimes amplified – by the terrain on which it occurs. He illustrated this point with the Battle of Thermopylae (fifth century BCE) where 300 Spartan soldiers held tens of thousands of Persian soldiers at bay, a feat made possible by a narrow mountain pass that allowed only a small portion of the Persian force to advance. As the Greeks did at Thermopylae, social actors (whether individuals or collectives) purposefully and strategically view the social terrain when making decisions. This relational and spatial view of social power contributes to the "shopper model" that Logan and Molotch (1987) employ when examining the choices of large corporations selecting where to locate facilities. Hooks (1994) and Markusen et al. (1991) also adopt this view when examining decisions of military planners locating bases and defense production facilities. These decisions are strategic in the sense that agents of large, powerful organizations scan the terrain to identify places affording advantages in pursuing organizational goals. The manner in which they treat land and people is often at odds with the needs and attachment of local residents. Strategic decisions by powerful external actors such as corporations and the military can degrade the environment and endanger residents (Hooks and Smith 2004; Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss 2001). Similarly, location decisions of corporations and the state profoundly influence the welfare of residents and communities (Gaventa 1980). In turn, decisions of powerful social actors may generate significant opposition movements grounded in the strategic protection of places.

States

Conceptual understanding of the evolution of the state is also enriched by taking a spatial lens. When accounting for the rise of states, Michael Mann (1986) highlights "social cages." For the earliest civilizations, a social cage was only possible by unusual geography that constrained inhabitants – making it difficult to escape and providing a great deal of insulation from rival powers. For instance, the rise of the ancient Egyptian state and empire was made possible by the fertility of the Nile Valley coupled with the desert that separated Egypt from rivals. The centrality of geography in Mann's account of early civilizations is consistent with the use of the spatial context as an environmental mechanism – exogenous to social groupings but serving to delimit and channel social change and state formation. Reflecting the growing capacities of social organizations, modern states were capable of encaging without obvious contributions from geographic barriers such as deserts, mountains, and bodies of water (Mann 1993).

While it is a mistake to attribute a timeless and natural inevitability to the boundaries dividing nation-states from each other, it is also important to recognize the striking accomplishment of the state as an organization. The arbitrary boundaries delineated by states and enshrined by the Westphalian system of states have been consequential for centuries. For this reason, Giddens (1985) identifies the nation-state as the quintessential “power container” of the modern era and social scientists have treated the state’s dominion as a “society,” i.e., as the default unit of analysis.

Tilly (1975, 1990) brings spatial context and relational mechanisms into sharp relief. Building on his assertion that “war made the state, and the state made war” (Tilly 1975: 42), Tilly (1990) charts the paths to modernity taken by European polities. He concludes that availability of the means of production and the means of coercion in the territory over which a state exerts dominion molds the approach to warmaking and domestic governance. Tilly (1990) is not making the case that early modern states induced the growth of the means of capital or the means of coercion – by contrast, his argument is that the path of statemaking open to a given state and its strategic posture in warmaking were heavily influenced by its geographic location. Thus, European states controlling the means of coercion – but without a sizeable concentration of capital – often exerted sweeping control over society and postponed a democratic transition until well into the twentieth Century (e.g., Spain). Conversely, such a state waged war by strengthening its ability to coerce, but lacked the ability to promote economic expansion and technological innovativeness. The ultimate winners in this competition were states exercising sovereignty over a region with both the means of coercion and capital (e.g., France and England). These states were able to harness economic resources and technological dynamism, compromise with leading economic institutions and elites, and negotiate with the citizenry to serve as soldiers. Due to their approach to waging war, these nations tilted toward a democratic and pluralistic polity. In Tilly’s account, the concentration (or relative scarcity) of the means of coercion and capital in the territory that the state controls are “environmental mechanisms.” These spatial characteristics are largely exogenous and serve to channel institutional development into a restricted set of pathways, making some outcomes more likely and others unlikely (see Tilly 2001: 24).

Global Politics

The study of global political development is also moved forward by taking a spatial perspective. Skocpol (1979; see also Goldstone 1991) offered an influential reminder that states are Janus-faced: profoundly influenced by domestic politics, they also exist in the international system of states with survival depending on the ability to fend off rival states. As the term connotes, geopolitics is necessarily concerned with the spatial. Geographic influences on political development have figured prominently throughout human history. In the ancient world, “marcher lords” (Collins 1978, 1981; Mann 1986) bordered on a core power but faced less potent military foes on other frontiers. When compared to the established civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the ascendant Greeks enjoyed this strategic advantage circa 700–500 BCE. In turn, the rise of Rome several centuries later was facilitated by the multiple military threats confronted by Greece and Rome’s favorable geographical location. When considering the contemporary period, the expansion of infrastructural power mobilized by military organizations (especially military transport and logistics) have contributed to a striking increase in the mobility of military forces. Nonetheless, ascendant states geographically located at the periphery continue to enjoy strategic advantages (see Collins 1978, 1981) – and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Just as the spatial turn calls into question the primacy of the nation-state as the unit of analysis when studying domestic processes, this shift poses a parallel challenge when considering geopolitics (Brenner et al. 2003). For the most part, scholars have assumed that states are “like units” – each state is assumed to be sovereign and autonomous. “The conventional view holds that in the period since 1648 European, and subsequently world, politics can be characterized as an anarchical system comprising the interactions of like units (states), in turn selected and socialized in accordance with Westphalian sovereignty” (Hobson and Sharman 2005: 63–64). Westphalian sovereignty rests on *de jure* recognition by other states. A state (as defined by Westphalia) is a legitimate actor in the international realm, given free rein in domestic policies and actions. These assumptions have dominated political sociology (Hooks and Rice 2005). “For several centuries, sovereignty has been considered as an attribute of states. The state is the locus of ultimate authority in society, uniquely qualified to represent society as a whole in its relations with the external world. No body, no organization, no power stands higher than the state; the world is basically a feudal structure composed of lordly states all jealously guarding their respective domains” (Boli 2001: 53).

Stephen Krasner (1999) challenges this conventional view. The geographic reach of a powerful state extends beyond its official boundaries; this powerful state can constrain, guide and at times directly control political decisions in weaker states. Conversely, weaker states often fail to control their own military and foreign policies; they are neither fully sovereign nor are they autonomous in governing the territory over which they claim dominion. Simply on the basis of size, economic resources, and military assets, it is impossible to ignore the enormous difference among states (see Ragin 1987 for a discussion of methodological challenges this poses). The social sciences have shifted the focus towards global dynamics and downplayed the centrality of the nation-state. In different ways and emphasizing distinct causal mechanisms, both world polity (see Boli 2001) and world systems theory (see Sklair 1999; Hobson and Sharman 2005) draw attention to global dynamics. But they continue to build on the assumption of sovereign states.

Krasner’s (1999) challenge to the conventional view of sovereignty and states also raises questions of spatial scale. Claims that states are “like” units (in the sense of being equally sovereign) are demonstrably inconsistent with the historical record. As a consequence, flexibility in selecting spatial units and scales of analysis is evident among those studying geopolitics. Instead of limiting focus to either the nation-state or the global level, Krasner (1999) points to the importance of regional (here referring to a spatial scale larger than the nation-state but not global) dynamics and processes. Others too have argued for greater attention to the regional scale. Arrighi (1994, 2004) and Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) argue for the need to extend world systems theory to the regional scale. Cliath and Hooks (2008) particularly stress the importance of this scale for the analysis of human rights violations.

CONTOURS OF CURRENT RESEARCH: SPACE, PLACE, AND SPATIAL SCALE

To explain the varieties of current research taking a spatial approach to political topics, we provide an organizing framework centered around three fundamental concepts: space, place, and spatial scale. These concepts inform current studies by demarcating the ontological basis of research, and in turn, the manner by which research questions are posed conceptually and tackled methodologically (Lobao et al. 2007). It should be noted that outside of geography, space, place, and spatial scale are typically treated implicitly rather than directly scrutinized. We draw out the meaning and significance of these concepts, often obscure in any one study, because they usefully demonstrate the contours of work integrating space with political research.

Space: Bringing in New Research Questions

As noted, space is an abstract dimension pertaining to everywhere, a dimension to be brought in to theory and research in the same vein as the dimension of time. Researchers have long been interested in extending generalizations about social movement strategies, political attitudes, and state policy processes to account for time and history. Similar questions are being extended across space and geography, as shown by the following examples. Social movement researchers have expanded the use of political opportunity structures from temporal to spatial context in studies of antinuclear activism (Miller 2000) and workers' strikes (Roscigno and Danaher 2004). Research on U.S. political attitudes, typically treated over time, has been reinvigorated by interrogating urban–rural and red–blue state variations (Frank 2004; McKee 2007; Sperling et al. 2004). The study of state policy, conventionally undertaken at the cross-national scale through comparative historical analysis, has been extended through comparative subnational research using spatial units such as states and counties. Analysts find for example that federal policy such as involving the defense industry (Hooks 1994) and state-level economic development programs (Jenkins et al. 2006) creates uneven subnational playing fields for generating economic growth. Interrogation of neoliberal policy has also been extended. In contrast to neoliberal assertions that minimalist government is best, when analyzed spatially, a stronger social safety net and greater federal employment per capita have been found to benefit U. S. populations (Lobao and Hooks 2003).

The contours of current research are also distinguished by the conceptual-methodological manner in which space is brought in to address research questions. For most studies, space serves as a platform or container for political action (Del Casino and Jones 2007). That is, space is treated in a static manner, usually as a territorial context with comparisons drawn *vis-à-vis* other contexts. Quantitative studies employing U.S. states and localities as simple units of analysis and comparative cross-national research have long treated space in this manner. But as interest in space has expanded, the concept has been woven into the study of politics in more dynamic ways. Studies addressing policy diffusion across states (Soule and Zylan 1997), social movement contagion-diffusion studies (Tolnay et al. 1996), and power-network analyses (Massey 1994) are examples. In these studies, space is not merely a container or context – but it is inextricably linked to the operation of political processes and thus central to their explanation. A view of space as woven into political processes is particularly important for understanding governance trends such as decentralization that appear to be emerging globally (Brenner 2004). In the U.S. case for example, Tickamyer et al. (2007) demonstrate that welfare reform takes different forms even within a single state because spatial inequality is built in every step of the way. Decentralization inherently gives rise to a spatially variegated social safety net because poorer localities have less resources and capacity to administer social programs.

Place: Analyzing Territorial Units in Current Research

In contrast to space, place is somewhere. Place is typically treated as a distinct territorial unit and setting within which social relationships transpire. The types of places studied in research on politics and power are varied. For example, they may range from microunit of the body and household, to mesolevel units such as states and provinces, to the global region. The nation-state

and to a lesser degree, local governmental units, namely cities, are the types of places commonly studied by political researchers.

Lobao et al. (2007) characterize much research on the state and political processes, such as found in comparative, cross-national and in urban studies, as taking a “place-in-society” approach. Here, places are treated as unique units of intrinsic interest, analysis centering on each place’s distinctiveness in light of others in a social system. For example, the longstanding literature on comparative welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; O’Connor et al. 1999) documents the distinguishing characteristics of individual western nation’s social safety net systems, classifying each nation into a form of liberal, corporatist, or social democratic system. Political research on cities is similarly interested in individual city’s distinct governance systems, which are then classified into systemic-types, as found in urban-regime theory (Lauria 1997) and growth-machine research (Logan and Molotch 1987). In the examples above, specific cities and nation-states are often treated as model places from which analysts build broader theoretical generalizations. While starting out with place-specificity, analysts are typically interested in generalizing upward, to say something about how the place of focus illuminates broader theory or societal processes.

A contrasting view of “place” is to move away from treating it as a unique territorial unit and toward its conceptualization as a moment of intersecting social relationships in space. This view has been characterized as a “society-in-place” approach (Agnew 1989; Lobao et al. 2007). Here, researchers start out with some fundamental question about power and politics, then take it downward, to examine it from the vantage of place. Analysts are less interested in the intrinsic quality of places and more interested in how general relationships work out across them. For example, analysts have questioned how theories about the welfare state (Lobao and Hooks 2003), the political economy of development (Grant and Wallace 1994; Nielsen and Alderson 1997), and state-sponsored militarism (Hooks and Smith 2004) are manifest across places. According to Massey (1994: 5), this tradition challenges: “some influential conceptualizations of place..[that attempt] to fix the meaning of particular places, to enclose them, endow them with fixed identities, and to claim them for one’s own.” From the “society-in place” tradition, places can be conceptualized as a power-geometry or particular moments of intersecting power relations, “nets of which have over time been constructed, laid down, interacted with one another, decayed, and renewed” (Massey 1994: 120). This tradition assigns no particular priority to studying the nation-state, city, or other territorial unit. Rather a variety of bounded or unbounded territories may be usefully studied. In short, this approach sees “place” in an array of territorial units that can inform political research.

How places are conceptualized affects research design. The place-in-society approach is more place-intensive, lending itself to focus on a limited number of territorial units about which richly detailed data may be collected. Case-studies and comparative designs are often used to study places in this way. The society-in-place approach, by contrast, is more place-extensive, lending itself to a larger number cases and quantitative analysis. In either case, however, qualitative or quantitative analyses are not precluded.

The “place-in-society” and “society-in-place” approaches are complementary and important forms of inquiry. By and large, however, the former is the more visibly recognized tradition to studying – as well as defining – places in political research. Explicit articulation of political processes also is largely confined to the first, as seen in the large bodies of comparative cross-national welfare states and urban political research. The second tradition, which starts out first with some question about power and politics applied across places variously conceptualized has been less systematically developed in extant work.

Spatial Scale: Studying the Territorial Resolution of Political Processes

For research on power and politics, spatial scale is pivotal, and particularly informs recent debates about changes in the state. Scale can be conceptualized as the territorial resolution at which social processes work out, are theorized, and studied (Smith 2003: 228). At present with certain exceptions (e.g., Brenner 2004), only geographers have deeply and explicitly grappled with scale as a concept, producing a large outpouring of work relevant for the study of the state and political action. In economics, political science, and sociology, scale is largely implicit to research, its treatment haphazard and uneven. For instance, as we discuss in the following section, questions of scale are germane to studies of decentralization and globalization, but nongeographic, U.S. social scientists do not customarily bring in the concept to address these topics. To examine how spatial scale informs political research, we draw largely from human geography, demonstrating how the concept applies to current work.

Scale informs research by virtue of its ontological use in studies. Herod and Wright (2002) explain that a contrasting axis in the treatment of scale is along material versus ideal lines. Most commonly, social scientists use scale as a real, material entity or “natural metric” existing in the landscape (Herod and Wright 2002: 5), an approach so taken for granted that it is hardly recognized as distinctive. For example, research on politics is typically conducted at governance scales such as cities and nation-states, conceptualized as entities which have a territorial span, built environments, and identifiable state and market structures. This materialist perspective has been criticized for reifying spatial scales by the idealist perspective that sees scale more as a mental category for organizing research. In the idealist view, researchers should not begin from a predetermined grounded scale. Rather they should start with a political process, then trace out how this process might be expressed in scalar terms. An example is Crump’s (2002) study on union mobilization processes. He examines the manner by which labor unions’ employed discourses related to scale (e.g., globalization) and shifted organizing strategies back and forth, from local to global scales to recruit members when new political opportunities arose.²

A related axis along which scale is treated concerns fixed versus fluid approaches. A materialist stance is more compatible with a fixed view of scale while an idealist stance is more compatible with fluid view. By and large, in economics, political science, and sociology, scale is treated as a fixed, ladder-like concept, in which analysis proceeds upwards or downwards from the local scale (e.g., neighborhoods or communities), to nation-states and finally the global system of nation states. Perhaps more than economics and political science, sociology treats scale in a dualistic manner with well-developed political literatures existing only at the local or city/community scale and across nation-states. The mesolevel, subnational scale of regions and states is particularly underdeveloped, although a new generation of political sociological research is tackling this scale (Leicht and Jenkins 2007; Lobao and Hooks 2007). Human geographers, by contrast, have long argued for a more fluid view: not only should processes be scrutinized at a variety of scales beyond the conventional local or global scales – but the overlap, reciprocal influence, and contradictions of processes occurring at and across different scales merit exploration. This view of scale is closer to a root-system rather than hierarchical approach taken in other social sciences. Recent research on the geography of power (Allen 2003; Herod and Wright 2002) and political economic perspectives on the state (Brenner et al. 2003; Brenner 2004) demonstrate this more fluid approach.

²The idealist view ranges from recognizing the usefulness of scale as a social construction (Marston 2000) to the more extreme position that “scale” slices political processes arbitrarily, obfuscates more than it illuminates, and thus should be abandoned with researchers only focusing on processes (Marston et al. 2005).

A final axis is the treatment of scale as a constraining versus an emergent concept (Herod and Wright 2002: 5). As a constraining concept, scale imposes order on political activity. This view is illustrated by studies on individuals' political attitudes, where researchers assess the impact of national-scale, welfare states (Hicks and Kentworthy 2003) and community and regional contexts (Oliver 2001; Sperling et al. 2004). Studies addressing state institutions and policy formulation, where researchers assess scale-related constraints ushered in by devolution, government size, and ecological conditions provide another example (Jenkins et al. 2006; Orfield 1997; Partridge and Rickman 2006). Scale can also be treated as an emergent concept, produced by actors through struggles and compromises (Herod and Wright 2002). Examples are studies assessing the manner by which policy-makers and conservative groups colluded in down-scaling redistributive policy to states and localities via welfare reform (Peck 2001a; Tickamyer et al. 2007); bureaucratic and business elites spurred the creation of new regional governing bodies at the subnational and supranational scales (Brenner 2004); and nonelites such as the urban poor (Gotham 2003) and labor unions (Crump 2002) have reproduced or shifted their scales of struggles to tap into new political opportunities.

“Rescaling” the State

A relatively new area of research emerging from the interrogation of scale centers on “rescaling the state.” An outpouring of work on this topic has been produced by geographers and more recently, by European and Canadian sociologists, political scientists, and institutional economists. As of this writing, U.S. political sociologists still little directly reference “state rescaling” as an identifiable research area, but for an exception see Brenner (2004). Most broadly, the topic of state-rescaling centers on questioning the manner by which state institutions and actors are reorganized from one territorial resolution to another. The topic emerged from a confluence of distinct literatures of the 1990s. Globalization research raised questions about the decline of the autonomy of the nation-state, growth of supranational regulatory bodies, and local state responses (Cox 1997). Political economy research on capitalist regulation questioned the trajectory of post-Fordism particularly its regional unevenness, which brought in the need to attend to the state at the subnational scale (Lobao et al. 1999). Research on the welfare state documented the movement toward neoliberalism and its advocacy of devolution from central to lower governmental units with the long-term goal of cutting the social safety net (Staeheli et al. 1997). Today, studies on state-rescaling still often respond to these strands of literatures, but have merged more into an amalgam topical area. We denote some of the research questions that fall under this banner.

First, analysts are questioning the degree to which the state as an institution is being “rescaled.” Older debates about the ascendance of a supranational or global order and the presumed decline of the nation state are being reappraised in light of new theory and empirical evidence (Shaw 2003). Analysts are examining state transformation at formerly neglected scales, such as subnational or regional scale, and the articulation of state processes across scales, such as through the study of globalization and cross-national border regions (Brenner 2004; Cox 2005; Lobao and Hooks 2007). They are also interrogating the meaning and significance of state-rescaling itself: here, concern is to what extent state-rescaling is part of a broader package of neoliberal governance and welfare state restructuring occurring across many nations (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jessop 2002). Earlier views of a blanket decline of the nation-state in the face of globalization, have been overturned, with focus now on the varieties of state transformation across scales.

Second, state policy in various sectors, particularly economic development and social welfare, is increasingly studied in terms of scalar shifts. While some analysts directly cast the study of policy in terms of state rescaling (Cox 2005; Jones and Ward 2002), more frequently the topic is addressed through focus on intranational decentralization and on global shifts. Analysts for example, see state rescaling (brought about by decentralization and/or global pressures) as creating greater competition between states and localities for economic development, spurring an increase in the use of economic development policy tools to attract and retain business (Jenkins et al. 2006; Lobao 2007). Studies on welfare reform (Peck 2001b; Schram 2006; Tickamyer et al. 2007) document contradictions and problems brought about by rescaling. They find that poorer people fare worse when social welfare policies are decentralized to states and localities at the same time these governments are exposed to ever greater global competition.

Third, analysts are studying emerging forms of governance arising from rescaling, questioning whether traditional governance patterns are being replaced and with what consequences. For example, decentralization and re-centralization processes shift the roles of state institutions and actors, giving rise to new regulatory bodies, public–private partnerships, and forms of government such as special districts (Pike et al. 2007; Brenner 2004; Haugh and Kitson 2007). These rescaling processes are often viewed as related to neoliberal governance, whereby: influence of the private sector and nongovernmental organization in formal state operations increases; governments become more market oriented; and privatization of public services expands. Analysts have also questioned how governance shifts related to state-rescaling affect poverty and prosperity across places and populations. While some analysts see a race-to-the bottom created by these new shifts, others find a wide spatial variation. Larger, richer governments and their populations generally fare better under decentralized governance (Lobao 2007; Morrill 1999; Warner and Hefetz 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

Bringing in space – and corollary concepts such as place and scale – is promising for the study of power, politics, and the state for a number of reasons. First, a spatial lens extends extant research theoretically, substantively, and methodologically. For theory, aspatially framed and/or national generalizations may be challenged or revised to take into account the inherent diversity within and across different geographic settings. Longstanding substantive topics can be broadened to address new territorially related issues. Research on voting patterns, for instance, has been enlarged through attention to space (Frank 2004). Marked partisan variation between and within red–blue states in the last two U.S. presidential elections, highlights the need to scrutinize separately urban, suburban, exurban, and remote rural populations. Research on the welfare state has been extended through attention to subnational processes involving the state-level (Soule and Zylan 1997) and local-level (Tickamyer et al. 2007) states. For methodology, use of geographic techniques of spatial analysis and GIS has brought new ways of conceptualizing research questions and analyzing data, particularly as they involve spatial diffusion processes (Leicht and Jenkins 2007; Tolnay et al. 1996).

Second, public policy debates are often most rigorously evaluated empirically through research using territorial units. U.S. economic development policy provides a number of examples. One debate is whether policies promoting the growth of low wage retail firms like Wal-Mart will contribute to poverty across communities, with Goetz and Swaminathan (2006) finding support for that assertion. Another is whether policies promoting U.S. prison

building efforts will benefit poor, rural areas, as often touted by officials. Hooks et al. (2004) find no support that prison-building promotes economic growth in these areas. Jenkins et al. (2006) assess debates about the impacts of state government policies designed to attract high technology firms. Their study, based on a sample of metropolitan areas, tends to find positive impacts on job creation in this sector.

Finally, attention to space is imperative for social scientists seeking to understand contemporary state–society relationships, often characterized as an era of neoliberal governance. A spatial agenda is built into neoliberalism. Postwar Keynesian welfare states were instituted primarily at the national level. As they have been undermined by globalization and the decline of Fordism, neoliberalism has served the ideological purpose of providing a rationale for an alternative (and far less generous) approach to social welfare (Brenner et al. 2003: 4). The consequences for the scale and spatial variation in social welfare regimes are noteworthy: there has been a “decentering of the national scale and the proliferation of new institutions, projects and struggles at both subnational and supranational scales” (Brenner et al. 2003: 4). Under neoliberalism, governments at all levels reduce support for citizens, particularly the poor, and act more on behalf of private sector business interests, while central governments devolve greater responsibilities to subnational units (Peck and Tickell 2002). A number of analysts argue that subnational governments such as states, provinces, counties, and other local and regional units both in advanced and developing nations have become intense sites of social welfare and economic development policy-making and implementation (Brenner 2004; Lobao 2007; Lobao and Hooks 2003). Decentralization creates new rounds of social inequality, more regionally specific than in the past, because the poor are less protected by the central state and subnational governments vary in capacity to carry out redistributive functions.

In sum, research taking a spatial lens is broadly significant for the study of power, politics, and the state. An overriding contribution comes from the need to address space in order to analyze today’s big questions about shifts in governance and the distribution of power within and across societies. To advance research, much remains to be done, and we briefly outline some directions.

First, we need to develop a more systematic conceptual template that can be used to study power, politics, and the state at different scales. We are by no means advocating one-size-fits-all theory. Our point here is that currently, research tends to be segmented by scale and bifurcated between studies focusing on the nation-state including the global system of nation states and studies focusing on the local level. There is still little collective effort to theorize political processes at the subnational scale. To better understand how local and national processes are connected – social scientists need to give greater attention to their point of intersection, the subnational scale. Questions about power, politics, and the state that have been posed traditionally at particular scales also might be usefully studied across a range of scales. For example, the large literature on comparative welfare states might be extended to examine the extent to which subnational welfare regimes have emerged. A collective effort toward better theoretical understanding of how political processes would work out across different scale would accomplish several things. It would help bridge research traditions. It would create a more systematic knowledge base, where repeated use of similar concepts and attention to similar actors and institutions would yield insights into political processes at different scales. Most important, such efforts would foster a distinct overarching spatial approach to the study of politics.

Second, we need to give greater attention to human agency and how social actors strategically use and create spaces and places. Historical examples demonstrate the strategic use of space and place to achieve political ends, ranging from the deliberate location of new

settlements to selection of battlefields (Clegg 1989). Contemporary examples of business, military, and government elites (Hooks 1994; Markusen et al. 1991) show that agents of large, powerful organizations scan the terrain to identify places affording advantages in pursuing organizational goals. Location decisions of corporations and the state influence the welfare of communities and residents, and in turn, may generate social movements grounded in the strategic protection of places.

Third, to build a more comprehensive understanding of space and politics, linkages between geography and political sociology must be cultivated. We have drawn from geographers' work on space, spatial scales and places to situate the contours of political research. Geographers' disciplinary strengths with regard to these areas coupled with sociology's long-standing core body of work on power, politics, and state blend the geographical and sociological imaginations and will move research on politics forward.

Fourth, researchers need to build a stronger methodological-empirical foundation for studying political processes across geographic space. Across the social sciences, researchers are increasingly aware of the need to develop methodologies applicable to analyzing a variety of spatial data and to address other empirically related concerns. An example is the recent effort by the Center for Spatially Integrated Social Sciences (CSISS) (Goodchild and Janelle 2004), which seeks to move forward spatial thinking and analyses across disciplines. Geographic data also present common challenges which are conceptual in nature and never easily sorted out. One is the modifiable areal unit problem (Sweeney and Freser 2004), where results may vary under different levels of areal aggregation or boundary change. For example, in examining determinants of political variables (such as political affiliation), state-level studies may yield different results from local level studies. In a sense, this was found in the last two presidential elections, where instead of red–blue state variation, a “purple” America was characterized by county maps. Another issue is potential endogeneity in regional processes, where cause–effect are difficult to disentangle (Moffitt 2005). For example, do local governments in Appalachia lack capacity because their populations vote for weak or minimalist government? Or does a long history of uneven development and/or current regional characteristics undermine the capacity of local government? Another issue is modeling spatial diffusion processes. While this has been well-studied in geography, disciplines such as sociology are to still degree newcomers to understanding the forms of spatial autocorrelation that exist and how to control for them or incorporate them conceptually in political research.

Finally, researchers should look at spatial flows and processes, moving beyond the *sui generis* nature of territories. Recent calls for a “relational sociology” (Tilly 1995; Urry 2000) emphasize the importance of shifting attention to flows and to avoid overemphasizing the nodes, inert structures and frozen moments in social life. To the extent that space is incorporated into political studies, it is often tacked on as a single categorical concept – such as urban or rural location-or viewed from the vantage of a fixed territorial unit. The result is that researchers miss the dynamic exchanges occurring within and between different units at various spatial scales. By adding a focus on flows and processes, we can better address the continuity between political processes in cities, the country-side, regions, nation-states, and the world. Territories and populations are increasingly linked through technology, employment, and daily life; the demarcation between the urban and county-side is now blurred; and local, regional, national, and global structures and processes are increasingly intertwined (Castells 1996). These changes argue for a shift in focus. It is important to avoid fixing the study of political processes in any single place or scale and to focus on the connections among them. For example, the conservative right has pushed for a limited national state with its resources channeled subnationally, through localities and states. This, however, creates the potential for

place-based social movements that press for resource claims from all levels of government and for progressive subnational governments to challenge the national state. Conflict over the allocation of state resources continually moves up and down places across spatial scales, particularly given the federalist nature of American government.

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CHAPTER 21

Politics and the Environment

ROBERT J. BRULLE

For nearly 150 years, environmental concerns have been part of the U.S. political agenda. As early as 1864, the U.S. Congress debated the proper use of national lands and, motivated by press accounts of the logging of Giant Sequoia trees, decided to protect Yosemite Valley for aesthetic reasons (Brulle 2000). Since then, as industrialization and environmental impacts have risen in tandem, environmental politics has expanded its range over an increasingly wide spectrum of political action, ranging from local level land use decisions to global controls over CO₂ emissions. Thus, the study of environmental politics encompasses a range of issues across virtually all political arenas. As the range of environmental politics has expanded, so too has the scholarship on this topic. Using a wide variety of intellectual tools, ranging from legal studies to geospatial analysis, the literature on environmental politics has expanded into an immense field.

In this essay, I seek to summarize the key theoretical approaches that define this academic subfield and some of the leading research topics in environmental politics. It is important to realize that there is not one universal definition of environmentalism. Rather, environmentalism is defined by numerous discursive frames that define distinct policy fields. Thus, environmental politics is carried out in distinct communities, each focused on a particular aspect of environmental concerns. Thus, this essay begins with a discussion of the multiple frames that define environmentalism. Secondly, there are several intellectual frameworks that define the causes and cures to environmental problems. In the second part of this essay, I describe the major models regarding the causes of environmental degradation, and how these models inform different approaches to their solution. In the third section, I summarize the analysis of the drivers that are unique to the development of environmental policy. Here, I focus on specific applications of standard approaches to understanding environmental politics; (1) Changes in the political opportunity structure, (2) Movement activities, (3) Development and promulgation of new cultural belief systems, and (4) Condition of the natural environment, including major environmental disasters. This section concludes with a review of the literature on the dynamics of environmental policy.

THE RANGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

The U.S. environmental movement is perhaps the largest, most long lived, and complex social movement in the U.S. There are over 6,500 national and 20,000 local environmental organizations,

with an estimated 20–30 million members. It is also the longest running social movement. Several still existing national environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and American Forests, were founded in the late 19th century.

One way to understand the diversity of the environmental movement is through the use of discourse analysis. From a discursive viewpoint, social movement organizations can be seen as cultural rules that identify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 75; Spillman 1995: 141; Sewell 1992: 8). Through the definition of the nature of the social reality in which a movement organization exists, the discursive frame creates and defines movement organizations (Bittner 1965; Brown 1978: 373–74). On the basis of this collective identity, a network of interaction is formed which constitutes a social movement. Thus, within any social movement, there are generally multiple frames, defining distinct movement sectors or “wings” which diverge in terms of their definition of problems, strategies, and methods of organization.

Within the environmental movement, there are eleven significant frames, defining distinct movement sectors or “wings” which diverge in terms of their definition of problems, strategies, and methods of organization (Brulle 2000: 96–99; Brulle and Jenkins 2008). Subsequent analyses have verified this framework (Dreiling and Wolf 2001; Carmin and Balser 2002; Clark 2002; Lankard and McLaughlin 2003; Brechin 2003; Dalton et al. 2003; Rootes 2004; Oelschlaeger 1991). These discursive frames are listed in [Table 21.1](#). These discursive

TABLE 21.1. Major Discursive Frames in the U.S. Environmental Movement

Wildlife management:	Wildlife should be managed to insure adequate supply to provide for the recreational use of humans in terms of hunting or fishing.
Conservation:	Natural resources should be technically managed from a utilitarian perspective to realize the greatest good for the greatest number of people over the longest period of time.
Preservation:	Nature is an important component in supporting both the physical and spiritual life of humans. Hence the continued existence of wilderness and wildlife, undisturbed by human action is necessary.
Reform environmentalism:	Human health is linked to ecosystem conditions. To maintain a healthy human society, ecologically responsible actions are necessary. These actions can be developed and implemented through the use of natural sciences.
Environmental health:	Human health is the outcome of interactions with physical, chemical, biological and social factors in the natural environment, especially toxic substances and pollution. To ensure community health requires a livable and healthy community, with adequate social services, and elimination of exposures to toxic or polluting substances
Deep ecology:	The richness and diversity of all life on earth has intrinsic value, and so human life is privileged only to the extent of satisfying vital needs. Maintenance the diversity of life on earth mandates a decrease in human impacts on the natural environment, and substantial increases in the wilderness areas of the globe.
Environmental justice:	Ecological problems occur because of the structure of society and the imperatives this structure creates for the continued exploitation of nature. Hence, the resolution of environmental problems requires fundamental social change.
EcoFeminism:	Ecosystem abuse is rooted in androcentric concepts & institutions. Relations of complementarity rather than superiority between culture/nature, human/nonhuman, and male/female are needed to resolve the conflict between the human and natural worlds.
EcoSpiritualism:	Nature is God’s creation, and humanity has a moral obligation to keep and tend the Creation. Hence, natural and unpolluted ecosystems and biodiversity needs to be preserved.
Green:	All humans and their communities deserve to live in an equitable, just and environmentally sound world. Global abuses – such as ecological destruction, poverty, war, and oppression – are linked to global capitalism and the political and economic forces that have allowed the development of social inequality and injustices.
Animal rights:	All species have intrinsic rights to realize their own evolved characteristics, and to live an independent life free from human direction or intervention.

frames form the basis for many different forms of action, organization, and objectives within the current environmental movement. As framing theory and “ideologically structured action” show (Benford and Hunt 1992; Benford 1993; Benford and Snow 2000; Zald 2000; Diani 2000), discursive frames shape a number of internal organizational characteristics of movements. Knoke (1990) found, organizational culture outweighs resources, constituencies, and political alliances in defining movement strategies and tactics. Once instituted, the ideological frame of an SMO forms a collective identity that guides the subsequent socialization of leaders and activists and is therefore highly resistant to change (Gamson 1991). Research has also shown that, for the environmental movement, discursive frames are critical factors defining the practices of environmental groups, and often outweigh their resource base or political alliances (Dalton 1994; Dalton et al. 2003; Dreiling and Wolf 2001; Carmin and Balser 2002).

The development of specific movement organizations is the outcome of processes of contingent historical events, the development of specific discourses, and the mobilization of material resources used to create these organizations. This broad pattern of development shows that the current population of environmental movement organizations originated in very different historical circumstances. These historical processes have created the numerous, partially overlapping communities which form the current environmental movements in the United States. For example, the community defined by the discursive frame of wildlife management is composed primarily by hunting and fishing organizations. These organizations frequently form coalitions regarding policies involving water quality in important fishing streams, or the management policies of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agency. This community is quite unique and separate from other parts of the environmental movement, such as environmental justice organizations. However, within the environmental movement, there are several very large frame spanning organizations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, or Greenpeace. Most notably is the Sierra Club. With over 750,000 members, and active grass-roots chapters throughout the U.S., this organization spans the range of environmental concerns and has engaged in collaborative action across a number of different environmental communities.

Using a comprehensive data set of national environmental organizations (Brulle et al. 2007), the growth of the different components of the environmental movement can be empirically shown. First, the overall growth in organizations is shown in Fig. 21. 1. To simplify this presentation, the number of discourses illustrated has been reduced. First, due to the relatively small number of organizations with the discourse of Wildlife Management, and its close ideological similarity with Conservation, these two discursive frames have been combined. Secondly, due to their small numbers, organizations with the discursive frames of Animal Rights, Deep Ecology, Ecofeminism, Ecospiritualism, Environmental Health, Environmental Justice, and Anti-Globalization/Green have been combined into one category, labeled here as “Alternative Discourses.” As this graph illustrates, there was a substantial increase in the levels of organizational foundings starting in the mid 1950s up until around 1967. This was followed by explosive growth starting in the time period 1968–1970, and again in the 1988–1990 timeframe.

To further examine this growth by different discursive frames, the relative growth rates of the different communities are shown in Fig. 21. 2. This graph clearly shows that the discursive frames of Preservation and Conservation/Wildlife Management were dominant up until the end of the 1930s. In the 1940s, there was a significant rise in the number of alternative discursive organizations. This was primarily due to the increase of environmental health organizations founded during World War II. Additionally, the founding of Preservation organizations dramatically declined in the 1940s. However, in the 1950s, Preservation foundings increased rapidly, and Conservation/Wildlife Management foundings started a long slow decline. Additionally, Reform Environmental organizational foundings started a long and steady increase,





FIGURE 21.1. U.S. national and regional environmental organizations 1900–2000.



Note: Trends based on 5 year moving average

FIGURE 21.2. Foundings by discursive frame.

which culminated in an explosive rate of growth in 1970. Additionally, as more alternative discursive frames were developed in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a slow but steady growth in these organizations in the time period from 1960 on.

What this graph shows is that there are unique developmental dynamics to each discursive community. It is the cumulative impact of these different developmental dynamics that has led to the highly differentiated environmental movement we encounter today.

The current number of organizations and their financial resources in each discursive frame are shown in [Table 21.2](#). As this table shows, the largest numbers of organizations are found in the long established discursive frames of Reform Environmentalism, Preservation, and Conservation. Together, these three discursive frames represent 83% of the environmental movement. All of the other discursive frames represent 5% or less of the total organizations. Thus, although a great deal of attention is given to the newer discursive frames in the academic literature, the environmental movement continues to be concentrated in these more conventional and long lived discursive frames.

Additionally, using information compiled in the comprehensive data set on organizations with income listed in the IRS nonprofit organizational data file (Brulle et al. 2007), the annual income for the organizations in each discursive frame was calculated. On the basis of 1,390 organizations with IRS income data, [Table 21.2](#) shows the total income of these different discursive communities in 2003. As this table shows, fully 50% of the funding of the environmental movement is found in organizations with a Preservationist frame. This is followed by the other three mainstream discursive frames of Reform Environmentalism, Wildlife Management, and Conservation, ranging between 12.7% and 20.4% of total income. The alternative discourses have very low levels of economic resources. Even if they are all combined, they total less than 5% of the total income distribution. As these data show, the different components of the environmental movement have widely varying histories of development and vast differentials in terms of income. These differentials need to be acknowledged in any analysis of the dynamics of environmental politics in the U.S.

TABLE 21.2. Income Distribution by Discursive Frame – 2003

Frame	<i>N</i>	% of <i>N</i>	Total Income	% of Total	Mean	Median
Animal rights	35	2.5%	95,542,298	1.9%	2,729,780	420,819
Conservation	223	16.0%	627,813,084	12.2%	2,815,305	345,421
Deep ecology	34	2.4%	17,763,087	.3%	522,444	270,092
Ecofeminism	4	0.3%	2,027,480	>.1%	506,870	115,100
Ecospiritualism	12	0.9%	8,776,361	.2	731,363	149,452
Environmental health	33	2.4%	36,683,659	.7%	1,111,626	503,346
Environmental justice	38	2.7%	57,301,562	1.1%	1,507,936	385,728
Green/anti-globalization	9	0.6%	8,844,870	.2%	982,763	571,318
Preservation	536	38.6%	2,590,627,143	50.3%	4,833,260	296,873
Reform environmentalism	404	29.1%	1,048,293,688	20.4%	2,594,786	395,409
Wildlife management	62	4.5%	656,084,214	12.7%	10,582,003	310,477
Total	1,390	100.0%	5,149,757,446	100.0%	3,704,861	348,058

TABLE 21.3. Environmental Movement Tactics

Tactic	Percent distribution
Public opinion and media advocacy	86%
Political advocacy	28%
Support services	42%
Physical activities	22%
Community organizing	21%
Protest	2%

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

A second key to understanding the range of environmental politics is through the analysis of the different underlying models of the interactions between society and the natural environment. These approaches cross discursive communities, and thus define a second dimension in environmental politics. The nature of the specific models of the driving forces has an important impact on the nature of environmental policy. Forsyth (2003) argues from a Foucaultian perspective, that environmental science and politics are coproduced and reinforcing processes. This means that politics is not strictly limited to responding to neutral scientific finding. Political forces also work to shape the nature of and dissemination of environmental frameworks that reflect certain political or economic interests, resulting in implicit social and political models being built into statements of supposedly neutral explanations (Forsyth 2003: 20). These frameworks then are used to guide the development of environmental policy along certain lines. These analyses then form the “institutional basis of truth claims” which are presented as non-negotiable forms of truth to legitimate certain political objectives (Forsyth 2003: 275).” Thus, it is important to see the connections between different models of environmental degradation, and how they define a certain political approach.

There is no single, universally accepted or consistent formulation of the driving forces of environmental change (Berkes and Folke 1998: 9). Scholars have worked on developing a number of perspectives on the key driving forces. While several different theoretical models have been formulated, only three of these models have developed into a substantive literature: Neo-Malthusian Models, Ecological Modernization Theory, and Political Economy/World Systems Theory (Cantor and Yohe 1998: 69; Dietz and Rosa 2002: 385–389). All three of these models define different approaches to the solution of environmental problems, and thus have significant political impacts.

Neo-Malthusian Models

There are several related models regarding the key driving forces of environmental change. For example, the NRC (1992: 75) identifies (1) population change, (2) economic growth, (3) technological change, (4) political-economic institutions, and (5) attitudes and beliefs as the key drivers of ecological change. Recently, the Millennium Assessment identified six major global environmental driving forces: (1) Demographic Drivers, (2) Economic Drivers, (3) Sociopolitical drivers, (4) Science and technology drivers, (5) Cultural and religious drivers; and (6) Physical, biological, and chemical drivers (MEA 2005: 91). What is common to these models is that the various drivers are listed without any connections drawn between them or any overriding theoretical model to inform their selection or interactions.

One effort to develop a more comprehensive model between society and the natural environment is the neo-malthusian formulation known as the IPAT model. Originally developed in 1971 (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971), the IPAT model “represents the efforts of population biologists, ecologists, and environmental scientists to formalize the relationship between population, human welfare, and environmental impacts (Dietz and Rosa 1994: 278).” The IPAT model postulates a causal sequence of the impacts of human activity on the natural environment. Environmental Impacts (I) are seen as a function of three variables (1) P – Population, (2) A – Affluence Level, and (3) T – Technological Development. The IPAT model forms the basis for a number of significant reports, including the Millennium Assessment and the IPCC reports. For example, this framework has been utilized extensively as an overall framework by

the IPCC to develop emissions scenarios (IPCC 2000). What this analysis does is to collect a listing of relevant driving factors under each variable. So, while the emissions scenarios of the IPCC have a greater degree of inclusion of specific variables, the analysis remains piecemeal, and lacking any overall theoretical integration.

There are a number of empirical and theoretical difficulties with this approach. Mishra et al. (1998: 126–135) argue that the IPAT model is fundamentally flawed as an empirical research tool. They point to two areas, first is the assumption of the independence of population, affluence, and technological development. Instead, the authors maintain that these variables are interrelated, and thus not independent. Secondly, while technology is seen to be a major driver of environmental change, thus far to date, the application of the IPAT model has yet to develop and include an empirical measurement of technology. So instead of measuring T, it is treated as a residual category that includes virtually all of the other possible explanations of environmental change, and the error term of the model (Dietz and Rosa 1997: 177).” Thus the meaning of technology originally specified in the IPAT model dissolves in this analysis into a completely residual category.

Additionally, there are two major theoretical critiques of the IPAT model. First, the IPAT model treats each nation state as independent from other states. So thus the internal conditions of a country alone account for its environmental impact. The IPAT model is unable to view these relationships, and hence they remain unexamined in the IPAT models (Fischer-Kowalski and Amann 2001: 36). Secondly, the IPAT model is its grounding in agent based and individualistic analysis. The key drivers of environmental degradation in the IPAT models are increasing individual levels of consumption and population growth. This analysis leaves out the social, economic, and cultural forces that create changes in consumption levels or in population growth (Mishra et al. 1998: 119), which the IPAT model fails to consider this dynamic (Douglas et al. 1998: 259). By being bound to an individualist analysis, the IPAT model is unable to examine the social, cultural, and institutional factors that drive environmental change (Cantor and Yohe 1998: 64–65). Thus the IPAT model is unable to connect to social theory (Mishra et al. 1998: 129). Thus the IPAT model is decontextualized in that it does not situate the process of ecological degradation within a specific social, cultural, or historical dynamic. Accordingly, this model fails to elaborate on the aspects of the current social order that contribute to the process of ecological degradation.

Accordingly, Forsyth (2003: 37) argues that the IPAT model is an excellent example of an “Environmental Orthodoxy”, i.e., an institutionalized, but highly criticized conceptualization of environmental degradation. Since the IPAT model does not address the role of social norms and organizations in the production of environmental degradation, Forsyth (2003: 46) argues that it effectively obscures the institutional factors driving environmental degradation, and legitimates a political solution not based on systematic institutional reform, but specific actions based on analyses provided by the natural sciences. This focus on the proximate determinants of environmental degradation leaves the dominant social institutions unchallenged. Thus the IPAT model serves to delegitimize institutional critiques, and thus maintains the existing system of economic and political power (Maniates 2002: 59–62, Cantor and Yohe 1998 64–65). Without a critical perspective on both the limitations of the IPAT approach and its political functions, this model becomes reified and forms a virtual ideology that conceals relationships of power and domination regarding environmental degradation.

In practice, this leads to the legitimation of natural scientists as the key to effective governance. This model takes the form of Green Governmentality (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007: 126–129) or global environmental management (Glover 2006: 3–6). In this approach, the solution to environmental problems is the implementation of a strong system of governance

of the economy, natural resource use, and individual behavior informed by the natural sciences. This places scientists in the key role of defining the nature of this problem, and proposing mechanisms for their resolution. In essence, this viewpoint legitimates the creation of an ecotocracy. This approach underlies the many of the existing international treaty frameworks, in which science-based resource management plays a central role. It also informs actions aimed at the proximate causes of environmental degradation, such as creating parks or land trusts to preserve ecosystems, or developing methods to limit population growth.

Ecological Modernization

The second major approach is known as Ecological Modernization. This theoretical approach focuses on the role of technological development, economic expansion, and the growth of environmental governance in creating and also mitigating environmental problems. In this perspective, economic development and shifts in technology lead to the initial generation of environmental problems. However, further economic development can also mitigate these problems. The process of modernization leads to the development of more advanced technologies and a shift from highly polluting production to less polluting production methods (Cantor and Yohe 1998: 70–71). This shift in production results in a decrease of environmental pollution and a decoupling of economic growth and the use of ecological resources (Murphy 2000: 1–2). This process takes the form of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), i.e. – levels of environmental degradation follow an inverted U curve, in which at a certain point of development, environmental degradation will quit increasing and start decreasing. Thus, in this perspective, economic growth can result in an absolute decline in levels of environmental pollution (Mol 2001: 56).

In addition to the dynamics of an industrial economy pointing to the resolution of environmental problems, the process of modernization is also theorized to increase social transformations that increase the capacity of industrial societies to address environmental degradation. The development of environmental interests and ideas is seen to lead to a constant transformation and “ecological restructuring” of industrial societies (Mol 2001: 59).” This restructuring is based on two related dynamics of modernization. First, concern over environmental degradation is linked to increasing affluence and education as theorized by Inglehart (1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). For Inglehart, environmental quality is a concern that emerges only after lower levels of need, such as basic requirements for food and security, are met. Thus rising affluence, higher levels of education, and increased communication capabilities associated with economic expansion can lead to a greater capacity for political mobilization to demand environmental quality (Cantor and Yohe 1998: 70–71). As affluence and education increase, the public concern over environmental degradation will also naturally increase. This translates into increased formation of environmental movement organizations and pressure on both the government and business to address environmental pollution. Secondly, the institutionalization and expansion of democracy and civil liberties in advanced capitalist societies increases the potential levels of public participation and social movements (Spaargaren and Mol 1992; Hajer 1995; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000: 3–4). These institutions, based in civil society, can create effective political pressure on the state to address environmental degradation (Murphy 2000: 4; Mol 2001: 222).

Thus, through the rise of civil society and the environmental movement, social change can be brought about that can lead to the ecological restructuring of social institutions. Thus capitalism is seen as being flexible enough to adapt its institutions to environmental limits

(Murphy 2000: 1–2; Crenshaw and Jenkins 1996; Spaargaren 1997; Buttel 2000: 61). Thus at the core of ecological modernization theory is that the existing social, economic, and governmental institutions can effectively deal with environmental issues, and there is no need for radical structural changes in industrial society (York and Rosa 2003: 274; Buttel 2000: 62).

While the ecological modernization approach has enjoyed a widespread acceptance within sociology, it has also been subjected to a rigorous critique. First, the EKC hypothesis has been subjected to extensive scientific analysis. Based on his analysis, Stern (2004: 1420) concludes that “the EKC does not exist.” Rather, a careful empirical analysis of this phenomena reveals that the proximate causes for the appearance of the EKC are due to growth in the economy, changes in economic production, and shifts in raw material and technology of production (Stern 2004: 1421). The apparent decline in a country’s level of environmental degradation as economic growth increases merely reflect the increasing globalization of production (Stern 2004: 1426; Fischer-Kowalski and Amann 2001: 28). In fact, the increase in environmental impacts through economic growth has been well documented in a detailed study of the U.S. economy over the time period from 1905–1995 (Ayers et al. 2004). On the basis of the analysis of the material flows into the U.S. economic system, they demonstrate that “There is little evidence of per capita dematerialization of the U.S. economy. On the contrary, increased demand seems to overcompensate for efficiency gains in every case we have investigated (Ayers et al. 2004: 80).”

Additionally, ecological modernization fails to engage with the extensive and well developed empirical analyses regarding both the factors driving individual environmental beliefs, and the creation, maintenance, and impact of social movement organizations. First, the theory of ecological modernization relies heavily on Inglehart’s notion of post-materialism, i.e. – as wealth increases, this will lead to the growth of concerns beyond economic survival and security, and then leads to the expansion of environmental concerns. What this ignores is the well developed literature based on international polls on environmental attitudes (Dunlap 1993; Dunlap and York 2008; Dunlap and Mertig 1995) regarding international environmental attitudes. Secondly, ecological modernization arguments generally point to the growth of institutions to address environmental issues as demonstration that an ecological sphere is growing to address environmental issues. First, it is not at all clear that the growth of institutions to address environmental degradation will actually result in this occurring (York and Rosa 2003: 282). Additionally, this approach fails to take into account several different explanations for the expansion of international environmental associations and legislation (DeSombre 2000). Third, while ecological modernization asserts the growing political influence of the environmental movement, it fails to build on the many theoretical and empirical studies of the actual influence of social movements in industrialized society. A number of recent analyses challenge the assertions of ecological modernization of the growing influence of the environmental movement. Rather, they show a relative decline in the importance of social movements (Barber 1984; Habermas 1996; Putnam 2000; Fiorina and Skocpol 1999; Fung 2003; Brulle 2000). This directly contradicts one of the central premises of ecological modernization theory. Overall then, ecological modernization fails to engage with the detailed empirical literature regarding the phenomena it lumps together under the rubric of “ecological modernization.” The end result is that ecological modernization has not developed a set of hypotheses that can be the focus of a research agenda (Buttel 2000: 64) nor can this approach make any meaningful contribution to the relevant sociological literatures on the processes it purports to examine.

Yet, despite its theoretical and empirical deficiencies, ecological modernization has risen to a high degree of prominence in public discourse regarding environmental problems. This theoretical perspective underlies many approaches to environmental degradation that

stress technological innovation and economic growth. Buttel (2000) argues that this rise to prominence is that it “accorded particularly well with a number of intellectual and broader political-economic factors.” Ecological modernization argues that capitalism can be modified to be ecologically sustainable, and that these modifications are both economically and politically feasible (Fisher and Freudenberg 2004: 702). We can continue to grow and, in fact, it is through economic expansion that we can effectively deal with environmental problems. In this view, capitalism can be readily modified to be ecologically sustainable and no changes in our style of living, consumption patterns, or basic institutions are needed (Buttel 2000).

Politically, this approach legitimates a liberal market approach to the resolution of environmental problems. The mechanisms involved include the use of market based user fees for pollution, tax incentives, increases in energy efficiency, or the shifting of production toward “green” products. This position legitimates a corporatist approach to environmental problems, in which corporations and government develop a joint environmental approach. One excellent example of this approach can be seen in the development of the Obama administration’s “green” infrastructure investment plan. So, despite its tenuous intellectual foundations, this approach has found a wide audience among corporate and government elites (Glover 2006: 4–6; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007: 129–131). This argument has obvious appeal to entrenched interests and to those who wish to avoid significant change. A number of scholars have argued that ecological modernization is essentially a discourse to ensure economic growth and to co-opt industrialism’s environmental critics (Torgerson 1995: 15; Bernstein 2001: 178–179; Blühdorn 2000: 30).

Political Economy and the Environment

The final major model of environmental degradation is the use of political economy to explain the development and continued persistence of environmental problem (Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994; O’Connor 1973, 1984, 1987). This perspective maintains that the capitalist economy forms a “treadmill of production” that continues to create ecological problems through a self-reinforcing mechanism of ever more production and consumption. The logic of the treadmill of production is an ever-growing need for capital investment to generate goods for sale in the marketplace. Corporations seek to maximize the return on capital investment. Thus, they continuously attempt to reduce production costs through improved technology. While this technology may improve the efficiency of resource in one area, and thus lead to the appearance of environmental improvement, it ultimately increases environmental impacts, as the profits are reinvested to increase production in a different area, increasing economic growth. From an ecological perspective this process requires continuous and growing inputs of energy and material. The expansion of the economy drives two fundamental dynamics of a market economy: first, the creation of economic wealth, and second, the creation of the negative byproducts of the production process. Thus the treadmill operates to maintain a positive rate of return on investments and externalizes the environmental costs of its activities. The social and economic benefits of the treadmill are unevenly distributed in favor of business and affluent communities, whereas the environmental risks associated with the treadmill are disproportionately concentrated among specific groups of people with the least ability to resist the location of polluting facilities in their community. Thus polluting facilities are sited among “the most vulnerable groups: the poor, unskilled laborers, and the skilled blue collar” residents (Gould et al. 1996: 13).

The Treadmill of Production has been extended into an analysis of global economic systems through the development of World Systems Theory (WST). WST is based on the application of political economy to a global scale (Bunker 1984, 1985; Burns et al. 1994;

Kick et al. 1996). The central point of world-system theory is that all nations of the world are organized into a single global economy. Nations are divided into three different locations, the core, semiperiphery, and the periphery. The core nations consist of wealthy and powerful nations that control economic trade relationships, and dominate global politics. The periphery nations are primarily small and politically weak. They have a minimal level of industrialization, and their economies are dominated by the export of natural resources. Finally, nations in the semiperiphery occupy an intermediate position between the core and periphery. They have some political power, and a developing industrial base. Within this system, core nations are dominant economic and political powers. It is in these nations that the greatest levels of economic production and consumption occur. They also have the power to set favorable terms of trade. Peripheral nations serve as sources for the basic raw materials needed for production, and also as the site for the disposal of hazardous waste from the core (Bunker 1984, 1985; Frey 1995, 1998). Thus the world systems perspective, environmental impacts will continually increase with economic growth. However, the impacts will not be limited to the nation in which the economic growth occurs. The fundamental conclusion of this perspective is that reformist policies and new technological developments will not result in a decrease of the extent of environmental degradation. Rather, the fundamental solution rests on a restructuring of societies away from economic expansion and toward ecological sustainability.

There are several emerging critiques of this perspective. First, the treadmill sees political economy as a unitary cause of social relationships i.e., – in the end, the treadmill of production is seen to govern all production relationships. Thus this perspective is unable to explain the significant variance of environmental degradation within capitalism between different nation states (Mol 2001: 203). Additionally, as Wright (2004: 317–322) has noted, the treadmill of production has not produced any form of alternative other than a vague notion of socialist control over the economy. Finally, as was well noted by Habermas (1975), the political economy approach to social relationships is unable to examine the social and cultural relations that make up advanced societies. Specifically, he maintains that political economy limits the discussion to the sphere of society concerned with the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, thereby ignoring the social relations involved and the socialization processes that enable the stable role production in capitalist society. Thus, the cultural drivers of environmental degradation are invisible to this perspective.

The political economy approach informs a resistance movement to both the liberal environmental mechanisms legitimated by ecological modernization, and the notion of global governance associated with neo-malthusian models. This alternative takes the form of civic environmentalism. Both market based and global governance approaches are seen to favor the existing power elites, and the marginalization of poorer, less developed countries. So rather than advocating either approach, civic environmentalism is seen as the radical democratization of global governance and economic processes. It aims at “a fundamental transformation of consumption patterns and existing institutions to realize a more eco-centric and equitable world order (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007: 132). Hence the political economy model places a great deal of emphasis on the notion of environmental justice, and the equitable sharing of technology and capital to enable the poorest nations to address environmental problems, as well as the reform of large multi-lateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

Empirical Research on the Driving Forces of Environmental Change

Recently, there has been the emergence of empirical research programs to sort out the validity of these different models of environmental change. This research program centers on the

development of the STIRPAT model. In 1994, Dietz and Rosa (1994) reformulated the IPAT equation as STIRPAT – defined as the “Stochastic Impacts by Regression on Population, Affluence and Technology”. The objective of this model is to disaggregate P, A, and T and utilize regression analysis to test the relationships between Population, Affluence and Technology and Environmental Impacts. The STIRPAT equation takes the form $I = aP^bA^cT^de$, where P, A, and T are included in a regression equation, and are modified based on statistical analysis, where variables a – d take the form of specific parameters or complex function (Dietz and Rosa 1994, 1997). As a result, York et al. (2002) maintain that the STIRPAT model can be used “to test hypotheses and develop a more sophisticated and subtle analysis than can be done with the original $I = PAT$ formulation.” In the application of the STIRPAT model, T (Technology) represents “not just physical infrastructure but also social and economic organization, culture, and all factors whose effects are not captured by population and affluence (Dietz and Rosa 1997: 177).” Since there is no clear empirical measure of T, the value of this independent variable is typically included in the error term. With T left out of the model, this allows for the entry of additional factors (such as social or ecological variables) that are not included in Population or Affluence to be entered into the equation. Thus the final equation takes the general form: Environmental Impact (I) = a + B₁(Population) + B₂(Affluence) + B₃ (Other Variables) + e

There have been a series of empirical tests and elaboration of this model (Dietz and Rosa 1994, 1997; Rosa 1997). These analyses take the form of a statistical analysis utilizing historical or cross-sectional data to assess the relationships between Environmental Impacts and the “Driving Forces” of environmental degradation (Fischer-Kowalski and Amann 2001: 9–10). Some of the key findings show: (1) a declining rate of CO₂ emission increases per capita in countries with a GDP over \$10,000 (Dietz and Rosa 1997), (2) considerable nonlinearity in the impacts of changes in population and affluence on energy use and CO₂ emissions (Mazur 1994; Shi 2003; York et al. 2003b; Waggoner and Ausubel 2002), and (3) significantly different contributions of population, affluence, or technology depending on the nature of the environmental degradation – e.g. toxic chemical production is a function of technology change, where as impacts of food production are highly related to population changes (York et al. 2002). Additionally, variations of the IPAT model have been applied toward understanding CO₂ impacts at the local level (Soule and Dehart 1998). Recently, the STIRPAT model has been expanded to assess the validity of ecological modernization (York and Rosa 2003; York et al. 2003a, c), and the factors that influence motor vehicle use and their associated environmental impacts (York 2003). Additionally, further multi-national studies have shown that the major causes of greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental problems turn out to be economic growth and population, magnified by open trade policy and foreign investment in developing countries. Open trade allows for the movement of polluting industrial processes to pollution havens (York et al. 2003a; Jorgensen and Burns 2007, Dinda 2004; Jorgensen et al. 2007). Additionally, what these empirical models show is virtually no empirical support for either ecological modernization, and many of the proximate causes identified by the natural sciences. Rather, the empirical evidence to date supports the treadmill of production approach most strongly.

DRIVERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS

To understand the unique factors that influence environmental politics requires the consideration of four key theoretical approaches. The first factor is the shifting political opportunities that frame environmental politics. Changes in political opportunities may have both a direct effect on policy and an indirect effect through facilitating and channeling the environmental movement.

The second component focuses on the mobilization and activities of the environmental movement, including the formation of new environmental movement organizations (EMOs), their strategies and tactics, and their direct and indirect influences. Cultural dynamics comprise the third component of the framework. Media coverage and the environmental beliefs of both elites and the public have impacts on both the environmental movement and its activities, as well as on environmental policy. Finally, environmental politics is deeply impacted by the condition of the natural environment, especially in the form of major environmental incidents. Together, these four areas exercise critical and unique influences on the dynamics of environmental politics.

Political Opportunity Structure

One of the key influences on environmental politics is the enduring split between Democratic and Republican elites. As Dunlap et al. (2001) shows, there has been a continuous and increasing divergence on environmental issues between the Democratic and Republican parties over the last three decades. Thus shifts in party control have major influences on the legislative success of the environmental movement (Rubin et al. 1983; Issac and Christensen 2002; Minkoff 1997; Jenkins et al. 2003). A second factor driving environmental politics are third party challengers. In a forthcoming analysis (Jenkins et al. 2008), 3rd party votes in Presidential elections are key contributors to the formation of new EMOs, indicating the mobilization of a significant segment of the population that is alienated from the major political parties.

A compliment to influential allies or external support is the extent of opposition encountered by a social movement. Some advance the thesis that movements respond to political threats, i.e. "the costs that social groups will incur from protest, or that it expects to suffer if it does not take action" (Goldstone and Tilly 2001: 183). In the case of the environmental politics, one major factor is a strong countermovement mobilization (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1632; Gale 1986: 207; Pichardo 1995). Over the past century, a number of short-lived anti-environmental countermovements have mobilized (Short 1989: ix; Brulle 2000: 119–129). These included: (1) demonstrations against the development of the national forests from 1891–1914 (Robbins 1962: 316; Maughan and Nilson 1993: 2; Richardson 1962: 36–40, 155), (2) protests over grazing fees in the Stanfield Rebellion (1925–1934), and McCarran Protests (1941–1946) (Cawley 1993; Maughan and Nilson 1993; Clepper 1966: 140; Graf 1990: 166), and (3) the attack on Silent Spring in 1962 (Brulle 2000: 123–124). The nature of the countermovement quantitatively and qualitatively shifted in the late 1970s with the development of the "Sagebrush Rebellion." (Shabercoff 1993: 164). The agenda remained the same, as previous countermovements, (Graf 1990: 228; Short 1989: 15; Cawley 1993: 103). However, in distinction to previous countermovements, this phase resulted in a number of new countermovement organizations (Graf 1990: 243). The Sagebrush Rebellion expanded and gave birth to a larger organized countermovement in the late 1980s known as the "Wise Use Movement" (Cawley 1993: 166; Knox 1990; O'Callaghan 1992; Stapleton 1992; Helvarg 1994: 9). This movement continued to expand in the 1990s, and is now a potent political force (Brick and Cawley 1996: 7; Canan and Pring 1988; Helvarg 1994; Grumbine 1994; Austin 2002).

The Environmental Movement

The second component focuses on the activities of the environmental movement. Movements can have both direct and indirect effects on environmental policies. For the environmental

movement, this impact is dependent on the levels of foundation funding, organizational governance characteristics, and activities of the movement. First, the environmental movement is heavily influenced by foundation funding. Since the late 1950s, foundations have provided critical startup funding and currently, roughly a quarter of the annual budgets of the major environmental organizations (Godwin and Mitchell 1984: 837; Johnson 1998; Jenkins and Halcli 1999). Brulle (2000: 256) shows that foundation grants were the second largest source of income (between 22 and 29% of total income) for the major environmental EMOs in the mid-1990s. Brulle and Jenkins (2005) shows that most foundation funding goes to the moderate organizations that use the traditional discourses of conservation, preservation, and mainstream liberal environmentalism. Although the total pool of environmental funding has grown rapidly almost fivefold per decade since the 1970s, it has been concentrated on a relatively small number of large EMOs involved in political advocacy work. The impact of this funding has been to channel the environmental movement into more moderate discourses and conventional forms of action. While there are notable cases of foundations attempting to directly control movement activities, the general pattern is a more indirect process of creating incentives for specific discourses, styles of organization, and tactics, thereby drawing the movement into the institutional system. A typical case is the conversion of the tropical forest products boycott organizations into sustainable forest products monitoring (Bartley 2007). Under pressure from the boycott, Home Depot and other forest product marketers met with Pew Foundation officials and boycott leaders to develop a new system for monitoring the sustainability of tropical forest production. Pew then worked with other foundations to legitimize this new system of monitoring, bringing a disruptive boycott to a close and instituting a new system of tropical forest production.

Additionally, little environmental funding goes to participatory membership associations, meaning that instead of being governed by citizens, the environmental movement has become increasingly controlled by foundations that represent large corporate wealth and rationalized power in the American political economy. Most are professional movement organizations with at most a "paper" membership of direct mail contributors who lack participatory mechanisms. The role of the so-called members is to be donors, not participants who actively guide organization programs and activities. Decision making is concentrated in the hands of the staff and board, who are largely self-selecting and autonomous from member control. Critics argue that this blunts the potential impact of movements, promotes nonparticipatory civic organizations and limits the range of viewpoints represented in the public arena (Skocpol 1999; Brulle 2000).

The final area focuses on the activities of EMOs. Social movement organizations employ a wide range of tactics in pursuit of their aims, ranging from institutional tactics, such as educational campaigns, lobbying and litigation, to expressive and direct actions, such as strikes, protests, or other confrontational activities. Most social movement research has focused on protest as reported in leading newspapers. While environmental protest may have a significant effect on the enactment of environmental policy (Agnone 2007; Soule and Olzak 2007; Jenkins et al. 2007), it is a small component of environmental movement activity. In a forthcoming analysis, Jenkins et al. (forthcoming) show the following distribution of movement tactics.

As this table shows, protest actions are only engaged in by 2% of environmental movement organizations. The largest component is spent on general public environmental education. This is followed by the provision of support services to the other components of the environmental movement. Political advocacy is the third most common activity. What is unique about the environmental movement is that a large number of movement organizations engage in physical activities to improve the environment. Most notably are the activities of large environmental land trusts, which aim to improve the environment by buying and preserving

land. Another major activity engaged in by environmental movement organizations is the planting of trees to combat deforestation. This is a unique activity that is not usually found in any other social movement.

Cultural Dynamics of Environmental Politics

To examine the specific dynamics of environmental politics, it is necessary to consider the cultural dynamics of the rise and fall of environmental issues. The cultural approach to environmental politics (Melucci 1989, 1996; Rochon 1998; Zald 2000; Williams 2004) emphasizes the creation and dissemination of new worldviews, the development and structuring of social movements based on these alternative worldviews, and the competition of these movement worldviews with dominant worldviews for cultural hegemony. Specifically, a number of scholars (e.g. Rochon 1998; Benford and Snow 2000) have highlighted the need to examine the “cultural contexts in which movements grow, flourish and wither” (Williams 2004: 95). As Rochon (1998) shows, the creation and advocacy of alternative discursive frames involves two distinct social groups. The first consists of a self-aware, mutually interacting “critical community.” Arguing that social movements initially form around the ideas generated by critical intellectuals, Rochon (1998: 8–22) distinguishes between “critical communities,” i.e., small groups of critical thinkers “whose experiences, reading, and interaction with each other help them to develop a set of cultural values that is out of step with the larger society,” and social movements, which emerge in response to (among other things) the world views developed by these critical communities. As Rochon (1998: 22) argues, the key process is the creation of a new alternative worldview displaying “sensitivity to some problem, an analysis of the sources of the problem, and a prescription for what should be done about the problem.” This alternative worldview and its dissemination by a movement is a critical condition for the collective perception of a social problem. Without the language to define and evaluate problems, potential grievances and opportunities/threats are ignored. For example, in 1966, a serious nuclear accident at the Fermi nuclear reactor in Detroit stirred neither protest nor public demands for closer regulation (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Thirteen years later, when the Three Mile Island nuclear accident occurred, the local response in terms of protests and demands for shutting down the nuclear reactor was prompt and widespread (Walsh 1988), reflecting the intervening changes in environmental frames.

Within the environmental movement, natural scientists have long played an important role as critical intellectuals. As early as 1873, the American Association for the Advancement of Science petitioned Congress and the President to take action to address deforestation in the U.S. (Dana and Fairfax 1980: 42). Scientists have played this role throughout the history of the environmental movement (Tschinkel 1989; Hastie 2007), exemplified by the rise of environmental scientists, such as Dr. Barry Commoner, who act as prominent environmental spokespersons (Egan 2007) and Rachel Carson, who was an environmental scientist for the Audubon Society at the time she wrote *Silent Spring* (1962). Thus the environmental movement is unique in the critical role that environmental scientists play in the development and promulgation of environmental issues.

Environmental Conditions

For the most part, environmental politics are driven by large long term trends in economic development, demographic change, and the slow degradation of natural systems. The response

to the deterioration of the natural environment tends to be incremental and piecemeal. A traditional explanation that has been advanced for environmental policy shifts is the classic “grievance” or “strain” thesis. Several studies show that grievances and strains affect mobilization (e.g. Walsh 1988; Snow et al. 1998; Jenkins et al. 2003) and conventional wisdom suggests that these may influence public opinion and public policy. In this sense, the environmental movement is very similar to other social movements.

However, one unique characteristic of environmental politics is the policy impact of dramatic incidents. Unlike most social movements, environmental conditions can create large scale incidents that have the power to shift environmental politics. In the U.S, there have been a number of significant environmental incidents that led to rapid changes in environmental policy. These events, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents, and the Love Canal Toxic Waste site incident, all catalyzed public and policy concern, and greatly accelerated policy action in these areas (Leiserowitz et al. 2006: 50).

A key framework in examining these events is the notion of punctuated equilibrium developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993; Repetto 2006). The core idea of their model is that the U.S. policy system is characterized by relatively stable relations, with intermittent shifts in both the nature of the policy discussion and the venue in which the political process takes place. A punctuated equilibrium refers to the situation in which the ways an issue is characterized in the mass media shifts, and new political venues are created in response to these shifting public concerns (Gormleyuld 2007; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Bosso 1987). For example, early nuclear accidents were virtually unnoted by the mass media and policy-makers in the 1950s (e.g. the Fermi near disaster), creating no public response, but Three Mile Island and Chernobyl stirred considerable protest and mobilization in the 1980s (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). This was due to a reframing of nuclear incidents as potentially catastrophic in nature.

In his analysis of environmental disasters and their impact on the policy process, Birkland (2006: 168) centers on the concept of focusing events. He defines focusing events as large disasters that “change the salience of issues and sometimes replace indicator-based analyses with much more emotionally charged examples of policy failure and the need for reform (Birkland 2006: 168).” His empirical analyses show that focusing events draw increased attention to a problem. However, “increased attention is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for event-related policy change (Birkland 2006: 180, 1997).” Rather, the increased attention creates a window of opportunity in which political actors can mobilize for new policy directions.

The news coverage of an event generally focuses on the scope, extent of visible and tangible harm, and the novelty of the event (Birkland 1997: 31–32). Under certain conditions, this event can develop into a longer-term reaction in the policy making community. The response of the political community is dependent on two factors. First is the degree to which the pro-change community is organized. “If no group exists to react to the event, the event will fail to gain more than passing attention (Birkland 1997: 43).” Thus without an organized institutional advocacy component, the window of opportunity created by a focusing event can pass without any significant policy change. Secondly, the degree of polarization in the policy community impacts the extent of policy change. As Birkland (1997: 39) notes: “The most polarized communities will find that events have relatively little influence on the overall trend in policy. A greater extent of polarization results in a vigorous defense of a coalition’s core beliefs, even in the face of a highly dramatic event.” However, if the pro-change community is well organized, and the policy community is not highly polarized, focusing events can lead to a process of event related learning, in which new ideas and information are applied to environmental policy decisions and greater potential for policy change (Birkland 1997: 134, 2006: 22).

CONCLUSION

Thus, environmental politics has several unique characteristics that make its analysis significantly different from most policy fields. First, environmental politics does not center on a single discursive frame. Rather, it has multiple discursive frames that define distinct fields of interaction. Second, there are competing notions of what constitutes the driving forces of environmental degradation, which results in different political approaches that are adopted by distinct communities to forward their particular interests in the adoption of environmental policies. Finally, there are several characteristics of environmental politics that make its study unique. This includes: a large foundation presence, a well developed counter-movement, the importance of science in defining environmental issues, and the potential for dramatic incidents to shift environmental policies. Together, these factors overlay the traditional approaches to the study of politics. A combined approach that recognizes both the common and unique factors that comprise environmental politics offers the best approach for scholarship on this topic.

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CHAPTER 22

Politics as a Cultural Phenomenon

LIAH GREENFELD AND ERIC MALCZEWSKI

Culture is the symbolic process through which human beings cognitively order reality and transmit their ways of life. Human beings are creatures of culture, having culture-specific orientations to reality (i.e., forms of consciousness) and culture-induced motivations that vary across history, types of societies, and individual experience: political problems – those problems related to the structure of authority relationships and distribution of power – are, therefore, necessarily cultural problems.¹ The core phenomena in any problem of politics, indeed in any problem concerning humanity, are phenomena that have at their center human minds who animate them and who, in turn, are themselves symbolic or cultural processes occurring in the brain; thus, to understand and explain problems of politics one must understand and explain the relevant symbolic and mental processes, which is to understand and explain human actors' forms of consciousness and motivations. The problems that any social science must address are cultural problems in their various manifestations; the mentalist perspective, which the present paper represents, is the perspective which specifically focuses on them.

Notably for students of politics, political scientists, and policy makers, the mentalist perspective on reality differs dramatically from much work typically performed under the label “social science.”² Science is a patterned activity oriented to the understanding of a particular set of *empirical* reality or *experience* (as physics, which attempts to understand inanimate matter, or biology, the goal of which is to understand the reality of life) and achieving this understanding by means of logically formulated conjectures (i.e., hypotheses) and methodical refutations of these conjectures (i.e., submitting hypotheses to the test of the *relevant* empirical evidence, which would be different among the sciences and depends on the set of experiences the science in question seeks to understand).³ Very often, work in “social science” does not accord with this definition and thus lacks scientific validity. The particular empirical reality, or the set of experiences, on which social sciences must be focused is culture – symbolic mental processes and representations

¹For more on the nature of political action, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978; and, Liah Greenfeld, “The Political Significance of Culture,” *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture*, Oxford: OneWorld Publications, 2006.

²Liah Greenfeld, “The Trouble with Social Science,” *Critical Review* 17, 2005, Nos. 1–2, pp. 101–116. Also see the edition of *Critical Review* entitled *Is Social Science Hopeless?* Jeffrey Friedman (Ed.), dedicated to the nature of the problem of social science and contemporary social scientific practice: *Critical Review* 16, 2004, Nos. 2–3, pp. 143–351.

³“Science and Literature as Social Institutions,” *Nationalism and the Mind*, op. cit.

– and it is from this set that they must draw the empirical evidence needed to test their hypotheses. Section I of this article will begin with a discussion on the mentalist approach to the study of humanity as a science. Section II of this article will then focus on the political implications of modern culture – nationalism – such as the advent of democracy and the state.

SECTION I: THE NATURE OF CULTURE

In distinction to other sciences (such as physics, chemistry, and biology), the subject matter of social sciences is neither matter, inanimate or organic, nor the processes of life; it is, rather, humanity, which offers content all its own: symbolic processes and experiences. In other words, social sciences treat an aspect of empirical reality that the other sciences do not treat. That physics, biology, or chemistry do not explain political institutions, economic institutions, linguistic patterns and practices, religious rituals, or the motivations of the actors who animate all of these (to give only a few examples) is obvious. It is less obvious that these institutions and patterns, embodied in language and activities, are representations of culture in the minds of the relevant actors and that such cultural representations are empirical reality. The strangeness of this idea, however, is only due to the misinterpretation of the meaning of “empirical” in the social sciences, where it is taken to be that which is studied by the natural sciences. But “empirical,” in fact, means simply that which we experience; it is, in other words, “the experiential,” and nobody can dispute that most of what human beings experience most of the time – i.e., most of what is empirical reality for humans – happens in their minds and is symbolic, or cultural, in character. The mentalist perspective has its roots in the work of two founding figures of sociology, anthropology, and political science: Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. This perspective draws on the work of the great French social, political, and economic historian, Marc Bloch, and it is currently carried on and developed by the representatives of the Boston School of Nationalism with a special emphasis on politics.⁴

In the “Preface to the Second Edition” of *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim offers a definition of the science he is practicing, which he terms “sociology”: the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning” (1992: 45). He then defines institutions as “all the beliefs and modes of behavior instituted by the collectivity,” which are recognizable by the constraint that they place on actors (1992: 45). Such constraint is the distinguishing characteristic of a fact, as opposed to a personal, unexpressed “idea.” Facts, in contrast to personal ideas, are observable from outside; as Durkheim puts it, they “are phenomena... [with] certain distinctive characteristics. It should thus be possible to observe, describe and classify them, as well as to seek out the laws that explain them” (1984: xxv). For example, one may study laws, architecture, ideas expressed in writing or speech, art, gestures, political structures, values exchanged in economic transactions, or events as registered in statistical figures, all of which have characteristics all their own that may be classified and evaluated from the outside. Durkheim argues that, like all empirical phenomena, institutions’ “mode of existence is constant...they possess a character independent of individual arbitrariness, yet

⁴For representative work in the mentalist tradition see, among others, Oliver Benoit, “Ressentiment and the Gairy Social Revolution,” in *Small Axe*, February 2007, pp. 95–111; Jonathan Eastwood, *The Rise of Nationalism in Venezuela*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006; Chandler Rosenberger, “Other People’s Wars: George Antonius, Historian as Liberator,” *Historically Speaking*, July 2005, and “The Dissident Mind: Václav Havel as Revolutionary Intellectual,” *The Journal of the Historical Society*, September 2006; James Stergios, “Language and Italian Nationalism,” *Nations and Nationalism*, 2005, pp. 8–24; as well as the work of Liah Greenfeld.

one from which flow necessary relationships” (1992: 46). Penal law, for instance, has qualities that allow the observer to identify its type and differentiate it from civil law, in the same way that a molecule of water has qualities that allow the observer to identify it and differentiate it from other molecules.

Institutions are evidence of human actions and the evidence of mental processes that they flow from; they shed light on the actors’ forms of consciousness that are shared by the collectivity and that give rise to individuals’ motivations or interests. Institutions are phenomena that have their roots in what Durkheim calls “social organization,” “society,” or “social life.” Unfortunately, the term “social” (which Durkheim takes from Auguste Comte) in his work is a misnomer, because the symbolic products of human sociality are nothing like those that are characteristic of animal sociality in general; Durkheim himself appears to have recognized this and often used the more precise French term *moral* – which is clearly indicative of a cultural, and, therefore, a mental process – as a synonym of “social.” Some may misread the English translation “moral,” interpreting it in the sense of the just, the good, and the ethical as understood in some absolute and empirically unjustifiable sense, but the examination of the context in which Durkheim uses this term makes it clear that this is not the sense in which it is employed. Whether Durkheim refers to the content of his science as “moral facts,” “social facts,” or “civilization,” the meaning is always the same: empirical phenomena created by humans and representing human cultural activity; the English term “culture” can be substituted for all of these.

Concerning the genesis of institutions, Durkheim argues that in order to understand a given institution and its peculiar characteristics one must discover those institutions that preceded and gave rise to it. The genesis of institutions is their history: the cultural process, of which institutions represent temporary crystallizations, is therefore an historical process. Durkheim’s method is analogous to the practice of all other sciences in the effort to comprehend the elementary parts of a given phenomenon. Some of the greatest findings in natural science, in effect, are merely discoveries of an order of significant and differentiated fact beneath realities formerly understood as foundational (e.g., the discovery of that water is not an element and can be decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen). An important difference between understanding the genesis of institutions and breaking given material phenomena into their elementary parts is that the former is an *essentially* historical problem which builds up in time – that is to say, a problem that is dependent upon the previous symbolic structures and therefore on the constantly changing context giving meaning to symbols. In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim writes:

History alone enables us to break down an institution into its component parts, because it shows those parts to us as they are born in time, one after the other. Second, by situating each part of the institution within the totality of circumstances in which it was born, history puts into our hands the only tools we have for identifying the causes that have brought it into being. Thus, whenever we set out to explain something human at a specific moment in time – be it a religious belief, a moral rule, a legal principle, an aesthetic technique, or an economic system – we must begin by going back to its simplest and most primitive form. (1995: 3)

Understanding of the genesis of a given institution also must take into account the conditions that may be unique to that institution and, therefore, do not exist elsewhere within the empirical universe. Unique events exist for the other sciences, but their “uniqueness” is not a quality of their very being from the perspective of the science; the attribution of uniqueness is rather a procedural attitude towards, or procedural setting-aside of, an event that is as yet unintelligible from what is known in that framework. Importantly, as concerns humanity, unique events are an intrinsic problem of the reality one seeks to comprehend, which is, again,

a reflection of their essentially historical nature, having their basis in an ever-changing context of meaning. Anticipating the argument that will be made in the second section of this article, we see, for example, that political institutions in modern societies are derivative from and legitimated by nationalism, the modern form of consciousness. Nationalism thus being the source of political motivations, in order to understand modern political institutions, one must examine the nature of nationalism and its historical development.

The emphasis on institutions in Durkheim's work is related to his insistence on the autonomous nature of "society" or culture – autonomous, among other things, from the biological nature of human individuals. A given French Catholic, for example, although he carries the culturally given rules of the faith within his mind, is not the creator of the faith or its moral rules; the individuals responsible for the construction of the form of consciousness characteristic of the Catholic faith over generations are forgotten, and this form of consciousness and the rules for behavior it prescribes are external to this French Catholic and exert a force on him which he is not free to disregard. As Durkheim demonstrates, different forms of consciousness characteristic of different cultures even explain variances in the rates of suicide between these cultures; in this way, Durkheim not only proves that culture serves as a causal force, but also demonstrates that this causal force is strong enough to overpower the biological orientation toward survival.⁵

Max Weber also recognizes culture as an order of empirical reality and shares Durkheim's scientific orientation to its study. In *Economy and Society*, Weber writes:

Sociology, a word often used in quite diverse ways, shall mean here: a science which seeks interpretive understanding of social action, and thereby will causally explain its course and effects. By 'action' is meant human behavior linked to a subjective meaning on the part of the actor or actors concerned; such behavior may be overt or occur inwardly – whether by positive action, or by refraining from such action, or by acquiescence to some situation. Such behavior is 'social' action where the meaning intended by the actor or actors is related to the behavior of others, and conduct so oriented. (2003: 312)

Meaning can only be symbolic or cultural; the requirement that it be subjective locates it within the individual mind: the cultural process is thus understood as the human mental process. When Weber writes that social action occurs "where the meaning intended by the actor or actors is related to the behavior of others, and conduct so oriented," he is arguing that it is the actor's orientation to this complex of meaning that is decisive – no other living actor need be present; what is decisive is that the actor's meaningful behavior is in some way constrained by his action having a cultural referent; this cultural referent is always a product of some previous symbolic mental process (in other minds) and, therefore, is "related to the behavior of others." The use of language, logic, etc. provides examples of such relation. To sum up, Weber's "sociology" is a science that takes "social action" as its data; thus, Weber's concept of "social action" corresponds to Durkheim's concept of "institutions." Although Weber holds that social action "exists only as the behavior of one or more individual human beings," he shares Durkheim's view that the phenomena of interest are not "psychological" in the sense of products of pure individual consciousness or personal, unexpressed "ideas," but rather that they have their roots in the association of men's minds (1978: 13).

⁵For more on this subject, see Durkheim's *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. For an in-depth treatment of Durkheim's contribution to the mentalist tradition, see Liah Greenfeld's "Main Currents and Sociological Thought" in Frost and Mahoney (Eds.), *Political Reason in the Age of Ideology: Essays in Honor of Raymond Aron*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007.

It is clear from Weber's argument that he understands social action as a process of cultural *interaction*, and it is the individual meaningful actions that constitute this process that Weber takes as the empirical evidence available to test his hypotheses. What is more, in his discussion of "rationalization" we see that Weber finds that the central function of this process is the cognitive ordering of a sphere of action; rationalization is understood as ultimately a mental process.⁶ This cognitive organization is an important element of the cultural construction of human reality, which Weber, accordingly, sees (very much like Durkheim) as a reality *sui generis*, adding to the layers of empirical reality studied by other sciences and requiring a science of its own.

Rationalization, to repeat, is a symbolic process, carried on in the minds of the actors who cognitively order their experience. The process of rationalization provides one with his orientation to reality, the attitude with which to confront the world, the very understanding of what that world is, what the possibilities within it are, and what ends one can pursue and the means available for their realization. Rationalization occurs in all spheres of human life. In fact, at any historical point, there may be multiple rationalizations proceeding simultaneously, although in different forms and directions.⁷ Some of them (for instance, rationalization of fashion) are of limited significance and duration, while others affect entire societies, historical periods, or even civilizations spanning numerous societies and historical periods; they permeate central institutions and institutional complexes (such as the state and the economy, for instance) and provide foundational forms of consciousness. Like all historical processes, however, institutionalization of a given form of rationalization such that it becomes foundational for a civilization is never inevitable. In order to understand fully a given culture's form of consciousness, one must be aware of the range of rationalizations that exist in it as well as why some of them were institutionalized on a grand scale.

The great French historian Marc Bloch did not pay much attention to Weber (probably for the same reason that Durkheim and Weber disregarded each other), but he explicitly recognized Durkheim as his predecessor. His understanding of history closely resembles the sociological perspective offered by Durkheim and Weber, underscoring the artificiality of distinctions – i.e., the lack of logical justification for such distinctions – between social sciences and, in general, academic disciplines which take humanity as their subject-matter. As sociology for Durkheim and Weber, so history for Bloch must focus on the human mind. The mind, however, is historically and culturally constituted, and, while being the only active element in history and culture, is always defined by its place within this larger process. It is this processual (as opposed to structural) nature of both culture and the mind, the all-important fact that they occur in time, as well as their tight interdependence, that Bloch's notable definition of history as "the science...of men in time" captures (2006: 867).

Culture, to restate, is the symbolic process by which human beings cognitively order reality and transmit their ways of life; it goes on only in living human beings and, although simultaneously internal and external to any given individual (thus validating the ancient claim, stressed by Durkheim, that "man is double"), is always a *mental* process. Of course, representations of culture, such as buildings, paintings, books, armored tanks, or any tangible

⁶For more on Weber's concept of rationalization, see "Nationalism and Modern Economy: Communing with the Spirit of Max Weber" in *Nationalism and the Mind*, op.cit.; and "Main Currents and Sociological Thought," op. cit. Jonathan Eastwood's discussion of Weber's theory of interests is also insightful: "The Role of Ideas in Weber's Theory of Interests," *Critical Review* 17, Nos. 1–2, 2005, pp. 89–100.

⁷See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Talcott Parsons (Trans.), New York: Routledge, 2005.

product of the human mind whatsoever may serve as vehicles for transmitting culture, but it is to be understood that representations of culture are only part of the process of culture when the culture they are helping to transmit is actualized in the mind of a human individual – given life by the individual, as it were. There is no *living* culture outside the minds of living human beings. The human mind – *culture in the brain* – is the process of historically-given-yet-individualized culture, so the human mind is the proper subject matter of social science.

The concept of culture developed by mentalists does not discount the force of material conditions to *affect* human action; material conditions, however, are not living realities of their own and only have a place in human activity as proximate causes prompting responses from human actors (and such responses are not necessarily meaningful). The use of the verb “affect” here makes it clear that although material conditions may influence human action, they bear no direct relationship to what is distinctly human in human action: the ability to *effect* action using the mind, which is a product of culture and depends upon the individual’s consciousness. Material forces have no causal effect on human identity, agency, or will, all of which are mental phenomena that are symbolic in nature and that refer to some form of consciousness not given in the objective conditions that material forces provide.⁸ For example, a flowing river physically presents the same obstacle to all men and affects what they may or may not do; whether these same men choose to build a bridge, a dam, a raft, or choose to consider the river sacred, etc. depends upon the culture available at that moment of time and this culture is used by the human individual to *effect* action; that is, to act. It is impossible that a given individual could be completely determined by one’s culture (or, of course, material conditions) or be viewed as a pure product of it; the symbolic, mental process of culture is at all times under the influence of the creative ability of individual minds: symbolic imagination, the ability to create new information within the brain. The study of culture must also, therefore, seek to account for innovations of or modifications to culture made by individuals as they seek to order their experience using the cultural material given to them at their point in history.

One of the most useful theoretical contributions to our understanding of culture is Durkheim’s concept “anomie.” Anomie refers to a state of cultural insufficiency; it is a systemic problem that reflects inconsistency between or the lack of coordination among various institutional structures, the result of which is the sending of contradictory messages to individuals within them.⁹ Culture provides humans with their ends and the means for their satisfaction, and when culture fails to perform its function one is left groping for a solution. It is for this reason that anomie is also a culture-generative force: it is the spur to symbolic imagination and is thereby the premier cause of cultural change. If a given person’s culture explains the situations, this person finds oneself in, no problem arises; if, however, there is an inconsistency between one’s experiences and the image of reality one’s culture provides, one is prompted to resolve this problem using one’s imaginative capacity.

SECTION II: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN CULTURE

Nationalism: The Cultural Framework of Modernity

Nationalism was a solution to the anomic situation in which individuals in sixteenth century England found themselves as a result of the vacuum created at the top of the social hierarchy by the War of the Roses, which destroyed the feudal aristocracy and led to the ascension of

⁸Jonathan Eastwood, “The Role of Ideas in Weber’s Theory of Interest,” op. cit.

⁹“Nationalism and the Mind” in *Nationalism and the Mind*, op. cit.

the Tudors to the English throne.¹⁰ The change in the structural conditions of English society, in the first place, produced a state of anomie for those persons who moved to the top of the social hierarchy: the religious form of consciousness provided by the medieval *society of orders* which presupposed a natural division of humanity into three orders or species of being – the military nobility, the clergy, and the toilers – was contradicted time and again by their personal experience. The members of the English “people” (which at the time had the meaning of “rabble”) who became members of the new English aristocracy experienced upward mobility, which the prevailing consciousness represented as impossible, and they formed a new elite; they were elevated to their new positions as a result of their talent, education, and service to the Tudor kings. Elite status, in this way, became a product of merit rather than one of birth – an incomprehensible reality within the society of orders.

Such upwardly mobile Englishmen needed a new form of consciousness to explain their experiences. Among the cultural material available at the time was the concept “nation,” forged in the medieval church councils, which meant a “political and cultural elite.” Tudor aristocrats equated the concepts of “people” and “nation” and thereby elevated the populace to the dignity of such an elite; this implied the fundamental equality of all Englishmen, all members of the people. Since “nation” meant specifically “*political elite*,” i.e., the bearer of political authority, the people became, in the wording of the time, “sovereign.” Given that sovereignty meant supreme, or uppermost, authority, only one agency could have it; investing the people with it (the principle of popular sovereignty) thus displaced God. A new consciousness emerged, which was fundamentally secular, egalitarian, and based on the principle of popular sovereignty. This new consciousness, at its root the symbolic imagination of a people as a nation – nationalism – satisfied the new aristocrats’ need for a new interpretation of their experiences. Nationalism became the predominant form of consciousness in England by 1,600; it was imported by the American colonies, and in the eighteenth century, it was adopted by France and Russia and was adopted all over Europe and the Americas in the nineteenth century; by the end of the twentieth century it spread around the world.

Let us reiterate: nationalism is a new vision of reality which emerged in sixteenth century England. It is an essentially secular vision, fundamentally egalitarian, and assumes popular sovereignty. Even a cursory examination of modern social experience as compared to the experiences of feudal society which modern society replaced demonstrates that all the major features of the former (the characteristic features of its politics, economy, and social relations, for instance) derive from the three principles of nationalism. When a society redefines itself as a nation, it necessarily acquires the central “structures of modernity,” such as a fluid and open system of class stratification and the state, and it develops processes of secularization, bureaucratization, and democratization. In fact, every nation is a modern society, and every modern society is, by definition, a democracy, i.e., a fundamentally egalitarian society based on the principle of popular sovereignty, even though it is important to recognize that democracies may be of different kinds, and that a *liberal* – or individualistic – democracy is a political regime quite unlike the *social* or *popular* democracy, which well may be a dictatorship, while being as much a *democracy* as the liberal one. On the individual level, nationalism expresses itself in national identity, which presents the nationalist vision of reality as if in a microcosm. In modern societies, national identity constitutes the fundamental identity that coexists with and informs all the other, partial identities an individual may have – occupational, religious, linguistic, territorial identities, etc. It is particularly important to keep this in mind when trying to

¹⁰Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

understand the importance of these partial identities and the cultural forms they represent in modern politics (for example, the importance of religion in the current war between the so-called Islamic fundamentalists and Western powers¹¹).

Democracy, the rule of the people, however interpreted and whether institutionalized in the form of the rule of law and majoritarian representative government or that of direct expression of the general will in the person of a leader or a group of leaders, belongs to the political implications of nationalism in general. Other general implications, namely, features to be found in every nation, include political activism and the state. All of these general implications are, obviously, closely related. The secular focus of the national consciousness (that is to say the form of consciousness reflecting the image of reality offered by nationalism) dramatically elevates the value of this world and, therefore, the value of the individual life. One can no longer hope for better things in the eternal existence which follows after death; no other reality exists, and one necessarily becomes less tolerant of imperfections in the limited term that is allowed one on this earth. The idea that one has a right to contentment and even happiness becomes widespread, and one no longer feels that one must adjust to things as they are if they are experienced as irritating and that obstacles to happiness are an inevitable part of human existence. They are no longer believed to be placed there by God, but rather they are attributed either to the unfair actions of other people or to the forces of the inanimate nature which science – itself an implication of nationalism’s focus on this, experiential, empirical world – is thought to help humans be able to control. This makes modern societies politically activist: one feels both empowered and compelled to change an unsatisfactory reality. Nationalism locates the source of ultimate meaning in the terrestrial world and defines the nation as the source of all law and authority. Social reality, in this way, is viewed as changeable, subject to amelioration. The Kingdom of the Lord of medieval Christianity, or the world envisaged by the ancient Israelites, Greeks, or Romans, in contrast, discounted the importance of life on Earth, locating the sacred and meaningful reality in a transcendent, “higher” reality.¹² The political sphere is, as it were, made sacred by nationalism, accounting for the active, participatory nature of political life in modern societies. Only in the last 300 years, notably, have revolutions – the aim of which is the reshaping of the world by human design – existed as a form of political action: nationalism legitimates the stripping of authority from “divinely appointed” tsars and kings or secular leaders seen as responsible for the suffering extant in a society.

This effect of the secular nature of nationalism is reinforced by nationalism’s other two principles, those of egalitarianism and popular sovereignty. In nationalist societies, interest and participation in political matters affect members of all social strata. Unlike the regnant social consciousnesses in feudal Europe or Tokugawa Japan, for example, the picture of society nationalism provides does not limit involvement in political matters to those who occupy a given exclusive social position that legitimates their concern: nationalism makes involvement

¹¹ This conception of the social order wherein the individual is the central unit in the system of social stratification finds its ideal type in individualistic-civic nationalism. Representative cases include those of the United States and Australia, the political and social institutions of which were fashioned according to the social consciousness given by nationalism, thereby leading to the realization in practice of the ideal type of individualistic-civic nationalism. A discussion of the implications of different types of nationalism follows in the next section. For more, see Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood, “National Identity,” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 256–273.

¹² On the relationship between nationalism and religion, see “The Modern Religion?” in *Nationalism and the Mind*, op. cit.

in political affairs legitimate for all members of the national collectivity. In this way, interest and participation in political affairs in modern societies become a function of one's personality and temperament and not one of social positions. The legitimacy conferred on participation in political affairs derived from the principles of popular sovereignty and fundamental equality of membership in nationalist societies is responsible for nationalism's most important political implication – the state. The state (not to be confused with government as such)¹³ is the paradigmatic modern *form* of government. The state's existence and legitimacy is independent of the individuals who run it and staff it, even in the cases of personal, dictatorial leadership of socialist democracies; that is to say that the state is essentially impersonal and necessarily bureaucratic. In principle, offices may be occupied by anyone; such eligibility is legitimized by nationalism's egalitarian principle. Additionally, the functioning of the state requires a system of stratification that is amenable to augmentation and wherein the individuals within it may easily move from one social position to the next. Such mobility is, again, the norm in nationalist societies.

In accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty, in the nationalist conception of reality the source of authority resides in the nation itself; the government is, therefore, necessarily representative. The impersonal institution of the state is the implication of this necessarily representative character of government in nations, differing from forms of government identical with a person, such as kingship, and in this way, in principle, it is subjected to recall by the people and open to change: the bureaucrats who occupy positions within the state do so on the sufferance of the people who delegate their sovereignty to the office. In certain cases, such as those of Hitler and Stalin, for example, the state may be in effect personalized in particular individuals; even in these cases, however, these statesmen only represent the authority of the state and are, ultimately, bureaucrats. In the society of orders, by contrast, sovereignty was located in particular persons and families and was legitimated by religious, transcendental authority.

TYPES OF NATIONALISM. All of these general political implications are subject to modification in accordance with the type of nationalism. As nationalism spread in the eighteenth century, the concept of "nation" developed an additional sense; it came to mean not only, as originally in England, "a sovereign people," but also "a unique sovereign people," having been cognitively linked with various political, territorial, linguistic, etc. characteristics of populations of the countries to which it was imported.¹⁴ This new concept of "nation" flourished alongside the one that preceded it, ultimately resulting in and leading to differing patterns of social attitudes, action, and institutions. What sets these types apart from one another is the position they take in regard to the nature of the nation and the criteria of national membership.

The nation may be perceived as an association of individuals, as happened in England and later in the United States and other nations derived from England, or as a collective individual, the case of all imported nationalisms not reflecting the individual experiences of upward mobility and authority, which were based on the concept of "a unique sovereign people." The former perception results in an *individualistic* nationalism, the latter in a *collectivistic* nationalism. In individualistic nations, each individual – being perceived as a rational

¹³ For a detailed discussion on the state, see "Nationalism and Modernity" in *Nationalism and the Mind*, op. cit.; Also, see Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., pp. 21–26, among others.

¹⁴ See the French, German, and Russian cases in *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, op. cit..

creature – is seen, in principle, as being sovereign; the will of the nation (what it desires, what ends it pursues) is equated with the will of the majority. Individualistic nationalism, for this reason, implies liberal democracy and the idea of human rights which it holds in fundamental respect and safeguards in a variety of representative institutions. In contrast, in collectivistic nations, it is the nation itself that is sovereign; that is to say there is a collective entity with its own rights, interests, and will, called the nation, that theoretically precedes the individuals who are only elements of it and whose will must be interpreted (typically by self-appointed elites within the nation who end up reifying differences between themselves and other members of the nation). Collectivistic nations, for this reason, are inherently authoritarian. They form social or popular democracies (which may or may not be called “socialist,” as in the case of the National Socialist Germany, or “communist,” as in the case of the Communist societies of Eastern Europe, for instance), are frequently dictatorially governed, and stress group rights rather than individual rights.

The criteria of membership in the nation, or nationality, vary not only in accordance with the (individualistic vs. collectivistic) conception of the national community but also with the specific characteristics which make a nation defined as “a unique sovereign people” unique. In individualistic nations, the criteria of membership are necessarily achievement-based, i.e., concerned with the qualities of the individual, rather than the groups to which one may belong, while in collectivistic nations, these criteria may be both achievement-based and ascription-based. The achievement-based criteria of membership represent qualities which may be, in principle, acquired or abandoned, as, for example, certain commitments and values; they make a nation *civic*. In civic nationalisms, nationality is theoretically open, or voluntary: it can be acquired (and in some cases must be acquired); it is equated with citizenship and is understood as a political or legal category. Being American or French, for example, requires a commitment to fulfill certain duties and obligations, which then entitles one to certain rights. In the United States, one must demonstrate a *bona fide* effort to learn English, but an inability to actually speak it will not invalidate one’s nationality; in France, however, it would: anyone who speaks good French is welcome to consider oneself French, but not being able to speak it fluently and in preference to any other language makes it absolutely clear that one is not. The point is that a language, theoretically, given a sufficient desire and effort, can be acquired. French nationalism, which presents French language as one of the bases of the people’s uniqueness, thus is a civic nationalism. If an ascriptive, or group, characteristic is considered derivative from one’s biological endowment, i.e., blood or birth, as language is in Germany, it cannot be acquired, whatever the effort one puts into it. Such ascriptive criteria of national membership make the nation *ethnic*. In ethnic nationalisms, nationality is believed to be an inborn, quasi-genetic quality: membership is open only to those who have the right heredity; membership in an ethnic nation has nothing to do with will.

The intersection of these two axes gives rise to three distinct types of nationalism: individualistic-civic, collectivistic-civic, and collectivistic-ethnic. (Individualistic-ethnic nationalism is a logical contradiction and is empirically non-existent.) These three types are conceptual tools, categories used to compare and pinpoint qualities of varying nationalisms. No actual nationalism represents a pure type. Still, differences between nationalisms are pronounced enough to make the use of the types helpful. The original English nationalism, American nationalism, and Australian nationalism offer paradigmatic examples of individualistic-civic nationalism. France represents the model case of the ambivalent collectivistic-civic nationalism. Germany and Russia are examples of the most common type, the collectivistic-ethnic nationalism.

Different types of nationalism, as was pointed out already, are associated with different types of regimes and, therefore, display differences in forms of political activism and the organization of the state. In individualistic and, to a considerable extent, collectivistic-civic nations political activism takes the form of civil society (organization within the framework of the law for the pursuit of a collective agenda), and it is manifested in participation in political institutions, such as campaigning and voting, and the choice of politics as a common outlet for individual ambition. The latter is particularly characteristic of individualistic nations. Collectivistic nations tend to focus on the needs of the collectivity as interpreted by the self-appointed (and usually) cultural elite. Only this elite, in fact, considers political participation its right, denying it to the rest of the population. Individuals qua individuals are disregarded, and, for this reason, collectivistic nationalisms as a rule do not promote individual interests (or consider them a legitimate motivating force), including ambition, to the same degree as is seen in individualistic nations which emphasize the individual and the involvement of every individual member. Collectivistic nationalisms of the consistent, ethnic, variety (collectivistic-civic nationalism, such as the French, being fundamentally conflicted and inconsistent), tending toward authoritarianism, as was mentioned earlier, produces a type of democracy with relatively little regular participation by the populace. Political activism in ethnic nations thus takes the form of eruptions of violence (spontaneous or, often, directed from above) against ethnic minorities and/or groups within the nation seen as agents of other nations believed to be hostile. An example was seen recently in the news from the Russian-Georgian front: a Russian patrol encountering a civilian fugitive from Gori, fleeing, apparently in the direction of Tbilisi, stopped him with the accusatory “Aha! You are running to the Americans!”¹⁵

This difference in regard to political activism inside the national polity finds a parallel in the different foreign policy propensities of the three types of nations and their very different conduct during warfare. The plurality of opinions as to what constitutes the national interest in individualistic nations makes it relatively difficult to mobilize them for war and creates a general atmosphere of disdain for aggressive warfare, as is so clearly demonstrated by the widespread opposition to the war in Iraq today in the United States. By contrast, in collectivistic nationalisms such pluralism is rare and, once the need for war is accepted by the small elite, it is quite easy to convince and mobilize the populace. This effect of collectivistic consensus is exacerbated in ethnic nationalisms. There, other nations are always perceived as collective beings that can nurture grievances and inflict insults; moreover, the line between “us” and “them” is clearly demarcated, and the presumed culprits and victims in every conflict are well-specified. Ethnic nationalisms see humanity as divided by blood, in fact, divided racially, as if into different species of being and, as a result, they presuppose a double – or even multiple – standard of moral conduct (one can do to animals things that cannot be done to people, and to different kinds of animals one is allowed to do different things). Thus, ethnic nationalism is far more conducive to brutality in relation to the enemy population than civic nationalism is – civic nationalism, by contrast, treats humanity as one fundamentally homogenous entity, with foreigners, even enemy foreigners, still being fellow men. It must be stressed, however, that these propositions concerning the differences among types of nationalism are statements of probability: whether a given nation of a given type is likely to become brutal depends on the context of circumstances and opportunities.¹⁶

¹⁵ Michael J. Totten, *The Wall Street Journal*, August 22, 2008, pp. A13.

¹⁶ For more see Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot, “Nationalism and Aggression,” *Theory and Society* 23, 1994, pp. 79–130.

Understanding that nationalism, forming the cultural foundation of modernity, underlies and ultimately explains modern politics throws a new light on the political history of the twentieth century. This political history, from World War I to the end of the Cold War, is usually presented as a fundamentally economic conflict, expressing itself superstructurally (and thus superficially) as a conflict of universalistic ideologies. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, and especially during the 45 years following the Second World War, it was interpreted as the confrontation of liberal democracy and totalitarianism. This led to the jubilant view that the dissolution of the Soviet Empire represented the final victory of liberal democracy (referred to as “democracy” without any qualifier) in the historical struggle, and thus to the “end of history”; it also led to the now frustrated expectation that the transition to a market economy (capitalism) from a controlled one (socialism) would automatically establish liberal democracy across the regions which explicitly committed to such transition and, as a result, the world would become one happy global village. Clearly, this was a profoundly mistaken view. All of the great conflicts of the twentieth century were conflicts of competing nationalisms; specifically, there were conflicts between collectivistic-ethnic nationalisms (which always initiated them) and individualistic and collectivistic-civic nationalisms. It was nationalism, chiefly of the collectivistic-ethnic type, that brought about the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The newly independent nations of the Soviet periphery naturally turned to the West for support and pledged allegiance to Western ideology (i.e., capitalism and liberal democracy). The weakened and humiliated Russia attributed its (temporary) loss of superpower status to the erroneous – and always superficial – belief in the international proletarian brotherhood and rejected its Marxist past. As a token of its repentance, it privatized its tremendous natural wealth and joined the G-7 as the eighth member. Its now independent peripheries, none being as rich, turned to a market economy as well, but the “transition to democracy” (read: transition to liberal democracy) never took place. Liberal democracy is not a universal ideology, reflecting capitalism, but it is rather a *national* heritage of individualistic or at the very least essentially civic nations, and it would require of an ethnic-collectivistic nation a complete redefinition of self, a change in its very nature, to develop it: it would require the creation of new minds and new identities, a *cultural reconstruction* which can only be accomplished by historical accident and never by an act of will.

While the “transition to democracy” failed to occur there, the dream of a market economy is (like over much of the inhabited world) being realized. This is not surprising: modern (market, competitive) economy is not, and has never been, connected to liberal democracy in any way, shape, or form. It is a product of nationalism, but not of any particular type of nationalism, and it has been known to flourish in ethnic nations as well as in civic ones, in individualistic nations as well as in collectivistic ones. The sense of dignity and pride that membership in the nation endows individuals with, a product of nationalism’s inherent inclusiveness and egalitarianism leads to the interest in the dignity of the nation itself, i.e., to the inter-national competition for prestige. Prestige is, of course, measured relatively and is valued according to what (and to what degree) one holds something dear. One may value piousness, as did the pre-nationalist Catholic French, or military power, as does nationalist Russia. Some nations, such as England already in the sixteenth century, Germany, the United States, and Japan in the nineteenth century, and China and India today, have chosen to compete for prestige in the economic arena, orienting their action toward the accumulation of wealth and ever-renewed growth of this wealth – social action that is characteristic of modern economy. The form of consciousness provided by nationalism, as was mentioned earlier, created the social structure (an open system of stratification) that permitted ambition

to develop and flourish: legitimate social mobility created free, mobile labor. In certain cases, nationalism led to the explicit revaluation of economic growth, making it a desirable end.

Modern economy, of course, does not necessarily follow from nationalism. Given the historical record, it is evident that nations tend to compete for prestige in those realms of activity wherein they perceive their own strength. In the case of Russia – the nation having access to the richest abundance of natural resources in the world, the most expansive territory, and a well-educated labor force – the competition for international prestige never turned into a desire for sustained growth of economic wealth. Russia was and is clearly an aggressive competitor, orienting its action in the international competition for prestige, however, toward being a great military power. It is important to keep this in mind now that Russian nationalism, buoyed by its oil, has so impressively reared its head.

Non-nationalist Culture

Nationalism, as has been argued, in most contemporary societies, provides the orientation to reality from which actors begin, and political actors' motivations follow from this fundamental form of consciousness; in this way, nationalism constitutes the moving force of political action in such societies, thus being the foremost political force itself. Even in contemporary societies (which should not be confused with "modern societies") nationalism is, however, only one type of culture, providing one form of consciousness, one orientation to reality, and should not be imputed to exist where empirical evidence of its existence is lacking. According to some recent work, such imputation has been the mistake of most Africanist scholars who, believing that nationalism is but an ideological reflection of fundamental economic processes, assume nationalism in cultures that are, emphatically, not nationalist. It has been argued, for example, that anti-colonial movements in Africa in the post-World War II period have been consistently misinterpreted as expressions of nationalism, while displaying not a single element of the nationalist vision of reality. In a recent dissertation on nationalism in the African context with the focus on Eritrea and Rwanda, Oyeshiku Carr, a native of Liberia, has demonstrated that while anti-colonialism served as a vehicle for African nationalism where nationalism developed, it did not always develop into nationalism. In fact, what was typical in the African cases is that the traditional forms of consciousness that placed emphasis on race, social status, and authority served the actors well – that is to say that no anomie situation arose that led them to adopt a new fundamental perspective on reality, a new form of consciousness:

The fact that the status quo emerged intact in the post-colonial period is evidence that the central paradigm of imperial political reality, authoritarianism, has remained potent. Only when African intellectuals became estranged from the dominant symbolic culture [that is, when they experienced acute anomie] and started to question the legitimacy of the central zone did they begin fashioning alternate narratives with populist and democratic restructurings of the central paradigm. Cultural history, then, explains the emergence or failure of nationalism in the African context. (2008: 39)

In other words, the traditional understanding of the social order was, in fact, such an adequate form of consciousness that it was impermeable to nationalism or other new forms of culture.

It may be supposed that Africa's geographic distance from Western Europe (where nationalism emerged) alone explains African resistance to nationalism – it does not. A prominent example of Western European indifference to nationalism is the Dutch Republic. Being the first society to break out of the feudal mold and to achieve world economic supremacy, it had by the end of the sixteenth century adopted a new variety of the traditional,

religious, form of consciousness – Calvinist Protestantism – and developed certain social, political, and economic structures that were very similar to those considered modern. Calvinist Protestantism presupposed a far greater equality among social strata than did the Catholicism that it replaced. The reason for the adoption of Calvinism in the Netherlands was secular in nature: the desire for independence from Spain, whose absolutist policies chafed against the sensibilities of the Dutch nobility and tried the patience of the powerful commercial classes. The pretext for the revolt against Spanish rule, however, was the persecution of Protestants in the disaffected provinces; hence the revolt was interpreted as a religious war. When the several provinces that later came to be known as the Dutch Republic succeeded in gaining their independence, both communal and individual identities were defined in religious terms; these identities were generally consistent with the experience of the Dutch population and offered them the sense of an orderly reality, the opportunities of which corresponded to the ambitions legitimized by their form of social consciousness. The Dutch, therefore, had no need for nationalism.¹⁷

What is most important in this regard is that the forms of action characteristic of societies which are not nations, that is, those societies not based on the vision of nationalism or national consciousness, are likely to be very different from those existing in nations – societies animated by national consciousness and constructed on the basis of nationalism. Only this, for instance, can explain the failure of the Dutch Republic, the first dominant *world* economy, to take off into sustained growth in the seventeenth century: it lacked the nationalist motivation to compete with England (which, though far weaker than the Republic in every other relevant respect, within decades overtook it on the strength of such motivation), and rather than grow further, descended into absolute decline and lost all the economic importance for another two centuries.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

Nationalism is neither a necessary nor permanent element of human culture, but in those places where it came to exist as an accident of history, it is the most important factor in the creation of those humans whom we wish to understand and in the shaping of their actions. The mind forever retains its creative capacity vis-à-vis culture that exists outside it, and so human actions are never determined. Still, the only way they can be causally explained – which is the goal of social sciences – is by taking into consideration, in fact, focusing on, the cultural context within which they take place. Everything that is distinctly human (i.e., everything that we do not share with other animals) is essentially cultural. The modern political scene – in which nationalism is so salient – offers a striking proof that politics is a cultural phenomenon.

¹⁷For more, see the discussion on the Netherlands in *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 59–104; and, Liah Greenfeld, “Western Europe,” *Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Volume 1*, Academic Press, 2001, pp. 883–898.

¹⁸Nationalism, to reiterate, as one form of consciousness, is not a human universal: nationalism is, rather, historical and contingent. Seeing nationalism as a human universal has its root in two problems that have affinities with one another: (1) The first problem concerns observers who have nationalist forms of consciousness and who do not recognize the historical and accidental nature of their perspectives; and, (2) The second problem concerns the dominance of the empirically unjustified Marxian materialist perspective that is regnant in the social sciences which vigorously maintains the universality of nationalism against the universe of counterfactuals that resist this perspective. This latter problem affects even those observers who do not have nationalist forms of consciousness, given that the materialist perspective constitutes a defining condition in the genesis of the perspectives of the non-mentalist social sciences which these observers utilize. Indeed, this materialist perspective is so forceful as to kill off the science in such “social science.”

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CHAPTER 23

Urban Politics

TERRY NICHOLS CLARK AND RACHEL HARVEY

Cities have long been on the cutting edge of change. They are analytical windows for social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics, such as globalization. Urban regions are an accessible laboratory for broader questions since cities are smaller and vary more than nations on a range of socio-economic processes. While we consider local governments of all sizes in this chapter, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, we use the term urban or city to refer to that scale of politics. Such a designation fits with most empirical work on local politics since this research largely focuses on mid-sized to larger cities.

Even though some cities are left behind by, and others are central participants in globalization, this process is challenging past views of urban politics. The core paradigms from recent decades employed in the study of urban politics are losing their power. The rise of global markets, global commodity and production chains, the hollowing out of the state, and other processes related to globalization are undermining the explanatory power of growth machine, regime, class based, and clientelist theories of politics. These increasingly compete with a New Political Culture with its emphasis on innovative leaders, active citizens, and new forms of civic engagement, such as New Social Movements, to explain urban political dynamics. The New Political Culture allows for governance while retaining the importance of government.

RETHINKING PARADIGMS

Political and economic changes in the late twentieth century have weakened older paradigms. The end of the Cold War, the globalization of finance and trade, the increasing interconnectedness of the world through telecommunication developments, the “hollowing out” of the state, the emergence of postindustrial economies, and the increasing prominence of new political actors have deeply altered the urban terrain. Regardless of the labels used to describe these changes (post-Fordist, postindustrial, information economy, etc.), these shifts have helped produce a new politics, at the national and urban scale. Older theories are still important, but they cannot adequately capture the emergent politics (Clark 2003).

One of the most prominent paradigms of urban politics is the *growth machine model* and closely related *regime analysis*. Hunter (1953), Molotch (1976), and Stone (1989) argued that the growth of capital, jobs, and land value were prime concerns for business. As a result, businesses

were publically active and a major force in urban development and politics. This general view dominated most urban research from the 1950s to the 1990s, although it was periodically punctuated by debates over pluralism, led by Dahl (1961), and other challenges. The most striking sign of the growth paradigm's weakening was when its proponents abandoned their earlier views. John Logan, coauthor with Harvey Molotch of *Urban Fortunes*, challenged this paradigm himself. His research did not support the growth machine view (Logan and Crowder 2002), but showed that business leadership had no consistent impact on population growth. In a review of 20 years of research within this perspective, Logan et al. (1997) found that business leaders were active, but their impact was often limited and not related to pro-growth policies or actual growth. In addition, they suggested that the theory fell flat when slower or managed growth emerges. A coherent theory of urban politics should be able to explain both growth and anti-growth patterns.

The growth machine model also did not anticipate considerable variation in the degree to which business leaders were politically important, a major repeated finding in comparative studies of cities, especially cross national work. In the most extensive study of these issues to date, Pérez et al. (2008) codified the regime writings and tested their core ideas in 1,696 cities in 11 countries from the US to West Europe and Japan (Table 23.1).

They found all three major leadership patterns in most countries: business, state, and pluralistic/integrative. That is, business does not dominate anywhere consistently. Many other leadership types are salient within and across countries. Reese and Rosenfeld (2002) similarly studied several cases in detail and compared general patterns for 245 US and 105 Canadian cities. Like Perez, Yáñez, and Clark, they report diversity that refutes core elements of the growth machine/regime paradigm:

it is not at all clear that there is any single coherent business interest in communities...it does not appear that businesses are always in a position of trying to wrest any and all incentives from local governments. ...they do not seem to influence the use of financial incentives, such as tax abatements...where business input (is high) the result appears to be a greater emphasis on business volunteerism and support for all aspects of the community. This extends from arts to education, includes more emphasis on quality-of-life issues, and in some cases, reduces the use of public funds for economic development...Many cities, particularly smaller ones, appear not to have any regimes, using Stone's (1989) original definition ... (Reese and Rosenfeld 2002: 376–377).

The growth regime model also has problems explaining governing coalitions that emphasize new economic development strategies that place amenities, quality of life issues, and even redistribution policies at their center (Jonas and Wilson 1999). These innovations were a creative response, in part, of local governments to increased global economic competition and declines in national funding of cities. A substantial number of US localities have anti-growth or “controlled” growth or sustainability movements (about 20–30 percent). New models often work better in explaining such antigrowth politics than the growth/regime model (Clark and Goetz 1994). Some critics argue that the growth machine model is too dependent on the United States' context in which it was developed (see DiGaetano and Strom 2003 and Pierre 2005 for an overview). Such critiques do not incorporate the empirical work such as that of Pérez et al. (2008) and Reese and Rosenfeld (2002) which shows that business, state, and citizen/civic oriented leadership are found in different cities around the world. Clearly, there are important national differences with locations like Finland and Switzerland where business/growth coalitions are very weak, but even in France, the classic strong state, many pro-growth mayoral coalitions exist.

Changes related to globalization have also fostered the *declining explanatory power of race and class in urban politics*. This results, in part, from local and global market competition

TABLE 23.1. Mayor Governing Coalitions by Country

	Pro-growth	Progressive	Integrative	Total
Australia				
Count	45	17	35	97
%	46.4	17.5	36.1	100
Adj Res.	3.6	-1.6	-2.0	
Britain				
Count	13	14	49	76
%	17.1	18.4	64.5	100
Adj Res.	-2.5	-1.2	3.3	
Canada				
Count	53	12	35	100
%	53.0	12.0	35.0	100
Adj Res.	5.2	-2.9	-2.2	
Finland				
Count	1	4	62	67
%	1.5	6.0	92.5	100
Adj Res.	-5.2	-3.6	-7.8	
France				
Count	87	100	64	251
%	34.7	39.8	25.5	100
Adj Res.	1.8	6.3	-7.0	
Italy				
Count	3	76	15	94
%	3.2	80.9	16.	100
Adj Res.	-5.8	13.2	-6.0	
Japan				
Count	78	64	223	365
%	21.4	17.5	61.1	100
Adj Res.	-4.0	-3.3	6.6	
Mexico				
Count	16	18	40	74
%	21.6	24.3	54.1	100
Adj Res.	-1.6	0.0	1.4	
Spain				
Count	43	71	119	233
%	18.5	30.5	51.1	100
Adj Res.	-4.1	2.4	1.7	
Switzerland				
Count	3	6	68	77
%	3.9	7.8	88.3	100
Adj Res.	-5.1	-3.4	7.6	
USA				
Count	166	28	68	262
%	63.4	10.7	26.0	100
Adj Res.		12.8	-5.5	-7.0
Total				
Count	508	410	778	1,696
%	30	24.2	45.9	100

From: Pérez et al. (2008: 167). Data from the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project (www.fau.org) are available for others to download. Adjusted Residuals = the probability that one mayor is in that (one) cell in the table. Values >1.96 or <-1.96 are statistically significant (0.005).

among cities which weakens the impacts of local processes. Thus, the ability of local groups to impact local government has tended to decrease (Brenner and Theodore 2002). These groups were more important decades back, but over-time replication of the same models for hundreds of US cities show a decline in their participation from the 1960s to the 1990s, the critical period for globalization (Clark 1994: 62ff;) The European countries gave their localities even less autonomy than the U.S., leading European cities to be far less locally responsive to local disadvantaged groups (Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 1998: 132 ff.) – contradicting common views on this topic.

Class politics emerged with industrialization. Labor union and socialist parties who opposed the hierarchy of industrial management characterized this era. The globalization of production, the emergence of new political actors, the development of post-industrial economies, and other processes related to globalization, have altered the explanatory power of these variables. A decade or two back, class, as well as race, were the dominant variables used to understand political processes in industrialized cities. Voting behavior, group membership, political participation, and quality of service delivery by city governments were explained in terms of these variables. Recently, the dominance of race and class has become hotly contested. Increasingly multiple variables are being utilized by researchers. The decline of orthodox Marxism is perhaps the clearest example of this shift. A leading urban Marxist, Manuel Castells, moved to a multi-causal perspective in the 1980s. Even neo-Weberian conceptions of race and class have experienced a similar loss of power (Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001). Despite the emergence of new variables, race (Sharp 2007) and class clearly matter. Still, political processes are driven by more than these traditional factors. Many types of comparative studies (of citizen voting, of leader's parties, of sources of leader's policies) show that race and class explain about 10 percent of the variance; 90 percent thus remains unexplained by race and class. The great strength of urban research is that it can identify locations where class and race do and do not explain things (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Cross-national variations are huge.

Clientelism is also undermined by globalization. This political form is traditionally found in developing countries with more agriculturally based economies (Stokes 2007; Clark et al. 2002). In these economies, social relations are more tied to the land and endure over many years. While associated with agricultural based societies, clientelism was not limited to them. A version of clientelism existed in the machine politics of cities such as Chicago or many towns in the U.S. South. Even if the squeaky-clean city manager was and is the icon of local government in many locations, clientelism was the main rule of the game for decades. Despite its prevalence in the past, this political form too is declining the world over (Kobayashi 2008). The shift to service-based economies, the decline of agricultural economies, the rise of global markets, of citizen education, global media and New Social Movements are undermining clientelism. In the last decade or so alone, attacking clientelism has become one of the most salient political issues in locations from Italy to Argentina to Japan (e.g. Passotti 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

Globalization thus challenges the core concepts used to frame and understand urban politics. Even though global processes largely remain phenomena to be understood (Sassen 2007; Boschken 2008) rather than a research paradigm, changes associated with globalization destabilize existing understandings of urban politics. Whether it is the growth machine framework, the dominance of race or class based theories, or clientelism, all are challenged by current global processes. To complement their waning explanatory power, this chapter suggests that the New Political Culture can be used as a framework for understanding politics in an increasingly globalized era. It engages elements of these past paradigms, but

synthesizes them into a new set of rules of the game. It examines those points where global processes shift the operation of other national and local factors, suppressing many, while augmenting others.

THE NEW POLITICAL CULTURE

Social and economic changes associated with globalization are shifting the urban political terrain. Class politics is not dead, but is increasingly less central. Clientelism is weakening in many locations. Stratification is expressed in new ways. Economic development in cities does not necessarily take growth as inevitably good. Concern over disamenities due to growth has spurred local politics aimed to limit development. Since the 1970s, new non-class cleavages have emerged concerning gender, race, regional loyalty, sexual preference, ecology, and broader citizen participation. These social issues are distinct from fiscal/economic issues. Conflicts may be more intense than ever, but many cost little; many concern new social patterns and lifestyles – cultural norms about how people should live. While many of the social issues predated the 1970s, their current configuration in the political arena indicates the emergence of a New Political Culture. It has seven key dimensions.

One reason the New Political Culture's recognition is long overdue, is that it disrupts older political categories such as left and right. As is evident in public political discourse, left and right designations have not disappeared. What has shifted is how these categories are defined. The term left increasingly means social issues, and is decreasingly associated with traditional class politics. In Eastern Europe, the polarity of left and right changed to such a degree that in the late 1980s, the term "left" sometimes referred to those who supported increasing private ownership and *less* state intervention in the economy. The shift is less dramatic in the West, but increasing the role of government is no longer automatically equated with progress, even on the left. U.S. President Clinton, the first Democratic Party president in over a decade, implemented decentralization of the national welfare system. He initially experimented with workfare in Arkansas in 1980 as Governor, and later brought a similar approach to Washington D.C. as President. Increasingly absent from political discussions are issues pertaining to ownership and control of the means of production. Many leaders, and citizens, feel disoriented by the shifting meaning of the left-right map. What might appear to be political fragmentation actually represents the emergence of a new form of politics.

A second component of the New Political Culture is that social and fiscal/economic issues cannot be collapsed. Social issues demand analysis on their own terms. Positions on social issues – of citizens, leaders, and parties – cannot be deduced from their positions on fiscal issues. Social issues include issues like multiculturalism and same-sex couples' rights, as opposed to support of welfare state programs. Even though a distinction is made between these two types of issues, it does not exclude their overlap politically. Social issues can have fiscal implications – such as providing extra funding for minority students. But social issues can also be pursued with no fiscal implications such as Mayor Gavin Newsome allowing same-sex marriages in San Francisco. By contrast, the class politics model implies the opposite. Fiscal issues dominate social issues, positions on social issues derive from stances on fiscal issues; the left stands for liberal on social and fiscal issues and the right is conservative. The New Political Culture pattern is replacing the older class politics due to more general socio-economic differentiation and professionalization; correlations between fiscal and social liberalism are in decline.

It is not simply that social and fiscal issues need to be considered separately. Social issues have risen in salience relative to fiscal/economic issues. The increased importance of these issues is driven by affluence. Classic economic concerns do not necessarily disappear, but with an increase in wealth people grow more concerned with lifestyle and other amenity issues, as well as immigration and identity concerns. Recognition of these changes spurred some neo-Marxists to rethink socialist theory (e.g. Bowles and Gintis 1987; Harrington 1989). New Fiscal Populism provides evidence of this development. It combines a liberal stance on social issues with fiscal conservatism. An example of this trend is Bill Morris, mayor of Waukegan, Illinois. He was a leftist Democrat in background, who had grown conservative on fiscal issues while remaining progressive on social issues of race, gender, and the like. The New Fiscal Populism is not, however, synonymous with the New Political Culture. Since fiscal issues decline in relation to social issues, fiscal conservatism is not a defining element of the New Political Culture. Not every element of the New Political Culture entails a fiscally conservative stance.

Along with the shift in older political alignments, market and social individualism grow. Neither market nor social individualism implies a return to tradition in the sense of *laissez-faire* individualism; indeed the New Political Culture is most clearly opposed to the statist European right. At the same time, both types of individualisms foster skepticism towards traditional left policies, such as nationalization of industry and welfare state growth. In this manner, the New Political Culture joins “market liberalism” (in the past narrowly identified with parties on the right), with “social progressiveness” (often identified with parties on the left). This new combination of policy preferences leads to new programs, and new rules of the game.

The fifth dimension of the New Political Culture is the questioning of the welfare state. Some New Political Culture citizens and leaders, conclude that “governing,” in the sense of state-central planning, is unrealistic for many services, economic and social. While not seeking to reduce services, they question the specifics of service delivery and seek to improve efficiency. They are skeptical of large bureaucracies. They are willing to decentralize administration or contract with other governments or private firms – if these work better. “Work better” includes citizen responsiveness as well as meeting professional staff criteria. In difficult economic times, such as the 1970s stagflation or 2007 onward recession, the New Political Culture can become fiscally conservative. Such a shift cannot be assumed, since this new politics is clearly far from the traditional right (e.g. Reagan, Thatcher) that focuses on simply cutting government, and services. It is not possible to equate, therefore, the New Political Culture with a neo-liberalism, which omits social issues from its core.

Behind the questioning of the welfare state is the belief that local governments can serve the public better than nation states. Within this framework, the point is to develop smaller and more responsive governments and new intergovernmental agreements. This happened in the U.S. and many other countries in the 1980s and 1990s, but shifting legal/fiscal responsibilities continue to remain hot topics globally. In the U.S., non-profit organizations have taken a far more visible role, even shaping government policies in their own image, such as in health, education, and social service provision. In Eastern Europe local governments are enjoying a renaissance, especially in small towns that had been abolished in the past few decades. Many U.S. cities are criticizing their existing service delivery modes and experimenting with such alternative patterns of service delivery as contracting out services, using new technology, and the like. Even with declining turnout and interest in national elections (even with the highest voter turnout in forty years, only 61.6 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots in the 2008 US Presidential election of Barack Obama), neighborhood governments, block clubs, NGO's,


and other such associations are emerging the world over. This new decentralization and volatility may be more responsive to citizens, but it causes problems for the provision of large public goods, especially national defense or the formation of coherent national policies and issues that spread across more than one local government in a metropolitan area, like pollution or garbage disposal. The new character of leadership and decision making is thus open to criticism by many intellectuals and displaced political leaders. Sometimes, these opponents have been successful in displacing initial New Political Culture leaders, as in Eastern Europe and Italy in the 1990s. No trend is linear.

The sixth component of the New Political Culture is the rise of issue politics and broader citizen participation. Corresponding to this shift is the decline of hierarchical political organizations. The “New Social Movements” and “issue politics” are essential additions to the political process. These movements encourage governments to respond more directly to interested constituents. By contrast, traditional hierarchical parties, government agencies, and unions are increasingly seen as antiquated. New demands are articulated by activists and intelligent citizens who refuse treatment as docile “subjects” or “clients.” They thus organize around new issues of welfare state provision, like daycare or recycling. The media grow more visible and important, as new issues and developments rapidly emerge and frequently change, making New Political Culture leadership often volatile and turbulent. New groups seek to participate in general policy formation (rivaling parties and programs); and they may press to participate in service delivery (rivaling government agencies, clientelist leaders, and unions). Advocates of the New Political Culture are thus seen as “rocking the boat;” they mean to. Conflicts with traditional pluralistic leaders whose political support depends on clientelist patronage are particularly acute, for example, such as in southern Italy or Chicago.

The final element of the New Political Culture is the attribute of the people embracing the ideas. The younger, more educated, and affluent individuals, and societies lean more toward the New Political Culture. Higher incomes permit more economic choices. Once basic economic concerns are met, new concerns arise. As a result, individuals are able to pursue a wider range of tastes, including support for social issues. While this holds for individuals it is also apparent with social collectivities. In cities and countries with more wealth, social issues will be more prominent. Economic needs do not disappear; they are complemented by other concerns (Houtman et al. 2008). There is also correlation between education and tolerance. Individuals with more education are more likely to permit controversial books to be in school libraries, or accept a person with a different social background as a marriage partner (especially in the US; in Germany and Ireland, this is far weaker, for instance. Clark and Hoffman-Martinot 1998).

Even though the qualities of the New Political Culture are complex (see Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 1998 for some of the expected and unexpected findings), results from the FAUI survey of 7,000 cities in 20 countries empirically affirm the factors supporting the New Political Culture. Larger cities with educated and affluent citizens who worked in professional service jobs tended to have New Political Culture patterns. Women mayors and political leaders who favor socially liberal issues (abortion, gay rights, environmental protection, etc.) tend to dominate these areas. Classic examples of locations that are high on these variables are university and research locations, such as Cambridge, England, Uppsala, Sweden, or Austin, Texas. By contrast, the New Political Culture is weaker in areas where there is seriously declining agriculture or industry, and no new high technology industries such as the U.S. Rust Belt, the British Midlands, and the Ruhr area of Germany. Unions and blue collar workers, i.e., more traditional left-right, clientelist, and class based politics, tend to dominate such areas. The lack of security tends to preserve older hierarchies and political values.

Globalization Drives the New Political Culture, and more



Empirical examples of the New Political Culture abound. At the mayoral level, big city mayors in the U.S. like Giuliani in New York, Daley in Chicago, and Riordan in Los Angeles all articulated these new themes. While Daley is the only Democrat, all three stressed management specifics and details rather than why they do things. They focused on issues such as how to reduce crime, how to attract more tourists, or how to make buses cheaper to operate. The new style of pragmatic implementation is more common in the U.S. and many northern European countries. By contrast, the new mayors of Italy after the 1990s shared many of the same policy outlooks, but they were more ideological and sometimes displayed greater charisma than their predecessors – due largely to their being elected directly rather than chosen from party caucuses as in previous years. Leaders such as U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed similar direct elections in England in the late 1990s, perhaps to help reinforce the New over the Old Labor approach, as the New seemed more popular with citizens (Hambleton 2000). Similar efforts to change legal patterns and all manner of governance procedures to respond more to citizens were found in democracies around the globe in the 1990s, with an increasing sense of global interdependence (or specifically with the EU as a driver for such change in Europe): legal support for NGOs, stricter disclosure rules, more independence for judges to investigate and lower staff to inform, etc.

The New Political Culture thus adapts to each location. It is influenced by variables including local political cultures, party structure, specific configurations of political institutions, economic structures, and more. Despite the diversity, it is a global phenomenon. Globalization in fact spreads the New Political Culture. News, Hollywood films, popular music, consumer culture, and other forms of Western-oriented media can diffuse egalitarian themes and undercut hierarchy. Social criticism has mounted across the U.S. through advocacy journalists in established media outlets such as the *New York Times* and MSNBC (like Keith Obermann and Rachel Maddow). The internet takes these tendencies one step further by potentially empowering each individual to access a world of information. And more than information, Internet news sources such as the *Huffington Post* and *Drudge Report* mix news with social

commentary. The media grow increasingly central as global interpreters, and as links to new ideas for political actors as traditional left and right parties and unions decline.

Many New Political Culture dimensions are explored in specific literatures. While components of this new politics sometimes emerge gradually and piecemeal, often there has been decisive leadership innovation by a mayor. Local political leaders have been all the more critical as the New Political Culture breaks with the strong national political parties that controlled most slating of mayors outside the U.S. Innovation as a program is often espoused by New Political Culture leaders, as new strategies are required to overcome traditional left or right party platforms. The biography of Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist (1998) is a forceful example; he tore down freeways and filled in parking lots to discourage cars and make Milwaukee more pedestrian-friendly. Milwaukee was one of the few big cities to use school vouchers. Such support for innovation in politics parallels the remarkable interest in Richard Florida's work (e.g. 2002) among political and civic leaders, even while most academics spurn Florida.

Social issues in local politics, particularly consumption and entertainment, are on the rise. Culture and the arts, lifestyle and amenity issues are no longer seen as trivial. They have become core foci of urban development projects for mayors and urban policy makers – even if research on these lags far behind (beginnings are in Blau 1989; Currid 2007; Strom 2002; Clark 2004). Walter Benjamin (1999) was one of the first Marxists to stress the dynamic role of the consumer as his *flâneur* wandered through the Paris Arcades. Molotch et al.'s (2000) contrast of two Southern California counties to development projects treats culture as a central variable. Santa Barbara and Ventura counties long displayed different leadership strategies. The former stressed consumption via lifestyle; the latter sought wealth by digging for oil. In the subsequent debate over this paper, there was a clear movement away from Orthodox-style Marxist growth analyses emphasizing the power of capital (Paulsen et al. 2002). Lifestyle issues were argued to not only shape development, but also were central for citizens' location decisions. Molotch (2003) then published *Where Stuff Comes from: How Toasters, Toilets, Cars, Computers, and Many Others Things Come to Be as They Are*. Like John Logan, he was too perceptive to stick to outmoded ideas.

Related to the New Political Culture is the rise of the micro; turning away from national or even regional or metropolitan policy concerns, to focus instead on the neighborhood or similar micro units – since these are more salient to citizens. Los Angeles, for instance, following a close referendum by several neighborhoods to secede, created some 80-odd district governments to try to move closer to the citizenry. Hence the interest in "scenes" as neighborhood activities that join new cultural and aesthetic concerns (Clark, Silver and Rothfield draft). Together, we suggest, these new elements make for a paradigm change that has still escaped many interpreters of urban politics.

Many political activists as well as analysts see more disorder, decline, disintegration, and conflict than the rise of any new forms. Many lament the drop in turnout for elections, asking what it portends. Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* thus framed the decline of traditional civic groups as a clarion call for democracy. The decline of classic left and right parties deeply disturbs ideologues committed to these programs, more in Europe and more ideological contexts (like universities) than in less ideological cities. Newspapers are closing their doors, and blogs and chat groups on the internet are rising. The arrival of new immigrants from foreign lands has shaken the politics of many countries and cities the world over – a most tangible hand of globalization. Personal identity has become a salient issue, for women, environmentalists, gays, and immigrants – as have nationhood and patriotism in time of war and new security threats. "Culture wars" is a widely used term for debates over abortion, religiosity, gender roles and other new issues (Sharp 1999).

These several changes, we suggest, are not unrelated developments. They signal the weakening of several past paradigms of urban politics.

The focus in academia on fragmentation, as opposed to the recognition of a new political form is partially related to current professional dynamics. As social scientists increasingly specialize, their colleague-specialists in the next faculty office increasingly ignore each other. Such specialization also leads to greater distance between the “general public” and mainstream journals like the *American Political Science Review* or *American Sociological Review*, not to mention economics. Journalists and various social commentators have sought to fill the void left by synthesizing social science – of the Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, sort.

Consider probably the most sought-out political commentator in the U.S. today, *New York Times* writer David Brooks. Brooks (2000) charts a broader version of the cultural themes that join in the New Political Culture in his *Bobos in Paradise*. Bobos are an amalgam of the bourgeois wealth of the 1980s and the hip, counter-culture of the 1960s – illustrated for instance by Bill Clinton, and many stereotypical Young Urban Professionals (Yuppies). Brooks shows sensitively how a new set of values and norms emerged, particularly in the U.S. but with many global counterparts, especially in West Europe: in aesthetics (peasant simple replaces aristocratic elegance in dress, home furnishings, and more), social movements (women’s egalitarianism replaces the elite social club), career aspirations (top college, meritocratic promotion across multiple jobs replaces inheritance or long-term loyalty to one big firm). And in politics, traditional left and right are replaced by a New Political Culture that includes all seven definitional elements earlier – although there are no footnotes in the book.

Brooks’ next book, *On Paradise Drive* (2004) pushes this further, and directly cites a wide range of studies on values and culture that he seeks to join in a manner that parallels our more scholarly efforts. The Drive is an auto tour across the American social landscape that locates multiple subcultures (bohemian, traditional small town conservative, Bobo, and more). It characterizes the emergence of new subcultures in the metaphors of new suburbs, brand name stores (the ice cream company, Ben and Jerry’s, has its own foreign policy, etc.) and types of SUVs driven by their proud owners. People increasingly change suburbs to find political as well as social counterparts, which heightens socio-economic fragmentation.

This parallels work on *The City as an Entertainment Machine* (Clark 2004), which shows how New Political Culture politics works in issue-specific consumption patterns. For instance, individualistic lifestyle and egalitarianism in dress can lead to resistance to traditional Veblenesque conspicuous consumption in a manner that becomes an active political statement. To bring your own mug to MacDonalds rather than despoiling the forests by using a paper cup is a daily green attack on the Establishment, more pervasive and appealing than voting for distant party candidates who are seen as unresponsive to lifestyle-defined subcultures. The rise in importance of subcultures, for lifestyle and politics, is a direct extension of the general point about issue-specific politics replacing traditional party politics. Issue-specificity is heightened by the internet, blogs, NGOs, chat groups, and related developments. It also joins politics, production, and consumption in what appears as “mere play” to some outsiders.

Although an academic, Richard’s Florida’s works, such as the *Rise of the Creative Class* and his follow up books like *Cities and the Creative Class* and *Whose Your City?* are highly popular outside the ivory tower. They detail the new individualism of young, creative persons, in particular, who move from job to job easily, and are attracted to new cities by lifestyle and amenities, which interpenetrates their work. The young illustrate a “big morph” away from traditional left and right, bohemian and bourgeois, building on Brooks and the New Political Culture. The small N of these books is weak evidence to skeptics. Yet the books’ huge sales, their active debate on talk shows and blogs and the like, all illustrate how profoundly the

questions of socio-political change they raise have touched millions of persons who talk and write about these issues. This is at least visible, popular evidence that serious changes are underway in New Political Culture directions.

The rise of the New Political Culture or NPC raises all sorts of ideological and value questions. Here is a small sampling. First, we are not advocates of the NPC, just messengers with the bad news that it has arrived in force and is spreading globally. Our concern as social scientists is to document and interpret how NPC developments in national and local governments are changing what we knew, but by no means to defend them as good or better than the past. The rise of the NPC has brought heated and openly conflictual debates within political parties and among intellectuals in particular; there is no dearth of ideological discussion. One overview of many criticisms and responses is Anthony Giddens's *The Third Way Debate* (2001). A classic question is what about the poor? The simple answer is that the poor have been given short political shrift for decades, including in the US New Deal. This is the widely supported result in many studies of the politics of poverty: the poor were responded to generally when they were members of a distinct group that was part of the European Left or US New Deal, primarily unions and blue collar workers in Europe and unions, Catholic Church, and some ethnic groups and cities in the US. Thus African-Americans fared better than Hispanics or Japanese in most US politics as the Hispanics and Japanese were less well organized. Most poor are not black and most blacks are not poor, despite what the media show – cf. evidence in Clark and Ferguson (1983: 120ff). In this sense, the NPC is a byproduct of the times: with the drop by half in the percent of manual laborers, the left parties adopted social issues and became more NPC. This has left underrepresented many poor and blue collar workers and especially new immigrants who often cannot legally vote. The politics of attacking established institutions like the churches, state, and unions are linked to individual alienation, identity politics, personalized consumption, post-modernist Angst, and the rise of non-voting, divorce and crime – if not driven by and at the very least legitimated by the social individualism embraced by NPC leaders and advocates. Many European politicians and journalists write best selling books deploring these issues (e.g. Todd 2008). In two party systems, this can lead to new social movements that address these issues ignored by the parties or established institutions; in multiparty systems new parties emerge. Thus the new anti-immigrant right parties that have won about 20 percent of the vote in most European countries are a byproduct of left parties abandoning their traditional constituents and issues. Related to the NPC emphasis on more direct democracy is the instability and higher turnover of leaders, the unwillingness of public leaders to “take responsibility” or seek to address longer term complex issues, like social security or serious environmental planning. Chicago is sometimes invoked as going against the American general trend in having a stronger party and a more powerful mayor in a context where clientelism is still stronger and more legitimate than most US cities. Are anti-growth coalitions egalitarian? Maybe or may not; there are all sorts. Limiting growth often drives up the value of real estate, and drives out poor persons. The rise in relative cost of living in downtown neighborhoods around the 1980s, and the movement of poor to geographically outlying areas, reversed a trend that had held strong in especially big US cities and some other countries (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005). These complex and sometimes unintended consequences of key policies suggest the interest in systematically comparing across localities. This can address broader normative as well as analytical questions that confront developments like the battle between the NPC, class politics, and clientelism, that is likely to persist for decades.

The New Political Culture thus provides a framework for understanding urban politics that adjusts for the lessened significance of class based politics, growth machines, and

clientelism. Unlike growth machine analysis and regime theory that focus on the business dominance of politics, the chosen outcomes need not be pro-growth. They can include development emphasizing quality-of-life and redistribution issues. The New Political Culture implies a weaker role for at least traditional political parties, unions, and organized groups. Citizens, the media, and outside experts, on the other hand, have a stronger influence and can encourage policy innovations. This politics brings new interrelated rules of urban governance. Governance perspectives need not exclude state institutions, but the new focus is more on the informal and loose processes for influencing and negotiating with a range of public and private actors to achieve desired outcomes (Hambleton 2003). Urban politics should address these more seriously, and integrate separate literatures on them in future years. These actors are addressed in the next section.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, CIVIC GROUPS, NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND CITIZENS

T.H. Marshall identified “citizenship” as a core concept linking citizens to the nation. He traced shifts in its meaning over two centuries. Every citizen of a nation has “rights” which rose from minimal to extensive along with increasing egalitarianism. With the emergence of the national welfare state, it became the agency largely responsible for implementing these rights, which extended employment guarantees, health care, retirement, to later more and more domains, such as animal rights. As the nation-state grew, dependence on the locality paled. The strong nation legacy came under criticism, however, in the last decades of the twentieth century. Factors such as those social and demographic shifts discussed earlier, globalization, attacks on authority and hierarchy of the late 1960s, culminating in the May 1968 events in Paris and elsewhere, the “hollowing” of the state, and the attendant fiscal crises in the following two decades helped reverse nationalization. National agencies were criticized for their high costs, inefficiency, and non-responsiveness to citizens. One widespread response was increased autonomy for local governments and increased citizen participation from the 1970s onward.

The strength and importance of local governments has increased as many national governments have delegated more powers, if not money, to local levels. This reverses the tendency of the 1960s and 1970s to centralize in regional authorities planned and controlled by national governments (especially in France and Italy). But, the most dramatic cases are in Eastern Europe, where like Western European national governments, communists found small, local, governments troublesome. As a result, they abolished many in the 1960s. But in 1989, one of the very first major actions following restoration of democracy was the restoration of small local governments. Local governments in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example, then doubled in number. The valorization of smaller governing bodies is not uniform. In the U.K. local governments were the most “oppressed” by national government of any Western country by the Labor Party leadership. Instead, Margaret Thatcher vigorously decentralized many policies to individual citizens and all sorts of new local public authorities that included many non-elected officials, but not to general purpose “local authorities,” since many were controlled by Labour Party councils. Despite variations, the global trend for cities since the 1970s is toward more decentralized, participatory patterns - and less national funding.

Although not all that is small is beautiful, the devolution of power to local governments has the potential to increase citizen participation and hence local democracy. Echoing Alexis de Tocqueville’s arguments in *Democracy in America*, research on organizations, small

groups, families, and socialization suggest that increased participation by all generates more social interaction among peers, and more social skills and trust. This is more effectively achieved, moreover, in small units which encourage more focused exchange and meaningful social contacts. These dynamics are shaped, however, by the context in which they operate. Contrary to many visions of America, the most citizen-responsive country appears to be Switzerland. Unlike the U.S., the Swiss do not have a national government. Instead, it is a federation of cantons. Charismatic leaders are so distrusted that few communes have mayors. Instead, they have “executives” comprised of several council members who keep out of the press. Council members regularly consult with citizens whether it is in cafes, on street corners, or in their offices. In council meetings, the major organized groups are officially represented on many committees. Groups are constrained, however, from pursuing their narrow interests. The threat of referendum constrains many pressure groups to consider broader interests, like those of taxpayers, and not just increase spending for the most active groups as in most other countries (the U.S. and France, for instance, do not have such constraints). For these reasons, the referendum has become part of annual budgets in many communes. The role of the referendum in constraining private interests is a central reason behind the existence of lower taxes in Switzerland than anywhere else in Europe (Jeanrenaud and Clark 1989). Civic participation and localism, as opposed to anti-civic minded behavior, is behind the Swiss lower taxes.

Citizens grew more active in many cities after the 1970s via “New Social Movements” (NSMs). Many cutting edge issues that emerged in the closing decades of the twentieth century were driven by NSMs. They extended both individualism and egalitarianism. They also joined consumption and lifestyle issues with the classic production concerns championed by unions and parties. These new civic groups pressed new agendas – ecology, feminism, peace, gay rights, etc. – that the older political parties ignored. Over time other aesthetic and amenity concerns also arose, such as suburban sprawl and sports stadiums. In Europe, the national state and parties were the hierarchical “establishment” opposed by the NSMs. In the U.S., local business and political elites were often the target. Many governments were often seen as closed to these citizen activists. For instance in the 1970s in Italy, even Communist and Socialist parties rejected the new issues. It is opposition of this sort that likely led to the more informal organization of the NSMs and their often confrontational tactics. But as political parties and governments embraced many new social issues, the opportunity structure (McAdam et al. 1996) drastically shifted. Movement leaders then shifted from “urban guerilla warfare” to participating in elections, lobbying, and advising governments. As their issues were incorporated into the political system, their demands moderated.

It is not simply that the NSMs were on the cutting edge of political concerns that dominated the close of the twentieth century. These movements embodied the New Political Culture and helped promote it. Most items on the NSMs’ agenda concern consumption and leisure issues, more than work and jobs. The focus on fighting suburban sprawl, creating public spaces such as parks, and other such issues do not necessarily divide people into rich versus poor, as did class and party politics for much of the twentieth century. In addition, they often promoted civic participation more generally. The agendas of community civic groups (including block clubs and neighborhood associations) tend to be set locally through more general participation. This contrasts with more hierarchical parties and unions – which can alienate many younger activists. New issue-specific community associations have mushroomed in the late twentieth century. It would appear that the NSMs and their concerns encourage civic involvement at the local level. Indeed the largest U.S. environmental organization, the Sierra Club, reported that its average member belonged to seven other

environmental organizations. Even in Japan, where NSMs and local communities are less salient, local ecology groups were still the driving force generating national air and water standards, reversing the normal centralization (Michio 1997). As evident by the Japan example, the power of the NSMs is heightened by globalization. These civic groups can weaken traditional agendas and promote their new issues in countries that might change slower without international contact. Local affiliates of NSMs like ecology groups draw tactics and policies from their international counterparts, via congresses, newsletters, and the internet. The reach of the NSMs is now global in scope.

Civic associations are shifting away from narrow self-interest to appeal more to values of all local citizens. This broader shift has not been adequately conceptualized to date, but it is changing (Alexander 2006). While there are considerable local variations (Elazar 1998), the global shift is toward the “public good” of moralistic politics, even in contexts where such framing was totally absent until recent years, as stressed for instance in interpreting the drastic new leadership of Bogota, Naples, and Chicago (Passotti in press).

To conclude this section, here is a general proposition about the relation between the increased importance of local governments, globalization, and the growing significance of civic groups. If we make the reasonable assumption that uncertainty about citizen preferences should increase with the number and diversity of citizens, then: *larger and higher level governments, ceteris paribus, are less responsive to citizens and more responsive to organized groups*. This should hold across governments. As a result, groups should rise over citizens in larger cities compared to small towns, metropolitan governments compared to their subsidiary units, or national and international governments compared to local governments. Trust, legitimacy, transparency, and targeted policy specifics may follow. An interesting corollary is that citizen participation locally can enhance legitimacy of national as well as local governments, a finding that emerges in many countries in the careful work by Vetter (2007).

Still, further work shows important differences by types of participation: some types of groups have negative impacts on citizens feeling of legitimacy about government, such as some Not in My Backyard or other challenging groups. Tocqueville and Putnam are wrong – if we consider their emphasis that participation increases legitimacy and trust among citizens. Not only might this be reverse causality (Paxton 1999), but also there may be a negative or zero relation between participation and trust. Clark and Silva (2008) document positive, negative, and zero impacts in different contexts and issue-areas. To assess these impacts more subtlety is a future challenge.

The consequence is clear for citizen-based democracy. Over time, leaders in bigger governments, acting with less information and more lobbying pressures from organized groups, are more likely to alienate citizens than in smaller governments. Consequences can be disruptive, like the taxpayers’ revolts in the U.S. in the 1970s (following the turbulence of the late 1960s), or the paralysis of established leaders and collapse of the major parties in Italy in the early 1990s, followed by the rise of anti-government leagues, new parties, and candidates. These are just extreme cases, but more sensitive survey data on citizen preferences, documents variations for more normal issues.

Similarly, supra-national formations such as the United Nations and the European Union are most apt to be swayed by aggressive and rich pressure groups. Correlatively, citizen preferences win less consideration. Given the huge diversity of citizens under such large entities, responding to them seriously is less possible than for smaller governments. This suggests that as global forces grow, via markets and international governments, local governments and their associated democratic processes should also grow in importance due to local efforts to balance distant global forces.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that globalization challenges older conceptualizations of urban politics. The New Political Culture has emerged to challenge growth machine theory, business/regime leadership, class based analysis of politics, and clientelism. The New Political Culture includes crucial developments in the urban political landscape such as the rise of NSMs, the increased importance of local government, and the emergence of economic policies emphasizing amenity and aesthetic concerns. In the closing pages, the key points are reviewed and some of the central impacts of globalization on urban politics are identified.

The growth machine model lost its power as the conditions producing such coalitions have declined in many locations. Political issues focusing on production and jobs have (often but not always) been superseded by consumption and lifestyle decisions. As argued earlier, these developments are related to processes such as the increased global competition among cities, the withdrawal of national governments as funding sources for localities, and, as just discussed, the emergence of NSMs. The declining explanatory power of this growth model is evident in the issues stressed by political candidates and in citizen surveys of salient issues. "Human capital" concerns reinforce a focus on public education even for large employers. Anti-growth machines, environmentalists of all sorts, and citizens pursuing amenity agendas become visible political actors. They reinforce related changes in the political rules of the game which more often emphasize items such as government responsiveness to citizens. Cities are decreasingly growth machines and increasingly entertainment/amenity machines.

The second paradigm reconsidered focused on the relative decline of race and class cleavages. In the past, these categories were the "best tools in the box." The rise of post-industrial economies, multicultural politics, the emergence of new political actors, and other processes related to globalization have impacted the explanatory power of these variables. They still remain powerful forces in urban politics, but their influence is far from uniform. They are critical in some locations, politically insignificant in others. This is not an anomaly, but an instance where city contexts provide valuable data for more general theory building. Locations with more working-class persons (in Europe) and more non-whites (in the U.S.) have more class/race politics and less New Political Culture (as measured by women elected officials, importance of the media, etc.). Hierarchies perpetuate class and racial conflicts. As these hierarchies decline, however, so do the old cleavages. Post-class politics is not the consensus: new cleavages lead to conflict on many new issues, but they are diverse, splitting divisions in numerous directions. Dahrendorf defined social classes as any conflict group; following this line, class will never die. But for those following Marx and Weber more closely, class explains less.

In the face of globalization, clientelism faces a similar fate and is declining even in its strongest bastions: Chicago, southern Italy, Ireland, and albeit more slowly, less developed countries. Besides the general shifts mentioned earlier, the visible hand of globalization can be seen quite directly here. For instance, international accounting standards and written contracts are forcing subcontractors in developing countries to accept rules established in developed countries against clientelism. World Bank loans in Asia and Russia come with strong pressures in this direction. This is not to say that clientelism fully disappears, but that more strict market cost pressures press to keep it under control. The value of patronage jobs declines as media advertising, polls, and other professional activities rise – joined with more education by citizens and broader markets for contracting out.

A key argument is that the New Political Culture provides a lens for understanding today's urban politics. Weaknesses in the paradigms discussed earlier take on meaning in

contrast with this new politics. But the complexities of cities and neighborhoods are far from homogenous. As noted earlier, class and race cleavages endure in some areas, clientelism in others. The NPC, seen as a short-term aberration by many a decade or so back, has grown increasingly mainstream. Whatever one's normative views, it is critical for analysis to clarify how and why leaders, organized groups, and citizens change their rules in conflicts between class, race, growth and NPC politics. The volatility of the NPC is illustrated by the roller-coaster fluctuations of President Bill Clinton. This volatility is a common theme replayed, if less dramatically, in thousands of local governments around the world. With Britain's Blair and Germany's Schroeder following France's Mitterand, the NPC is clearly not just American and not just local, these were just its roots. It has become a global political phenomenon.

While we often discuss these types of rules of the game like clientelism or class politics, they are often framed more specifically, such as the corruption of Mayor X. From a more sociological perspective, we aim to specify the broader social trends and cultural transformations that define and redefine the specifics of urban politics. All these ideal types of politics coexist in many locales, with proponents variously seeking to appeal to each sort of "rule," but often without identifying the rules as a coherent set. As the legitimacy of clientelism, class politics and other rules wane, public discussion and media coverage of scandal mount, leading to feelings of distrust, illegitimacy, and lack of confidence in government in general. This is common the world over. There is seldom any clear or coherent shift; there are visible political battles and personality clashes. But if we look deeper, we can often find more general processes at work.

Most of the empirical literature of urban politics consists of case studies of individual cities. We have deliberately sought to locate the individual cases in a broader context, which inevitably prohibits the nuance possible in a single case. The reader can usefully complement this summary by consulting some of the best case studies. The leader is still probably Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* The nuanced work by Harald Baldersheim et al. (1996), Peter John and Alistair Cole (2000), Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot (2007), Laura Reese and Raymond Rosenfeld (2002), and Lloyd (2006) add subtlety to many of our points discussed earlier.

Globalization and the NPC are bringing a renaissance of local politics. Thus, local autonomy has been invigorated as the critical roles of active citizens and local politics have been rediscovered by leaders from Prague to Mexico. The political culture of local democracy has become a global priority. This has reinforced arguments against "metropolitan" government in the traditional hierarchical sense, but encouraged voluntary agreements in multiple, distinct service areas among localities near one another. As democracy spreads across virtually the entire globe, its quality is more closely watched and criticized. Federalism and localism are both global phenomena.

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CHAPTER 24

Democracy and Democratization

GEORG SØRENSEN

INTRODUCTION

The world today is more liberal than it ever was; more than 40 countries made transitions toward democracy between 1974 and 2007. As a result, the number of democratic regimes has increased from 40 to 90 countries. The transitions began in Southern Europe; the next wave was in Latin and Central America. Then came the democratization of Eastern Europe; the most recent wave has been in Africa and the former Soviet Union. Finally, transitions toward democracy have taken place in Asia during the entire period since the early 1970s (Sørensen 2008).¹ These transitions were termed the “third wave” of democratic expansion by Samuel Huntington (1991); the earlier waves were in the nineteenth/early twentieth century and after World War II. They led to great liberal optimism including the claim that mankind had reached “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1989) because there were no longer significant ideological rivals to a liberal democratic form of regime. But already some years ago, scholars began to speculate that the third wave of democratization was over (Diamond 1996); they have a point. In several countries, there have been reverses toward authoritarian rule. Furthermore, most of the countries that experienced transition are not yet full democracies; they are in the early phases of democratic opening or they have entered a situation of democratic “standstill.”

The reversals indicate that there is nothing automatic about transitions away from authoritarianism. The forces that favor democracy far from always prevail, as recent developments in Russia and elsewhere have demonstrated. Liberal philosophy entertains the optimistic idea that political change will always tend to be for the better, leading to progress toward democracy. But history is not predetermined; “de-democratization” might just as well happen as democratization.

This chapter will argue that the transitions away from authoritarianism have been replaced by a situation of “standstill,” where a large number of countries remain in the gray area between being outright authoritarian and fully democratic; these regimes are likely to persist as semidemocratic or semiauthoritarian. In order to develop this proposition, it is necessary to briefly introduce the debate about what democracy is. Furthermore, it will be relevant to further identify the major characteristics of these regimes and to survey the prospects for promoting democracy from outside. The overall conclusion is skeptical as regards the possibilities for further democratic consolidation in many countries.

¹What follows draws on this work. I am grateful to the editors for detailed comments on an earlier draft of the chapter.

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

Democracy is a form of government in which the people rule. The term comes from two Greek words: *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule). This sounds simple, but it is not, because it raises many difficult questions (Held 2006), for example: who are the people? What kind of participation in the political process should there be for the people? Which issues and areas of society should be subject to democratic rule? The dominant liberal tradition contains a tension in its reflection on these questions; that is because liberalism is concerned, not merely with the democratic foundations of state power, but also setting sharp limits to state power. Early liberals fought for a rollback of state power and the creation of a sphere of civil society where social relations, including private business, nonstate institutions, family, and personal life, could evolve without state interference. An important element in this regard was the support of a market economy based on the respect for private property. The tradition that became liberal democracy was liberal first (aimed at restricting state power over civil society) and democratic later (aimed at creating structures that would secure a popular mandate for holders of state power). Some early liberals had reservations about democracy, fearing that it would impede the establishment of a liberal society (Therborn 1977). The development of liberal democratic thinking evolved toward settling the complex relationship between these two elements.

In the debate about the relationship between capitalism and democracy, the liberalist tradition maintains that only a capitalist system can provide the necessary basis for liberty and democracy. The Marxist tradition rejects this view and argues that capitalism must be replaced by socialism as the necessary basis for democracy. The liberal view has prevailed as noncapitalist countries adhering to the Marxist tradition have been unable to construct political systems that can claim to be more democratic than the liberal democracies based on capitalism. At the same time, not every capitalist system is democratic; and Robert Dahl states that modern corporate capitalism tends to “produce inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence of the democratic process” (Dahl 1985: 60). There continues to be a debate between neoliberals who want to sharply limit government intervention in civil society and liberal/social democrats who argue for a reformed capitalism with less inequality and more democracy, a system that requires comprehensive government intervention.

Against this background, we can think of two different conceptions of democracy, one rather narrow, the other very comprehensive. The narrow concept was formulated by Joseph Schumpeter. For him, democracy is simply a mechanism for choosing political leadership. Citizens are given a choice among rival political leaders who compete for their votes. Between elections, decisions are made by the politicians. At the next election, citizens can replace their elected officials. This ability to choose between leaders at election time is democracy (Schumpeter 1976).

The very comprehensive notion of democracy is suggested by David Held; he calls it “democratic autonomy” (Held 2006). It requires both an accountable state and a reordering of civil society. It foresees substantial direct participation in local community institutions as well as self-management of cooperatively owned enterprises. It calls for a bill of rights that goes beyond the right to cast a vote, to include equal opportunities for participation and for citizens’ final control of the political agenda. Also included are social and economic rights to ensure adequate resources for democratic autonomy. In effect, Held’s notion of democracy maximizes popular participation, people’s control of all major aspects of social life, and popular rights in terms of political, civil, economic and social rights. Between the narrow notion of political democracy suggested by Schumpeter and the comprehensive understanding suggested by Held lies the debate about what democracy is and what it ought to be.

This overview of different meanings of democracy does not give us much guidance in determining whether specific countries are democratic or not. For that purpose, we need a precise concept that focuses on democracy as a specific type of political system. In this regard, it is helpful to follow Robert Dahl; he suggests a concept of democracy that is more demanding than Schumpeter but not quite as demanding as Held. For Dahl, a democracy is a system of government that meets the following conditions:

- Meaningful and extensive *competition* among individuals and organized groups (especially political *parties*) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force.
- A highly inclusive level of political *participation* in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded.
- A level of *civil and political liberties* – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (Dahl 1989; see also Diamond et al. 1988; Tilly 2007).

Several studies have attempted to measure the degree of democracy in a large number of countries using Dahl's concept of democracy as a starting point; the Freedom House Index is useful because it has global coverage and is updated on a regular basis (Freedom House 2007). The index employs one dimension for competition and participation (called political rights) and one dimension for civil liberties. For each dimension, a seven-point evaluation scale is used, so that the highest ranking countries (that is, those with the highest degree of democracy) are 1–1's and the lowest are 7–7's. Countries with an average rating between 1 and 2.5 are considered Free; those with an average between 3 and 5.0 are Partly Free; and those with ratings from 5.5 to 7 are considered Not Free. The 2007 Freedom House Survey of independent countries identified 90 countries as Free; 58 countries are classified as Partly Free, and another 45 as Not Free (Freedom House 2007).

This way of measuring democracy gives a quick overview of how democracy fares in the world. Still, this type of measurement is an imprecise approximation of a complex reality with many different and often contradictory aspects as a critical analysis has demonstrated (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Even countries that end up with the best rating (1–1) can be highly dissimilar on important dimensions. Such dissimilarity pertains to variation in institutions and other differences in democratic qualities. Several projects in recent years have attempted to go beyond the crude Freedom House measure in order to assess the quality of democracy around the world. David Beetham and his colleagues have conducted an “audit of democracy” in the United Kingdom and identified a number of “democratic flaws in the system” (Beetham 2004). A democratic audit is a systematic assessment of a country's political system in order to find out how democratic it is and how well human rights are protected. Larry Diamond has coordinated the Quality of Democracy project, which examines eight dimensions on which democracies can vary in quality. The assessment includes social and economic equality and estimates the extent to which public policies correspond to citizen demands and preferences (Diamond 2004; O'Donnell et al. 2004). Another measure worth mentioning is Ken Bollen's (1993) “democracy index” that shows significant differences among longstanding democracies. This is currently updated through 1995.

The spread of democracy since the end of the Cold War has increased the variety of more or less democratic systems. This in turn has stimulated a veritable cottage industry of concepts – attempts to produce labels and categories that point to political systems which have some, but frequently not all and often merely a few, democratic qualities. Hence the terms: elite-dominated, frozen, restricted, illiberal, pseudo, hybrid, or electoral democracies to mention a

few. Even if democratic progress has taken place, the terms indicate that it is wanting in major respects in many countries. In order to pave the way for an analysis of this, it is helpful first to consider the content of processes of regime change.

PROCESSES OF REGIME CHANGE

Certain patterns of economic, social and cultural conditions are more favorable to the rise and further consolidation of democracy than others. Seymour Lipset famously claimed that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959, 1994). As regards political culture, it has often been asserted that Protestantism supports democracy whereas Catholicism in many cases works against it – more recently Islam is the enemy. A third set of preconditions favoring democracy is associated with the social structure of society. Barrington Moore concluded that “a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Moore 1966: 418). Yet Göran Therborn claims that democracy has “always and everywhere” been brought about in a popular struggle against the leading sections of the bourgeoisie (Therborn 1977). Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) argue for a “middle class coalition” thesis where farmers, labor and the urban middle class forge a political coalition to press for democracy.

But the relationship between these structural conditions and the growth of democracy is complex; we cannot say that if specific preconditions are present, there will always be democracy. In some cases democracy can emerge even when none, or only a few, of the preconditions conducive to it are present. Economic, social, cultural and other structural conditions may decrease the likelihood for democracy to occur, but they do not themselves make the policy choice about whether there will be a democratic system. Over the past three decades, democratic openings have taken place in countries where the economic and other preconditions have been seriously wanting.

The preconditions set the stage on which the actors play; they cannot foretell whether the actors will produce democracy or not, but they can provide information about what kind of outcome we can expect from the players. Recent research has emphasized that even if democratic openings can occur in almost any kind of setting, the emergence of stable and consolidated democracy continues to depend on favorable preconditions (Karl 2005). For example, a country’s democratic prospects are better at higher rather than lower levels of economic development. Democracies emerging under adverse conditions are likely to be unstable, frail and vulnerable; such is the case with many of the current democratic openings. Before addressing this in detail, it is helpful to introduce the various major phases in a transition to democracy.

Figure 24. 1 is a slightly modified version of a model created by Dankwart Rustow (1970). It aims to give an overview of the major elements in a transition process.

The model has one background condition – national unity – that must be in place before it is possible to conceive of a transition toward democracy. The vast majority of citizens must “have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” (Rustow 1970: 350). When ethnic and other cleavages between groups in the population lead to basic questioning of national unity that problem must be resolved before a transition to democracy becomes feasible. National unity was an issue in India and Pakistan and is an issue today in Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Russia, and in several African countries.

The *preparatory phase* contains first and foremost what Rustow called a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. Individuals, groups, and classes challenge the nondemocratic rulers. Democracy may not be their main aim; it can be a means to another end or a by-product




FIGURE 24.1. Transitions toward democracy: a model.

Source: Based on Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," (1990)

of struggle for other ends, such as a more equal society with a better distribution of wealth. The composition of the groups behind the challenge to the rulers varies from country to country and over time periods. The *decision phase* contains "a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to ... institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure" (Rustow 1970: 355). There can be overlap with the previous (preparatory) phase and there might be several subphases in the decision phase. The pace of transition influences the outcome; so does the institutional legacy of authoritarian rule. To what extent is it possible to build on political parties, interest associations, local governments, and social movements from earlier periods? Another important factor concerns the makeup of the leading coalition behind the transition. Is it dominated by elite groups and how far do these groups want to go in terms of democratization (Karl 1990, 2005)? Why do political leaders agree to institutionalized democracy? (John Higley's contribution to this volume explores the elite variable in democratic transitions).

The final phase in the transition to democracy is the *consolidation phase*. There is no agreement on the precise definition of consolidation; most scholars will support the idea that democratic consolidation has taken place when all major political actors agree that they should follow the rules of the democratic process. Elite groups, parties and interest organizations, as well as the large majority of the public believe in the legitimacy of democracy and see it as the best form of government (Diamond 1999). That is to say, they consider democracy "the only game in town" (Linz 1990). But what this exactly means is open to considerable debate (for an overview of this subject, see Grugel 2002).

There is nothing inevitable about these phases of transition to democracy; no historical law defines the transition process as the natural order of things. The "natural order" in many countries appears rather to be an uneasy seesaw between semiauthoritarianism and frail democracy. The next section will further develop this proposition.

From Transition to Standstill

The term “transition” is too optimistic as a label for the processes of regime change in the third wave. We sooner have a “standstill,” where a large number of countries remain fixed in the gray area between the extremes of outright authoritarian and fully democratic. “Transition” suggests that these regimes may be on the way to something better, but the evidence indicates that most often they are not; they are more likely to stay semidemocratic or semiauthoritarian. Consider the global survey of democracy from Freedom House. Countries with an average score of 2.0 or less are considered full-blown democracies, and countries with an average score of 6.5 or more are considered closed authoritarian (Diamond 2002). Countries between these averages are in the gray area. On this view, roughly half of the countries in the world – 96 out of 192 – are in the gray zone. There are vast differences among them, of course; if we divide the 96 countries into two different groups, the half with the better scores could be called “electoral democracies” whereas the half with the worse scores could be called “electoral authoritarian systems”; the two groups are identified in [Table 24.1](#).

All of these countries have held elections. Elections tend to be the focus of democratic openings. They are highly visible and often celebrated events; an election appears to be a manifest and certain indicator that democratic transition is now well under way. But, this is only the case when elections are truly competitive, free, and fair (Elklit and Svensson 1997). The problem, however, is that many elections are not of this democratically attractive kind. Even highly authoritarian systems, such as the old Soviet Union or present-day North Korea held elections that certainly do not signal a transition away from authoritarianism. Elections do not always function as an indicator of democratization; they also take place under regimes that may retain major authoritarian elements.

Instead of routinely celebrating elections as part of a successful process of democratization, then, it is necessary to examine them in more detail, also considering the political process before and after polling day. “Good” elections are as much (or even more) about what happens in the preparation leading up to the event as about the political process after the event. “Free and fair elections” says Robert Dahl, are “the culmination of the [democratic] process, not the beginning. Indeed, unless and until the other rights and liberties are firmly protected, free and fair elections cannot take place. Except in countries already close to the thresholds of democracy,

TABLE 24.1. Countries in the Gray Zone 2006

Electoral democracies (<i>Freedom House average score above 2.0 and less than 4.25</i>)	Electoral authoritarian systems (<i>Freedom House average score 4.25 and above, but less than 6.5</i>)
El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lesotho, Peru, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Albania, Bolivia, Colombia, East Timor, Ecuador, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Guinea-Bissau, Moldova, Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fiji, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Burundi, Bangladesh, Comoros, Guatemala, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Tonga	Kuwait, Armenia, Central African Republic, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Singapore, The Gambia, Uganda, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Yemen, Gabon, Mauritania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Chad, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Cameroon, Congo (Kinshasa), Cote d’Ivoire, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Swaziland, Vietnam

Source: Calculated from Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006*. Countries arranged with lowest (i.e., most democratic) scores first.

therefore, it is a grave mistake to assume that if only the leader of a nondemocratic country can be persuaded to hold elections, then full democracy will follow” (Dahl 1992: 246).

Table 24.1 in the earlier section uses the terms “electoral democracies” and “electoral authoritarian systems” to describe the regimes in the gray area. There are many suggestions of additional labels. Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) suggested the term “delegative democracies”; such systems concentrate power in the presidency and sidestep the political process involved in going through congress. O’Donnell argued in 1994 that the purest cases of delegative democracy were Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. Today, it is probably the Hugo Chavez presidency in Venezuela and the Vladimir Putin presidency in Russia that best illustrate delegative democracy. In different ways, both presidents seek to concentrate power and control the political process, rejecting a pluralist notion of democracy “as the representation of diverse interests” (Krajev 2006).

The term “illiberal democracy” was suggested by Fareed Zakaria (1997). Democratically elected regimes, so his claim, are frequently ignoring “the constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. From Peru to the Palestinian Authority, from Sierra Leone to Slovakia, from Pakistan to the Philippines, we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in international life – illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997: 22). In other words, elections may be held but the liberal side of democracy – rule of law, separation of powers, protection of basic rights of speech, assembly, religion and property – is much less developed. Many countries with elected leader suffer from a lack of such liberties; these deficiencies may be combined with a flawed electoral process as well.

Another way of depicting countries in the gray areas has been proposed by Thomas Carothers (2002). He first notes that the democratization wave in the last two decades involved nearly 100 countries; but only a small number of those countries – probably fewer than 20 – are on the way to becoming “successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization” (2002: 9). The rest are “neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy ... they suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens’ interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions and persistently poor institutional performance by the state” (Carothers 2002: 10). The core message is that countries in the gray area are most often not on the way to becoming more democratic; in that sense they are not in a process of transition. They are likely to remain in the gray area.

In an early analysis, Robert Dahl listed five conditions that are most favorable for the development of stable democratic rule:

- Leaders do not employ coercion, notably through the police and the military, to gain and maintain their power;
- A modern, dynamic, organizationally pluralist society exists;
- The conflictive potentialities of subcultural pluralism are maintained at tolerable levels;
- Among the people of a country, particularly its active political stratum, a political culture and a system of beliefs exists that is favorable to the idea of democracy and the institutions of polyarchy;
- The effects of foreign influence or control are either negligible or positively favorable (Dahl 1989: 314).

None of these conditions, with the possible exception of the last one, are met in most countries in the gray zone today. Against this background, there is not much hope that the recent democratic openings will progress into consolidated democracies. “Standstill,” therefore, is a more accurate label than “transition.”

WEAK STATES AND DEMOCRACY

Many countries in the gray zone are weak states; a successful process of democratization requires that these countries develop more “stateness,” that is, become stronger states. We may distinguish between a broad and a narrow concept of state weakness. In the broad sense, weak states are deficient in three basic respects. First, the economy is defective; there is a lack of coherent national economy capable of sustaining a basic level of welfare for the population and of providing the resources for running an effective state. Defective economies often depend crucially on the world market because they are mono-economies based on the export of one or a few primary goods and on the import of more sophisticated, technology-intensive products. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, primary products account for 80–90% of total export. At the same time, the weak economy is highly heterogenous; there are elements of a modern sector but also feudal or semifeudal structures in agriculture. In both urban and rural areas large parts of the population are outside the formal sectors, living in localized subsistence economies at very loose standards.

The second major deficiency in weak states concerns relations between people in society; they do not make up a coherent national community. A national community is a community of sentiment, meaning a common language and a common cultural and historical identity based on literature, myths, symbols, music, and art. Such a community of sentiment is poorly developed in weak states. Instead, ethnic identities connected to tribal, religious, and similar characteristics dominate over the national identity. These ethnic identities are not necessarily primordial in the sense that they reflect ancient characteristics maintained over a long period of time. It is true that precolonial Africa, for example, was not neatly divided into territorially separate entities with clear-cut authority structures; it was rather a continent of overlapping entities where people had multiple group affiliations. But present-day ethnic groups were first created by colonial rulers employing ethnic labeling as a “divide and rule” instrument, and then by postcolonial leaders appealing to ethnic identities as part of their own ambitions of power. In the worst cases, the lack of national community can completely block a process of democratization; that is behind Rustow’s notion of “national unity” in the earlier model as a precondition for democratic transition. But even short of that, severe divisions in the population create cleavages and conflicts that impede democratization.

The third major problem in weak states concerns the state apparatus in a direct sense (that is, the institutions of government at all levels). Weak states lack effective and responsive institutions. This is what is meant by state weakness in a narrow sense. “Effective” means the ability to formulate, implement, and supervise policies. “Responsive” means that the state functions to the benefit of, and with the support from, major groups in society. Effective states have a competent bureaucracy and a political leadership bent on promoting economic, political, and social progress. In organizational terms, a good bureaucracy displays “corporate cohesion of the organization, differentiation and insulation from its social environment, unambiguous location of decision making and channels of authority, and internal features fostering instrumental rationality and activism” (Evans et al. 1985: 50). This is closely related to the demands on the single bureaucrat: he or she must possess general as well as relevant issue competence in order to “analyze problems, formulate feasible solutions and implement them in technically competent ways” (White 1984: 100).

In weak states, the bureaucracy is sooner incompetent and corrupt, and the political leadership is not seeking to provide public or collective goods. It rather seeks to mold the state apparatus into a personal source of income. The spoils of office are often shared by a group of followers making up a network of patron–client relationships in which significant parts of

the bureaucracy participate. As a result, the state does not provide public goods in any major way. It is neither effective, nor responsive. When the state does not deliver, two consequences follow. First, people turn elsewhere for the satisfaction of material and nonmaterial needs. In Sub-Saharan Africa, they have primarily turned to the ethnic communities that are the focal points of a "moral economy": "The moral economy enables individuals in various contexts to rely on nonbureaucratic mutual aid networks and to reciprocate toward those who belong to a common society. Examples include those better off helping relatives and clan members find jobs or pay school fees, as well as regular contributions to weddings and funerals, even for persons with whom face-to-face contact has never been established..." (Ndegwa 1997: 601). The second consequence is that the bond of right and obligation between people and the state does not develop; as a result, bonds of loyalty leading to state legitimacy do not mature. When the ethnic communities become the primary focus for the satisfaction of people's needs, loyalties are projected in that direction and ethnic identities are reinforced.

It was hoped that the democratic openings over the last two decades would create a new momentum with a positive circle of increased state accountability and efficiency, combined with a population more and more inclined to take on the identity of a national community of citizens. But, in many countries, the opposite has happened: the early phases of democratization have emphasized ethnic cleavages in the populations. First, democratization increases the possibilities for different ethnic groups to present their views and formulate their demands; the result of that has frequently been more rather than less conflict between various groups (Conteh-Morgan 1997). Second, state elites may actively enforce links with ethnic groups in their attempt to gain or hold on to power. One analysis found that elections "may actually increase the use of patronage... Traditional patron – client relations have often been critical in winning recent elections, indicating that the nature of African politics has not changed despite the new liberalization. Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya have all reported massive overspending as governments sought to reward traditional supporters, notably members of particular ethnic groups and civil servants, to smooth the transitions process or gain votes" (Bienen and Herbst 1996: 35).

The problems associated with democratizing weak states have led to a different kind of recommendation, one of "stateness first," meaning that "before you can have democracy or economic development, you have to have a state" (Fukuyama 2005: 84). The problem is, of course, that it is extremely difficult to conduct effective state-building over a short span of time, as is being currently demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In a recent book, Francis Fukuyama instructively sets forth the four different elements involved in a process of state-building (Fukuyama 2004). Understood as creating effective and responsive institutions, they are: (1) organizational design and management; (2) political system design concerning institutions at the level of the state as a whole; (3) basis of legitimation concerning the perception of state institutions as legitimate by society; and (4) cultural and structural factors concerning the ways in which norms, values and culture affect the make-up of institutions.

A major point emphasized in Fukuyama's analysis is that social and cultural factors, and to some extent also legitimation factors, are not easily changed in the short and medium run; nor are they easily transformed by outside forces, such as aid donors. As a result, we must expect problems of state weakness to persist in many countries for some considerable time to come. As indicated, the problems mean that attempts at democratization face serious difficulties; state weakness makes it less likely that countries can escape from the gray zone. In the worst of cases of weakness, countries have rather moved toward complete breakdown or failure.

Who are the weak states? I have indicated that the most serious problems are in Sub-Saharan Africa. But considerable elements of state weakness can also be found in Asia, in

TABLE 24.2. Weak States in 2007 as Reported in Foreign Policy's Failed States Index

1. Sudan	11. Haiti
2. Iraq	12. Pakistan
3. Somalia	13. North Korea
4. Zimbabwe	14. Burma
5. Chad	15. Uganda
6. Ivory Coast	16. Bangladesh
7. Dem. Republic of the Congo	17. Nigeria
8. Afghanistan	18. Ethiopia
9. Guinea	19. Burundi
10. Central African Republic	20. Timor-Leste

Source: Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace (2007).

postcommunist systems, in the Middle East, and even in Latin America. Since 2005, *Foreign Policy* together with The Fund for Peace has issued a Failed States Index based on 12 indicators of weakness (see also Rice and Patrick 2008). Even if the set of indicators is broader than the definitions of state weakness offered earlier, we may use the index as an approximate measure of the extent weak statehood in the world. The 2007 version of the index lists 20 countries in the most critical category of countries. They are listed in the table above in descending order, with the most problematic cases first (Table 24.2).

This section has argued that “stateness” is a precondition for a successful process of democratization. When “stateness” is lacking and the state is weak, the prospects for democratic transition deteriorate. The problem of weak statehood is most serious in Sub-Saharan Africa, but it is present in most other regions as well. Even countries that are not on the earlier list may contain significant elements of state weakness. In the index, the 20 countries mentioned earlier are in the “Critical” category; the next category (“Danger”) contains such states as: Nepal, Uzbekistan, Sierra Leone, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Lebanon.

ELITE DOMINATION AND DEMOCRACY

A third major characteristic of many countries in the gray zone is elite domination, that is, the presence of elite groups whose members reserve the right to interfere in the democratic process in order to protect their interests. Such interference can be part of the actual basis of the whole movement toward democracy. In other words, the elite groups (the military, traditional economic elites, and leading politicians) may make the transition toward democracy dependent on the acceptance of a set of agreements, or political pacts, that define vital areas of interest for the elites.

In sub-Saharan Africa, power lies with a president – a strong man – who supports a network of political clients by way of accessing the state’s resources. What is the problem? One plausible answer to this question, provided by Richard Sandbrook and also by other scholars, points to the lack of legitimacy that characterized postcolonial African states (Sandbrook 1985). At independence, there were no strong social forces in society capable of disciplining political leaders. And the latter had no moral basis or legitimizing ideology from which they could demand compliance of citizens and bureaucrats. Precolonial, traditional legitimacy was no longer a relevant foundation. The type of government that filled this vacuum was a form of neo-patrimonialism (Neo-patrimonialism must be understood against the background of

patrimonialism, which is the name used by Max Weber to describe any type of government originating from a royal household and having a ruler who treats matters of state as his or her personal affair. Present-day systems of this type, such as the system of personal rule in Africa, are examples of neo-patrimonialism.). Personal rule is based on personal loyalty, especially toward the leading figure of the regime, the strongman. All the important positions in the state, whether bureaucratic, political, military, or police, are filled with the loyal followers of the strongman, his relatives, friends, kinsmen, and tribesmen. Their loyalty to the strongman is reinforced by their sharing of the spoils of office.

The strongman commands a web of informal networks, or patron–client relationships, within which two main forms of spoils are distributed. Both emanate from the strongman and his followers' control of the state. They are access to the state's resources in the form of jobs, contracts, favorable loans, opportunities for illegal gain, and so forth, and access to resources not directly controlled by the state but subject to state regulation, such as import permits and business licenses.

The final element in personal rule, in addition to the strongman and clientelism, is an armed force personally loyal to the regime. Because of the state's lack of legitimacy and the fact that many people are excluded from the rewards resulting from clientelism, rulers must resort to coercion or the threat of it for survival. Thus, in determining the degree of democracy in African states, one should focus less on the differences between civilian and military regimes and more on the direct and indirect political influence of the armed forces.

It is against this background that different varieties of frail democracy and authoritarianism have developed in most African states. The grafting of more democratic procedures, such as multiparty systems and open presidential elections, is now in the cards or has already been effectuated in many African states. But, it is clear that the consolidation of democracy will be possible only if more profound changes in the structure of personal rule take place (van de Walle 2002).

A similar kind of elite domination by a personal ruler or a clan has developed in several of the former Soviet republics; a milder version of it characterizes Georgia; outright authoritarian Belarus is at the other extreme; in-betweens are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Former Communists no longer represent the past; they represent the successful capitalist future. What is the problem then? Is it not ideal that the forces of the past are becoming the architects of the future? The problem is that only a few of the new entrepreneurs hold traditional capitalist virtues, such as hard work, honesty, and responsibility. It is sooner a "corrupt business class which is intimately intertwined with a corrupt political class." The end result is "some forms of robust private entrepreneurship, an enormous, untaxed, gray market, and large companies, some state-owned some private, which enjoy deeply corrupt relationships with powerful politicians" (Applebaum 1996: 27).

A recent analysis claims that both Russia and Venezuela are turning into "managed democracies" that reject any kind of genuine political pluralism and representation of diverse interests:

Chàvez's strategy is to encourage maximum confrontation and political mobilization: the Kremlin's strategy is to encourage maximum confusion and political demobilization...Both Chàvez and Putin are masters at employing democratic rhetoric to achieve their political goals; both enjoy popular backing in national opinion polls...Each of them heads a regime that in some ways resembles democracy, but in both cases the reality is a near-monopoly of power (Krastev 2006).

Both Chàvez and Putin enjoy access to resources in the form of "petro-dollars"; when the system is based on oil or other mineral rents, the rulers have much better chances of discounting popular pressure. This is also a major problem in the Middle East where such oil and mineral rents abound. Arab rulers "had gained the means to create a clientelist stratum whose backing would help them bypass the need for popular support. Endowed with considerable

resources and freed from any possibility of popular pressure, the Arab regimes could ignore public opinion, and did not have to worry about improving their governance or seeking public support” (Ghalioun 2004: 129). While many such countries remain starkly authoritarian, some of them have moved into the gray zone, including Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Yemen.

Elite domination also characterizes many countries in Asia, including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, India, and Cambodia. In these countries, landowners and industrialists often yield major political influence; in Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, also the military and religious (Islamist) groups are major players. In sum, various forms of elite domination may impede, or even fully block, attempts at further democratization of most of the countries in the gray area.

POPULAR MOBILIZATION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY

The three propositions presented so far paint a rather gloomy picture of the current processes of transition toward democracy. But there is also a more promising aspect, which is the focus here. It concerns popular mobilization and organization. The discussion in the earlier section may have conveyed the impression that regime change is often imposed by competing elites on a docile population that is inarticulate in political matters. Such a picture is false. Even in the cases where elites dominate the process of transition, there is a large measure of popular activity. So-called ordinary men and women, workers, students, peasants, and office clerks are taking risks in distributing propaganda against authoritarian regimes, are organizing illegal groups, and in some cases are even directly assaulting the seats of power (Linz 1990).

The popular mobilization behind a transition toward democracy includes two different elements: the new social movements that emerged as various types of self-help organizations during authoritarian rule and the overall resurrection of civil society that takes place during the transition itself. The term “new social movements” encompasses a wide range of rural and urban associations. In the Latin American context, self-help projects concerning housing, community health care, popular education, consumer and producer cooperatives, and the defense of rural land rights have emerged, as have activities of “protest and conflict, lobbying and pressuring government agencies and politicians” (Lehmann 1990). In Africa, a similar array of groups, together with ethnic and kinship associations and regional or hometown groupings, have emerged (Rudbeck 2005). The new social movements have often appeared because of the difficulties created by authoritarian rule; the self-help organizations are a strategy of survival. Some of the organizations in Africa are working outside the formal economy in an attempt to cater to basic needs locally or in cooperation with nearby communities.

During the transition phase, these new social movements are joined by human rights groups, amnesty committees, and other civil associations; in some countries in Latin America, the justice and peace commissions of the Catholic Church have played an important role. Their critique of the authoritarian regimes’ abuses combined with their demands for democracy help to secure basic political, legal, and social rights. Finally, during the transition process the organizations of civil society that were suppressed during authoritarian rule often reappear on the political stage, including trade union associations, professional groups (lawyers, engineers, social workers, journalists, and so forth), and university associations.

The emergence of a stronger civil society in the context of the struggle for democracy has a wider perspective. These diverse associations constitute the plural society that is an important precondition for a thriving democracy because they create power centers outside the state.

Moreover, their internal organizations create forums for the education of citizens in democratic decision-making. In this sense, the associations can act as frameworks for democracy (Sandbrook 2000).

Thus, the transition toward democracy creates a more open environment in which the associations of civil society have much better possibilities for functioning. But, the changes in society cause questions to be raised about the relationship between the movements and the emerging political parties. In many cases, the new social movements were organized in direct opposition to the state apparatus and orthodox party politics. Yet the best way to support the nascent democracy seems to be by becoming active in the political parties.

Overall, however, the picture is clear: The transitions toward democracy are accompanied by decisive upsurges in popular mobilization and organization. A strengthening of civil society is taking place, which improves the conditions for democracy and simultaneously makes the reversal to authoritarian rule more difficult.

At the same time, however, the transition toward democracy creates a new political environment with new challenges to the popular movements. The rallying point of a common enemy – the authoritarian government – is no longer there. The challenge has shifted from cooperating in a common goal of removing old rulers to working toward institutionalizing a democratic competition between the interests and visions of various groups in the population. The demands put on the skills and commitments of leading actors to meet this challenge are different from those required during the transition itself. The actors must, according to one observer of Latin America, “demonstrate the ability to differentiate political forces rather than to draw them all into a grand coalition, the capacity to define and channel competing political projects rather than seek to keep potentially divisive reforms off the agenda, and the willingness to tackle incremental reforms... rather than defer them to some later date” (Karl 1990: 17). In other words, the popular mobilization and organization in itself improves the prospects for democracy; but the way this popular power is utilized is a decisive element in the difficult process that will determine whether democracy will be consolidated.

The importance of the personal qualities of political leadership for processes of democratization have not been sufficiently examined. This goes both for the determinants of leadership quality – what is it that brings forward the Mandelas instead of the Mugabes and the Mobutus? – as well as for the concrete impact of charismatic and competent leadership. Leadership certainly matters, but as indicated earlier, the required qualities of leadership may vary with the phases of democratic transition and consolidation so it is a complex for subject (for early attempts to study the impact of leadership, see Arias 2002; Whitehead 1999).

THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY FROM THE OUTSIDE

Democracy promotion from the outside may appear as a contradiction in terms. If the core of democracy is that the will of the people is the basis for the government’s authority and that representatives of the people are principally empowered by having been elected in free and fair elections, how can outsiders assume influence on the process in the first place without risking the charge of being nondemocratic? It is true that if foreign actors take over, democracy must suffer. But, that is not necessarily what is meant by democracy promotion. If outsiders assist in setting up free and fair elections, if they successfully empower people in civil society by providing education, information and other means of effective participation, then they can help promote democracy.

At the same time, it is clear that external actors can either help or hinder democracy and democratization in specific countries. That leads to the question of whether the emphasis on democracy promotion is merely or primarily rhetoric designed to cover the pursuit or more narrow national interest. The question arises also because during the Cold War, the superpowers were first and foremost looking for allies in the Third World, caring little whether their partners were democratic or not. The logic of power and national interest prevailed in the sense that the United States supported nondemocratic regimes in Latin America, the Middle East and elsewhere; that the Soviet Union would support nondemocracy in the Third World was less surprising given its own status as a totalitarian dictatorship.

As indicated earlier, the end of the Cold War removed the constraint of superpower competition and strengthened a trend already under way in the policies of the U.S. and other Western countries for some years: to emphasize support for democratization and human rights. Other national interests are not completely out of the picture, of course; they never are. The question is whether the new context is more conducive to real democracy promotion; many observers would answer affirmatively (e.g., Carothers 1999); others remain skeptical. The charge by some skeptics is that the United States follows basically the same policies today as earlier, namely the support for friendly elites in other countries. But, a new twist has been added: the elites must support the basic rules of a liberal democratic game. The most thorough analysis making this claim is by William I. Robinson; he contends that the U.S. supports “low-intensity democracy” (Robinson 1996).

With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a new dimension has been added to the project of democracy promotion. On the one hand, they led to a renewed emphasis on the need for the United States to use its foreign aid to “promote freedom and support those who struggle nonviolently for it, ensuring that nations moving towards democracy are rewarded for the steps they take” (NSS 2002). On the other hand, it renewed a spectre of the Cold War in the sense that the “war on terror” may necessitate friendly relationships with nondemocratic regimes in Pakistan, Egypt and elsewhere. In the long term, there is no doubt that the establishment of more democratic political systems will help combat extremism and terrorism; in the short and medium term, however, processes of democratization “can exacerbate conflict and tensions within societies. Democratization changes the prevailing power structure, threatening the political status and gains of established elites, who then seek to protect their position and access to power. In doing so, they may appeal to religious or ethnic differences to mobilize support or to create a climate of disorder and violence that discourages any further change in favour of maintaining the status quo” (Windsor 2003: 48).

What can we then say about today’s effort at democracy promotion? Are Western democracies making genuine attempts to support democracy around the world or are they sooner pursuing more narrow national interests unrelated to democracy promotion? First, the terrorist threat has led to a further emphasis on democracy promotion, but in some countries there is a need for clarification of policies; Egypt is such a case, where “U.S. foreign policy has multiple, sometimes contradictory objectives in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. In the past, democracy advocates within USAID have felt constrained by the policy dictates of a State Department and a White House that were simply not interested in promoting democracy through U.S. diplomatic or assistance efforts” (Windsor 2003: 54).

Second, the charge of one-sided support for elite-dominated rule may be somewhat overdrawn, because the distinction between elite-domination and mass-domination is less straightforward than it seems. Some administrations have the support of both substantial factions of elites and of a majority of the population, as demonstrated by Brazil, Chile, and South Africa; furthermore, the broad support is reflected in their politics. Moreover, democracy introduces

an element of uncertainty into the political process; it opens channels for popular pressure on the rulers that can point away from “low-intensity democracy.” Even elite-dominated democracies may be pushed in the direction of more effective reform measures and in that sense become more responsive to mass needs.

Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between the U.S. on the one hand and EU on the other hand. While EU “foreign policy” is still something of an oxymoron, there is probably a tendency for leading EU states to give a higher priority to democratization efforts. It should also be noted that policies develop and change over time. For example, U.S. support for democratization during the Carter administration helped overturn Marcos in the Philippines, the Shah in Iran, and Somoza in Nicaragua, as demonstrated by Kurt Schock (2005).

Taking this into consideration, I believe a soft version of the elite-support thesis applies. Western countries are most likely to support regimes that (1) exercise leadership that is oriented toward cooperation with the leading Western countries; (2) are liberal on economic policies, including support for economic openness toward the world market; (3) respect private property; including the setting up of an effective system of commercial law. Within such a framework, substantial democracy promotion from the outside is surely possible, even if there can be cases where the support for “friendly elites” is an overriding concern.

The lessons of democracy promotion from the outside have been comprehensively analyzed by Thomas Carothers. He contends that it must be seen as a long-term undertaking and that the main job must be left to insiders, not outsiders: “Accepting that most democracy promotion efforts do not bring about rapid or decisive change, does not imply that, the United States should downgrade or abandon its commitment to advancing democracy abroad. It means that democracy promotion must be approached as a long-term, uncertain venture. Policy makers must be prepared to stick to the goal for decades, to weather reversals, and to find ways to question and criticize their own methods as they go along without throwing the enterprise into disarray. The challenge, in short, is to build a cautious, realistic understanding of capabilities into the commitment. Basing a call for a democracy-oriented foreign policy on an assumption of vast American influence over other countries’ political fortunes only sets up the policy edifice for a fall” (Carothers 1999: 354).

In sum, there is no quick and simple way to further the consolidation of democracy from the outside; conditions for promoting democracy from the outside have not been improving in recent years. Rather to the contrary, an “assault on democracy assistance” has emerged in several countries (Gershman and Allen 2006). Both insiders and outsiders face formidable challenges in supporting a viable process of democratic consolidation. Favorable domestic preconditions are vital if the process is to succeed. Three elements of such domestic conditions deserve special emphasis: (1) political leaders, committed to the promotion of democracy; (2) a politically independent, merit-based bureaucracy; and (3) a vibrant civil society capable of imposing checks on the state. The major problem for democracy promotion (and even for the general progress of democracy) is that these three conditions are not present in a large number of countries in the gray zone.

CONCLUSION

Today, popular support for democratic ideals is strong, even in societies once thought to embrace different values (Inglehart and Norris 2004). But, even if few authoritarian rulers would actively defend traditional, authoritarian modes of rule, we are also witnessing an

increasing self-confidence of nondemocratic models of authoritarian capitalism, especially in great powers such as China and Russia that also currently enjoy economic success. That situation makes democracy promotion more difficult.

At the same time, there are numerous unconsolidated and fragile democracies in the gray zone and in most of these countries, the prospects for further democratic advance are not good. The large measure of elite influence in the early stages of the move away from authoritarianism can lead to a later phase of instability and stalemate during which it can prove impossible to further develop and strengthen democracy. Furthermore, the optimal conditions for the consolidation of democracy are not present in the large majority of the new democracies. It was explained earlier how the problems of weak statehood will continue to impede democratization for some considerable time; state weakness makes it less likely that countries can successfully achieve democratic consolidation. Finally, the economic and social crisis that exists in these countries makes a smooth passage toward consolidated democracy even more difficult.

Which major factors determine whether countries in the gray zone will advance toward democratic consolidation? There are several, but two factors deserve special mention: (a) the existence of institutionalized political parties, and (b) the strength of civil society. Political parties are crucially important for democratic consolidation. Stable party systems help reduce uncertainty in the political process because “actors know the rules and have some sense of how to pursue their interests.... Democracy has generally thrived when party systems have been institutionalized” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 27). Many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America do not have institutionalized party systems and that impedes the process of democratic consolidation.

Political parties are part of the larger system of nonstate institutions called civil society. An effective civil society – a dense network of associations, interest groups, civil rights groups, and so forth – is the best basis for the consolidation of democracy. In a number of new democracies an effective civil society is only on the process of being established; these countries face additional problems as regards democratic consolidation.

Can outsiders help promote democratization? Defenders of democracy-promotion from the outside argue that there are many democracy-improving measures outsiders can assist with: setting up free and fair elections; empowering people in civil society; providing education, information, and other means of effective participation, etc. (Carothers 1999). In the final analysis, however, democracy must be built by insiders; outsiders can help or hinder, but they cannot do the job. Given the situation of democratic “standstill” analyzed earlier, there is no reason to be overly optimistic concerning democratic progress.

It may well be that determined groups of actors will be able to consolidate democracy in some countries, despite the generally adverse conditions. The transition in Spain is an example, as are some of the transitions in Eastern Europe, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. But, these countries also had the external incentive of a European Community demanding democratization as a membership condition; in the developing world, only a few countries thus present reasonably favorable conditions for democratic consolidation.

The general picture is much gloomier; in most cases, the odds seem to weigh heavily against the further development and consolidation of the frail democratic openings that have taken place in recent years. These openings inspired a wealth of analyses on transitions toward democracy. Unfortunately, there is imminent risk that the next set of analyses will have to deal with democratic decay rather than democratic consolidation.

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CHAPTER 25

Authoritarian State and Contentious Politics

DINGXIN ZHAO

The modern state has taken much power (in taxation, law, welfare and war-making, etc) away from the local communities and is increasingly relevant to people's lives (Howard 1976; Mann 1986; Tilly 1992). The more a state gains power over the people, the more its presence is felt by the people. Revolution and social movement can thus be seen as people's attempt to harness the increasingly powerful state or to use the state to advance sectarian interests (Bright and Harding 1984; Tilly 1975, 1978, 1986; Tilly et al. 1975). The state plays a more important role in shaping the contentious politics under authoritarian regimes than in democracies. Authoritarian states tend to exert greater control over people's lives and politicize the matters under their control.¹ Most authoritarian states are also less developed and tend to play a more active role in economic development (Evans 1995; Gershenkron 1952; Migdal 1994; Wade 1990; Zhao and Hall 1994), which often generates state-centered grievances. The policies of authoritarian states are more likely to be predatory due to the lack of efficient bureaucracy and democratic politics. The sense of injustice tends to be much stronger among the people under an authoritarian state than in a democracy.

This article discusses the studies of contentious politics in the authoritarian states.² I will also touch upon the methodological issues along the way. I classify the studies of contentious politics in the authoritarian states into two methodological orientations: the interpretative and the explanatory traditions. At the center of this article is the mechanism-based analysis proposed by McAdam et al. (2001). Contentious politics in democratic and authoritarian states shares many similarities. Their major difference lies in the mechanism, that is, contentious politics of different regimes differs largely because their dynamics are shaped by different yet

¹For example, food riots were common in eighteenth century Europe. However, food became a political issue in France because the Old Regime accepted responsibility for the bread supply (Mann 1993, Chap. 6). Also, in China before the 1990s, job security was usually a political issue because the state took the responsibility. However, during the 1990s, after the labor market reform, job security became increasingly an economic issue tied with the performance of individual companies.

²In this article, the meaning of contentious politics is limited to revolution, social movement and riot, which is slightly different from McAdam et al. (2001) definition.

overlapping mechanisms as well as by different constellations of the mechanisms involved. This article first briefly summarizes the interpretative tradition and its limitations. Then, I move to the explanatory approach to contentious politics, particularly the mechanism-based explanation and its limitations. Finally, I suggest a way to move beyond the mechanism-based explanation. Since I am most familiar with the literature on the contentious politics in China, many examples discussed here are drawn from the Chinese experiences. Nevertheless, the implications of the discussions are general.

THE INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH

Although interpretation is vital to any kind of social science research, interpretation-oriented studies of contentious politics became significant after James Scott's work. Interpretation-oriented studies do not aim to identify mechanisms and causal processes in order to explain certain research puzzles or variations, but to delineate an aspect of the social processes under investigation and then claim that this is an important and somehow neglected aspect in the earlier studies. Typically, scholars of this tradition epitomize their findings in a highly quotable phrase such as Scott's (1976, 1985) "moral economy of the peasant" and the "weapons of the weak." Recently, Straughn (2005) coined the concept "consentful contention" to depict how the young people in Eastern Germany appealed to the state's legitimating principles to resist state decisions that they felt were against those principles. O'Brien and Li (2006: 2) created the concept "rightful resistance" to characterize a form of popular contention in China "that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions with the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider public." Andreas (2007) uses "charismatic mobilization" to depict the nature and effectiveness of participant mobilization during China's Cultural Revolution. In some cases, scholars of this tradition are content with portraying a facet of a contentious political process without providing a catch phrase. Deess's (1997) study on how the activities of the state-sponsored organizations contributed to the decline and collapse of the German Democratic Republic, and Perry's (2002) study on the importance of "emotional work" (by which she means the "thought works" that the Chinese Communist Party employed to mobilize its cadres and soldiers) in the Chinese Communist Revolution, may be taken to represent this kind of study.

When scholars (particularly anthropologists and cultural historians) promoted the interpretative methodology in the 1960s and 1970s, they were consciously advocating a by our times quite popular antiscience tradition. Geertz (1983), for example, once stressed that explanation was the goal of natural sciences and had little validity when applied to study society and that the interpreting and understanding of meaningful human practices should be the goal of social sciences. Most social movement scholars adopting the interpretative research methods, however, may not have such a strong antiscience methodological conviction. Many of them might even be unaware of the ontological and epistemological stances to which they have committed themselves by producing works that exclusively focus on interpretation.

Interpretation-oriented studies have great value. They allow us to unlock much interstitial knowledge of human society that is otherwise blocked in those "essentialized" theories and conceptualizations. Interpretative methods are particularly powerful when used to "deconstruct" an existing simplistic explanatory argument. The best example is E. P. Thompson's (1968) classic work on the formation of the nineteenth century English working class, which shows convincingly that the class consciousness and behaviors of the English workers did not

arise automatically from its structural position in the capitalist mode of production as argued by Marx, but was shaped by the cultural factors “embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms” (Thompson 1968: 10). On the other hand, interpretation-oriented studies have a few methodological problems that must be spelled out.

Most interpretation-oriented studies are only interested in revealing a particular feature in a social process, not in uncovering the variation between the cases and understanding the mechanisms leading to the difference. The dynamics of contentious politics, however, are mostly highly complicated, and can be interpreted in endless ways. In fact, even for a relatively simple event such as a medium-size wedding party of a few hundred guests, the event could be narrated and interpreted very differently depending on the interests and perspectives of the attendees, such as a relative from the bride’s or the groom’s side, a friend of the bride or the groom, a newly divorced person, a person with a troubled married life, or a loner whose only activity during the wedding was talking with a few acquaintances in a corner. Without formulating analytical puzzles based on comparative perspectives, we cannot possibly have a sense of the importance of a conceptualized phenomenon (e.g., “weapons of the weak”) in a larger social process.

For instance, the “emotional work” discussed by Perry no doubt played a role in the Chinese Communist Revolution. However, we do not know whether emotional work alone made a major contribution to the success of the revolution because the effectiveness of such emotional work also depended on the effectiveness of the organizations and the propagandas (frames) created by the Chinese Communist Party. After all, under the influence of the same Leninist organizational principles and mobilization strategies, the Nationalist government in China also adopted strategies of “emotional work” similar to what was used by the communists in a number of important ways, but all with little success. O’Brien and Li’s (2006) “rightful resistance” concept captures a salient feature of the contentious politics in current China. On the other hand, endless examples can be given of occasions when Chinese workers or farmers were not acting “near the boundary of authorized channels.” A few years ago when Chinese farmers were still burdened by heavy taxation, thousands of local tax collectors were reportedly attacked, and some of them were seriously beaten or even killed by the angry farmers. In 2005 in Jiangxi Province, the deputy Mayor of a county government went to a village to mediate a dispute between the angry farmers and the township government. The negotiation took place in the village ancestral hall on a hot summer day, and the deputy Mayor raised her hand to cover her nose, perhaps instinctively, to fend off the stench that filled this crowded space. Feeling insulted by her action, the farmers tied up the deputy Mayor to a column in the ancestral hall and went on to launch an attack on the county government (personal communication with two Jiangxi locals). At the time when I am writing this article (June 28, 2008), tens of thousands of rioters have burned several government buildings, the police headquarters, and cars on the streets and beat up police and local officials of Weng’an County, Guizhou province, all triggered by an unfounded rumor that a girl who recently committed suicide had been raped and killed by a relative of a county official who has in fact no relatives in the county.³ The above kinds of violence have been very common occurrences in some Chinese provinces and they are certainly not the type of “rightful resistance” defined by O’Brien and Li. In short, if a social process is seen as a set of complicated jigsaw puzzles, interpretation-based studies are at best only able to point out the existence of some kind of puzzle pieces in the set

³ See <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64099/7613285.html>, and <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026//7490555.html>.

(e.g., there are some red or blue, green puzzles, etc.), not the amount of a particular kind of puzzle pieces and their positions in the larger picture.

These said, however, I must stress that interpretation is a vital part of social science research and how to use it more fruitfully is an issue to which we shall return later.

MECHANISM-BASED EXPLANATION

Despite the significant presence of interpretation-oriented studies, most published works in contentious politics follow the explanatory tradition. Explanation takes many forms that I will not summarize here. What I focus on in the following is the most powerful kind of explanatory strategy in social sciences: mechanism-based explanation (McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). I promote mechanism-based explanation for three reasons. First, mechanism-based explanation is the essence of the “median-range theory” developed by the leading American sociologists back to more than half-century ago and is still a dominant methodological approach in American sociology (Coleman 1990; Merton 1967, 1968; Stinchcombe 1991). Second, good interpretations often reveal the working of certain mechanisms, and therefore, can be incorporated into the mechanism-based explanation. For instance, Geertz (1973) found that, during the cock-fighting gamble, Balinese tended to bet on the cock owned by the people of their own village rather than on the one that was obviously going to win the fight. Geertz’s story reveals the working of a very simple mechanism: The more an individual’s membership in a community depends on that individual’s loyalty to the community, the more that individual will make decisions based on community rules rather than on instrumental calculation. Many other interpretative concepts developed can likewise be expressed in terms of mechanism. Third, in the following discussion, readers will soon find that the state and its patterned behavior are major determinants in shaping the constellations of social mechanisms and the domination of some social mechanisms over others in the society. For example, the free-rider problem exists in any society, but it becomes a crucial mechanism shaping people’s lives in the communist regime. This is because employees in the firms of a communist state hold “iron rice bowls.” They cannot be fired unless serious political mistakes are made, and they are compensated similarly regardless of their skills and performances. Therefore, although workers of the communist regime are supposedly working for a common cause (to achieve communism), most of them do not work very hard. Mechanism-based explanation is a research strategy highly sensitive to the nature of regime and its impact on the dynamics of contentious politics.

While I promote mechanism-based explanation, my understanding of mechanism differs from Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 29) define mechanisms as “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.” I do not see much problem with this definition. On the other hand, when they give examples of important biological and social mechanisms, they list courtship, pregnancy, birth and nurturing of infants as biological mechanisms, and brokerage, diffusion, coordination, and boundary activation as social mechanisms. However, none of the biological and sociological phenomena that they list are mechanisms. For example, birth is a phenomenon involving multiple mechanisms at chemical, physiological, and biological levels. Birds and mammals also give birth through different mechanisms. Birth is something that needs to be explained rather than a mechanism of an explanation. The same is also true for sociological concepts such as diffusion. Ideas or certain ways of social actions diffuse very differently under different situations involving different (single or multiple) mechanisms. A mechanism must reveal a causal pattern which explains something, but a concept like diffusion,

however important it is, explains nothing. Because of their misunderstanding of mechanisms, once it comes to the analysis of different types of contentious politics across times and places, Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam's account tends to become descriptive and superficial, which has invited severe criticisms (Koopmans 2003).

In this article, social mechanisms are roughly defined as causal patterns that are triggered by known or unknown conditions (Elster 1998). Countless mechanisms are at work in various social processes. In the study of contentious politics, one of the best known mechanisms is Olson's (1965) "free-rider problem." This mechanism specifies a causal pattern, according to which an increase in the size of a group of rational actors would lead to the declining possibility for this group to fight for a public good that is supposedly highly desired by each individual member of the group. Olson's free-rider problem is formally derived, but most empirically oriented mechanism-based studies are carried out inductively. A research project as such usually starts with one "why question" or a set of "why questions" posed as puzzles (e.g., why England developed parliamentary democracy, Japan developed fascism and China ended up with the rise of the communist revolution (Moore 1966)). It is then followed by delineating a set of macrostructural conditions and associated mechanisms that could explain the puzzles, and finally by conducting a quantitative test or constructing a qualitative narrative (or both) to convince the readers how the macrostructural conditions and related social mechanisms explain the puzzles.

Tocqueville (1955) was no doubt a pioneer in the study of contentious politics in authoritarian regimes. Tocqueville's puzzles are about the origins of the French Revolution, and why the Revolution which supposedly fought for democracy led to tyranny instead. His central argument is that, after Louis XIV's extensive administrative centralization efforts, French nobles lost most of their power and social roles in the society but meanwhile gained more privileges such as tax exemption and exclusive access to imperial offices. The whole process turned French nobles from a class into a parasitic caste. This transformation weakened a healthier state-society relation mediated by the intermediary social and political forces between the king and the people, and contributed to the rise of the French Revolution as well as its tyrannical development.

In 1959, Kornhauser (1959), an American sociologist who was greatly concerned about the rise of mass movement (by which he meant the Communist and Fascist Movements) in the world, more clearly specified the stabilizing mechanisms of the intermediary social and political forces (what he called intermediate organizations operating between the state and family) in the society. He argues that strong intermediate organizations could prevent the direct exposure of the state elite to the populist pressure from the masses, counterbalance the power of the state and nurture a sense of cooperation and reality among the people. Together, they could prevent the rise of mass movement in a society. Even though Kornhauser never relates the rise of mass movement to the nature of the state, his work clearly implies that mass movement is more likely to occur under an authoritarian state or immature democracy, that is, a state with poor development of intermediate organizations. Kornhauser's theory has been understood in the United States as arguing that the intermediate organizations prohibit movement mobilization. It has been heavily criticized by students of resource mobilization theories, who have shown convincingly that organization and personal networks actually facilitate movement mobilization (Halebsky 1976; Oberschall 1973; Pinard 1975; Tilly 1978; Useem 1980; von Eschen et al. 1971). In fact, however, what Kornhauser tries to explain is the rise of large-scale social movements and revolutions aiming at achieving regime change, but resource mobilization scholars are interested in understanding the micromobilization mechanisms of the smaller-scale reform-oriented social movements in North America. Organizations and

networks are no doubt important micromobilization mechanisms. On the other hand, strong and diverse intermediate organizations create distinctive interests and crosscutting identities that make it hard for a society to be mobilized for the same cause and move toward the same direction, which in turn greatly lowers the chances of revolutionary turmoil. Obviously, the mechanisms revealed by Kornhauser and the resource mobilization scholars respectively are both valid, but they work at different levels. That being said, I must stress that social sciences differ from natural sciences. In natural sciences, wrong criticisms usually lead us nowhere, but in social sciences wrong criticisms sometimes highlight a previously neglected aspect of social life. While resource mobilization scholars' criticism of the mass society theory is largely unfounded, it nevertheless facilitated the development of highly fruitful micromobilization researches (e.g., Gould 1991; Marwell et al. 1988; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McCarthy 1987; Snow et al. 1980).

After the publication of Skocpol's (1979) *States and Social Revolutions*, studies exploring the nature of authoritarian states and revolution have become popular (e.g., Aminzade 1993; Farhi 1990; Foran 1997; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; McDaniel 1988, 1991; Wickham-Crowley 1992). Two different but overlapping analyses stand out in terms of their theoretical undertaking. Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) relate the state and revolution by three factors: the level of bureaucratization of a state, a state's capacity to penetrate the society, and a state's capacity to include societal forces in its political process. They argue that a state with stronger bureaucracy, deeper penetration in the society and higher inclusion of societal forces is least likely to experience revolutionary turmoil. Meanwhile, focusing on the cases of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the Islamic Revolution in Iran, McDaniel (1988, 1991) argues that modernization led by an autocratic state would almost inevitably trigger revolutions. This is because (1) autocratic states tend to be legitimized by tradition and divine forces. The modernization drive, therefore, alienates the traditionalists and makes the traditional grounds of legitimacy increasingly irrelevant to the modernizers. (2) Autocratic states rely on personal rule, not the bureaucracy and law. It is very hard for the regime to rationalize its policies, to rule the society based on law and adapt to the increasingly complicated society in the modernizing process. (3) Autocratic modernization was detrimental to the traditional forms of association among the people, but the nature of the regime also prevents the rise of modern associations vital for social cohesion and political stability. Together, autocratic modernization makes a state highly vulnerable to revolution. As can be seen, McDaniel has made positive use of the Kornhauserian argument. Moreover, even though Goodwin and Skocpol and McDaniel speak in somewhat different languages, the mechanisms they rely on to analyze regime and revolution are quite similar. Yet, they differ in two important ways. While Goodwin and Skocpol adopt a state-centered perspective, McDaniel emphasizes the state-society relations. Moreover, McDaniel emphasizes the role of state legitimacy in revolution, which falls outside Goodwin and Skocpol's scope of attention.

Before the mid-1990s, most studies on the relationships between the state and contentious politics focused on revolutions. The dominant paradigm in social movement studies did not place great emphasis on the role of the state in social movement. In the early "political process model," the state was only regarded as an environment exerting impact on social movements through "opportunity" (political opportunity structures) or "repression" (e.g., Costain and McFarland 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1996; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1990; Tarrow 1992, 1998; Tilly 1978). Before the mid-1990s, few studies on social movements considered the state a structurally patterned, but not necessarily unitary actor with varying degrees of independence from the societal forces. The situation started to change after the mid-1990s with the publication of Jenkins and Klandermans' (1995) edited volume. Although the book

focuses exclusively on the democratic state and social movements, more and more recent works have started to examine social movements under authoritarian settings (e.g., Almeida 2003; Boudreau 2008; Javeline 2003; Pfaff and Kim 2003; Koo 2001; O'Brien 2003, 2008; Opp 1994; Opp and Roehl 1990; Opp and Gern 1993; Pfaff 1998; Szabo 1996; Yu and Zhao 2006; Wood 2000; Zhao 2001, 2002, 2008). In the following, I provide in-depth analyses of some recent literature on the topic. I restrict myself mainly to the studies of contentious politics in China because the recent literature in that area is enough for me to illustrate how to construe the authoritarian state differently depending on the kind of political contentions we study and the research puzzles we pose.

Liu's (2006) study shows that while the international gender equality agenda promoted by the UN Fourth World Conference on Women was supported by the government in both India and China, the Indian women's movement rejected the agenda by emphasizing its similarities with the government position, but the Chinese women's movement endorsed it and meanwhile led the movement away from the government stance. In explaining this puzzle, Liu argues that the authoritarian nature of the Chinese state does not simply make social movement impossible, but requires the movement activists to justify their demands by the official rhetoric. Therefore, the Chinese women's movement legitimated its own cause by supporting the government policy. In contrast, India's democratic setting gave women's movement more freedom to choose. The movement rejected the UN gender equality agenda largely due to its discordant relationship with the government. Liu's study is interesting in two aspects. First, Liu's argument shares great similarity with O'Brien and Li's (2006) interpretative concept "rightful resistance." However, while O'Brien and Li stop at pointing out the existence of a particular kind of collective action in China, Liu delineates a clear mechanism: Other factors being equal, the more repressive a state is, the more likely the activists of a social movement will adopt the state sanctioned discourses and strategies to legitimize their action. This kind of "safe space" creation tactics has been frequently discussed in social movement literature (Evans and Boyte 1992; Gurr 1986; Lichbach 1995; Opp and Roehl 1990). Second, while earlier studies tend to argue that authoritarian states generally hamper contentious politics (Zhou 1993), Liu's study shows convincingly that the authoritarian state may also create room facilitating collective actions, a point that was also made by Deess (1997) in his study of how the state-sponsored organizations in Eastern Germany contributed to the collapse of the communist regime.

An authoritarian state could not only facilitate social movements, but sometimes part of the state institutions would even ally with a social movement sector, thereby promoting the movement. The environmental movement in China is such an example (Sun and Zhao 2007). Most Chinese environmentalists emerged in the aftermath of the 1989 Prodemocracy Movement (Zhao 2001). Quite a few Chinese environmentalists once had strong dissident inclinations and started the movement mainly for the purpose of weakening the authoritarian rule. However, over time, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) of the State Council became a crucial ally of the environmentalists, the environmental activists were successful in several campaigns largely because of the support of SEPA, and China's environmental movements are also institutionalized to a great extent. To explain this, Sun and Zhao (2007) discern eight major actors involved in China's environment-related issues: the central government, SEPA, the other ministries of the State Council, the relevant local government, the media, the environmental activists, the economic interest groups and the antimovement, and they analyze the dynamics and outcomes of different environmental protests in China according to the changing relationships among the eight groups. With regard to the above puzzle, Sun and Zhao locate the logic in three constraints that SEPA faces: (1) SEPA's power is quickly rising. Yet as the newest ministry

of the State Council, it only has some 300 employees and has to constantly fight jurisdiction battles with the other ministries (before SEPA became important, almost all the State Council ministries had bureaus in charge of environmental issues). (2) Many local governments, especially the government in the poor regions tends to place economic development above environment protection and often pursue policies at odds with SEPA's efforts. (3) While SEPA has branches in every province, the local SEPA personnel were paid and subject to control by the local government. Facing these constraints, SEPA reached out to the environmentalists for help, which greatly empowered the environmental movement, and at the same time made the environmentalists see SEPA (and to some extent China's central government) as an ally rather than the target of the movement.

Both Liu (2006) and Sun and Zhao (2007) study social movements in contemporary China, but the two studies construe the nature of the state differently. In Liu's study, both the state and the women's movement are seen as unitary actors and the state only exists as a context for the movement. For Sun and Zhao, the state and the environmental movement are construed as multiactor entities, each pursuing sectarian interests, and the state actors actively interact with the movement. There is no right and wrong in the two different constructions of the reality. Liu's highly reified state serves her purpose well. Which level of disaggregation of the state and society is needed all depends on the movements we study and the puzzles we pose.

Sometimes, similar forms of contentious politics happening in different places of the same country may also have different dynamics depending on the local political contexts. Lee (2007) finds that the workers in China's sunbelt region mostly protest for wages and working conditions and they fight legal battles backed up by street politics, while the workers of China's traditionally state-owned industries in rustbelt protest against the betrayal of the state and they are more ready to engage in demonstrations and disruption of the public order. Lee attributes the differences to the Chinese regime's dual nature: It embraces capitalist market economy, but retains many ideological and structural characteristics of state socialism. Therefore, the rustbelt workers who are still nostalgic about the secure life under state socialism embrace the socialist ideology and class-based solidarity in the protest, while the sunbelt workers who entered factories as free laborers of the market economy fight for their rights through legal means with the backing of street politics. Hurst (2004) adds an additional mechanism to explain the dynamics of the workers' protest across regions in China. He finds that workers' protests in both the sunbelt and the rustbelt can be effective, but the workers' protests in regions between the sunbelt and rustbelt are more likely to meet with hard-line repression. Hurst argues that the protests in the sunbelt can be effective because the local governments can afford to buy off the protesters and are interested in doing so for maintaining the local stability and keeping the central government happy. On the other hand, the poor rustbelt governments do not have the resource to buy off the protesters, and they tend to tolerate or even sympathize with the protesters because the protesters can attract the attention of the central government and compel it to transfer funds to the region. For the regions in between, the local governments are not rich enough to be able to buy off the protests and their relationships with the central government are more tenuous, which pushes them to take a hard line on workers' protests. Both Lee's and Hurst's studies show that, under the same authoritarian state, local governments can be construed as regimes of different natures depending on the cases and puzzles we have.

The examples of contentious politics that we have discussed so far all fall in a gray zone that the Chinese state more or less tolerates. However, the Chinese state is much less tolerant of contentious political activities that directly challenge its rule, such as the late stage of the 1989 Prodemocracy Movement, the Falungong Movement and the recent Tibetan Riot.

In dealing with this kind of political contentions, the Chinese state could act much more repressively, which invokes the working of different kinds of mechanisms that shape the movement dynamics. In short, the above analysis shows that the same authoritarian state contains many facets and manifests differently facing different kinds of contentious politics. It can prohibit or hamper some, but facilitate other forms of contentious politics, and it can also be seen either as a unitary actor or an entity of multiple interests and voices, all depending on the kind of contentious politics concerned and the research questions we ask. In the study of contentious politics, defining the nature of a state and society without having clear research puzzles is not that meaningful.

BEYOND MECHANISM-BASED EXPLANATION

The researches discussed in the last section differ widely, but they all try to explain a certain puzzle by relying on one or several general or ad hoc constructed mechanisms believed to have played prominent roles under a particular authoritarian setting in a particular kind of contentious politics. A major advantage of this kind of study over the interpretative approach is that the arguments developed are falsifiable so that a deeper understanding can be reached and more and more mechanisms become known. Yet, many social mechanisms have similar effects (known as the many-to-one problem). For example, the poor mobilization capacity of a social movement can always be explained by the existence of the free-rider problem (Olsen 1965), the threshold problem (Granovetter 1978), the problem of “preference falsification” (Kuran 1991, 1995, 1997), strong repression (Tilly 1978), and many other mechanisms. Good logic is sufficient for a scholar to construct a good story showing how one or several delineated mechanisms have shaped the patterns of a movement under investigation, even though the account may contain serious biases.

The fact that any known social phenomenon with a certain level of complexity can be explained by more ways than one has been at once a blessing and a headache for sociologists. It is a blessing because it makes it easy to come up with “new” theories. It is a headache because mechanism-based argument can always be very easily criticized. Let me provide two examples of the studies of the contentious politics under authoritarian settings to illustrate how easily first-rate mechanism-based studies can be criticized.

Goodwin (1997) argues that the highly imbalanced sex ratio (14 male/1 female) among the communist guerrillas in Philippine resulted in sex hunger and laxity of discipline among the guerrilla soldiers and contributed to the failure of the movement. The argument makes great sense in itself, but readers may want to know whether the imbalanced sex ratio was in any way related to the more inclusive politics of the colonial and neocolonial rule in Philippine, which according to Goodwin (2001) was also important behind the failure of the Philippine communist movement. Moreover, highly imbalanced sex ratio is very common in most guerrilla army controlled regions. During the Chinese communist revolution, the sex ratio in communist controlled Yan’an reached 18/1 (male to female). While such an imbalanced sex ratio induced tensions and problems, it never in any serious manner hampered the success of the revolution. Also, using the death rates in Paris’ twenty districts as measures of the local resistance during the Paris Commune, Gould (1991, 1995) tries to show that the people who were mobilized through neighborhood networks (residential battalions) fought much better than the volunteers. However, if we look at the map provided by Gould (1991: 723), it becomes clear that most deaths happened in the south-western part of Paris (the Left Bank) plus one district at the center. We know that the invading troops attacked Paris from the direction of

Versailles, which was exactly pointed to the city's south-western part. It is possible that different death rates in the 20 Paris districts reflected the nature of the military operation more than the patterns of networks: The battalions defending the Left Bank were attacked first and resisted vehemently (more death resulted), but after they were defeated, the battalions in other Paris districts lost morale, which led to weak resistance and lower death tolls. The centrally located high death toll district could be the place where the Paris Commune headquarters was located. It is understandable that many hardliners in that district would fight to the end. Both Goodwin and Gould are extraordinary scholars (Gould's study, in particular, is so rigorously and ingeniously executed that it can be regarded as exemplary). The above "criticisms" are only meant to serve one purpose, which is to show that additional mechanisms could always be introduced even for the best mechanism-based accounts.

The social world contains countless mechanisms. This gives us endless opportunities to discover new mechanisms and explore the working of the known mechanisms under various conditions. On the other hand, it tends to be the case in sociology that the more we know about mechanisms and their various ramifications, the more we see trees instead of the forest. While the mechanism-based explanation should always be the core of sociological analysis, we must also be able to move beyond, that is, to link the mechanism-based explanation with macrosociology. I advance this research strategy under the following premise: a social process with a certain level of complexity is always shaped by multiple mechanisms that do not function as variables in a multiple regression, but constellate into a certain pattern, and the relative importance of the mechanisms involved and the flexibility of the constellation are shaped by the macrostructural conditions and mechanism-constrained agentic activities. For the purpose of this article, I argue that the nature of the regime and the patterns of the state-society relationships are important macrostructural forces shaping the relative importance of various mechanisms in a contentious politics, the constellations of the mechanisms, and the flexibilities of the constellations.

Earlier in this article, I discussed how the free-rider problem as a mechanism became prominent in the Communist regime's workplaces. My discussion of the social movements in modern China in the last section also illustrated the workings of several mechanisms related to the authoritarian state. Here, I provide one more example to illustrate the point. Rumors have played an important role in the development of many events of contentious politics. Other factors being equal, the importance of rumors in contentious politics depends on the ability of the mainstream media to construct the public opinion. The more the mainstream media have such capacity, the less likely the dynamics of contentious politics will be shaped by rumors. This mechanism implies that rumors tend to play a more prominent role in contentious politics in an authoritarian state whose legitimacy is not based on a charismatic leadership or a popularly endorsed ideology. In such a case, the state-controlled media can no longer construct the public opinion, which would compel the people to depend on the word of mouth for news.

Let me now use my study on the rise and dynamics of the 1989 Beijing Movement to illustrate how a macrostructure informed mechanism-based analysis can be executed and how it differs from the mechanism-based analysis. Due to space constraint, I shall only focus on my explanation of the movement's dynamics and introduce only some of the most important mechanisms employed in the analysis. In the traditional mechanism-based analysis, research puzzles tend to be specific and narrowly defined. The puzzles can be either about the 1989 Movement's tragic ending or about some more specific aspects of the movement, such as the pattern of interactions between the state and movement participants, the mobilization structure of the movement, the dynamics of movement rhetoric and symbolic activities, and the role of media frame and the patterns of interactions between the media and public opinion. I tried

to explain all the above questions and more by mechanisms constrained by macrostructural conditions. I first identify the macrostructural conditions behind the 1989 Movement. I argue that the 1989 Movement was under the constraints of the following state–society relationships: In 1989, the Chinese state could still exercise a tight control over the media and its people and the top state leaders still had faith in the ideological and legal legitimacy of the regime, while Chinese society was poorly organized outside the realm of the state and the people started to view the legitimacy of the regime in terms of its economic and moral performance rather than in its official ideology. The macrostructural conditions are important because they determined the domination of some mechanisms over the others as well as the relationships among the mechanisms that shaped the dynamics of the 1989 Movement. More specifically, I argue that the poorly organized society had facilitated the rise of a built environment based mobilization structure (Zhao 1998), the rise of nascent movement organizations that were only able to mobilize people for radical actions rather than to direct them out of various strategic needs, and the existence of competing movement frames whose significance was less related to movement activists' intention than to the collective interpretation and social construction of the public closer to mechanism in Goffman's original concept, which was in turn shaped by the regime's performance-based legitimacy (Zhao 2000).⁴ I also argue that the different understandings of the basis of state legitimacy by the people and the top state leaders gave rise to a pattern of interaction between the state and the people as if they were applying Garfinkel's "breaching experiment" mechanism toward each other just to antagonize the other party,⁵ and a pattern of interactions between the media and public that greatly favored the domination of the public opinions and rumors to the government's great disadvantage (The mechanism behind this was discussed in the last paragraph). These mechanisms and associated dynamics not only shaped the movement's development but also contributed to the head-on confrontation between the state and the people and the tragic ending of the 1989 Movement (Zhao 2001).

In comparison with the traditional mechanism-based tradition, the research strategy that I adopted has six major characteristics. First, rather than relying on one or a few mechanisms to explain a single puzzle at hand, the new research strategy explains multiple puzzles by many mechanisms which work different levels and whose relationships are shaped by the macrostructural conditions of the society. Second, since the mechanisms under the new research strategy are not mechanically related as if they were independent variables in a multiple regression but are organically related in ways shaped by the parsimoniously constructed macrostructural conditions of the society, we are able to introduce more mechanisms in the research without violating the parsimony rule in explanation and eliminate the problem of "over-determination" in the traditional mechanism-based explanation. Third, while it is difficult to introduce multiple puzzles in the same explanation for the traditional mechanism-based analysis, the new research strategy is flexible enough to deal with multiple puzzles. This greatly raises the bar of falsification in sociology: under this new research strategy, an argument could no longer be falsified simply by introducing another mechanism that also explains the same puzzles. One now has

⁴See also McAdam and Sewell (2001: 118–20) for this point. See Chen (2003), Hurst (2004: 103) and Thornton (2002) for similar discussions on the nature of frame in China's contentious politics.

⁵Here, the key lies in the top state elite's and the people's different understandings of the basis of state legitimacy. While the majority of top state elite still hung on to the communist ideology, most people judged the state by its economic and moral performance. Thus, when the government was challenged ideologically and morally, the challenge resonated widely. However, when the government invoked ideological or legal dimensions of state authority to control the movement, its measures only antagonized people. The interaction between the top state elite and the people thus replicated Garfinkel's "breaching experiments" mechanism.

to show how this mechanism is situated in the larger picture. Moreover, to falsify an argument made through the new research strategy, one needs to add more puzzles to the already existing numerous research questions. This is a much harder task.

Fourth, while the new research strategy aims at explaining more variations (puzzles) by incorporating numerous organically related mechanisms whose relationships are informed by the macrostructural conditions of the society, it is neither a system theory nor a covering law. It is not a system theory because it does not pretend to have the capacity to exhaust all the mechanisms involved in an event of contentious politics and explain every aspect of it. Mechanisms and their relationships can be differently constructed for the same contentious political event based on different research questions. It is not even a covering law because the macrostructural conditions that one has constructed (such as my construction of the state–society relations during the 1989 Movement) is just an “essentialized” model tailored to explain the puzzles one has. A state’s macrostructural conditions can be differently conceived depending on the types of contentious politics we study and the puzzles we have.

Fifth, the new research strategy has greater explanatory power and allows us to reach a deeper understanding of the society, but it does not pretend that the constructed theory can predict any future social processes. On the contrary, the new research strategy emphasizes the changing importance of mechanisms and their constellations as a result of mechanism-constrained agentic activities. Any social mechanisms and their patterns of interaction have no fixed role in the society. Finally, in promoting the new research strategy, I have used a highly scientific language. The new research strategy, however, is not a science but a combination of art and science. The process of figuring out what are the mechanisms at work and how various social mechanisms are related is essentially a hermeneutic endeavor involving sense and sensibilities and great interpretation skills. It is an art work. However, even though mechanisms and their relationships are largely hermeneutically constructed, the validity of the construction can be judged by the amount of variations that the constructed theory explains. It is thus a science.

The 1989 Beijing Movement happened in a matter of 7 weeks. While some mechanisms had changed their importance and their relationships with the other mechanisms in this period, the change can still be somehow neglected especially in view of the puzzles I have and the fact that the macrostructural conditions shaping the role of the mechanisms and their constellations remained relatively stable in the 7 weeks. This, however, is not the case if we want to study how contentious politics develops under changing macrostructural conditions. This could happen in a time of great structural elasticity (such as during the French Revolution after the meeting of the Estate General) or/and in contentious politics involving much longer time spans allowing macrostructural conditions to metamorphosize into new forms. In those cases, we have to add a historical aspect to the study. We may call it a macrostructural informed mechanism-process research, corresponding to Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) mechanism-process research. I can provide no example on the application of this analytic strategy in the study of contentious politics, but the analytic strategies adopted by leading historical sociologists, such as Tilly’s (1992) and Mann’s (1986, 1993) works, are very close to the kind of macrostructural informed mechanism-process research that I have in mind. A more detailed introduction of this research strategy, however, is beyond this article.

FINAL REMARKS

Intermingled with methodological discussion, this article tries to show that the contentious politics in different kinds of authoritarian states have different dynamics because of the operation of different regime specific mechanisms, that the dynamics of different kinds of contentious

politics that happen in the same state involve different mechanisms, and that even for the same event of contentious politics that happens in an authoritarian state, the mechanisms involved can be differently construed depending on the puzzles we pose. Keeping in mind the huge variations between different authoritarian states as well as within the same state, however, I would argue that the following three macrostructural characteristics of the authoritarian state are most important in shaping the dynamics of contentious politics. Authoritarian states tend to be more despotic; they tend to have a less developed associational life beyond the control of the state; their state legitimacy is not conferred by regular competitive elections. The dynamics of contentious politics in authoritarian states differ from that under democracies largely because these regime-specific structural conditions not only trigger the working of different kind of mechanisms but also shape the relationships of these mechanisms involved.

Of the above-listed three characteristics of the authoritarian regime, the impact of the first two factors on the dynamics of contentious politics will greatly vary depending on a state's bureaucratic strength and infrastructural capacity. The monitoring and controlling capacity of some authoritarian states can be much weaker than their democratic counterparts due to the lack of an effective bureaucracy and infrastructural capacity. Likewise, while the associational life in authoritarian regimes tends to be more suppressed due to the state's higher repression potential, actual organization life can be abundant in some authoritarian states due to their weak bureaucratic strength and capacity to penetrate the society.⁶ When it comes to the third characteristic, all the authoritarian states start to share similarity. It is, therefore, a most decisive mechanism-shaping factor that distinguishes the dynamics of contentious politics under authoritarian states and democracies.

When a government is not elected, it is also unable to benefit from the procedure-based legitimacy enjoyed by all democratic governments. An authoritarian government has to legitimize itself by ideology or/and performance. Yet, traditional ideology will become less and less relevant to most authoritarian states that are undergoing quick social change in the modernization process, while most modern ideologies (with the exception of liberalism) make concrete promises for the improvement of the people's economic lives that they trigger a crisis of faith when the promises are broken. Performance-based legitimacy has three major aspects: moral performance, economic performance and national defense (often supplanted by patriotism in time of peace). They all have the same problem as the modern ideology-based legitimacy in the sense that they all promise something too real and concrete. Once a state's legitimacy is based on moral performance, corruptions or other publicly disproved behaviors of officials immediately become political issues jeopardizing the state rule. As for economic performance, it is easy to understand that no state is able to maintain high-speed economic development forever. Finally, excessive patriotic propaganda produces zealous nationalists attacking the government as traitors and pushing it to adopt unsustainable hardline stance in diplomacy. To overcome the intrinsic instability brought by performance-based legitimacy, the leaders of authoritarian state tend to have a strong desire to control information, sometimes to the extent of being repressive. On the other hand, such a regime also has a strong tendency to appease the populist demands in order to release the tension induced by the state's legitimacy deficiency. All of these have strong imprints on the nature and dynamics of contentious politics.

Law and repression always occupy an important position in the ways that a state deals with contentious politics (e.g., Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Francisco 2004). The problem is that law does not carry the same authority in an authoritarian state as under a democracy.

⁶Many organizations in authoritarian regimes structurally resemble the authoritarian state or even the secret society, which contributes to the dynamics of contentious politics in their own interesting ways.

First, the ruling elite in most authoritarian states manipulate at least some aspects of law and legal procedures vital to the regime's survival, which means that these aspects of law and legal procedures (all closely related to contentious politics) are no longer respected by the people. Second, when a state bases its legitimacy on moral performance, people also judge the political issues based on morality. Law conveys little message in constraining the behavior of the political oppositions in a moral-based political system. Third, without the backing of the legitimacy conferred by regular competitive elections, the legality of the government will always be a question especially in times of crisis, which also greatly compromises the authority of law in the society. This does not mean that the people in an authoritarian state will not respect the law in their daily life. It also does not prevent the people from making claims by invoking legal codes to their advantages (Lee 2007). The problem is that, in an authoritarian state, it is often the case that people do not deeply respect the constraining aspect of law (especially its political dimensions), and that most people including some state elite tend to see the repression of a government as immoral even if the repression itself has a legal base.⁷ The situation is even worse when an event of contentious politics challenges a morality-based regime on moral terms. Now, any state control measures become immoral and will automatically undermine the regime's legitimacy base.

With Goldstone (1998), this article sees riot, social movement and revolution as three interchangeable forms of contentious politics, with the prevalence of a particular form in a state depending on the state's capacity to channel the contentious politics into more institutionalized social movement. In the United States and other mature democratic nations, revolution is impossible and riots and public disturbance are rare. Actions of contentious politics are channeled into highly institutionalized expressions – well organized social movements resembling interest group politics. The whole society becomes a “social movement society” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). For the above mentioned reasons, authoritarian states have a much weaker capacity to institutionalize social conflicts. Protest activities under authoritarian regimes tend to be squeezed into “everyday resistance,” “rightful resistance,” riots and economic-oriented protests more or less tolerated by the state when the state could still maintain its repressive capacity and a reasonable economic performance. However, when the state's economic performance deteriorates, its repressive machine breaks down, and its intellectuals start to produce ideologies for the aggrieved people, contentious politics in the authoritarian state tends to develop into a revolution or revolution-like social movements.

What has been summarized in the above is only a highly generalized pattern of contentious politics in authoritarian states (with democracies as a reference point). Once we start to disaggregate, we will immediately find that some authoritarian states have a higher capacity to channel contentious politics into institutionalized forms than the others and the same authoritarian state has different institutionalization capacity facing different kinds of contentious politics. Nevertheless, I believe that the differentiated capacity of institutionalizing contentious politics marks one of the most crucial differences between the authoritarian state and democracy. I would also suggest that the state's capacity of channeling contentious politics into more institutionalized forms remains the most central research question for the studies of contentious politics under an authoritarian setting.

⁷For example, in the United States, the elite and the majority of the population seldom question the legitimacy of government repression during the early stages of working class movements and the Civil Rights Movement. In China, by contrast, it is difficult to find a case in which the police are not widely condemned once they hurt the protesters even if the police responses are out of desperate self-protection.

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CHAPTER 26

Mass Media and Democratic Politics

DELIA DUMITRESCU AND ANTHONY MUGHAN

This chapter summarizes the current state of our knowledge about the relationship between the mass media of communication and politics in representative democracies. It is an important topic for two reasons. One, the mass communications media are the connective tissue of democracy, in that they are the principal means by which elected representatives and citizens reach out to each other in their reciprocal efforts to inform and influence. Two, the politically relevant media landscape is in a constant state of flux as communications technologies proliferate and change almost from day to day. For a long period, students of mass communication could restrict their attention to newspaper, radio, and television. To this list must now be added, at least, cable television and the internet, each of which has had profound implications for the way voters seek (or avoid) political information and the way political parties conduct election campaigns. The chapter will start with a brief discussion of the role of the mass media in democratic theory. It will then move on to the question of how well the traditional media (and especially newspapers and television) perform this role by examining how they influence individuals' political opinions and behaviors. There will then be an examination of the democratic role of what might be called the "new" media, and especially the internet.

THE MEDIA IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

There are competing visions of democracy, ranging from the representative variety where the decisions affecting people's lives are taken by their elected representatives to the direct variety where the people take these decisions for themselves. This chapter limits its attention almost exclusively to representative democracy, which can formally be defined as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 76). The most important implication of this definition, for our purposes, is that, in an ideal representative democracy, plentiful and reliable political information is readily available to citizens to allow them to make informed political choices. As the principal vehicle of communication between governors and governed, the media have the potential to improve the quality of representative democracy by performing and providing "a number of functions and

services for the political system...[including] surveillance of the sociopolitical environment, ...meaningful agenda setting,...dialogue across a diverse range of views and incentives for citizens to learn, choose and become involved” (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990: 270). The media are thus responsible for providing the political information necessary to allow citizens to make political decisions and cast their ballot on the basis of informed choice – retrospectively, about the extent to which the government has kept its promises in office and, prospectively, about how rival contenders will act if (re)elected to office. Moreover, reasoned choice requires, above all else, that the political information flowing to citizens must be impartial in the sense of not being systematically biased in favor of any of the contestants for office.

Impartiality involves, essentially, the balanced reporting of competing views and it is achieved in two ways. The first is through media pluralism and the second through non-partisan news coverage of politics.

Media pluralism refers to the pattern of ownership of the communications media. Democracy is held to be better served by a diversified ownership structure, since citizens receive their political information from a plurality of sources representing competing ideological viewpoints and better conveying the range of choices on offer to them at election time. The trend since the 1980s, however, has been in the direction of ever more concentrated media ownership both within states and across them. For example, “(f)ive global-dimension firms...own *most* of the newspapers, magazines, book publishers, motion picture studios and radio and television stations in the United States” (Bagdikian 2004: 3; a global perspective is Herman and McChesney 1997). For some, this trend does not make for a healthy democracy since a “huge, nondemocratically organized force...has major power over politics, public discourse, and culture” (Baker 2007: 3; see also McChesney: 2000). For others, however, the problem is not a serious one. Sometimes, their counter-argument is that the degree of media concentration simply reflects market forces and, moreover, its magnitude is often overstated. At other times, it is that the internet has “democratized” the dissemination of political information by making publicly available channels of communication not controlled by the owners of the traditional media.

A recent thoughtful, thorough, and balanced analysis of this debate concedes that media concentration, at least in the United States, is taking place and concludes that it is not good for democracy. The dispersion of media ownership, the argument continues, remains democratically desirable in and of itself for three reasons. One, it embodies a fairer, more democratic allocation of communication power. Two, it provides democratic safeguards; spreading ownership across different individuals and companies can raise the probabilities that resources will be devoted to watchdog coverage of government, and can reduce the likelihood that media firms will be co-opted by the government. Finally, there are market failures in media coverage in some areas and markets, as media firms focused only on profits, have withdrawn high-quality, hard news coverage of government, diluting the beneficial spillover effects for society to which such coverage can lead (Baker 2007: 1–53).

The second source of impartial information for citizens in a democracy is nonpartisan news coverage. Again, the rationale is, basically, that voters should be introduced to all sides of an argument. Interestingly, this concern never applied to printed news, largely because “on the European continent, a great many newspapers and magazines began as the organs of political parties and remained closely affiliated with them. Others began as organs of the Catholic church” (Rothman 1992: 38). The electronic media are another story altogether, however. The first of them was radio, and governments had no choice but to intervene to regulate it only because they were obliged to resolve the problem of wavelength scarcity by awarding broadcast licenses on the basis of criteria they themselves had to formulate. Two modal regulatory philosophies emerged, the “public service” and the “commercial,” and they were typified by the responses of the governments of the United Kingdom and United States, respectively (Avery 1993).

From the birth of radio in the 1920s, British governments of whatever ideological stripe regarded the broadcast media as a public utility that the state had to control in the public interest. Two especially important benefits were seen in the ability to broadcast nationwide. First was the opportunity to rise above the partiality of newspapers and provide common access to a wide range of public events, ceremonies and national occasions, thereby bringing all classes together and strengthening national social solidarity. Second, in a country where the franchise had only recently been extended to all men and was imminent for all women, radio was seen as having great potential to help create the educated, informed and enlightened electorate widely deemed necessary to a healthy, pluralistic democracy (Scannell 1989). Thus, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was born in the 1920s and it was granted both a broadcasting monopoly and financial and political independence from the government through the imposition of an annual license fee paid by all radio (and later television) owners. It was answerable to a nonpartisan regulatory body and its reciprocal obligation was to remain strictly impartial in its coverage of political affairs. This same obligation was placed on commercial television when it was founded in the 1950s; it too was mandated by law and under pain of losing its broadcast license to inform and educate as well as entertain.

Regulation was especially strong during the highlight of the democratic calendar: election campaigns. The expectation of balanced, nonpartisan coverage remained in force, and to ensure media independence as well as impartiality, paid political advertising, even on commercial television, was banned in favor of an arrangement, whereby political parties with enough support received free radio (and later television) time, in which they were able to broadcast programs of their own devising. The broadcast media's role in local contests was also minimized by the imposition of stringent spending limits at the constituency level.

The "commercial" model typified by the United States is based on a sharply contrasting regulatory philosophy. In keeping with the country's traditional liberalism and governing ethos of minimal intervention, governments opted for a largely private, regionalized and unabashedly profit-oriented broadcasting system. No effort was made to establish a financially independent public broadcasting sector with a public service mission. Indeed, no provision was even made for noncommercial educational stations in the distribution of transmission frequencies and broadcast licenses. There was a reaction to the excesses of commercialism's broadcasting hegemony with the establishment in 1967 of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting as a federally chartered, nonprofit and nongovernmental body to oversee the public broadcasting service. Public broadcasting has remained very much the "poor relation" in the U.S., however, in part because it is not allowed to air advertisements or charge a license fee and in part because it attracts far smaller audiences than the commercial radio and television networks (Katz 1989).

The overwhelmingly commercial nature of American broadcasting does not imply that no attention was paid to content impartiality and partisan balance. As mandated by the Communications Act of 1934, radio broadcasters had to satisfy general public interest and equal time standards. In face of ever-greater wavelength spectrum scarcity in an increasingly crowded broadcasting world, broadcasters' public obligations were tightened with the passage of the Fairness Doctrine in 1949. This doctrine required broadcasters to be nonpartisan, to give air time to controversial news and public affairs programs and to provide reasonable opportunities for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints (Donahue 1989).

The U.K. and U.S. models capture the essence of the broadcasting environment for the world's democracies from the interwar years to the onset of cable television in the 1980s. It was a time when the traditional print and broadcast (radio and especially television) media all but monopolized the political communication function and academic research into the effects of these mass media emerged and matured. It is to the complex and complicated issue of media effects on people that we now turn.

MASS MEDIA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC

The model of the democratic voter implied by the public service broadcasting model in particular is that of the citizen who is interested in politics, approaches elections with an open mind, actively seeks and compares policy information on the partisan alternatives available on the ballot and, evaluating that information against his own self-interest, votes rationally for the party that best represents that self-interest. This “rational voter” model also informed the earliest studies of media effects in American presidential elections. Instead, however, of finding an unaligned, inquisitive electorate that made its voting decisions on the basis of reasoned choice, it was found that, media exposure notwithstanding, voters largely approached elections with a long-standing attachment to one of the parties, were little interested in the campaign, did not seek out policy information during it, tended to interpret the media messages that did reach them through their existing partisan lens and were unlikely to change their vote choice as a result of the campaign. That is, the behavioral effects that took place were modest and benign; media exposure may have made voters more informed and knowledgeable and more likely to turn out and vote, but it did not lead them to defect from their long-standing party identification at the polls (Berelson et al. 1954). Experimental and survey studies alike concurred that individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors were likely to be reinforced rather than changed by media exposure (Roberts and Maccoby 1985: 541). The net result was a “minimal effects” model holding that media exposure was far more likely to reinforce existing attitudes and party preferences than to change them.

This “minimal effects” thesis was based mainly on the experience of voters’ exposure to newspapers, radio and magazines, but it remained the conventional wisdom for many years after television’s emergence as the main medium of political communication from about 1960 onwards in the United States and later in other democracies. One reason for its persistence was that voting studies consistently found voters to be generally little interested and involved in politics and to vote in line with their long-standing party identification (Campbell et al. 1960; Butler and Stokes 1969). If voters approached elections with closed minds, in other words, it seemed reasonable to accept that media exposure were unlikely to change their political attitudes and behaviors. But perhaps the more important reason for its persistence lay in its implicit assumption, based on a simplistic stimulus-response psychological model, that media effects were direct and unmediated in character. If a partisan were exposed, for example, to a hostile newspaper editorial, but his/her political attitudes and preferences were unaffected by it, then the media were necessarily concluded to have had no effect. Not allowed for was the possibility that the media influence individuals in more subtle ways than allowed for by this simple stimulus-response way of thinking.

Several factors converged to encourage media researchers to conceptualize media effects differently and to adjust their research designs accordingly. First, television came to outstrip newspapers, radio and magazines as the preferred vehicle of political communication and mobilization for political parties and as the main source of political information for voters. The important point here is that television’s coverage of politics was, by law, impartial so that it could not be expected to be similar to the often-partisan printed press in its pattern of influence on voters. Second, with its brief and episodic coverage of politics, especially in news broadcasts, television conveys political information in neither sufficient quantity nor depth to expect it to be associated with the reasoned deliberation and choice in the traditional, newspaper-based model of rational voting. Third, this particular quality of television has been strengthened by the emergence of cable television in the early 1970s in the United States and later elsewhere. From the outset, cable television was not held to the same “inform and educate”

strictures as its terrestrial counterpart; it was not even obliged to provide coverage of politics and many cable channels do not. Perhaps as a result, their audience share has risen at the expense of the more heavily regulated network channels and, faced with smaller government subsidies or lower advertising revenues, these more traditional channels have had to adapt to fight for audience share. A common criticism is a part of their adaptation strategy has been trivialization of their coverage of politics so that “infotainment” has taken precedence over “information.”

Following this dilution of the public service broadcasting model and convergence on its commercial counterpart pioneered in the United States, campaign politics around the world are now argued to have been “Americanized.” Put differently, the argument is that the key attributes of modern election campaigning include: “personalization of politics, expanding reliance on technical experts and professional advisers, growing detachment of political parties from citizens, development of autonomous structures of communication, and casting citizens in the role of spectator.” In more concrete terms, political reporting today “prefers personalities to ideas, simplicity to complexity, confrontation to compromise, and heavy emphasis on the ‘horse race’ in electoral campaigns” (Swanson and Mancini 1996: 249, 251; Mughan 2001). This is a different medium disseminating a very different kind of information to the one envisaged in traditional democratic theory.

RECONSIDERING MEDIA EFFECTS

These twin developments of the emergence of television as the preeminent medium of political communication and this medium’s ever more apparent failure to present the volume and quality of political information essential to traditional notions of rational voting helped to change the way researchers thought about media effects. Their existence was no longer rejected out of hand. Instead, researchers began to reconceptualize their understanding of what form these effects might take, particularly with the all-pervasive television. This medium’s influence may not be direct and transformative of individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors, but political researchers, armed with new insights from the disciplines of psychology and communications, began to think in terms of subtler, indirect effects. Three strands of research have emerged in the contemporary study of media effects in politics: (I) the media and political attitudes and behavior; (II) the media and political knowledge; and (III) the media and participation and democratic commitment. We will now summarize the main theories and findings in these three strands of literature before going to discuss the impact of the internet on politics.

Media Effects on Political Attitudes and Behaviors

The first alternative to the minimal effects thesis was the agenda setting hypothesis, which argues essentially that while the media may not be successful in telling voters what to think, they were effective in telling them what to think *about*. A ground-breaking study of the 1969 presidential election campaign in the United States highlighted the congruency between the campaign coverage in the mass media and the importance of the same issues to the voting public (McCombs and Shaw 1972). This finding has proved remarkably robust. Summarizing more than 90 studies that use both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs, that focus on individual and group effects, and that identify the impact of single and multiple issues, Wanta and Ghanem (2007) point to the existence of strong agenda setting effects findings across the board;

they also conclude that these effects are stronger when the relationship between media coverage and the public's agenda is studied longitudinally (for at least a month), and that stronger effects are found for experimental studies than for survey data. In other words, this meta-study shows just how "wide-ranging the agenda setting influence of the news media is," but it also suggests two other conclusions. The first is that agenda setting is more of a "long-term effect (phenomenon)," occurring over extended periods of time. The second, more speculative, conclusion posits a more indirect agenda setting role: since voters often get their political information from discussions with others, their exposure to the messages that the news media transmit is often indirect so that discussion may be "even more important (than direct exposure to the media) in ensuring their agenda setting effect" (Wanta and Ghanem 2007: 46, 47).

The next advance in the study of media effects critically advanced the agenda setting thesis by showing not only that the media could persuade people to think about, say, a particular candidate or issue in the campaign, but they could also shape how they evaluated that same issue or candidate. In other words, by shaping, for example, evaluations of presidential candidates, the media had the potential to influence not only people's political agenda, but also their behavior in the polling booth. Pride of place in this profound reinterpretation of the minimal effects thesis is held by two psychological processes, *priming* and *framing*. Let's start with priming.

The starting point of the notion of priming is that people rarely engage in exhaustive analysis when taking political decisions. Rather, they rely for making those decisions on whatever political issues or candidate attributes readily come to mind at a given time. Priming refers to the process whereby media exposure triggers one of these political issues, or candidate attributes, at the expense of others. A presidential candidate, for example, will present both a domestic and a foreign policy program in his quest for election. Assuming, however, that he is less credible in foreign than domestic affairs *and* that the media choose to emphasize foreign policy issues in their coverage of the campaign, then two consequences follow. One, voters exposed to these media and/or their messages are "primed" by this exposure to place greater emphasis on foreign policy criteria when evaluating the competing candidates. Two, the candidate presented as being weak on foreign policy will be negatively evaluated overall and he will lose votes he would probably have kept if media coverage of the campaign had emphasized domestic policy issues. In a seminal and exhaustive analysis involving 16 different experimental studies that exposed participants to modified television news broadcasts, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) demonstrated not only that the media influence what people consider to be the most pressing political issue (i.e., it had an "agenda setting" effect), but that the political coverage in the news also shapes the basis on which people evaluate public political figures (i.e., it had a priming effect).

Not all voters are equally susceptible to priming effects, however. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) demonstrated not only that the media can influence political attitudes and behavior, but they also emphasized that partisanship importantly mediated the relationship between television and the voter. Priming effects, for example, worked largely along party lines, with Democrats and Republicans emphasizing different considerations in evaluations of their party's candidate, but Independents were more likely than either partisan group to follow the media's agenda and to be primed in their candidate evaluations. In another path-breaking study, Zaller (1992) showed not only that people's political opinions and positions on political issues were influenced by the elite discourse in the media, but also that voters' prior ideological orientation and political awareness (i.e., political knowledge) were crucial moderators of these media effects. More specifically, he showed that the strength of these effects followed an inverted U-shaped curve: Highly partisan and knowledgeable people were less susceptible to influence

and opinion change because the media could not penetrate the shield of ideological resistance to discordant information. The least partisan and knowledgeable were also resistant to media influence, but because they were less likely to be exposed to it in the first place. The group most susceptible to agenda setting and priming media effects was the moderately politically aware who relied on the media for cues on the saliency and importance of political issues.

The important contribution of this new wave of media effects research has been to reinstate the media as a political force and influence in democratic politics. After a period of dismissing them as inconsequential actors in campaigning and elections in particular, scholars are now sensitive to the importance for democracy of what the media choose to emphasize, the manner in which they present issues and candidates, and how presentation affects public opinion. This progress is especially apparent in the research on framing, which uncovered another key psychological mechanism by which the media affect voters' making of political decisions.

Priming occurs when the media emphasize one issue over others in a campaign so that the audience's evaluation of political actors is more likely to be influenced by that issue. The news, however, usually does more than simply draw viewers' attention to a particular issue and candidates' positions on it, it also frames those issues and positions in particular ways. Framing research thus focuses on the manner in which the media choose to present, or frame, the information they impart about a phenomenon and how the slant they put on it affects viewers' attitudes and opinions. Essentially, framing effects occur when subtle alterations in the media's explanation of, say, the war in Iraq, influences people's views support for it and/or their allocation of blame for it. An early study of framing effects in television news, for example, distinguished between "episodic" and "thematic" frames in television news' coverage of the unemployment issue (Iyengar 1991). "Episodic" frames covered the problem by focusing on specific unemployed individuals, whereas "thematic" ones covered it from a collective, or societal, perspective. Experimental analysis suggested that the use of different frames resulted in people blaming different actors for the problem of unemployment. Under the episodic frame condition, study participants tended to place the blame on individuals, whereas they blamed the government more under the thematic condition.

Greater understanding of the psychological processes involved in media framing came with the identification of two more complex types of framing effects: "issue" and "equivalency framing." Issue framing essentially affects the relative importance given to the criteria by which a politician or political event is judged. One experimental study, for example, showed that support for allowing the Klu Klux Klan to hold a rally was higher when the media presented it as a freedom of speech right under the constitution rather than as a disruption of public order issue (Nelson et al. 1997). This pattern of differential support could not be attributed to a priming effect since the study established that participants in it were aware of the competing "freedom of speech" and "public order" claims when expressing their level of tolerance for the rally. Instead, the *frame* (freedom of speech vs. public order) to which they were exposed influenced whether they attached more importance to one claim than the other. More generally, while issue framing effects have been shown to be robust, effects due to exposure to a single frame can be attenuated by discussion with people holding different views or who have been exposed to alternative frames (Druckman and Nelson 2003).

Equivalency frames describe a situation in which different, but logically equivalent, phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences typically because the same information is cast in a positive or a negative light (Druckman 2004). A classical example concerns the number of people in work. One possible media frame is: "Unemployment soars. Jobless rate hits 5%, a two-year high". Another way of framing these figures, however, could be: "95%

employment, falling only a third of a percentage point since last month.” The two frames are logically equivalent, but the first of them makes people feel more threatened and risk-averse, while the positive “95% employment frame” makes them feel more secure and more risk-acceptant. Equivalency effects are not uniform, though. An experimental study points out that while they can certainly affect people’s preferences, the strength of the effect diminishes with expertise as well as with group discussion, especially when the group membership is diverse (Druckman 2004).

A newer research agenda focuses on how emotional cues contained in the media and/or political advertisements affect people’s political attitudes and preferences (a review is Marcus 2000). In an innovative experimental study in which political advertisements were shown during the break in a local news broadcast, for example, Brader (2005) showed that combining the advertisement with uplifting music and images served to make people more interested in the campaign, more willing to vote and more reliant on preexisting preferences in their choice of candidate. Conversely, pairing the same advertisement with fear-evoking music and images improved voters’ recall of related news, weakened dependence on prior preferences and, heavily influenced by issue and candidate trait evaluations, made them more likely to prefer the candidate sponsoring the advertisement. In a similar vein, early research on the role of emotion in politics provides evidence that a leader’s “happy/reassuring facial displays” on television elicit similar emotional reactions from viewers and thereby affect their attitude toward that leader. Moreover, “at least under some conditions, (these) affective responses are moderated by prior attitudes, just as they probably moderate attitude change” (Glaser and Salovey 1998: 165).

In short, once the media came to be seen as complex entities by means of which politicians sought to shape their interactions with voters rather than simply as characterless vehicles for the selfless transmission of “objective” political information to rational voters, the minimal effects hypothesis lost its credibility. It is now commonly accepted that media effects are indirect and subtle. Moreover, to the extent they take place, they are a function of three interacting units, the medium, its message and its audience, and all three have to be taken into account in establishing the conditions under which the mass media of communication have an effect on voters. This subtlety is as evident in the study of the media’s contribution to citizens’ political knowledge as it has been in its contribution to understanding their political attitudes and behaviors.

Political Knowledge: (What) Do Citizens Learn from the Media?

Political knowledge and reasoning about politics are critical to effective citizenship since democratic accountability is inconceivable without them. How can voters hold their elected representatives accountable for their record in office if they have no information or knowledge by which to evaluate that record? In democratic theory, the media have a special role to play in providing that information and knowledge to voters, but how does exposure to the media actually affect individuals’ political knowledge? In a seminal, long-term study of the level of political knowledge among U.S. citizens, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) found that while self-reported media attention had a positive, if limited, impact on political knowledge, socio-demographic predictors, like education, are much more powerful determinants of it. Recognizing the strong positive correlation between education and political involvement, Price and Zaller (1993: 158) argue similarly that it is the most politically informed who are likely to gain factual information from the media, and, “as a practical matter, the measurable effects of

self-reported media use on learning from the news are more or less completely swamped by the stronger, overall tendency of the better informed to remain that way.”

This line of argument has not gone uncontested, however. Graber (2001) argues that, precisely because it is a visual medium, television constitutes an important source of political learning, particularly for people of lower socio-economic status. The key to this argument is that the interpretation of visual stimuli is inherent to the human brain, allowing small children and lower educated people to make sense of politics just by seeing images.

While most studies of the relationship between media exposure and political knowledge centered around similarities and differences between the traditional media of newspapers and television (for a review see Eveland et al. 2004), a more recent study examines the relationship for cable television (Prior 2005). Using a representative sample of U.S. citizens, it examines how the increased availability of both political information and entertainment as the result of the multiplication of cable channels affects individuals’ levels of political knowledge. Results lend support to the argument that the ready availability of news and entertainment fare through cable television allows the less politically interested (aided by the remote control) to surf channels and avoid exposure to political news on television. This ability in turn, the argument continues, promotes an even wider information gap between the politically uninvolved (who, prior to the advent of cable television, had a difficult time avoiding political news) and the politically interested and involved.

Paid political advertising on television is an alternative source of information to news broadcasts. This is especially so in the United States, which is one of the few established democracies to allow this practice. Pairing television campaign expenditure data in the 2000 U.S. presidential election with individual-level data on television attention patterns, one study has shown that exposure to televised political advertisements significantly increased voter recall of House candidate names, the number of volunteered candidate likes and dislikes and the ability to identify correctly presidential candidates’ issue stances. Moreover, exposure to advertisements appears to boost the knowledge levels, particularly, of voters who view the campaign with very low levels of political information, allowing them to more than double their initial knowledge score (Freedman et al. 2004). There is little agreement beyond this point, however. Some researchers have found that people learn more from advertisements, and particularly negative ones, than from television news broadcasts and newspaper reading, but others question the generalizability of this finding. Another line of research has pointed to the existence of factors moderating voter learning from paid advertisements. The sponsor of the advertisement, for example, is one such factor, with candidate-sponsored advertisements being more conducive to learning than interest group-sponsored ones (for a review, see Goldstein and Ridout 2004).

To summarize, most would agree that media exposure, whether to political news or political advertising, has a positive impact on individuals’ level of political knowledge and information, but this impact is weak when compared to more enduring influences like education and prior political interest. There is agreement on little else, however, largely because of divergence of opinion on how an individual’s political knowledge is best measured. Most studies rely on surveys to measure it, but there is a question of how well these reflect what people actually know. The problem is that people agreeing to respond to surveys may be insufficiently motivated to answer questions conscientiously. For example, a recent large experimental U.S. study shows that the provision of financial incentives to respondents or giving them more time to answer questions produces a substantial increase in the percentage of correct responses to political knowledge questions, particularly among those moderately or less attentive to news broadcasts (Prior and Lupia 2008). Another debate concerns the format of political knowledge questions. It has been argued

that knowing political facts is less important than the ability to connect these facts coherently to structural knowledge. Thus, more important than identifying the Kyoto Treaty correctly is the ability to associate it closely with environmental protection (Eveland et al. 2004; see also the “politics and new media” later in this review).

Campaigns, Participation and Democratic Commitment

The political role of the mass media is especially evident in election campaigns and these same campaigns involve citizens in the political process more intensely than usual, generally thereby serving to restore and reinforce their support for, and commitment to, democracy. The decision to turn out to vote is sometimes seen as an indicator of this commitment and there is some interesting research on the relationship between the media and voting turnout. One interesting finding is that watching television news on public service channels in the Netherlands has positive effects on citizens’ political knowledge and voting turnout, while exposure to commercial television news broadcasts has the opposite effect (Aarts and Semetko 2003).

Far more attention, however, has been given to political advertisements in the United States. Study of the relationship between emotions and politics suggests an asymmetric effect for them, with the addition of uplifting images and music leading to higher levels of intention to turn out and vote and the addition of fear-evoking images and music being unrelated to this decision (Brader 2005). A somewhat different perspective can be found in the much fuller literature on the relationship between negative political advertising on television and citizens’ political participation and opinions about the democratic system. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) initially concluded that exposure to negative political advertising reduced turnout by approximately 5%, a claim that provoked a huge reaction. A subsequent review of more than 50 studies on negative political advertising reported 117 “pertinent findings” and found no consistent evidence that exposure to political advertisements was associated with democratic disenchantment (Lau et al. 1999). While this review found that people did not like negative political advertisements, the same dislike was also expressed for positive ones. Negative political advertisements were also concluded to be no more effective than positive ones and not to be responsible for reduced voter turnout. A more recent review of the relationship between negative television advertising and turnout turns up the same conclusions (Goldstein and Ridout 2004).

In sum, two broad conclusions follow from this review of the relationship between the traditional mass media (newspapers and television) and political attitudes and behaviors. The first is that media influence may most often take the form of reinforcing existing opinions and behaviors, but, contrary to long-held beliefs, it can also change them. To be sure, the media are most often weak as an agent for change and their effects are more often than not indirect and felt only by voters who are not among the most interested in, and informed about, politics. Nonetheless, the media are undoubtedly a force in electoral politics. The second conclusion is that the traditional media carry out the democratic role originally assigned to them less and less well. To be sure, some responsibility for their failure to inform and educate to the degree originally expected of the broadcast media in particular lies with voters who are set in their ways and resist discordant media messages, but there are other problems with the contemporary traditional media landscape. For a start, ownership is more and more concentrated so that the information and messages received by voters have become more homogeneous and less reflective of the diversity of viewpoints and interests in society. In addition, the public service ethos that was to be the driving force behind the media’s inform and educate function has

been diluted as governments have ceded some of their regulatory powers to market forces and forced public service channels to converge on a commercial model as concerned with market share and profits as with promoting electorates whose informed deliberation keeps democratic governments accountable by holding them responsible for their (in)actions in office.

But is there light on the horizon? For some, the recent emergence of the internet promises a way out of both these limitations of modern representative democracy for two reasons. One, it is a free, public resource and, unlike the traditional media, not under the control of fewer and fewer “media barons.” Two, the absence of government regulation of the internet and free and easy access to it for all means that it is a treasure trove of information of all kinds. Traditional media can be found promoting their wares on the internet as well as in their more conventional formats, but also individuals and small groups without anything like matching resources can promote their views relatively free of charge simply by creating and maintaining websites that reach out to voters who are disenchanted with the “infotainment” fare of the traditional media and are hungry for the competing points of view they need to act as responsible, informed democratic citizens. While still in their infancy and barely studied for their political effects, it is these new media that we now briefly turn.

POLITICS AND THE NEW MEDIA

Political communication has taken on a different character since the 1990s as the universe of politically relevant media has been transformed. As with the earlier introduction of television, the expansion of cable and satellite television, the rapid spread of mobile telephony and massive growth in the ownership of, or at least access to, personal computers have all come together to transform the way we think about modern communications. In the span of no more than a few years, a significant part of the world’s population has gone from an internet-less, computer-less lifestyle to one in which their life would be unthinkable without this new form of electronic communication and conversation. Indeed, between 2000 and 2007, internet penetration has grown by 227% in Europe, by 304% in Asia, by 119% in North America, by over 800% in Africa and the Middle East and by over 550% in Latin America¹. The same survey of internet usage indicates that 70.2% of the U.S. population and 55.7% of Europeans are internet users. Moreover, survey data collected between 2002 and 2006 shows that the percentage of people using the internet everyday has increased constantly across all European countries, while the percentage without internet access at work or at home has declined comparably². Research on the implications of this media revolution for politics is still in its infancy, but some early observations pertinent to this chapter can still be made.

Early research on the internet and politics has had a normative-laden agenda. Given the relatively low cost of internet communications and the low barriers to accessing it whether as a producer of internet content or as a consumer of it, some scholars welcomed the opportunity for a more open forum for political discussion than the “old media” provided (Norris 2001). In their review of this early research, Ward et al. (2003) note that the internet held out the promise of an opportunity for more people to get more involved in politics at the same time that the contacts between parties and voters were weakening because of developments like declining

¹ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>.

² These data come from the annual European Social Survey. The exact percentages by country can be found at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

party loyalties, the rise of television-based campaigning and parties' tendency to cast their net ever more widely and impersonally in their search for votes. In another review of this same literature, Jankowski et al. (2007) observe that internet researchers fell essentially into two groups. On the one side were the "optimists" who believed in the potential of the internet to enhance democracy by bringing government closer to the people. On the other, were the "pessimists" who argued that the pattern of control over the internet was essentially the same as for the traditional media and so could only result in "politics as usual."

Ward et al. (2003) identify three lines of research directly related to the normative concern with the internet's potential to improve the quality of democracy. They are: (1) *enhanced interparty competition*, the theoretical argument here being that the low costs and broad reach of internet communication would help smaller parties to compete on equal terms with their larger rivals; (2) *greater voter participation*, the argument here being that the internet would increase the direct contacts between party or governmental officials and the public compared to the traditional media; and (3) *greater democracy within parties*, the key here being that the internet would multiply the opportunities for an upward flow of communication to party elites from rank-and-file activists. Other scholars even saw a potential to spread democracy by undermining authoritarian regimes, with the internet allowing penetration of these regimes by outsiders and providing a much-needed locus for discussion and organization for opponents within them.

Early efforts to assess internet effects has involved identifying those information senders who organize web pages, examining how these pages are designed to advance their political goals, and pairing them with survey data on individual internet browsing. For example, in one of the most extensive effort to date to study the impact of the internet on the quality of democratic political life, Kluver et al. (2007) examined web political sources and patterns of political web pages in election campaigns in 22 countries on four continents. Their overall conclusions tend to favor the "pessimistic" conclusion that it is politicians rather than users who shape and control the information flow on the internet. In a separate analysis of almost a thousand election web pages in 19 countries that examined the internet's "informing", "involving", "connecting" and "mobilizing" potential, Foot et al. (2007) concluded that the most reliable indicator of web page content quality seems to be the type of actor involved in producing it and not, as earlier findings had suggested, level of economic, technological and political development. In other words, web pages in advanced industrial countries did not offer users significantly more information or opportunities to become involved in the campaign than did web pages in less developed countries. Following the same "politics as usual" pattern, candidate, party and government web pages provide most of the election-related information irrespective of country or continent. Similarly, party and candidates web pages provide many more involving, connecting and mobilizing opportunities than do those of governmental, non-governmental organization (NGO) and other advocacy groups. At the same time, though, the structure of these contacts seems to be mostly top-down and provide relatively limited civic engagement options. The authors conclude that campaigning on the internet is much more a vehicle for "politics as usual" than it is for the greater participation and equality envisaged by optimists. Not only is intraparty democracy limited by there being only limited input from the rank-and-file, but also the web pages from both large and small parties prioritize targeting the "already converted", which means that smaller parties attract considerably fewer visitors and make no relative gains in visibility (Kluver et al. 2007; see also Ward et al. 2003).

The existing internet literature focuses primarily on candidate, party or NGO websites, but more recent research has turned its attention to the description of web advertising and blogging in election campaigns. One study of the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign reports,

for example, that both candidates and parties spent significant money advertising on various websites (Kaid 2006). This type of campaigning, as it points out, allows parties to target very specific groups of voters, an example being John Kerry's reaching out to the more liberal audience of the Washington Post online in the 2004 presidential contest. Trammell (2006) takes another perspective and examines the blogging activities of the two 2004 presidential candidates, showing that one of the main differences between was that John Kerry's blog allowed for visitor feedback or comments on the posts, while George W Bush's did not. Neither of these studies takes the next step and relates their findings to the political opinions and behaviors of voters.³ This is unfortunate since the question of how, if at all, do web advertisements influence voters seems particularly interesting in the run-up to a 2008 U.S. presidential election in which political advertisements have been posted on sites completely unrelated to politics and may have been selected on the basis of their IP address.⁴ This observation simply highlights how little is known about the possible political effects of the increasingly prevalent activity of blogging.

Finally, another promising avenue of research is the impact of web political news on voters' political knowledge. Using experimentation, Eveland et al. (2004) have shown that exposure to online news containing hyperlinks to related stories increased individuals' ability to connect different political facts and politicians when compared to news sites without hyperlinks. At the same time, however, exposure to hyperlinked online news led to less factual knowledge than exposure to non-hyperlinked stories. It may be, in other words, that the web does not promote the acquisition of knowledge about political facts and figures, but rather is conducive to making connections between different pieces of political information. The political uses and effects of the internet is a research domain that has barely been touched.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of communication between governors and governed fundamentally defines the nature of the relationship between them. A common theme in democratic theory has been that technological improvement in the electronic media of communication especially will make for a more participatory democracy; citizens will not only be able to know more about what their representatives are doing, or not doing in government, but also will be able to reach out to them and influence their decisions directly (Abramson et al. 1988). Empirical research on mass media effects, however, has belied this picture of involvement and influence. The minimal effects thesis may no longer hold sway, and the traditional media may now be accepted to be influential, but the extent of this influence should not be overstated. A recent comparative study of Germany, Britain, Spain and the United States over a long time period finds that personal influence is consistently more significant than mass media in influencing the vote (Schmitt-Beck 2004). Moreover, as the relevant media universe has exploded beyond the relatively simple world of a small number of terrestrial television channels, these same media are less able to monopolize audience share and perform the "educate and inform" function

³There is some preliminary research on the effects of seeing candidate advertisements on TV as opposed to on line. One study, for example, reports their greater effectiveness when seen on the web (Kaid and Postelnicu 2005).

⁴This speculation arises from one of the author's experience with the Internet Movie Data Base website. Beginning in October 2007, imdb.com posted a series of U.S. primary advertisements, an example of which is the question "Can Hillary Win? Vote here" placed next to a picture of Hillary Clinton. These advertisements were not attached officially to any campaign and they disappeared when the imdb.com website was accessed from a different IP address.

originally anticipated for them. In the United States, cable television and the internet now dominate the world of political communication, and the vaunted reintroduction of the Fairness Doctrine would do little to turn back the clock in this regard.

Mass media research suggests that similar hopes for the democratizing potential of the internet are also doomed for two critical reasons. One, there is not much evidence that the large majority of any democratic citizenry craves high levels of participation in the making of governmental decisions. Indeed, by their own choice, citizens' political participation in representative democracies commonly goes no farther than the simple act of voting at election time; some do not even manage this. Two, elected politicians do not view the mass media of communications only as a vehicle for improving citizen oversight of government. Rather, they also see them as a tool to be used, perhaps primarily, to achieve their own political ends, which likely include their own reelection as much as the provision of information that might jeopardize that reelection. The media are indeed a political force, but elite control and manipulation of them combine with public apathy to ensure that they function largely to maintain representative democracy in its current limited form rather than to reform it.

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CHAPTER 27

Elections and Voting

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There are more democracies in the world now than ever before. Elections and voting are the lynchpins of new and established democracies alike. The object of this chapter is to examine the recent developments within studies of elections and voting. This general topic is far too vast for any single chapter or set of authors to survey comprehensively; instead we focus on the developments centered around two of the most central aspects of elections: Who votes and why? Who do those voters vote for and why? We also examine one of the most interesting new developments in election studies in recent years, political polarization, especially as it pertains to our central concerns with turnout and vote choice. While much of our attention centers on the United States, we consider developments as they pertain to the other established democracies as well as to newer and emerging democratic nations.

SUFFRAGE RIGHTS AND VOTER TURNOUT

Quite literally, democracy means that the people rule. But, who are the people? At the core of this question are issues of eligibility to make ruling choices in a given polity and the circumstances under which citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity. On the one hand, political systems and institutions define who the “people” are and the nature of their voting rights. And on the other, individual characteristics and motivations influence the holders of such rights to actually exercise them (or not). In between institutions and individuals, various social and organizational factors shape the operation of both the rules and the choices. We start our review of suffrage and turnout at the institutional level where voting rights and capacities are defined and where other macro-level factors, such as levels of socio-economic development and inequality are relatively fixed, at least in the short-run.

The issue of who is allowed to vote may appear as largely settled – universal adult suffrage is often taken as the normative expectation of democratic practice. Though women, propertyless workers, immigrants, and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, among other groups, have all been subject to exclusion in the historical development of democracies, new democracies that have developed since World War II have tended toward the adoption of universal rather than restricted suffrage at the point of founding (Ramirez et al. 1997). In the United States, the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its subsequent renewals in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006 have reinforced this assumption. And yet, even as U.S. voting

rights act litigation has shifted largely to issues of representation rather than vote eligibility, concerns about the latter have hardly disappeared. For example, many U.S. states have attempted to pass voter identification requirements in recent years, ostensibly to prevent voter fraud. Critics, however, have long claimed that such measures are aimed more at suppressing votes, especially those of minorities and the poor (Valelly 2005).

In addition, the United States, unlike most of its well-established democratic counterparts, still prevents many if not most convicted felons from voting. Far from being a trivial anomaly, Uggen and Manza (2002, 2006) suggest that such suppressed votes may well have made a substantial difference in recent U.S. national and local electoral outcomes. Large ramifications also loom in battles over the rights of immigrants to the ballot in the U.S. and elsewhere (Back and Sojininen 1998; Hayduk 2006). More than 10% of the voting age population is ineligible to vote in the United States (McDonald and Popkin 2001) and more than 35,000 noncitizens serve in the U.S. military (Hayduk 2006, pp. 1–3). With both numbers expected to continue to grow, this is far from a settled issue in the United States and other democracies with significant immigrant populations.

Most studies of voter turnout, however, take eligibility rules as a given. They set out to explain variation in voting rates and especially apparent declines in turnout over the past several decades. Until fairly recently, turnout studies have been dominated by two somewhat disparate approaches, one focusing primarily on macro, institutional factors shaping variations in aggregate turnout rates, the other on the individual motivations and characteristics associated with voter turnout. In the last 10–15 years, however, a significant and diverse body of research has focused much more on the mediating mechanisms that connect institutions to individuals and to the act of voting. By mediating mechanisms, we mean explicitly social factors, including networks, group identities and connections, mobilizing organizations and mechanisms, and competitive political contexts. We consider each of these three areas of research, in turn.

Institutional Factors

Macro-level institutional explanations of U.S. turnout fluctuations have pivoted around arguments emphasizing changes in the character of parties and party competition and those which emphasize legal institutional barriers to suffrage. Some have pinned the blame for U.S. turnout declines of both the post 1896 and post 1960s periods on the institutional rules governing voting, such as registration laws, the introduction of the secret ballot, poll taxes and literacy tests (Converse 1974; Rusk and Stucker 1978; Kousser 1974; Piven and Cloward 1989; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Erikson 1981; Powell 1986). Others, however, argued that the activities of parties and the competition between them are much more central determinants of turnout levels (Burnham 1970, 1974, 1987). Recent studies of variation in turnout among American states demonstrated this linkage not only by gauging of the closeness of elections but also by including indications of party expenditures and whether an incumbent was running for re-election. In addition, such research has also established that elections with more contested races typically command higher turnout (Jackson 1997; Jackson et al. 1998).

Beyond the direct electoral contexts of voting, other studies showed that economic- and/or ethnocultural-based movements stimulated political participation and turnout (Jensen 1971; Kleppner 1982; Piven and Cloward 1989) and that turnout varies substantially with the degree of intra- and inter-class conflict and with the mobilization of movements (Winders 1999).

Pioneering comparative studies have suggested the importance of institutional factors, such as compulsory voting laws, proportional representational systems, smaller competitive

electoral districts, and unicameralism as all fostering greater levels of turnout (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987). Proportional representation systems are said to foster multi-party systems in which parties are more responsive to citizens (especially where electoral districts are themselves smaller and competitive) and thereby to induce greater voter interest.

However, more recent research casts some doubt on each of these factors. Some studies have suggested that the effect of compulsory voting laws is conditional upon the age of the democracy (Norris 2002) and the degree of sanctioning and enforcement of such laws (Fornos et al. 2004; Blais et al. 2003). The effect of proportional representation may be similarly conditional since it has been found to have an effect in advanced industrial democracies (Jackman and Miller 1995; Franklin 1996; Radcliff and Davis 2000) and democratizing former communist nations (Kostadinova 2003) but not in Latin America (Perez-Linan 2001; Fornos et al. 2004). The most recent research on unicameralism has also produced mixed results, though new work by Franklin (2004) holds some hope for the idea that voters are more likely to go to the polls in institutional settings where votes are most likely to translate directly into political power and change. Specifically, Franklin argues that voter turnout is lower in the United States and Switzerland in part because of what he calls the lack of “executive responsiveness” built into their respective political institutions. In the United States, the separation of powers and in Switzerland the “golden rule” (which rotates the prime minister’s post among long established parties regardless of the electoral outcome in any given election) severely reduces the prospect that voting will have significant policy implications. Contrast this with Malta, where a shift to independent nationhood status in the early 1960s made the unicameral parliamentary system much more responsive to the electorate and, according to Franklin (2004, pp. 96–7), helped produce a dramatic rise in voter turnout for the island nation.

Franklin’s research, in fact, makes a much larger point about the problems of macro, cross-sectional research. Looking across nations, it does appear that certain institutional factors are associated with higher turnout; and yet, changes in institutional rules and arrangements do not always immediately impact voter turnout (Franklin 2004; Fitzgerald 2005). The National Voter Registration Act (the “motor voter” bill) is a case in point. Instigated in part by activist political sociologists Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (2000), this bill was supposed to increase turnout by allowing voter registration when citizens renew their drivers’ licenses or apply for public assistance. The act has, in fact, led to significant increases in voter registration, but the impact on turnout has been much lower and more variable than many had expected (Brown and Wedeking 2006); voter turnout declined in the 1996 presidential elections, 3 years after the act was passed. Institutional reforms aimed at restricting ballot access may also fail to have the expected effect. In early 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to Indiana’s voter identification law, the most draconian among the 50 states, with some expecting the law to lead to turnout decline and allowing the adoption of such laws in other states (Stout 2008). Still, Indiana voter turnout in 2008 increased nearly 5% from 2004 (and 10% from 2000), giving the Democratic Party only its second presidential victory there since 1936 (McDonald 2009). Thus, the failure of the motor voter bill and other institutional reforms to clearly impact turnout in predictable ways only reinforces the need to examine other factors.

Individual Level Factors

Individual level research on voter turnout has two distinct, though not unrelated, traditions. Since Downs (1957), Olson (1965), and Riker and Ordeshook (1968), many researchers have focused on rational individual motivations to vote: because the costs of voting are non-trivial and the benefits of voting are extraordinarily small and can accrue even to nonvoters,

we would expect rational individuals to abstain. Even in the face of such logic, most citizens do, in fact, vote. Undaunted by this “paradox that ate rational choice theory” (Grofman 1993), rational choice researchers have come up with elaborate mathematical models and simulations to try to account for voter turnout and yet remain true to the tenets of the theory. Though too large of a literature to review in all of its complexity here, recent work in this tradition has attempted to model how altruism (Fowler 2006; Jankowski 2007), stochastic learning (Kanazawa 2000), competitiveness, the size of electorate, and the “underdog effect” (Levine and Palfrey 2007), shame (Gerber et al. 2008), and a large set of election specific factors (Franklin 2004) affect individual cost-benefit calculus of voting. Such efforts may not mollify the critics of rational choice approaches to voter turnout (Green and Shapiro 1994; Schlozman 2002; Leighley 1995; see also, Grofman 1993; Aldrich 1993) or fully resolve the paradox of the theory without vitiating its foundational assumptions or rendering it tautological.

A different, though not entirely contradictory approach, has been to identify the traits of individuals that distinguish their propensity to vote. Sometimes referred to as the socio-economic status model, such research has shown how voting rises with greater levels of income and education, occupational prestige, and partisan identity (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba et al. 1995; see Leighley (1995, 2008) for reviews and critique of this work). These characteristics, especially education, promote a civic orientation and make it easier for higher status citizens to gain information about how to register, what the parties and candidates stand for, and what is at stake in their selection. And they are related to attitudes and psychological orientations (e.g., interest in politics, sense of political efficacy, etc.) that make people more likely to vote. Moreover, these variables also help explain not only class differences in voting levels but may underlie differences in voter turnout among racial, ethnic, and gender groupings. Current Population Survey estimates from the 2004 presidential elections show that African-American turnout still lagged that of non-Hispanic whites by 7% (67–60%). For Latino and Asian citizens, turnout rates lag even further, at 47 and 44%, respectively (Holder 2006, p. 4). In studies that control for the socioeconomic status variables discussed above, however, differences in turnout along the lines of race, ethnicity, and gender largely disappear (Schlozman 2002, p. 444; but see also, Timpone 1998).

As powerful as such studies have been in explaining the variation in individual-level turnout, they have nonetheless received a good deal of criticism. Knoke (1990) points out that such studies relied on surveys that “stripped individuals out of their social contexts” and “depicted atomized actors floating unanchored,” their “perceptions unfiltered by constraining and validating personal relationships.” And if mobilizing mechanisms, such as direct mail, door-to-door canvassing, and phone banking efforts are differentially targeted to high status groups, this will lead such models to overestimate the significance of socioeconomic status and political attitudes (Leighley 1995).

The so-called “mobilization models,” while still working within the survey research tradition, have attempted to capture more of these factors, by suggesting that people are more likely to vote not only when they can (because of resource advantages) or because they want to (because of attitudes or social-psychological dispositions), but *because they are asked* (Verba et al. 1995; Schlozman 2002; Rosenstone and Hanson 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). These include contacts from parties, candidates, and other organizations, and involvement in informal discussion groups and voluntary organizations, among others (see Leighley (1995) and Schlozman (2002) for reviews of this approach). Gray and Caul (2000) also offer an internationally oriented, comparative study in which they argue that much of the decline in turnout in industrial democracies during the Post-War Era can be traced to the declining mobilization efforts of unions and labor parties. Still, individual-level research on turnout in the United

States will fall short if it fails to untangle the different factors that drive registration and voting, factors which can be confounded if selection bias is not accounted for (Timpone 1998).

Intermediate Level Approaches: Networks, Organizations, and Mobilizing Mechanisms

Mobilization models move us closer to the idea that far from being a purely private, individual act, the decision to vote is collective and subject to a host of social factors. Lying between individuals and institutions, social contexts and dynamics of electoral campaigns matter for turnout in at least four ways. First, organized partisan and even nonpartisan get-out-the-vote contacts with potential voters increase the probability of voting (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993; Gerber and Green 2000a, b, 2004; Green et al. 2003; Nickerson et al. 2006; McClurg 2004). Gerber, Green and colleagues have made particular advances in this area by using experimental data to examine the effect of mobilizing mechanisms such as door to door canvassing, phone contact, leafleting, etc., which have been mainstays of voter mobilizing for decades or longer yet. Until recently, little research had been done to test whether such mechanisms have any effect on the likelihood of voters going to the polls or whether one mechanism was more efficacious and/or cost-effective than another (see, especially Nickerson and Friedrichs 2006; Michelson 2006; Nickerson 2007).

Second, the nature of individuals' social networks, and the political information derived therefrom, do much to shape the likelihood of participation. While these basic ideas are rooted in the early Columbia studies, more recent work has reinvigorated this line of research (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2002 McClurg 2003, 2006a, b). Such studies move beyond the individual-centered SES model and answer Knoke's (1990) call for more sophisticated analyses of the social contexts of political decision making. Related to such arguments is work by Firebaugh and Chen (1995), Plutzer (2002), and Franklin (2004), who all stress the importance of the social and historical contexts involving cohort effects, political socialization, and the setting of voting "habits." This research is vitally important because it helps us understand the apparent resistance of turnout rates to various institutional reforms, mobilizing campaigns, or even rising levels of socio-economic status. In fact, Franklin (2004) traces much of the recent declines in voter turnout to the lowering of voting ages to age 18, a particularly inopportune moment in the life course from which to instill, socialize, and habitualize the act of voting. Nonvoters in early life become relatively immune to later changes in political or institutional contexts designed to produce greater participation.

Third, indications of the contexts of voter mobilization, such as candidate and/or party spending and, especially, party competition, have been shown to affect voter turnout by reducing the costs of political information to potential voters and increasing their interest in voting (Holbrook and McClurg 2005). While researchers generally agree that greater campaign expenditures lead to higher mobilization and turnout (Cox and Munger 1989; Holbrook and McClurg 2005), the impact of competition is less clear, with some research suggesting that it has little or no effect (Nownes 1992; Hogan 1999) and others suggesting that it is important (Cox and Munger 1989; Franklin 1998). The mixed results may reflect that spending and competition are likely confounded with one another, as the competitiveness of any election may be an important determinant of campaign expenditures (Cox and Munger 1989; Holbrook and McClurg 2005) and thereby affect the turnout indirectly. Also, as Franklin (2004) notes, it may be that competition spurs voting *only* in those institutional contexts where an election can be expected to actually change policy, a prospect which is less likely in divided government

in systems such as the United States or coalitional rule under proportional representation systems.

Fourth, some research has suggested that the tone of campaigns may affect the turnout, specifically the degree of negative campaigning and advertising. Early studies suggested that negative campaigning directly and significantly depressed turnout by causing voters to think negatively about the target *and* perpetrator of the ad, as well as the democratic process, more generally (Ansolabehere et al 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). The most recent research has been broadly skeptical. Gerber and Green (2004) suggest a small negative impact, while others have actually even found a positive effect of campaign negativity on turnout (Lau and Pomper 2001; Djupe and Peterson 2002; Niven 2006; Jackson and Carsey 2007). Moreover, Lau et al.'s (2007) meta-analysis of this literature and Brooks' (2006b) re-analysis of the Ansolabehere and Iyengar data cast further doubt on the idea that negative campaigning leads to lower turnout.

Voter Turnout in Non-western and Emerging Democracies

While much of the analyses of turnout discussed above have centered on established western democracies and the United States in particular, there is a growing literature on turnout in non-western and emerging democracies. The first, and most powerful, factor that shapes turnout in these settings is the incidence of “transitional” or “founding” elections, in which nations are reviving democracy or establishing democracy for the first time. Voter turnout for these types of elections is uniformly high regardless of region. Social and political forces that mobilize people into turning out to vote in these situations include optimism that comes with transitioning to democracy and the belief that better times lie ahead, or the opportunity to oppose past authoritarian rule (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). No matter the impetus, another uniform effect takes hold in all subsequent elections that depresses turnout thereafter (Kostadinova and Power 2007; Kostadinova 2003; Fornos et al. 2004). In any event, founding and transitional elections need to be studied more carefully for several reasons: (1) their ability to set the institutional inertia for future elections, (2) their potential power for instilling the habit of voting into voters, especially younger voters (Franklin 2004), and (3) their unique ability to offer a glimpse of the electoral system-party system linkage at a time of formation or change (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). One of the major difficulties in this regard will continue to be collecting or gaining access to data in situations of tumult and poor government centralization and coordination.

Przeworski correctly cautions scholars to closely interrogate the nature of founding and transitional elections as they are often only nominally democratic. Autocratic regimes may hold “elections” to show the public that they control political outcomes and their dominance is unrivaled or to co-opt rival parties who pose a threat (Przeworski 2009). Often, these co-opted parties receive minor policy consolations in exchange for loyalty to the ruling regime (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).

In a recent study of voter turnout in Latin American and post-Communist, Eastern European nations Kostadinova and Power (2007) analyze the traditional institutional, socioeconomic, and political process variables, along with what they call temporal effects. They find that several traditional explanations of turnout in Western industrial nations hold for these regions as well. The institutional variables district magnitude and concurrent legislative and presidential elections shape turnout in both regions, while socioeconomic effects (per capita GDP) hold in post-Communist Europe but not in Latin America (replicating the findings

of Fornos et al. 2004). Yet, they break with the literature (Blais 2006; Franklin 2004) when they argue that the most important political process variable in past literature, electoral competitiveness, carries little explanatory weight in either region. They suspect that the fluid and fragmented party systems they examine make it difficult for voters to gauge competitiveness in the already disorienting environment of transitional and post-transitional elections, echoing the arguments that Roberts and Wibbles (1999) make in regard to electoral volatility (discussed in the next section). Their unique contribution is to show that across two culturally and institutionally distinct regions of the world, turnout declines in every election (up to at least the fourth) after the founding or transitional election. They also note that turnout in Latin America is consistently lower than turnout in post-Communist Europe and suggest that the particular institutional legacies and transition dynamics of each region explain that gap (see also, Weyland 2002).

Some authors are more optimistic about the role of institutionalism in explaining turnout in nascent democracies. In their study of turnout in Africa, Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) find that proportional electoral systems have higher turnout, as do systems which hold presidential and legislative elections concurrently. They also argue that, similar to Franklin (2004), much of voting is habitual and “people need a little experience with new institutions before their behavior is consistent with the incentives provided” (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007; 683). It seems, then, that extra-institutional factors are more important in determining voter turnout internationally than they are in the United States, at least partially because younger democracies experience more institutional change. When voters cannot reliably judge the effect of their vote because of uncertainty with their nation’s political institutions, their decision to vote may be more influenced by ethno-cultural, socio-economic, and political process variables.

VOTER CHOICE

Not so long ago, scholars of politics could distinguish three basic approaches to voting analysis in the United States. The “sociological” or “social cleavages” model focused on social structural and social group bases of voting behavior and, of course, had its origins in sociology (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The social-psychological or “Michigan” school has focused more on voter attitudes toward issues and candidates, which it saw as more proximate to voting choice, and originated in the discipline of political science (Campbell et al. 1960). Finally, the “economic” or rational choice approach, which had its origins in the field of economics (Downs 1957) though it was quickly appropriated by many political scientists, put voters’ cost-benefit calculus at the center of its analysis. If these neat little boxes were never quite as exhaustive, analytically distinct, or mutually exclusive as some analysts made them out to be, they nonetheless served as useful heuristics. That is much less the case today. In what follows, we review the problems and prospects for each of the three traditional analytic categories of voter choice and then turn our attention to new debates over culture and political polarization which clearly relate to but do not fit neatly into the lines of previous research traditions.

Social Cleavages

At its core, the sociological model claims that voter choices are significantly shaped by their own location within the social and group structures of society, such as class, race and ethnicity,

religion, and gender. By their very nature, these positions are thought to be relatively stable over the life course of the individual voter and across multiple elections, thereby producing relatively stable political alignments and voting patterns. As discussed in detail elsewhere (Manza and Brooks 1999; Brooks et al. 2003), this research tradition has a long and distinguished lineage but nonetheless fell into relative neglect during the 1970s and 1980s, only to be revived in the 1990s. This revival stemmed, in part, from increasing indications that the most consistently potent predictor of voting choice and political alignment, class, was declining. The rise of the so-called Reagan-Democrats and split ticket voting in the United States coincided with the increasingly apparent weakness of old left parties in Europe and rise of new left and far right parties, sparking debates about the decline of class voting and its replacement by new political alignments and even the de-alignment of voters.

Debates in the 1990s centered on whether class was declining or whether it was changing form (see Clark and Lipset 2001). For some, class has become less relevant as new forms of stratification have emerged and weakened links between class position, partisanship and voting (Clark and Lipset 2001; Lipset 2001), making efforts to fit new forms of political influence back into old class boxes ultimately self-defeating (Pakulski 2001; see also Hechter 2004). Using newer class indicators, based on finer grained occupational categorizations, and new statistical techniques better designed to capture changes in class structure and alignments, others have made the case for the continuing importance of class even as classes change forms and even realign into different parties (Hout et al. 1995, Goldthorpe 2001). And, though political scientists have often eschewed class analysis of voting behavior, a spate of recent studies has suggested its continuing power to shape voting behavior. Three distinct studies of the United States have found partisan identity and class (as measured by income rather than occupational category) are *increasingly* linked to vote choice in last two decades (McCarty et al 2006; Brewer and Stonecash 2007) and that the bottom third of income voters have become *more* Democratic in presidential voting over the last 30 years (Bartels 2008b).

Because the debate over the decline of class voting often revolves, in part, around disputes over conceptualization, measurement, and epistemology (see Weeden 2002), it is not likely to be resolved anytime soon. There are, however, indications that the debate is moving on in new and more productive directions. First, a number of studies have suggested that the zero-sum nature of the decline debate is misleading. That is, class may continue to be important even as other factors (race, gender, religion, cultural, ideological, and value conflicts, etc.) grow in significance (Weakliem 2001; Brooks et al. 2003; Achterberg 2006). Second, and perhaps even more interesting are efforts to make sense of the way in which these other factors interact with class. Brewer and Stonecash (2007), for example, argue that both culture and class are becoming more salient to voting choice in the United States. More to the point, they find evidence of voter sorting in which income and views on abortion, when paired together, powerfully shape voter choice. Specifically, just 58% of low income anti-abortion voters supported President Bush in 2004, whereas two-thirds of high income voters support abortion rights, but only 45% voted for Bush (p. 179). Third, new comparative research suggests that the effect of class varies significantly not only over time, but across place (Nieuwbeerta 2001; Achterberg 2006; Brooks et al. 2006), with declines in class voting more evident in the United States and Scandinavia than in the other western democracies.

The concern with the decline of class has often been paired with arguments about other factors becoming more important. In the United States, this was certainly the case for race for much of the late 1980s and 1990s (Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Weakliem 1997). While certainly confirming the importance of the racial cleavage for U.S. voting and even finding it to be the most important voting cleavage, Manza and Brooks (1999)

cast some doubt on the purported strong tradeoff between race and class voting. They argue that the class cleavage remained fairly stable between 1964 and 1992, even as race became more salient to voters as upwards of 90% of African-American voters came to side with the Democratic Party, whereas many whites, especially in the South, moved toward the Republican Party. Analysts have found it difficult to trace the precise causes of this latter movement, however. Is it because of the use of coded campaign messages designed to play upon the racial resentments of whites? Or, is it more closely related to attitudes toward the welfare state? Or to perceptions of economic interests? We discuss some of these issues when we consider the issue of political polarization, below.

The realignment of the South from a Democratic bastion to a Republican stronghold is certainly one of the most important electoral developments in the last 50 years. It has been widely understood as racially motivated, a product of white backlash against civil rights movements and the Democratic Party's support thereof. Shafer and Johnston (2006) argue against this interpretation. In their fine-grained analysis of individual and aggregate level data, they find that partisan change in the South was more a product of economic development and resulting shifts in voter economic interests than of racial resentment; race was hardly irrelevant in their view, but it played a secondary role in the destruction of "Southern exceptionalism," the end product of which made southern vote choices much more akin to those found in the rest of the country. Such a thoroughgoing flouting of conventional wisdom, of course, does not go unchallenged; others have been skeptical of the way in which Shafer and Johnston elide the complex interconnections between class, economic motivations, and race and downplay continued southern racial and cultural distinctiveness (Carter 2007; Black and Black 2007). Though, for the most part, studies of racial politics have focused on the racial divides that are particularly evident among recalcitrant whites, there is some evidence that increasingly liberal, racial attitudes among some whites actually prevented what would have otherwise been a more extensive Republican realignment in the 1980s and 1990s (Brooks 2002).

Amid the remarkable emergence of Barack Obama as the first African-American President, it may be tempting to wonder as to the actual triumph of this racial liberalism. Some have argued that, whatever its merits in its own right, that the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 as well as the massive decline in crime rates over the past decade, have "taken the air" out of the key racial resentments that fueled racialized politics in the U.S. during the latter decades of the twentieth century and may, therefore, have dampened the racial cleavages of the U.S. polity. Exit polls suggest Obama received 43% of the white vote in 2008 (while garnering 95% of the black vote); only Clinton in 1996 and Carter in 1976 did better among Democratic candidates in the 11 elections since Johnson's landslide in 1964 (Noah 2008). Even in the South, Obama failed to better Kerry's numbers among whites in only four states (Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana), none of which he contested. And he did significantly better than Kerry in southern states where he campaigned extensively, notably Virginia (+7) and North Carolina (+8) (Franklin 2008; Silver 2008). Still, Obama did not win because of his increased share of the white vote; rather, he would have lost even with 43% white support had not blacks and Hispanics voted Democratic in higher percentages than in 2004 and turned out at much higher rates, thereby gaining a larger share of the total votes cast. Of the ten million additional votes Obama garnered over Kerry, fully 70% of that increase came from blacks and Hispanics (Ansolabehere and Stewart 2009). Ironically, Obama's race may have played a different role than expected; the remarkable, strategic feat of his campaign was to raise the hopes, allegiance, and participation of minority voters without overtly courting them and, therefore, without alienating white voters (Ambinder 2009).

Though debates over race and class characterized much of the discussion of social cleavages in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, religion has come much more front and center over the last decade. Here, more than everything, a good deal of research has centered on questions of the extent to which religion displaces the class cleavage as a shaper of voter choices. While mass media portrayals have suggested the rising influence of religion at the expense of economic and class concerns, sociologists and political scientists paint a more complicated picture. In a comparison by Manza and Brooks (1999, p. 171), the religion cleavage in the United States is more influential than gender and class but less so than race, is fairly stable in its impact on voting from 1968 to 1992, and has had no demonstrable dampening effect on the importance of class. Moreover, the only significant shift in denominational influence on voter choice is the shift of mainline Protestants away from consistent support for Republicans to a much more middling stance, in part because of mainliners' increasingly liberal views on social issues and race relations (Manza and Brooks 1999, ch. 4).

Subsequent research using somewhat different denominational categorizations, however, has found more denominational movement, indicating significant movement toward the Republicans since the 1970s, by Catholics and Evangelical Protestants, but leaving the role of mainline Protestants in dispute (Layman 2001; Brooks and Manza 2004). While part of the shift in Catholic and Evangelical voting may be traceable to the discernible rise in both groups' socioeconomic status over the latter decades of the twentieth century, the role of evangelicals has received the most attention. Early research indicated a minimal effect, since evangelicals had traditionally supported the Republican party, especially outside the South. More recent indications, however, suggest the key role played by evangelicals in the transformation of southern politics toward Republican dominance (Black and Black 2007). Moreover, other studies have indicated the importance of Christian Right supplied information to many evangelical voter decisions (Regnerus et al. 1999) and an increasing concern with family decline has had a marked increase in the influence on voter choice among evangelical Protestants (Brooks 2002).

Still, as we will discuss further below, there are also indications that the so-called polarization around religious values, groups, and attendance has been exaggerated and is perhaps more ephemeral than many expected. The mass media, for example, centered many discussions of the 2004 campaign around the popular *What's the Matter with Kansas* (Frank 2004) and exit polls indicating that 22% of voters listed "moral values" as their top issue concern. Both the polls and the book were read as indications that many lower and middle class voters were successfully wooed to cast votes that defended traditional values but defied their economic class interests. Bartels (2008b) and others (McCarty et al. 2006; Brewer and Stonecash 2007) have found significant flaws in this claim that culture and religion trump class interests among working class American voters. Of course, in the parts of Europe where secularization has advanced far beyond what has been the case in the United States, things look a bit different. There, non-religious cultural factors have been found to affect, though not necessarily diminish, class voting (Achterberg and Houtman 2006).

Though it has grown in political influence over the latter decades of the twentieth century, the gender cleavage has historically been and still is the social cleavage with the least impact on voting relative to class, race, and religion. Driven by increasing women's labor force participation and the often negative experiences linked to that participation, a significant gender cleavage in voting patterns opened up in the United States in the late 1960s, began to level off in 1980 and remained fairly stable through 1992 (Manza and Brooks 1999). While Manza and Brooks focused primarily on what was happening with women to explain how this gap emerged, other studies looked more closely at men, with one noting that male partisan

identification with the Democratic Party dropped 16 points from 1952 to 2004, with the decline for white men being even steeper (Kaufmann 2006; see also, Kaufman and Petrocik 1999; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004).

Since 1992, the gap between male and female partisan voting in the United States peaked in 1996 at 14 percentage points and declined to 9.5% in the 2000, 7% in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. While popular media accounts have suggested that decreasing support of women for the Democratic Party could be traced to the rise of “security moms,” especially in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Kaufmann’s preliminary analyses (2006) suggests that this is not the case since mothers with children at home voted for Bush in 2004 in numbers similar to 2000. Instead, Kaufmann finds that the decline is almost entirely regional. In 2004, southern women’s vote for the Democratic Party dropped 11 points from 2000, while non-southern women voted Democratic at virtually the same rate across the two elections.

THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

The best of the newer analyses of social cleavages and voting are able to use new modeling techniques and measures to tease out the cross-cuts in these cleavages and the changes in them over time (Manza and Brooks 1999). Yet, these last figures on the gender gap illustrate one of the central difficulties of the sociological, social cleavage approach to voting choice: even the best modeling strategies in this approach cannot fully explain the voters who do not always vote in accord with their location in the social structure. From *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) to *The New American Voter* (Miller and Shanks 1996) and *The American Voter Revisited* (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008b), the social psychological approach (sometimes referred to as the “Michigan school”) focused on factors it saw as more proximate to voter decision making. This approach also developed much of the rubrics associated with the modern elections studies, especially the American National Elections Studies (ANES) survey, conducted for each Presidential election cycle.

While not dismissing the cleavage approach, Campbell and his colleagues saw voting as a product of a “funnel of causality,” with the more stable socio-demographic, cleavage factors located furthest from the vote itself and mediated by progressively more ephemeral factors such as party identification, and attitudes toward issues and candidates. The latter factors could help explain, for example, the success of Eisenhower after 20 years of Democratic Party rule even as social cleavages and party identification remained relatively unchanged in 1952 and 1956. In spite of the model’s apparent comprehensiveness and ability to capture both long- and short-term factors, two key findings stood out from the initial study. The first was the overwhelming importance of party identification as a determinant of party choice. The second was that American voters were too unsophisticated and too ideologically inconsistent to make clear sense of their class or other structural interests when they entered the voting booth. Instead, they relied on their “affective orientation” to the political party (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 121) as a primary guide for whom to vote. Partisan identification is measured in the ANES not as an either/or but as a matter of the degree of loyalty or attachment and seen as a product not purely of interests, but of long-term political socialization and thus is relatively stable over time.

Both of these basic claims came under significant attack as the United States moved out of the relatively quiescent politics of the 1950s and into the much more turbulent 1960s and 1970s, when a host of equal rights and anti-war movements and social protests along with political assassinations and scandals seemed to produce widespread disdain for conventional

political parties as well as an increasingly issue-oriented and ideologically charged electorate. A host of critical studies purported to capture declines in partisan identification and increases in issue salience and ideological consistency, culminating in *The Changing American Voter* (Nie et al. 1976), and casting doubt on the central tenets of the Michigan model.

In the longer term, the model has held up quite well as the critics were themselves subject to critique, their findings in some cases seen as attributable to changes questionnaire design and wording rather than in voter attitudes (see Smith 1989, for a review). Lewis-Beck et al.'s (2008a, b) comprehensive replication study, focused on comparing the analyses of 2000 and 2004 data with that from the original study of 1952 and 1956, found that "the structure and strength of basic relationships uncovered in *The American Voter* persist" (2008, p. 427). Other recent reviews agree (Bartels 2008b), though some with caveats. While accepting the continued significance of party identification and low levels of political information and consistency in voter choice, Brooks et al. (2003), for example, suggest that the "minimalist views" of voter choice mechanisms embedded in the social-psychological approach are at a dead end, supplanted by new research that is uncovering significantly more structure and coherence in voter behavior. Some of this latter work has come from efforts to make sense of how the state of a nation's economy strongly influences the electoral decisions of the voting public.

ECONOMIC MODELS

If the social cleavage and social psychological approaches emphasize vote choice as rooted in social structures and locations and motivated by psychological attachments to parties, economic models see voters as much more calculating and strategic (Downs 1957; Key and Cummings 1966; Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Downs (1957) and Key (1966) provide the foundational work in economic rationality for the economic voting hypothesis, which serves as the central theme for the literature. The economic voter hypothesis, also known as the *responsibility* hypothesis (Nannestad and Paldam 1994), states that an electorate holds its government accountable for the economic condition of the country by voting out incumbent parties when the economic condition is poor (Fiorina 1978; Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Nannestad and Paldam 1994). The hypothesized relationship between economic performance and political vote was first tested in three seminal papers by Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Kramer (1971), and Mueller (1970) with what has become known as VP-functions (Vote and Popularity functions) (Goodhart and Bhansali 1970; Kramer 1971; Mueller 1970). VP-functions explain changes in voting patterns as they are predicted by economic and political indicators, and these techniques have been routinely employed to test the responsibility hypothesis since the late 1960s (see the following studies for literature reviews: (Fiorina et al. 2003; Lewis-Beck 1988; Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Norpoth 1996; Paldam 1991).

The overarching debate as to whether macro and/or micro economic conditions influence voting patterns (see Stigler's 1973 critique of Kramer 1971) has largely been resolved in favor of the economic voting hypothesis (until recently, which we will explore toward the end of this section; Kramer 1971; Stigler 1973). But, as Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) point out in their discussion of VP functions, a series of recurring debates within the literature crop up around the economic voter hypothesis (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). The most prominent of these debates raises questions about whether citizens vote retrospectively or prospectively with respect to the economy. That is, do citizens vote according to economic events since past or do they vote according to predictions about future economic performance?

The bulk of scholarship on this controversy finds in favor of the retrospective hypothesis (Downs 1957; Hetherington 1996; Key and Cummings 1966; Kiewiet 2000; Kramer 1971; Lanoue 1994; Norpoth 1996), but, beginning with the work of Chappell and Keech (1985), scholars have found competing evidence that voters do look forward when making economic assessments (MacKuen et al. 1992; Miller and Wattenberg 1985; Suzuki and Chappell 1996).

A second debate closely related to the retrospective/prospective debate is a controversy that springs up around whether citizens will leverage more cost on the incumbent party if the economy is in decline relative to the rewards that are bestowed when the economy is in an upswing. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) identify this non-linear relationship as grievance-asymmetry: "A good economic development increases the popularity of the government less than a bad one decreases the popularity" (Nannestad and Paldam 1994: 215). Kramer (1971) ignited this debate and is supported by Bloom and Price (1975) with his contention that an economic downturn exacts more cost on incumbents than they can expect to receive in the event up an economic upswing (Bloom and Price 1975; Kramer 1971). A few more recent studies confirm this argument (Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Nannestad and Paldam 1997), with some evidence to the contrary (Jordahl 2006; Lewis-Beck 1988; Nannestad and Paldam 1993).

The third noteworthy debate in this literature surrounds the location of voters' economic concerns. Do citizens vote out of concern for their own pocketbook, called *egotropic* voting, or out of consideration for the nation's economy as a whole, called *sociotropic* voting? (see Nannestad and Paldam 1994 for review). Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) find that sociotropic voting occurs exclusively in congressional elections, a finding which is much discussed and has been criticized by Kramer (1983). The bulk of the evidence from the United States that addresses the sociotropic/egotropic debate finds support for the sociotropic voting hypothesis (Lewis-Beck 1988; Markus 1988), yet a few studies find that sociotropic and egotropic tendencies carry approximately the same explanatory power (Alvarez et al. 2000; Nannestad and Paldam 2000).

The more traditional debates in the economic voting literature set up a more recent controversy surrounding the social-psychological work of Campbell et al (1960) and Converse and Apter (1964) on ideology and cognitive complexity. It revolves around the question as to whether citizens will attribute responsibility for the condition of the economy differently depending on their ability to make connections between the recent economic condition and the source of that condition (Luskin 1987; Sniderman 1993). Recent work in this field posits that voters who are politically unsophisticated will be more apt to position responsibility for economic downturns or upswings on the most readily identifiable and simplest target, which tends to be the president. Politically sophisticated voters, however, will attribute responsibility to not only the president, but also to the legislature (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003, 2006). Voters with higher levels of political sophistication tend to be egotropic voters, while voters with lower levels of political sophistication tend to be sociotropic voters (Gomez and Wilson 2006). Egotropic voting requires the ability to connect one's own economic wellbeing to a larger sociopolitical context, while sociotropic voting requires that fewer connections be made between the political actors and economic conditions.

Just as the sociotropic/egotropic debate has resurfaced recently, so too has the controversy over retrospective versus prospective voting. A study by Evans and Anderson (2006) reexamined both of these debates with the use of 1990s British electoral panel data (Evans and Andersen 2006). The authors discover that political partisanship shapes citizens' perceptions of the economy. The authors contend that opinions about the economy should not be treated as exogenous conditions. Rather, the causal arrow pointing from economy

to partisan vote should be turned around. This argument fails to resonate with scholars like Lewis-Beck whose decades of work have argued in favor of the traditional causal direction of economy and vote (Lewis-Beck 1985, 1986, 1988, 1997, 2006; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-Beck and Tien 1996). It may still be too soon to predict the path this literature will take, but already this debate appears to be motivating additional research into the relationships between economic voting, partisan attachment, and electoral outcomes. Rudolph (2006) examines the process by which partisan bias arises and influences perceptions of economic responsibility (Rudolph 2006). Lewis-Beck with co-authors has already published a study that finds empirical evidence that fails to support the findings of Evans and Anderson (2006; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). And in light of the financial crisis that arose in the final months of the 2008 presidential campaign and its impact on an election outcome that might otherwise have been strongly influenced by race issues, we suspect that economic voting in general and retrospective-prospective, grievance asymmetry, and socio-tropic-ego-tropic hypotheses in particular will be retested with new empirical evidence from 2008.

Pacek and Radcliff's work in the early and mid-1990s laid the foundation for studying economic voting in the "developing" democracies of the world. Pacek's (1994) work on East-Central Europe showed that incumbent parties lost support in favor of opposition parties. This result was extended in their joint work (1995) where they argue that economic downswings cause turnout to increase to the benefit of non-incumbent parties, but that economic upswings do not provide any additional support for incumbent parties that presided over growth. They argue that voters in developing nations face a much more tenuous economic reality and are much more motivated to express their discontent at the polls than the voters in industrialized nations.

Benton's (2005) work on economic voting in Latin America is particularly instructive of how the difference between a stable economic and institutional environment (Western nations) impacts voters very differently than a tumultuous one. Latin American nations, she argues, have a long history of economic adversity and voters take this into account when they go to the polls. Voters often would like to hold the parties responsible for the economic malaise. In some cases, voters may wish to punish several parties for economic failure because each of those parties presided over less than ideal circumstances, but electoral rules limit party options. In more permissive circumstances, where smaller parties have been able to construct a national profile, voters can hold more parties accountable because the alternatives are not tied to past economic problems.

Gelineau (2007), similarly, found that the institutional environment of politics in Latin America, particularly the fragmented party systems and personalistic presidential regimes, shape voter choice and, ultimately, the degree to which citizens can hold their governments accountable. He finds that, in all cases, voters' economic evaluations affected their appraisal of presidential performance, but not always their vote choice, especially in fragmented party systems where a sitting president was not on the ballot.

For Roberts and Wibbels (1999), the lack of institutionalization among Latin America's party systems has left voters with a weak and unstable link to representation. There, a voter's preference from election to election may be wildly erratic, not because of changing absolute preferences but because voting options are muddled in nascent regimes where electoral and party systems are undeveloped and social cleavages are unstable. Contrast these findings with Western nations where party systems link well with existing social cleavages, voter preference is fairly stable for much of the population, and existing voter preference from election to election turns out to be important in explaining voter choice (Franklin et al. 2007).

PARTISANSHIP, CULTURE WARS, AND INEQUALITY: NEW STUDIES IN THE POLITICS OF POLARIZATION

One of the most important developments in studies of voting and elections, particularly pertaining to the United States, are analyses of political polarization. While such research does not fit neatly into the traditional research traditions used to make sense of turnout and voter choice discussed above, it is nonetheless deeply related to analyses of both. Within political science, concerns started out with notions of increasing partisan conflict over the last two decades between the two major American parties and the decline of the so-called moderate voters and elected officials. Within sociology, research on polarization began with studies suggesting that the United States was entering a “culture war” characterized by divergent values and worldviews. More recent research has more directly connected political and cultural dimensions of polarization and asked questions as to how such conflicts may be implicated in the growing U.S. economic divide over the past three decades.

Among political sociologists, arguments about polarization in public opinion date at least to the publication of James Davison Hunter’s *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (1991). There Hunter claimed traditional class cleavages were rapidly becoming obsolete in the face of over-arching cultural concerns centering on overtly moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage. Moreover, these cultural concerns were dividing the larger population into “traditionalists” and “progressives,” with views so different as to be incomprehensible to one another. This book informed much of the political and popular media discourse over the next decade.

Soon social scientists of all stripes laid siege to these claims, using public opinion data to show that the electorate was not, after all, that divided on much of anything, save abortion (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Wolfe 1998; Evans 1996, 1997; Fiorina 2004), and even the latter was contested (Mouw and Sobel 2001). This would seem to end the interest for scholars of voting; if the masses are not polarized in their attitudes, we should not expect to see much influence from polarization on voting.

However, around the same time, political scientists were finding increasing evidence of partisan polarization, especially among elected officials, party leaders, and party activists. Evidence of polarization was somewhat unexpected given that much of the recent political science literature had concluded or assumed that political parties were in decline (Brady et al. 1979; Burnham 1970; Coleman 1996; Cox and McCubbins 1991; Nie et al. 1976; Wattenberg 1984). But late in the twentieth century, scholars of US political parties revisited the assumption of waning party importance and discovered a recent and significant upswing in the level of partisanship (see Layman et al. 2006 for a review). Upon reexamination, this growing distinctiveness in party ideology and/or policy orientation beginning in the 1970s became visible between parties at the legislative level (Abramson et al. 2005; Carson et al. 2004; Fleisher and Bond 2004; Poole and Rosenthal 1984b; Stonecash et al. 2002; Theriault 2006) between the legislative and executive branches and even between presidential candidates (Bartels 2000; Fleisher and Bond 2001; Jacobson 2003), and finally within the general electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Bartels 2000; Brewer 2005; Hetherington 2001; Layman and Carsey 2002). This new evidence helped to shift the theoretical orientation of most scholars of political parties from theorizing about the similarity of parties to their dissimilarity.

The general character of this increasing shift toward a more partisan congress and electorate can be described as increasing intraparty homogeneity with a growing interparty divide. Yet the specifics of this party homogenization and cleavage are in dispute. According to one dominant theory in the political realignment literature called “conflict displacement,” parties only move to the poles along one important policy dimension at a time (Carmines and Stimson 1989;

Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Miller and Schofield 2003; Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1983). If parties divide along economic issues, then they will be indistinguishable on issues of social welfare or vice-versa. Historically, Republican and Democratic parties were divided along the economic policy dimension, but now appear to be aligning on economic issues while cleaving along racial and other social issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). According to Miller and Schofield (2003), the recent shift toward social issue cleavage is actually a realignment that is now dividing parties along dimensions similar to those seen in the late nineteenth century.

Not all scholars agree with the contention that parties only cleave along one significant policy dimension at a time. Some suggest that parties are now diverging along a single ideological dimension (liberal-conservative) that cuts across all policy dimensions (Abramowitz et al. 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Putz 2002; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004; Schreckhise and Shields 2003). Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) offer the theory of “ideological realignment” to explain the shift in party loyalties that is visible in the 1990s as a result of the two political parties becoming more ideologically polarized. As the parties become more ideologically distinct, citizens were better able to align their policy preferences with their party identification (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Ideological realignment can be seen at both the party elite (elected official) level (Fleisher and Bond 2004; Poole and Daniels 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 1984a; Rohde 1991) and at the electorate level (Abramowitz 1994; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Bartels 2000; Hetherington 2001).

This is a departure from the conflict displacement theory in so much as parties are now growing polarized on more than a single set of issues. But, the theory of ideological realignment, as Layman points out, may oversimplify the complexity of recent shifts in polarization (Layman and Carsey 2002; Layman et al. 2006). According to Layman and his coauthors, the theoretical tools provided by the ideological perspective are ill-equipped to apprehend the complexity of increasing polarization on every policy dimension. Layman and others now advance the theory of “conflict extension” to address the additional complexity in polarization that is now evident in racial attitudes, cultural issues, and religious affiliations. Conflict extension suggests that new party conflicts are not supplanting old disputes as conflict displacement theorists suggest. Rather, “party conflict has *extended* from older issues to newer issues” (authors’ italics) (Layman et al. 2006, p. 87).

Out of the framework of conflict displacement, ideological realignment, and conflict extension, a rapidly expanding body of literature arises to explain the drivers of party polarization. The two most commonly offered sets of explanations involve either electoral realignments or structural changes in the legislature. The general electoral realignment explanations examine redistricting processes that have created more homogeneous voting blocks (Bond et al. 2003; Carson et al. 2004), while more detailed explanations often focus on the realignment of southern districts resulting in the gradual elimination of Southern conservative Democratic seats (Carson et al. 2004; Fleisher and Bond 2004; Lublin and Voss 2000; Nadeau and Stanley 1993; Theriault 2003). The structural change explanations attribute increases in polarization to increasing numbers of strongly ideological party leaders (Roberts and Smith 2003), increasingly restrictive congressional rules that constrain moderates (Sinclair 2000), and control over congressional resources (Snyder and Groseclose 2000).

Disagreement arises over the precise role that elected officials (party elites) play in driving polarization into the electorate, but most agree that elite-level decisions precede as well as play a critical role in shaping the public opinion (Bartels 2000; Brewer 2005; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Hetherington 2001; Page 1987; Zaller 1992). Yet, the pace of this influence and the scope of the issues that appear to be influenced by the elite polarization are still disputed

(Abramowitz 1994; Hetherington 2001; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Carmines and Stimson (1989) offer up the model of “issue evolution” to explain partisan change with respect to racial issues through the twentieth century. This argument maintains that issue evolution is a long-term process that develops gradually over time. The causal direction of influence in this model runs from elites to the electorate.

Out of the difficulties arising with the issue evolution model, issue evolution proponents and others are now finding that the causal linkage between party elites and electorate policy preferences requires mediating mechanisms. This mediation comes in the form of strongly ideological party activists (Aldrich 1995; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Carmines and Woods 2002; Fiorina 1999; Layman and Carsey 1998; Layman et al. 2005). As Miller and Schofield (2003) discuss, activists are often more committed to preserving the ideology of the party than to getting the party elected (Miller and Schofield 2003), which may have the effect of polarizing elites who need the support of party activists to win elections (Layman et al. 2006). Carmines and Stimson (1989) find that party activists effectively mediated a shift on racial issues through the late twentieth century. In a related study, Carmines and Woods (2002) heed Adams’ (1997) call for investigation into the process of party activist mediation of abortion issue positions. The authors find that the policy preferences of activists shifted earlier and to a greater extent than those of the general electorate.

The issue of elite vs. mass polarization still bedevils scholars addressing this issue. Hunter et al. (2006) has himself argued that his theory was never meant to imply a mass polarization in opinion per se, but rather, was meant to get at a deeper, culturally rooted polarization that manifests itself in many ways. Under this view, elites and the institutions they inhabit are responsible for producing a polarized public discourse. In this way, ideologues create a polarized cultural landscape where those in the middle must contend with polarization at the ballot box, in the media, and among elites in other institutions (religion, universities).

The most persistent critic of the polarization thesis has been Morris Fiorina. While conceding that political elites have become more polarized, Fiorina and colleagues, in a series of articles and books (Fiorina et al. 2005; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina et al. 2003) have denied polarization in the opinions and voter choices of the wider electorate (for the most recent pro-polarization view, see Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). In addition to pointing to the earlier sociological critiques of Hunter’s culture war thesis (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Evans 2003), they point to evidence suggesting no clear movement in political ideology (running from liberal to conservative) among Americans from the 1970s to 2006 in GSS, ANES, and Gallup surveys (Fiorina and Abrams 2008, pp. 571–2). Closer to our concern with voting choice, they point out that what might appear to be evidence of polarization, such as 2004 figures reporting 90% of Democrats voted for John Kerry while 90% of Republicans voted for George Bush, may in fact say more about the candidates than those that voted for them. In other words, the polarization literature typically does not measure how the positions of the candidates may polarize voter choices even when the ideologies of the voters themselves do not evidence such a divergence.

Instead, Fiorina and colleagues have argued that there is simply a process of partisan sorting going on, which involves voters aligning themselves in accord with the increasingly bright-line positions of political elites and parties (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). This “sorting” does not qualify as polarization, in their view, because it does not involve voters becoming more extreme in their views; rather, it involves the decline of cross-cutting cleavages across political issues as “the overall population shows little or no change [but] subpopulations...sort themselves out in ways that heighten their differences” (p. 578; see also Brewer and Stonecash 2007, pp. 182–3 and Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).

CONCLUSION

We began this review with the simple claim that elections are the lynchpins of democracy and questions concerning who votes and who voters vote for (and why) are central to any understanding of elections. The literatures on voter turnout and choice are as varied as they are vast, but our selective reading suggests some especially important areas of promise.

With respect to voter turnout studies, as we have suggested above, the most recent innovative work has examined where individuals and institutions meet organizations, social networks, and identities. Even rational choice approaches are becoming much more social in their efforts to understand the rational calculus of voting. Where new statistical techniques and mixed models are creating greater opportunities for cross-level inference, scholars are developing new understandings of the intermediate level social mechanisms which get people to or keep people from the polls. On the other hand, in our increasingly mobile and multicultural societies, more work needs to be done to understand the political fate of new entrants and new citizens that are challenging our notions of democracy and who “the people” in a democracy are. We are only beginning to understand the ways in which variations in the national, institutional settings interact with the identities and organizational capacities of the migrants (Bloemrad 2006; Hayduk 2006; Wolbrecht and Hero 2005).

With respect to studies of voter choice, we have suggested that longstanding schools of thought centered on the social cleavage, social psychological, and economic bases of voting continue to guide research in this area. Moreover, claims that social cleavages are declining as a basis for voting, that the social psychological approach is no longer relevant, or that culture is displacing the economic or class considerations of voters, have all been vigorously contested on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that these theoretical, empirical, and disciplinary distinctions are breaking down as researchers attempt to forge more synthetic and comprehensive approaches to understanding voter choice. Most obviously, we see this in the election cycle studies of political scientists, which eclectically draw from all three research traditions (e.g., Abramson et al. 2007). It is also evident in research that suggests ways in which class and culture might interact (rather than conflict) in shaping voting (Weakliem 2001; Achterberg and Houtman 2006; Brewer and Stonecash 2007). Important recent studies that have tried to reconcile the persistence of class and economic political interests, even when policy outcomes fail to reflect those interests, include Bartels (2008b) and McCarty et al. (2006). Such studies hold the promise of furthering our understanding of the relationship of voting to growing economic inequalities in western societies, especially the United States, and the links between those inequalities and elite, if not mass, political polarization. Yet, other studies are moving beyond the traditional approaches to voter choice by trying to further unpack the voting decision process by much more closely interrogating how voters cope with the huge flows of information that bombards them during an election campaign (Lau and Redlawsk 2006; see Brooks (2006a) for an overview).

Such efforts run the risk of muddying the theoretical clarity and consistency of the old approaches but they also reflect responsiveness to changes in the real-world events and the development and refinement of knowledge and analytical tools necessary to better understand mass political behavior. And yet, in a field where the data points keep coming at regular intervals with each new election, analysts can do no less than continually refine their empirical and theoretical tools and be prepared to gauge change as the voters will it.

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CHAPTER 28

The Politics of Economic Inequality

DAVID BRADY AND BENJAMIN SOSNAUD

One of the more remarkable features of modern society is how much economic inequalities vary across countries and over recent history. For example, the Luxembourg Income Study reveals that the 90th percentile household in Mexico has an income that is about ten times greater than the 10th percentile household.¹ This extreme inequality dwarfs the United States' 90/10 ratio of 5.7 in 2004. Still, inequality in the U.S. dwarfs any other affluent democracy. The United Kingdom had a 90/10 ratio of 4.6 in 1999, and egalitarian countries like Denmark were as low as 2.8 in 2004. Even among seemingly similar former state socialist economies, one cannot help but be struck by the disparities between the Czech Republic with a 90/10 ratio of 2.8 in 1992 and 3.0 in 1996 versus increasingly polarized Russia. Russia's 90/10 ratio was already high at 6.7 in 1992, rose all the way to 9.4 in 1995, before plateauing at 8.4 in 2000. As the political scientist Graeme Robertson remarks, "Russia changed from being Finland into Mexico seemingly overnight." This variation is not simply due to development or industrialization. For if it was, one would not find countries like Taiwan with a 90/10 ratio of 3.8 in 2000, far below the U.S. and U.K.

Social scientists have been interested in this cross-national and historical variation in inequality since at least the nineteenth century. Marx, Weber, Adam Smith and many others devoted attention to why inequality rose with industrialization, and how and/or if anything could be done to address it. Within sociology, one can point to the influential work of scholars like Gerhard Lenski (1984). Yet, it may be only in the last 15 or so years that sociologists and other social scientists have truly begun to produce a field of inquiry on this issue. A host of studies have sought to explain differences among affluent democracies, trends in inequality with development, and global inequalities of between and within country trends.² Scholars have compared inequality across countries, across cities, provinces and regions, across history,

¹For these figures, see the Luxembourg Income Study (<http://www.lisproject.org/php/kf/kf.php>).

²Several sociologists have claimed that their discipline has been slow to address rising inequality. Morris and Western (1999: 649, 624) write: "[S]ociology ignored these trends" and "If you had been reading only the flagship journals in sociology, you probably would not know about these trends. Sociologists have been strangely and remarkably silent on this issue." Also, Neckerman and Torche (2007) write, "sociologists have been relatively slow to take up the study of inequality." Perhaps, however, this claim of neglect has been rectified since Morris and Western's review. In addition to the tradition of scholarship following Lenski, there actually has been a nontrivial sociological literature on these questions (reviewed in this chapter).

and pooled historical and spatial variations as well. In this fast moving field, we have reached a point where social scientists actually know a fair amount about what is associated with temporal and cross-national variations in inequality.

This chapter reviews the social sciences on the political sources of inequality. Although we begin by acknowledging important alternative sources of inequality, we concentrate this chapter on political sources. Moreover, although gender and race inequalities deserve to be examined on their own, it is our charge to focus on economic inequalities (although we discuss how race and gender are linked to economic inequalities). Our review has seven sections. First, we take stock of the contributions and limitations of power resources theory. Second, we discuss the political actors that have been linked with inequality. Third, we examine political institutions. Fourth, we consider how politics and welfare states interact to influence inequality. Fifth, we consider the popular discourse of “redistribution” and how this might actually constrain this field of research. Finally, we discuss a few general directions for future research and conclude. Before proceeding, however, we lay out two major orienting concerns.

ORIENTING CONCERNS

Primarily, we seek to highlight political explanations of variations in inequality. In turn, we acknowledge that even within sociology, the prevailing approach to understanding inequality (at least economic inequality) tends to eschew politics and concentrate on demographic and economic sources. This approach has been greatly influenced by Kuznets' (1953) theory that inequality follows an inverted-U shape with economic development, rising in initial stages of industrialization and declining with subsequent development (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Lenski 1984). This “society-developmental” approach focused on the dualism between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as development progresses, and changes in the family and population that result from the related demographic transition (Brady and Leicht 2008). Harrison and Bluestone (1988) demonstrate that in the latest stages of advanced capitalism, inequality rises again, demonstrating a Great U-turn with deindustrialization and globalization (Bluestone and Harrison 2000). This tradition implicitly seems to suggest that inequality patterns are mainly shaped by a set of economic and demographic antecedents. If a country experiences deindustrialization or rising single parenthood, inequality mechanically rises. Hence, inequality is a product of how the population is distributed across labor market sectors or vulnerable family arrangements (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). In particular, we point to Alderson and Nielsen's (1999, 2002) recent research as one of the more compelling examples of the society-developmental tradition. Alderson and Nielsen provide a novel synthesis of Kuznets and Lenski to construct models of inequality across affluent democracies as well as all countries. Their studies also contributed to a wave of research on how globalization affects inequality. Ultimately, however, they conclude that inequality in affluent democracies continues to be driven by sectoral changes like the decay of agricultural and manufacturing employment, and the rise of female labor force participation.

Upon consideration of the substantial contributions of this society-developmental tradition, one could conclude that cross-national and historical variations in inequality have little to do with politics. Our review aims to counter that impression (Brady 2009; Fischer et al. 1996; Hout et al. 1996; Tilly 1998), and in the process contribute to an alternative to the society-developmental tradition. This is partly because even the best society-developmental explanations cannot fully explain many of the important facts of the variations in inequality. This is also partly because of the mounting contributions of studies demonstrating the political

sources of inequality. The literature has accumulated such that it would be difficult for even the most ardent society-developmentalists to dismiss. Rather than seeking to explicitly critique the society-developmental tradition, however, we review the evidence for political effects.

Secondly, we lay out three premises of our review – premises which partly reflect our motivation to highlight political sources of inequality. Our review is informed by the belief, first, that scholars should not assume that economic inequality is an automatic or mechanical outcome of demographic and technological change. Even the most tightly coupled demographic correlates of rising inequality – like single parenthood – do not deterministically shape inequality as their association is actually rather weak in some affluent democracies. Relatedly, after much research on inequality in recent years, there appear to be some clear limitations to Lenski's classic claim that technology and human nature are the original causes of inequality. Second, we hold the view that scholars should not assume that any translations automatically occur from economic structure to political behavior. One cannot simply read politics from the supposedly objective economic interests of locations in the labor market. Though few contemporary sociologists subscribe to the view, it is noteworthy that one often finds this simplistic account in studies of how economics influence politics (e.g., the rarely supported but widely cited Meltzer-Richard theorem). Third, we emphasize that politics takes a wide variety of forms and takes place in a wide variety of arenas (states, workplaces, communities, international institutions, etc.). Many kinds of political power exist (ideological, office-holding, bureaucratic administration, legislative, enforcement and under-enforcement) and there are many kinds of collective action and institutions. Thus, a broad perspective on what constitutes politics is most useful for seeking to understand how politics influences inequalities.

POWER RESOURCES THEORY

One of the core theories within the study of the politics of economic inequality is power resources theory. Though power resources theory is mostly known as a theory of the welfare state, it offers a general explanation for the politics of the distribution of economic resources in advanced capitalist democracies (Hicks 1999; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). This theory provides a compelling narrative of how the working class can mobilize to overcome the power of business in order to expand the welfare state. Power resources theory begins with the realistic premise that political power is unequally distributed in a capitalist democracy. Business, owners, and managers have far more power because they control the means of production. Because business possesses greater wealth, it also has more resources to deploy in politics. Metaphorically, business can be thought of as an iceberg – where the majority of its power lurks below the surface, and does not need to be visible to present a threat. At any time, business can create economic instability, which undermines the parties holding office, and can therefore influence elections. Business can also flex its muscles in the political arena by deploying resources strategically to tilt elections in their favor. Business does not need to always exert power in these ways, since everyone knows they have it. The threat, coupled with a business-friendly ideology common in affluent democracies – something business actively cultivates – is sufficient to structurally constrain the state and ensure and legitimate business-friendly policy (Block 1987). As a result, the default organization of markets becomes favorable for business, which enables the exploitation and economic insecurity of workers. Business has an interest in maintaining this default organization, and so exerts its influence for a minimalist welfare state and low levels of government regulation. Of course, business is often supportive of government intervention to enhance profits and facilitate opportunities and subsidies. But, this is ignored

when business advocates a broad free-market orientation for workers. In this default position, the working-class and the poor have very little political power.

To alter the distribution of economic resources, the working-class and poor must bond together and attract some of the middle class. Then, this bonding can be mobilized into class-based political action in the workplace and in elections. As Huber and Stephens (2001: 17) explain, “The struggle over welfare states is a struggle over distribution, and thus the organizational power of those standing to benefit from redistribution, the working and lower middle classes, is crucial.” Workers can strike and interrupt the ability of business to make profits. Moreover, the working-class and poor allied with parts of the middle-class can form and support Leftist political parties. Although labor unions are the immediate manifestation of working class mobilization, Huber and Stephens (2001: 17) emphasize that, “political parties perform [the] crucial mediating role.” When in office, these parties can push for an expansion of the welfare state to protect workers and the poor and guard against the economic insecurity that is inherent in capitalism. As Korpi (1983: 187) summarizes: “The variations in the differences between these two basic types of power resources – control over the means of production and the organization of wage-earners into unions and political parties – are thus assumed to be of major importance for the distributive processes in capitalist democracies and for their final result; the extent of inequality.” Thus, collective political actors representing the working-class pressure the state in order to expand social policy.

At least since the 1970s, power resources theory has been the leading theory of the welfare state and made deep contributions to the study of the politics of inequality. Indeed, the conventional wisdom in sociology and political science on how politics might shape inequality basically reflects power resources theory. However, despite its lasting and significant contributions, three major criticisms of power resources theory have emerged.

One criticism of power resources theory is that it overemphasizes the material interests of the working class and, in turn, underappreciates ideology. Indeed, underlying power resources theory is a materialist interest-based rational choice explanation (Korpi 1985). The interests of business lead to profit-seeking and exploitation of workers. In the state, business is interested in free markets and minimal protections for workers. The interests of the working class and poor are viewed as translating directly into Leftist politics. While there is room in power resources theory for questions of how and why the working class becomes mobilized, power resources theory presumes that workers act in their rational economic interests to support welfare state expansion, and business acts in its interest to oppose redistribution.

To be certain, the working class and business often have divergent interests. However, ideology may be equally as important as interest in accounting for political support for a generous welfare state and reduced inequality (Steenland 2006). For example, Brooks and Manza (2007) show that mass policy preferences – public opinion regarding social policy and egalitarianism – substantially influence welfare state generosity. Deeply embedded in national values are stable norms about welfare states, and there are national differences that cannot be accounted for by the class distribution. The rich literature on class voting shows that there is still a great deal of class voting: the poor and less educated are often more likely to vote Leftist and managers and high income people are more likely to vote Rightist (Manza and Brooks 1999). But, the relationship is far from deterministic. The working class and poor often do not vote even though doing so is in their interest. When they vote, a sizable minority vote for parties opposed to welfare generosity. Indeed, there is persuasive evidence that white working class men in the U.S. have been far more likely to vote Republican since 1996 (Brady et al. 2009). Moreover, professionals are one of the most supportive classes of Leftist parties, and since professionals tend to be affluent, voting Leftist is against their strict economic interest

(Manza and Brooks 1999). So, one cannot simply read party preferences from the economic interests of class locations. Ideology has a similarly large role to play in explaining vote choice, even though there is a relationship between income and voting (Brooks and Brady 1999).

A second criticism of power resources theory is that it does not sufficiently incorporate the path dependency of welfare politics. Power resources theory presents a picture of an iterative game where politics involves separate negotiations at each election.³ Though there is little dispute about the stability of cross-national differences between generous and minimalist welfare states, power resources theory implies that each election presents a chance for welfare states to expand or contract. It is almost as if each election was a new negotiation between the power resources of capital and labor. Indeed, Korpi and Palme (2003) have recently argued that the decline of Leftist class politics has led to substantial welfare state cutbacks in Europe. Social policies have purportedly been retrenched as working class political organizations have declined. However, the claim that the welfare state has actually declined in affluent democracies is quite controversial. There is at least as much evidence for stability (Brady et al. 2005). In contrast to the portrayal of an iterative game, many have argued that welfare state politics are better characterized as path dependent (Pierson 2004). Welfare state and inequality politics are deeply institutionalized and past political conflict and settlements feed back into contemporary politics (Pierson 2001).⁴ Indeed, welfare politics are influenced by the rules of the electoral arena, bureaucratic inertia, previous historical settlements, and importantly, each country's normative commitment to egalitarianism. Welfare politics may be more about habit than an iterative game of struggle and conflict with each election. Relatedly, welfare politics is as much about constituencies of welfare beneficiaries as it is class politics these days. As Brady and colleagues (2005) show, the size of the elderly population has as large of a positive effect on welfare generosity as unionization or Leftist parties. This is not to suggest, as some "new politics of the welfare state" scholars do, that parties have become irrelevant. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that power resources theory under-appreciates the new bases and coalitions that support welfare generosity and Leftist parties (including the elderly, constituencies of beneficiaries, etc.), because it is so focused on the bygone era of old bases and coalitions of workers (Myles and Pierson 2001).⁵

Finally, perhaps the most vocal criticism of power resources theory is that it marginalizes race and gender (Orloff 1993; Quadagno 1994). Because it centers its argument on class politics, race and gender hierarchies often get little attention. As any observer of the welfare and poverty politics in the U.S. would attest, race and gender are probably quite relevant to the failure to accomplish more generous social policies. For example, Quadagno (1994) persuasively documents how profoundly racial divisions and the exclusion of women and minorities shaped assistance to the poor, single mothers, the elderly, and the disabled. In a compelling study, Gilens (1999) demonstrates that much of the American reluctance to support welfare

³Korpi (1989: 313) writes that power resources theory offers, "a game theoretical perspective on the analysis of interdependent actors." See also Korpi (1985); van den Berg and Janoski (2005).

⁴On balance, power resources theory often considered institutions and settlements from past negotiations. Korpi (1985: 38) wrote, "The power resources approach, leads us to view societal institutions largely as the residues of previous activations of power resources, often in the context of manifest conflicts which for the time being have been settled through various types of compromises." But, such institutions were always very secondary to the manifest class conflict that primarily drives welfare politics.

⁵Relatedly, power resources theory presents a rather romantic image of civil society. One of the central factors in power resources theory has always been the ability of workers to disrupt production through strikes. Yet, strikes are few, far between and ineffectual in many contemporary affluent democracies (Rosenfeld 2006a).

and help the poor can be explained by a deep animosity towards racial minorities. In one analysis, Gilens shows that survey attitudes about helping the poor significantly depend on whether the survey vignette features a Black or White poor person. Given the cumulative contributions of such scholars, it has become difficult to argue that class is the dominant source of welfare states. Gender and race may be equally salient to the politics of welfare generosity and inequality. By remaining centralized on class, power resources theory likely presents an incomplete account.

To address this third criticism, scholars have begun to incorporate race and gender both as causes and effects of the welfare state. Although the motivation for this literature has often come from the puzzle of American exceptionalism, there has been growing interest in these themes cross-nationally as well. First, race inequalities may prevent the class-based political mobilization envisioned by power resources theory (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). It has long been presumed that one basis for social democratic coalitions was the ethnic homogeneity of small northern European countries. Perhaps ethnic heterogeneity inhibits the formation of the class-based solidarity that is essential in power resources theory (Hechter 2004).⁶ Second, gender mobilization may act in concert with class mobilization to facilitate more generous welfare states. Several scholars have highlighted gender power resources as similarly potent to the expansion of the welfare state along with class-based power resources (Misra 2002). Third, even though some welfare states may appear more economically egalitarian, the consequences for women, ethnic minorities and immigrants are less clear. Rather than examining poverty or inequality overall, it may prove valuable to also investigate the feminization of poverty (Brady and Kall 2008), how welfare states may actually inhibit gender equality (Mandel and Semyonov 2005), and the “outsiders” to generous welfare states (Rueda 2005).

Power resources theory has not stood still in the face of these criticisms and there have been several cogent revisions and modifications. One of the more compelling revisions is Huber and Stephens’ (2001) power constellations approach. In their account, Huber and Stephens incorporate institutional factors like veto points (electoral rules, legislative systems, etc.), the historical path dependent influence of political parties, the impact of constituencies of beneficiaries in “ratcheting” up welfare programs, and gender power resources. They develop a synthetic model of welfare state variation that integrates the variables of many competing explanations. Moreover, those scholars link welfare states and production regimes to explain poverty and inequality. At the same time, Huber and Stephens maintain power resources theory’s interest in working class politics.

Ultimately, power resources has had a sort of paradigmatic centrality in the study of welfare states and the politics of inequality. On one hand, that centrality is justly deserved. The pioneering contributions of these scholars since the late 1970s catalyzed a great deal of research and made many salient contributions to our understanding of the politics of inequality. On the other hand, the criticisms of power resources theory have substantial merit. At the very least, research in this area must take the three criticisms seriously. Thus, we suggest a balancing act for scholars of the politics of inequality. We should continue to recognize the value of power resources theory to how we explain inequality, but we should also move with urgency to incorporate and address its limitations.

⁶Of course, one problem with this argument is the presence of welfare states that are clearly more generous than the U.S. despite having at least as much ethnically heterogeneity and immigration as the U.S. (e.g. Australia, Canada, Luxembourg, Switzerland, etc.) (Brady 2007).

POLITICAL ACTORS

Perhaps the most straight-forward way to show how politics influence inequality is to identify key political actors that have been associated with variation in inequality. Although a few key individuals can on rare occasions have great influence on inequality, most of the politics of inequality is driven by collective actors.⁷ Only collective actors have the costly resources to leverage power over other actors in the national political arena. Collective political actors need to maintain a constant presence in national capitols, be able to monitor often fine-grained information about policy, communicate to diverse constituents and supporters, and be able to threaten to or actually challenge the power of office-holders and elites (Knoke et al. 1996). Moreover, collective political actors need to be embedded in networks of other collective actors and use this embeddedness for influence. By collective actors, we have in mind a broad set of actors besides just interest groups. Sometimes the collective actors driving the politics of inequality are not officially an association or group (e.g., in the political influence of “business”), and thus, interest groups are but one type of collective actors.

Political actors can have direct and indirect effects on inequality. Thus, borrowing from Link and Phelan’s (1995) influential work in medical sociology, we can think of political actors as “fundamental causes” of inequality.⁸ Political actors embody the power relations that determine policies influencing inequality, and affect inequality through multiple mechanisms including some beyond policies. Political actors may maintain an association with inequality even given changes in policies and/or net of policies (e.g., the effect of unions on wage inequality during different government administrations or policy regimes). In short, political actors can influence inequality directly or indirectly by shaping policies (see below) that influence inequality. Finally, it is worth noting that political actors can matter both in terms of capacity and mobilization, and both inside formal political arenas and through informal dissensus politics.

Several scholars have identified political parties as key actors shaping inequality. The most well-established finding has been that leftist parties contribute to generous social policies (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Brady et al. 2005; Hicks 1999; Korpi 1983; Korpi and Palme 2003; Sassoon 1996) and lessened inequality (Huber and Stephens 2001). Leftist parties define the social rights of citizenship to guarantee economic security for a broader share of the population and to institutionalize egalitarianism. Scholars have specifically linked leftist party power with reduced income inequality (Mahler 2004; Korpi and Palme 1998), poverty (Brady 2003; Moller et al. 2003), working conditions (Burgoon and Baxandall 2004), earnings inequality (Pontusson 2005; Rueda and Pontusson 2000), and wages (Western and Healy 1999). Extending beyond the affluent democracies, Huber and colleagues (2006) show that a left-leaning legislative partisan balance is associated with lower inequality in Latin America since 1970.

Some have also called attention to the inequality consequences of non-Leftist parties. Bradley and colleagues (2003) have shown that Christian Democratic parties also trigger greater redistribution across affluent democracies. Perhaps rising inequality has been driven by the ascent of market fundamentalist and neoliberal ideology (Harvey 2007).

⁷Among the individuals shown to have substantial effects are particularly effective politicians, social movement leaders, and policy intellectuals that act as institutional entrepreneurs in delivering social change (e.g. Amenta 1998).

⁸Link and Phelan explain that the fundamental causes of disease – like class – should get more attention than proximate risk factors. They explain that even if interventions reduce risk factors, the fundamental cause will find a new risk factor to trigger inequalities in disease. See also Lieberman’s (1985) “basic” cause.

Right parties have ushered in a program of monetarism, privatization and free markets and have at least attempted to dismantle welfare states, labor unions and social democracy. A few suggestively link conservative regimes, right parties and inequality (Lo and Schwartz 1998; Mahler et al. 1999; Navarro and Shi 2001; Sassoon 1996). Brady and Leicht (2008) demonstrate that the cumulative power of rightist parties since World War II is a powerful influence on income inequality in affluent democracies. They show that the effects of right parties might even be larger than the effects of leftist parties and labor unions, especially for the gap between the affluent and middle class. They also explain that the rise of rightist parties has probably contributed to the Great U-Turn of increased inequality since the 1970s. There is accumulating evidence linking right parties with less progressive taxation, reductions in welfare transfers to the poor and the vulnerable, and the privatization of welfare programs (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Amenta 1998; Blyth 2002; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Zylan and Soule 2000) – all policies that plausibly could influence inequality.

Beyond legislation, parties can also indirectly influence inequality through the appointment and control of administrative officials that vary in the enforcement of law. For example, if parties exert pressure for the enforcement of overtime pay rules, minimum wage laws, and the right to collectively bargain and organize unions, this could trickle down to inequality (Voss and Fantasia 2004). Plausibly, the policies enacted by leftist parties could lose potency due to the administrative neglect of rightist governments. Right parties often revise and weaken regulations that protect workers, and make it more difficult to form unions and recruit union members (Brady 2007; Western 1997).

The influence of parties on unionization efforts speaks to a second key collective actor influencing inequality: labor unions. Where unions have high membership levels, the earnings distribution is compressed (Mares 2004; Moene and Wallerstein 1995; Mosher 2007; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Wallace et al. 1999; Wallerstein 1999) and average wages tend to be higher (Freeman 1999; Kalleberg et al. 1981; Leicht 1989; Leicht et al. 1993; Volscho and Fullerton 2005; Western and Healy 1999). Rosenfeld (2006b; also Mosher 2007) demonstrates that the decline of unionization in the U.S. has clearly contributed to rising inequality. Historically, unions could exert influence on inequality by using strikes (Wallace et al. 1999). However, in recent decades and at least in the U.S., the strike has become less potent (Rosenfeld 2006a). Thus, unions may be more likely to influence inequality because of negotiation (especially in institutionalized corporatist arrangements), the control of the supply of competing workers, the protection of the property rights of jobs, and by influencing policies and partisan politics.

One political actor that may influence inequality and is gaining renewed attention is business. In the U.S., business owners and managers overwhelmingly financially support U.S. Republican candidates (Burris 2001). The political activism of business and elites in funding and leading rightist policy formation networks could certainly contribute to rising inequality as well (Domhoff 1998; Jenkins and Eckert 1989; Mills 2000; Mizruchi 1992). By collaborating with and sponsoring rightist parties, business often contributes to policies favoring the top of income and earnings distributions. In contrast to this kind of anti-welfare state politics envisioned by power resources theory, however, there is some recent political science research suggesting that business political action could result in lessened inequality because business supports the welfare state (Hall and Soskice 2001). Swank and Martin (2001) show that business associations often mobilize for welfare state expansion. The view is that business supports the welfare state when labor markets are corporatist, cooperative, and coordinated, and there is a presence of cross-class alliances (Swenson 2002). Although the literature on varieties of capitalism points to configurations of institutions that provide incentives for business to support generous social insurance for example (Hall and Soskice 2001), we urge against

interpreting business politics as supportive of egalitarianism in all contexts (Swenson 2002: 143–144).⁹ As one final dimension of how business might affect inequality, Gordon (1996) offered a unique and novel argument about the growth of and growing power of managers. Gordon called attention to the swelling managerial class, how it creates a bureaucratic burden on firms, and how it contributes to rising earnings inequality and stagnating worker wages. Gordon contends that increases in management are a manifestation of a “stick” strategy – as opposed to a “carrot” strategy – where business disciplines workers into greater productivity.

Two final political actors that could influence inequality are think tanks and intellectual entrepreneurs. Though we suggest that these could be avenues by which business influences inequality, there actually has not been much research linking these to inequality. Perhaps deep changes in how policy makers think about monetarism, free markets and deregulation have had some influence on inequality, and these changes have been at least partly influenced by think tanks and intellectual entrepreneurs (Harvey 2007; Perrucci and Wysong 1999). Certainly, there is evidence that intellectual entrepreneurs and think tanks have had success in constructing Keynesianism and social democracy as in crisis, and framing egalitarianism as detrimental to competitiveness and efficiency (Blyth 2002; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Chwieroth 2007; Harvey 2007; Sassoon 1996). Plausibly, this ideological project creates an environment where calls for egalitarianism have reduced legitimacy and popular appeal. Nevertheless, compared to the evidence for other actors, the influence on inequality needs to be studied more thoroughly.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Beyond collective actors, and often mixed up with collective actors, political institutions can exert substantial influence on inequality. Institutions can be understood as the rules of the game, stable arrangements, legal and regulatory frameworks, and more generally the state and societal infrastructure governing politics and markets (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Fligstein 2001). For our purposes, political institutions include electoral rules and practices, the decentralization of government, and labor market institutions. In recent years, many studies have linked a wide variety of institutions with inequality.

For at least a few decades, there has been an interdisciplinary debate about the consequences of democracy for inequality and well-being. Reviewing many studies, Sen (1999) explains that democracy tends to reduce human suffering, including measures like infant mortality. Sen gives the well-known example that no democracy has ever experienced a famine, and he explains this is because democratic governments are forced to respond to extreme deprivation. There has been some criticisms of the robustness of the link between democracy and infant mortality (Ross 2006), and there is still room for debate. Still, a set of studies has demonstrated that democracy in developing countries contributes to reduced inequality (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Reuveny and Li 2003; Simpson 1993; Waylen 2007). With both well-being and inequality, democracy matters because it engenders governmental responsiveness and thus encourages taxation of the affluent, and public sector spending on services, education and public goods

⁹As an example of such a configuration, business may be more in favor of the welfare state under more regressive taxation. If public social insurance is funded by taxes borne by workers, with only modest employer contributions, and those employer contributions are less costly than private insurance, business might have incentives to support public social insurance because of lower costs in the long run.

(Avelino et al. 2005; Rudra and Haggard 2005). Stasavage (2005), for example, shows that democratization in Africa prompted governments to spend more on primary education. Interestingly, Lee (2005) demonstrates that government spending only reduces inequality (in developed and developing countries) in interaction with democracy. Thus, greater government spending is only likely to really matter in the presence of democratic regime. Huber and colleagues (2006) are able to replicate Lee's finding in Latin America as well. Thus, there seems to be convincing evidence that democracy forces government to be more responsive and spend more on public well-being.

Extending general claims about the power of democracy to trigger egalitarian distributions of resources, several scholars have linked electoral institutions with inequality in affluent democracies. Perhaps echoing the theme in the previous paragraph, one key finding has been that proportional representation (PR) electoral systems produce more egalitarianism than single member district plurality systems (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Beramendi and Anderson 2008; Wilensky 2002). Brady (2009) shows that PR systems generate less poverty than single member district systems. Partly, this is because PR systems directly influence the distribution of income, and partly this is because PR systems favor Leftist political parties. Perhaps the emblematic statement of this is Iversen and Soskice (2006), who demonstrate with both a formal theory and empirical evidence that Leftist parties benefit from PR systems and that Rightist parties benefit from single member district plurality systems. This work on PR systems is convincing, but relative to other areas in the politics of inequality, this work is just building. One underexplored question is how much of the PR effect is related to associated political institutions. For example, PR systems tend to be present where campaigns are shorter and more publicly financed. Yet, we could not locate any studies that examine the effects of systems of private vs. public campaign financing on inequality. This is noteworthy given that business likely has some influence on inequality and can probably exert this influence more in privately financed campaign systems.

Because democracy and electoral systems influence inequality, it may not be surprising that the actual turnout of voters is consequential. Where voter turnout is higher, poverty tends to be lower (Brady 2003). Again, this tends to be tied up with other Leftist institutions like Leftist parties and PR systems. The egalitarian effects of turnout could be because the increased turnout draws more economically and educationally disadvantaged segments of the population into the electorate. Perhaps, increased turnout and greater political representation are linked to greater social spending (Ansolabehere et al. 2002). If so, this suggests that the disenfranchisement of marginal groups – for example, the formerly imprisoned – might lead to less egalitarianism because politicians have less obligation to represent and respond to them (Manza and Uggen 2006). Because many affluent democracies experience high voter turnout as a result of legal requirements that all citizens vote, this raises interesting questions for developing countries. In some emergent democracies, voter turnout is often high and legally required. So, for example in Peru where citizens face stiff penalties for failing to vote, it will be interesting to see if that country's recent turn towards democratization leads to more egalitarian development.

In recent years, political scientists and political sociologists have called attention to regional dynamics, both within and between nation-states. This work is quite new, but the early research suggests that there are important political influences on inequality embedded in various regionalisms. Within nation-states, there is some evidence that greater federalism and decentralization contributes to heightened inequality (Beramendi and Anderson 2008). In the U.S., for example, the recent devolution of social policy to states has led to greater stratification in benefits and eligibility requirements (Fellowes and Rowe 2004). As was the case in the history of U.S. social policy (Amenta 1998; Quadagno 1994), it is fairly clear that the

more decentralization there is, the greater the exclusion of some groups from the full benefits of citizenship. Across nation-states, the regional integration of countries into supranational entities also has consequences for inequality. For example, Beckfield (2006) demonstrates that the entry and participation in the European Union (EU) led to greater income inequality within member states. Beckfield argues that this is because the EU encouraged fiscal austerity and the enactment of global scripts of neoliberalism (Campbell and Pedersen 2001).

The final institution worth discussing is perhaps one of the most well-studied institutions. There has been a vibrant literature, especially in political science, on how labor market institutions like wage centralization, corporatism, and unionization affect earnings and inequality (Beramendi and Anderson 2008; Mares 2004; Moene and Wallerstein 1995; Oskarsson 2005; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Western and Healy 1999). The vibrancy of this literature reflects the longstanding interest in how some (especially European) countries are distinctly cooperative and corporatist in the organization of labor markets, combined with the aforementioned interest in how unionization affects inequality (see Hall and Soskice 2001; Korpi 1983; Wilensky 2002). These more corporatist labor markets are focused more on long-term stability of firms, and tend to compress the earnings distribution and ensure greater job security for workers. For example, Wallerstein (1999) concludes that labor market institutions, especially labor market centralization as well as unions, are the most important predictors of earnings inequality across affluent democracies. Pontusson (2005) traces the differences in inequality between Europe and the U.S. to a combination of politics and labor market institutions. Blau and Kahn (2002) and others have suggested that there are tradeoffs to these more egalitarian corporatist labor markets, including a lessened ability to generate new jobs and facilitate the entry into the labor market for young workers. Yet, the debate often seems to depend on how one measures labor market performance and what is defined as a labor market institution. For example, Western and Beckett (1999) challenged the assumption that the U.S. had lower unemployment than Western Europe by demonstrating that this is partly due to the dramatically higher rates of imprisonment in the U.S. (where millions of less employable workers are “removed” from the labor market).

POLITICS, POLICIES AND WELFARE STATES

The influence of policies and welfare states on inequality has long been a central concern for scholars of politics (Wilensky 2002). For the past several decades, there has been a vigorous debate about how to measure the welfare state. Since at least Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) influential criticism of general spending measures, there has been a lot of enthusiasm for nuanced measures of the welfare state focused on the *quality* of welfare programs instead of the *quantity* of welfare effort.¹⁰ By the late 1990s, most welfare state scholars considered it inadequate to examine general spending measures, and many advocated for measures similar to his decommodification index. For example, Korpi and colleagues used an index of the social rights of citizenship (see Korpi and Palme 2003).¹¹ Several scholars advocated for measures of social wages: the amount of income a worker would receive if one were to stop working and rely solely on the state (e.g., Freeman 1999). Recently, Allan and Scruggs (2004)

¹⁰These critiques went hand in hand with Korpi and Palme’s (1998) contention that “encompassing” welfare states that uphold social citizenship rights for all universally – as opposed to those that guarantee basic economic security for those at the bottom – were more successful at reducing poverty.

¹¹Unfortunately, their measure has never been publicly available, so scholars have been unable to replicate the analyses of Korpi and his collaborators.

have recreated and extended Esping-Andersen's original decommodification index and provided publicly available data for affluent democracies over time.

In addition to focusing our attention on the qualities of welfare states, Esping-Andersen (1990) made a fundamental contribution by calling attention to the three different types of welfare states or what he called liberal, conservative and socialist regimes.¹² These regimes represent the genetic historical legacies of social policy development and the state's particular institutionalized tradition of intervention into the market. The liberal regime is epitomized by the U.S. and typically includes Ireland, Australia, Canada and the U.K. This regime is based on free market and individualistic ideology; and involves means-tested benefits targeted at the poor's basic security. The best example of the conservative regime is Germany and other examples include Switzerland, Austria and France. This regime emphasizes social insurance (for unemployment, sickness and old age), especially for male breadwinners and their families. This regime developed during authoritarianism, and reflects a tradition of corporatism, Catholicism, and familism. The Scandinavian countries more or less make up the socialist regime. This regime features universal welfare programs guaranteed to all citizens; extensive public employment systems; and generous family leave policies. With their near complete unionization and female labor force participation, socialist regimes are uniquely collectivist and egalitarian.

While substantial progress has clearly been made in this field, Esping-Andersen's conception of welfare regimes is not without limitations (Brady 2009). The literature has followed Esping-Andersen and assumed three things: (a) decommodification-based measures are more valid than welfare effort measures¹³; (b) regimes supposedly reflect core differences in the institutionalization of equality that *cannot* be captured by simply analyzing the quantitative levels of welfare effort;¹⁴ and (c) social policies are expected to have different effects across the three regimes.¹⁵ The problem is that there has never been much evidence to support these assumptions. Indeed, Brady (2005, 2009) shows with analyses of poverty that all three assumptions may be wrong (but see Beramendi and Andersen 2008; Scruggs and Allan 2006). In the area of gender inequality, there is rather convincing evidence that Esping-Andersen's claims are inappropriate (Misra 2002; Orloff 1993). Thus, it remains an open question (and may even be dubious) as to whether decommodification-based measures have greater predictive validity than the old-fashioned welfare effort measures. Moreover, rather than asserting the essential need for typologies of states, it would be more appropriate for scholars to actually provide evidence that these typologies enhance our explanations of poverty and inequality.

Beyond the debates about Esping-Andersen, one could list all social policy analyses as somehow assessing the political sources of inequality. In the interests of brevity, we simply

¹²The literature has experienced a proliferation of typologies, and also refers to institutional clusters and systems. Korpi and Palme (1998) divide countries along a targeting versus universalism continuum. Huber and Stephens (2001) break welfare states into the social democratic, Christian-democratic, Mediterranean, Antipodean, and liberal types. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that countries can be collapsed into coordinated and liberal market economies. Even before these typologies, there were classic distinctions between residual and institutionalized welfare states, or civil, political and social rights (Wilensky 2002).

¹³Esping-Andersen (1990: 2, 19, 58) specifically wrote: "The existence of a social program and the amount of money spent on it may be less important than what it does;" "Expenditures are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states;" and, "Welfare states may be equally large or comprehensive, but with entirely different effects on social structure."

¹⁴Hicks and Esping-Andersen (2005: 511–512) summarize this prevailing view: "The sociological conceptualization of welfare states is now dominated by the idea of distinct real-world models, thus rejecting the notion that they can be compared simply along a linear dimension – such as social spending levels."

¹⁵Esping-Andersen (1990: 76–77) writes, "It is misleading to compare welfare states as merely 'more' or 'less' egalitarian. We discover, instead, entirely different logics of social stratification embedded in welfare-state construction."

review a few examples of how policy makes inequality an explicitly political outcome (Page and Simmons 2000). For example, several scholars have recently demonstrated that welfare state generosity is one of the most important (if not the most important) influences on cross-national variation in poverty and inequality (Bradley et al. 2003; Brady 2005, 2009; Brady and Kall 2008; DeFina and Thanawala 2004; Korpi and Palme 1998; Misra et al. 2007; Moller et al. 2003; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). Since cross-national differences in welfare generosity clearly owe a great deal to politics, this literature suggests that poverty and inequality are deeply influenced by politics. With the global advance of neoliberalism, political scholars have noticed that the cutbacks to government programs and the privatization of social services have had clear inequality effects (Lobao and Hooks 2003). A few studies have examined how dimensions of neoliberalism and market transition undermine the possibilities for upward mobility (Gerber and Hout 2004; Parrado 2005). Several others examine how inequality is affected by components of the welfare state (including specific programs like unemployment or pensions, Gangl 2006), taxation (Block and Manza 1997); government-sponsored or -mandated maternity leave and childcare programs (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2005; Pettit and Hook 2005), and the state as public employer (Gornick and Jacobs 1998). Indeed, recent innovations in cross-nationally comparable micro-level data have greatly advanced the study of how different policy contexts explain varied dimensions of inequality.

Although research on policy effects on inequality has cumulatively demonstrated the political nature of inequality, there is at least one way in which research in this area could advance. Probably even more attention could be directed to how the regulatory state, and not just the welfare state, shapes inequality. Certainly, the state shapes what is permitted for how people earn incomes, how families are allowed to save and keep that income, and how business is allowed to allocate compensation to employees, managers and owners. Yet, these dimensions of the state remain relatively understudied. For example, compared to research on social policy, there is relatively little work by sociologists and political scientists on the effect of minimum wages (Beramendi and Andersen 2008; Volscho 2005). One productive line of research on the regulatory state has been the recent attention paid to how imprisonment shapes inequality. Western (2007) and others have shown that the massive rise in U.S. imprisonment has significantly contributed to racial differences in employment and earnings. Two other understudied dimensions of the regulatory state include affirmative action/equal employment opportunity and immigration. As these two dimensions continue to be highly salient aspects of state policy, their consequences for inequality may actually grow.

REDISTRIBUTION OR DISTRIBUTION?

Research on how policies, politics and inequality could also advance by moving beyond the commonly employed discourse of “redistribution.” Normally, scholars attempt to untangle the consequences of states/policies for income inequality and poverty by simulating the distribution of income *before* taxes and transfers (“pre-fisc”). This conventional approach estimates the value of every household’s income while adding back the value of taxes paid and subtracting the value of transfers. This is supposed to simulate what income would look like before taxes and transfers.¹⁶ Many analysts have extended this logic to calculate pre-fisc poverty rates or

¹⁶This simulated counterfactual is probably most useful when analyzing individual employed adults. As the majority of their income comes from labor market earnings, perhaps it is not unreasonable to estimate what a working adult’s pre-fisc income might have been.

pre-fisc inequality levels for the entire population. Pre-fisc is supposed to represent the private sector or labor market earnings, and “post-fisc” is supposed to incorporate the state. Indeed, it has become conventional to estimate pre-fisc and post-fisc poverty or inequality, and then take the rate of change between the two and call that “redistribution.” Despite its widespread use, there are serious micro-level and macro-level problems with this approach.

On a micro-level, pre-fisc measures are deceptive. The elderly usually have little pre-fisc income in most countries as they often rely on public pensions. Working adults have also gained greatly from state investment. Human capital, an essential factor behind any labor market earnings, is shaped deeply by public investments in education. This clearly affects private labor market earnings, and owners and managers profit from this. Further, vast numbers of working adults are employed in public sector jobs or at private-sector employers who have government grants and contracts. Yet, constructing pre-fisc measures forces analysts to act as if earnings are independent of the state. In reality, no household exists in, and there is no such thing as, a pretax and pretransfer world. Indeed, Bergh (2005) has recently convincingly demonstrated that pre-fisc estimates are biased by the fact that state taxes and transfers actually do impact how much people earn, and whether people work, retire or leave the labor force to care for family.¹⁷ Thus, it is disingenuous to simulate a person’s income before state involvement since the state permeates every individual’s labor market opportunities.

On a macro-level, it is unrealistic to reify these simulations of individual pre-fisc income into national-level estimates of poverty, inequality and redistribution. One of the emerging conclusions of economic sociology is that states and markets inherently constitute each other (Esping-Andersen 2003; Fligstein 2001). States are always involved in the allocation of economic resources to workers, managers and especially owners. States do not simply respond to what markets have initiated; states define and constitute markets.

The state plays a pivotal role in establishing the very possibility of markets through the coercive enforcement of property rights that directly impact on the nature of market-generated distributions. In all sorts of ways the state is involved in regulating aspects of market exchanges and production – from health and safety rules, to credentialing requirements in many labor markets, to labor laws – that impact on the income distribution process. It is therefore misleading to talk about a clear distinction between pure “distribution” of income and a process of politically shaped ‘redistribution’ (Wright 2004: 3–4).

Since the state is *always* involved in the market, there is really no such thing as income *before* the state. All of the private sector has some state influence – even if just by the state protecting the property rights or governing the rules of exchange in the private sector. Markets simply cannot exist prior to the state, as the process of market formation necessitates state formation (Fligstein 2001). Bergh (2005) explains that precisely because people are influenced by the state when earning income, a person’s pre-fisc income is not severable from taxes and transfers. As a result, we cannot estimate what the income distribution would be as if the state does not exist. Ultimately, it is deceptive to define taxes and transfers as

¹⁷ Bergh demonstrates specifically: (a) how welfare states redistribute between individuals and over the life-cycle; (b) the interdependence between pre-fisc incomes and taxes and transfers; (c) the incorrect description of the redistributive effect of social insurance that crowds out market insurance; and (d) how welfare states influence the distribution of earnings through education. People consider their expected taxes and transfers when making decisions about labor market behavior, and this biases pre-fisc estimates.

“re”-distribution and it is unrealistic to calculate what the pre-fisc income distribution would be before the state.¹⁸

Rather than continuing to frame political effects on the income distribution as a question of redistribution, it would be more justified for scholars to call it simply distribution. Consistent with contemporary economic sociology’s view of how states shape markets (Fligstein 2001), politics should be implicated in organizing the distribution of economic resources. Through governing the rules of exchange between workers and owners and managers, or regulating currencies and business, or providing public goods like education and health care, or by facilitating transportation and communication or even simply by creating jobs; the welfare state shapes how much income each household receives. Importantly, framing of redistribution forces us to neglect and obscure how states govern the accumulation of profits and income for the affluent as well as the poor.¹⁹ The imagery of redistribution artificially insinuates that there is a two-step process, where markets naturally distribute income and states only subsequently intervene to redistribute that income. But, no such two-step process exists. States do not simply follow what markets have initiated; states enable and allow markets to happen. Ultimately, we suggest that moving away from discourse of redistribution would be a productive step for scholars of the politics of economic inequality.

DISCUSSION

Our chapter has reviewed the political sources of economic inequality. Our aim has been to document and demonstrate how inequality is not simply the byproduct of economic and demographic developments. Instead, we claim that much economic inequality can be explained by politics. In particular, we highlight the role of political actors, political institutions and policies. In recent years, this area of inquiry has grown substantially, and this is in part due to advances in cross-national and historical data on inequality. Classic accounts, from Kuznets, Lenski and others cannot fully explain all of the macro-level variation in inequality, and there are certainly are many intriguing questions to be addressed.

Throughout the chapter, we have mentioned several remaining questions and areas where greater research is needed. Beyond these specific points, we suggest there are at least two major areas in which future research should be headed.

¹⁸ As a final illustration of these problems, consider the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the U.S. Because the EITC is a tax refund, and pre-fisc is a simulation of one’s income excluding all taxes paid and transfers received, studies treat the EITC in confusing and contradictory ways. The EITC mostly refunds labor market earnings that were taxed. So, it is pre-fisc income, but it is also “post-fisc” as the state gives it back at the end of the year after receiving some paperwork. Also, there is a transfer component of the EITC as it gives more to the bottom of the earnings distribution. Certainly, the majority of EITC recipients are aware of it, and many probably factor it into their labor market behavior. Pre-fisc income may be underestimated because people are being taxed, and alternatively redistribution might be overestimated because they are mostly just getting those pre-fisc earnings back. Very small in previous decades, the EITC has grown into the largest family assistance program in the U.S. As a result, ignoring the EITC severely undermines reliable comparisons of pre-fisc income or redistribution over time. Because the U.S. heavily relies on the EITC to alleviate poverty and other affluent democracies rely more on transfers, international comparisons of pre-fisc income or redistribution are untrustworthy.

¹⁹ Framing all this as distribution may even be consistent with power resources theory. As Korpi (1983: 188) explains, “The intervention of the state in the distributive processes in society is thus not limited to measures directed towards persons with publicly acknowledged needs.”

First, one increasingly influential theme in political sociology and political science is that there are feedback dynamics (Skocpol 1992). Social policies create constituencies of beneficiaries, who in turn, provide political support for specific social policies and welfare states in general (Pierson 2001). For example, the elderly tend to be beneficiaries of public pension systems, and consequently tend to support social policies protecting the poor (Brady et al. 2005). Partly because of these feedback dynamics, welfare states can be said to *institutionalize* equality (Brady 2009). Welfare states are both shaped by and contribute to societies' ideologies. That is, how societies normalize collective expectations about whether various economic distributions are appropriate and just (Brooks and Manza 2007). As a result, welfare policy tends to be highly path dependent, and it is quite difficult to cut welfare programs due to their political popularity.²⁰ One theme in this literature is that universal programs guaranteed as a citizenship right tend to have far more political support than means-tested programs targeted at the vulnerable (Skocpol 1992). This literature has productively informed our understanding of welfare politics, however, we would suggest that the next step to inequality has not been fully explored. Plausibly, scholars could examine how policies shape inequalities through this mechanism of political support. One interesting question would be if universal welfare programs are less likely to contribute to racial/ethnic divisions – which themselves compound socio-economic inequalities (Quadagno 1994). As well, it would be valuable to study the interactions between political actors, political institutions and inequality (see Beramendi and Anderson 2008). Under certain political institutions like a highly deregulated and decentralized labor market, labor unions are weaker and probably have less potent effects on worker earnings and inequality. Where public employment is extensive, it probably reduces inequality by providing stable and well-paid employment. At the same time, public employment contributes to unionization, which then may interact with public employment to reduce inequality. These sorts of interactions could lead to a next generation of research on the politics of inequality. Whereas we have a pretty good picture of the key actors and their effects on inequality, we have not fully explored how institutions, actors and inequality reciprocally influence each other with potentially egalitarian consequences.

Second, despite the clear cross-national bent of the literatures we have reviewed, scholars of the politics of inequality (including the authors of this chapter) have given insufficient attention to less developed countries (LDCs). When compared with the vast quantity of studies of affluent democracies, there is a striking lack of research on the politics of inequality in LDCs. We acknowledge the important work of some scholars who have taken steps in that direction (e.g., Huber et al. 2006; Lee 2005). Unfortunately, the study of the politics of inequality, like so much of U.S. sociology, continues to neglect many of the world's regions and peoples. There is very little research on the most unequal region of the world Latin America, and even less research on the most deprived region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Even applying very orthodox and traditional questions and theories to these regions would be a rare contribution. Certainly, applying classic theories, like power resources theory, to understudied LDCs would be an opportune way for young scholars to make a significant impact.

Ultimately, we conclude this essay by pointing to the substantial growth in this area of inquiry. Social scientists have responded with a rich literature to the escalation in economic inequality that has occurred in several countries. At this point, we can confidently state that sociologists and political scientists have convincingly shown that economic inequality is not simply the domain of economists or demographers. Politics should be part of all explanations of variation in economic inequality.

²⁰Of course, there is debate about whether or not welfare states have actually experienced substantial retrenchment in recent decades (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003). This area is quite unsettled and there is equal evidence that welfare states have experienced stability or a plateau rather than a crisis (Brady et al. 2005).

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CHAPTER 29

The Political Sociology of Criminal Justice

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The provision of public order and the defense of citizens against criminal predation may well be the most important undertaking that any government must accomplish. This claim follows from the most widely accepted definition of the state. Weber tells us that any regime that finds it can no longer win violent contests with domestic rivals can no longer claim to be a government. Hobbes reinforces this point when he tells us that in the absence of a state's ability to perform such tasks, life for citizens in such a society will be "nasty, brutish, and short."

In addition to being one of the most important criteria on which governments should be judged, a state's domestic control apparatus also provides the means to sustain regime power. Garland (1990: 123) reveals some of the conceptual promise of a theoretically refined political sociology of domestic social control when he writes "Penal law, at base, concerns itself with social authority and the governing claims of those with power. It reinforces these claims by coercive sanctions as well as symbolic displays." Foucault (1977) and Garland thus see the punishment of criminals as a symbolic ritual that enhances political authority by forcibly reminding potential criminals and other prospective miscreants of the modern state's vast coercive resources and the sharp penalties for defiance.

Since the provision of domestic order is such an intrinsically political task, the control of purported criminals and other domestic deviants who are tempted to disobey state directives should be studied by political sociologists. Both the evaluative considerations in the first paragraph and the observation that state punishment acts to reinforce political authority in the next suggest that important theoretical gaps in political sociology can be filled by successful efforts to construct a well developed political sociology of domestic control.

There are other reasons to study the interrelationships between politics and efforts to control crime. Because they endorse policies that primarily help the prosperous (Hibbs 1987; Allen and Campbell 1994; Brooks and Brady 1999), political parties closer to the right face election obstacles in a democracy. The distribution of earnings, income, and wealth is highly unbalanced with only a few recipients receiving far more than the rest of the population, so prosperous voters are in the minority. Political parties on the right therefore have a smaller voter base than their rivals on the moderate left. One tactic that can help overcome this persistent disadvantage involves law and order campaign appeals. Such tactics resonate with less affluent voters who have less education and who do not appreciate civil liberties as much as their educated counterparts.

And, these voters frequently face increased criminal victimization risks because they often live near to or in areas where exposure to such hazards is greater.¹

Officials in the 1968 Nixon and the 1988 Bush campaigns for the presidency admit that they placed heavy emphasis on street crime to attract white voters with antipathetic views about African Americans. By focusing on law and order and other social problems readily blamed on underclass racial minorities, Republicans won elections by using this “wedge” issue to divide the Democratic party’s voting coalition. Particularly in the United States and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom, conservative politicians successfully used law and order campaign appeals to win elections. The many reasons for studying the links between politics and attempts to create or maintain domestic order thus offer the promise of helping us uncover some overlooked, but theoretically fruitful connections that should increase the conceptual power of political sociology.

One useful theoretical perspective that provides insight about the relationships between politics and crime control views social order as a problematic outcome that can only be maintained by vigilance. To many scholars who view the world through conceptual lenses provided by Hobbes, Marx, or Weber, the maintenance of social stability is a never ending challenge even in the most progressive democracies as the least prosperous citizens in the developed democracies with market based economies receive far less resources than others. Inasmuch as the distribution of social rewards is skewed to the point where only a few reap lavish rewards while many must accept far less, the stability of such unequal societies is problematic. Why are significant disruptions to domestic order such uncommon events when so few get so much while so many receive so little? One answer to this question rests on the state’s preponderance of force.

Skeptics who see social order as largely based on consensus rather than compulsion often counter arguments about the necessity for force by claiming that a society based only on coercion could not long survive. Goode (1972), however, answers by pointing out that scholars who use such claims to dispute the indispensability of the ever present threat of state violence as a prerequisite for order forget that even the worst despots regularly employ means other than coercion or its threat. His point is that although no ruler need (or could) rely solely on force, it is unlikely that this ingredient would be a dispensable part of the mix. If we instead think about a completely opposite political order, this necessity for the credible threat of state violence does not disappear. Even the most benevolent ruler must command scarce resources from unwilling subjects with the threat of punishment backed by the state’s ability to win force contests with any domestic rival. Even in the state with the most compassionate government that provides the greatest justice for its citizens, sufficient state revenues to ensure the common good could not be obtained by appealing only to citizen altruism.²

¹Some of these citizens, of course, quite reasonably may harbor intense anxieties criminal predation and vote for Republican candidates on the basis of this interest. But this claim is not supported by findings that women – who not surprisingly express substantially greater anxieties about criminal victimization than men – are far less likely than males to support harsh criminal punishments (Warr 1995) or vote for Republican law and order candidates.

²Many sociologists think order rests on consent. Polls in fact show that majorities view social arrangements as just. If such attitudes lead the less affluent who benefit least from existing arrangements to remain passive, the stability of unequal societies is less puzzling. But attitudes at best are weak causes of behavior (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Bishop 2005; Pager and Quillian 2005). And this causal order may be backwards. If the necessity to conform leads those who have least to avoid the disturbing realization that the existing order is unjust, such a consensus account would be based on *post hoc* rationalizations. Successful efforts by the least prosperous to alter the existing order are costly, perhaps dangerous, and therefore extremely unlikely (Olson 1965). Passivity and attitudes that justify passivity clearly may be the best choice for those least favored by existing arrangements. As long as attitudes are not strong causes of behavior or as long as consensus views largely are rationalizations for obedience based on the futility of rebellion, analyses that take a conflict approach and view order in unequal societies as problematic may provide new insights about the politics of social stability. In any case, this logic does not require that conflict theorists must claim that force is the only or even the most important determinant.

A focus on a government's ability to win violent contests with any internal rivals is an especially useful way to think about the relationships between crime control and politics partly because street crimes are often committed by citizens who are getting least from the societies in which they live. The typical criminal who undertakes a career based on predatory violence starts at the bottom of the social order and has faint prospects to rise above these origins despite his (or more rarely her) ability and effort. Non conflict explanations for street crimes based on presumptions that these citizens are improperly socialized because they failed to internalize consensus based norms that lead them to consider the rights of others thus seem more than a bit naïve.³

In any case, the Weberians and the neo-Marxists who stress coercive explanations for order typically see the criminal law and the state agencies that administer it as primarily seeking to benefit the privileged and those political officials who serve their interests. In this view, an important (but certainly not the only) use of the criminal law is to maintain control over the "dangerous classes" who are most likely to pose a threat to social order that is so beneficial to the prosperous (Chambliss 1964, 1994; Garland 1990). If state efforts to control street crime are largely shaped by the need to restrain the inevitable losers in market based economies who have much to gain from violence that reallocates resources, enhanced control measures that take various forms can be expected when or where this threat seems to be most pronounced.

These views produced studies that analyze various outcomes in the criminal justice system. For example, if such a politically informed conflict perspective is accurate, where (or when) larger numbers of citizens who are viewed as a threat to social order are present, we can expect larger police departments that are less likely to exercise restraint when they deal with threatening minority citizens. If such theoretical presumptions are accurate, we also can expect harsher criminal sanctions when greater threats to social order are deemed present. Criminal sentences, for example, should be less lenient and those ethnic or minority groups viewed as threatening should be treated particularly harshly by prosecutors and by trial courts in jurisdictions in which such threats are seen as most menacing. In addition to longer sentences, these conditions should produce larger incarcerated populations. And when these threatening conditions are present, the most severe criminal penalties such as the death sentence should be increasingly likely to be legal. In what follows, I will examine the political literature on these relationships.

In this review I proceed by presenting the studies of the politics of the criminal justice system in the order in which a citizen would encounter various stages in this system. I first will examine the politics of law enforcement. Next, I discuss work on the politics of criminal sentencing, followed by a summary of the literature on aggregate imprisonment rates. Finally, I will review the systematic research on the politics of the death penalty. But, this coverage must be selective. The literature on criminal justice agencies is extremely large yet the literature on the politics of criminal justice is sparse. This essay will focus almost entirely on the political aspects of crime control and mention studies of other relationships only as needed.

THE POLITICS OF THE POLICE

Modern states avoid the military and employ urban police departments that specialize in daily needs to maintain order. The core tasks of these street level bureaucrats fit well with theoretical perspectives that stress coercion. The main activity that separates modern police departments

³Non conflict theories of crime and social order in fact have a different focus – that crime stems from defective socialization and strains in the "social system." This perspective, however focuses attention away from the politics of crime control and order keeping.

from other state agencies is their legal authorization to use justifiable force (Bittner 1990). Bittner in fact tells us that the most common characteristic of police tasks is *not* a focus on crime. Most estimates suggest that crime involves less than forty percent of the typical officer's time. Instead, the element most common to police tasks is their law based capacity to use violence in support of state directives. Yet, how this force is used is an extremely divisive political issue particularly in a nation like the United States with its sharp racial divisions.

Most police studies that at least indirectly address political factors investigate the (standardized) number of city police officers, but this work only is implicitly political. A few studies on police violence have directly addressed political matters. We begin with literature on department size and go on to describe research on the use of force. This section concludes with an analysis of how unwarranted police violence can be controlled by political means.

Police Department Size

It is difficult to find city level political measures partly because many municipal elections are non partisan and no city level measures of citizen ideology apparently exist. But the statistical studies that analyze the determinants of the population corrected number of officers employed by urban police departments have tested a minority threat hypothesis that has political elements.

According to this perspective, ethnocentric views and majority inclinations to view minorities as trespassers enhance majority assumptions that they should retain exclusive claims over important rights and privileges (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Minority threat theorists hold that majority hostility and beliefs about their "rightful" position are sharpened by the political struggles that occur when minority groups seek to alter these unequal arrangements (Blumer 1958). Where expanding minority populations threaten their cultural and political dominance, whites frequently react by supporting conservative candidates who are likely to resist the changes sought by minorities and who often endorse harsh law and order measures that at least indirectly target these minorities (Key 1949; Goldfield 1997; Jacobs and Tope 2007).

Multiple findings support various elements of this threat perspective. Prejudice against African Americans is greater in urban areas with larger minority populations (Fosset and Kiecolt 1989; Taylor 1998; Quillian 1996). Additional results show that, with the crime rates held constant, fear of crime is greater in cities or in neighborhoods with higher proportions of African American residents (Liska et al. 1982; Quillian and Pager 2002). Majority whites also react politically to this threat to their dominance. Larger African American populations produce increased votes for openly racist candidates (Heer 1959; Giles and Buckner 1993). Conservative political parties and candidates, who often endorse severe anti crime measures, also receive greater support from whites in areas with larger minority populations (Giles and Hertz 1994). The threat from a growth in minority populations as well as increases in the most fear inducing street crime that majorities blame on minorities produce added support for conservative legislators who are likely to endorse both expansions in the police and other severe criminal measures (Jacobs and Tope 2007).

Only few crimes are interracial, but the conventional wisdom sees violent street crime as almost entirely the work of minorities who, it is erroneously believed, often victimize whites (Chiricos et al. 2004). Findings suggest that whites, who feel threatened by the presence of larger underclass minority populations, frequently make successful political demands for additional police officers (Jacobs 1979, Liska et al. 1981). Some characteristics of police work help explain this strong relationship between the percentage of minorities and police strength.

Officers on the street are primarily reactive rather than proactive (Wilson 1971; Rubenstein 1973; Ericson 1982, 1989). Officers are not abundant when compared with the populations they must control and they cannot read minds nor see into buildings. They are unable to identify recent law breakers or those who are about to commit such acts (Rubenstein 1973). Decisions about who to stop must be made on the basis of anomalies and crude decision rules (Weitzer and Tuch 2002; Lundman and Kaufman 2003). Such endemic uncertainties often are resolved by statistical discrimination. Officers make inferences about individuals based on their perceptions of group characteristics (Rubenstein 1973). And these tactics are especially likely in underclass neighborhoods, where officers face greater handicaps because street criminals and the innocent share many surface characteristics.

But, if the police are numerous relative to a city's population, their inclinations to rely on "that which is out of place" (Rubenstein 1973) should increase their effectiveness in white neighborhoods, where residents tend to be visibly distinct from underclass minority street criminals (Jacobs 1979; Manning 1994). Even if the police do not make greater efforts to please majority whites, this dominant racial group nevertheless should benefit from larger departments. The neighborhood boundaries the police help enforce that at least partially insulate white districts from underclass street criminals should be less permeable in cities with additional officers. This logic suggests that larger departments should be present in communities in which white anxieties about crime are enhanced by larger underclass minority populations.

Cross-sectional studies have gauged the relationship between minority threat and the per capita number of officers in cities and found support for this hypothesis (Jacobs 1979; Liska et al. 1981). Greenberg et al. (1985) used a potentially superior panel research design and reported inconsistent support for racial threat. But these researchers used variables from a prior census to account for police strength 10 years later. Such a lag is implausible as it should not take 10 years for this relationship to be completed. Greenberg et al. included the lag of their dependent variable on the right side of their models, yet correlated measurement error between the dependent variable and its lag will weaken the coefficients on the other explanatory variables. And most of the cities in the Greenberg et al. sample were smaller than those analyzed in studies that found greater support for racial threat. The reduced support for the threat hypothesis in the Greenberg et al. study is predictable as the informal controls on criminal behavior – undercut by greater anonymity in large cities – should be effective in smaller communities. Threatened whites thus have increased reasons to demand additional police officers in the larger cities analyzed in most of the studies on this issue.

Another study instead used a conventional pooled time-series cross-sectional approach to isolate the determinants of police strength in larger cities using explanatory variables in 1980, 1990 and 2000 to account for police strength a year later (Kent and Jacobs 2005). Using two-way fixed-effects model to hold constant both unchanging city specific differences and any cross-city national shocks, these researchers found more consistent support for the hypothesis that the population corrected number of police officers expands after a growth in the percentage of African American residents. A political determinant that also explained department size was the presence of a city manager. Cities with this arrangement had fewer officers, probably because such unelected public executives could better resist panics about street crime and the resulting public pressures to hire additional but unnecessary officers.

By interacting the percentage of African Americans in cities with period dummy variables, Kent and Jacobs (2005) tested for changes in the strength of the relationship between African Americans presence and police strength. Their findings suggest that the explanatory power of the minority threat hypothesis has increased. Coefficients on the interactions that gauge the decade specific independent relationship between African American presence and police

strength became significantly stronger in each decade despite the purported progress in race relations since the 1960s. Such results suggest that the overall growth in department strength in the largest U.S. cities since 1980 is at least partly attributable to stronger links between racial threat based on African presence and larger departments.

But a problem concerns the absence of explanatory factors that intervene between measurable determinants and department size. It is unfortunate that indicators of white political activity that result from minority threat are not available. Other findings, however, make threat assumptions about the intervening political links between minority presence and police strength plausible. Recall that larger African American populations produce greater fear of crime after the crime rates have been held constant (Liska et al. 1982; Quillian and Pager 2002). We also know that whites respond politically to minority threat because expansions in minority populations lead to increased white support for both anti-minority and conservative law and order candidates (Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz 1994; Jacobs and Tope 2007). These results suggest that expansions in underclass minority populations produce increases in the number of police officers because threatened whites act politically to attain this goal. We can now turn to a discussion of police use of force.

The Use of Force by the Police

We begin this section by first presenting research findings on the determinants of police violence and then we finish by discussing legal and political remedies for illegal police brutality.

Research on Situational Effects: Most of the micro level research has concentrated on suspect race, demeanor, and social status. Many studies have found that those who physically or verbally challenge officers are far more likely to be subjected to unwarranted violence (Friedrich 1977; Reiss 1972) than those who do not. And lower-class suspects receive comparatively harsh treatment (Banton 1964; Friedrich 1977). Friedrich (1977), for example, reports that 100% of the persons subjected to excessive force in his sample were lower class, yet, only 68% of the suspects that the police encountered in this study came from such backgrounds.

Inasmuch as African Americans and Hispanics are likely to be at the bottom of the economic order, such findings suggest that these minorities should be especially likely to be subjected to unjustified police violence. Moreover, the typical neighborhoods occupied by underclass minorities can be accurately described as at least a partial Hobbesian state of nature (Anderson 1999; Jacobs and Wright 2006). People who live in crowded dwelling units without air conditioning are likely to spend large amounts of time on the street. In contrast to more affluent neighborhoods, there are no well defined property lines, so contests over turf that become violent in such neighborhoods are comparatively common.

And many activities in such areas often are illegal, but the courts will not enforce contracts that facilitate criminal enterprise. Entrepreneurs who operate outside the law therefore must become their own enforcers by carrying and sometimes using weapons. In this volatile world, "projecting an image of self-reliance dominates almost all other concerns. Interpersonal encounters are loaded with meaning, especially disputes, which are proving grounds for character...Violations that do not elicit retaliatory responses label the victim as being weak, and on the street, there is no place, or mercy, for cowards" (Jacobs and Wright 2006: 4).

Where such a potential for aggression is common, preemptive violence often will be prudent. Even when it is not, if they wish to avoid victimization, young males in such neighborhoods must not adopt a submissive manner (Anderson 1999; Jacobs and Wright 2006). A demeanor that instead suggests one is ready and willing to use force should enhance survival.

But such a demeanor – that often will seem insolent to outsiders – is not the best way to deal with police officers who feel that they must command respect to maintain order. The findings indicating that a less than deferential attitude toward officers enhances the probability that officers will use unwarranted force also suggest that minority males, who must adapt to their potentially violent world, more often will be subjected to unwarranted police aggression.

While non-deadly force is used by police officers in the great majority of the situations when officers encounter resistance, their use of lethal violence has rightly been subjected to far more scrutiny. This is partly because the data on non-deadly force is questionable, but also because an unwarranted use of deadly force by police officers – or what Sherman (1980a) calls “executions without trial” – is such a direct threat to a just society.

Statistical Findings about Police Killings in Multiple Jurisdictions

The statistical studies on lethal force differ sharply in quality. In perhaps the first, Kania and Mackey (1977) computed the rate of police killings per million residents in the U.S. states from 1961 to 1970. Georgia, with almost 38 citizens killed by the police per million residents, had the highest rate. Yet, northern states such as Wisconsin and New Hampshire had rates just under three killings per million in this period. Unfortunately, when Kania and Mackey attempted to assess the determinants of these rates, they ignored minority presence. This and other difficulties such as their attempt to analyze this data with simple bivariate correlations and their failure to take alternative explanations into account make their findings suspect.

Jacobs and Britt (1979) reanalyzed Kania and Mackey’s rates. They found that the most unequal states with higher violent crime rates were likely to have the largest police killing rates, but they ignored political explanations despite the availability of such indicators at the state level. The explanatory power of violent crime rates makes sense because officers can be expected to use increased deadly force when they must control particularly violent populations. City level analyses, however, should be more appropriate because local environments should better explain police behavior. Sherman (1980b) in fact writes that “Theoretically the community level should be given the most attention... Rossi et al. (1974) found that in comparing city of employment and officer’s personal characteristics as explanations of the use of aggressive detection tactics, 67% of the variance was uniquely attributable to the city.” (94).

Four city level studies apparently exist. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) and Liska and Yu (1992) gauged police killings with data from Vital Statistics and with two different surveys of police departments. But, the Vital Statistics estimates were about half as large as either of the survey estimates of police killings. And the overlap in the components of the scales used to estimate police killing rates was quite modest. The weak correlations between these dimensions suggest that the reliability of these two dependent variables is questionable. Such difficulties and the modest number of cases analyzed in both studies probably explain their opposite conclusions.

Sorensen et al. (1993) overcome some of these problems by analyzing Supplemental Homicide Report data collected from local police reports by the FBI. But, their study used OLS regression to analyze a censored dependent variable and all three studies ignored political considerations. Jacobs and O’Brien (1998), however, assess the effects of one explicitly political effect and another that is indirectly political. By conducting separate analyses of police killings of African Americans, these researchers could compare the explanatory power of explanations for all police killings to those that explain the use of deadly force against this minority. Their results support racial threat theory as additional police killings occurred in cities with larger African American populations.

Yet, their most interesting results suggest that two political factors explain the use of deadly force. First, greater income differences between African Americans and whites should reduce the African American population's political influence and their ability to curb police violence. It is noteworthy that such racial economic differences led to a greater use of deadly force. This result suggests that a willingness by dominant groups to interfere with harsh police methods is diminished in cities where differences in the resources of African Americans and whites are most pronounced. The Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) findings also showed that the police in cities with an African American mayor were less likely to use lethal violence against African Americans. This last finding is important as it highlights the political nature of this outcome.

Controls on the Police Use of Unwarranted Force

Legal Remedies: In its 1985 *Garner* decision, the Supreme Court held that an officer can take a life only when there is good reason to suspect that an individual's actions present immediate danger to others (Faulkner 1999). This decision prohibited the use of deadly force to apprehend non-dangerous fleeing suspects. Subsequent evaluations suggest that "the apparent discriminatory application of lethal force [was] greatly reduced as a result of the post-*Garner* deadly force policy" (Sparger and Giacomassi 1992: 224; Culliver and Sigler 1995).

Several legal paths exist for victims. The police can be subjected to civil lawsuits alleging the use of excessive force. Plaintiff victories make defendants liable for monetary damages, but these civil remedies are not effective. In the rare instance when plaintiffs win, penalties typically are paid out of city coffers. A department that does not discourage unwarranted violence thus is unlikely to suffer. The states also have criminal codes that prohibit unjustified officer violence. Although the *de jure* penalties for excessive force can be severe, prosecutors rarely pursue such cases. They know that officers are unwilling to testify against their peers and juries are unwilling to use penalties against officers that normally are reserved for street criminals (Faulkner 1999). If these cases are litigated, convictions are unusual (Kobler 1975). Internal department investigations are just as unlikely to find misconduct.

It follows that evaluations of state laws are not encouraging. For example, the Pennsylvania law that made the shooting of a nonviolent fleeing-felon illegal did not reduce deadly force (Waegel 1984). Waegel concludes that in the absence of a clear message from department officials, the situational conditions that encourage officer violence will trump state laws. In contrast to the first findings about the Supreme Court's *Garner* decision, state codes became ineffective because these statutes were not vigorously enforced.

Other studies examined the effects of departmental rules. Fyfe (1979), Meyer (1980), and Geller and Scott (1992) report that restrictive regulations about firearms significantly decrease police shootings. Prior to stringent departmental policies, Geller and Karales (1981) find that nearly one out of four killings committed by police could have been avoided had policies been limited to "defense of life." When the Dallas department changed its shooting policy on two separate occasions during the 1980s, for example, each change led to reductions in the number of intentional discharges (Geller and Scott 1992). Finally, the conventional wisdom suggests minority or female or better educated officers are less likely to use violent methods. But after duty assignments were taken into account, officers who shot citizens were no different from the officers who had not.

Greater police violence therefore seems to occur in cities where racial and ethnic minorities are less capable of restraining the police because they have little political influence. The Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) result that police violence is significantly reduced in cities

with an African American mayor supports claims that minority political influence is critical. This finding is predictable as African American elected officials – who often are beholden to minority voters – will have strong reasons and the ability to control police violence. We can now discuss a general political perspective on how this violence can be controlled.

A Political Remedy

The discussion that follows rests on an inescapable fact. Absent close restraints, unwarranted force by officers will be more common than it should be (Chevigny 1995). Put differently, excessive police violence is *probable* unless it is intentionally controlled for at least three reasons. First, the primary goal of departments and hence officers on the street is to preserve order rather than to enforce the law (Bittner 1990). This emphasis makes the inappropriate use of violence a tempting shortcut. Second, personal risks are an inevitable part of this work, so officer inclinations to shoot first and ask questions later should not be surprising. Third, police behavior on the street is not readily observed, so administrative or other controls on excessive force are handicapped. These conditions suggest that unjustified police violence will be too frequent unless those in power make deliberate efforts to stop it.

In an essay on German attitudes about the concentration camps based on interviews just after Nazi Germany surrendered, Hughes (1963) provides a useful perspective on this and related problems. He argues that a willingness to remain conveniently ignorant about the activities of people he calls the “dirty workers” provides a compelling explanation for much official brutality. While many Germans claimed that “something had to be done about the Jews”, these citizens simply did not want to know what was happening, so they didn’t – even though millions of killings must have been difficult to ignore. This logic is not only applicable to the German public’s convenient ignorance. Consider just one of many possible contemporary examples. Those of us who are not vegetarians find it is expedient to remain uninformed about exactly how the animals we eat are killed.

This idea, of course, can be readily applied to the police use of unwarranted violence. In cities where racial, ethnic, or economic disparities are most substantial, dominant groups often will feel threatened by the resulting increases in the potential for underclass violence that they mistakenly believe is likely to be directed against them. Greater differences in the economic resources of dominant whites and underclass minorities also should heighten the feelings of relative deprivation. This is so because minority perceptions that they are not being treated fairly should increase when such disparities become increasingly conspicuous. Unequal resource distributions thus should produce both the motivation and greater potential rewards for violence directed against the affluent. It is likely that the most politically influential citizens typically respond to this menace in the same manner as the Germans described by Hughes. *They choose to remain conveniently ignorant about the harsh methods their police force uses to maintain their security.*

It follows that the best remedy for unwarranted police violence is political. If office holders and their elite supporters make their distaste for brutality abundantly clear, police administrators will face powerful incentives to alter relevant departmental regulations that matter. In almost all U.S. cities, the most powerful police executive can be readily discharged by the chief political official in local governments. This fact gives police administrators strong reasons to alter department practices on the use of force if that is what their political superiors wish. And, as has been already noted, the literature indicates that such changes will sharply reduce police brutality (Fyfe 1979; Meyer 1980; Geller and Scott 1992). But, if the public tacitly supports

harsh police methods by electing a law and order candidate who at least implicitly encourages the use force to maintain order, unfortunate violence that often is directed against minorities is predictable. As long as political elites and citizens act like citizens in Hitler's Germany and look the other way, we can expect too much police brutality.

The increases in police violence in New York provide a good illustration. Before the election of a law and order mayor, this department seemed to be much better at avoiding inappropriate violence than departments in other large cities (Chevigny 1995). It is difficult to believe that Mayor Giuliani's repeated stress on law and order and his directives that both implicitly and explicitly encouraged aggressive policing did not make the unfortunate surge in police shootings and beatings near the end of his tenure far more likely. In fact, contemporary accounts claimed that both liberals and economic elites did not object to Giuliani's law and order initiatives as both groups enjoyed the appearance of civic order and the apparent decrease in street crime the mayor's emphasis on forceful policing seemed to produce. We can conclude that when police brutality is problematic, reductions in such acts will occur only when citizens decide to put sufficient pressure on their elected officials to stop officers from punishing less influential citizens without trials.

SENTENCING

After an arrest, a prosecutor must decide if a criminal charge is warranted. If a charge is filed, the next step is the determination of guilt or innocence, and then a decision must be made about the appropriate sentence. Unfortunately and despite the fact that well over ninety percent of all U.S. criminal sentences are based on plea bargains (in which a defendant agrees to plead guilty to a reduced charge in return for a reduced sentence), few systematic studies about this stage exist as little data is available about these negotiations or about prosecutor behavior.

Research on the next stage that determines guilt or innocence is equally sparse for related reasons. First, guilt – or at least a guilty plea – is largely predetermined by the less than open plea agreements that have occurred before trial, although such bargains must be approved by the presiding judge. Second, even in the highly unusual case when agreement about both plea and sentence has not already occurred, it is difficult or impossible to analyze court decisions about guilt or innocence because an acute omitted variable problem is present. Plausible measures that capture the degree to which evidence of guilt is compelling would be extremely difficult or impossible to construct. But information about sentencing is readily available. Literally, hundreds of studies have investigated the factors that explain sentencing in trial courts. Investigations that assess political explanations, however, remain unusual despite their promise.

Research on Sentencing

Problems with Sentencing Studies: Almost all of the studies on sentencing focused on offenders and their offense by investigating whether ascriptive extra legal factors that should be irrelevant explain sentence after offense severity is held constant. These studies typically investigate the relationship between offender attributes such as race, gender, or ethnicity and punishment after controlling for legal effects such as an offender's prior criminal record and the severity of his or her offense. While plausible claims that minorities are treated inequitably in the U.S. criminal justice system provided the main impetus for this research, after hundreds of studies, findings about this critical issue remain inconsistent.

One reason for these discrepancies concerns the way in which this research was conducted. Almost all of these studies analyzed sentences in just one or at most a few jurisdictions. Such an approach severely restricts variation in court environments and makes cross-sectional examinations of community effects impossible. This extremely popular research design is quite likely to produce erroneous findings because these trial court decisions do not occur in a social vacuum. Contextual forces external to organizations have repeatedly provided the most powerful explanations for organizational behavior (Perrow 1987; Scott 1987). It is difficult to believe that local trial courts are an exception to this well documented observation.

Some offenders clearly receive much harsher punishments than their otherwise equivalent counterparts in more lenient communities. It follows that studies of the effects of court context and offender attributes conducted by gauging the individual extra-legal, legal, *and* environmental determinants in multiple jurisdictions should provide far more accurate results. If such findings suggest that ascriptive attributes such as race have stronger effects in some court environments rather than others, this evidence should help to explain these discrepant findings and begin to resolve disagreements about the effects of extra-legal offender characteristics on sentencing.

Studies of Court Environments and Political Contexts: One of the first investigations of the effects of court context analyzed sentences for drug offenses. Kuklinski and Stanga (1979) studied such sentences in California counties shortly after a state-wide referendum on sentences for marijuana violations. Their findings showed that trial courts reduced drug sentences in those counties in which the voters gave greater support for liberalized marijuana laws, but Kuklinski and Stanga did not control for individual attributes such as offender race or offense severity.

Additional research by political scientists on judicial elections provides added reasons to suspect that political influences may provide a powerful explanation for trial court decisions about punishment. There is substantial state variation in how judges are retained. In eight states incumbent judges face the voters in competitive partisan elections, but in 21 judge retention decisions are made with competitive but non partisan elections. And in ten states, these decisions are based on retention elections in which only the judge's name appears on the ballot and no opponent or party affiliation is listed (Huber and Gordon 2004).

Findings show that large majorities of voters strongly believe that criminal sentences are far too lenient (Roberts and Edwards 1989; Warr 1995). One strong indication that political factors help determine sentencing in trial courts are the findings suggesting that judge behavior is shaped even "by retention elections although the probability of losing is low" (Aspin and Hall 1994: 315). And multiple results show that judges become increasingly punitive as the date of their next election approaches (Hall 1992, 1995; Brace and Hall 1997). This finding holds in the methodologically exemplary study by Huber and Gordon (2004) after they held constant many other factors including offender race, offense severity, and offender prior records.

In one of the first studies that attempted to use both individual and county level contextual effects to explain sentencing, Myers and Talarico (1987) analyze sentence severity in Georgia trial court environments and report mixed evidence for contextual effects. Less lenient sentencing occurred in some counties with a larger African American population and higher violent crime rates. Huang et al. (1996) reanalyzed this data and found longer sentences in the most politically conservative counties in Georgia. Yet, both studies used OLS to analyze a censored outcome (sentence severity typically is measured by time to be served in jail or prison, but from 30% to 40% of all felony offenders in most samples are not incarcerated), and neither could introduce systematic controls for legal effects such as prior criminal records.

Other investigations attempted to assess conservative trial court environments with the percentage of county populations registered as Republicans (Kramer and Steffensmeier 1993; Steffensmeier et al. 1998). Yet, the findings were weak probably because registration as a Republican in the moderate Republican party in Pennsylvania (Sundquist 1983) is not the best indicator of the intensity of conservative law-and-order values. Sampson and Laub (1993) report that African American presence in court environments explains sentence severity in juvenile courts, but they could not control for individual explanations as privacy restrictions make individual juvenile characteristics difficult to obtain. And, when Balbus (1973) studied sentences in cities shortly after riots, his results showed that while arrests grew, court decisions about punishments did not increase after these outbursts.

Helms and Jacobs (2002) instead analyze statistical interactions between votes for a law and order Republican in court environments and extra-legal offender attributes using a sample of trial court outcomes in 337 counties with data collected in 1990. If politics matters, county support for a Republican presidential candidate who 2 years before placed heavy emphasis on his opponent's supposed tendency to be soft on crime should predict felony sentencing in local trial courts. Recall that George H. W. Bush used strident law and order campaign appeals when he ran against Michael Dukakas (who had been governor of Massachusetts) in 1988. For example:

A Republican group called 'Americans for Bush'...blanketed Cable News Network with an ad declaring that 'Dukakis not only opposed the death penalty, he allowed first-degree murderers to have weekend passes from prison.' ... [as the] clearly black [offender] – Willie Horton stared dully into the camera. Forty-eight hours after the initial 'Americans for Bush' commercial, the California Committee for the Presidency released a second, even more devastating radio ad featuring a [victim]. 'Mike Dukakis and Willie Horton changed our lives forever...Horton broke into our home. For twelve hours, we were beaten, slashed, and terrorized,' ...My wife Angie was brutally raped' (Carter 1996: 76–77).

Added evidence shows that such political appeals matter. Beckett (1997) holds both the crime rates and media coverage constant and finds that statements of national politicians magnify public perceptions of crime. Her results suggest that the law and order appeals some politicians employ to win elections enhance public anxieties about street crime.

Using Tobit to correct for their censored dependent variable and with multiple alternative explanations such as differences in the state criminal codes held constant, Helms and Jacobs (2002) find evidence for an important statistical interaction. African-Americans received longer sentences in those court environments in which the vote for the law and order Bush candidacy was most substantial. Such political results support the claims by theorists like Garland (1990) that criminal punishments are highly dependent on political context.

These findings begin to explain the inconsistent results in the research on racial discrimination in sentencing. Reviews of the many statistically competent studies on the effects of offender race on sentencing (Chiricos and Crawford 1995; Walker et al. 1996) must base conclusions on results that appear in only a bare majority of these investigations. But, since almost all of the studies summarized in these reviews were restricted to analyses of sentencing decisions in one or just a few trial courts or courts in one region, it should not be surprising that little consensus about this important issue has emerged. It almost certainly will be impossible to find general relationships as long as researchers do not analyze samples that provide a representative picture of courts and court environments.

Another plausible explanation for the unfortunate inconsistencies in this literature concerns the almost complete neglect of political effects. As long as there is a higher probability that harsh sentences based on extra-legal ascriptive offender attributes will occur in some

political environments rather than others, studies that ignore politics are likely to find results that inexplicably diverge. The Helms and Jacobs (2002) findings about statistical interaction between law and order trial court environments and sentences based on extra-legal characteristics such as offender race suggest studies of court outcomes in such conservative jurisdictions are likely to show that race explains sentence length. Researchers who use identical methods to study the determinants of sentencing in less conservative environments should not be as likely to find that race influences these decisions. We can conclude that if political factors in court environments continue to be ignored, findings on sentencing probably will remain inconsistent.

STUDIES OF AGGREGATE IMPRISONMENT RATES

The popular wisdom views fluctuations in imprisonments as a natural response to changes in the amount of serious crime. Yet, there is little correspondence between yearly shifts in the crime rates and imprisonment rates in the United States. From 1947 until the early 1970s, the imprisonment rates remained almost constant. After 1980, total crime rates had mostly stopped growing, but the proportion of the population that was imprisoned grew dramatically (Blumstein 1993; Western 2006). The absence of a close relationship between the crime and the imprisonment rates suggests a need for other explanations. In light of the fact that conservative Republican office seekers have campaigned so vigorously on a law and order anti-crime platforms after 1968, it is reasonable to examine the explanatory power of such partisan accounts.

The Literature: Only a few studies have examined the political determinants of imprisonment rates. One early time-series study found that in contrast to Democrats, Republican presidents since 1935 increased spending on corrections and other federal criminal justice programs (Caldeira and Cowart 1980). Other researchers (Jacobs and Helms 1996) analyzed yearly shifts in prison admissions and found that expansions in the political strength of the law-and-order Republican party produced a subsequent growth in these rates. A national level time-series analysis, however, is not the best research design. State and local officials are responsible for almost all incarceration decisions. Time-series studies of incarceration rates in the entire United States cannot uncover the effects at this level. But, before 2001, the most methodologically sophisticated studies of state imprisonment rates (Wallace 1981, Carroll and Cornell 1985, Parker and Horwitz 1986) ignored political explanations.

Ideology: A state level analysis also can test ideological explanations and thereby discover whether the political strength of the most conservative party or pre-existing conservative views explain imprisonment rates. In contrast to liberals who blame pernicious social conditions, conservatives see reprehensible individual choices as the primary explanation for street crime (Burnham 1970; Thorne 1990). The last Conservative Prime Minister in the United Kingdom expressed this position parsimoniously when he claimed that “Crime is a decision, not a disease” (John Major as quoted by Garland 2001). If this view is correct, increases in the expected costs of illegal acts should be an effective remedy for street crime, so conservatives claim that deterrence and incapacitation are the best methods to obtain safe streets.

Partisan Strength: Republican political strength in the states also should explain higher incarceration rates. The core support for the Republican party comes from the prosperous who are well served by the existing arrangements, so appeals for law and order that capture some democratic votes will not offend this constituency. Largely, because Democrats and their liberal core supporters view street crime as resulting from social arrangements such as poverty and discrimination, it has been difficult for Democrats to employ campaign tactics

that emphasize harsh punishments. In any case, claims that the Democrats are “soft on crime” became a major part of largely successful Republican political campaigns at both the national and the state levels since 1968 (Chambliss 1994; Davey 1998; Mendelberg 2001).

After they won state elections at least partly on the basis of these campaign appeals, Republicans kept their campaign promises. State level Republican elected officials as well as those at the federal level spent greater amounts on law enforcement and corrections than their democratic counterparts (Scheingold 1991; Davey 1998). And both federal and state Republican elected officials vigorously supported severe sentencing provisions that increased the number of crimes punishable by imprisonment.

Findings: Using a two-way pooled fixed-effects design that automatically held constant both unchanging state effects and changes in any national conditions that might affect imprisonments across all states, Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) tested these political hypotheses by analyzing the proportion of state residents who were incarcerated immediately after decennial census years from 1970 to 1990. They found that two political factors had strong independent effects. States with the most conservative voters and states in which the Republican party held larger proportions of the most important political offices had the highest incarceration rates with crime rates and other factors held constant. As minority threat theorists would expect, these findings also showed that racial and ethnic politics helped explain these rates. States with larger percentages of African American and Hispanic residents also had higher proportions of their populations in prison.

Their interactive results also showed that the influence of Republican political strength increased with the passage of time, but the explanatory power of conservative political values remained constant. Yet, by restricting their sample to three census years and 150 cases, Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) sacrificed statistical power. Subsequent researchers analyzed imprisonment rates in consecutive census and non census years and also reported that various measures of Republican political strength in the states explained state incarceration rates (Stucky et al. 2005; Yates and Fording 2005; Western 2006).

And, at least one cross-national study supports this conclusion. In a theoretically exemplary pooled time-series analysis based on a sample of English-speaking nations, Sutton (2000) found that the political strength of conservative parties had an independent positive relationship with national incarceration rates. Yet, in another cross-national panel analysis Jacobs and Kleban (2003) did not find this association, probably because they analyzed many non English speaking European nations as well as some of the societies included in Sutton’s sample. These contrasting results suggest that the political strength of conservative parties explains incarceration rates in the U.K. and in the nations that had been British colonies, but this account does not seem to explain these rates in the European democracies.

Political explanations therefore help account for police behavior, sentencing, and aggregate imprisonment rates, but it remains to be seen if politics explains the legality of the death penalty or the frequency of executions.

THE POLITICS OF THE DEATH PENALTY

Why is the death penalty illegal only in some states? And when this punishment is legal, why do some jurisdictions use this penalty far more often than others? No other contemporary punishment is as severe, yet the literature is almost silent about the political influences that determine whether this penalty is legal and how often it is used. A few informative case studies about attempts to alter the death penalty in specific states exist (Koch and Galliher 1993;

Haines 1996; Galliher and Galliher 1997). Yet, few systematic tests of theoretically derived political hypotheses about the legality and the administration of this punishment are available.

This gap in the literature is puzzling as the other aspects of this penalty have been so intensely studied. Many investigations have assessed the racial and other determinants of death sentences (for reviews see Dodge et al. 1990; Paternoster 1991; Baldous and Woodworth 2003; Paternoster et al. 2008). The research on deterrent effects is equally voluminous (for reviews see Paternoster 1991; Hood 1998; Levitt 2002; Donohue and Wolfers 2006; Paternoster, Brame and Bacon 2008). But we know little about the political forces that make capital punishment legal or those that explain the substantial jurisdictional differences in the frequency of executions when this penalty is legal.

A related question concerns the primary source of political influence. In the European democracies, the abolition of the death penalty was imposed on a reluctant public by political elites (Zimring and Hawkins 1986). Yet the United States is an exceptional polity with comparatively frail political parties, a weak bureaucracy, along with federalist political institutions and state governments with particularly great authority over criminal justice matters. These factors combine to produce democratically responsive state governments in which public views about crime and punishment are far more influential than they are in Europe (Savelsberg 1994; Whitman 2003). And in a direct democracy like the United States, a politically inactive public can be readily aroused by political entrepreneurs who are all willing to take advantage of the public thirst for revenge after the especially horrific crimes the media relies on to increase ratings and advertising revenues (Koch and Galliher 1993; Zimring 2003).

Rather than being controlled by politically insulated experts, as these policies are in Europe, the legality of this penalty in the United States depends to a much greater extent on public values and the resulting citizen political pressures that force politicians to act. The comparative history of the abolition of this penalty in Europe and in the United States provides an illustration. In the European democracies, political elites abolished the death penalty in spite of overwhelming public support for capital punishment (Zimring and Hawkins 1986). Yet, when the U.S. Supreme Court made the death penalty unconstitutional in *Furman* in 1974, the resulting political objections particularly from the state politicians in the South were intense (Zimring and Hawkins 1986). This strident opposition could have been the primary reason why the High Court reversed only 4 years later in *Gregg* and again allowed the states to execute.

I first describe research findings on the political factors that influenced the legalization of capital punishment and then I review research on the politics of executions.

The Legality of the Death Penalty

Racial Politics and Minority Threat: Recall that Blumer (1958) and Blalock (1967) claim that increases in minority presence threaten the dominance of lower middle and working class whites who respond with political efforts to maintain their influence. Many findings we have reviewed suggest that whites successfully demand harsher criminal punishments in areas with the largest minority populations. Such results, in conjunction with the finding that white support for capital punishment is closely associated with prejudice against African Americans (Barkan and Cohn 1994) lead to the plausible expectation that a legal death penalty should be likely in jurisdictions with the most African-American residents.

Ideology: The probability of a legal death penalty also should be greater in jurisdictions with a comparatively conservative public. Recall that conservatives see criminals as autonomous, unfettered individuals who are responsible for their acts (Lacey 1988).

Conservative presumptions about crime rely on other concepts borrowed from the marketplace. According to conservatives, “Punishment should be equivalent to the offense so that justice consists in a kind of equity or fair trading which exchanges one harmful act for another which equals it” (Garland 1990: 113). Since conservatives believe that individuals chose to do criminal acts (Burnham 1970, Thorne 1990), increases in the expected costs of law breaking should be an effective deterrent.

And some conservatives view social cohesion as partly built on punishment. Thus, Molnar (1976: 47) claims “if those who deserve it are not appropriately penalized, then the so-far guiltless tend to fall, by a kind of social gravitational pull, to lower levels of discipline and civilization.” Conservatives use this logic to justify (probably mistaken) claims that the threat of the death penalty will save many innocent victims from criminal predation.⁴ Inasmuch as they often see human nature as immutable (Thorne 1990), many conservatives believe that criminals cannot be reformed. Pernicious incorrigible offenders therefore should be executed to ensure that they no longer can harm the innocent.

But liberals are much more optimistic about the potential for rehabilitation and believe that crime is caused by inequitable social conditions (Thorne 1990; Garland 2001). It follows the findings show that liberal values are closely associated with an intense aversion to the death penalty (Taylor et al. 1979; Langworthy and Whitehead 1986). As mass support for the death penalty should be most intense when or where conservative values dominate, we can expect that the death penalty will be legal in the most conservative states.

Partisan Political Tactics: Recall that Republican candidates often have won elections by campaigning on law and order issues (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Mendelberg 2001). An anti-street crime agenda lets Republicans covertly appeal to anti-minority sentiments (Mendelberg 2001; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005). The multiple findings we have already discussed suggest that Republican political strength is closely associated with harsh punishments. Inasmuch as capital punishment has been a key issue in many state political campaigns (Constanzo 1997), jurisdictions in which the political strength of the Republican party is the greatest, should be particularly likely to have a legal death penalty.

Testing these Hypotheses: Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) assess the empirical adequacy of such political accounts for the presence of capital punishment in the U.S. states in two ways. They first perform a pooled time-series analysis of this outcome using state data from 1970, 1980, and 1990. With the state murder or violent crime rates (which did not account for this outcome) and other plausible explanations held constant, they find support for hypotheses that the death penalty is likely to be legal in conservative states with larger African American populations where Republicans hold the most important state offices.

Yet, a methodological problem concerns timing. Some states never legalized capital punishment. Michigan, for example, abandoned this punishment before this state was admitted to the union in 1855 (Koch and Galliher 1993). And despite occasional mass movements that attempted to overturn this historical decision – often in reaction to a particularly vicious and well publicized murder (Haines 1996) – the absence of this penalty persisted in many abolitionist states. Such resilient choices from the distant past make the findings based on the panel

⁴Careful reviews of the multiple empirical studies on this issue conducted by legal scholars (Zimring and Hawkins 1986), criminologists (Paternoster 1991; Hood 1998), sociologists (Bailey and Peterson 1999), and economists (Donohue and Wolfers 2006; Levitt 2002) conclude that the death penalty has no discernable general deterrent effects beyond those conferred by long prison terms. This list of skeptics includes a scholar (Levitt) who has repeatedly published findings showing that imprisonment and other policies designed to control crime are effective deterrents.

analysis in the Jacobs and Carmichael study questionable. Their explanatory variables were measured after 1968, yet the state political decisions to abolish or legalize the death penalty often were made many years before.

But the Supreme Court provided a natural experiment that let Jacobs and Carmichael overcome this difficulty. Recall that in 1972 by a narrow five-four vote the Court struck down the constitutionality of the death penalty in *Furman*. Only 4 years later, however, the High Court relegalized this penalty in *Gregg*. But the Court required important modifications to preexisting state capital punishment statutes if states wished to use this penalty again. Most states with a legal death penalty before *Furman* met the Court's requirements by making the necessary alterations to their codes, but they varied in how long they took to complete this process.

These diverse delays let Jacobs and Carmichael conduct an alternative analysis to discover if the factors that best explained state support for capital punishment and also explained how long it took states to relegalize this punishment. By analyzing the time retentionist states took to modify their preexisting capital punishment statutes after *Gregg*, Jacobs and Carmichael could eliminate the effects of historical inertia. When they assessed the effects of equivalent explanatory factors used in their initial analyses, Jacobs and Carmichael again found that the most ideologically conservative states with larger African American populations whose voters provided greater support for a law and order Republican candidate (Nixon in 1968) were most likely to alter their death penalty statutes quickly so that they could restore the death penalty. Inasmuch as these two different analyses produced equivalent findings, there are good reasons to believe that these three political factors provide accurate explanations for state decisions about the legality of this punishment.

But there is an omitted variable problem. No timely data on public support for the death penalty in the states existed. Many political scientists seem wedded to the idea that public opinion is the most important determinant of public policy perhaps because they do not wish to contradict their discipline's consensus that the United States is fundamentally democratic (Burawoy 2005). But citizens have little knowledge about political issues (Converse 1964; Bishop 2005). Skeptics therefore claim that using public opinion to explain policy outcomes is dubious as attempts to measure such uninformed views produce statistically unreliable reifications (Converse 1964; Bishop 2005). And sampling bias is present. Representative national surveys only include questions about the most salient issues, so question availability forces researchers to confine their analyses especially to prominent matters. Even a largely uninformed public is unlikely to be completely ignorant about such issues, but the ability of public opinion to explain political choices about the many critical policies that receive less publicity remains questionable (Burstein 2006).

Yet, public opinion should provide a strong explanation for political decisions about a few intensely moral political decisions because the public cares so deeply about these issues. Racial policy (Miller and Stokes 1963) and capital punishment are good examples. Erickson (1976) analyzed public opinion in the 1930s when pollsters used extremely large samples with enough within state respondents to permit accurate measurements of state public opinion differences and found a close relationship between public support for capital punishment and the presence of a legal death penalty.

A different study based on a time-series approach provides information about the specific stage in the long capital punishment process when public opinion matters. Fluctuations in public support for the death penalty explain the likelihood of death sentences probably because these early decisions in this complicated multi-stage process are made by juries and by local prosecutors and judges who mostly are elected. A comparison of the explanatory power of various lags on public opinion, however, shows shifts in support for the death penalty do not

explain executions, which typically occur many years after a death sentence (Jacobs and Kent 2007). This finding is plausible. Although there are sharp debates in political science about the degree to which federal court decisions are guided by shifts in public opinion, the unelected federal judges who handle the last death penalty appeals should be less likely than their state counterparts to be influenced by shifts in public support for capital punishment.

On the Politics of Executions

Although executions clearly are the most severe legal punishment, only one systematic study on the combined political and individual factors that combine to determine which death row inmates will be executed apparently exists. Some earlier studies described what happens to offenders after they reach death row (Aarons 1998; Liebman et al. 2000), yet there are few systematic investigations about the determinants of executions. Studies by Spurr (2002) and Blume and Eisenberg (1999) are partial exceptions, but these researchers focused only on offender characteristics and ignored political conditions. And although research shows that victim race is the most important determinant of death sentences, little evidence exists as to whether this factor influences the fate of offenders on death row. In fact, only one study seems to have investigated whether this account explains executions.

The factors that influence execution probabilities are of interest partly because there are such sharp disparities in this outcome. Largely, as a result of the long and complicated appeals process after a death sentence, at least until 1995 less than 10% of all offenders on death row ultimately were executed (Liebman et al. 2000).⁵ To assess the determinants of these legal decisions about who will live and who will die, Jacobs et al. (2007) investigated the explanatory power of individual influences on post death sentence execution probabilities. And, because it is unlikely that the officials who decide who will be executed are unaffected by their political environment and because some death row offenders face far lower execution probabilities than their counterparts in less lenient jurisdictions, Jacobs et al. also assessed the effects of the political climate and other contextual factors.

Individual Accounts: Trial court studies of the offender attributes that lead to death sentences show that offenders convicted of killing whites are particularly likely to be sentenced to death (Dodge et al. 1990; Paternoster 1991; Baldous and Woodworth 2003) especially if the offender is black (Baldous and Woodworth 2003). Wacquant (2000) provides a theoretical foundation for this association when he claims that harsh legal punishments continue to be used to maintain the “symbolic distance needed to prevent the odium of ‘amalgamation’” with [minorities] considered inferior, rootless, and vile” (380). It follows that the ultimate symbolic assault on such a caste system occurs when an underclass minority kills a white. Yet, whether victim race continues to explain the fate of condemned prisoners after a death sentence has remained a complete mystery.

⁵Prisoners on death row escape execution mostly because they win a legal appeal. While local trial courts sentence, state and federal appellate courts handle appeals. The first of three possible capital appeals is mandatory and the initial two typically are decided by state appellate courts. After exhausting their state appeals, offenders can and (almost always do) seek relief in the federal courts. From 1970 to 1995 roughly 41% of all state death sentences were reversed on first appeal and about 9.5% were reversed in the second state appeal. Roughly 40% of the remainder who sought federal relief were successful (Liebman et al. 2000). Most of the rest were executed. Of the few of this remainder who were not, a small number received executive clemency, a larger proportion died before execution, and a few were removed from death row for other miscellaneous reasons. The great majority who obtained appellate relief were re-sentenced to prison after their release from death row.

Two paths seem most plausible. In contrast to the great majority of homicides, media outlets publicize interracial murders, particularly if the victim is white (Lipschultz and Hilt 2002; Bandes 2004). This increased coverage is critical as victories in well-publicized capital trials often help politically ambitious prosecutors reach higher office. But such triumphs must be protected. Prosecutors who have won death penalty verdicts thus have strong reasons to oppose capital appeals that may jeopardize a victory that can further their political career. And after a death sentence, the local prosecutor who won a capital verdict often plays an important role in resisting subsequent appeals. Since prosecutor efforts to thwart legal appeals by death row inmates probably influence execution probabilities, their opposition should be greater when the appeals by a minority offender who killed a white are at issue because such homicides receive greater media attention.

Even in the unlikely event that local prosecutor resistance to appeals after a death sentence have little influence, the media's focus on those murders in which a white was killed by a minority puts added pressure on appellate court justices to rule against these capital offenders in the subsequent appeals. State judges who defied intense public support for particular executions and granted appellate relief to such claimants have been defeated in the next election even though it is extremely difficult to lose retention elections (Brace and Hall 1997; Bright and Keenan 1995). Hence, Jacobs et al. (2007) hypothesized that African American or Hispanic offenders convicted of murdering a white should be less likely than other offenders to avoid the death chamber.

Contextual Accounts: The findings based on aggregate data in this review that provide such robust explanations for so many criminal justice outcomes suggest that legal decision makers cannot ignore their political environment. Claims that political ideology helps shape legal penalties are compelling particularly when the most severe punishment is at issue. Images of evil and beliefs about the most appropriate punishments based on these views are foundational components of political ideologies. Recall that conservative views about the efficacy of deterrence provide the basis for dubious conservative claims that a few executions will protect many innocent victims from criminal brutality. It again follows that execution frequencies should be significantly higher in states with the most conservative citizenry and the most conservative public officials.

Republican campaigns for the presidency relied on and probably accentuated (Beckett 1997) mass perceptions about the links between purportedly venal underclass life styles and lawlessness. Recall that Jacobs and Carmichael found that votes for the first of the Republican presidents who successfully exploited public views about the links between race and crime (Nixon in 1968) helped explain how quickly states relegalized capital punishment after the Supreme Court ruling that forced changes in state statutes. Incarceration rates also were higher in counties in which larger percentages of voters supported a Republican law and order presidential candidate (Weidner and Frase 2003). Death row inmates thus should be less likely to avoid execution in states that gave the most votes to Republican presidential candidates because prosecutors, appellate justices who handle death row appeals, and governors who must sign death warrants or award clemency will face stronger public pressures to support executions in such jurisdictions.

Results: The findings support these predictions. First, at the individual level, Jacobs et al. (2007) found that an African American on death row convicted of killing a white was far more likely to be executed than the other equivalent death row inmates. And the likelihood that a Hispanic on death row convicted of killing a white would be executed also was greater than otherwise identical inmates under sentence of death. Yet, the disparity in execution probabilities for Hispanics who killed whites was not as substantial as the contrast in execution probabilities between African Americans who killed whites and other death row inmates.

In short, African Americans who violated the racial caste system by killing whites were most likely to face the ultimate penalty. Second, two state political characteristics had robust independent effects on execution probabilities with state murder rates and other plausible explanatory factors held constant. Consistent with the research on legalization, execution frequencies were greater in states in which conservative ideologies were dominant and where law and order Republican presidential candidates received the most votes.

And indirect indicators of the influence of racial politics had substantial explanatory power as well. In support of a political version of minority threat theory, states with larger percentages of African American residents executed more often, but after the proportion of African Americans reached a relatively substantial threshold, execution probabilities diminished. These findings support threat theory because they suggest that executions will increase after initial expansions in minority presence. Yet, after African American proportions expand past the point where their potential political influence becomes sufficient, the positive relationship between the percentage of African American residents in a state and execution frequencies becomes negative.

This latter finding makes sense for two reasons. First, African American political associations such as the Legal Defense Fund have waged war on the death penalty largely because African Americans have been far more likely to be executed than other citizens (Haines 1996). Second, all local prosecutors (save those in Alaska), most state appellate justices who rule on death penalty appeals, and all governors, are elected. Such results therefore are consistent with a supposition that if African Americans are to reduce executions, their proportion in a state must expand to the point at which their votes may help decide elections, but this proportion can be modest if the other voting blocs are evenly matched.

It follows that underclass minorities who defied the racial caste system by killing a white were most likely to be executed. Second, execution probabilities were heavily influenced by political considerations. This result calls into question the degree to which horizontal equity is present in the administration of this irreversible punishment. Would identical offenders who commit identical homicides be identically punished in states with different political climates? As long as political considerations that probably should not matter have such substantial explanatory power, the available evidence suggests not.

CONCLUSIONS

This review has summarized the rather sparse systematic research on the politics of criminal justice with findings mostly confined to the United States. As one might expect in light of the recent theoretical emphasis on the intrinsically political nature of legal punishments (Foucault 1977; Garland 1990, 2001; Chambliss 1994) and the Republican party's tactical use of law and order appeals to covertly enhance voters' racial fears, multiple results show that various severe punishments increased after states awarded additional votes to Republican candidates. Yet, an increased electoral support for law and order Republicans who enthusiastically supported harsh punishments may have been based on preexisting conservative values. But this alternative hypothesis is unlikely as the studies that analyzed multiple criminal justice outcome in the states repeatedly find that votes for Republican candidates account for punishments after citizen ideology is held constant. The findings summarized in this review also indirectly confirm the racial politics perspective that provided the primary conceptual impetus for the earlier studies that sought to test conflict theory, but for the most part left the political aspects implicit.

Even though almost all of the studies in this review analyzed outcomes in the United States, nevertheless there are some important comparative implications that are a subtext in this literature. In the relatively homogeneous European democracies, the predominant penal emphasis is on the reintegration of offenders into a solidaristic society administered by experts who are only distantly accountable to the voters (Savelsberg 1994; Whitman 2003). In such top down democracies, penal policies and other aspects of the criminal justice system are not subject to the whims of voters animated by ambitious politicians. Rather than emphasizing penal goals such as incapacitation, vengeance, and denunciation, European elected officials seem instead to be motivated by different values.

In contrast to the U.S. Republican party, much of the initial support for the conservative confessional parties in Europe came from a rural aristocracy who felt some responsibility for the least fortunate. *Noblesse oblige* or a duty to provide for the welfare of the lower orders was and still may be considered an obligation by persons of high birth. If Garland (1990), Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939), and Western (2006) are right when they claim that the penal outcomes are largely determined by relationships between the rich and the poor, perhaps the remnants of these values still help explain the seemingly weak or nonexistent relationships between the political strength of conservative parties in Europe and the comparative absence of harsh punitive practices in these democracies.

In the United States, however, the public's Manichean image of human nature combined with a history of bitter racial conflict produced or perhaps let public officials create an exclusionary penal system. According to Wacquant (2000, 2001), the resilient racial divisions produced by slavery and by the subsequent virulent measures used to maintain white supremacy ultimately led to a segregative penal solution. Such an exclusionary policy is consistent with the dominant public image of street criminals as members of a "vile" (Wacquant 2000) racial underclass. This exceptional racial history and the premises created by social arrangements designed to maintain African American subordination helped produce a criminal justice system that mainly uses incapacitation to control street crime. This incapacitative solution fits well with the prevailing public view – often forcefully expressed by voters energized by political entrepreneurs in this most direct of all large democracies – that the primary goal of the U.S. criminal justice system should be vengeance.

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PART III

Methods in the Study of Politics

Comparative-Historical Methodology in Political Sociology

EDGAR KISER AND STEVE PFAFF

Debates about the methodology of comparative and historical work have raged since its inception. They are in part a function of the difficulties encountered in this type of work – data from the past are not only incomplete but samples are biased and several types of methods (experiments, surveys, observational techniques) cannot be used. Unfortunately, many of the methodological debates have been waged between advocates of one type of data (e.g., quantitative, archival) or one particular methodology (e.g., Mill's methods, game theory) interested in pushing for its broader (or even universal) use. Our approach in this chapter is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of several different types of data and methods and to try to outline the conditions in which each will be most useful.

Two general principles will guide our survey. First, all research should begin with theory. Theory should determine the choice of cases (both how many are needed and which ones) and the type of data to be collected. Once these decisions have been made, the number and characteristics of cases and the type of data collected for each should dictate the choice of method. This is the central problem with those who advocate for the general application of particular methods – the choice of method should be the last decision made by the analyst, not the first. Second, we follow Lieberman (1985), King et al. (1994), and Goldthorpe (2000) in arguing that there is only one general logic of inference, and it applies to qualitative as well as quantitative work, historical analysis and regression analysis of survey data.

The organization of our chapter reflects these general principles. We begin with a discussion of comparative-historical data. After commenting on the general problems and limitations of data in this area, we explore the uses of the two main sources of data about history, archival records and secondary sources. We conclude this section with a discussion of a new technique for dealing with the limitations of historical data, the use of computer simulations to explore historical counterfactuals. The next section of the chapter covers methods of data analysis and is organized around different methods used to analyze different number of cases. We begin with the quantitative analysis of large numbers of cases, explore the particular issues involved in mid-sized Ns (about 5–30 cases), and conclude with different forms of narrative analyses of one or a few cases.

COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL DATA

Social scientists who do comparative-historical work face major data limitations. Historical data are incomplete and the extent of incompleteness varies significantly. It is often noted that the winners write the history, so data are better for states that survived than for those that failed, better for elites than for the masses, and better for men than for women. Each of these limitations makes it difficult to get good samples (of all states that existed in 1500, for example), and tends to bias case choice toward those with better data availability. Moreover, the types of data we do have were not produced by scholars to answer particular academic questions (as most contemporary social science data are using experiments, surveys, or ethnographies), but were produced by historical actors (often the rulers of states or other elites) and reflect their interests and biases. In short, historical data for many periods are in limited supply and difficult to interpret.

John Goldthorpe (1991) has argued that these limitations are so severe that historical social science will be able to contribute very little to the accumulation of knowledge. Because the “relics” of history (his term for historical data) are finite and incomplete, and secondary sources provide too many different opinions about what really happened, the empirical foundation of historical work is not sufficient to build or test theory. We should thus jettison historical work and focus on the contemporary world, where scholars can create their own data. The problem with Goldthorpe’s critique is that it allows data to dictate research topics. First, this leads to a huge presentist sampling bias, a serious problem if we are interested in the general study of society and politics. Second, several types of questions, including extremely important questions about the origins of institutions, could not be studied at all.

ARCHIVAL DATA

Historians are the preeminent specialists of the documentary record. Most graduate programs in history include training in the use of historical archives and most doctoral dissertations in history draw on archival sources. However, procedures for using archival records are rarely formalized into explicit methodological guidelines, reflecting the training of historians as craft specialists. Historians are generally quite aware of the evidentiary bias raised by Goldthorpe. In both field and historiography seminars, they are taught to consider the reasons why documents were produced and why records of particular events or transactions were recorded and carefully preserved and others were not. Historians are also made sensitive to the often incomplete or one-sided depiction of events that sources represent; formal records often exclude the views of historical “losers”, as well as the perceptions of events by the subaltern classes. And, because they are usually not interested in drawing broad inferences beyond a particular case, archives serve primarily descriptive purposes.

The practical work of historians thus relies on their developing sensitivity, discretion, and judiciousness in the handling of evidence found in the historical record. However, historians have also institutionalized the parallel field of historiography. Historiography refers to the logic of historical process, rules of evidence, and methods for assessing the validity of historical arguments. Historiographers evaluate the history of the discipline, comparatively assess competing accounts of the same or similar events, consider questions of valid inference and description, reveal the implicit assumptions of historical works, and consider how evidence was collected and assessed. Because historiography itself does not offer a set of concrete practices that produce measurably valid results, it is more philosophy of history and history of knowledge than method. Instead, the purpose of historiography is to help to make knowledge cumulative and

make historians self-conscious readers of history. While most historians strive for objectivity, for most this entails the embrace of a scholarly ethic of honesty, the balancing of competing accounts, and transparency in argumentation and the handling of evidence (Burke 1991; Novick 1988).

Although there are voices prominent in contemporary debates concerning historical and comparative methods in the social sciences that urge adoption of orientations akin to those of historians (Sewell 1996; Somers 1996; Steinmetz 2007), most historical and comparative social scientists are not content with narrative explanation or the informality of historical methods. When social scientists employ archival records, they most fruitfully approach them as a source of data, that is, as discrete observations or measurable facts. Joseph Gerteis (2007), for example, uses the records and newspaper archives of the Farmer's Alliance and the Knights of Labor to help demonstrate the possibilities and limits of cross-racial political alliances among workers and Populists in late nineteenth Century America. Drawing on both social-structural variables and discourse analysis, he reconstructs the political conditions and strategies for framing interests that favored interracial mobilization or spelled its doom. In a study of labor party organization in Australia and the United States, Robin Archer (2007) engages a side-by-side comparison of two "most similar" cases where intense debates raged at the end of the nineteenth century over whether labor should organize an independent political party. Drawing on Australian and American labor movement documents, the memoirs of leading organizers, period newspapers, and other primary sources, Archer shows why Australia got a Labor Party and why the comparative severity of class-based repression, the enduring strength of craft unionism, the rival pull of confessional and ethnic attachments, and Marxist sectarianism deterred labor leaders from founding their own party in the United States.

Other recent political studies use archival evidence to help reconstruct the policy process and decision making. Edwin Amenta (2006) employs the "negative" case of the Townsend movement for generous, universal old-age pensions in the 1930s and 1940s to explore the conditions under which outsider social movements can influence social policy. Drawing on Congressional archives, Townsend movement records and publications, and wealth of other primary sources, Amenta is able to use a single case to unravel how policy is made and to suggest why and when social movement mobilization impacts the political process.

Ivan Ermakoff (2008) uses extensive archival evidence to understand "collective abdications" by sovereign parliaments in the case of Weimar Germany and third Republic France. Ermakoff marshals impressive contextual and individual data to understand what led parliamentarians to vote away their powers in the face of would-be dictators. Ermakoff's brilliant use of the archival record allows him to analyze individual and collective choices in light of explicit theories of decision making, thereby not only improving our understanding of Hitler's consolidation of power and the advent of Vichy France, but also advancing the sophistication and real-world applicability of game theory and choice-theoretic models. Studies like these indicate the payoffs to political analysis when it pays explicit attention to processes of causation in specific historical episodes, uses archival evidence to trace the evolution of outcomes, and seeks to understand the subjective motivations of actors in explaining political behavior.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Archival work is extremely time-consuming. Therefore, when the questions a scholar wants to answer require the use of several cases, it is generally not possible to do archival research. When the empirical scope of a study precludes archival data, historical work must be based on secondary sources, books and articles written by historians. Bollen et al. (1993) showed

that the vast majority of comparative–historical work uses secondary sources, and while this appears to be changing for small-N research, it remains true of larger-N studies.

The problem with secondary sources is that they cannot be taken as raw data, since the narratives that organize them are not just neutral records of “what happened”, but are based in part on the implicit (or in rare cases, explicit) theoretical assumptions and arguments of the historians who wrote them (Lustick 1996). Moreover, the historiographical literature in any area is often very complicated, since historical accounts frequently disagree and historiography only provides for informed judgment. When this happens, how will sociologists and political scientists choose between conflicting historical accounts? The obvious problem is that in the absence of any clear rules about adjudicating between alternative historical narratives, social scientists will simply choose those that seem the most reasonable to them, which in most cases will be those that employ the same or similar implicit theories. The result of this would be that different social scientists with different theoretical orientations could both find confirming evidence for their theories in the same historiographical debates by relying on different secondary sources (Lustick 1996).

The only way for social scientists to even begin to solve this problem is by becoming much more aware of the historiographical debates, and the implicit theories guiding the protagonists in these debates. Lustick (1996:615–116) offers three more specific strategies for mitigating the problem of conflicting secondary sources. First, a researcher could pick a particular school of historiography and explicitly accept the implicit theories used to construct its account of history. Second, scholars could look for similarities in historical accounts that cut across historiographical schools, and use these areas of agreement as their data. Third, social scientists could be more explicit about the reasons they chose to use certain secondary sources and ignore others, so that others could better judge the validity of their choices. While none of these strategies completely solve the problem, all of them are improvements over most current practice.

CREATING VIRTUAL ‘DATA’: COMPUTER SIMULATIONS

Computer simulations are beginning to be used more widely in the social sciences, but have not been used much in historical sociology (Collins and Hanneman [1995] is one notable exception). Several characteristics of computer simulations make them especially well suited to historical analyses. Goldthorpe’s (1991) main criticism of historical sociology is based on the paucity and unreliability of its data (a reliance on the “relics” of history). The use of simulations provides one way to respond to this criticism. Simulations can create large data sets of virtual histories that allow us to compensate for data limitations and to construct and test historical counterfactuals.

Computer simulations can also more precisely reveal the theorized impact of particular causal mechanisms. Simulations make the causal mechanisms explicit – they are in the code – and variations in their strength and in the conditions in which they occur (including the presence or absence of other mechanisms) can be used to isolate their effects and model their interactions. Furthermore, simulations can be used to test the robustness of causal mechanisms using sensitivity analysis. This is an important issue in comparative-historical work, since it is often difficult to tell if an outcome is due to general causal mechanisms or to chance, accident, or particular historical initial conditions. To put it another way, simulations can be used to specify the scope of causal mechanisms. Simulations are especially useful for modeling complex interactions. This is important in historical work due to the frequency of complex

conjunctural causation there (Ragin 1987; Mahoney 2008). For all of these reasons, computer simulations should be especially useful to historical sociologists.¹

METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

There have been two general trends in the development of methods for comparative-historical analysis in the last couple of decades. First, as the type of theory dominant in the area has changed, debates about methods have been transformed. During what Adams et al. (2005) call the “second wave” of historical sociology, dominated by debates about large-scale social transformations (the origins of capitalism, the causes of major revolutions) using structuralist versions of Marxist and Weberian theory, the main debates about methods centered on Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. These methods were used by some (most prominently Skocpol [1979]) to adjudicate between macro-level causal variables thought to produce the large-scale outcomes of interest. Mill’s methods are no longer used in comparative-historical social science, in part because of a series of criticisms (Burawoy 1989; Kiser and Hechter 1991), but also because the theoretical models guiding comparative-historical work changed dramatically. In place of the macro-structuralism that once dominated the field, more scholars are now using multi-level theories and focusing on strategic interaction. This has resulted in a new focus on narrative methods, and to the second important trend: the development of many different ways to formalize narrative analysis.²

CASE CHOICE

The process of choosing cases in the social sciences is often driven by non-scientific considerations. Bollen et al. (1993) noted that very few scholars doing comparative-historical work pay sufficient attention to the selection of cases and, while this remains the case in sociology, this has changed in political science (see, e.g., Gerring 2007). Scholars often want to study “important” cases, where importance is defined either by contemporary policy concerns or by general cultural identity. The best example of the latter is the focus on early modern Western Europe. Whether it is the origins of capitalism or early modern revolutions, an extraordinary number of

¹ Computer simulations are certainly not a panacea for all of our problems, and they do have several limitations and shortcomings. First, simulation models are often highly simplified, and thus can be criticized for a lack of realism. Second, the numerical parameter values of many of the variables in the models are often arbitrary, and can in some cases influence the results (this is why sensitivity analysis is essential). It is important to note that work using computer simulations is still in its infancy, especially in the social sciences, thus caution is in order.

² As James Mahoney (2008) persuasively argues, causal inquiry in historical and comparative studies can be approached through both case-oriented and population-oriented research. The main difference between these approaches is that case-oriented researchers generally search for the causes of particular outcomes of interest in small number of cases while population-oriented researchers seek typical causal effects in a population of interest. Mahoney argues that the two approaches can be reconciled through a realization that causal effects at the overall population level are evident only insofar as they can be theorized to be operating in individual cases. Rather than start with the mean causal effects identified at the population level in order to understand causation at the level of individual cases, researchers would be better off starting with a solid understanding of causation drawn from individual cases and extending it to the population level (414). Causes identified as insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome (INUS causation, see p. 418) are thus assumed to be operating in both case-oriented and population-oriented research. Mahoney’s is a program of unification that favors case-based reasoning by assuming that mean causal effects identified in large-N studies are derivative of case-level causation. Doing so requires models that capture interactions between variables or the tools of QCA.

books and articles have been devoted to this time and place relative to other periods and areas. The obvious reason is that American and European scholars are interested in “our” history, since it is part of our cultural identity. The main problem with choosing cases in this way is that it leads to very biased sampling, a serious problem if scholars want to generalize broadly.

There are other biases in case choice in contemporary comparative-historical sociology. Some types of cases are much more likely to have collected and preserved data than others (Ebbinghaus 2005). Selecting on the dependent variable is another serious problem (Geddes 1990). The only time it is acceptable to do that without biasing results is when the question of interest is about the necessary causes of particular outcomes (Mahoney 2003:351–52; see also Mahoney 2008).

The best way to avoid these errors is to select cases based on theoretical considerations. Degrees of freedom issues dictate that the number of cases should be a function of the number of variables being considered as possible causes – the more possible causes, the more cases required to adjudicate between them. Focusing on cases that are anomalous from the perspective of existing theories is also a useful case choice strategy (Emigh 1997; Froese and Pfaff 2001). These strategies of case choice will better facilitate the cumulation of knowledge.

ANALYZING LARGE NUMBERS OF CASES

There are ongoing debates among scholars doing comparative-historical work about the costs and benefits of quantitative analyses of large numbers of cases. The most important virtues of having a lot of cases are having a lot of degrees of freedom to test complex arguments, being able to use sophisticated statistical techniques, and being able to generalize broadly. In spite of these obvious benefits, there is a great deal of skepticism about this type of study design. Tilly (1984:77) sums up the view of many when he claims that “little of long-term value to the social sciences has emerged from the hundreds of studies conducted during the last few decades that have run statistical analyses including most of the world’s national states.”

There are several potential problems with large-N quantitative research. It is difficult if not impossible for anyone to know all of the cases well enough to know if the data are reliable or the model correctly specified for any particular case. More generally, it is also difficult to know if all of the cases are similar enough to be included in the same analysis – the unit homogeneity assumption is often violated. There is also a further assumption that the same causal paths produce the outcome of interest in all of cases, ignoring the possibility that different causal configurations could lead to the same outcome (Ragin 1987). Galton’s problem – the fact that outcomes in different cases could have been produced not by the same causal processes but by diffusion across cases – is also a serious consideration and too often ignored. When large-N quantitative work is cross-sectional, as it most often is, the temporal dimension of causal processes is ignored, and one runs the risk that the outcomes could be conditional on factors present in the particular time period of the study. For all of these reasons, scholars must use caution in doing this kind of work.

CLIOMETRICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY

In the 1950s, the “new economic historians” in the United States pioneered an influential approach to economic history that involved explicit application of theoretical propositions to primarily quantitative data (Meyer 1997). Dubbed “cliometrics” (for Clio, the muse of history,

and metric for the use of measurement) scholars embracing these new methods revolutionized the practice of economic history. Mostly, they sought to apply economic theory directly in quantitative studies of long-term economic performance. They employed new techniques, such as constructing large-N data sets from historical records such as censuses, crop returns, commodity prices, contracts, trade reports, etc. which they submitted to statistical analysis, as well as using explicit counter-factual reasoning in which they constructed theoretically plausible historical alternatives against which measurable economic performance could be assessed.

Famously, cliometricians used the new techniques to assess the profitability and durability of the American slave labor system (Conrad and Myer 1958; Fogel and Engerman 1974) and to analyze factors such as property rights and the railroads in the growth and development of the United States' economy (Fogel 1964; North 1961). This work opened up lively debates on a host of substantive and methodological issues, seriously calling into question much of the consensus in the field and advancing the methodological state-of-the-art. Quantitative economic history became a standard practice and was widely taken up worldwide. It influenced not only economic history, but spurred the development of self-consciously social-scientific practices among historians, political scientists, sociologists, and others. Certainly, the incredible expansion in access to, and power of, computing makes the sort of large-N analysis developed by cliometric's founders decades ago much less daunting today.

Nevertheless, cliometrics has faced criticism and resistance. Economists have criticized the quality of historical data for all but the most recent historical periods. Institutionalists have questioned work driven by neoclassical assumptions and raise serious objections concerning the ability of numerical measurement to capture institutional effects. Finally, most economists do not regard economic history as a central part of the discipline and find its concerns peripheral to mainstream economics (Williamson and Whaples 2003). For their part, historians often object to theoretical models being "imposed" upon history and are reluctant to sacrifice or compromise narrative methods. Although the subfield of social history was deeply influenced by cliometrics in the 1970s, it never substantially remade the historical profession, as few historians have the training to employ or evaluate statistical methods and often rightly point to the limits of the approach, particularly where systematic data are scarce or incomplete (Jarausch and Hardy 1991). Exploding interest in postmodernist, feminist, and poststructural critiques associated with the "cultural turn" in history (Hunt 1989) also conspired to make quantitative history peripheral to the discipline.

Nevertheless, in the historical and comparative study of politics, the use of quantitative data and the explicit use of counter-factual analysis are now commonplace. For example, in a brilliant study of federalism in nineteenth Century European political development, Daniel Ziblatt (2006) examines why nationalist political elites intent on unifying Germany and Italy from a diverse collection of existing states choose a federal structure for one (Germany) and a unitary state structure for the other (Italy) even though both preferred federalism. Collecting a wealth of data on economic performance and state capacity for the various German and Italian states, Ziblatt shows that the weak administrative capacity and retarded economic development of many Italian regions accounts for the difference. Chaos during the critical juncture following the wars of unification compelled Cavour and the House of Savoy to impose their own political institutions over the whole of Italy. By contrast, the principal states included in the new German empire by Bismarck had the economic and administrative development necessary to include them in an effective federal state led by Prussia. There are many other examples. For instance, using economic and social indicators of development, James Mahoney (2001) showed why elite plans for liberalizing Central American economy and society in the late nineteenth Century resulted in such divergent pathways across the region and

Philip Gorski (2003) employs a host of economic, political, and social data to show how Calvinism influenced Northern European state formation in the early modern period and increased the ability states to penetrate society.

INFERRING INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATED DATA: ECOLOGICAL REGRESSION

A common problem in historical studies of politics, especially elections, is that we often lack individual-level data on political behavior. Ecological methods are an extension of statistical inference to cases in which needed information at the individual level is lost in the process of aggregation. This is especially troublesome when the missing information is systematically related to the dependent variable. Ecological methods have recently been improved to make valid inferences about individual-level behaviors from aggregated data. Gary King's (1997) new approach to the ecological inference problem synthesized and improved upon existing techniques. King's solution makes it possible to analyze mean individual level behavior from the possible range set by the proportions of categories of interest within a defined population. There has been extensive application of the method in racial-voting studies where, because of the secret ballot and the unavailability or unreliability of surveys, scholars wish to infer how members of racial categories vote from aggregate information, such as electoral returns in a district, the demographic divisions in it, and the number of total voters that that turned-out on election day.

While King's method has been criticized by some for yielding inconclusive results or errors in inference, it has had an enormous impact on both studies of political behavior and epidemiology. Since it was proposed, the basic model has been extended to include Bayesian hierarchical models, to treat cases with temporal dependence, and for problems of spatial heterogeneity and dependence (King et al. 2004). Most importantly, for students of political history, the development of more sophisticated methods for ecological regression has made it possible to reexamine questions which previously seemed intractable. Work on ethnic and nationalist voting during the interwar period in Central and Eastern Europe being done by Jason Wittenberg and Jeffrey Kopstein is an example of the promise of ecological regression models for historical analysis. Through ecological inference, they are able to reconsider the historical depiction of ethnic politics in a fractious region characterized by new democracies. Contrary to much received historical wisdom, their work shows, among other things, that the Jewish population did not "betray" Polish democracy by voting disproportionately for the Communists and that voting behavior was influenced by complex assessment of interests shaped by ethnic local fractionalization (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2003).

In a fascinating study of the persistence of political loyalties under Communism, Wittenberg (2006) has also used ecological regression techniques to explain why some Hungarian regions retained their traditional rightist electoral orientations from the 1940s through the first few elections after 1989. Wittenberg theorizes that persistent attachments grew out of church-based social networks that helped their members resist assimilation into socialist society. His archival research shows that where defiant clergy catalyzed resistance, conservative social milieus survived and were able to reproduce themselves through religious socialization. With the end of the dictatorship, these bastions of conservative loyalty could be reactivated by political campaigns, leading citizens to vote for the right. Wittenberg tests his hypothesis using multivariate and ecological regression analysis of patterns of electoral returns in around 3,000 localities. This allows him to discern if religious mobilization in a locality (measured by

the proportion of youth enrolling in voluntary religious instruction) predicts subsequent voting patterns. Indeed, both regression and graphical analysis reveal strong correlations between religious mobilization and subsequent rightist voting patterns.

COPING WITH TOO FEW 'POSITIVE' CASES IN HISTORICAL STUDIES: CASE-CONTROL METHODS

The low incidence of many classes of political events and rare forms of political behavior pose a challenge in many historical studies. However, this does not rule out the use of quantitative methods. One approach that has only begun to be adopted by comparative and historical researchers is the case-control method. Case-control studies are intended for study of (1) rare conditions or events; (2) and events of short duration; (3) and for the estimation of the relative risks of occurrence associated with variables of interest – all features of many phenomena of interest to social scientists studying politics and political behavior. In case-control studies, the researcher compares a group which is positive for a rare outcome of interest with an appropriate control group which does not have that outcome. Case-control methods are widely used to study rare diseases or unusual disease outbreaks, because the methods are efficient with respect to sample size and offer analytic power that would be otherwise absent with other approaches (Haroutune and Lillienfeld 1994; Lillienfeld and Stalley 1994; Newman 2001; Schlesselman 1982).

In case-based analysis with a retrospective sample, one cannot estimate the probability of an event but one can estimate the odds ratios predicting occurrence (Agresti 2002). In conducting case-control studies, a researcher identifies and validates a case group of “positive cases”, assembles a comparison group which is “negative” for the outcome in question which must be at potential risk of positive occurrence and drawn from the study population. For the sake of efficiency, the smallest sample should be drawn that still permits valid inferences. Matching strategies for control groups can be employed to create a stratified sample linked to known factors that place cases at risk of occurrence. For example, if a disease is known to afflict only men of East Asian ancestry, it is inefficient to compare positive cases with a random sample of all U.S. citizens. However, matching variables cannot be examined as risk factors in the analysis, and gains to efficiency come at the cost of complicating design and analysis. Drawing a control group from a population-based sample helps reduce sampling bias and allows for analysis of a full range of variables.

Case-control methods may offer advantages to the historical study of rare political events such as rebellions, revolutions, political transitions, and like episodes as they were designed for rare occurrences and permit multivariate analysis where population-based approaches would not. The method is both efficient with respect to sample size and offers analytic power that would be otherwise absent with other approaches. Moreover, the outcome in question need not be binary – that is, researchers can analyze cases that range from “mild” to “severe” through multinomial logistic regression analysis. An appealing aspect of case-control methods is the reduction in the cost of data collection compared with approaches based on standard random sampling of a study population. Moreover, when events are very rare, the very great effort and cost that would be required to obtain a valid population-based sample would probably result in too few positive cases to permit valid inference on the dependent variable. Case-based retrospective studies require far smaller samples. Because the return to power decreases sharply as the ratio of controls to cases grows, the standard practice in epidemiology is to draw a control

group based on a 4–1 ratio of controls to cases, which achieves more than 80% of its theoretical maximum (Lillienfeld and Stalley 1994:13; Newman 2001).³

However, case–control methods also have disadvantages. They do not provide an estimate of the incidence of a condition or event in the population at risk, only of those factors that increase the odds of occurrence. One cannot estimate prevalence rates; so, for example, use of these methods would not allow us to estimate the rate at which episodes of political unrest occur within some population. The feasibility of case–control studies relies on obtaining a listing of units that experienced the rare event (cases) and the drawing of an appropriate control group from the larger at-risk population, both of which can be difficult in historical studies.

One example of recent work that has used case–control methods to study a rare form of political behavior can be seen in Federico Varese and Meir Yaish's (2000, 2005) research on the factors that increased the odds that people living in Nazi-occupied Europe would risk their lives to rescue or assist imperiled Jews. Their research shows how factors related to opportunity and resources increased the odds of a person choosing to assist, as did prior signals of altruistic intent, and prosocial personality traits. So far, however, the use of case–control methods has been rare in sociology and political science (Lacy 1997). Why? How much does this have to do with understanding of the method vs. applicability?

ANALYZING MID-SIZED Ns: QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FUZZY SETS

In part because we lack appropriate methods to analyze data sets with mid-sized Ns, scholars tend to avoid this work in favor of either qualitative analyses of a few cases or quantitative work on a very large number of cases. Charles Ragin (1987, 2000) has been trying to develop methods that bridge the unfortunately large gap between qualitative case studies and quantitative statistical analyses.

His (1987) method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) uses Boolean algebra to discover necessary and sufficient conditions for producing particular outcomes. Although it has been useful in a fair amount of comparative–historical work, like many novel approaches, QCA has some serious flaws. The two most significant are the necessity to dichotomize all variables and the deterministic nature of the method (it is not based on probability theory, and lacks any kind of significance test).

In order to address the first problem, Ragin (2000) has developed a new version of QCA based on the theory of fuzzy sets. In set theory, variables are conceived of in terms of set membership, and relationships between variables are modeled as the intersections of sets. In Ragin's earlier QCA, the sets were crisp, thus the variables were dichotomous (i.e., a country was either democratic or not, capitalist or not). The problem with using crisp sets is their procrustian quality, making it difficult to deal with cases that are somewhat democratic or somewhat capitalist. In quantitative statistical analysis, this issue is normally addressed by increasing the number of sets (moving to interval scale measurements), and miscategorizations are captured in the error term of the regression equation. Since fuzzy sets are not based

³As a result of the rule of diminishing power gain in sampling theory, Gail et al. (1976:722) observe “When the researcher has little control over the number of subjects available in one group [the cases] and the number is limited... incremental gains in power diminish rapidly with increasing k (# of controls), and values of k greater than 4 are seldom worthwhile.”

on probability theory, Ragin takes a different tack. Using detailed knowledge about the cases, the analyst determines whether cases are either fully in or fully out of the set, or fall somewhere in between. The latter's relationship to the set is quantified precisely – for example, if full inclusion is 1 and exclusion is 0, cases are depicted as .7 democratic or .86 capitalist. The use of fuzzy sets thus combines qualitative distinctions (cases that are fully in or fully out of sets) with quantitative distinctions indicating intermediate degrees of membership.

One of the virtues of his approach is that it allows for tight relationship between verbal and quantitative expressions. The analyst can specify that 'predominantly' capitalist refers to cases at .8 or above and "somewhat" capitalist refers to those at .6–.79. A potential problem with the fuzzy set approach is that the analyst is required to characterize set membership very precisely. First, this means that his method requires extremely precise data, and thus will be difficult to apply to cases in which data are fragmentary or of poor quality. Second, it requires the analyst to know a great deal about each of the cases, enough to distinguish between those that are .7 and those that are .8 democratic, for example. This is difficult enough to do in small N studies, but the problem is greatly magnified when detailed knowledge is required for 20–30 cases. It is clearly not easy to do fuzzy set social science.

What are the costs and benefits of using the fuzzy set approach instead of existing alternatives (such as logit regression) for studies with mid-sized Ns? For example, could we simply use interval instead of categorical measures to capture the "fuzzy" part, and interaction terms to address conjunctural causation? Ragin's answer to the first is that interval measures cannot adequately capture the qualitative part of fuzzy sets. For many theories, it is only important to know if something is in a set or not, quantitative variations among entities that are fully within the set do not matter. The question of whether regression models with interaction terms can be used to capture conjunctural causation seems to come down to an issue of degrees of freedom, but in fact it rests primarily on Ragin's ontological assumption that most causation is based on complex multi-way interactions. If he is right about that, then he is also right that regression models will not be able to capture this type of causation without exhausting degrees of freedom, and a method like fuzzy set QCA is necessary.

The second main limitation of QCA and fuzzy set logic has been recently addressed by Eliason and Stryker (Forthcoming). They extend Ragin's fuzzy set methodology in three ways: (1) by formally accounting for measurement error; (2) by creating descriptive measures of the distance and consistency between an observed fuzzy set graph and specific hypotheses; and (3) by creating goodness-of-fit tests to assess the fit between a fuzzy set graph and hypotheses about causal sufficiency and necessity. These modifications seem to respond to the main criticisms of Ragin's methods made by statisticians, and could open the way for more widespread use of these methods.

SMALL Ns AND CASE STUDIES: FORMS OF NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Narrative is the traditional method used by historians and social scientists to tell "stories" linking temporally ordered events. Lawrence Stone (1979:10) provides the most straightforward definition: "[n]arrative is taken to mean the organization of material in a chronologically sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with sub-plots." Most "second wave" structuralist historical work uses narrative, but relegates it to the background of arguments that focus on more general macro-level causes of major political and economic transformations (e.g., Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979). Narrative is used in structuralist historical work mainly in two rather limited ways: (1) to describe and discuss the nature of the

initial conditions (factors exogenous to the causal model), in order to “set the stage” for the causal argument; and (2) to describe in greater detail the causal mechanisms linking causes and effects, in order to make rather sparse structural arguments more compelling.

The revival of narrative analysis in sociology is an attempt to employ narrative in a more central role than in most macrosociological history, and to do it more systematically and more formally than most traditional historians. Narratives are composed of sequences of events, and the temporal ordering of the events in the sequence is a central aspect of the analysis. Aminzade (1992) provides the most detailed analysis of the role of time and sequence in narrative analysis, distinguishing between four aspects of temporality: pace, duration, cycles, and trajectory. The central claim narrativists make about temporality is that the order in which causal factors occur will affect outcomes. As Tilly (1984) puts it, “when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen.” This is an important point, and one too often ignored in sociological research.

The focus on temporal order also leads many narrativists to emphasize the path dependent nature of social processes (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). Although path dependence has been used in a wide variety of ways, the central thread is an argument that some events in the distant past have lasting effects on later historical periods. After a “critical juncture” in which many different outcomes are possible, one outcome emerges and gets “locked in” due to processes of increasing returns. As Aminzade (1992) puts it, “for any given trajectory, past choices and temporally remote events can help to explain subsequent paths of development and contemporary outcomes.” Historical development is viewed as a branching process, in which key actions push history down one branch and foreclose others (somewhat analogous to punctuated equilibrium analysis in evolutionary biology). In some cases, this is combined with a focus on small changes in initial conditions producing large effects – as stressed in chaos theory. Path dependence thus combines the narrative focus on action, events and temporal sequence.

OPTIMAL MATCHING: COMPARING AND CLASSIFYING NARRATIVE STRUCTURES

One of the most promising new techniques for formalizing narratives was borrowed from evolutionary biology. Abbott and Forrest 1986, Abbott and Hrycak 1990, Abbott and Barman 1997) uses optimal matching techniques to analyze the sequences in DNA molecules in order to construct evolutionary trees to measure the extent to which different sequences of events are similar. The method works by measuring the minimum number of changes (insertions, deletions, and substitutions) necessary to transform one sequence into another. The end product is a classification of sequences. Abbott and Hrycak (1990:171) argues that optimal matching algorithms can be used to develop ideal typical sequences of historical development. Like Weberian ideal types, the technique can be used both to discover broad similarities across sequences and to identify the unique characteristics of particular sequences (the exact ways in which they deviate from the typical sequence). Abbott and Forrest 1986; Abbott and Barman 1997; Abbott and Hrycak 1990) has applied optimal match to a wide range of empirical sequences, including the careers of musicians, the development of different aspects of welfare states, and the emergence of modern standardized structures in academic journal articles. Stovel (2001) uses optimal matching techniques to look at the different temporality of lynching in southern counties. She shows that different counties experienced very different temporal patterns – some were steady “pulses” of lynching at regular intervals, while others had long periods with no lynching punctuated by “bursts” of frequent lynching events.

EVENT STRUCTURE ANALYSIS: FORMALIZING NARRATIVE SEQUENCES

Abbott's optimal matching program begins with multiple particular sequences, and then explores the extent to which they are similar – but where do we get these particular sequences in the first place? In some cases, narrative sequences will be obvious, and thus the process will be unproblematic. However, in many cases the sequence of the narrative, including not just “what happened” but which of the many things that happened should be included in the narrative, is not a simple matter. Griffin's (1993) adaptation of Heise's (1988, 1989) Event Structure Analysis (ESA) is intended primarily to address this issue – how do you construct particular narrative sequences?

The main goal of ESA is to construct a causally coherent narrative sequence. The ETHNO program that implements ESA does this by forcing the analyst to include only those actions and events that are necessary conditions for subsequent events in the narrative. Each link in the narrative chain is thus made explicit and replicable (Griffin 1993:1106). The program also contains a consistency check – basically that the same causal mechanisms must be used throughout, in this case based on rational choice theory. However, the analyst can relax this constraint, allowing many different (even unrelated or contradictory) types of causal mechanisms to be used to link events, and Griffin does this in his lynching narrative. When this is done, the advantage of adding causation to analytic description is mitigated by the potential of ad hoc argumentation – the narrative may be explicit, but not theoretically coherent.

ESA also allows the construction of narratives at very different levels of abstraction. In addition to particular concrete narratives, it is also possible to construct more abstract narratives that stress the general features of the sequence. It is then possible to explore the relationship between the concrete and the abstract event structures. Griffin (1993:1125) notes that it may be possible to use ESA to compare across different event sequences, in a manner similar to Abbott's optimal matching, but since he is uncertain about the status of these comparisons he does not present them in his article.⁴

MODELING INTERACTION: GAME THEORY IN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Game theoretic models, especially extensive form games, provide another promising method for mapping and explaining narrative sequences. These models explain outcomes as the consequence of temporally ordered strategic interaction – sequences of action and reaction. Bates et al. (1998), who coined the term “analytic narrative,” focus on the role of institutions, viewed as equilibria in extensive form games. They make a compelling case that the use of extensive form games allows for the incorporation of temporal sequences and human agency into explanations of particular events.

There are several other interesting applications of game theory to historical sequences (see Kiser [1996] for a more detailed list). Abell's (1987) integration of game theory into narrative analysis is one of the most well-developed attempts to incorporate sequentiality in a

⁴A related method for analyzing sequences of events is process tracing (Bennett 1998). This involves listing a sequence of events leading up to an outcome of interest, and specifying the causal mechanisms linking the sequence of events, given the interests and situations of the main actors involved.

theoretical manner. Lindenberg (1989) outlines an ordered sequence of game structures that are likely to unfold as a revolutionary situation moves toward revolution – and then uses them to construct brief narratives of the French and Russian revolutions. Kiser and Linton (2002) apply game theory to revolts in early modern France. Brown and Boswell (1995) analyze strike outcomes combining narrative, game theory, and qualitative comparative analysis – the sequence of choices by workers and unions is a critical determinant of the outcome. Finally, Ermakoff (2008) uses game theoretic models to explain political abdication.

Strategic game theory, the dominant form in economics and political science and the type used in the examples above, generally relies on standard rational choice assumptions: actors are instrumentally rational, have full information, and are able to do the complex calculations required for backward induction in extensive form games. These assumptions have often been criticized as unrealistic (Hechter 1992). These criticisms are partly valid – in some conditions, rational choice assumptions are quite reasonable, in others they are not – the important point is to be able to identify which conditions are present in any particular case.

Other forms of game theory that rely on different microfoundations can be used in conditions in which standard rational choice assumptions are not applicable. Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 1982; Gintis 2000) does not assume that actors have either full information or the ability to do complex calculations – in fact, in some cases the “actors” in these models are unable to think at all. Actors in evolutionary models use trial and error, sometimes learn, and sometimes imitate others (in some forms, microfoundational assumptions are jettisoned entirely or used in “as if” fashion since the actors cannot think at all, and selection mechanisms do all the causal work). In situations in which actors are not expected to have very good information or be able to do complex calculations, evolutionary game theory will be preferable to strategic game theory. Behavioral (sometimes called experimental) game theory (Camerer 2003) uses microfoundations developed in experimental economics and psychology such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) instead of standard rational choice microfoundations. They incorporate both deviations from rationality due to the use of decision heuristics and emotions and deviations from the assumption of self-interest such as a preference for fairness (Rabin 1998). When these factors are important, behavioral game theory will be more useful than strategic game theory.

Under what conditions are the basic rational choice assumptions underlying strategic game theory reasonable? We argue that three factors affect the scope of strategic game theory: (1) the level of uncertainty and complexity; (2) the costs and benefits involved; and (3) the type of actor making the decision. Strategic game theory will be most useful when uncertainty and complexity are low, costs and benefits of the decision are high, and when the decision is being made by a formal organization, especially a bureaucratic one (Kiser and Welser 2007).

Historical sociology should benefit from using game theory as a way to structure and discipline its narratives (see Bates et al. 1997 and Greif 2006 for great examples from political scientists). However, in contrast to the overemphasis on strategic game theory in economics and political science, we should use evolutionary and behavioral game theory in conditions in which the assumptions required for strategic game theory are not realistic.

CONCLUSION

Goldthorpe and other critics are right about the limitations and problems with historical data, but the solution is not to give up the study of history, but to try to find ways to mitigate those problems. Doing so requires the diligent gathering of historical data through a variety of

sources, including archival sources, and through innovative approaches to analyzing historical data.

In the past, the most influential historical and comparative researchers relied almost exclusively on secondary sources. Today, many are engaging directly in the collection of primary data. Drawing on primary source material, historical studies of politics are attempting to reconstruct narrative methods, deploy game theory, enrich traditional narrative approaches through “process-tracing”, and are using comparison of historical sequences to unravel causal order in complex events. Contemporary historical studies are also following an earlier generation of economic historians by assembling primary evidence into data sets that can be evaluated using statistical techniques. Court records, police files, censuses, tax and marriage rolls, birth records and the like are being analyzed to help understand political development and behavior.

The new wave of comparative and historical research suggests that social scientists can not only reassess existing studies and interpretations, but also make original empirical contributions to historical knowledge. Indeed, recent work in historical and comparative studies of politics is moving further down the path of a productive dialogue between theory, history, and social science. The state of the art has been improved both in methodological terms and in terms of the wide array of sources used and the creativity of their use. There are new and exciting methodologies being developed for both quantitative and qualitative analyses of all sample sizes. Because most of these methods are useful for particular things, and each has its limitations, some of the best work being done currently uses multiple methods.

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CHAPTER 31

Multilevel Models

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INTRODUCTION

Scholars who study political processes often must consider how these processes are embedded within sociopolitical contexts determined by geographical units, organizations, or other higher-level units. Often, this is reflected in the development of multilevel data sets that permit these scholars to analyze social processes that operate across different levels of analysis. Increasingly, the focus of study in such research is on contextual or cross-level variables as opposed to variables at lower levels of analysis (Blalock 1984). For instance, scholars interested in determinants of voting for Democratic or Republican presidential candidates will certainly consider individual-level characteristics of voters such as age, race, gender, education, income, and political ideology. But they might also want to understand how characteristics of electoral districts, such as the unemployment rate, racial composition, percent of workers belonging to labor unions, the length of political incumbency of Democratic or Republican Congressional representatives, or the number of campaign appearances by the candidates shape electoral outcomes.

As another example, researchers interested in cross-cultural differences in attitudes about environmental issues might utilize a cross-national data set with individual responses to a battery of environmental questions nested within 30 or more different countries. In such an analysis, individual-level determinants of environmental attitudes are relevant, but they are of secondary importance. The primary focus is on differences in national culture, history, or experiences, which might forge a common national consciousness regarding environmental issues. So, for example, cultural attitudes about the environment might be shaped by a country's level of economic affluence, the degree of openness in the political system, the volume of CO₂ emissions, postmaterialist values, and the presence of pro-environmental organizations.

Or researchers might be interested in how the severity of racial riots in U.S. cities in the 1960s and 1970s is determined by the characteristics of the riots themselves and by the urban context in which the riots occur. Measuring riot severity by property damage or the number of persons arrested or killed, the researcher might seek to assess the impact of factors such as precipitating events, police reactions to the initial events, or duration of the riot in days. In addition, however, the researcher might be interested in city-level characteristics that are common to all riots in each city, such as the degree of racial segregation, the black unemployment rate, the racial composition of city council or the mayor's office, or the degree of media coverage of minority grievances.

Research opportunities such as these abound in political sociology and related sub-fields and are limited only by the researcher's imagination and the development of appropriate multilevel data sets. Indeed, political sociologists' constant concern for the role of social context compels them to contemplate such multilevel research designs. Each of the examples mentioned earlier involves the consideration of both micro and macro-level social processes. In each case, the analysis involves a multilevel data set and a framing of the research problem that focuses attention on the higher-level or contextual variables. The conventional approach in such analyses has been to use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression or another technique that mixes lower-level and higher-level variables. However, increasingly, political sociologists and others are reaching a consensus that the appropriate method for analyzing such multilevel research questions is hierarchical linear modeling.

In this paper, we discuss hierarchical linear modeling and its applications to the study of political processes, social movements, and other phenomena of interest to students of politics. We begin in the next section with a discussion of the logic and method of hierarchical linear modeling and an illustrative example. Next, we provide some prominent examples from the literature in political sociology and social movements to demonstrate the possibilities for this method. We conclude with a discussion of possible future directions using hierarchical linear modeling.

LOGIC AND METHOD OF HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS

Sociologists' interest in the link between micro and macro-level social processes makes hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) a vital tool for quantitative research. In order to examine how one's social context matters for individual-level phenomenon, such as income attainment, voting behavior, or attitudes about specific public policies, researchers have traditionally relied upon ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with both individual and contextual-level variables. For example, in a study of opposition to affirmative action, one might include individual-level predictors, such as race, education, and political ideology, and county or MSA-level predictors, such as percent in poverty or percent African-American. A significant relationship between contextual variables and the outcome (net of individual-level variables) suggests that social context plays an important role in shaping this individual-level phenomenon. However, herein lies the rub. The addition of contextual-level variables into the traditional OLS or logistic regression models (for continuous or categorical outcomes, respectively) violates the assumption of independent errors, which leads to biases in both the parameter estimates (Guo and Zhao 2000: 444) and standard errors (Mason et al. 1983; DiPrete and Forristal 1994; Guo and Zhao 2000; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

The assumption of no autocorrelation is violated in OLS and logit in the presence of contextual variables due to the clustering of observations within these higher-level or contextual units. Level 1 units within the same level 2 group are not "truly" independent because there is an underlying similarity due to group membership that leads to dependence among the errors within contextual units. Each observation no longer provides an independent piece of information, which tends to result in underestimated standard errors (Guo and Zhao 2000: 444) and therefore inflated t- and z-ratios. For example, students within the same school will have individual error terms affected by a common source (i.e., attending the same school). The standard error for the effect of a contextual variable, such as percent minority in the school, will be biased downward, which increases the probability of committing a type I error (i.e., rejecting a true null hypothesis).

HLM incorporates the clustering of micro-level units within macro-level units, allows for separate error terms at each level of analysis, and therefore does not violate the assumption of independent errors. Additionally, HLM provides a convenient framework for analyzing social processes occurring at multiple levels of analysis. In the most basic form of HLM, micro-level units (e.g., individuals) are nested within macro-level units (e.g., neighborhoods) in a two-level model. The micro and macro levels are linked in this multilevel model through the randomly varying level 1 coefficients. The intercept and partial slopes at level 1 become outcomes for level 2 variables (Mason et al. 1983; DiPrete and Forristal 1994; Hox 2002). The structural equations for the two-level HLM are as follows (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 42–43):

$$Y_j = X_j \beta_j + r_j, \quad r_j \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I), \quad (31.1)$$

$$\beta_j = W_j \gamma + u_j, \quad u_j \sim N(0, T), \quad (31.2)$$

$$Y_j = X_j W_j \gamma + X_j u_j + r_j. \quad (31.3)$$

In the level 1 equation, Y_j is the individual-level outcome, X_j is a vector of level 1 variables, β_j is a vector of individual-level slopes randomly varying across level 2, and r_j is the level 1 error term. In the level 2 equation, W_j is a vector of level 2 variables, γ is a vector of fixed level 2 slopes, and u_j is the level 2 error term. The equations may be expressed separately for each level of analysis (31.1 and 31.2) or combined (31.3) by substituting the right-hand side of the level 2 equation for the coefficient vector in the level 1 equation.

In order to determine the extent of clustering in the data and thus the importance of using HLM, researchers typically estimate an intercept-only model, which is equivalent to a random one-way ANOVA model:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + r_{ij} \quad (31.4)$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \quad (31.5)$$

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij} \quad (31.6)$$

The intercept-only model consists of the grand mean (γ_{00}) and error terms for levels 1 (r_{ij}) and 2 (u_{0j}). At first glance, this does not appear to be a very useful baseline model. However, the unconditional error variances at levels 1 and 2 determine the degree of clustering in the data, which makes the intercept-only model an important first step in the multilevel modeling process. The degree of clustering is the extent to which variation in the outcome occurs between groups rather than within groups. If we define the total amount of variability in the outcome as the total amount of error variance in the model, then we can represent the degree of clustering with the “intra-class correlation coefficient” or ICC (Hox 2002: 15; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 24):

$$ICC = \rho = \tau_{00} / (\tau_{00} + \sigma^2), \quad (31.7)$$

where τ_{00} is the level 2 error variance ($\sigma_{u_{0j}}^2$) and σ^2 is the level 1 error variance ($\sigma_{r_{ij}}^2$). Rho (ρ) ranges from 0 (no between-group variation) to 1 (no within-group variation). Estimates of ρ greater than or equal to 0.05 suggest a substantial amount of clustering in the data. Statistical software packages such as HLM (Raudenbush et al. 2004) also report hypothesis tests for the random (and fixed) components in a multilevel model. A statistically significant level 2 error variance is an indicator that clustering is present in the data and the use of OLS is inappropriate even if the ICC value is below the standard threshold of 0.05.

Given a substantial or significant amount of clustering, researchers typically begin building the full HLM model by first specifying the level 1 equation:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} X_{1j} + \beta_{2j} X_{2j} + r_{ij} \quad (31.8)$$

In this example, we have two independent variables at level 1 (X_1 and X_2). Removing the subscript j from each of the terms would result in the traditional OLS regression equation. However, in equation (31.8), the intercept and partial slopes are allowed to randomly vary across level 2 units. In a full-HLM, each β randomly varies across level 2 units and is predicted with level 2 variables. However, in practice, one or more of these coefficients are typically treated as fixed either because the variation across level 2 units is not statistically significant or not substantively interesting given the research question. Centering the level 1 variables around their group (level 2) means makes the level 1 intercept interpretable as the average level of the outcome for that particular group (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The interpretation of the level 1 intercept is important in HLM because it serves as the outcome for the main effects at level 2.

In the next step in the model building process, we predict the random variation in each level 1 coefficient based on the level 2 variables:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} W_{1j} + \gamma_{02} W_{2j} + u_{0j} \quad (31.9)$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} W_{1j} + \gamma_{12} W_{2j} + u_{1j} \quad (31.10)$$

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21} W_{1j} + \gamma_{22} W_{2j} + u_{2j} \quad (31.11)$$

The level 2 variables (W_1 and W_2) are included as predictors of the intercept as well as the level 1 partial slopes for X_1 and X_2 . The partial slopes for the level 2 variables in the intercept (31.9) are the main effects, whereas the partial slopes for these variables in the equations for β_1 and β_2 are cross-level interaction effects. For example, the relative size of the African American population in a local area may directly affect the average level of support for affirmative action in the area (main effect), but it may also indirectly affect the outcome through its influence on the strength of the effects of individual-level factors such as education and ideology on the outcome (cross-level interaction effects). We could substitute (31.9) through (31.11) back into (31.8), in order to express the full HLM as a single equation. Other models that may be familiar to some readers, such as fixed effects and random effects, are special cases of this full multilevel model (Mason et al. 1983: 76–78).

HLM avoids the problems associated with estimating multilevel models in OLS by employing three separate estimation strategies. First, the random level 1 coefficients are “Empirical Bayes” (EB) estimates that are “shrunk” toward a grand mean based on the reliability of the OLS estimate within a particular level 2 unit (Hox 2002: 29). Level 2 units with fewer level 1 units nested within them are less reliable and therefore contribute less to the EB estimate. Second, the level 2 fixed effects are estimated using Generalized Least Squares. Finally, the error variances and covariances are estimated using either full or restricted maximum likelihood (Raudenbush et al. 2004: 9).

Although HLM was originally designed for continuous outcomes, multilevel models for binary data are gaining popularity, given the prevalence of questions with categorical responses in surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS) or the National Election Study (NES). We can estimate a multilevel model for a binary outcome as a hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM) with a logit link. Although the relationship between the independent variables and the outcome is nonlinear in logistic regression (Long 1997), the relationship is linear in the logit. The logit transformation, $\ln(p/1-p)$, “linearizes” the relationship and is therefore the “link” between the original outcome, $\text{pr}(Y = 1)$, and the right-hand side of the equation (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 295–297 for the structural and unconditional models for

HGLM with a logit link). Multilevel models for binary outcomes may be estimated using either marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL) or penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL). For a discussion of the estimation of fixed and random effects in hierarchical logistic regression, see Wong and Mason (1985) or Guo and Zhao (2000).

The issue of clustering is more complicated in HGLM. As with the single-level logistic regression model, the level 1 error variance is now heteroscedastic. Therefore, we cannot use the previous formula for the ICC (31.7). One alternative is to take a latent variable approach and assume that the level 1 error variance is $\pi^2/3$, which is the assumption we make in the traditional logit model. The formula for the ICC is now the following (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 334):

$$\text{ICC}_{\text{logit}} = \rho = \tau_{00}/(\tau_{00} + \pi^2/3). \quad (31.12)$$

The ICC in HGLM is not directly comparable to the ICC in HLM because of this assumption. In addition, one is no longer a realistic upper limit for the ICC because the level 1 error variance is never equal to zero (we assume it is $\pi^2/3$ or 3.29). The level 2 error variance would have to approach infinity for the ICC to approach 1, which is obviously not a realistic scenario. For a full two-level HGLM with a logit link and two variables at each level, the equations are as follows:

$$\eta_{ij} = \text{In} \left(\frac{\phi_{ij}}{1 - \phi_{ij}} \right) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} X_{1j} + \beta_{2j} X_{2j} \quad (31.13)$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} W_{1j} + \gamma_{02} W_{2j} + u_{0j} \quad (31.14)$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} W_{1j} + \gamma_{12} W_{2j} + u_{1j} \quad (31.15)$$

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21} W_{1j} + \gamma_{22} W_{2j} + u_{2j} \quad (31.16)$$

where η_{ij} is the log odds and ϕ_{ij} is the predicted probability.

EXAMPLE: OPPOSITION TO WELFARE SPENDING IN THE U.S.

In order to make this discussion of HLM more concrete, consider the following example. Recent studies of welfare attitudes in the U.S. point to both individual- and contextual-level factors as key determinants of opposition to government spending on welfare programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]). Individual-level factors such as education, political ideology, and racial attitudes help determine who supports or opposes welfare spending (Gilens 1999). In addition, the size of the black population in a local area has a direct effect on the level of opposition to welfare spending (Taylor 2000). Racial prejudice and the size of the local black population are particularly important predictors given the “racialization” of welfare in the U.S. (Gilens 1999). Other contextual factors, such as the strength of the local economy or number of welfare recipients, may matter as well. In order to examine the simultaneous influences of individual and contextual factors on welfare attitudes, we can employ HGLM with a logit link. The data for this example come from several years of the General Social Survey (GSS) between 1990 and 2002. In accordance with previous research (Gilens 1999; Taylor 2000), we limit the sample to non-Hispanic, non-Asian whites. Given the increasing state control over the distribution of welfare benefits in recent years, we use the state as the contextual level of analysis. After dropping missing cases, we have 3,081 individuals (level 1) nested within 43 states (level 2). Although the ICC is rather low (0.01), the level 2 error variance in the intercept only model is statistically significant ($X^2 = 75.94, p = 0.001$).

Table 31.1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables included in the multilevel binary logit models. The dependent variable, *welfare opposition*, is a binary measure of opposition to government spending on welfare in the U.S. (1 = spend “too much” on welfare, 0 = spend “about right” or “too little” on welfare). According to these data, approximately 51% of GSS respondents oppose welfare spending. We control for several level 1 variables, including: *year*, *age*, *cohort*, *female*, *education*, *income* (logged), *party identification*, *political ideology*, and *racial attitudes*. The first racial attitude measure, *view blacks as lazy*, is the key variable at level 1. At level 2, we include the following variables: *south*, *economic*

TABLE 31.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models of Whites’ Opposition to Welfare Spending in the U.S.^a

Dependent Variable			
Welfare Opposition			
0 = Spending is “too little” or “about right”	(49.24%)		
1 = Spending is “too much”	(50.76%)		
Independent Variables			
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>Range</i>
Individual Characteristics (N = 3,081)			
Year			
1990 (reference)	0.16	0.36	0–1
1994	0.18	0.38	0–1
1996	0.11	0.31	0–1
1998	0.20	0.40	0–1
2000	0.25	0.44	0–1
2002	0.10	0.30	0–1
Age	46.70	17.22	18–89
Cohort			
New Deal & WWII (reference)	0.16	0.37	0–1
Cold War	0.20	0.40	0–1
Early Baby Boom	0.18	0.39	0–1
Late Baby Boom	0.23	0.42	0–1
Generation X	0.23	0.42	0–1
Female	0.53	0.50	0–1
Education	13.45	2.86	0–20
Log Income	9.32	3.27	0–11.59
Income Missing	0.10	0.30	0–1
Party Identification	3.13	1.95	0–6
Political Ideology	4.08	1.51	0–7
Ideology Missing	0.03	0.16	0–1
Racial Attitudes			
View Blacks as Lazy (0 = hardworking, 6 = lazy)	3.37	1.16	0–6
View Whites as Lazy (0 = hardworking, 6 = lazy)	2.38	1.06	0–6
State Characteristics (N = 43)			
South	0.26	0.44	0–1
Economic Growth	2.47	1.18	0.47–4.96
Percent Receiving Welfare (AFDC/TANF)	2.88	0.99	1.54–5.83
Percent Conservative	33.12	7.40	13.13–48.49
Percent Black	11.12	9.74	0.32–36.23

^aIndividual-level data come from the 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 General Social Survey (GSS). State-level data come from various government sources, including the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Annual TANF report. Analyses are limited to non-Hispanic, non-Asian whites

growth (% change in GSP), *percent receiving welfare*, *percent conservative*, and *percent black*. *Percent black* is the key level 2 variable. We examine its direct and indirect effects on welfare opposition through a cross-level interaction with the key racial attitudes measure.

Table 31.2 presents odds ratios from hierarchical and traditional binary logistic regression models of whites' welfare opposition. In models 1 through 6, we can see that the key level 1 variable, *view blacks as lazy*, has a significant, positive effect on the odds of opposing welfare. Whites who feel that blacks are lazy are much more likely to oppose welfare than whites who feel that blacks are hard working. In other words, negative racial prejudice has a significant, positive effect on opposition to welfare spending. In models 1 through 5, we also include each of the state-level variables separately. These results suggest that opposition is greatest in Southern states with small welfare caseloads, a conservative population, and a relatively large black population. The results also indicate that *percent conservative* is the most important state-level predictor of opposition to welfare spending. According to the level 2 pseudo- R^2 , *percent conservative* alone explains 78% of the level 2 error variance in the intercept equation and the remaining error variance is not statistically significant ($p = 0.125$). To calculate this pseudo- R^2 , we compare the level 2 error variance before and after the addition of one or more level 2 variables and calculate the percent reduction in the size of the error variance.

Although the direct effect of the size of the black population on welfare opposition is somewhat weak, we find a significant interaction effect in model 7. In accordance with previous research (Fullerton and Dixon 2009), we find that as the size of the black population increases, the strength of the relationship between negative racial prejudice and welfare opposition increases as well. In other words, the gap in welfare opposition between the most and least racially prejudiced respondents is largest in states with the largest black populations (e.g., Deep South states such as Mississippi and Louisiana). Racial prejudice has a significantly weaker effect on opposition to welfare spending in states with the smallest black populations (e.g., Idaho and Maine).

The final column in Table 31.2 presents odds ratios from a traditional, single-level logistic regression model. There are very few differences in the odds ratios and standard errors between the HGLM and logit models for most of the individual-level variables. However, the traditional logit model substantially underestimates the coefficient for *view blacks as lazy* and overestimates its standard error. The standard error is almost twice as big in the single-level model, which results in a marginally significant main effect. There are other noticeable differences in the coefficients and standard errors for several of the state-level variables. However, the key interaction term is virtually identical in both models.

As the findings from this example show, HLM provides a flexible framework in which to investigate relationships between variables at multiple levels of analysis and yields more accurate estimates than OLS for multilevel data. In the next section, we discuss three major applications of HLM in political research, including cross-national studies, sub-national studies, and individual growth models.

APPLICATIONS OF HLM IN POLITICAL RESEARCH

Cross-National Studies

Students of politics are often interested in the role of sociopolitical context on outcomes such as voting, civic participation, or a variety of attitudes and beliefs of a political nature. Often "sociopolitical context" is conceptualized as a by-product of geographic units such as countries,

TABLE 31.2. Odds Ratios from Hierarchical and Traditional Binary Logistic Regression Models of Whites' Welfare Opposition

	Hierarchical Binary Logit (Models 1–7)							Traditional Binary Logit
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	
<i>Individual characteristics</i>								
Age	0.981* (0.009)	0.981* (0.009)	0.981* (0.009)	0.981* (0.009)	0.981* (0.009)	0.981* (0.009)	0.981* (0.009)	0.981* (0.009)
Female	0.961 (0.078)	0.962 (0.078)	0.962 (0.078)	0.960 (0.078)	0.961 (0.078)	0.960 (0.078)	0.957 (0.078)	0.952 (0.078)
Education	0.963* (0.015)	0.963* (0.015)	0.963* (0.015)	0.963* (0.015)	0.963* (0.015)	0.963* (0.015)	0.964* (0.015)	0.960** (0.015)
Log Income	1.152** (0.051)	1.152** (0.051)	1.152** (0.051)	1.152** (0.051)	1.152** (0.051)	1.153** (0.051)	1.151** (0.051)	1.158** (0.051)
Party Identification	1.119*** (0.022)	1.119*** (0.022)	1.119*** (0.022)	1.119*** (0.022)	1.119*** (0.022)	1.119*** (0.022)	1.120*** (0.022)	1.123*** (0.022)
Political Ideology	1.236*** (0.032)	1.236*** (0.032)	1.237*** (0.032)	1.237*** (0.032)	1.236*** (0.032)	1.238*** (0.032)	1.239*** (0.032)	1.232*** (0.032)
View Blacks as Lazy	1.313*** (0.036)	1.313*** (0.036)	1.313*** (0.036)	1.314*** (0.036)	1.313*** (0.036)	1.314*** (0.036)	1.289*** (0.037)	1.122# (0.069)
<i>State characteristics</i>								
South	1.322* (0.121)					0.978 (0.136)	0.981 (0.138)	0.891 (0.131)
Economic Growth		1.011 (0.056)						
Percent Receiving Welfare			0.891* (0.051)			0.924# (0.042)	0.925# (0.043)	0.939 (0.040)
Percent Conservative				1.033*** (0.007)		1.027*** (0.007)	1.027*** (0.007)	1.021** (0.007)
Percent Black					1.012# (0.007)	1.008 (0.007)	1.008 (0.007)	0.967* (0.017)
<i>Cross-level interaction</i>								
View Blacks as Lazy*Percent Black							1.011* (0.005)	1.012** (0.005)
Level 2 Error Variance (τ_{00})	0.047**	0.063***	0.038**	0.013	0.057***	0.004	0.004	
Level 2 Pseudo R^2	0.217	-0.050	0.367	0.783	0.050	0.933	0.933	

$p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Standard errors are in parentheses. Models also include a constant and the remaining level 1 variables from Table 31.1. The error variance (τ_{00}) is 0.045 in the intercept-only model and 0.060 in a model with only level 1 variables. The Pseudo- R^2 is the proportional reduction in τ_{00} relative to a model with only level 1 variables. Level 1 and 2 slopes are group- and grand-mean centered, respectively (except South). The error variance for the View Blacks as Lazy slope in Model 7 is 0.00006 ($p > 0.500$). The HGLM models were estimated using PQL in HLM6

states or provinces, counties, cities or municipalities, electoral districts, or neighborhoods. So, for instance, research using data sets that consist of individual-level data nested within one or more higher-order geographical units such as countries or cities is ideally suited to HLM analysis. Such data sets – with ample degrees of freedom among the level 2 data – are still

relatively rare and this has limited the diffusion of HLM models. Ideally, HLM models should have at least 25–30 level 2 units.

One data set that meets these criteria is the World Values Survey (WVS), an outgrowth of the original European Values Study of 1981. The WVS consists of a collection of nationally representative surveys focusing mainly on cross-cultural variation in attitudes and values, most notably on the emerging concept of postmaterialism (for an overview, see Inglehart 1997). So far, the WVS has been conducted in four waves about five years apart – 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 – in an effort to produce longitudinal, as well as cross-cultural data on these topics. In the most recent 2005 wave, participation has grown to include about 92,000 respondents in 62 different countries. Thus, the WVS exemplifies the multilevel design necessary to conduct HLM-based research and it is no surprise that it has been used frequently for that purpose. By appending country-specific variables to the individual-level data, analysts can more accurately investigate cross-national sources of variation in individual-level outcomes. Here, we briefly review some of the research that has emerged from this project.

Jenkins et al. (2008) use the 1990 wave of the WVS to investigate the cross-national components of protest potential. Using a four-item scale to measure participants' willingness to participate in protest actions, they append country-level measures grouped in three clusters: affluence and postmaterialism; political institutions, democratization, and state capacity; and ethnic and religious cleavages. After controlling for individual-level determinants such as sex, age, education, and political engagement, they find that each cluster contributes to an understanding of protest potential. Jenkins et al.'s final models show that protest potential is positively associated with population size, economic growth, women in the labor force, state capacity, ethnic economic discrimination, and percent Protestant, and negatively associated with language dominance. Their analysis provides convincing evidence that national culture and sociopolitical context is a fundamental source of variation in propensity to engage in protest.

Two articles use the 1991 wave of the WVS to explore sources of voluntary association membership. Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) develop an index of membership in 10 voluntary associations and subdivide this index into categories of "old social movement" and "new social movement" associations. Because their dependent variables are "counts," their HLM models employ nonlinear Poisson techniques. Their two central country-level variables, measured dichotomously, are statism (the institutionalized patterns of political sovereignty and organization) and corporateness (the degree to which political representation is organized at the group-level as opposed to the individual-level). After controlling for individual-level factors and additional country-level measures, and level of democracy and economic development, they find that statism constrains associational activity of all types, especially in "new" social movement associations and corporateness positively affects membership, particularly for "old" social movements. These authors also explored cross-level interactions and found, for instance, that education has reduced effects in corporatist societies where membership is taken for granted and is more important in noncorporatist societies where membership is optional.

Curtis et al. (2001) conduct a similar analysis of voluntary association membership using the 1991 WVS among countries that were democratic as of 1991. They devise a count of membership in 16 voluntary associations as their dependent variable and also employ Poisson regression models in HLM. These authors employ a more diverse range of country-level variables including GDP, years of continuous democracy, religious composition (Protestant, Catholic, mixed, or other), and political type (liberal democracy, social democracy, former Eastern bloc, or other). These authors conclude that higher levels of voluntary membership are associated with: (1) multi-denominational Christian or predominantly Protestant religious compositions, (2) prolonged and continuous experience with democratic institutions, (3) social democratic

or liberal democratic political systems, and (4) high levels of economic development. These patterns were weakened somewhat for “working memberships” (excluding nominal or inactive members) with the effects of GDP and religion being substantially weakened.

Other prominent studies employing various HLM methodologies using the World Values Survey include two studies investigating the determinants of union membership in affluent (Brady 2007) and less developed (Martin and Brady 2007) countries; a study linking prices of traded goods, distance to markets, and nationalist sentiments to consumer preferences about globalization (Baker 2005); and a study that links individuals’ sense of work centrality to the degree of educational accessibility, industrialization, union density, social inequality, and degree of socialism (Parboteeah and Cullen 2003).

There are also examples of HLM analyses using other data sets, but generally these analyses have a smaller number of countries than the WVS resulting in dangerously low degrees of freedom in the level 2 data set. Bowler et al. (2003) use the 1990 Eurobarometer Survey to investigate the sources of civic engagement (discussing politics with friends, trying to convince others of their views, interest in politics, and membership in a political party) among 11 European democracies. At the national-level, these authors find that civic engagement is negatively associated with Catholicism and relatively little experience with democracy. Surprisingly, though, “older democracies” have lower levels of civil engagement than “middle-aged democracies.” Similarly, Weldon (2006) uses the 1997 Eurobarometer Survey to analyze the impact of national context on political and social tolerance for ethnic minorities among 16 Western European nations. They find that legal dimension of regime type and cultural dimension of regime type are positively related and far-right party support for political tolerance and cultural dimension of regime type are positively related to social tolerance. In addition, they find support for cross-level interactions with individual-level variables national identity, ideology, and satisfaction with the democratic process for political tolerance and national identity for social tolerance. A key concern for these and other similar analyses (e.g., Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Letki 2004) is the relatively small number of degrees of freedom in the level 2 analyses.

Wells and Kriekhaus (2006) provide an instructive analysis of the utility of HLM. They replicate two analyses by Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Rose et al. (1998), but in place of standard OLS-based procedures used by these authors, they use HLM to estimate multi-level models. Like Anderson and Guillory (1997), they find that the national-level effect of consensus-based politics reduces differences in democratic satisfaction between winners and losers. However, the true advantage of HLM is shown in the individual-level effects which are much more robust and less sensitive to the exclusion of cases from any single country. Similarly, in their replication of Rose et al. (1998) study, they find that while the effects of national-level variables, corruption, and changes in freedom are similar as the authors’ original research, these effects are extremely sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of individual countries. For instance, one key finding that countries that have high levels of corruption are more prone to reject authoritarian regimes is actually reversed in direction when a single country (Hungary) is dropped from the analysis. Based on these replications, Wells and Kriekhaus (2006) conclude that HLM is required in order to have confidence in the robustness of country-level effects, but also caution that HLM analyses with so few countries, as these two analyses have too few degrees of freedom for reliable estimates of country-level effects. Thus, they conclude future analyses of these problems should involve more countries, reinforcing the desirability of data sets like the World Values Survey. Regarding the failure of some researchers to use multilevel models in such analyses, Wells and Kriekhaus (2006: 569) conclude that “the bias produced by traditional statistical techniques is so severe that scholars must discontinue their use in future research.”

SubNational Studies

HLM also lends itself to subnational analyses within single countries. We first summarize exemplary studies from countries other than the United States. In an innovative analysis, Kunovich and Hodson (2002) investigate structural differences in average levels of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia in 1989 prior to the wars of national separation. They develop several indicators of structural characteristics of the 34 counties in these two republics. Among the county-level variables, they find that ethnic diversity and occupational segregation are negatively related, and ethnic economic inequality is positively related to ethnic prejudice. Other structural features – ethnic residential segregation, economic hardship, and unemployment – had no effect on prejudice. Shu (2004) examines attitudes of Chinese men and women toward four measures of gender egalitarianism (women's careers, marriage rights, sexual freedom, and the importance of having sons) using a 1991 national sample of individuals nested within communities. Focusing on the role of education, Shu finds that education at the individual-level positively impacts gender egalitarianism. At the community level, average level of education positively affects all four gender attitudes for both men and women; however, the gender gap in education (the difference in average education of men minus that of women) negatively affects all four gender attitudes for women, but has no effect for men. When cross-level interactions among education measures are examined, the interaction between the gender gap in education and individual education has a positive effect on gender attitudes. In other words, the negative community-level impact of the gender gap in education is somewhat offset among individual women who are highly educated.

Next, we review two subnational studies from within the United States. Helms and Jacobs (2002) examined the sentencing of criminals in 337 jurisdictions (i.e., counties) located in seven states whose cases reached final disposition by 1990. After controlling for state effects with six dummy variables and the nature of the criminal offense with 20 dummy variables, they use tobit analysis and multilevel models to focus on interactions between the political contexts of the jurisdictions and the sex and race of the convicted person. They find that African-Americans and males received longer sentences when they were tried in politically conservative jurisdictions where a law-and-order presidential candidate received more votes. Also at the county level, they find that the violent crime rate is positively associated with length of sentence. Tolnay (2001) appends county-level data to microlevel data from the 1920 U.S. census to examine the effects of the relative sizes of African-American and immigrant populations on the occupational standing of both groups in early twentieth century American cities. Using counties as proxies for labor markets, Tolnay finds that the occupational standing of African-Americans was unaffected by the relative sizes of the black and immigrant populations, but that the occupational standing of immigrants was more favorable in labor markets with proportionately larger black populations. He also finds an inverted-U relationship between size of immigrant population and occupational standing of new immigrants, indicating that occupational standing is negatively affected by lower levels of immigrant population, turning to positive at higher levels of immigrant population (for a similar analysis, see Tolnay et al. 2002).

We conclude this section by discussing two articles that represent missed opportunities from the standpoint of multilevel modeling. Each study, while important in its own right, could have gone farther to investigate the topic at hand using multilevel models. First, Dalton (2005) used the 2000 wave of the World Values Survey to investigate cross-national differences in membership in environmental groups among respondents in 56 countries. The data show substantial variation in membership rates across countries, but multivariate models ($N = 56$) indicate that only postmaterialist values are positively associated with membership.

Levels of affluence, political democracy, and environmental conditions failed to reach statistical significance in this national-level analysis. This paper might easily have been reframed as a multilevel analysis to take better advantage of the World Values Survey and ask the question whether national context affects individual-level membership in environmental groups, controlling for individual-level predictors of membership. Also, it might have addressed how individual-level measures like education (which is known to be highly related to environmental attitudes) interact with national-level measures to predict membership.

A second study by Southworth and Stepan-Norris (2003) uses an innovative data set comprised of 367 census tracts in the city of Detroit, Michigan to examine determinants of voting for Democratic and Progressive party candidates in the 1952 presidential election. Their key finding is that high concentrations of workers from a left-wing union, the United Auto Workers Local 600 at the River Rouge plant, is strongly associated with higher proportions of Democratic and Progressive party voting. The authors contend that: “The politics of the factory alter voting in tracts beyond the workers themselves voting for the party in question. Ford workers influenced people in adjoining communities to engage in left-voting” (Southworth and Stepan-Norris 2003: 319). While we admire the creativity of this research, HLM modeling might have allowed the paper to go farther by investigating whether and how concentrations of UAW Local 600 workers might have influenced the voting of specific segments of the electorate within census tracts. For instance, how did leftist union concentrations affect the voting patterns of different groups based on age, education, political ideology, or income?

Growth Curve Models of Individual Change

Thus far, we have considered examples which use spatial units such as states or countries as the contextual level of analysis. However, HLM is also applied in practice to microlevel studies of individual change over time. For example, educational scholars have studied student change over time in math and science achievement (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The use of HLM to study individual change in some phenomenon over time is referred to as a “growth model.” In an HLM growth model, the individual by time period is the level 1 unit and the individual is the level 2 unit. For example, with 1,000 respondents, each interviewed in five different waves, there will potentially be 5,000 level 1 units (person by wave) and 1,000 level 2 units (person). The researcher may then examine the “growth” in the outcome over time as a function of one or more time/wave variables (e.g., time or time + time²). At level 1, the focus is on changes over time within individuals, whereas at level 2, the focus is on time-invariant differences between individuals. When the units are states or countries over time rather than individuals, researchers tend to use random or fixed-effects models. However, HLM growth models are equally appropriate (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002 for more details on growth models). Below, we use a recent study of voter turnout to provide an illustration of how this approach can be used by political scholars.

Although increasingly used in the areas of educational and health research, political researchers have been slow to employ growth curve models. However, several recent studies have shown the technique’s utility in the field. Here, we use an example from Plutzer’s (2002) study of becoming a habitual voter and his test of the developmental theory of voter turnout as an illustration for the potential of growth curve models. In this study, he examines the role of parental influence, partisanship, and geographic mobility among other predictors on *becoming*

a habitual voter or nonvoter. Importantly, there is a starting-level (the probability that a person will vote in the first election for which they are eligible or “initial turnout”), t , and other data points, $t + 1$, $t + 2$, $t + 3$, and so forth that represent “growth” as measured in turnout for subsequent elections for which the person is eligible.

Plutzer (2002: 48) first tests the effects of “parental influence” on initial turnout and growth. His model includes parental average education, family income, and head of household occupation prestige as measures of parents’ socioeconomic status. The model also includes measures of “politics at home” including parental political interest, political knowledge, political trust, strength of partisanship, and whether the parents voted in the previous presidential election. Finally, race and sex were included as controls. Using growth curve analysis, we are given two separate slope estimates for each regressor. The first slope estimate, β_0 , represents the impact of the predictor on voting in election. The second, β_1 , corresponds to the impact of growth across subsequent elections. In the first model, predicting β_0 , he finds that whether the parents voted in the previous election is the strongest predictor for an individual’s probability of initial voting. However, in the β_1 model, the only variable found to have an impact on the slope at a statistically significant level is parental strength of partisanship, which was not related to initial turnout. Thus, we can see that parental voting has a short-term effect as evidenced by initial turnout; however, it is parental partisanship that has a long-term effect on the voter’s growth rate.

Plutzer suggests that the growth curve models provided results consistent with the developmental theory of voter turnout. His subsequent models show that, while a number of parental and personal attributes predict initial turnout, political engagement, voters’ political knowledge, and parental partisanship predict habitual voting. Therefore, the research shows that parental variables create inertia for voting that dissipates over time. However, parental partisanship is one parental-level variable that has a long-term effect. Importantly, it was by using growth curve models that Plutzer was able to address the simple fact that voter turnout is the product of starting level and growth rate, though they often have separate predictors.

There are several other advantages to using growth curves models that we do not discuss in detail here. First, we can approximate starting points and rates of change with a relatively small number of data points (e.g., as few as three presidential elections). Thus, this approach is more efficient than running separate models for each wave of a panel study or group trajectory modeling. Second, Muthén (1991) and Duncan et al. (1999) have shown that general growth curve models are well-suited for incorporation into structural equation models allowing for endogenous predictors for initial behavior or status and growth. Some recent examples of this extension can be found in the work of Kaplan (2000), Potter (2001), Simmons et al. (2007). Third, although mathematically sophisticated, growth curve models are ideally suited to using predicted probabilities to plot and visually represent growth against time leading to increased interpretability for social science readers. Finally, Plutzer (2002) argues that growth curve analysis allows researchers to theorize about the effects of events on individual-level life trajectories; a serious shortcoming in cohort analysis. Studies using growth curve models are rare in political research because panel data sets are more common in other areas such as medical sociology and the sociology of education. However, even when researchers have been able to use panel data in the study of political behavior, they have not always utilized the full potential of the longitudinal nature of the data. Future research should consider utilizing HLM in panel studies of political participation, changing political attitudes, and other topics related to politics and civil society.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we provided a brief introduction to HLM and discussed three different applications of HLM in political research. Although we limited our discussion primarily to continuous and binary outcomes, in recent years, HLM has also been extended to other categorical and limited outcomes, such as ordinal, nominal, and count data. Each of these multilevel models fits within a HGLM framework with different link functions and distributional assumptions. In addition, several recent studies have extended the traditional HLM to include three or more levels. In the context of voting, a researcher may be interested in examining the impact of individual-, district-, and state-level factors on voter turnout and candidate choice. In the context of educational research, individual growth models of math or science achievement often include schools as the third level of analysis. Although models with four or more levels of analysis are theoretically possible, standard statistical software packages such as HLM6 only allow for the estimation of two- and three-level models. Finally, researchers have also begun to examine the simultaneous influence of two non-nested contextual levels of analysis. For example, political economy scholars may be interested in the influence of both occupations and industries on earnings in the U.S. Obviously, neither one is nested within the other, and in order to examine the influence of both industry- and occupation-level variables on earnings, one would need to account for both types of clustering simultaneously. Recent advances in multilevel modeling have made these types of cross-classified models possible (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Although they remain underutilized in political research, demographers are now using cross-classified HLM models in order to solve the identification problem in age-period-cohort analyses (see Yang 2008; Yang and Land 2006, 2008).

Despite the vast array of new applications and extensions of HLM in current studies of politics and society, there are other potential applications that remain unexplored. Recent studies of voting have begun to address the issue of sample selection bias in studies of voter registration and turnout (e.g., see Timpone 1998). People who are registered to vote are systematically different from those who are not registered, and this selection effect can bias the estimates in turnout models for registered voters. In order to address this issue, scholars now model voting as a two-step process of registering and then casting a vote on Election Day using Heckman probit, which estimates both binary models simultaneously (registering and voting) and correlates the errors between equations (Heckman 1979).

While this has arguably solved the problem of sample selection bias, researchers may still be interested in examining the influence of both individual- and contextual-level factors on registering and voting. For example, one may wish to examine the effects of district- or state-level characteristics (e.g., racial composition, economic downturn, election competitiveness) in addition to the traditional individual-level determinants of registering and voting. Software programs specifically designed for multilevel models, such as *HLM* and *MLwiN*, do not allow for the estimation of multilevel Heckman probit models. One can also estimate multilevel models with standard statistical software programs, such as *Stata* and *SAS*, but these programs tend to have even fewer options for advanced multilevel methods. Although researchers have attempted to address this concern by estimating Heckman probit models with robust standard errors that take into account clustering within contextual units (e.g., Fullerton and Borch 2008), the integration of HLM and sample selection models would constitute an important step forward in the quantitative analysis of the voting process. Statisticians are beginning to develop these types of models in the context of medical research (e.g., Del Bianco and Borgoni 2006), and the diffusion of these new models to the social sciences will enable political researchers to address new and old questions alike with improved statistical techniques and hopefully provide a better understanding of politics and society.

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CHAPTER 32

Event History Methods

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AN INTRODUCTION TO EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS

Researchers are often interested in more than just the occurrence or non-occurrence of a political events; often the *timing* of events is of equal substantive importance, whether it is the dissolution of a government's cabinet (e.g., King et al. 1990; Warwick 1992; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999), the presence of international military disputes (Jones et al. 1996; Werner 2000; King and Zeng 2001), contributions by political action committees (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2005), or as we will examine in this paper, when a voter makes up his/her mind in an election campaign. Examining when an event occurs provides additional information and may lead to new insights into the event and process under study. Event history – or survival analysis – is the tool of choice when political scientists find that the answer to “why” necessitates an answer to “when.”¹

At its base, event history involves the statistical analysis of data that is longitudinal in nature or that at least implies a longitudinal process. The dependent variable is the amount of time that an observation – whether a country, dyad, individual, etc. – spends in one state before entering another; in the case of a voter choosing a candidate in an election, it would be the amount of time that the individual spends making up his/her mind before deciding whom he/she is voting for (i.e., the amount of time before changing from the state of “undecided” to the state of “decided”).

Such state changes are typically referred to as “failures” or “events,” and depending on whether a discrete or continuous approach is taken, these can occur either anywhere in time (the continuous case), or only within observed intervals (the discrete case). In this chapter, we will focus on models that assume continuous event history processes, although discrete-time models remain a popular alternative (see Beck 1999 for a discussion).²

¹We wish to distinguish our focus in this chapter – time duration modeling – from other recent approaches developed for analyzing “events data.” For example, Schrodtt and colleagues have been applying hidden Markov models in the realm of international relations; the idea is to compare sequences of discrete events to produce quantitative estimates that match “precedent-based reasoning” (for an excellent overview, please see Schrodtt 2000).

²Researchers have – sometimes incorrectly – used a variety of techniques for analyzing discrete duration data, including conventional logit/probit (with or without added time dummy variables; for a discussion, see Beck et al. 1998), and transition techniques (which consist of separate models for separate transition processes). Duration data analyzed with logit/probit models need to account for duration dependence, which is typically done with splines.

Of course, researchers may also deal with data processes in which there are multiple failures (i.e., repeated events), or multiple spells (i.e., periods during which a subject is at risk of failing), or both. These additional data complications are straightforward to address and are critical to making correct inferences.

Since event history is concerned with the timing of change, it makes sense that analysis begins by conceptualizing survival times as a positive random variable, T , with a distribution function:

$$F(t) = \int_0^t f(u) d(u) = \Pr(T \leq t) \quad (1)$$

Differentiating $F(t)$ yields the probability density function $f(t)$,

$$f(t) = dF(t) / d(t) \quad (2)^3$$

which like $F(t)$, characterizes the failure times. In turn, the survivor function, $S(t)$,

$$S(t) = 1 - F(t) = \Pr(T \geq t) \quad (3)$$

denotes the probability that a survival time T is equal to or greater than some time t . Pairing these two functions provides the *hazard rate*, $h(t)$,

$$h(t) = f(t) / S(t) \quad (4)$$

which captures the relationship between the density of failure times, $f(t)$, and the survivor function, $S(t)$. The concept of risk is at the heart of event history analysis, and the hazard rate is intimately tied to this idea – the hazard describes the rate at which observations fail by time t , given that they have survived up until t . Social scientists are often interested in understanding how this – the risk of an event – changes in response to the values of various independent variables or covariates.

THE STATISTICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: DEALING WITH DURATION DEPENDENCE

In ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the residuals (ε_i) are assumed to follow a normal distribution. Thus, if we were to model an event history process using such an estimation procedure, the time to an event – conditional on our covariates – would also be assumed to follow such a distribution. However, in thinking about real world failure-time processes, such an assumption would be both hard to justify (as the distributions of such times are often asymmetrical) and would often lead us to incorrect inferences (as OLS is not robust to such deviations) (Cleves et al. 2004).

Other primary statistical motivations for using the event history approach include censored data and time-varying covariates; OLS is an improper technique for modeling failure-time processes because of its inability to deal with these issues. Censoring occurs when an observation's full history is not observed, and event history analysis is specifically designed to account for censored data via the calculation of the hazard rate. For example, in studying the duration of an international military dispute, the dispute may be ongoing at the end-time of the analysis – that is, it has not ended, and thus the dispute is *right censored*. *Left-truncation* occurs when some observations have experienced an event before the beginning of the study;

³In the discrete case, the probability mass function for a discrete random variable is $f(t) = \Pr(T = t)$.

it can also be considered a censoring problem as data are not-observed, only in this case the nonobservation occurs prior to the start of the study.

Time-varying covariates are also readily handled in an event history analysis. Allowing the value of the covariates to change over time is important in order to properly assess hypotheses. For example, time-varying covariates are needed to gauge the impact of war chests on whether a challenger enters an electoral race – war chests need to be measured over the course of the election cycle as simply measuring them at one time point (whether at the beginning, middle, or end of the cycle) would be woefully inadequate (For a more in-depth discussion, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: Chap. 2.).

Parametric Modeling

Parametric event history models improve upon OLS by directly modeling the duration dependence in the data using more appropriate distributional forms. For example, if we thought the “risk” of an individual making a decision among presidential candidates was *constant* over the course of the electoral campaign, specifying an exponential distribution for the time dependency would be the right choice as it characterizes the baseline hazard as flat; if we thought the risk of making a decision was monotonically increasing (or decreasing) over time, the Weibull, which nests the exponential, might be appropriate.⁴ Other parametric models such as the log-logistic can offer the researcher a bit more flexibility in that they allow the specification of nonmonotonic hazard rates.

All such parametric models are estimated through maximum likelihood, with the likelihood function being expressed in terms of the density of whatever distribution one has chosen; most parametric models can be run fairly easily in popular software packages such as *R* and *Stata*. Best practice demands that the choice of distributional forms always be guided by theory, though as Blossfeld and Rohwer (2002) note, social scientists rarely have theory sufficient to justify a particular parametric choice. Further, the choice of parameterization is an important one, for different distributional assumptions can produce markedly different results (we will further address both of these points in the next section). To revisit the vote decision example, simply assuming that the “risk” of an individual’s decision increases monotonically (e.g., as a Weibull) as a function of the approach of election day may be unwise; electoral politics research – and conventional political wisdom – would suggest that the hazard rate may be nonmonotonic (e.g., as a log-normal), rising and falling to reflect the major milestones of the campaign, including the parties’ conventions and the presidential debates. If parametric models are used, extra testing is needed to determine if the appropriate parametric distribution has been chosen. As in regular maximum likelihood analysis, the fit of parametrically nested models may be compared using a likelihood ratio (LR) test. The fit of parametric, non-nested models can be compared by using the Akaike information criterion (AIC).

Semi-Parametric Modeling: The Cox Proportional Hazards Model

While the previous set of models makes distributional assumptions about the nature of the time dependency in the data, the Cox model (Cox 1972, 1975) leaves this, the baseline hazard, unspecified. While parametric models and the Cox model are both perfectly acceptable ways

⁴These models (along with others, such as the Gompertz) assume *proportional hazards*, which must be tested for during implementation. We define and discuss this model property in our discussion of the Cox semi-parametric model.

to proceed with event history estimation (both are widely used across numerous scholarly fields), the Cox model offers some key advantages for social scientists. A central benefit of the Cox approach is that it allows researchers to avoid the testing of various parametric assumptions *by allowing them to avoid having to make assumptions about the nature of the duration times in the first place* – assumptions which may be poorly informed, which may lead to incorrect inferences, and which are often of secondary importance to the relationship between the outcome variable and the set of covariates under consideration (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).⁵ Accordingly, we consider the Cox to be a more straightforward alternative to parameterization techniques.

In the Cox model, the hazard rate for the i th individual is specified as:

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\beta'X) \quad (5)$$

where $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard function, and $\beta'X$ are the covariates and regression parameters; looking at the equation, we can see that changes in the baseline hazard are solely a function of the covariates and are a multiple of the baseline. Thus, like some of the aforementioned parametric models (e.g., the exponential and the Weibull), the Cox model also adheres to the *proportional hazards property* (hence it is sometimes called “the Cox proportional hazards model”) – which means that this proportional change in the baseline is assumed to be fixed across time. Like all modeling assumptions, the proportional hazards assumption should always be tested for violations, and we will demonstrate common diagnostics and corrections in the example presented below.

Unlike the aforementioned models, however, the Cox proportional hazards model is estimated through *partial* maximum likelihood (i.e., not full MLE), so named because only part of the information available in the data is used in the estimation. Under this method, it is assumed that the intervals between events provide no information about the relationship between the covariates of interest and the baseline hazard. Rather, it is the ordered failure times that contribute information to the partial likelihood function – time matters to the extent that it gives order to the failure times (Cleves et al. 2004: 5; Collett 1994). It is this breakthrough that provides the tradeoff which allows the parametric assumptions to be relaxed.

To derive the partial likelihood function, we begin with the conditional probability of a failure at time t_j , given the number of cases that are in the “risk set” – that is, the number of cases that are at risk of failure at t_j . Equation 6 denotes the probability that the j th case will fail at time T_j , given the number of cases that are at risk at time t_i (defined by $R(t_i)$) (while summing over all individuals in the risk set).

$$\Pr(t_j = T_j | R(t_i)) = \frac{e^{\beta'x_j}}{\sum_{j \in R(t_i)} e^{\beta'x_j}} \quad (6)$$

Taking the product of the conditional probabilities produces the partial likelihood function (which is often logged before being maximized):

$$L_p = \prod_{i=1}^K \left[\frac{e^{\beta'x_i}}{\sum_{j \in R(t_i)} e^{\beta'x_j}} \right] \quad (7)$$

⁵Discrete and continuous time approaches are both acceptable ways to proceed with event history estimation. However, the continuous time approach – which we discuss here – is more straightforward. By using a continuous time approach, one does not have to fit and test for an appropriate link function to account for the duration dependence. However, see Beck et al. (1998) and Beck (1999) who argue that discrete time approaches are more straightforward to interpret due to researchers’ familiarity with discrete time (i.e., logit and probit) models.

Given that the Cox model's partial likelihood function is based solely on the ordered failures in the data, estimation originally could not take place in the presence of "ties," or coterminous events. However, in the last couple of decades, approximation and computing advances concerning the risk set have solved this problem. The issue of ties is relevant for any continuous time model, but several methods exist for dealing with this problem, including the Breslow, Efron, and Exact Discrete methods. Indeed, another advantage of the Cox model over parametric models is its ability to deal with data that is heavily "tied" (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Golub and Collett 2002).

EXTENSIONS TO THE COX SEMI-PARAMETRIC MODEL

Useful and important extensions to the basic Cox model include approaches for dealing with multiple events and unobserved heterogeneity – these include shared frailty (multilevel models) and individual frailty models. The flexibility of the Cox model to account for such unique data aspects – in addition to the extensive diagnostics available – has contributed to the popularity of the approach.

Multiple events can be unordered or ordered; unordered events are often referred to as *competing risks*, and ordered events as *repeated events*. Competing risks models allow the researcher to incorporate additional information about the data and to test more specific hypotheses. For example, we might be interested in not only whether or not a member of a legislature leaves office, but *how* the member leaves office – by retirement, scandal, defeat in the primary, defeat in the general election, or to run for higher office (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997); the nature of the event is important information, and we expect the effect of the covariates to vary based on these different types of events. Furthermore, ignoring this information could lead to incorrect inferences – the effects may be the opposite across the different types of events, and this would be missed if the researcher were to collapse all types into only one summary event.

Repeated events occur in a specific order, and taking into account this sequencing information – rather than treating all the events as independent – is likely to be important. For example, the hazard rate may vary or the covariate effects may differ for a child who has been placed in foster care for the fifth time versus for the first time (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2008).

Cox models may also be extended to account for unmeasured, unmeasurable, or unknown sources of heterogeneity, and these statistical dependencies can be accounted for via shared or individual frailty models.⁶ Therneau and Grambusch (2000) define a frailty as a continuous variable that describes excess risk for distinct categories such as individuals, families, countries, or regions. The idea is that observations have different frailties, and that those who are the most "frail" will experience the event first (2000: 231). Dependencies arise for a variety of reasons, including spatial location, such as observations being from the same legislative

⁶Another popular strategy for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity is through split-population models (Schmidt and Witte 1988), which relax the assumption that eventually all observations will experience the event of interest. With origins in the biostatistics literature (Boag 1949), these models split the sample into two groups: one that has some risk of experiencing an event and one that has essentially zero risk; overly high failure rates are avoided by adjusting the information that is contributed to the likelihood function by the low-risk "population" (for political science applications, see Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2005; Clark and Regan 2003).

district, state, country, or region. It is also worth noting that levels may be defined by distance rather than by a fixed region, such as the “Middle East.” That is, all countries within 500 miles of each others’ capitals (e.g., Qatar, UAE, and Oman) may be defined as having a shared frailty; in the case of distance, the frailties may overlap (see Banerjee et al. 2003).

Garibotti et al. (2006) point out that the shared frailty model is attractive, because it explicitly acknowledges the potential role of unobserved factors that affect the duration of the event being studied. They also note that it assumes that unobservable characteristics are perfectly shared with others in the specified group (such as the family, state, or school), and that unobserved factors that are not shared are not considered. In contrast, correlated frailty models allow for individual-level frailties that can be correlated across the individuals (or more generally, the observations) within a group. The shared frailty (or multilevel/random effects) Cox model is another useful extension that should be applicable across the social sciences.

Finally, the conditional frailty model is another Cox extension designed to account for the presence of both repeated events and heterogeneity through stratification and random effects. Stratification by event number, i.e., first, second, third, etc., occurrence of the event, provides the flexibility of varying baseline hazards to allow for event dependence, and the addition of a frailty term captures unmeasured variation in the dependent variable. Allowing for the possibility of event dependence *and* heterogeneity provides additional modeling flexibility (see Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef 2006; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2007).

WHEN DO VOTERS MAKE UP THEIR MINDS?

Data: The 2004 American National Election Study

Having introduced the Cox model and some of its popular extensions, we now proceed to our example analysis. Using data from the 2004 American National Election Study, we analyze the timing of when voters decided which candidate to support in the 2004 presidential election.⁷ The specific wording of the timing question is as follows: “How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?” The item immediately preceding this one on the survey instrument asked who the respondent voted for in the presidential election.

The general categories and distribution of responses for this question are provided in Table 32.1. Looking at the table, we note that 33% of respondents stated that they knew “all along” how they would vote. At the other end of the spectrum, over 15% reported deciding within the last 2 weeks of the campaign. We code the dependent variable in days, where day 1 indicates the earliest deciders and day 252 – election day – indicates the latest deciders.

To the best of our knowledge, no one has looked at the timing of the voting decision in quite this way.⁸ We include a number of covariates to explain the timing of one’s decision, and have divided these variables into three basic categories: personal political characteristics, factors related to political engagement, and demographic controls. The personal political characteristics include strength of partisan identification, strength of ideology, and disapproval of the president. We expect those who decide early in the election cycle to be strong partisans

⁷The 2004 American National Election Study is available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR); <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/>, accessed August 15, 2007.

⁸McClurg (2006) examines how social networks (and other factors) influence the timing of the decision to vote for a specific candidate, but does not conduct an event history analysis.

TABLE 32.1. When Voters Made Up Their Minds in the 2004 American Presidential Election

	Frequency	Percentage	Campaign days "survived"
"Knew all along/always/from the first/9 months or more"	276	33.62	1
"During/after the primaries/5–8 months before"	93	11.33	42
"Before the conventions/early on"	85	10.35	84
"At the time of the Democratic convention (7/26–7/29/04) /3–4 months"	50	6.09	154
"At the time of the Republican convention (8/30–9/2/04) /2–3 months"	71	8.65	182
"after the conventions/during the campaign/September/ a couple of months"	47	5.72	196
"5–7 weeks before"	8	0.97	217
"1 month/October/after the debates/several weeks"	66	8.04	231
"~2 weeks/10 days before"	51	6.21	242
"in the last days/a week/less than a week"	56	6.82	247
"on election day"	18	2.19	252
Total	821	100.00	

Note: Respondents were asked the following question: "How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?" The question immediately preceding asks who the respondent voted for in the presidential election.

Source: The 2004 American National Election Studies.

and/or ideologues – their partisanship and ideology will serve as the strongest possible "cue" (Conover and Feldman 1981), and thus they will be among the first to know who they will support in the election.⁹ In the spirit of retrospective evaluation (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966), we include a dummy variable for presidential disapproval to test whether voters who disapprove of the job the president has done will decide earlier in the campaign to vote against the president's party.

The political engagement variables include previous voting participation (in the 2000 election), the frequency of the individual's political conversations (with family, friends and peers), the respondent's level of political interest, and the respondent's level of political knowledge. For the first of these covariates, we test whether previous participatory experience leads a voter to an earlier decision on whom to support in the election. We expect that experienced voters may reach a decision sooner, reflecting greater political awareness (Zaller 1992) or perhaps political sophistication (Luskin 1987).

Regarding the second factor, we note that conversation serves to provide voters with information (Downs 1957; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), and thus posit that more frequent political discussion may provide an individual with more information earlier in an election (especially before the campaign is in the "home stretch," and all individuals are exposed to more electoral stimuli). In turn, we expect that such early "doses" of information may cause an earlier crystallization of opinion. We posit that political interest and knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) work in largely similar ways: individuals with greater interest seek out more information and are thus more likely to have better-formed opinions; those with higher stocks of political knowledge (i.e., those who are more familiar with government) are more likely to have stronger preferences (which again translates into earlier decisions).

⁹Relatedly, we might expect that stronger partisans and ideologues would be less ambivalent (Zaller 1992) about the presidential contest, which would make them more likely to come to a decision earlier (McClurg 2006).

Finally, we include a number of demographic controls to test whether there are differences by age, gender, education, income, and race. However, we do not expect such differences to emerge, as there is no theory that we are aware of to suggest – for example – that women decide on a candidate sooner or later than men.

In the model, we include a shared frailty term to account for the multilevel nature of the data – that is, voters (i.e., the lower-level units) are nested within state electoral contexts (i.e., the higher-level units). Because of the United States' electoral college and the winner take all system in the states, American presidential campaigns are strategic and state focused. Thus, we might expect that individuals in some states would be more likely to make up their mind earlier than individuals in other states. A shared frailty model estimates a random parameter to account for the unmeasured factors that make individuals in certain states more “frail” than individuals in other states when it comes to the timing of the decision – this makes sense as we have little “level-2” data in the American National Election Study.¹⁰

Results

Researchers should always conduct modeling diagnostic tests, and thus we begin by examining a few common procedures as they pertain to our models: the link test and test(s) of the proportional hazards assumption. A link test can be used to evaluate general model specification. The intuition behind the test, which can be applied beyond event history models, is to evaluate the specification of the model by testing an alternative specification; this specification is based upon a re-estimation which uses the transformation of linear predictors from the model being scrutinized. If the transformation is statistically indistinguishable from zero when included in the model with the linear predictions, then the model is well-specified; if not, the model has problems that require further inquiry. In the case at hand, for both models, a link test does not reveal any concerns, as the p -value is not statistically significant. For the shared frailty model, the positive coefficient on $\hat{\gamma}^2$ (0.024) has a statistically insignificant z -score of 0.13, with a p -value of 0.90.

Since the Cox model belongs to the class of survival models that relies on the assumption that the covariates' effects on the hazard rate are proportional over time, one area of concern is the possibility that the proportional hazards assumption does not hold for one or more of the covariates. Using the Schoenfeld residuals (called during estimation), we can employ a number of diagnostic tests – both graphical and statistical – to determine whether there are any violations of the proportional hazards assumption in the model. We use the straightforward Grambusch and Therneau global test (Grambusch and Therneau 1994) for the models, as well as Harrell's rho (Harrell 1986) for individual covariates. These statistical tests avoid the subjectivity inherent in graphical tests that require trying to decide whether residuals fall in consistent, discernable patterns, or are randomly dispersed. We should emphasize, however, that the graphical tests *are* still useful, particularly when trying to determine which function

¹⁰When estimating a frailty model, a distribution must be specified for the random effects. Though the gamma is the typical – sometimes only choice in certain statistical packages (and what we present in the tables) – some scholars have criticized the often “atheoretical” choice of distributional forms, and others have noted that different assumptions can greatly alter the parameter estimates obtained (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). Frailty models are an active and fast-developing area of research, including semi-parametric approaches for the estimation of the frailty parameter (e.g., Andersen et al. 1999; Li and Lin 2003).

of time to use as an interaction with offending covariates when addressing violations. Our tests here show that there is not a problem with the proportional hazards assumption in either model – in the case of the frailty model, we see that the Global Proportional Hazards Test is not statistically significant with a χ^2 value of 9.6 and $\text{Prob} > \chi^2$ 0.65.

Looking at the results of the model (see Table 32.2), we find that some personal political characteristics, as well as some political engagement covariates, have a statistically significant effect on when voters decide which presidential candidate to support. Specifically, voters with stronger ideologies and stronger partisan identification decide earlier; those who voted in 2000 and those with greater political interest are also predicted to decide earlier.¹¹ For hazard ratios (presented in the second column of Table 32.2), estimates below one indicate a lower risk of experiencing the event – in this case making a decision – and estimates above one indicate a higher risk of experiencing the event, all else equal; the largest hazard ratio is for political interest. Moving down the column for the shared frailty model, we see that the estimated size of the random effect (akin to a random effect in a multilevel model) is 0.021, which is small,

TABLE 32.2. Predicting the Timing of Voting Decisions, 2004 (Cox Prop. Hazards Estimates; Multilevel (Shared Frailty) Model)^a

Covariates	Coefficient	Hazard ratio	S.E.
<i>Personal political characteristics</i>			
Strength of ideology	0.21	1.24	0.05***
Strength of partisanship	0.24	1.27	0.05***
Disapprove of the President	-0.01	0.99	0.09
<i>Political engagement</i>			
Frequency of political discussion	0.02	1.02	0.02
Voted in 2000	0.24	1.27	0.14*
Political interest	0.35	1.42	0.09***
Political knowledge	0.07	1.07	0.05
<i>Demographics</i>			
Age	-0.00	1.00	0.00
Gender	0.04	1.05	0.09
Education	-0.01	0.99	0.02
Income	0.00	1.00	0.01
Race (African American)	0.24	1.28	0.16
Random effect (Shared frailty term θ)	Variance: 0.021	Likelihood ratio test of θ : 2.22 (0.07)	
<i>Model statistics</i>			
Log likelihood	-2831.94		
Wald χ^2 (Prob > χ^2)	91.28 (0.00)		
Number of failures	543		
Number of observations	543		
Number of groups (states)	28		
Observations per group	Min: 2; Max: 72; Avg.: 19.4		
Global PH test:	χ^2 : 9.6 (Prob > χ^2): 0.65		

Source: The 2004 American National Election Study.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, two-tailed.

^aWe use the Efron method for ties. The multilevel model is estimated using a Gamma distribution for the frailty.

¹¹ We ran a second version of the model without a frailty term, and the estimates for the parameters and their standard errors are comparable across the models (though there are small differences on about 1/2 of the covariates (results not shown)).

though the likelihood ratio test shows that the random effect is statistically significant. Thus, there is significant within-state correlation/“state-wise” heterogeneity.¹²

Figures 32.1 and 32.2 present the “backed out” cumulative hazard and baseline hazard rates for the Cox model with a shared frailty; although the Cox model does not parameterize the baseline, it can be retrieved after estimation. Looking at the figures, we see that slope in the cumulative hazard function changes with time, and that the baseline hazard has a steeper slope near the end of the election cycle, but lowers for roughly days 225 – 250. The results show that voters have a higher risk of deciding starting approximately 135 days into the campaign, and that this risk continues to increase until it peaks about a month before election day. In general, these results suggest there is duration dependence in the data. For all observations, events at some time periods are at more risk to occur in comparison to other time periods. Furthermore, this rate appears to fluctuate with no specific functional form.

Lastly, Fig. 32.3 shows the “electoral frailty” of American states in the 2004 presidential contest, as we graph the group-wise frailty estimates for the states included in the sample.¹³ From this graph, we can see that states above 0 are the most failure prone (the most frail state was Minnesota, with a value of 0.11), and those below the line are the least failure prone (the least frail state was Texas, home of the incumbent, with a value of -0.26). Our analysis




FIGURE 32.1. The Cumulative Hazard for the Multilevel (Shared Frailty) Cox Model

¹²When estimating a shared frailty model, we must be careful to note that the interpretation of the hazard ratios becomes conditional on the frailty term (Cleves et al. 2004). However, as the frailty term – θ – approaches 0, the interpretation of the hazard ratios returns to normal. In the case of our model, we do not concern ourselves with additional interpretation given the relatively small size of the frailty effect.

¹³The x-axis is marked according to ICPSR state identification numbers, and bears no relevance to the analysis other than to enable the graphical presentation of the frailty estimates.




FIGURE 32.2. The Baseline Hazard for the Multilevel (Shared Frailty) Cox Model




FIGURE 32.3. The Electoral "Frailty" of American States in the 2004 Presidential Contest. Least Frail State: Texas (-0.26). Most Frail State: Minnesota (0.11)

indicates that although Bush carried Texas by a comfortable margin, Texans were more likely to decide later in the election.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Event history leverages temporal information when social scientists find that the answer to “why” necessitates an answer to “when,” and the result is a more nuanced understanding of process and (ultimately) the subject under study – one that is more empirically and theoretically satisfying. Event history analysis accounts for important temporal dynamics.

There is a growing body of longitudinal data available as social scientists have come to recognize the increased inferential leverage of event history analysis. In particular, within the last decade, the use of these techniques has ballooned in the study of politics due to increased interest in the concepts of survival and risk – processes that are an inherent part of survival modeling. Thus, event history analysis often provides an ideal example of synergy between method and question.

The future of event history in the study of politics is promising, as approaches and extensions continue to provide less restrictive and more realistic accounts of the dynamic, longitudinal processes being studied. As we noted previously, most recently these extensions have included the ability to account for heterogeneity, event dependence, and increasingly spatial relationships, and each of these extensions are exciting and powerful in their own right. Heterogeneity may arise in a number of contexts, perhaps as subjects vary in their ability to learn, leaders take differential risks, and cultures diverge (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2007)¹⁴; event dependence arises from the repeated occurrences of events, and has long been recognized as a concern in the study of politics (Andersen and Gill 1982; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002; Wei et al. 1989; Prentice et al. 1981). And lastly, the incorporation of spatial dependencies (though most recent) is also of great interest to those studying politics (Banerjee et al. 2003; Berry and Baybeck 2005; Volden 2006; Boehmke 2007; Darmofal 2007) – after all, the diffusion of policies across states is likely to impact the timing of the adoption of policies, just as the proximity of civil unrest is likely to impact the timing of outbreaks of additional violence. Researchers are discovering both new questions *and* new answers to old questions when conducting event history analyses, which bodes well for the social sciences in terms of disciplinary progress and maturity.

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¹⁴See also Sastry (1996) and Kuate-Defo (2001), who explicitly incorporate heterogeneity into their event history models of childhood mortality.

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CHAPTER 33

Social Networks and Political Analysis

CLAYTON D. PEOPLES

INTRODUCTION

Social networks have been an important area of study in sociology dating back to the classic works of Simmel. The study of social networks entails a unique perspective focused on social relations. It also carries a powerful methodological repertoire geared toward mapping and analyzing social ties. Political research has greatly benefited from the application of social networks. In particular, numerous studies of political behavior/social movements and political power structure have applied social networks to help us better understand how relations matter in these realms. But, there are still virtually endless opportunities to apply social networks to political research.

In this chapter, I briefly discuss how research on political behavior/social movements and political power structure has been impacted by social networks. I then illustrate how social networks can be fruitfully applied to another important political topic – policymaking – and bridge this back with political power structure research. Specifically, I examine how receiving campaign contributions from the same big business and labor political action committees (PACs) affects roll call vote similarity among pairs of U.S. House members. My analyses show that the more big business PAC contributors legislators share, the more similarly they vote, independent of other factors (including their vote similarity in prior years). Conversely, sharing labor contributors has no influence on voting patterns among legislators. These findings carry significant implications for our understanding of policymaking and political power structure. Importantly, the findings also show that social networks are important in policymaking, which means they should be included in future policymaking research.

SOCIAL NETWORKS: BACKGROUND

The study of social networks has been significant part of sociology for over a century. Its roots go back to the work of Simmel, whose focus on social relations and examination of the most elementary social groupings – dyads and triads – laid the foundation for future study on the

topic (e.g. Simmel 1950). The importance of social networks to sociology is symbolically evident in the names of some of our discipline's major journals. The American Sociological Association (ASA) specialty journal on social psychology was for many decades called *Sociometry*, a reference to social networks and mathematical representations thereof. Additionally, today there is a high quality, widely cited specialty journal in sociology named *Social Networks*.

The importance of social networks to sociology is also apparent in sociological research on some of society's most popular beliefs concerning social relationships. For instance, the adage "birds of a feather flock together" is actually a well-studied social networks phenomenon referred to as "the principle of homophily" which shows that peoples' networks are indeed composed largely of people similar to them (McPherson et al. 2001). Also, the popular concepts of "the small world" and "six degrees of separation" are well examined and supported by social networks research. Studies nationally (Travers and Milgram 1967) and globally (Dodds et al. 2003) suggest that most people in the U.S. and world are, in fact, tied to one another by just six or fewer links.

Given the importance of social networks in sociology, it is not surprising that some studies have examined politics from a social networks perspective. There are two areas of political study, in particular, that have seen considerable application of social networks ideas and methodologies: political behavior/social movements research and political power structure research.

Work on political behavior/social movements has been greatly enhanced by social networks. This has resulted in some fascinating findings. For instance, research shows that citizen involvement in institutional forms of civic engagement (voting in elections, etc.) can depend greatly on their social networks (Knoke 1990). Involvement in less institutional forms of politics such as social movements can also depend on social networks. Social networks are important in the emergence of social movements (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984); networks are key in recruiting social movement participants once a movement has emerged (e.g. Jasper and Poulsen 1995; McAdam 1986); and networks are critical for maintaining shared identities and goals among members of a mature movement (Snow et al. 1986).

Political power structure research has been enhanced by social networks as well. One of the earliest applications of social networks to the study of political power is found in the pivotal work of Hunter (1953), *Community Power Structure*. In the study, Hunter employs social networks techniques to identify the key players in Atlanta and map their connections to one another. He finds considerable overlap among the city's leaders. Similar methodologies have since been utilized to study patterns of power and the connections among elites in other communities (e.g. Laumann et al. 1977; Laumann and Pappi 1976).

Social networks have also been applied to national political power research. Even the earliest works on national power structure show hints of a social networks perspective. For instance, in his seminal work, *The Power Elite*, Mills (1956) highlights the overlap between elites at the top of the economic, political, and military institutions. Additionally, Mills notes the many social ties among elites stemming from attending the same private schools or belonging to exclusive clubs. Not all subsequent studies of the national power structure have continued this social networks approach. For instance, Knoke (1990) points out a few examples of "non-network" approaches, which include the public choice and pluralist pressure group approaches. Nonetheless, many studies have continued the networks approach in studying national political power. Some allude to social networks in their titles, such as *The Inner Circle* (Useem 1984). Others promote social networks techniques as the foremost means of studying political power, as found in the important *Who Rules America?* books (e.g. Domhoff 2006).

One interesting distinction emerges in how social networks are applied in the aforementioned areas. In the research on political behavior/social movements, social networks are generally applied to explain social action. In political power research, however, they are applied for largely descriptive purposes. There are exceptions to this – for instance, solid strains of political power research explore how connections among corporate elites affect their contributions to political campaigns (e.g. Burris 2001; Mizruchi 1992). Nonetheless, most political power studies that apply social networks focus on the composition and structure of the networks rather than on their consequences for social action.

In this chapter, I bridge the above gap by analyzing how the connections between powerful entities and politicians influence the politicians' behaviors. Specifically, I examine how the connections between PAC contributors and U.S. House members – and the resultant connections between the members stemming from their joint ties to contributors – influence their votes on bills. By doing so, I continue the fine tradition of using social networks in political power structure research. Additionally, I extend social networks into the study of policymaking.

PAC CONTRIBUTORS AND POLICYMAKING: PREVIOUS WORK

Policymaking is clearly an important part of the political process. The laws that regulate economic and social life come out of policymaking. Understanding how outsiders – particularly PAC contributors – may influence policymaking is critical for a number of reasons. First, it carries significant implications for theories of political power structure. PACs are particularly important since they are essentially the political money machines of class-based interests such as big business and labor, and much political power theorizing focuses on class-based groups, as I will expound later in the hypotheses section. Second, PAC contributors give money in huge sums, giving candidates for federal office millions of dollars in PAC contributions (see Table 33.1). So, it would seem that if “money talks,” where one would find outsider influence would be in such contributions. Finally, from a public policy standpoint, PAC influence has implications for campaign finance reform. Much of the debate surrounding campaign financing revolves around the potential influence of “special interests,” a category under which PACs could certainly be included. (See also Burris’ review of campaign contribution research in this volume.)

Sociological research examining contributors has tended to focus on *access* rather than influence. For instance, Clawson et al. (1998) actually focus on contributor access to policymakers in their impressive scholarship, *Dollars and Votes*. Yet, examining *influence on policymaking* is crucial for the many reasons noted above. There are many potential ways of

TABLE 33.1. PAC Contributions to Winning U.S. House Candidates, 100th through 104th Houses (Contributions Given in the Two-Year Election Cycle Prior to Start of a Given House)

House	Years	Total PAC contributions to winning candidates
100th House	1987–1988	\$84,512,263
101st House	1989–1990	\$98,480,414
102nd House	1991–1992	\$102,274,201
103rd House	1993–1994	\$111,469,933
104th House	1995–1996	\$114,756,457

TABLE 33.2. Roll Call Vote Summary Statistics, 100th through 104th Houses

House	Years	Total votes in house	Votes per year (average)
100th House	1987–1988	939	470
101st House	1989–1990	879	440
102nd House	1991–1992	932	466
103rd House	1993–1994	1,122	561
104th House	1995–1996	1,340	670
Averages	1987–1996	1,042	521

examining influence, each with pros and cons. Here I promote here a strategy of examining influence on later stages of policymaking – roll call voting, specifically.

Looking at roll call voting carries many advantages. Unlike earlier stages of policymaking, roll call voting is concrete and part of public record. Legislators decide yea or nay on a bill in roll call votes, and this is then recorded as part of the official record on the legislation. Additionally, legislators cast many roll call votes (approximately 500 votes per year in the U.S. House), providing plenty of data points to analyze (see [Table 33.2](#)). Finally, roll call votes provide a highly conservative test of potential contributor influence. This is because roll call votes are the final stage in policymaking. Contributors and other outsiders could arguably wield more influence in earlier stages, playing a role in setting the policy agenda, shaping legislation wording, pushing amendments and/or special provisions, or even blocking some bills before they reach a final vote.

A couple of sociological studies have examined contributor influence on roll call voting (e.g. Ashford 1986; Neustadt 1990), but their findings are mixed. This is also true of the literature outside sociology that examines contributor influence (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998, for a nice review). These mixed findings are likely a result of three key methodological issues: (1) examining only a small set of roll call votes, (2) failing to explicitly take into account the social context of voting, or (3) inadequately addressing causality concerns. Applying a social networks approach can help resolve all three of these issues.

APPLYING SOCIAL NETWORKS: ANALYTIC STRATEGIES

Issue 1: Examining only Certain Bills

Virtually, all the studies in the literature on contributors and roll call voting examine only a selection of votes. In fact, of the thirty-three studies reviewed by Baumgartner and Leech (1998), only nine directly analyze ten or more roll call votes. More importantly, none of the studies analyze all the roll call votes in a given Congress, so they are all guilty of selecting only certain votes.

Selecting only certain roll call votes for analysis is highly problematic. It limits the field of examination, potentially biasing the results and increasing the risk of producing a false positive result (a statistically significant relationship is found when the relationship is not actually significant – error of type I) or a false negative result (a statistically significant relationship is not found when the relationship actually is significant – error of type II). On the question of whether or not campaign contributions influence roll call votes, selecting only certain votes for analysis likely elevates the risk of producing a false negative result.

Research shows that campaign contributions have little, if any, influence on highly visible votes (Jones and Keiser 1987). So, if a researcher selects for analysis a set of votes that seem particularly important – votes that, not coincidentally, would probably be highly visible – the researcher would likely find that contributions are not significant, potentially a false negative finding. This may explain why some studies in the literature find campaign contributors do not influence roll call voting.

SOLUTION. How can this issue be resolved? Analyzing *all* the roll call votes in a given Congress is the only way to truly resolve this issue. But how can one do this? Doing so requires data reorganization consistent with a social networks approach. The typical organization of data in quantitative analysis is shown in Table 33.3. This organization assumes a single, easily quantifiable dependent variable (e.g. one roll call vote). It also assumes unique, independent cases (in this case, unique, independent legislators). This would be fine if one were using a single roll call vote as the dependent variable. But, how can one measure multiple roll call votes in a single variable?

There are a number of ways one could measure the multiple roll call votes at once. One approach would be to change the cases to legislator-bills (e.g. Neustadt 1990). In such an organization of data, the cases take on the following pattern: Legislator A, Bill 1; Legislator A, Bill 2; Legislator A, Bill 3; ... Legislator Z, Bill N (where N = the finite number of bills analyzed). Another approach, though, which I take in this research, is to change the cases to legislator-legislator pairs, consistent with a networks approach.

Organizing data such that cases are legislator-legislator pairs reflects a social networks approach because it ties actors together. In this organization of data, the cases would be as follows (see Table 33.4 for more detail): Legislator A, Legislator B; Legislator A, Legislator C; Legislator A, Legislator D; ... Legislator Y, Legislator Z (where legislators Y and Z are the final pair of legislators among all possible pairs). The similarity values for the dependent variable are the percent of similarity between given pairs of legislators in their voting across X number of bills. This organization of data allows for the analysis of an unlimited number of bills in a single variable. It also treats voting as a potentially social process by linking legislators’ voting behavior with one another. It therefore resolves the issue of selecting on the dependent variable and better reflects the social reality of legislative roll call voting, which I address next.

TABLE 33.3. Typical Organization of Data in Quantitative Analysis

Cases	Variable 1	Variable 2	Variable 3	Variable N
Legislator A	Value	Value	Value	Value
Legislator B	Value	Value	Value	Value
Legislator C	Value	Value	Value	Value
Legislator Z	Value	Value	Value	Value

TABLE 33.4. Social Networks Data Organized such that Variables are Columns

Cases	Variable 1	Variable 2	Variable 3	Variable N
Legislators A, B	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value
Legislators A, C	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value
Legislators A, D	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value
Legislators Y, Z	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value	Similarity value

Problem 2: Ignoring the Social Context of Voting

From a social networks standpoint, the social context of behavior is very important. Yet no studies of roll call voting explicitly take into account the social context of voting. Spatial modeling, a method of analyzing roll call votes advanced by the works of Poole and Rosenthal (1985) and Heckman and Snyder (1997), is dominant in the roll call vote literature. It is methodologically rigorous, but as it is typically applied it essentially mirrors standard attribute models of behavior. Put differently, spatial modeling implicitly assumes that legislator attributes matter most in roll call voting. Yet, few would argue that social relations are unimportant.

The legislature is a social arena that brings legislators into constant social contact with one another, embedding them in social networks (Caldiera and Patterson 1987). Moreover, policy making itself is a social process, implying that social networks should play a key role in legislative voting (Davidson and Oleszek 1998). Thus, using approaches that fail to explicitly account for the social interdependence of legislators (such as spatial modeling) is inappropriate.

SOLUTION. I therefore explicitly account for the social interdependence of legislators in this study through using legislator-legislator pairs, or dyads, as my units (as noted in the last section and shown in Table 33.4) and using network-analytic regression tools to analyze the data. Virtually no studies analyze roll call voting this way (see Arnold, Deen, and Patterson, 2000, and Peoples, 2008, for exceptions). Network analysis, as applied to regression, treats cases as interdependent rather than independent. This implies, though, that a networks approach violates one of the key assumptions of standard parametric regression – that the cases are independent – thereby resulting in an autocorrelation problem. One way of addressing this would be to use nonparametric statistics.

There are a number of nonparametric techniques available. For instance, recent methodological innovations promote the use of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods (e.g. Snijders, 2002), and extensions of MCMC with maximum likelihood estimation (e.g. Butts, 2007), when dealing with relational data. But the type of nonparametric modeling I use in this study is quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) regression (described well in Hubert & Schultz, 1976). There is strong methodological argument for using QAP regression (e.g. Krackhardt, 1988), and studies of political power such as Mizuchi's (1992) major book and the recent Burris (2005) article have set a precedent for its use in this realm. QAP is a very conservative form of regression that gets around the assumption of case independence in a systematic fashion. QAP uses logic similar to bootstrapping whereby the dependent variable is regressed on the independent variable(s) once, and then the actors attached to each node are semi-randomly shuffled – the difference is that QAP uses a permutation procedure to preserve the structure of the relations in the social network of actors. After shuffling the actors, regression is repeated again with this new, semi-random configuration of actors.

This shuffling, re-regressing procedure is repeated many times (1,000 or more), and the original regression coefficients (with all the actors in their actual, original positions) are compared with the distribution of subsequent coefficients to determine their statistical significance (Hubert and Schultz 1976). For instance, if a given coefficient from the original regression model is greater than 95% of the coefficients in 1,000 other “shuffled” models, the coefficient is significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test. This nonparametric model thus corrects for the potential errors stemming from autocorrelation.

Problem 3: Inadequately Addressing Causality Concerns

As some researchers have pointed out, the question of causality is important in examining the relationship between campaign contributions and voting (e.g. Stratmann 1991). It may be that contributors give money to candidates who support their issues, meaning votes may cause contributions rather than contributions causing votes. Empirical work on the contributing strategies of donors lends some insight into this question.

Burris (2001) uses network techniques to show that whereas individual capitalists give ideologically, business PACs contribute pragmatically. This implies that business PACs do not closely scrutinize legislators' campaign platforms and voting records before making contributions – they simply give money to the candidates most likely to win an election. But other PACs – namely labor PACs – give much more ideologically (Grier and Munger 1986). This underscores the importance of carefully addressing causality concerns in this chapter.

SOLUTION. First off, I only include contributions in my analyses that came before the votes analyzed. In other words, for a given House (the 104th House – 1995–1996), I examine the effects of campaign contributions arriving in the election cycle before the start of the House (1993–1994 contributions). This temporal ordering is obviously important, as time-ordering is the first step in establishing causality. I also go further, though, looking at both the present and past behavior of the legislators.

Very few researchers take into account past behavior in their roll call vote studies. Two exceptions, though, are Grenzke (1989) and Wawro (2001). Both take into account prior roll call voting in their studies, and both reach the same conclusion: campaign contributions do not affect roll call voting – rather, voting likely affects contributions. But both studies exhibit methodological limitations.

Grenzke (1989) creates panel data on legislators who served in all Congresses from 1973 to 1982, and then analyzes how their contributions – and their prior voting – are related to their voting in each of the Congresses. Grenzke's approach, though, builds a survivor bias in the construction of the panel data, creating "sample selection" problems, as noted by Wawro (2001).

Wawro (2001) analyzes how legislators' contributions are related to their subsequent voting within single Congresses, using panel analysis. But Wawro conceives of the contributor-legislator relationship as a market relationship, only examining contributions given a short time before votes (weeks or months at most). This narrows the timeframe of potential influence. Recent work suggests that it is more appropriate to view the contributor-legislator relationship as a true long-term social tie – or as she puts it, a "gift-giving" relationship (Gordon 2005). In such a relationship, Gordon posits, roll call voting could be influenced by contributions given a year or more before particular votes.

I develop a two-pronged approach that is not subject to the limitations found in the Grenzke (1989) and Wawro (2001) studies. My approach does not commit a survivor bias, nor does it narrow the timeframe of influence to just a few weeks or months. My two-pronged approach involves examining the roll call votes of two groups in a given two-year House separately – first freshman legislators, then nonfreshman legislators – and how their votes are impacted by their shared contributors coming into that House.

The advantage of examining freshman legislators separately is that they have no prior voting history, and, thus, no voting record on which contributors could base their contributions. This is not perfect given that freshmen still run on platforms that contributors could be attracted to, but it is better than examining freshmen lumped together with the entire population of legislators.

With the nonfreshman legislators, I add a lagged control variable for their similarity in voting in the prior assembly. This is consistent with my networks approach of linking lawmakers' behaviors with that of their peers, even when it comes to prior voting. But, it is also critical for establishing causality. Adding this lagged control variable explicitly accounts for prior voting patterns, meaning any significant relationship between contributions and voting would largely indicate contributions affecting votes, not votes affecting contributions.

Summary of Analytic Strategies

To sum up, I pursue a network approach to the study of contributions and policymaking through the following: I organize all of the variables into dyadic arc lists as depicted in [Table 33.4](#), focusing on similarities and/or relations between pairs of legislators, i and j . I run regression analyses modeling similarity in roll call voting among pairs of legislators as a function of their similarity in receipts of contributions from different types of contributors (namely business PAC and labor PAC contributors), controlling for other sources of similarity and/or relations between them. In my analyses, I use a nonparametric technique (QAP regression) to resolve the violation of the case independence assumption. Finally, I run separate analyses on freshmen legislators and nonfreshmen legislators, controlling for prior vote similarity among the latter, to address causality concerns.

HYPOTHESES

I develop hypotheses from theories of political power. Put simply, political power theories address who rules in politics among various class-based outsiders and state actors. Scholars in this area have debated for decades without resolution the relative roles of outsiders and state actors. Three main competing theories emerge from this debate: state-centered theory, arguing outsiders generally do not influence the state (e.g. Amenta and Parikh 1989; Skocpol 1980); pluralist theory, arguing that a diverse array of outsiders influence the state (e.g. Polsby 1960; Dahl 1961); and elite-power/class theory, arguing that primarily big business influences the state (e.g. Mills 1956; Domhoff 1967).

Studying PAC influence on policymaking provides a unique opportunity to test these theories of political power. As noted earlier, policymaking is a crucial part of the political process, and PACs are significant outsiders that contribute large sums of money to policymakers. Of special note, PACs can be categorized based on class-based interests, and PACs representing big business and labor combined contribute more than 50% of all PAC money given to winning House candidates. This is significant because big business and labor reside on opposing ends of most class conceptualizations and are most involved in class struggle (e.g. Wright 1985a). Also worthy of note: while there are fewer labor PACs than big business PACs, labor PACs as a whole contribute about as much money as big business PACs, potentially leveling the playing field (see [Table 33.5](#) for details).

Examining big business and labor PAC influence on policymaking thus allows one to critically examine the claims of state-centered, pluralist, and elite-power/class theories. Below, I briefly construct hypotheses from each of these theories concerning big business and labor PAC influence on policymaking.

State-centered hypothesis: neither big business nor labor PACs influence policymaking. This stems from the state-centered assertion that state actors and state-based organizations, not outsiders, hold primacy in state decisions.

TABLE 33.5. Big Business and Labor PAC Contributions to Winning U.S. House Candidates and Percent Equivalent of All PAC Money Given to those Candidates, 100th through 104th Houses (Contributions Given in the Two-Year Election Cycle Prior to Start of a Given House)

House	Years	Big business contributions	Labor contributions	Combined contributions	% of All PAC \$
100th House	1987–1988	\$24,434,055	\$21,499,296	\$45,933,351	54.4%
101st House	1989–1990	\$29,377,560	\$26,043,028	\$55,420,588	56.3%
102nd House	1991–1992	\$32,358,885	\$28,998,854	\$61,357,739	59.9%
103rd House	1993–1994	\$35,186,488	\$26,936,047	\$62,122,535	55.7%
104th House	1995–1996	\$36,900,907	\$27,716,154	\$64,617,061	56.3%

TABLE 33.6. Variables Used in Analyses: Sources and Descriptive Statistics (104th House; Units are Non-Directional Dyadic Pairs of Legislators; *N* for all Variables = 93,096)

Variable	Source	Mean	St. Dev.
<i>Dependent variable</i>			
Vote similarity	Poole and Rosenthal, available electronically www.voteview.com	0.650	0.181
<i>Main independent variable(s)</i>			
Shared big business PAC contributors	FEC filings, available electronically at the FECs website	0.086	0.051
Shared labor PAC contributors	FEC filings, available electronically at the FECs website	0.117	0.104
<i>Control variables</i>			
Same party	Congressional and biographical references	0.498	0.500
Same race	Congressional and biographical references	0.828	0.376
Same gender	Congressional and biographical references	0.803	0.398
Committee overlap	Congressional and biographical references	0.174	0.400

Pluralist hypothesis: both big business and labor PACs influence policymaking. This stems from the pluralist argument that a wide spectrum of outsiders can impact the state, meaning both big business and labor ought to have some influence.

Elite-power/class hypothesis: big business PACs influence policymaking, but labor PACs do not. This stems from the elite-power/class assertion that big business holds virtually exclusive sway over the state and its actions.

DATA

I use data on members of the 104th U.S. House of Representatives, 1995–1996 (see [Table 33.6](#) for the names of each variable, data sources, and descriptive statistics). This is an ideal House to analyze because it was the first year of the republican majority in the House that continued for twelve years through the 2006 lawmaking year, dominating our recent political climate in the U.S.; moreover, there were a large number of new legislators in the 104th, which is important for my two-pronged approach to causality.

I include data on all members of the 104th excluding those who voted in only one – or none – of the roll calls in the two-year period (this situation only occurred in the case of legislators who were elected but did not go on to serve in the House) and those few legislators

who did not receive any campaign contributions (this only occurred in the case of legislators who funded their own campaigns or who took office late to replace a legislator who left office mid-assembly). In the end, 432 of the 435 House members remain after these exclusions.

My data on these 432 legislators cover a lot of ground and come from a number of sources. The data incorporate information on legislative roll call voting, gathered from congressional records and compiled by Poole and Rosenthal (2007). The data also include information on big business and labor campaign contributions, gleaned from the Federal Election Commission, or FEC. Additionally, the data include information on political and demographic characteristics of the legislators, such as their party affiliation, race, gender, and committee membership, retrieved from public records. Consistent with my networks approach, for each variable I convert the data into legislator-by-legislator arc lists before running analyses (refer back to [Table 33.4](#) for an example). Specifics on how each variable is coded, as well as how each is measured follow in the paragraphs below.

VARIABLES

Dependent Variable: Vote Similarity

I use data on legislative votes collected by Poole and Rosenthal (2007) in their “VoteView” project, which are publicly available at www.voteview.com. Poole and Rosenthal have compiled roll call vote records and created raw roll call vote data sets for the 1st through the present U.S. Houses (and Senates). For this study, I use their roll call data on the 104th House including data on how members voted on all of the roll call votes ($N = 1,340$) that took place during the two-year period.

To prepare the vote similarity variable for analysis using a social networks approach, I shift the units to relational dyads. To do so, I convert the data into legislator-by-legislator dyadic relational matrixes in SAS using methods outlined by Moody (1998). In each cell of the matrix is a value representing the proportion of bills and resolutions that dyads of legislators i and j agreed on given the total possible number of bills they could have agreed on, taking into account nonvoting (since some legislators did not vote on certain bills, due either to absenteeism or conflicts of interest, I could not use a simple count of vote agreement – I needed to take into account nonvoting). The total number of dyads is 93,096: $((432 \text{ senders}) \times (432 - 1 \text{ receivers}))/2$.

Main Independent Variables: Big Business and Labor PAC Contributors

I obtained information on legislators’ receipts of PAC campaign contributions electronically through the FEC. My data cover the election cycle leading to the 104th House. In other words, the data cover contributions given to candidates in the years 1993 and 1994, as election for the 104th House occurred in November 1994. In the FEC data, all types of PAC contributions are included in a single data file, but are identifiable by type. As such, big business (“corporation with capital stock”) and labor (“union or labor organization”) are clearly identifiable class-based PAC types within the data file.

Big business and labor exhibit interesting patterns of contributing. As already noted, big business and labor PACs account for the majority of PAC money contributed to winning

U.S. House candidates. Conventional wisdom might suggest that big business contributes mostly to republicans, while labor gives the vast majority of its contributions to democrats. This is not entirely true. A large share – almost 50% – of big business’s contributions to winning members of the 104th House went to democrats. And while the majority of labor’s contributions do go to democrats, nearly 30% percent of their contributions to winning members of the 104th House went to republicans (see [Tables 33.7 and 33.8](#) for more detail on big business and labor PAC contributions by party affiliation of candidate in the 100th through 104th Houses).

With the FEC data, I construct two measures of shared PAC contributors for the study: one based on shared PAC contributions from the same big business PAC contributors, and one based on shared PAC contributions from the same labor PAC contributors. Operationally, “shared contributions” means receiving contributions from the same sources, regardless of money amount. I use these measures of shared contributions in my analyses rather than money-based measures for a number of reasons.

First, PAC contributions usually involve set money amounts. PACs frequently solicit monies in predetermined sums (such as asking \$50 per plate at a fundraising meal); and more importantly, PACs then give this money in fixed quantities to candidates, often \$500 or \$1,000 per candidate per election. Second, innovative research by Mizruchi (1992) set a precedent for measuring shared contributions in studies of corporate political action rather than measuring money amount per se, because in theory, the contribution tie is what matters most from a networks perspective. Third, and perhaps most importantly, I constructed and tested measures based on money amount in preliminary models and they produced results very similar to measures based

TABLE 33.7. Big Business PAC Contributions to Winning House Candidates in the 100th through 104th Houses, by Party Affiliation of Candidates (Contributions Given in the Two-Year Election Cycle Prior to Start of a Given House; Total Percentage of Big Business PAC Money going to that Party’s Winning Candidates in Parentheses)

House	Years	Contributions to winning democratic candidates	Contributions to winning republican candidates
100th House	1987–1988	\$12,309,441 (50.4%)	\$12,124,614 (49.6%)
101st House	1989–1990	\$15,739,422 (53.6%)	\$13,638,138 (46.4%)
102nd House	1991–1992	\$18,322,964 (56.6%)	\$13,968,414 (43.2%)
103rd House	1993–1994	\$19,764,859 (56.2%)	\$15,421,429 (43.8%)
104th House	1995–1996	\$17,631,881 (47.8%)	\$19,268,026 (52.2%)

TABLE 33.8. Labor PAC Contributions to Winning House Candidates in the 100th through 104th Houses, by Party Affiliation of Candidates (Contributions Given in the Two-Year Election Cycle Prior to Start of a Given House; Total Percentage of Labor PAC Money going to that Party’s Winning Candidates in Parentheses)

House	Years	Contributions to winning democratic candidates	Contributions to winning republican candidates
100th House	1987–1988	\$16,249,466 (75.6%)	\$5,249,830 (24.4%)
101st House	1989–1990	\$19,558,978 (75.1%)	\$6,484,050 (24.9%)
102nd House	1991–1992	\$21,552,222 (74.3%)	\$7,388,775 (25.5%)
103rd House	1993–1994	\$21,237,106 (78.8%)	\$5,564,938 (20.7%)
104th House	1995–1996	\$19,384,312 (69.9%)	\$8,192,853 (29.6%)

on shared contributions – so given the nature of giving and the precedent in past work, it seemed more appropriate to use the shared contributions measures in the final models.

Again, I arrange the data into dyadic relational matrixes, consistent with my networks approach. With both measures, in each cell of the matrix is the log of the number of contributors legislators i and j share controlling for the number of contributors each has where N_{ij} is the number of unique PACs contributing to both legislators i and j , N_i is the number contributing to legislator i , and N_j is the number contributing to legislator j (see equation). I log all the variables because their distributions are highly skewed. Again the total number of dyads for each contribution variable is 93,096.

$$\text{Similarity}(ij) = \frac{N_{ij}}{\sqrt{N_i N_j}}$$

Control Variables

SAME IDEOLOGY/PARTY. A number of studies in political science have found that personal ideology is a very strong determinant of roll call voting – so strong, in fact, that some argue ideology is the primary dimension on which legislators make decisions (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal 1985, 1991; Schneider 1979). But frequently these measures are based on interest group scores, and interest group scores are tabulated from surveys of legislators' past votes on issues. This clearly presents a tautology since using scores from these indexes to explain roll call votes is essentially using votes to explain votes (Jackson and Kingdon 1992). One way this problem of measurement can be tackled is by using a variable measuring party in lieu of ideology.

Legislator ideology can be viewed as a factor that fits somewhat well with simple left-right or liberal-conservative categories; party affiliation, too, fits somewhat well with left-right categories. Thus, party is a factor that, at least to some degree, likely taps legislator ideology. Using party as a proxy of ideology is somewhat limiting in that there are generally two main categories with which to belong, whereas an interest group based measure could produce a continuum of scores. Nonetheless, party does not pose tautological issues when used as a vote predictor, and it shares an important characteristic with ideology measures – it affects roll call voting greatly.

In studies of roll call voting that include party as a predictor, party almost always emerges as the quintessential vote determinant (Weisberg 1978). In fact, a number of studies suggest that the effect of contributions on roll call voting becomes less significant or even non-significant when party is added to the equation (e.g. Chappell 1982; Wright 1985, 1990), which makes its inclusion critical to this study. In practice, research no longer questions whether or not party affects voting, but, instead, tends to focus on issues of accurately estimating just how strong the effect of party is, spurring methodological debates (e.g., Snyder and Groseclose 2000, 2001; McCarty et al. 2001). One of those debates asks whether or not party and other indicators of ideology should be included in the same statistical models.

While some researchers would argue that party and ideology are different enough that one ought to include both in models of roll call voting, recent statistical testing and scrutiny suggests that major methodological issues arise when both are included in models (Herron 2001). As such, I use party in my models as a proxy for ideology, and exclude any additional measures of ideology from the analyses (of course, though, I also keep in mind that party is not merely an ideological label – it is also a source of social relations in the legislature). In constructing the party variable, I again arrange the data into a dyadic relational matrix to remain consistent with my networks approach. In each cell of the matrix is a dummy value

(1 or 0) where 1 indicates that legislators i and j are in the same party. Again, the total number of dyads for same party is 93,096.

SAME RACE. It is a well-known fact in sociology that race is correlated with a number of important socioeconomic factors. These factors, such as family wealth, help dictate objective group interests. Moreover, research shows that race is an important factor affecting socialization (e.g. Blau et al. 1982), bringing people together around common objective interests. This joining around interests occurs in the political sphere, where there are a number of race-based political organizations that aim to promote and defend group interests.

There are a number of formal organizations that unite legislators of the same race, such as the Congressional Black Caucus, and research suggests that these organizations can be very influential in politics (Wright 2000). As such, race likely influences the way legislators vote on roll calls, meriting its inclusion as a control variable. Information on legislators' racial backgrounds was obtained from various congressional biographical references. In constructing the racial homophily variable, I again follow a networks approach by arranging the data into a dyadic relational matrix. In each cell of the matrix is a dummy value where 1 indicates that legislators i and j are the same race. Again, the total number of dyads for the same race variable is roughly 93,096.

SAME GENDER. Gender is also an important factor affecting socialization, and should in theory affect roll call voting. Yet, the literature on the topic is surprisingly small and somewhat mixed. One study suggests gender affects roll call voting family leave legislation (Segal and Brzuzy 1995). Similarly, another study argues that gender affects voting on women's issues, with female legislators voting more favorably than males toward policies that benefit women (Thomas 1989). But, a more recent study on non issue-specific roll call voting suggests that gender has little impact (Barnello 1999).

Given the mixed findings in the studies above, the relationship between gender and roll call voting remains unclear, warranting further examination and inclusion in this study. I gathered information on legislator gender from various biographical references. In constructing the gender homophily variable, I again arrange the data into a dyadic relational matrix to reflect my networks approach. In each cell of the matrix is a dummy value where 1 indicates that legislators i and j are the same gender. Again the total number of dyads for the same gender variable is 93,096.

COMMITTEE OVERLAP. Within the legislature, there are specific tasks that bring certain representatives into close contact. One of those responsibilities is serving on committees. Legislative committees bring legislators together and increase their odds of establishing relationships with one another (Caldeira and Patterson 1987). While it is true that legislators have some choice in what committees they sit on, this interest in a committee does not guarantee that all the legislators choosing to participate in that committee carry the same opinions on the issues. As such, committees are arenas with diverse viewpoints where negotiation and compromise are crucial – without compromise, bills would never leave committee for vote.

Given that committees are clearly arenas where interactions and influence take place, committee overlap should be a social tie with importance for roll call voting. In other words, the greater committee overlap between two legislators, the more likely they are to vote similarly on bills. I therefore include committee overlap as a control variable in my models. In constructing the committee overlap variable, I again arrange the data into a dyadic relational matrix, consistent with a networks approach. In each cell of the matrix is the number of legislative committees that legislators i and j sit on together. The total number of dyads for committee overlap is again 93,096.

OTHER VARIABLES: TENURE SIMILARITY, DISTRICT PROXIMITY. The longer two legislators have been in the legislature together, the more likely they are to have established a relationship with one another. Furthermore, there are a number of orientations and events geared toward incoming cohorts of legislators (Davidson and Oleszek 1998), bringing them into contact. So, even legislators who have been in the legislature for a short time are more likely to come into contact with one another if they are in the same cohort. Therefore, tenure similarity can be considered, in the very least, a weak tie that links legislators to one another. I therefore include tenure similarity as a control variable in my preliminary analyses.

I construct two different dyadic relational measures of tenure similarity for testing: one measuring the negative absolute value of the difference in the number of years legislators *i* and *j* have overlapped in the legislature, the other simply measuring the minimum number of years legislators *i* and *j* have served in the legislature together. Neither measure is statistically significant in the test model results. Additionally, neither had any measurable impact on the main relationship under study – the relationship between campaign contributions and roll call voting. I therefore exclude tenure similarity in the final models for the sake of parsimony.

Another variable I test that yields a similar non-significance is district proximity. One would think that district proximity would have some influence on roll call vote similarity between dyads of legislators. Generally speaking, being from the same state should place legislators' interests closer together because of similar constituencies. And from the perspective of campaign contributions, legislators should, conceivably, receive contributions from more of the same PACs if they are from the same geographic region, meaning that controlling for district proximity would seem crucial in analyses of how campaign contributions influence roll call voting since it is possible that any statistically significant effect of contributions is merely a reflection of constituency interests.

I construct a dyadic relational measure of district proximity that measures whether or not legislators *i* and *j* represent districts in the same state, and in preliminary models the measure is non-significant. Moreover, this variable does not have a discernible impact on the relationship between campaign contributions and roll call voting, and the coefficients for big business and labor contributions do not change with the addition and subtraction of the measure. I therefore exclude district proximity in the final models, but nonetheless feel confident that the final models are parsimonious and robust.

TABLE 33.9. Unstandardized Coefficients from QAP Regression of Similarity in Roll Call Voting on Big Business and Labor PAC Campaign Contributions in the 104th House, with Control Variables (QAP does not Produce Normal Standard Errors as it is Based on Permutation Tests)

	Model 1 (all legislators)	Model 2 (freshmen)	Model 3 (non-freshmen)
Shared big business PAC contributors	0.289***	0.062	0.227***
Shared labor PAC contributors	-0.012	-0.005	-0.026
Same party	0.406***	0.469***	0.041***
Same race	0.056***	0.058*	0.038***
Same gender	0.019*	0.011	0.017*
Committee overlap	0.007***	0.002	0.002
Prior vote similarity	-	-	0.864***
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.817	0.958	0.836
<i>N</i>	93,096	4,371	56,953

p* < .05, *p* < .01, ****p* < .001, one-tailed significance test.

RESULTS

Findings from my analyses are shown in [Table 33.9](#). The results in Model 1 of [Table 33.9](#) show that sharing big business PAC contributors is significantly related to roll call voting while sharing labor contributors is not – in other words, the more big business PAC contributors legislators share, the more similarly they vote; but sharing labor contributors has no significant effect on similarity in voting. The relationship between sharing big business PAC contributors and vote similarity is significant at the .001 significance level, suggesting a less than 1 in 1,000 probability the relationship is a product of chance.

Importantly, this significant relationship in Model 1 maintains controlling for the effects of being in the same party and other similarities. This is important because, as noted earlier, some have argued that contributions lose their significance when party is added to the equation – this is apparently not the case with big business PACs. In a similar vein, it is also worth noting that the adjusted R^2 of the model is .817, suggesting the variables included in the model account for 81.7% of the variation in roll call vote similarity between legislators during this two-year period. Certainly, a significant portion of this explanatory power comes from the strong effect of party on voting. Nonetheless, this large R^2 leaves very little room for the possibility that other variables may account for the significant relationship between sharing big business PAC contributors and similarity in voting.

Model 2 shows results for freshmen legislators. Neither shared big business PAC contributors nor shared labor PAC contributors are significantly related to voting among freshmen. Part of what may be behind this lack of statistical significance, though, is the smaller N of legislators in the model. Note that most of the variables that were significant in the first model are no longer significant here. Only party – and race, to a lesser degree – maintain their significance for freshmen. Clearly, the highly significant effect of party suggests that party discipline was very strong among these freshmen, as might be expected given the large number who came in together under the “republican revolution.”

What the findings from Model 2 imply about causality? They do not rule it out. The relationship between shared big business PAC contributors and vote similarity is a positive relationship (albeit non-significant – but again, this may be due to the smaller N) yet the relationship between labor PAC contributors and voting is virtually nonexistent. These patterns mirror those in the first model except that big business PACs are non-significant. Hence, these findings do not rule out the possibility that the relationship between shared big business PACs and voting found in the first model are causal. The next model lends more insight.

Model 3, with nonfreshmen legislators controlling for prior voting, provides much stronger and more compelling results. All of the patterns in Model 3 mirror those in Model 1, and statistical significance is maintained as well. Most importantly, sharing big business PAC contributors is significant while sharing labor PACs is not for these legislators, controlling for their prior voting patterns. This is solid evidence that among elder legislators in the 104th House, sharing big business PAC contributors *causes* greater similarity in voting. This does not mean that the causal arrow cannot flow the other way. In fact, not only may votes influence the contribution patterns of PACs in some cases, legislators likely have some influence on the behavior of their contributors, as with the “K-Street” phenomenon whereby legislators seek to influence lobbying hires. Nonetheless, Model 3 provides solid evidence that contributors cause legislators to vote in a particular way through their social network ties.

Overall, my findings point toward a causal relationship between sharing big business PAC contributors and voting similarly in roll call votes; but no such relationship exists between labor PAC contributors and votes. These findings thus fail to support the predic-

tions of state-centered theory (no PAC influence on policymaking) and pluralist theory (big business *and* labor PAC influence on policymaking) – the only theory supported is elite-power/class theory. Of course, these findings are based on a fairly short time period in a specific lawmaking body, but they nonetheless suggest that during this key two-year period in the U.S. House, an elite-power/class model best fits the policymaking patterns. *Most importantly, my findings demonstrate that a social networks approach can resolve the methodological issues plaguing this area of work, resulting in clear elucidation of contributor influence on policymaking.*

CONCLUSIONS

Social networks are important to sociology, and they have become increasingly important in studies of politics. Prior work shows that social networks influence the participation in institutional and non-institutional forms of political behavior. Social networks also play a significant role in political power structure at both the community and national levels. In this chapter, I have extended social networks into the study of politician behavior – policymaking, in particular – connecting this back to issues of political power. Specifically, I have examined how the ties between PAC contributors (particularly big business and labor PACs) and legislators affect the way legislators vote.

Applying social networks to the question of PAC influence on policymaking is a novel strategy. The social networks approach I pursued in this chapter views the House itself as a social network and converts the units to legislator-legislator pairs, thus treating lawmakers as socially interdependent and linking their attributes and behaviors to that of their peers. My findings show a significant causal link between sharing big business PAC contributors and similarity in voting among House members (104th House), but no link between sharing labor PACs and voting. This carries significant implications for political power structure theorizing, as it suggests an elite-power/class model best fits what was happening in the House during the mid-1990s (and possibly beyond). *More importantly, this shows that social networks play a significant role in the all-important process of policymaking, and illustrates one way of fruitfully applying social networks to political analysis.*

The specific methodological technique used in this chapter – converting units to dyadic pairs and examining influence across these dyadic pairs of actors – is certainly not the only way to apply social networks to political analysis. Other ways of applying social networks can involve, for instance, mapping networks of power (e.g. Hunter 1953) or looking at the number of acquaintances a person has of a given orientation and how this influences political behavior (e.g. McAdam 1986). What is really critical in applying social networks to political analysis is examining the role of *social ties* in structuring political institutions and/or political action (Knoke 1990).

Social networks are clearly an important area of study in sociology, and they have been applied to a number of substantive areas over the years. Social networks have been applied fruitfully to a number of political topics: political behavior/social movements, political power structure, and now policymaking. Social networks can still be further applied to these and other areas of political research, though, with great returns in terms of new understanding of key political processes. Hopefully, future research will continue this tradition of applying social networks to political studies, illuminating the many roles of social relations in politics.

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CHAPTER 34

Time Series Analysis of Political Change

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This chapter considers the use of time-series analysis in the study of politics. Time-series analysis, as traditionally understood, requires a moderate number of observations on a single unit at approximately equal intervals. Data of this kind are rarely available at the individual level, so this chapter will focus on the macro level. Quantitative analysis of individual change is usually based on panels rather than time series (see Hsiao 1986 for a comprehensive discussion). Examples of time series relevant to the study of politics include election results, the number of protests, ratings of governments in terms of various qualities, and averages of individual opinions as measured by surveys. The chapter will focus on dependent variables that can be treated as at least approximately continuous, although it will give some attention to issues involving small counts. The analysis of single events calls for different techniques, which are discussed in Chap. 32.

Time-series data related to politics are characterized by several features that present practical and theoretical difficulties. First, the series usually contain relatively few observations, either because data are not recorded on a frequent basis or because data collection began relatively recently. In some fields of economics and natural sciences, a typical time series might contain more than 100 observations, but in the study of politics it is unusual to have more than 50. Second, it cannot be assumed that the parameters of the underlying process remain constant during the period of observation. For example, a researcher studying the relationship between economic growth and democracy would have to consider the possibility that the relationship will change over time. Moreover, the change could be either sudden – a shift between two historical eras – or a gradual shift. As a result of these features, some advanced time-series techniques such as spectral analysis or transfer function modeling cannot be usefully applied to most political data. Hence, this chapter will focus on traditional methods based on regression analysis. We can begin with the following model:

$$y_t = \alpha + \beta x_t + e_t \quad (34.1)$$

where y is a dependent variable, x is an independent or predictor variable, e is an error term, and the subscript t refers to time. Of course, usually a regression will include multiple independent variables, but many of the points can be illustrated by considering a regression with only one.

Traditionally, time series analysis has focused on data from a single unit, but sometimes time-series data from multiple units are available. In this case, a subscript representing the unit can be included as well. The chapter begins by considering the analysis of a single time series, and then turns to the analysis of multiple time series.

SINGLE TIME SERIES

Equation (34.1) could be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). In time series data, however, it is not safe to assume the errors for the individual observations are independent. Because of the influence of factors that cannot be measured separately, there is often a substantial positive correlation between the errors of observations that are close in time. If this is the case, the OLS estimates of β will be consistent, but not efficient, and given the small sample sizes typically found in time series, considerations of efficiency are important. Moreover, estimates of the standard errors will be biased, so conclusions about statistical significance will be affected. If the error correlation for adjacent observations is positive, the standard errors will be underestimated. A plausible pattern for the error correlations is a steady decline as the distance between observations increases: that is, if the correlation between e_t and e_{t-k} is designated r_k , $|r_1| > |r_2| > |r_3|$ and so on. This pattern is produced by a model of the form $e_t = r e_{t-1} + u_t$, where e_{t-1} is the error in the previous time period and u is a random term that is uncorrelated over time. Models of this type are known as “autoregressions,” since a variable is regressed on its own previous values. Although the errors for earlier periods do not directly affect e_t , they have an indirect effect through e_{t-1} , accounting for the declining pattern of the correlations. An autoregression does not necessarily represent a causal model – it is often merely a way to represent the persistence of factors that are not separately measured and included in the model. The adequacy of the model for the errors can be evaluated by considering the actual pattern of residual correlations from the regression: if they do not show the gradual decline implied by the model, it is necessary to consider alternative models. The Durbin–Watson statistic, which is routinely reported in many regression programs, is approximately equal to $2 - r_1$ (Kendall and Ord 1990: 213). The more general pattern of residual correlations can be evaluated by saving the residuals and computing the autocorrelation function – that is, the observed values of r_i for $i = 1 \dots k$.¹

The general class of autoregression models includes direct effects of earlier values of the errors, e_{t-2} , e_{t-k} , ... e_{t-k} . The highest value of k is known as the “order” of the autoregression. A common strategy is to fit a first order autoregression, followed by a second order, third order, and so on until the coefficient on the largest order term is non-significant. A second class of models makes e_t depend on the earlier values of u rather than e : for example, $e_t = r u_{t-1} + u_t$. Models of this kind are known as moving averages and again higher order terms can be included. In contrast to autoregressions, moving averages produce a pattern in which the error correlations suddenly drop to zero. For example, in a first-order moving average, the correlation between e_t and e_{t-1} is r , but the correlation between e_t and e_{t-2} is zero. Models including both autoregressive and moving average components (ARIMA models) are also possible (Kendall and Ord 1990: 63–69).

¹The maximum value K is usually chosen to be some fraction of the length of the series. Many statistical packages include the autocorrelation function as an option, and provide a default value for K .

Efficient estimates of β and unbiased estimates of the standard errors can be obtained by using generalized least squares (GLS). In practice, the true structure of error correlations is unknown, so it is not possible to obtain fully efficient estimates, but even an approximate model will produce substantial gains over OLS. As a practical matter, estimation is considerably easier for autoregressive than for moving average errors, so autoregressive models are much more widely used. In such models, GLS estimates can be obtained by applying OLS after all the variables are transformed using “generalized differences” of the form $y_t - \sum r_i y_{t-i}$, where the r parameters are estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients. Any moving average or mixed model can be approximated by an autoregression of sufficiently high order, and in practice orders of two or three are often sufficient. One important situation in which a moving average component can be expected is when the dependent variable is measured with error that is independent across cases. When transitory error is added to a first order autoregression, the result is a combined autoregression-moving average model, with both components of the first order: $e_t = r e_{t-1} + u_t + s u_{t-1}$.

The model for the error term is usually of little or no substantive interest – it is needed merely as a way to obtain better estimates of the β parameters. Hence, investigators are not generally interested in finding the “true” model of error correlation, merely in obtaining a good approximation. However, it should not be assumed that the first-order autoregression model is sufficient: investigators should examine the pattern of correlations among the residuals and consider the possibility of higher-order autoregressions.

DISTRIBUTED LAGS

In (34.1), it is assumed that changes in the value of the independent variables produce immediate changes in the values of the dependent variable. An alternative possibility is that there is some delay – for example, because it takes time to pass legislation or develop new regulations, government policy may be influenced by the conditions that prevailed a year or two previously rather than by current conditions. It is also possible that the dependent variable is influenced by the values of the independent variables at several previous periods. For example, public views about the economy might depend on memories of previous conditions as well as on current conditions. To the extent that they depend on personal experience, one would probably expect the largest influence from current conditions, and a gradual decline representing memories of the past. However, to the extent that views depend on information obtained from the media or from acquaintances, there is likely to be some delay. For example, media discussion of economic conditions relies heavily on official economic statistics, which take time to compile. Hence, perceptions might be more heavily influenced by conditions in the recent past than in the present. Finally, people might respond to change in conditions as well as to the conditions themselves. For example, suppose that perceptions are influenced by the current unemployment rate and also by recent changes in that rate:

$$y_t = \alpha + \beta_1 u_t + \beta_2 (u_t - u_{t-1}) + e_t \tag{34.2}$$

Equation (34.2) can be rewritten as:

$$y_t = \alpha + \gamma_1 u_t + \gamma_2 u_{t-1} + e_t \tag{34.3}$$

where $\gamma_1 = \beta_1 + \beta_2$ and $\gamma_2 = -\beta_2$. Hence, it cannot be assumed that the most recent values of x will have the greatest effect or even that all the effects will have the same sign. The most straightforward way to estimate models of this kind is to simply add the “lagged” values

x_{t-1}, \dots, x_{t-k} as independent variables. One strategy is to begin with a relatively large value of k and simplify the model by dropping non-significant terms; another is to begin with x_t and then successively add previous values until there is no further improvement in fit. These approaches, however, may result in the use of a large number of degrees of freedom, and the coefficients may be difficult to interpret, especially when the correlations between the successive values of x are high. Hence, various models of “distributed lags” have been developed. The simplest is the geometric lag model, in which the effects of x gradually decline as the elapsed time increases: $\beta_{t-k} = \beta^{k+1}$. In this model, all current and previous values of x affect y , but only two parameters are needed to represent those effects, one representing the magnitude and the other the rate of decline. Other models allow more flexible shapes: for example, the β coefficients may be modeled by a polynomial function of the lag (Almon 1965). A second-degree (quadratic) polynomial allows the coefficients have a non-monotonic pattern, rising and then falling as k increases. Programs for time series analysis usually include options for standard distributed lag models, and they can also be estimated by imposing appropriate constraints on the parameters and using a non-linear regression program.

Sometimes, researchers are interested in the exact temporal pattern of the response to x , but often they are primarily interested in the sum of the effects at all lags. If values of x are highly correlated over time, simply using the current value of x will give a reasonably good estimate of the sum. However, if they are not, using any single value of x will understate the total impact of the variable. Hence, researchers should consider the possibility that values at several previous time periods have an effect, either by directly including them as independent variables or by using a model for distributed lags. If a model for distributed lags is used, it is advisable to begin with one that allows for non-monotonic effects.

DYNAMIC MODELS

Dynamic models, or models in which a lagged dependent variable is one of the predictors, are often used in time-series analysis. Sometimes, there is reason to think that the previous value of y is actually a cause of the current value: for example, if the dependent variable represents a party’s share of seats in the legislature, the effect of the lagged dependent variable could be interpreted as representing the advantages of incumbency. However, in other cases, the lagged dependent variable model is simply used as a way to allow for autocorrelated residuals. The lagged dependent variable model is:

$$y_t = \lambda y_{t-1} + \beta x_t + e_t \quad (34.4)$$

The model can be estimated by ordinary least squares; usually the first-order residual correlation is near zero and the value of λ is between zero and 1.² Values of λ equal to or greater than 1 indicate a trend in the dependent variable, an issue that will be discussed in the section on non-stationarity. The lagged dependent variable can be expressed as a function of y_{t-2}, x_{t-1} , and e_{t-1} , and by successive substitutions, we arrive at an alternative way of expressing (34.4):

$$y_t = \sum (\beta \lambda^k x_{t-k} + \lambda^k e_{t-k}) \quad (34.5)$$

In (34.5), the effects of x follow a geometric distributed lag and the errors follow a first-order autoregression, both governed by the same coefficient λ . For example, the weights of x will be

²The usual Durbin–Watson statistic is a biased measure of first-order serial correlation for this model; appropriate statistics are discussed in Kendall and Ord (1990, p. 213).

β , $\beta\lambda$, $\beta\lambda^2$, and so on. The sum of these coefficients, representing the total effect of a change in x , is $\beta/(1 - \lambda)$. If there is more than one independent variable, all will follow a geometric lag with the same rate of decline.

It is also possible to rewrite any regression with an autoregressive error term as a dynamic model. If a first order autoregression is assumed, (34.1) can be written:

$$y_t = \alpha + \beta x_t + \rho e_{t-1} + u_t \quad (34.6)$$

Hence,

$$y_t - \rho y_{t-1} = (1 - \rho)\alpha + \beta(x_t - \rho x_{t-1}) + u_t \quad (34.7)$$

Rearranging terms produces:

$$y_t = \alpha' + \rho y_{t-1} + \beta x_t - \beta \rho x_{t-1} + u_t \quad (34.8)$$

Thus, both models (34.1) and (34.4) can be regarded as special cases of the model:

$$y_t = \alpha' + \rho y_{t-1} + \beta x_t + \gamma x_{t-1} + u_t \quad (34.9)$$

The restriction in the lagged dependent variable model is that $\gamma = 0$, while the restriction in the usual regression model is that $\gamma = -\beta\rho$ (Hendry 1995: 231–3). Hence, using the standard lagged dependent variable model amounts to making a very specific set of assumptions. Although the simplicity of the model makes it appealing, it does not provide an all-purpose way of allowing for distributed lags and autocorrelated errors, and does not eliminate the need to consider the lag structure and the exact nature of correlation in the errors.

NON-STATIONARITY

Many of the variables of interest in time-series analysis show some kind trend over time. Such “non-stationary” variables, as they are known, present major problems for time series analysis.³ Any two variables that have a trend over a period of time will have a correlation, often a substantial one, even if there is no causal connection. Figure 34.1 shows plots for two artificial variables defined as the cumulative sum of normally distributed random variables with mean 0.3 and standard deviation 1. The non-zero means imply that the cumulative sums tend to increase over time. The resulting tendency known as a “stochastic trend,” as distinct from a “deterministic trend” of the form $x = ct + e$. In general, stochastic trends provide a more realistic model of most variables of interest to social scientists: GDP, for example, can be thought of as the accumulation of previous changes in GDP.

As a result of the common trend, the regression coefficient is highly significant and the R^2 is 0.84. An alternative approach is to remove the trend from each variable by regressing it on some function of time and using the residuals from that regression for analysis. However, the use of first differences ($x_t - x_{t-1}$) is generally preferred, since they are effective at removing both stochastic and deterministic trends. In this case, the R^2 from a regression using the first differences of the two variables is essentially zero.

However, if a non-stationary independent variable actually causes the dependent variable, the dependent variable will show a trend as a result of its influence. That is, the common trend will be an evidence of the influence of the independent variable: in effect, the use of first

³In general, a non-stationary variable is one for which the conditional distribution differs over time. However, the case of a trend in the mean is of particular importance, so it will be the focus of this section.




FIGURE 34.1. Example of spurious relationship between trended variables.

TABLE 34.1. Example of Regression Estimates in Levels and Differences

	(1) Levels OLS	(2) Differences OLS	(3) Differences MA1	(4) Differences AR1
Constant	0.118 (0.183)	-0.037 (0.211)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.107)
X	0.473*** (0.037)	0.685*** (0.181)	0.465*** (0.069)	0.596*** (0.134)
R ²	0.770	0.233	0.677	0.496
DW	2.44	3.05		
P			-0.999	-0.611
N	50	49	49	49

Notes: N is number of non-missing cases; DW is Durbin–Watson statistic; *** indicates significance at the 0.1% level.

differences will discard this information. Table 34.1 presents the results from the analysis of a dependent variable $z_t = \alpha + \beta x_t + e_t$, where e_t is a normally distributed random variable and x_t is the artificial variable described in the previous section. Parameter values of $\alpha = 0$ and $\beta = 0.50$ are used for the example. Column (1) shows results from a regression of z on x , while column (2) shows results from a regression in the first differences. In both cases, the coefficient estimate is reasonably close to true value of 0.5, but when first differences are used, the standard error is much bigger. In the first regression, the 95% confidence interval is about 0.4–0.55; in the second, it is about 0.32–1.05. The nature of the error term is also affected by the choice: in terms of the original variables, the model in differences is $z_t - z_{t-1} = \alpha + \beta(x_t - x_{t-1}) + (e_t - e_{t-1})$. That is, the errors will follow a first-order moving average. In column (3), the parameters are estimated under this model for the errors – the parameter estimate for β is considerably closer to the true value, although the standard error is still larger than in column (1). Finally, in column (4) the estimates are obtained using a first-order autoregressive model

for the errors. The estimates are somewhat better than those in column (2), although not as good as those using the correct error specification. As the example illustrates, all the methods produce consistent estimates, but there are substantial differences in efficiency. Hence, when both independent and dependent variables appear to show a trend, the best course is to conduct an analysis in both levels and differences, and pay close attention to the pattern of correlations in the residuals.

PARAMETER CHANGE

When analyzing time-series data on human society, it is not safe to assume that the regression coefficients remain the same over the whole period of time. One possible form of change is the “structural break,” in which a coefficient shifts suddenly from one value to another. For example, the unemployment rate might have different effects on government popularity depending on which party is in power. An alternative possibility is that the coefficient changes gradually – for example, Inglehart’s (1997) hypothesis of a long term shift away from material values might be taken to imply that there will be a gradual decline in the influence of economic conditions on government popularity. Even if there is no specific reason to expect the coefficients to change, it is generally advisable to check parameter stability if the data cover a long period of time.

If the timing of a potential structural break is known, the analysis is straightforward: create a dummy variable representing period and terms for the interaction of period and other variables, add them to the model as independent variables, and use standard hypothesis tests to evaluate statistical significance (Chow 1960). If the timing is unknown, however, the problem is more difficult. One possibility is to set the periods before conducting any analysis, but if the division does not correspond closely to the actual structural break, the power of the tests will be low. Moreover, the timing of the break is often of substantive interest – that is, an investigator might want to treat it as a parameter to be estimated rather than an arbitrary fixed date. Another possibility is to select the periods after examining the data. This is often done informally, but Quandt (1960) observed that it was possible to systematically try every possible break point and choose the one that produced the best fit. If the break point is chosen after examining the data, the usual standards of statistical significance cannot be applied, but Andrews (1993) found appropriate critical values for the Quandt procedure. The approach can be extended to allow for the possibility of more than one structural break (Hansen 2001).

Gradual shifts in parameter values have received less attention, although they often seem more realistic in principle. One possibility is to create artificial variables representing interactions with various functions of time and add them to the regression. For example, in the model:

$$y_t = \alpha + \beta_0 x + \beta_1 (tx) + \beta_2 (t^2 x) + e \quad (34.10)$$

the implied coefficient of x is $\beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 t^2$. Other functions of time might be used, but polynomials are appealing because of their simplicity and flexibility. Polynomials do have the disadvantage of implying smooth shifts – in cases where a shift is thought to have occurred over a relatively short period of time, the model of a structural break would probably give a better approximation. An alternative approach is to assume that the parameters change in a stochastic fashion: for example, β might follow a random walk in which $\beta_t = \beta_{t-1} + v$. This approach is very flexible, and econometricians have shown a good deal of interest in models of this kind. Such models, however, are considerably more difficult to estimate, and have rarely been used in the study of politics (see Wood 2000 for an exception).

Moreover, researchers often wish to have a simple description of the changes, even if they know that the description is only approximately true, and models of deterministic change are more useful for this purpose.

OUTLIERS, INFLUENTIAL CASES, AND ROBUST ESTIMATION

Because of the small samples typically found in time series, it is not safe to rely on asymptotic properties of estimators. Moreover, there are often arguments in favor of treating certain cases as exceptional. Hence, examination of outliers, influential cases, and the form of the error distribution plays a large role in time series analysis. This may be done in an ad-hoc fashion: for example, an investigator might include dummy variables for certain cases that might be regarded as exceptional, and retain those variables if they are statistically significant. A more systematic approach is to use robust estimation techniques, which reduce the influence of extreme cases. One of the best known techniques is Least Absolute Deviations, which minimizes the sum of $|e|$ rather than the usual sum of squared errors. This method can be regarded as a form of weighted least squares, where the weights are equal to $1/|e|$.⁴ However, it is difficult to extend robust estimation techniques to allow for correlated errors. One alternative is to transform the dependent variable so that the errors more closely approximate a normal distribution, and then apply standard techniques based on least squares to the transformed variable. If the dependent variable is limited to positive values, the Box–Cox transformation is often used (Box and Cox 1964). This transformation is defined as $(y^\lambda - 1)/\lambda$, or $\ln(y)$ if $\lambda = 0$; many standard software packages include procedures to obtain the maximum likelihood estimate of λ . It can be extended to cover negative values of y by applying the transformation to the absolute values and restoring the original sign. The Box–Cox transformation should not be used, however, when the zero point is arbitrary. Another possibility, which can be applied in all cases, is to transform the dependent variable into ranks or normal scores. The use of transformations makes it more difficult to interpret the coefficient estimates, since they will generally be non-linear when translated back into the original units. However, the effects may be displayed graphically, and in any case, transformations are useful a check on the sensitivity of the results. If the statistical significance and relative magnitude of the estimates is approximately the same when using the original and transformed dependent variable, the researcher can rely on the original units; if not, it is necessary to examine the reasons for the discrepancy.

Finally, transformations of the independent variables are useful in reducing the influence of extreme cases, so they may be used as an alternative to robust regression techniques. Powers between 0 and 1 or logarithms will generally reduce the occurrence of extreme outliers.

SELECTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Model specification is an important issue in all statistical analysis, but it is particularly important in time series analysis. With a small sample, including superfluous predictors can substantially reduce the precision of the other parameter estimates. On the other hand, the power to reject a false null hypothesis is low, so that an investigator who uses standard significance levels may omit important variables. Finally, the potential predictors often are highly correlated, so that parameter estimates may be very sensitive to the specification of the model.

⁴A maximum weight should be set and used for cases in which the residual is very close to zero.

Many researchers use standard hypothesis tests to select variables, although sometimes relying on a .10 level of significance rather than the standard .05 level. More systematic techniques for setting significance levels have been proposed, but are rarely used (Arrow 1960). Other researchers use various model selection criteria, among which the AIC (Akaike 1973) and BIC (Schwartz 1978) are the most important. The AIC is defined as $L^2 + 2p$, and the BIC as $L^2 + \log(N)p$, where L^2 is -2 times the log-likelihood of the model, p is the number of parameters in the model, and N is the number of cases.⁵ Despite their similar appearance, the two criteria are based on different principles: the BIC is intended to select a true model using Bayesian principles, while the AIC is intended to select a model that gives a good approximation. With the AIC, a parameter will be retained if its t -ratio is larger than the square root of two, equivalent to a p -value of about .15. With the BIC, the critical value is about 1.7 in a sample of 20 and 2.0 in a sample of 50. Thus, in small samples, the BIC and standard hypothesis tests will lead to similar conclusions, while the AIC will favor models with more parameters. The rationales for both the AIC and the BIC, however, are based on asymptotic considerations. It is generally agreed that the AIC tends to include too many parameters in small samples, and a number of adjustments have been proposed to correct for this tendency. A simple criterion that is equivalent to an adjusted AIC is MSE/df, where MSE is the mean square error and df is the residual degrees of freedom (Hurvich 1997). There has been less work on small-sample adjustments to the BIC, but in general Bayesian hypothesis tests are more favorable to the null hypothesis than are classical tests (Berger and Sellke 1987). Hence, the AIC will generally tend to lead to more complex models than either the BIC or classical tests.

MODEL UNCERTAINTY

Regardless of how carefully an analysis is conducted, it is not reasonable to think that it will yield a definitive conclusion about the correct model. Rather, there will be a range of more or less plausible models. For practical purposes, the investigator will have to focus on a small number of models, and may want to designate one as the “final” model. Nevertheless, in addition to uncertainty resulting from the random error term, which is represented by the standard errors, there is uncertainty related to the specification of the model.

Table 34.2 gives results from several regressions concerning economic conditions and the results of Presidential elections in the United States between 1916 and 2004. Ray Fair developed the equation in the 1970s and refined its specification over the years (Fair 1996).⁶ The dependent variable is the incumbent party’s share of the two-party popular vote, and the independent variables are:

PARTY: 1 if incumbent President is a Democrat, -1 if Republican

PERSON: 1 if incumbent President is running for re-election

DURATION: incumbent party’s time in office (0 for one term, 1 for two, additional 0.25 for every term beyond two)

⁵If one assumes normally distributed errors, least squares is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation, and L^2 is equivalent to $N \log(R)$, where R is the residual sum of squares. Some programs give the AIC and BIC as part of their standard regression output; because of the inclusion of various constant terms, the figures may differ from those given by these formulas. However, comparisons between values of the AIC and BIC from different models fitted to the same data are not affected by the choice of formula.

⁶The most current data and a full description of the variables can be found at fairmodel.econ.yale.edu

WAR: dummy variable for “wartime” elections (1920, 1944, and 1948)⁷

GROWTH: annual growth rate in per capita income, current year

INFLATION: absolute value of change in prices, last four years

GOODNEWS: quarters with growth rate of over 3.2 percent, last 4 years

Column (1) gives the results using Fair’s preferred specification. Columns (2)–(4) use slightly different specifications. Fair did not count Gerald Ford as an incumbent in 1976 on the grounds that he had not been elected as President or Vice-President; in column (2), Ford is counted as an incumbent. The definition of the WAR variable is open to debate, so in column (3), it is removed.⁸ Finally, column (4) adds a variable for the interaction of an index number for the election (1 in 1916 to 23 in 2004) and the incumbent party, representing a trend in favor of one party or the other over the whole period. Some of the estimates are fairly stable across the specifications: for example, the estimated effect of growth varies from 0.60 to 0.76 and is always strongly significant. Others are more sensitive: for example, the estimated effect of inflation varies from -0.36 to -0.83 and the p -values vary from 0.126 to 0.025. Hence, using any single model understates the reasonable degree of uncertainty about the parameters. Each of these models differs from the model in column (1) in only one respect, so more models could be generated by varying two or more features at once. Moreover, there are many other ways that the variables might be defined, and many other variables that could be added. Hence, even with this relatively simple model, there are numerous potential alternative specifications.

Researchers often present a number of models and informally evaluate the stability of parameter estimates across different specifications. However, it is also possible to use more systematic approaches. From a Bayesian point of view, one could decide on a probability distribution that represented prior beliefs about the probability of various specifications (Berk et al. 1995). A final distribution of the parameter estimates could be obtained by combining the information in the sample observations with the information in the prior distribution. The final estimates will be subjective in the sense that they are influenced by the prior distributions. However, Bayesians reply that the objectivity of the standard techniques is illusory, since prior beliefs affect decisions about which models to estimate and display. The task of specifying prior beliefs in the form of a probability distribution, however, is very difficult. A compromise between Bayesian and classical approaches is to estimate a variety of models by standard methods, assign a relative probability to each, and compute the distribution of parameter estimates across all model specifications. The relative probability of a model can be computed by $e^{-0.5c}$, where c is the preferred model selection criterion (the AIC, BIC, or one of their variants). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: 543–556) describe this approach and apply it to data on economic growth. A practical difficulty with this approach is that the number of models becomes very large as the number of potential predictors and alternative specifications increases. Hence, it would be desirable to estimate only those models that can be expected to have reasonably high relative probability: Hoeting et al. (1999) offer some techniques for accomplishing this.

These approaches are most useful for problems such as selecting variables from a group of potential predictors. Substantive considerations play a larger role in decisions about the

⁷The United States was not at war in 1920 and 1948, but part of the incumbent government’s record had been compiled under wartime conditions.

⁸Fair also set the values of INFLATION and GOODNEWS to zero in these elections on the grounds that voters might discount the government’s economic record under wartime conditions. Hence, the model also redefines these variables, using the actual values in all years.

TABLE 34.2. Alternative Specifications of Economic Conditions and Support for Incumbent Party in Presidential Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	47.26*** (2.54)	48.33*** (2.52)	49.29*** (2.39)	48.59*** (2.41)
Party	-2.68*** (0.62)	-2.57*** (0.66)	-1.96** (0.67)	-4.94** (1.26)
Person	3.30* (1.41)	3.02† (1.61)	1.82 (1.52)	3.22* (1.28)
Duration	-3.33* (1.21)	-3.79** (1.21)	-3.77** (1.25)	-3.49** (1.11)
WAR	5.62 (2.69)†	5.15 (2.89)		5.73* (2.45)
Growth	0.68*** (0.11)	0.64*** (0.12)	0.60*** (0.14)	0.76*** (0.11)
Inflation	-0.66* (0.29)	-0.83* (0.33)	-0.36 (0.22)	0.64* (0.26)
Goodnews	1.07*** (0.25)	1.05*** (0.26)	0.82** (0.23)	0.85** (0.25)
Trend				0.18† (0.09)
R ²	0.905	0.895	0.868	0.926
DW	2.74	2.68	2.41	3.10

Notes: $N = 23$ for all models. DW is Durbin–Watson statistic. See text for variable definitions. Statistical significance indicated by † for 0.10, * for 0.05, ** for 0.01, *** for 0.01.

specification of particular variables, making it difficult to apply any standardized procedure. For example, although model (34.2) does not fit as well as model (34.1) in Table 34.2, an observer might regard it as more defensible in principle. In Bayesian terms, that belief could be expressed by giving the model a higher initial probability, but such decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis.

MULTIPLE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Traditionally, time series analysis focused on single units. As the availability of comparative data has increase, researchers have become increasingly interested in the analysis of time series from multiple units, or what is sometimes called pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data. In some cases, the units are observed at only a few time points, and must be treated as a panel rather than a time series. This section will focus on cases in which there are a reasonably large number of units on each case.

An objection to the analysis of a single time series is that one cannot be sure that the unit is typical. In terms of a regression equation

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i x_{it} + e_{it} \quad (34.11)$$

where i represents the unit, any general statement about the effects of x implicitly assumes that β_i is identical for some larger group of units. If one is not willing to make this assumption, the conclusions apply only to the particular unit that was analyzed. Clearly, the only way to discover whether this assumption is true is to consider data on additional units. In many applications, the cross-sectional component is effectively a convenience sample – for example, the nations for which information on the variables happens to be available. Nevertheless, finding that β is approximately identical over a range of units increases confidence in any generalizations about the effects of the independent variables. Moreover, it may be possible to relate the observed differences in β to other characteristics of the units.

The simplest model for TSCS data assumes that α and β are the same in all units, and that e_{it} is independent and identically distributed. These assumptions can be tested by

examining the residuals from the model. For example, one can test whether there is a correlation between the errors within a unit at times t and $t - 1$. If the assumption of equal and identically distributed errors cannot be maintained, as is usually the case, there are a number of ways that the model may be modified. One popular approach, known as “fixed effects,” is to add unique intercepts for each cross-sectional unit and time period while assuming that there is a single value of b :

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \eta_t + \beta x_{it} + e_{it} \quad (34.12)$$

In substantive terms, η_t could be interpreted as representing a “spirit of the age” that influences all units, while α_i could be interpreted as the permanent characteristics of a unit.

For example, Lipset (1960) proposed that economic development tended to produce democratic government. He found a strong correlation between variables measuring the two quantities in a cross-section of nations. However, it seems likely that some enduring national characteristics affect the form of government. If these characteristics were unrelated to economic development, the cross-sectional estimates of β would be unbiased. If they were not, however, the cross-sectional estimates could reflect a common cause, rather than a real relationship between the two variables.

The influence of enduring national characteristics could be eliminated by following a single nation over time. However, general perceptions of the effectiveness and legitimacy of various forms of government may also change over time. If there are two distinct long-term trends, one towards democracy and the other towards economic growth, a positive association over time within a single nation could also be spurious. The appeal of the fixed-effects model with time and unit intercepts is that it eliminates both of these potential sources of bias. The drawback is that it may discard a large amount of information. In effect, the model considers only change relative to other units – for example, Lipset’s hypothesis will be supported if the nations that experience the most rapid economic growth also experience the most rapid moves towards democracy. Nations that consistently rank towards the top or the bottom in economic development will have little effect on the estimate of β .

As an example of the effect of including fixed effects, Acemoglu et al. (2007) attempt to evaluate the relationship between economic development and democracy using data from 25 nations measured at 25-year intervals between 1875 and 2000. The measure of economic development is the logarithm of per capita GDP. When only time intercepts are included, the estimated effect of economic development on democracy is .116 with a standard error of .034, supporting Lipset’s hypothesis. When intercepts for each nation are added, the estimated effect becomes negative (–0.02), with a standard error of .093: that is, there is no evidence of any relationship. However, because of the large standard errors, the 95% confidence interval in the model with national intercepts extends from about –0.18 to +0.18: that is, it includes the estimate obtained when no intercepts are included. Hence, one could argue that the results are not actually in conflict, and that the original estimates should be preferred because they use more of the information in the data. In effect, the question involves the burden of proof – should we discard the information on enduring national differences unless there is clear evidence that it is safe to use it, or use it unless there is clear evidence that it is not?

An alternative approach, known as random effects, treats the intercepts as a probability distribution that is uncorrelated with the error term. Random effects estimates tend to fall somewhere in between the OLS and fixed-effects estimates. However, because of the assumption that the intercepts are uncorrelated with the error term, they are conceptually closer to the OLS approach. Hence, the use of random-effects models does not provide an definitive solution to the problem. There is no purely statistical solution, and little prospect of

obtaining one, since the question involves the assumptions that one is willing to make about unobserved quantities.

CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND PATH DEPENDENCE

Convergence and divergence are important questions in comparative work. These terms involve the relationship between an initial state and the equilibrium state implied by a dynamic model. In the simple model:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \lambda y_{i,t-1} + e_{it} \quad (34.13)$$

the equilibrium, which can be designated y^* , is $\alpha/(1 - \lambda)$ for values of λ between -1 and 1 . In the equilibrium state, the values of y_{it} will not be constant – they will continue to change because of the influence of transitory factors represented by the error term. The existence of the error term also means that the values for the units will not be identical – at any point, it is likely that some values will be above y^* and others below y^* . The model implies that the equilibrium value of the variance across units will be equal to $\sigma^2/(1 - \lambda)$, where σ^2 is the variance of the error term. If at some starting point the variance across units is substantially larger than this value, there will be a tendency towards convergence; if it is substantially smaller than this value, there will be a tendency towards divergence (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004: 461–5 for more discussion of the concept of convergence).

An alternative sense of divergence is that the values of β are outside of the range $(-1, 1)$. If β is larger than 1 , the units which begin with larger values of y will tend to grow faster, so that the gap will increase. Clearly a model of this kind could not be sustained indefinitely, but it might hold for some period.

If the value of the intercept changes over time, then the equilibrium will change. One theoretically interesting possibility is that the intercept will depend on the actual value for one or more of the other units. For example, a particular nation or group of nations might become a model for others, so that innovations from that source would tend to spread throughout the world (Meyer et al. 1997). This possibility could be represented by a model in which $\alpha_t = \alpha + \theta y'_{t-1}$, where y is the value of y in the “model” unit. However, if that unit is unusual with respect to some independent variables, it could be difficult to distinguish θ from the effects of these variables. The nations which become models are likely to be unusual in some respect – for example, wealth or military power – so this problem is likely to be encountered in applications.

If (34.13) is extended to include independent variables that differ across the units, each unit will have its own equilibrium value depending on its values on the independent variables. Moreover, if the values of those variables change over time, the equilibrium values of y will change as well. Hence, there is no single model that corresponds to divergence or convergence – the same model can imply divergence or convergence depending on the initial values of y . It should be also noted that convergence is distinct from the uniformity of the effects of x . Thus, the modernization hypothesis, which holds that economic growth has some general effects that hold in all countries, does *not* imply that all countries will become more similar (Inglehart and Baker 2000). In fact, it implies that if there is divergence in the level of economic development, it will be followed by divergence with respect to other variables.

However, the possibility that the effects of a given variable differ among units or over time is often of interest. The possibility of parameter change between time periods was discussed in a previous section. It is also possible that the effects of any independent variable differ

depending on the values of some other variable. If this variable is measured, the possibility can be evaluated by estimating interaction effects in the usual fashion. However, it may also represent some complex combination of qualities that differs from unit to unit and is not separately measured. In this case, the relevant model will be:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda y_{i,t-1} + \beta_i x_{it} + e_{it} \quad (34.14)$$

That is, there is no single effect of x , but a distinct effect in each unit. It is possible to conduct a global test of the hypothesis that $\beta_i = \beta$ in all units. However, if the hypothesis is rejected, an investigator will usually want to go beyond the statement that each unit is unique. One possibility is to group the units in some way that seems consistent with both informed judgment and the unit-specific estimates of β . This is often a reasonable approach, but it is difficult to formalize. An alternative is to treat β_i as a random variable with a mean and variance – the variance represents real differences in the effects of x that cannot be explained by the variables in the model. The approach of treating parameters as random variables is the basis of multi-level modeling, which is discussed in Chap. 31.

Finally, the idea of “path dependence” has attracted considerable attention in recent years. One interpretation of path dependence is that y is influenced not only by y_{t-1} , but also by earlier values of y . It is straightforward to accommodate this possibility in principle, although data limitations may make it difficult to implement. However, most discussions of path dependence seem to imply something more: that previous values of x and y will also produce changes in the relationship between the variables. That is, the value of β that applies to each unit changes over time, and the values that are observed when model (34.14) is estimated over any short time period will be the result of the history of the unit. Sometimes there is a suggestion that there was a period in which the values of β_i were relatively flexible, but that after that period they become resistant to change. Hence, incorporating the possibility of path dependence into time series models is likely to be difficult, particularly given the typical data limitations discussed in the introduction. However, evaluation of the hypothesis that β_i is the same for all units is an important first step – before trying to explain differences, it is important to establish that they actually exist (Merton 1987). Moreover, an attempt to specify the idea of path dependence in terms of a time-series model, even if it is only an approximation, may be useful in terms of theoretical development.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As discussed in the introduction, time series analyses of political data generally must rely on relatively simple techniques, given the nature of the data available. Also, because investigators generally have a good deal of knowledge that cannot be expressed as variables, exploratory analysis and examination of specific cases play a major role. A major challenge for researchers is to combine the information from the sample with outside knowledge in a flexible and appropriate way. Statistical analysis is an aid to judgment, not a substitute for it.

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