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Editor

International Politics in Times of Change

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Nikolaos Tzifakis
Editor

International Politics in Times of Change



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KONSTANTINOS KARAMANLIS
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY



CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

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March 2011

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Abbreviations

AfPak	Afghanistan and Pakistan
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BE	Belgium
BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
BIO	Biotechnology Industry Organization
BNDES	Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCYL	Chinese Communist Youth League
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSA	Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSI	Crime Scene Investigation
CTUs	Counterterrorist units
CW	Chemical-warfare
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreement

DCI	Development Co-operation Instrument
DE	Germany
DG	Directorate-General
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic acid
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EG	India–China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officials
EMBRAPA	Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European People’s Party
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
G-2	Group of Two (US and China)
G-4	Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan)
G-7	Group of Seven
G-8	Group of Eight
G-14	Group of Fourteen
G-20	Group of Twenty
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HEU	High-enriched Uranium
HLG	High Level Group
HM	Her Majesty’s
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBD	Inter-American Development Bank
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ID	Identity Document
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JWG	Joint Working Group
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LEU	Low-enriched Uranium

LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MI5	Military Intelligence, Section 5 (UK Security Service)
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OTA	United States Office of Technology
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PFLP	Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PL	Poland
PT	Brazilian Worker's Party
RELEX	External Relations
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VICS	Verbs in Context System
VX	nerve agent
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Change in International Politics: An Introduction to the Contemporary Debate

Nikolaos Tzifakis

Among the deficiencies demonstrated by the world financial crisis of 2008–9, one was the limited capacity of G-8 to provide for global economic governance. The developed economies quickly realised that they should seek joint solutions and coordinated policies in cooperation with the leading emerging-market economies. As a result, the G-20 turned into the main forum for managing the crisis. This in fact pointed to an early institutional acknowledgement that important changes were underway in the global distribution of power. These changes derive from the substantially higher growth rates of the emerging-market economies in comparison with those of the developed economies, a trend named ‘the rise of the rest’ (Zakaria, 2008, pp. 2–3).

The differential impact of the financial crisis on the world’s largest economies accelerated the pace of these changes, prompting market analysts and financial services companies to radically revise their projections about global economic trends. While some disagreement persists concerning the speed of transformation (see for instance Ward, 2011; Standard Chartered Bank, 2010; O’Neill and Stupnytska, 2009), all analyses converge on the forecast that in the coming years, the leading emerging-market economies will overtake the largest G-8 economies. Whether or not it happens as early as 2020 (Standard Chartered, 2010, p. 21) or a few years later, in 2027–9 (O’Neill and Stupnytska, 2009, pp. 22–3), China will surpass the US and become the world’s largest economy, India will emerge in Japan’s place as the third-largest economy and Brazil will outpace Germany as the fifth-largest. In light of these projections, an interesting debate is going on among analysts of international politics about the future of the international system. Much of it revolves around three closely interrelated questions: (a) the evolving role of the US and the prospects of

its global pre-eminence, (b) the nature of Sino–American relations and (c) the chances for the consolidation of multilateralism and cooperation among the leading powers.

With respect to the first question, several commentators have expressed concern about the prospective relative diminution of US power. Gideon Rachman (2011) remarks that the US ‘will never again experience the global dominance’ it enjoyed between the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the financial crisis, asserting that ‘[t]hose days are over’. Roger Cohen (2009) concurs that ‘Pax Americana’ is approaching the end of its life. And Thomas Wright (2010) notes that the era of expansion of the US-led ‘open, democratic international order’ is coming to an end.

At the same time, some analysts advise restraint in predicting the rapid demise of US power (Ferguson, 2009, p. 123). According to Paul Kennedy, ‘[g]reat empires, or hegemonies, or number-one powers (whichever term one prefers) rarely if ever crash in some swift, spectacular way. Rather, they slide slowly downhill, trying to avoid collisions, dodging rising obstacles, making an offering here and there, ever searching for a flatter, calmer landscape’ (2010, pp. 15–16). Two other scholars agree that it is premature ‘to write America’s great-power obituary’ and point to the US’s unrivalled military capabilities (Kaplan and Kaplan, 2011, p. 42). Indeed, the US defence budget remains around 10 times higher than the second-largest defence budget (China’s) in the world (IISS, 2011, p. 33). Moreover, Joseph Nye (2010, p. 12) argues that if the US adopts ‘a smart strategy’ that combines hard- and soft-power resources and builds on alliances and networks, it will remain for some time the most powerful state in the world. Interestingly, another analyst claims that the position of the US will actually be strengthened once the age of its unipolarity is over. This is because it will then avoid the danger of overextension as well as all the frequent distractions that inhibit the advancement of its narrow interests. Washington will also no longer pay the disproportionate cost of sustaining the international status quo, and many sources of anti-Americanism will disappear. As for US allies, the same analyst argues that they will become even more reliable out of fear of the emergence of Russia and China (Maher, 2011, pp. 59–64).

A second thread of the debate builds on the argument that the emerging international system will be bipolar and focuses on Sino-American relations. Analysts are split in their forecasts on the probability that China will develop revisionist and hegemonic aspirations. On the one hand, several

experts warn that China will become more assertive with the growth of its power. Dyer, Pilling and Sender (2011) claim that China is increasingly attempting to 'mould' the rules and institutions that are essential for the function of the world economy with the aim of forging 'post-American globalisation'. Another commentator concurs that two concepts of world order are in collision, and the US has a choice to make: 'resist Chinese ambitions and risk a trade war in which everyone loses; or do nothing and let China remake the trading system. The first would be dangerous; the second, potentially disastrous' (Samuelson, 2010). John Mearsheimer takes this line of argument a step further and suggests that if China's economic growth persists over time, Beijing will drastically increase its military capabilities in order to rise as a regional hegemon in Asia. This is a development that the US will not allow to happen (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 33). Overall, what all these analyses share in common is a bleak prediction of the evolution of US–China relations. Unsurprisingly, Washington is encouraged to adopt some version of policy of containment.

However, others believe that China's ascendance does not need to lead to deteriorating relations between the world's two largest powers. They advocate the advancement of Sino–American cooperation, suggesting a G-2 type of arrangement whereby the two powers share responsibility for the preservation of world order. Henry Kissinger (2009) argues that the US–China relationship 'needs to be taken to a new level'. He points out that the two powers should strengthen their political ties by developing 'a sense of common purpose'. Handel Jones advances a similar argument, claiming that Washington and Beijing should develop 'ChinAmerica', denoting a mutually beneficial partnership for the equitable sharing of wealth without inflicting damage on each other's interests (Jones, 2010, p. 8). And Thomas Christensen (2011) suggests that Washington should encourage Beijing to assume a greater role in the collective effort of dealing with global challenges such as the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea.

Many analysts stand somewhere between the two opposing poles of the debate on China (that is, containment vs. engagement). For instance, Zakaria predicts that Beijing will probably remain an asymmetric superpower that may attempt to peacefully enlarge its (largely economic) sphere of influence without, however, challenging the US's military pre-eminence. In Zakaria's assessment, the US is unprepared for such a scenario because it has had experience only with traditional political-military challengers such as Nazi Germany and the USSR (2008, pp. 126–8).

The third strand of the debate concerns the hypothesis that the emerging international system will be multipolar in nature.¹ According to Barry Buzan (2011), superpowers are ‘dying out’ and being replaced by great powers with regional reach in an emerging ‘regionalized world order’. Buzan asserts that the main feature of this system will be ‘a relatively even distribution of power worldwide and a densely integrated and interdependent global system and society. This might be labelled *decentred globalism* to contrast it with the centred globalism captured in the many core–periphery characterizations of the modern world order’ (p. 21).

There has also been some debate about the fate of multilateralism as well as on predictions about the course of relations among G-20 members (mainly between the seven developed economies, on the one hand, and the remaining thirteen powers, on the other). One commentator notes the world’s division between ‘a worried, depressed and disoriented West’ on the one hand, and a ‘buoyant, questing and increasingly confident emergent world of nations’ on the other. While the West experiences a ‘new Age of Anxiety’, several emerging-market countries are undergoing a ‘new Age of Possibility’ (Cohen, 2010). Two other scholars anticipate that the developed world will observe a diminution of the influence of its ideas and of its capacity to shape the content of the global development agenda (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011, p. 53). And Richard Rosecrance claims that it will be futile for the US to resist the rise of new powers. What it should do instead is establish a ‘transatlantic economic union’ with Europe that will ‘draw surging protocapitalist states into its web’ (Rosecrance, 2010, p. 49).

Part of the discussion also concerns the role that the G-20 might play in the future.² Geoffrey Garrett (2010) asserts that a more institutionalised G-20 might nest the G-2 within its ranks and assist the diffusion of US–China tensions. However, other analysts do not vest so much hope in multilateralism. They remark that international cooperation over the most important global issues has stalled and the G-20 countries have failed to translate words into deeds (Samans, Schwab and Malloch-Brown, 2011). Bremmer and Roubini (2011) claim that what we see is neither a G-20 nor

¹ According to Alasdair Young (2010, p. 3), different depictions of the system’s polarity reflect a different degree of emphasis with respect to power (its aggregate content vs. some selected dimensions) on the one hand, and the referent object of analysis (the US vs. ‘middle-ranked great powers’) on the other.

² See for instance the exchange between Shorr and Wright (2010).

a G-2 world. Rather, we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘cacophony of competing voices’, a ‘G-Zero world’ in which no single great power or coalition of powers has the leverage or the will to advance the international agenda. As a result, competition will drive the negotiations among the world’s leading powers on economic and trade issues during the following decades (Bremmer and Roubini, 2011).

This brief presentation of some aspects of the debate concerning upcoming transformations in the international system demonstrates a plurality of assessments, predictions and policy prescriptions. It is indeed very difficult to discern in advance the direction and the content of meaningful international changes. The realm of world affairs is so complex that ‘to dare to understand’ it (not to mention make forecasts about it) has been depicted as ‘sheer craziness’ (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000, p. 1). As Kissinger (2009) observes, ‘[n]ever have so many transformations occurred at the same time in so many different parts of the world and been made globally accessible via instantaneous communication’. There are far too many developments taking place across multiple sectors and different levels of analysis, and the detection and singling out of whatever might matter in the long term is simply impossible.

Different prognoses about international changes largely reflect and reproduce the divergent presumptions emanating from contending theoretical traditions of international relations. Political realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) and Robert Gilpin (1981) link international transformation with changes in the capabilities of states. Gilpin suggests in his seminal work, *War and Change in World Politics*, that ‘the most important factor for the process of international political change . . . is the differential or uneven growth of power among states’ (1981, p. 93). A transformation of the distribution of power may alter the cost-benefit calculus of states regarding their chances of changing (usually through a hegemonic war) the international political order. In this regard, the international system moves cyclically from a condition of equilibrium to one of disequilibrium and again (after the end of the hegemonic war) to a new equilibrium. Presumably, the realist tradition generates most of the predictions that competition will be the main feature of the emerging international system. Interestingly, it is from the same tradition, and out of serious concern for the repercussions that a Sino–American competition might have, that Kissinger’s preference for a G-2 arrangement also emanates.

For liberals, to give another example, the drivers of international change are norms, institutions and ideas. For instance, James Rosenau, among other influential advocates of liberal theory, considers the world order to be sustained by three levels of activity: (a) the ideational level, referring to the people's perceptions, beliefs and shared values concerning the content of global arrangements; (b) the behavioural level, implying what people routinely and unconsciously do to maintain global arrangements and (c) the political level, consisting of the institutions and regimes materialising the policies that are implied at the ideational and behavioural levels (Rosenau, 2000, p. 14). While Rosenau does not deny the importance of changes in material conditions as drivers of international transformation, he notices that the above three levels of activity are related interactively, feeding on each other to maintain order (pp. 19–21). The ideational, behavioural and political patterns of international order generate habits (meaning 'standardized, routinized, and repetitive ways of responding to events') that are not easily or readily replaced (p. 24). According to Rosenau, whilst a change in the global distribution of power can render the arrangements of the contemporary international order useless, the emergence of a new order that will be rooted in consensus and new 'habits' might be a slow-ripening process (p. 24). Therefore, within the liberal tradition fall some of the prescriptive (rather than predictive) analyses that view the G-20 or a 'transatlantic economic union' (or any other multi-lateral framework) as the adequate institution that will provide for the accommodation of the great powers' interests and the shaping of the new international order.

Even if we assume that we can accurately predict how great powers will react to upcoming changes, we will never be entirely certain of the repercussions of their policies. As one scholar explains, '[s]tates do tend to throw dice, however, with little capacity to predict how the throw will turn out: to expedite primacy or stall decline, to achieve affluence or escape austerity, compel regime change or resist it, win a war without ending it or end it before winning it, and more, much more' (Serfaty, 2011, p. 19). Moreover, irrespectively of how one reads global trends, they are not the sole 'markers' of international transformation. According to Kalevi Holsti, there are two more identifiers of international change. One type is 'great events', that is to say, sharp breaks in history causing the interruption of typical patterns (Holsti, 2004, pp. 10–11). The outbreak of the First and Second World Wars, the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of

9/11 qualify as such ‘great events’. The other type of marker is ‘significant social/technological innovations’. This is a specific category of great events signalling progress in material conditions (for instance, the invention of the atomic bomb and the revolution in information and communications technology) (pp. 11–12). The problem with both of these types of markers is that we usually do not apprehend them until the moment that they are actually taking place. For example, it was beyond anyone’s imagination that the suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, in protest over the confiscation of his wares could trigger in early 2011 a wave of anti-regime protests across North Africa and the Middle East that within days would force Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to step down and would cause the outbreak of war in Libya. Thus, beyond the study of trends, our early prediction capacity is rather limited.

The aim of this book is not to renounce or discredit any effort at comprehending change in international politics. It is indeed a human need to quest for early predictions of upcoming transformations in order to reduce uncertainty and prepare adequately for the future. The book, however, underscores the complexity of the entire enterprise of forecasting international politics and proceeds cautiously to investigate the questions of change and continuity concerning a large array of actors, with respect to a series of issues and across three major levels of analysis. At the systemic level, this volume debates the questions of order, anarchy, power and security. At the unit level, it focuses on the priorities, policies and relations among the world’s largest powers. And at the individual level, it discusses the beliefs and preferences of the current leaderships in the two leading global powers, the US and China.

This collection of essays does not attempt to articulate a cohesive alternative perspective of how the world will look in the near future. Its pieces do not form perfectly complementary parts of a uniform image of the international system. In some respects, the book serves as a forum for debate and for the presentation of often divergent accounts of core dimensions of contemporary international politics. In this regard, what is offered is a series of snapshots of different aspects, and from varying angles, of an international system in motion. Snapshots are by definition static reflections of a fluid reality, and accordingly, comprehension of the international system’s evolution requires continuous analysis and assessment.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the established global players – the US, the EU and Japan – and their role in the new world configuration of power. The second part of the book discusses the role of the emerging great powers – the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China)³ – and assesses the prospect of their participation in the global order. Finally, the third part deals with the main features of the international system and provides accounts of some of the pressing issues of high politics on the world agenda, debating core dimensions of intractable problems such as ethnic conflicts, international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The first chapter assesses the influence of the US in the contemporary international system. Dimitris Keridis argues that American world pre-eminence will not be challenged in the foreseeable future. In terms of capabilities, the US will persist as the indispensable nation. This is not to claim that Washington will be able to resolve international problems unilaterally, nor should the use of military force be the remedy for all situations. Keridis instead asserts that Washington will keep playing a leading role in all successful collective efforts towards the management of international challenges.

In the second chapter, Alexander Moens examines the changes that have been introduced in American foreign policy under the Obama Administration. The author elaborates on the President's preference for diplomacy, soft power and multilateralism. Obama has registered some successes with this approach, most notably the improvement of relations with traditional allies and the signing of the New START agreement with Russia. However, Moens claims that Obama's foreign policy lacks a strategic vision of American security interests and underestimates the continuing relevance of hard power. Hence, Obama's diplomatic approach might be misinterpreted by rival powers such as China and Russia as signalling weakness.

Stephen Szabo analyses in the third chapter the impact of the global shift of power on the transatlantic community. The author notes that the rise of the BRICs diminishes Western influence in the world and challenges the post-Second World War global institutional arrangements. However, the emerging powers have greater differences among themselves than they do common interests. Hence, Szabo contends that the Americans

³ The group was enlarged (and renamed BRICS) with the admission of South Africa at the end of 2010.

and the Europeans may set aside their own recent divergences and draw on their common values and similar threat perceptions to establish the core of a new global order which some of the BRICs might decide to join.

The next two chapters focus on the efforts of the European Union (EU) to assume greater responsibilities in the international system. Whether it acts collectively on the basis of common policies and joint actions or is only indirectly present through the coordinated policies of some of its member states, the EU struggles to participate in the management of a broad range of global challenges.

Kostas Ifantis and Ioannis Galariotis explicate the foundations of European power and analyse the EU's approach towards its major partners and the most pressing international questions. The authors remark that by virtue of its 'civilian' power as well as the aggregate material capabilities of its member states, the EU should be considered the second superpower, far ahead of emerging contenders such as China and India. However in Europe's case, capabilities alone do not suffice for the performance of a global role. The EU needs to act internationally as a global power. It should articulate its own strategic vision of the world and attempt to advance it through an elaborate grand strategy.

In the fifth chapter, Rafał Trzaskowski, Olaf Osica and Joanna Popielewska discuss the institutional efforts of the EU to streamline its Common Foreign and Security Policy. The authors present the reforms that were introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, focusing on the provision for the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS). The chapter offers a detailed account of the institutional negotiations and procedures for the operationalisation of the EEAS and concludes that the success of this reform will largely depend on the political will of the EU member states to forge a genuinely common EU foreign policy.

Malcolm Cook unfolds the multiple changes that are taking place simultaneously in Japan's domestic and international environments. He explains how Japan is struggling to cope with a lengthy period of economic decline and the deterioration of its relative power position against China. Cook underscores the sharp diminution of the country's foreign aid budget, the strengthening of its alliance with the US, the conclusion of bilateral security treaties with India and Australia and the adoption of a more assertive policy as an international security provider. Overall, the author concludes that Japan is currently undergoing the early stages of an uncertain epochal change.

In the next chapter, Robert Sutter assesses the prospects of China's assuming a leading role in world affairs. Notwithstanding its impressive growth rates and its significantly improved military capabilities, the author claims that China's international leadership will remain limited and encumbered in the foreseeable future. Beijing has on several occasions demonstrated that it is not eager to undertake costs, risks and commitments for causes not directly linked to its narrowly defined national interests. Moreover, the US will remain the leading power in Asia, benefiting from the development of good relations with all major regional powers that are concerned with China's rise.

From a political psychology perspective, Huiyun Feng and Kai He study the personal traits of contemporary Chinese leadership. The two authors employ (and update) Alexander George's framework of operational code analysis to examine the belief systems of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Feng and He demonstrate that the two Chinese leaders have similar beliefs about politics, both of them supporting tolerance, moderation and cooperation. However, Hu and Wen both perceive that they have a weak grasp over historical developments. The chapter concludes with the observation that the outcome of the struggle between moderate and conservative factions within the Communist Party will determine China's political future.

The chapter by Efstathios Fakiolas elaborates on Russia's resurgence as a great power. The author observes a continuity of strategic aims and policies between the presidencies of Putin and Medvedev. Fakiolas unfolds the basic elements of Russia's grand strategy encompassing the stimulation of exports of energy resources and weapons, domestic reforms aimed at restoring some of the state's control over the economy, and the country's integration into the world economy. According to Fakiolas, the resurgent Russia will not evolve again into a hostile actor towards the West but instead will strive to consolidate its recovery by carefully advancing its interests and preferences.

Harsh Pant analyses India's trajectory towards the acquisition of a global power status. The chapter acknowledges the impressive growth of India's economic power. It also remarks on the progress in India-US relations, culminating in Obama's support of India's bid for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council. However, Sino-Indian frictions have not abated and New Delhi observes Beijing's military build-up with anxiety. Above all, India is increasingly marginalised within its own neighbourhood as a result of China's successful openings towards Paki-

stan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. If India cannot restore its influence in South Asia, it will certainly have difficulty in advancing its global aspirations.

Pedro Seabra's contribution explores Brazil's attempt to wield greater clout in international politics. The author elaborates on Brazil's ambition to participate in the reform of the post-Second World War international order and upgrade its status in international institutions. Brazil has actively taken part in various multinational fora and has gained much visibility for its positions on different questions ranging from climate change and economic governance to Iran's nuclear programme. Notwithstanding the fact that it has invested much on groupings of emerging powers – specifically, BRIC and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) – Brazil has also maintained a pragmatic approach towards the US and Europe, Seabra suggests.

Harry Papatotiriou offers a perspective, informed in part by the Realist tradition and in part by the English School of international relations, of the main features of the contemporary international system. The author highlights the central role of the great powers and of the operation of the balance of power mechanism among them for the maintenance of international order. In light of this, Papatotiriou explicates the US decision to go to war against Iraq by recalling the tendency of the great powers to promote their domestic values internationally. However, he warns that the violent imposition of liberalism could have adverse effects, stimulating the formation of anti-hegemonic coalitions among the world's most authoritarian regimes.

Dimitris Chrysochoou and Dimitris Xenakis unfold a different perspective on questions of order and anarchy in the international system. In contrast with what Papatotiriou asserts in the previous chapter, these two authors observe a complex and pluralistic world in motion that is characterised by the synthesis of anarchy and synarchy as well as of order and disorder. Rule-based international governance and several other processes that operate at the global level alter (but do not obliterate) the contours of state sovereignty and provide for the symbiosis of a variety of actors in an emerging organised plurality.

In the next chapter, Irini Chila reflects on the outbreak and protraction of the large number of ethnic conflicts around the world. The author elaborates on the causes of these conflicts and highlights the complex interplay of a variety of factors, such as historical enmities, ethnic differences and grievances, territorial claims, weak state structures and intrastate security

dilemmas fuelling collective fears. The great powers have placed much hope for the pacification and stabilisation of war-shattered states on the implementation of democratic reforms. Chila demonstrates, however, that the track record of democratic peace, especially where it has been externally imposed, is modest at best.

Miles Pomper and Cole Harvey discuss the question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They explain how technological developments and the improved technical capacity of many developing countries have facilitated the access of some of the latter to the most lethal weapons. The problem is further complicated by the so-called dual-use dilemma, denoting several critical materials for weapons of this type are useful for civilian purposes as well. Although the current nonproliferation regime is under strain (especially with respect to verifications), the chapter concludes that the core of this regime (consisting of the three treaties) should be preserved and updated to the changing needs of our times.

Andreas Gofas explores the merits of the prevailing assumption that 9/11 signifies the appearance of a new type of terrorism. The author argues that contemporary terrorism is not as distinct as has been suggested in terms of operational range, motives and tactics. Gofas notes that the old-versus-new terrorism debate is not just an academic exercise but expresses the quest for legitimisation for more assertive counterterrorism policies that often impinge upon civil liberties. The chapter challenges the notion that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism and promotes a re-evaluation of the trade-off between security and civil liberties.

Finally, Anthony Glees and Julian Richards assess in their contribution the counterterrorism policies of Western democracies. In contrast with Gofas, these two authors attempt to demonstrate the changing nature of the threat by highlighting the – until recently – unnoticed domestic (so-called home-grown) dimension of international terrorism, particularly in the US and the UK. Glees and Richards express concern about the diminished support in Western societies for both internal and external anti-terrorist policies, and they urge the authorities to stay the course. However, they recommend that Western countries should privilege intelligence-led instead of police or military operations.

Taken as a whole, this book scrutinises the question of change and continuity over several aspects of contemporary international politics. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the comprehension of the international system's ongoing transformation.

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PART I

THE ESTABLISHED GLOBAL PLAYERS

US Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in an Increasingly Complex World

Dimitris Keridis

US Foreign Policy: Power and Constraints

At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States of America continues to be the pre-eminent power in the world. Even the economic crisis of 2008–9, which erupted there first before spreading to the rest of the world, reaffirmed America’s global influence. Whereas Japan’s economic malaise had been going on for two decades, it was only when the US got sick that the whole world became infected.

For all the recent costs and failures of US foreign policy in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States remains unrivalled internationally in terms of its power. With an economy of almost \$15 trillion and a defence budget of \$600 billion in 2010 (CIA, 2010), the US is the sole military superpower. Indeed, the US spends as much on defence as does the rest of the world combined and is the only country with an ability to assert its power anywhere in the world. Unlike any other nation, the US has global interests and a worldwide network of alliances and bases for their defence. It enjoys a historically unprecedented abundance of both hard and soft power, including a widespread influence in both elite¹ and popular culture that in the eyes of many has equated globalisation with Americanisation. In sum, no major international problem, from Palestine to Korea, can be solved in opposition to or even without the active engagement of the US. In this sense, the United States truly remains the indispensable nation.²

¹ For example, it is estimated that 80% of the world’s scientific research takes place in the US.

² Addressing an audience at Ohio State University in Columbus on 18 February 1998, Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, proclaimed: ‘We are

And yet, it is equally true that no major international problem, from environmental degradation and climate change to transnational mega-terrorism, can be resolved by the US without the support of and cooperation with other powers. The US is powerful but not as powerful as it is often thought to be. It can do many things on its own, but managing and successfully harnessing the forces of globalisation towards stability and prosperity requires the cooperation of Asia and Europe. This reality informs US foreign policy as it confronts the challenge of power transition (the rise of China) and power diffusion (the ‘privatisation’ of mass murder and war).

Briefly put, the United States is neither weak nor omnipotent. Appreciating the complexities of the various power structures that inform today’s world requires an open, unbiased mind that has often proved elusive.³ Outsiders tend to view the US as a behemoth, sometimes scary and threatening, sometimes magnanimous and benevolent. On the other hand, Americans, having led and won all the major battles of the twentieth century, find it difficult to cooperate with others. Often they appear impatient, moralising and distasteful of the ‘old world’s’ time-consuming diplomatic games. And yet a successful US foreign policy needs, first and foremost, to be able to recognise where America should take the lead and where it should cooperate and share with others in taking the wheel of a rapidly changing world.

This is a central issue but only one of the many choices and dilemmas US foreign policymaking involves. Overall, American foreign policy remains a balancing act between a number of often opposing forces: a volatile domestic public opinion versus hard international realities; short-term political gains versus long-term national interests; a populist impulse towards isolationism versus a missionary zealotry and a tendency to overreach; militarism versus the need for constructive engagement abroad in an age of increased interdependence and, ultimately, between (liberal) values and (realist) interests. Thus far, the end result of this balancing act has

the greatest country in the world. And what we are doing is serving the role of the *indispensable nation* to see what we can do to make the world safer for our children and grandchildren and for those people around the world who follow the rules’.

³ In the 1990s Joseph S. Nye popularised the notion of the variety of power and the distinct dimensions or levels of world politics: the political/military, the economic and the non-governmental/transnational (Nye 1991, 2004).

been a policy that oscillates between unilateralism and selective multilateralism.

The pressures and counter-pressures of contrasting policy choices have increased with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the clear and tangible threat that the Soviet Union was between 1945 and 1989 (Huntington, 1997). For a while, after 1989, the US appeared unchallenged. But this ‘unilateral moment’ was not meant to last. Soon, tensions resurfaced and came to a peak with George W. Bush’s adventurism in the Middle East, mainly in Iraq, and the hijacking of US foreign policy by neoconservatives along the lines of a radical, militaristic and heavily ideological agenda. The arrival of Barack Obama at the White House was greeted with worldwide relief, and there has since been some rebalancing of US foreign policy. But the tensions remain, as is evident in the failures of US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the stagnation of the Palestinian–Israeli peace process.

Alexis de Toqueville, the pre-eminent analyst of America’s public psyche, wrote some 170 years ago that the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy is a particularly difficult business.⁴ According to this great thinker, whereas foreign policy requires patient long-term planning, secrecy and cool calculation, emotion-prone public opinion often privileges short-term and spectacular gains. This is especially true for the United States, with its particularly open and adversarial political system. US foreign policy is greatly influenced by domestic developments, and much of Washington’s behaviour abroad can be explained by American rather than by global politics. From the policy regarding Cuba to the policy in the Middle East and the Arab–Israeli dispute, American foreign policy often appears hostage to a lobby infested political system of special interests (Davidson, 2009).

The primary architect of US foreign policy is the president, representing the American interest as a whole. He (or she) is the commander-in-chief, aided by a cabinet that he more or less appoints and dismisses at will. Nevertheless, no US president can ignore Congress, which is solely responsible for the ratification of international treaties and has the absolute power of the

⁴ Alexis de Toqueville (2003, p. 215) wrote: ‘As for myself, I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction, that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations, that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles’.

purse. No funding for any presidential initiative, either at home or abroad, is possible without the consent of Congress (Nathan and Oliver, 1994).

However, Congress is, by nature and structure, undisciplined and fragmented. Furthermore, the Senate, the all too powerful upper chamber, does not operate according to strict majority rule, as is the case in most legislative bodies in democracies around the world, but along aristocratic principles that privilege seniority and prolonged debates. Both bestow extraordinary power on individual senators. Thus, it is often the case that a single senator from an underpopulated state of the interior, representing 1% or less of the national electorate, blocks large parts of a president's agenda simply by being the chair of a committee, or worse, by 'talking a bill out' with a so-called filibuster. Inevitably, this *modus operandi* gives a lot of power to small but well-organised minorities which, in turn, gives rise to the proliferation of lobbies and lobbying in favour of a particular cause, often to the detriment of the overall national interest.

Things have grown worse over the years due to an increase in partisanship and the practice of gerrymandering (i.e. the practice, in first-past-the-post electoral systems, of redrawing the boundaries of electoral districts to give one party an electoral majority). The old consensus that supported US foreign policy during the Cold War has gone, the American nation appears to be, politically, equally divided between Democrats and Republicans,⁵ and the ideological divide between the two parties is growing. This has been particularly true ever since the Republicans succeeded in shifting the political centre further to the right, espousing cultural politics, political evangelicalism and anti-state populism in reaction to the old, post-war liberal consensus.

Furthermore, due to the politically based redistricting of electoral constituencies, at least 80% of races for seats in the House of Representatives have become uncompetitive. At present, modern information technology can map the electoral profile of a district with an accuracy that would have been unimaginable only a few years ago. The result of these races is a foregone conclusion in favour of the Democrat or the Republican candidate. Therefore, the real contest has become the inner-party primaries for the selection of the party candidate. In primaries, only a few of the party

⁵ In the presidential elections of 2008, Barack Obama won with 53% of the vote; in 2004, George W. Bush with 51% and in 2000, with 48% (less than his rival); in 1996, Bill Clinton won with 49% and in 1992, with 43% of the vote.

faithful are motivated enough to vote, which means that the more extreme and partisan a candidate is, the better he or she does. Consequently, the real outcome of gerrymandering is a polarised and overtly partisan House, with Congressmen representing narrow, extreme and irreconcilable positions that cannot easily converge to form a coherent policy.

There is simply no way one can overestimate the fragmentation, divisions and infighting that US foreign policymaking involves (Scott, 1998). Nevertheless, most foreigners continue to hold a very simplistic view of America, being unable and unwilling to appreciate the competition between the executive and the legislature, among the various branches of the US state bureaucracy (the Departments of State, Defense and Homeland Security, the intelligence community and so on) and within the legislature itself. And then, there also exists a lively civil society comprised, among other things, of influential old and new media, well-endowed think tanks and venerable universities.

US Foreign Policy: The New Challenges

Returning to the international level, three challenges stand out for US foreign policy and require priority attention: making sure that China's rise does not disturb world peace, fighting radical Islamism in parallel with fulfilling a minimum of Palestinian national aspirations and managing globalisation through the enhancement of international cooperation while protecting human rights more effectively and consistently worldwide.

The single development that characterises the beginning of the twenty-first century is the rise of Asia, mainly China and secondarily, India. In the past, capitalism succeeded several times in uplifting millions of people out of poverty. But never before have so many people in such a brief period of time enriched themselves enough to attain a middle class lifestyle, as has been the case with China since 1978.

Economic success holds the promise of greater political influence in world affairs. China is already the second largest economy in the world and, if current trends hold, will be the largest by 2030 (Barboza, 2010). This will undoubtedly mark a great shift – or, to be more precise, a return to the pre-1800 world, when China and India possessed half of the world's wealth. In any case, this is a development with important geostrategic consequences.

The question that dominates current US foreign policy thinking is how to manage China's rise. Should the United States contain or engage China? The answer, of course, depends on whether China constitutes a threat or an opportunity. No matter how one decides to answer, China is probably both an opportunity and a potential threat.

But first, it should be remembered that in the past, there have been many challenges to US pre-eminence that never really succeeded in toppling America from first place. In the 1950s it was the Soviet Union, but by 1991 the Soviet state had collapsed. In the 1970s it was Japan, but since 1990 that country has been suffering from a stagnation that shows no sign of ending anytime soon.

Currently, China is growing rapidly but nothing guarantees that this will continue unabated in the future. Already, some envision a certain 'Japanese syndrome' afflicting China after 2020 (Devine, 2010). In sum, China is more vulnerable than it seems today. Rising wealth will inevitably increase the popular pressure for a political opening that might curtail the Communist Party's hold on power and reinforce the decentralising forces in the country. Western China, from Tibet to Xinjiang, seems decades behind the booming eastern coast and continues to be plagued by serious ethnic strife. China cannot benefit in perpetuity from technology transfers from abroad, a frantic export-based growth, an undervalued currency, an appalling disregard for the environment and its own people, and a demographic window that is rapidly closing, as the benefits of the one-child policy were short term while the costs are felt only in the long run. The Chinese population is ageing rapidly and in the foreseeable future, the average Chinese under the best possible scenario will continue to be much poorer than the average American no matter what.

History, from the Athenian democracy of the fifth century BC to the German Reich in the first half of the twentieth century, teaches us many lessons, none better than the dangers involved in the rise of a new power. The world might be faced with a similar situation when the Chinese leadership feels confident enough to translate Chinese wealth into political power. Certainly the effects will be felt first and foremost in Asia, but China is already flexing its muscles in far away places such as Latin America and Africa.⁶

⁶ There has been much talk, for example, about China's support for the Sudanese government, which has been accused of genocide in Darfur; see Harman (2007).

The United States has responded by boosting a network of alliances around China's perimeter, including with India (Bajoria and Pan, 2010), which the US had antagonised throughout much of its independent existence.⁷ In this regard, Russia and Japan are of critical importance. The common fear of Beijing might lead to a rapprochement between Washington and Moscow or the nuclearisation of Japanese defence in the future.

All these factors may result in China's becoming less of a hegemon and less than the threat many outsiders fear. Nevertheless, peace or conflict will ultimately depend on political choices and the wisdom of leaders on all sides in steering the world against the tides of rapid economic and technological change and towards stability.

If China poses a conventional problem of power transition among states and the peaceful management of the global balance of power, the other two main challenges facing US foreign policy – radical Islamism and adapting the international institutional architecture to the challenges of globalisation and democratisation – are unconventional. They are related to the diffusion of power away from the state and into a disorderly, often chaotic transnational society.

In a sense, these challenges are about the weakening of the state as the traditional focus of the post-Westphalian international system, and the risks and opportunities associated with this process. This diffusion of power involves a variety of phenomena, including mega-terrorism, potentially, with weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation of failed states that feed criminality and regional instability and the expansion of transnational organised crime (Glenny, 2009), but, on the positive side, the emancipation of people from traditional authority and the renewed popular pressure for the respect of human rights, to the detriment of state rights (mainly, the state's right of sovereignty and of the non-interference in its internal affairs by other states). Facing up to these risks and opportunities requires new thinking and new strategies.

Today, US foreign policy needs, more than ever before, to move in all sorts of directions and use all sorts of different tools.⁸ Rivalry among states

⁷ *The Economist* (2010a) recently claimed that India will soon outpace China.

⁸ According to Hillary Clinton (2009): 'We must use what has been called smart power – the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy'.

is not ‘the only game in town’. Grasping this new reality requires a titanic mental shift for a machinery that was accustomed to working within the simplicity of the Cold War world and for a domestic political system that has favoured a few, striking ‘truths’.

In recent years, Islamism has emerged as the new global threat in place of Communism and the Soviet Union. The very term remains ill defined, adding to the overall confusion. For example, some conservative (and neo-conservative) commentators in the United States have been talking of Islamofascism,⁹ invoking powerful memories of the Second World War in an attempt to mobilise American resources towards a robust response against Iran’s nuclear programme or the possible re-Talibanisation of Afghanistan.¹⁰ For many people in the West, including Europeans, the basis of Islamism is Islam itself, a supposedly intolerant, belligerent, misogynous, all-encompassing religion that loathes the West’s core liberal ideology.

Nevertheless, the use of the term Islamism should be limited to describing contemporary political movements in the Muslim world that make systematic references to Islam and its teachings. In that regard, Islamism has politically benefited enormously from the discrediting, in the eyes of many Muslims, of the West’s secular ideologies, and from the recent bankruptcy of Marxism. Islamism’s origins are not in sixth century Arabia but in the very real problems of today that have mostly to do with issues of social control and emancipation in a world that changes at an accelerating pace, often with dramatic consequences.

⁹ According to Christopher Hitchens (2007), ‘The most obvious points of comparison would be these: Both movements are based on a cult of murderous violence that exalts death and destruction and despises the life of the mind. (“Death to the intellect! Long live death!” as Gen. Francisco Franco’s sidekick Gonzalo Queipo de Llano so pithily phrased it.) Both are hostile to modernity (except when it comes to the pursuit of weapons), and both are bitterly nostalgic for past empires and lost glories. Both are obsessed with real and imagined “humiliations” and thirsty for revenge. Both are chronically infected with the toxin of anti-Jewish paranoia (interestingly, also, with its milder cousin, anti-Freemason paranoia). Both are inclined to leader worship and to the exclusive stress on the power of one great book. Both have a strong commitment to sexual repression – especially to the repression of any sexual ‘deviance’ – and to its counterparts the subordination of the female and contempt for the feminine. Both despise art and literature as symptoms of degeneracy and decadence; both burn books and destroy museums and treasures’.

¹⁰ In Europe, the fear is of Muslim immigrants and further Muslim immigration.

The US should aim to be sensitive and intelligent when dealing with such a complex, multifaceted and extremely varied phenomenon that has been generated by modernity and modernisation in some parts of the Muslim world and avoid repeating the mistaken excesses of the Cold War struggle against Soviet Communism. Not all Islamists are the same and most are non-violent. Al-Qaeda, a small, radical offspring, is not the Soviet Union of today nor can it be defeated in the same way. Military deterrence and coercion cannot be the only tool in the toolbox of foreign and security policy. Besides military force, al-Qaeda's defeat requires networks of intelligence and alliances around the world and a strategy that integrates killing with 'winning the hearts and minds' of the world's dispossessed.

In this regard, many Islamists might pose a threat to the established political order of their country but not necessarily to the West. Take the case of Turkey: much has been said and written about Turkey's estrangement with the West (Cagaptay, 2009), with the US, Europe and Israel, especially since the mildly Islamist Tayip Erdogan was triumphantly re-elected in 2007 (*The Economist*, 2010b). However, Turkey's new-found confidence in foreign affairs is not necessarily the result of an Islamist government's reorientation away from the West and towards the East; it might be the product of Turkey's success and rapid economic growth. In the past there were similar instances when Turkey attempted a similar flexing of its muscles, and it should not be unexpected that today's Turkey repeats itself.

Radical Islamism, and in particular violent radical Islamism, is a minority phenomenon in the Muslim world. While its danger should not be underestimated, neither should it be exaggerated. More important, it should be understood rather than simply demonised. Thus, it should be properly contextualised in time and space. The stimulation of fear might be a profitable electoral strategy for entrepreneurial politicians in the short term but can prove dangerous and counterproductive as a basis for a foreign policy strategy.

Along these lines of thinking, it should not be forgotten that nothing has poisoned the US relationship with the Muslim world's Arab heartland more than the unresolved Palestinian problem, a classic question of national self-determination inherited from colonial times. Palestine has become the rallying cry for all anti-Americans around the world. The seemingly unconditional support of the US for Israel, even with the proliferation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, is highly problematic not only because it directly foments instability on the ground but also because

it makes a mockery of America's liberal ideals and commitment to human rights.

It is often said that we live in the age of globalisation. It is true that the flow of goods, services, capital, people and ideas across state borders has increased exponentially during the past few decades, and in many respects the world today is more interdependent and integrated than at any moment in human history. And yet, the world remains politically divided among egotistic and self-serving states. This is the real tragic paradox our world is faced with: thanks largely to globalisation, all major international problems today require for their solution the enhancement of international cooperation, but the present structures of the international system cannot provide for that.

Take, for example, the problems generated by human activity, such as environmental degradation, climate change, infectious diseases, deadly epidemics, economic crises and global financial imbalances. All these 'new' and unconventional risks and threats to international security cannot be dealt with by one nation alone, no matter how powerful it is or feels itself to be. Dealing with these problems effectively requires a completely different foreign policy posture from the one the United States exhibited after 9/11.

Until recently, the US had mostly remained sceptical of international cooperation or, more precisely, was willing to cooperate as long as it was in the lead. Being the most powerful nation on earth, the US has been justifiably reluctant to constrain its freedom of action by the niceties of international law and international organisations.¹¹ For years, Washington seemed to believe that international cooperation was a luxury the US could ill afford. However, the challenge of managing globalisation effectively has turned this old belief on its head. From the environment to the economy, global terrorism and pandemics, the US can no longer afford to ignore international cooperation.

The same goes for human rights. Although many Americans, including some American leaders, have been sincere in their commitment to human rights, much of the official US foreign policy has viewed human rights as a useful tool against opponents rather than an absolute value in itself. Thus violations of human rights by opponents were readily condemned but those of friends were easily ignored. Sadly, but not surprisingly, the historical

¹¹ A good example of this attitude has been the US opposition to the International Criminal Court.

record reveals that the US concern for human rights worldwide has been applied selectively and politically, in the service of other wider interests. Although far from being the only country to approach human rights that way, the United States' special weight in the international system has magnified the consequences of this inconsistency.

This is something that cannot go on forever without damaging the credibility of any policy. It is high time for some standardisation and institutionalisation. Today, it is generally accepted that state rights no longer reign supreme and that, in certain cases, state sovereignty needs to submit to human rights when the latter are grossly and massively violated. When, under what conditions and by whom can and should humanitarian interventions take place has not yet been fully determined but should, at some point, become clear.

Ultimately, if the US were willing to be more cooperative internationally, there would be no better starting point than the transatlantic relationship. After all, it was this relationship that defeated the ugly totalitarianisms of the twentieth century, and it is in this area that international and supranational cooperation has already moved the furthest.

The US–Europe Relationship: From Patronage to Partnership or Rivalry?

Since 1943,¹² the US has been rightly considered the supreme European power. Post-war European politics from reconstruction, democratisation and European integration to the end of Communism, German unification and the post-Yugoslav order have, to a great extent, been shaped by the US. Today, the transatlantic bond remains the strongest anchor for international stability and security.

Besides their cultural affinity, Europe and the US jointly control almost half of the global economic output while the size of trade and investment between the two sides of the northern Atlantic remains among the largest in the world.¹³ Furthermore, Europe and the US are united militarily

¹² In July 1943, US troops landed in Sicily as a first step in the Allies' Italian campaign during the Second World War.

¹³ According to the European Commission, the annual total trade in goods and services between the EU and the US has reached \$800 billion, the total flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) across both sides reached \$250 billion dollars

through NATO. The alliance, founded in 1949, represents a unique case of a concrete US military commitment to a multilateral organisation of collective defence. Today, through NATO, Europe and the US are jointly fighting a war in Afghanistan.¹⁴

The road to Euro–American partnership has been long and occasionally bumpy. Europeans continue to complain that Americans always want the final say and to have it either ‘their way or no way’. For their part, Americans continue to emphasise the need for a more equitable ‘burden sharing’, especially since so many Europeans enjoy a high standard of living. And yet, it is only fair to acknowledge that this partnership, forged during the Second World War and coming to full life during the first stages of the Cold War, has been an extraordinary accomplishment. Making partners out of former clients is a tribute to the extraordinary success of Europe’s reconstruction and to the US’s wise international engagement after the war.¹⁵

And yet today, the traditional European partners of the US have been turning somewhat cold vis-à-vis Washington. Up to a point this was to be expected, given Europe’s inevitable emancipation from America’s tutelage. But as long as the Soviet threat remained credible, disagreements between Europeans and Americans were kept manageable. For a brief period after the end of the Cold War, there was a political convergence between the two sides of the Atlantic with Bill Clinton occupying the White House and a group of centre-left pragmatists and reformers controlling the chancelleries of Europe.¹⁶

All this changed when George W. Bush, who came to power in 2001 and witnessed the worst atrocity committed against US citizens in recent memory on 11 September of that year, decided in 2003 to attack Iraq. Most Europeans, including the British people, reacted strongly against US foreign policy and what they thought of as dangerous American jingoism.

Since then, wounds have somehow healed and there is a general appreciation, from all sides, of the importance of the transatlantic relationship. However, it is well understood that the US and Europe, for reasons that

in 2008. See <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/>, accessed 29 March 2011.

¹⁴ In March 2011 NATO undertook the enforcement of resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council in Libya.

¹⁵ For this story there is no better book than Tony Judt’s *Postwar* (2006).

¹⁶ These included Gerhard Schröder in Germany, Lionel Jospin in France, Tony Blair in Britain and Romano Prodi in Italy.

have to do with their societies' distinct historical trajectories, are different and look at the world differently.¹⁷ When it comes to international politics, force still matters a great deal for America, whereas for Europe, the use of force is considered illegitimate and, increasingly, even unimaginable, no matter what the circumstances.¹⁸

Even more worrisome is that Europe, in many American eyes, seems to grow irrelevant. There are two reasons for this. First, Europe, in relative terms, has been stagnating economically, while its population is ageing and, in some parts, even shrinking, at an alarming rate.¹⁹ Second, Europe remains introverted and self-absorbed, consumed by the struggle to save whatever parts of the old welfare state it can, while spending all its remaining energy on integrating the newcomers of Eastern Europe.

It should be understood that US talk about European decline is the mirror image of Europe's talk about US adventurism. According to this discourse, whereas the United States is young, energetic and occasionally foolish, Europe is perceived as old, passive, cynical and inactive. Each side suffers from its own age-related disadvantages: America from the perils of adolescence and Europe from those of old age.

While both beliefs hold some truth, they are grossly exaggerated. For example, while Europe is facing the challenge of economic and demographic renewal, it is still the biggest economic area in the world with a credible common currency, the euro. Its core country, Germany, is the world's biggest exporter and is currently growing faster than any other rich country.²⁰ Similarly, the US administration's bold action during the eco-

¹⁷ The recent US midterm election results are very informative in this regard. Whereas Europeans have been demonstrating against budget cuts and for more public spending, in the US the popular 'Tea Party' movement came to the fore with demands to drastically cut non-military public spending.

¹⁸ Robert Kagan, a leading neoconservative critic of Europe, summed up the argument in his celebrated book *Of Paradise and Power* (2004). This is, obviously, the case more in pacifist Germany than in the former imperial powers of Great Britain and France, as the recent intervention in Libya powerfully demonstrated.

¹⁹ Today, the EU's population, roughly speaking, totals 500 million people and that of the United States, 300 million. It is estimated that before 2050, the US population will be larger than that of the 27 countries currently in the EU.

²⁰ According to *The Economist* (2010c), 'No big developed country has come out of the global recession looking stronger than Germany has. The economy minister, Rainer Brüderle, boasts of an "XL upswing". Exports are booming and unemployment is expected to fall to levels last seen in the early 1990s'.

conomic crisis in the winter of 2008–9 saved the world from the very real risk of a global financial meltdown and might prove to have been more prudent than adventurist when compared to Europe’s slow, reluctant and cautious response.

Nevertheless, the combination of a certain European inability and unwillingness to act forcefully internationally and beyond its immediate neighbourhood, together with European disunity, is real and has contributed to the partial diminishing of Europe’s standing in the world.²¹ Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, US and world attention has turned away from Central Europe to other hotspots, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. These are the main ‘battlegrounds’ of today where the new world order, for better or worse, is being shaped. As long as Europe abstains, for whatever reason, from playing an influential role in developments there, it will remain of little relevance to US foreign policy.

US Foreign Policy: What Next?

There is no point in restating the power advantages the US enjoys and the reasons why these will last into the foreseeable future. Suffice it to say that the American electorate, even in the midst of the current serious economic crisis when available resources are shrinking, continues to support a strong army in the service of a robust foreign policy in a way that would be unthinkable for European voters. The Republicans, who reclaimed the House of Representatives in a landslide victory in the 2010 midterm elections, are eager to cut any public spending except for that on defence. This means that the US will continue to have an activist foreign policy, even without the hard edge of the Bush era.

Much of its substance and style will continue to be determined in Washington rather than in response to the realities abroad.²² But even a nation as powerful as the US cannot ignore these international realities without pay-

²¹ In this respect, it is instructive to be reminded of the Copenhagen Climate Conference of 2009: whereas the environment is supposed to be an area where Europe is in the lead, it was Barack Obama and the Chinese who set the agenda in Copenhagen.

²² It has been claimed that Obama’s support for the US military campaign in Afghanistan had to do with the need to denounce the Iraqi operation without appearing too much of a pacifist.

ing an increasingly heavy price. Thus, US foreign policy will continue to be plagued by the constraints described in the first part of this chapter. Occasionally, it will commit grave mistakes to the detriment of its own national interest and that of the world's, as was the case with Iraq. But the ability to self-correct will always be there, thanks to the country's democratic traditions and strong checks and balances.

Some will continue to dream of an American imperial hegemony; others of an American withdrawal from the world. Neither is likely to happen. The age of empires is over and America has neither the will nor the ability to become one. At the same time, the US, thanks to its vast endogenous resources that have mostly to do with the wealth of its human capital and the robustness of its domestic institutions, is not likely to suffer a decline similar to the one experienced by Britain, the last empire that ruled much of the world. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The world would not be a safer place without the US, no matter what anti-Americans claim. Nor is the American national interest better served without a US foreign policy of actively engaging in an ever more closely interdependent world.

Thus for the foreseeable future, America will continue to be the world's leader but one increasingly in need of cooperating closely with others. Both Americans and foreigners will remain suspicious of each other. America will not become an empire, but it will be more than a country. It is and will be the great canvas upon which humanity projects its fears, frustrations, envy and hopes, often all at the same time. For all its occasional missteps, the United States will remain the world's strongest pillar for a secure, prosperous and liberal future.

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Obama's Foreign Policy: Change Without Conviction

Alexander Moens

The Bush–Obama Transition in American Foreign Policy

President Barack Obama took office in 2009 with a focus on domestic and economic problems. The raging debates about the Iraq War had finally settled down in 2008, as most people agreed that the military surge of early 2007 did indeed turn the tide. Given that the future of Iraq would now be decided by the political success of the Nouri al-Maliki regime in Iraq rather than by US military might, Obama's calls for a strict timetable of withdrawal for American troops appeared reasonable. Obama's approach towards Iraq was balanced by his call during the election campaign for a renewed American effort to win the war in Afghanistan, including an increase in troops and an enhanced diplomatic effort in a comprehensive strategy (Obama, 2007).

The financial crisis of 2008 was followed by a deep recession in 2009. The outgoing George W. Bush Administration initiated a \$700 billion financial bailout package called the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Obama's team decided that more was needed to stimulate the American economy. Obama embodied the American ideal of young and inspired leadership. His election slogans of 'Change we can believe in' and 'Hope and change' had been crafted early in the campaign. His team used a combined grassroots and massive email network to create a strong positive image of Obama that neither Hillary Clinton nor John McCain was able to challenge (Plouffe, 2009, pp. 103, 114, 237).

Obama introduced a large stimulus plan upon entering office called the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. He also announced that he would at the same time propose a thorough overhaul of American health care and build a 'new energy economy', asking Congress for a cap-

and-trade bill to reduce carbon dioxide emissions alongside new subsidies for green energy sources. Putting three large bills on the domestic agenda was indeed bold and, given the American legislative system of checks and balances, quite a risky strategy for any new president. As presidential scholar Richard Neustadt (1991) has argued, a new president needs to establish a reputation for being able to get things done. Would Obama risk this precarious effort by proposing three things at once?

Obama's stimulus plan passed in February of 2009 with a total spending plan of \$787 billion and with some Republican backing. For the next year, Obama used nearly all his domestic political capital to get Congress to pass his health care reform proposals which became known as 'Obama care'. By March 2010, Obama was able to get a compromise on an overall health care package in Congress, something that had eluded Bill Clinton in his two terms. Still, Obama used up nearly all his political capital and persuasive power to forge various Democratic and Republican compromises. In the end, almost no Republican legislator supported the reform package and Obama's legislative plans on green energy, including cap-and-trade, were put on hold.

If the Obama White House had calculated that his stimulus money would turn the American economy around before the November 2010 mid-term elections, this failed to materialise. The economic malaise continued and the unemployment rate was still at 9.6% in mid-2010. Public opinion swung dramatically against the new President. Obama's approval ratings fell below 50% and didn't regain positive ground until early 2011. An anti-tax and anti-big government movement inside the Republican Party, called the Tea Party, put Obama on the defensive. Many independent voters changed their perception of the new President from the embodied change to a big spender. Given that the US federal debt (62% of GDP in 2010) and deficit projections for the next 10 years look grim, Obama was vulnerable (Congressional Budget Office, 2010a). House Republicans took back the leadership in the November 2010 elections, gaining 62 seats, while the Democratic majority in the Senate shrunk to 53 seats, denying either party the 60 votes needed to end filibusters.

Republican representatives who regained majority of the House in 2010 have vowed to repeal Obama's health care legislation, but given Obama's veto power and the Republican lack of control of the Senate, this seems unlikely for the next two years. Obama appears poised to copy Bill Clinton's cooperative strategy after the 1994 election brought in a Republican

majority under Newt Gingrich: Obama immediately agreed to extend the tax cuts on upper-level incomes for two years, and in his 2011 State of the Union speech, he indicated his readiness to put deficit cutting nearer the top of his agenda.

Despite his ambitious agenda in domestic policy, Obama also launched several changes in American foreign policy during his first two years. His most important goal was to shift the tone of American public diplomacy away from the assertive and unilateral tendency witnessed during the first term of the Bush Administration. Fearing that Bush's policy in the Global War on Terror had been counterproductive, Obama began a new outreach plan to the Muslim world. Obama used opportunities in Cairo, Istanbul and Jakarta to reach Islamic audiences to describe his community-building vision for American foreign policy and to steer world perception away from the idea of a looming clash of civilisations between the West and the Muslim world. In his speech at Cairo University in June of 2009, Obama noted that 'America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles' (Obama, 2009b). His conciliatory tone seeks to reach across the divide, distinguishing his approach from Bush's 'with-us-or-against-us' image, although Bush always reminded his audience that America was not at war with Islam but with a jihadist faction that was hijacking Islam. But going the extra mile, Obama wants a 'new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world' (2009b).

Obama has been able to bring together European, Russian and Chinese support for a 'considerably harsher' sanctions regime on Iran than had previously been accomplished by European and American policy (Sanger et al., 2010). The Obama Administration also revived non-proliferation and disarmament policies, hoping to bring more international pressure to bear on nuclear violators such as Iran and North Korea. Obama pushed the 'reset button' with Russia, as Vice President Joe Biden described the effort, and negotiated New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), an agreement on cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two powers (Biden, 2009). By late December 2010, the Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 71–26. Unlike the Moscow Treaty negotiated by Bush and Putin, New START includes an inspection regime. Republican opposition to the treaty was overcome by Administration guarantees that the treaty would not prevent missile defence and by \$14 billion in promised spending for renewal of the American nuclear fleet (Sheridan and Branigin, 2010).

Obama initiated a new round of negotiations to move Israelis and Palestinians towards a Middle East peace accord. He undertook a major policy review on policy towards Afghanistan which ended in a ‘splitting the difference’ compromise in late 2009. A moderate surge of US forces (30,000) was begun, but at the same time the NATO allies and Hamid Karzai began their probe for negotiations with the Taliban. A deadline for withdrawal (2011) was also stipulated. At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, allies agreed that a ramped-up training programme of the Afghan army would lead to a withdrawal of most NATO forces by 2014. Obama is trying to create favourable conditions for withdrawal by means of a negotiated arrangement between Karzai and those Taliban elements that are willing to distance themselves from al-Qaeda. At the same time, US forces have upped their unmanned aerial vehicle attacks on suspected Islamist militants in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

Barack Obama’s Presidential Style and Foreign Policy Goals

Some critics describe Barack Obama as rigidly ideological. They accuse him of taking America in the direction of European-style social democracy and of being oblivious to rapidly growing government debt. In foreign policy, Obama is criticised for being too soft on America’s enemies. Some fear that he appeases America’s enemies with naive diplomatic initiatives and generally speaks too softly and does not carry a stick (Geller and Spencer, 2010; Krauthammer, 2010).

Obama is not simply defined by ideology, however. Henry Nau observes that Obama has indeed swung the pendulum of American foreign policy away from Bush’s emphasis on values. But Nau believes that policy pragmatism and tinkering define Obama’s foreign policy more so than a new set of values from the left (2010). Obama’s Afghan strategy, for example, is a refinement of the policy inherited by the Bush Administration, with the exception of a specific date (first 2011 and now 2014) for troop withdrawal. Policy towards Iran is also a case of continuity rather than change; a move from sanctions to smarter sanctions. The same is true for North Korea, where Obama is trying to engage the North Koreans and Chinese much the same way as Bush tried to do in his second term. If

ideology does not explain much about Obama, how do we understand his foreign policy approach?

Obama is a complex personality. In his two books, he appears as an intellectually curious person with a taste for philosophical reflection. He appears sceptical of political ideologies and absolute values. Obama reveals his intellectual curiosity and philosophical bend in his first book, *Dreams from My Father*, which was published in 1995 while he was yet an unknown figure in American politics. Born to a Kenyan father who attended the University of Hawaii as a foreign student and to an American mother who grew up in Kansas and Texas, Obama records the long intellectual and emotional journey he undertook to find his identity and roots. Because Obama's life has been a journey to understanding himself, he has a genuine desire to understand others. His policy vision is one of 'political inclusiveness' (Greenstein, 2009). The notion of understanding others, including seeing the world from their perspective, is a rare feature in American presidents and helps explain Obama's near reverential treatment of foreign leaders and his willingness to listen to regimes of all stripes. In his public demeanour, Obama demonstrates an inclination for reciprocity and accommodation (Schier, 2009). This express goodwill may produce diplomatic political capital for Washington. Obama's open-mindedness also influences his decision-making process.

Reportedly, lengthy debates on policy decisions take place in the White House in which Obama plays an active role. As one account puts it, 'Mr. Obama has built a machine in which all roads lead to and from him' (Luce and Dombey, 2010). General Colin Powell, who reportedly advises Obama from time to time, commented that Obama 'thinks like a lawyer'; 'He likes to pick apart an argument' (as quoted in Kornblut and Fletcher, 2010). Obama's foreign policy circle contains a fair bit of diversity. Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton as well as his first National Security Adviser, James Jones, are seen as centrists or conservatives. Vice President Biden and American Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, Undersecretary for Policy at the Pentagon Michelle Flournoy as well as the Attorney General Eric Holder are considered more left-leaning. Obama's National Security Council (NSC) reflects his willingness to hear many viewpoints. The Homeland Security and Energy secretaries also have a seat on the Council (DeYoung, 2009). Obama's NSC includes the Treasury and Commerce Secretaries and key White House aides when the issue at hand goes beyond national security (Destler, 2009).

The picture we get is one of inclusive debate inside a big tent in which the President himself is actively involved. Obama has also appointed several ambassadors-at-large to help conduct his foreign policy in various regions such as the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan. His style resembles that of Franklin Roosevelt, who was comfortable with being the hub in a competitive circle of advisors directly reporting to him (George, 1980, p. 149). A diverse decision group and an active president increase the likelihood of an effective decision-making process (Kuperman, 2006). However, such a process also requires careful management in order not to become bogged down (Moens, 1990, p. 21). It is not clear that such management has been in place.

The Obama Administration was criticised in the fall of 2009 for taking three months to decide on a 'new' strategy in Afghanistan (Dombey, 2009, p. 10). Different options advocated by Vice President Biden and General Stanley McChrystal were aired in public, with Biden pushing for a smaller American footprint in the form of a counterterrorism rather than a counter-insurgency effort (Spiegel and Weisman, 2009). Obama did not seem worried about conflict or competition among his advisers and would not be hurried into a decision. However, given the many new policy starts made by Obama, the risk of spending too much time in decision mode is fairly high.

Perhaps the high turnover of his White House staff at the end of his first two years is a result of the difficulties of managing such a diverse and competitive decision-making process. By early 2011, Obama's top campaign adviser David Axelrod and his Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, as well as most of his economic team and his National Security Adviser, James Jones, had left the administration. It is quite likely that more order will be imposed on the process by the experienced new Chief of Staff, William Daley. Also, the current National Security Adviser, Tom Donilon, who was Jones's deputy, appears to have more interest in organising the policy process.

Obama's second book, *The Audacity of Hope* (2006), reveals another part of his political personality. This book is a call to pragmatism, a call to rediscovering the art of political compromise and coalition building. Obama's surprise decision to make Congress a genuine 'partner' in his legislative agenda on health care and green energy must be seen as an attempt to revive a coalition government between the White House and Congress. The fact that 13 Republican senators voted for Obama's New START and

that Obama in turn agreed to \$14 billion in new spending for nuclear weapon modernisation shows that he knows how to cut a deal.

Similarly, in foreign policy, Obama has shown some pragmatism. Even his speeches show this trait. His Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech is a case in point. Obama addressed the notion of just war and building a just peace, stating that 'To say that force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason' (Obama, 2009a). Some commentators on the left suggested that he was laying the groundwork for potential armed conflict with Iran, dubbing it his 'Nobel War Speech' (Kristol, 2009). Others claimed that it was a shift from his previous policy (Schmitt and Donnelly, 2009). More likely, I think, Obama appears to lay down in foreign policy what he has done in domestic politics, namely that he is a pragmatist and knows how to play the game, which may include the threat and even the actual use of force. While Obama has not yet faced a direct threat to US security, his response to North Korea's provocations towards South Korea in late 2010 have shown that he will deploy military force when other options fail. Similarly, after what seemed to many commentators a very long period of consideration and international negotiation, the Obama administration agreed to a no-fly zone over Libya in March 2011.

Obama's Early Foreign Policy Record

Obama's good words and his diplomatic efforts have set a new tone for American diplomacy and have also produced several foreign policy achievements. Obama's emphasis on international institutions, multilateral negotiations, treaties and dialogue is obviously welcome and constructive in terms of building long-term confidence in American leadership. Many of America's traditional allies in Europe, the Americas and Asia are happy with the new tone and style of American foreign policy. To some extent Obama has 'repaired' alliance relations that had been frayed during the early George W. Bush years (Rubin, 2010).

The victory scored by Republicans in the 2010 elections obscures the fact that Obama has scored several successes in foreign policy and that these have come from his diplomatic efforts. These are derived from a willingness to compromise and to pursue small gains. The New START agreement offers a principled reduction in nuclear warheads. If its inspec-

tion regime prevents Russian nuclear materials falling into rogue hands, the treaty will be a good thing. Quite possibly, the atmosphere of bilateral cooperation is spilling over towards more Russian help in restraining Iranian nuclear weapons building.

There is a growing worldwide perception that Obama's diplomacy on Iran is producing real pressure on the regime (Dubowitz, 2010). Various Wikileaks have shown that Obama assembled a wide coalition, including Russia, China and Saudi Arabia, to put concerted pressure on Tehran (Sanger et al., 2010).

Obama guided the rewrite of NATO's Strategic Concept in 2010 quite competently. While the Alliance members did not make progress on the question of burden sharing, they were able to agree on policy towards Afghanistan and on streamlining NATO as an organisation. Obama also made no objections to further capability building by the European Union in its security and defence policy. NATO agreed on a modest step forward towards missile defence after Obama cancelled Bush's earlier plans to install facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. These had caused a strong Russian reaction and in so doing had put Germany and France on edge in terms of pursuing more missile defence plans through the Atlantic Alliance.

Obama's diplomacy is quite calibrated. For example, he avoided meeting with the Dalai Lama before his state visit to China, but he also gave the green light to a \$6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan (Goodspeed, 2010). Obama is not willing to walk away from Afghanistan without some form of success (Crowley, 2009, p. 10.). Few would fault the administration for not making much headway in the talks between Israel and the Palestinians so far.

Even in the highly charged environment of popular protests against old regimes in the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011, Obama has not made any obvious faux pas, which is an accomplishment. Obama's cautious call for Hosni Mubarak to step down was finally heeded on 11 February 2011. American public diplomacy and possibly even (covert) help on the ground to give secular political parties support will be needed to keep the Muslim Brotherhood from turning the Jasmine revolution into another Islamist state in the region. On 19 March 2011 Western aircraft began enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya after a broad agreement was reached at the UN Security Council the evening prior. The last-minute effort by various Western allies, including France, Britain, America and Canada to

block Colonel Gaddafi's forces from crushing the rebels in the city of Benghazi was, as of this writing, the most assertive military action undertaken by the Obama administration. The policy showed all the signs of the Obama approach: it was long in the making, very broad in terms of international support, but also uncertain about the final objective.

The Vulnerability of Obama's Approach

Obama's foreign policy has been likened to that of Woodrow Wilson. The Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy, as explained by Walter Russell Mead (2002, p. 88 and chap. 5), emphasises negotiations, the role of international law and organisation and the values of building an international community. However, I think the evidence for this conclusion is ambiguous. Mead also notes that Obama is torn between his desire to build international commitments and his wish to reduce America's role in the world (2010). In this final section, I argue that while Obama prefers the multilateral to the unilateral mode in foreign policy, he does not provide clear direction or conviction for American foreign policy. His internationalism seems more process than purpose. His foreign policy lacks strategic focus and is so far not producing 'transformative change' (Traub, 2010).

Obama has used the phrases 'a fresh start', a 'new beginning' and a 'new day' to cover almost every issue and problem on the globe (Paris, 2009). But what comes after that? What does Obama really stand for? As mentioned above, some critics fault his administration for lacking strategic thinking, for not 'shaping' the world but merely 'fixing' it (Nau, 2010, p. 29). Are Obama's public diplomacy and diplomatic achievements enough to advance American interests? If not, what impact do they have on basic security prospects in the longer term?

I believe that Obama's chief vulnerability lies in the strategic gap that has opened between his peaceful image and diplomatic doctoring on the one hand and the long-term threats to American security interests and values on the other.

George W. Bush's policies in his first term were too unilateralist and too focused on hard power. Arguably, Bush used military power as his chief tool in the Global War on Terror at the expense of other tools such as public diplomacy, psychological operations and covert political warfare. In the

early days of the Cold War, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations employed soft tools effectively against Communism (Gregg, 2010).

Under Obama's first two years, the pendulum has swung far the other way. Diplomacy and soft power appear to be the only tools in Obama's kit and an overall vision of American security is lacking. For example, the Putin-Medvedev regime is distinctly different from that of Gorbachev or Yeltsin. Moscow is again seeking to gain maximum leverage over its so-called near abroad. On top of that, Moscow is re-establishing a strict authoritarian regime, pushing hard against the Western influence of democracy and market economies. To be sure, Obama needs Moscow in order to secure a supply route to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and to tighten sanctions against Iran. However, Obama should not simply hit the reset button when it comes to NATO's dealing with Russia – as allies appeared to have done at the 2010 Lisbon Summit – but should instead exert pressure to have NATO and EU influence continue to push eastward. Ukraine is a difficult case, but letting it drift back into a stronger Russian sphere of influence is not in America's interest. The risk that Moscow will exploit Obama's perceived weakness is growing.

Another example of Obama's vulnerability is found in his handling of Iran and the Israeli–Palestinian question. Few expect that Obama's smart sanctions will cause Iran to change course and refrain from building nuclear weapons. That raises the question of whether Obama's constructive approach to Iran has inadvertently weakened the Green Revolution in that country.

Given the electoral debacle of Hamas taking control of Gaza and the massive arms build-up by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the formula of 'land for peace' is diminishing as an Israeli option. Talks reached a stalemate by December 2010. Yet the main point Obama has pursued in the negotiations is more Israeli concessions. With Egypt's political future uncertain after Mubarak's departure in early 2011, it is not likely that Israel could even consider handing over control of the West Bank.

Obama's emphasis on a diplomatic outcome in Afghanistan and his insistence on 'a date certain' to withdraw American and ISAF forces makes US policy unnecessarily weak in that region. Instead, Obama should stress that hard objectives in terms of governmental stability and general security will determine Western policy.

The lack of clear strategic and security interests on Obama's part makes American policy vulnerable. Obama's unbalanced approach is explained perhaps by his view that understanding plus compromise makes the best policy. As I have argued above, these two pillars are the core of Obama's political personality, as also expressed in his two biographies, and explain his overall approach in domestic and foreign policy.

The problem with Obama's approach is that it undervalues the importance of an overall strategy and the role of American hard power. What is lacking is the tier of 'peace through strength'. Obama's diplomatic approach comes at a time when the US economy is struggling and when US fiscal policy is quite vulnerable as well. Obama's 2011 budget forecasts a federal budget deficit of \$1.6 trillion and predicts that government debt will grow to over 70% of GDP by 2015 (Edwards, 2011). In order for Obama to rebalance American foreign policy, it is necessary that he shift his domestic policies to secure a better fiscal and economic footing for the nation. Arguably, the first step Obama should take in order to start rebalancing American foreign policy is to address the chronic federal budget problem.

When Obama took office, America's fiscal balance sheet was already in distress. Large outlays for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and new entitlement programmes such as the prescription drug benefit (Medicare Part D) pushed the Bush budget deep into negative territory. This large federal budget deficit was sent through the ceiling by Obama's stimulus spending and various other domestic outlays. The fiscal imbalance is fuelling economic uncertainty and anaemic growth. The spread between federal revenues and expenditures in 2011 has become alarmingly large (10% of GDP). Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has said that economic growth alone cannot close the gap in projected revenues and spending in the next 10 years, which will still be near \$1 trillion in 2020 (Congressional Budget Office, 2010b).

As a result of the rise of China, India and other large emerging economies, the US is losing influence in relative terms in international affairs. The US does not have as central a role in world politics as it did during the Clinton years; its 'unipolar moment' has ended (Krauthammer, 1990/1). Asia's economic strength as well as the build-up of regional military capacity by both China and India necessitate more than American diplomacy. Obama's diplomatic approach has left the US with an anaemic military strategy. Both Russia and China need to realise that Obama's diplomacy is

not based on weakness. Islamists need to know that Obama has not abandoned the global struggle against jihadist terrorism. American fiscal and economic recovery is needed to provide both the economic and military clout to give its values and interest the needed weight.

The 2010 National Security Strategy calls for 'national renewal and global leadership'. But the document points only to multilateral means to enhance American influence (DeYoung, 2010). Similarly, Obama's defence policy has been void of overall vision. Obama's first defence budget was a continuation of the shift in military strategy from heavy conventional forces to counter-insurgency begun several years earlier. However, Obama's 2011 defence budget includes serious cuts in personnel (army and marines), contrary to his campaign call for 'revitalizing the military' by expanding 'our ground forces by adding 65,000 soldiers to the army and 27,000 marines'. (Harrison, 2009; Obama, 2007, p. 4).

Obama's nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policies are an attempt to get the world back to following a common regime. Perhaps for that reason, he sought the New START agreement to persuade others that the great powers are serious about moving towards nuclear disarmament. With that goodwill, he is trying to augment the non-proliferation and nuclear-test-ban regime in general.

However, stopping nuclear proliferation and turning rogue regimes into legitimate international players will take more than returning to the ideals of the 1960s and '70s, when the nuclear test ban and non-proliferation regimes were negotiated. What the Obama team appears to overlook is that the structure and logic of the international regime of non-proliferation and arms control was already broken before George W. Bush took office. The growing concern about rogue regimes, as identified during the Clinton years, is a function of non-compliance and cheating for which none of the existing treaties have an answer. New START will not persuade North Korea or Iran to temper their nuclear agendas. At the same time, the pace and nature of the Chinese arms build-up is not captured by current treaties. Arguably, the US needs to start thinking about arms control treaties with China before an all-out arms race or alliance competition emerges in Asia.

Chinese officials and academics have been insisting that China is merely a regional power and that it has no political or security interests beyond simply wanting to prosper. Beijing has proclaimed its growth as 'a peaceful rise' (Feng, 2009, p. 37). But if so, it would be the first great power in

history with such modest interests. The Obama Administration simply cannot accept this Chinese position and should seek to bring more transparency to Chinese foreign policy objectives. What principles does it propose to pursue? Does it want alliances to secure its political and security interests? Does it want a league of autocracies to stave off democratising influences (Kagan, 2009)? What does it see as threats? What does China have to offer to the rest of the world?

Obama's lack of strategy also leaves the US vulnerable in the Middle East. Islamist factions in the Middle East need to know that the model of American democracy and capitalism is still strong, both in terms of setting an ideal for freedom and in terms of being able to oppose any Islamist regime that wants to pursue a foreign policy hostile to the US.

Militant Islam as a radicalising grass-roots ideology is a direct challenge to democracy movements in the Middle East. The anti-democratic dogmas of Islamism are causing changes below the level of state governments in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. They are preparing the groundwork for taking over government. Democratic rights and minority rights, including for Christians, need stronger support from the US. Moderate Muslims and secular political parties are facing increasing pressure to conform to militant Islamist doctrine.

Three years into his first term, Obama's foreign policy is still characterised by a sense of tentativeness and indirection. To his credit, Obama has avoided major gaffes and has been able to restore respect for American diplomacy among allies and friends. The uncertainty that remains, however, is that neither friend nor foe can gauge the President's commitment or conviction. Some are awaiting more 'assertive multilateralism' on the part of Obama (de Vasconcelos, 2009, p. 11). Others may interpret his diplomatic emphasis as weakness. To lessen this vulnerability, Obama needs to align his diplomacy with a stronger articulation of America's vital security interests.

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Global Atlanticism: Transatlantic Relations and the Global Shift

Stephen F. Szabo

The End of the Western Era

Globalisation has brought great challenges to the Western-centric system which has dominated politics for the last three hundred years. The transatlantic region faces the prospect of becoming a smaller and less powerful player in the world system by the middle of this century. A relative decline has already begun in demographic terms: less than 3% of world population growth over the next 20 years will be in the West. In addition to demographic decline, many scenario exercises and policy planning reports foresee a relative decline of Western economic influence over the next half century.¹ Non-Western emerging market countries already hold 75% of the world's foreign exchange reserves and, prior to the onset of the global economic crisis, Goldman Sachs had predicted that by 2040 five emerging market countries (China, Russia, Mexico, India and Brazil) will have a larger output than the G-7 countries. China passed Germany to become the third-largest economy in the world at the end of 2008. In 2010 it passed Japan and now ranks second, behind only the United States. The rise of powers such as Russia, China and India may be ushering in an era of global pluralism in which power is decentralised and the transatlantic community risks becoming less relevant. As the French strategist François Heisbourg has written, '[G]lobalization is being de-westernized, increasingly driven by the rise of Asia, limiting the Atlantic world's ability to write the rules' (2008, p. 11).

¹ See for example the report of the US National Intelligence Council (2008), which predicts that the world is entering a global multipolar system for the first time in human history.

This dispersion of power raises the prospect of global institutional sclerosis in a system in which no one power or group of powers will agree on a common approach to pressing global issues or have the legitimacy to lead. As the American columnist David Brooks has noted, in this prospective global system, small numbers of states will be able to block progress because of national interests and perspectives (Brooks, 2008). This view is shared by projections of the National Intelligence Council in the US and by the EU Institute for Security Studies and other think tanks and intellectuals.² Some indicators of this potential gridlock include

- the collapse of the Doha round on trade liberalisation;
- the difficulties facing the shaping of a post-Kyoto climate change regime;
- the stalemate over sanctions against Zimbabwe, Sudan and Iran, and the broader problems associated with reforming global institutions;
- the inability to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and specifically with the challenge posed by a nuclear Iran; and
- the weakening of major international institutions like the United Nations, World Bank and IMF.

As the core Western community faces the rise of this new global system, be it multipolar or nonpolar, it faces some important strategic challenges (Haass, 2008, pp. 44–56). The current global system still reflects many aspects of the distribution of power which existed at the end of the Second World War. Any new system will mean a relative reduction of Western power, especially of European representation in a number of global institutions. The G-20 organisation set up to deal with the new global financial crisis was widely seen as a harbinger of this new order and of the relative decline of the West. Will these trends reshape an Atlantic community capable of dealing with these challenges, or will the West rather begin to fragment and compete against itself, as individual Western countries pursue policies designed to protect national or regional interests at the cost of transatlantic or European concerns? Will Europe, America and the rest of the West continue to regard themselves as part of a Western community of values when confronted with the rise of non-Western values and neo-authoritarian states? (Kagan, 2008) Will the splits which first

² See for example Gnesotto and Grevi (2007), Zakaria (2008) and Steingart (2008); for a sceptical view on the rise of Asia, see Joshua Kurlantzick (2008, p. B3).

emerged over the Iraq war and then reemerged over policy towards Russia lead to two or more Wests?

The West Still Exists

The contemporary concept of the West and of Atlanticism is a product of the Cold War era. The struggle with the Soviet Union was both geopolitical and ideological, and Atlanticism was born from this struggle. The United States rediscovered its European roots and overcame its aversion to being involved in the European balance of power during this period, and came to regard itself as a European power for the first time in its history.³ While this reorientation of American policy was based on a realistic assessment of national interest, it also had a strong cultural component. After the experience of Fascism and Communism and the war fought to defeat the former, Americans came to realise that not only national security but a way of life was at stake. Europeans also overcame their aversion to American culture, its economic and social experience and their deep-seated sense of superiority based on a longer historical and cultural history and came to accept the idea of an Atlantic community. NATO became an alliance both of interests and of values.

At the end of the Cold War, many realists in both America and Europe began to argue that the two sides would begin to separate because the security threat they faced from the Soviet Union had disappeared. While there is a good deal of truth to this assessment, it underestimates what international relations scholars refer to as a 'pluralistic security community'.⁴ This idea of a security community 'can be said to exist when a group of people believe that social problems can be resolved through peaceful change', as Jeffrey Kopstein puts it. 'Americans and Europeans not only needed to be friends but also wanted to be friends' (Kopstein, 2009, p. 367). If the Atlantic Alliance is a security community rather than simply a traditional security alliance, the prospects for its survival beyond the weakening of security interests are strong. In any case, it is important to look at both the interest and value dimensions of the relationship in the context of the emerging new global order.

³ See for example Holbrooke (1995) and Daalder (2003), Kopstein (2009).

⁴ See for example, Anderson et al. (2008, p. 6).

Recent polling shows that there is still a substantial consensus in both Europe and America that both sides face common challenges and threats, and that a close EU–US relationship remains essential in dealing with them. Polling by Gallup in the summer of 2010 found that 47% believed that global challenges would strengthen transatlantic relations while only 16% thought they would weaken the relationship (Manchin, 2010). The main challenges cited by Europeans in both the Gallup Poll and the 2010 *Transatlantic Trends*, an annual survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, were the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fighting international terrorism, global climate change, the financial meltdown, resource scarcity, cultural and religious conflicts and overpopulation and migration. Americans tended to list the same challenges, although climate change was a decidedly lower priority than for Europeans. Both surveys underline strong support for both strong American leadership and a stronger EU. Support for NATO is weaker and seems to be diminishing, its decline being accelerated because of weak public support for the war in Afghanistan (The German Marshall Fund, 2010). The interest dimension remains important, therefore, but the decline of the old security challenges has meant a shift away from NATO as the transatlantic institution central to the US–European relationship.

The West as a Community of Values

Despite the continuing manifestations of anti-Americanism in Europe and, to a lesser degree, anti-Europeanism in the United States, there is also a good deal of polling data indicating a continuing and robust transatlantic value community. The German Marshall Fund's 2010 *Transatlantic Trends* found that 77% of Americans and 67% of Europeans polled felt that the US and the EU have common values. When looking at China, only about 30% of Europeans polled believed that Europe and China have enough common values to be able to cooperate on international affairs, while 63% felt they did not. In contrast, 55% of Americans held the more positive view on common values with China as compared to 45% who did not. However, Americans were more likely to see China as a military threat (48%) than were Europeans (32%). Both sides of the Atlantic have a negative view of China's role in managing regional conflicts and in combating climate change. Both sides tended slightly more towards viewing

China as an economic threat than as an opportunity for markets and investment. In comparison, India has a more positive image in both Europe and the United States than does China. However, the American public takes China and India more seriously as rising powers than do the publics in Europe and are more likely to see common interests with these two than do Europeans. This indicates a more realistic great power view in the US than in Europe and could become a fissure point in the future as Americans take the rise of Asia more seriously than a more regionally oriented Europe does, continuing an interest-driven shift towards Asia.

While a transatlantic value community continues to exist and to provide the foundation of the security community, there remain important cultural differences and contrasts in the hierarchy of values. The main areas of divergence are centred around different varieties of capitalism, religion and strategic cultures. This has resulted in two types of thinking about exceptionalism. American exceptionalism has been a feature of American foreign policy since the founding of the American republic. It is associated with the idea of America as a new form of society which serves as a beacon for the rest of the world in terms of liberty, individualism and freedom from religious and ethnic persecution. The linking of this sense of exceptionalism with American foreign policy has always been sceptically viewed in Europe. Charles de Gaulle, for example, noted that American exceptionalism was a veil for domination. More recently, Europeans have seen this exceptionalism linked to nationalism, an aggressive form of evangelical Christianity, unilateralism and the all-too-easy resort to the use of force justified by lofty ideals.

This was countered by a view of European exceptionalism, most starkly argued by Habermas and Derrida, but also by European leaders who have seen the European postmodern, soft-power model as the best one for the twenty-first century world of globalisation (Habermas and Derrida, 2003). Given what many Europeans have seen as the declining efficacy of the use of military force and of unilateralism, and given the pervasive secularisation of many European societies, a major gap between utopias seemed to be emerging during the first decade of this century, especially during the George W. Bush administration's years in office. The election of Barack Obama has provided a test of how deep and lasting this gap could prove to be. While it is too soon to offer a conclusive judgment, there is abundant evidence that the gap in strategic cultures has narrowed since Obama took office, and American and European leaders are now talking the same lan-

guage on many strategic issues. Both sides have had their arrogance and confidence tempered in the last years of the new century's first decade.

The European social and economic model continues to diverge in many ways from the American one. This is a long-standing difference. In his history of the formation of the Atlantic Alliance in the immediate post-Second World War period, Alfred Grosser wrote that 'from the European perspective, ideology and reality in the United States continued to subscribe to a liberalism which appeared to guarantee the power of the stronger and the impotence of the weaker' (1982, p. 53). The current financial crisis is seen in Europe as largely originating from American excess and has strengthened the impetus to increase international financial regulation. Although this has also occurred in the United States, the degree of proposed regulation is less comprehensive. These cultural and policy differences will remain but should not obscure the deep economic transatlantic relationship. Europe remains the largest foreign investor, employer and trading partner in the US, and Europe is the biggest foreign market for the US. The American investment stake in Europe is four times that of its stake in Asia (Hamilton and Quinlan, 2010). While there will always be frictions and differences in approaches to economic issues, as there were at the G-20 meetings in Toronto and Seoul in 2010, the challenges posed by the rise of China, India and other non-Western countries are more likely to lead to a convergence of approaches rather than a competition which will divide the West. Neither part of the West can effectively cope with the threat posed by cheap labour and the sometimes poor production quality in China and elsewhere, and both sides are beginning to see the need to protect their markets against the unequal conditions and terms of trade, investment, ownership and intellectual property rights.

In the realm of political culture, the West is beginning to see China, Russia and other emerging powers as not sharing its commitment to open societies. The idea that China will become a 'responsible shareholder' in the global system, to use Robert Zoellick's phrase, has taken a beating since the Copenhagen Climate Conference in late 2009. Assumptions that modernisation and globalisation will produce more democratic polities have also been shaken by the Chinese and Singaporean experiences. As the third wave of democratisation has seemed to have peaked early in this century, Western optimism about the inevitable development of democracy along with the pressures of globalisation to open markets has been shaken. Although optimism about the state of democracy in the West has been

shaken by the economic and financial crisis and the rise of extreme right-wing populism, the West still sees itself as a collection of pluralistic and open societies. Western leaders and their publics also continue to believe that democracies are more likely to follow peaceful foreign policies than are non-democratic systems. The democratic revolutions in the Middle East may revive confidence in the future of democracy, depending on how they evolve.

The relentless and well-thought-out strategy of China, Russia and others for using and acquiring natural resources to enhance national power, with little regard for human rights and democratic structures, has only strengthened this 'we feeling' in the transatlantic community.

Prospects for Global Atlanticism

In remarks to the Brussels Forum of the German Marshall Fund on 26 March 2010, European Commission President José Manuel Durão Barroso called for a new transatlantic partnership. He confronted the challenge of the new global system:

Some argue that with the rise of new powers, the transatlantic relationship has become less important and should just be one normal partnership among many. Let's call it the 'multipolarist argument'.

Barroso cogently refuted this on the basis of both common values and interests:

I think that view is misguided, because it ignores the importance of shared values. Values do matter. They aren't just abstract ideas; they are the foundation of our constitutional orders. They guide our political behaviour. They justify our political reforms. They shape our political discourses. They should guide our foreign policy. Values are also influential in defining our interests. Some people separate, if not oppose, values and interests. That is a mistake. Interests are not defined in a normative vacuum. On the contrary, the formulation of political interests is infused by our values, whether we are aware of it or not. (Barroso, 2010)

Only a few months later, Barroso complained that the US–Europe relationship was not living up to its potential and that the new era in the White House was in danger of becoming a missed opportunity for Europe (*The Times*, 2010). His concern reflected feelings of a deep rift fueled by the continuing financial crisis and differences between the

American and European approaches to fiscal policy, the fractious G-20 summit in Toronto and a view in Washington that the Lisbon Treaty over a more effective EU role in the world. Ever the realist, Obama cancelled his participation in the US–EU summit scheduled for May 2010 in Madrid and has made it clear that he would not waste his time in meetings with the Europeans which seem to exalt process over substantial policy results.

In spite of all these ups and downs, Barroso is right that the multipolarist argument is wrong if it implies a diminution of the transatlantic relationship. The prospects for a new global Atlanticism are realistic and should be actively pursued on both sides. Why?

First, the interest dimension remains important. The new vulnerabilities of the West will continue to act as a centripetal force. While the old security relationship based on Europe and NATO will continue to fade, the need to protect both American and European homelands from new threats is growing, and the two sides have responded with closer cooperation on a host of counter-terrorism measures. This form of cooperation goes far beyond the traditional military relationship to include police, intelligence, finance ministries, civil aviation, health and a host of other issues and institutions. Energy security and climate policy will demand closer cooperation as well, as Russia, China and other powers aggressively attempt to secure natural resources in a mercantilist strategy aimed at the West. The EU and the US are united on sanctions against Iran and are working together on the Middle East more broadly, while China and Russia remain obstacles to effective multilateral action. As Commission President Barroso stated, the interest-value nexus remains, albeit in a global as opposed to a regional setting.

While this foundation exists for a new global Atlanticism, the problem of effectiveness continues. The old form of Atlanticism was one based on American predominance and leadership. John F. Kennedy's call for a two-pillar Atlantic alliance was never realised. Today it is essential. The strain on American resources and will and the realisation that unilateralism does not work and undermines American soft power and legitimacy has created an openness on the American side to a balanced relationship with Europe. However, Europe has not responded as fully as it should have, and lack of coherence and will has been a primary reason for the unfulfilled potential of transatlantic relations criticised by President Barroso.

While the prospects for strong partnership from Europe appear weak in the short term, there is still reason to believe that the EU will continue to grow into a significant actor in the medium term. And it is the EU which will form the European pillar of the new global Atlantic partnership, not NATO. The Lisbon Treaty will lead to an incremental but real growth in the EU's foreign policy capacity, especially as the new External Action Service takes shape. It will allow for a productive division of labour within Europe, so that each region will be able to make use of its networks and expertise for the benefit of the larger Union. The enlargement of the EU is largely finished and the EU will develop its institutions unburdened by the demands of further major expansion. Europe is now close to the point that the United States reached by the end of the nineteenth century, when its 'manifest destiny' of expansion had reached its limits. Ukraine, Russia and, possibly, Turkey will remain outside of the EU but with close ties to it, one hopes. Europe will be forced to take on greater responsibilities for security in its region as the US shifts its main strategic concerns to Asia. Europe will face major challenges to its dynamism from its difficult demographic situation and will need to continue to remain competitive in the global marketplace, but the prospect will be for the development of a closer transatlantic economic area as a major pillar of the new global economic order.

Unlike the Atlanticism of the Cold War era, this new Atlanticism is taking place in a global context. It will not be limited to Europe. It will have to operate in a truly global system in which the West is a necessary but not sufficient player. Sanctions against Iran, for example, will not succeed if they are only Western ones, but the Western core is an essential precondition. The UN sanction regime was built upon the more extensive Western sanction regime. The same holds on climate change, energy security and international financial reform. The West can and should form the core and build out to an expanding circle. The emerging powers of the twenty-first century have one thing in common, which is that they are emerging and will have a larger relative degree of power in the future. They will not, however, be able to form a consistent core similar to that of the West. Brazil, Russia, India, China (the so-called BRIC countries), Turkey and others do not share interests or values. Many of them, most importantly China, do not seem to have the will to play a role in global governance, have limited soft power appeal and lack natural allies. Russia has few allies or appeal beyond its borders. India and China are rivals rather than partners. Brazil has its own agenda as well. The key BRIC countries are not an alliance and

will not become one given the national rivalries which divide them.⁵ A unified West, rather than creating an incentive for a counter-coalition of BRICs, will instead provide the core of the new global order. The alternative to no Western core is a nonpolar system and a lack of direction which will dampen hopes for global governance.

It is up to the West to shape a new global system which will expand the one it has created over the past centuries. The institutions of global governance which exist today were created at the end of the Second World War and to a large extent reflect the power balances of that period. The new institutions and networks will have to reflect the new power balances of this century. This means a readjustment, which will be painful for those European nations, especially Britain and France, which were given important roles in the Bretton Woods institutions, and Italy and Canada, whose G-7 roles have already diminished. The only effective solution is to create European seats on the UN Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank and other institutions to reflect the new power balances. Otherwise, Europe will continue to punch below its weight and the United States will not have the effective European partner it needs.

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The Quest for the Holy Grail: Europe's Global Strategy

Kostas Ifantis and Ioannis Galariotis

Introduction

The end of the twenty-first century's first decade has come with seismic force in international politics. Almost 20 years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent turbulence in the foundations of world order, a new systemic crisis has arisen that will restructure the political economy of international relations. Unleashed during the summer of 2008, the collapse of the US housing market provoked a global economic recession that implicitly and explicitly threatens the stability of the world economy for years to come. The return of 'depression economics' (Krugman, 2009) has established a new world order wherein international politics seems to be defined more by 'pure' economic factors rather than by political or strategic issues. Clearly, contemporary international challenges are multidimensional and complex. Even if we set aside the inexorable implications of the global economic crisis for world politics, the contemporary world is an uncertain place to live. Terrorism, organised crime and unregulated immigration as well as climate change and a continuous increase in poverty create an explosive state of affairs, which does not help the political stability of the international system.

For many, it is (once more) time for Europe to speak with a single voice in world politics. Certainly the EU is one of the most unusual political actors in the international system. Is it, however, a truly global actor, or is it just a major regional economic power with ambitions that will rarely be fulfilled? Although Europeans like to describe the EU as 'inevitably a global player' (European Security Strategy, 2003), contemporary history hardly testifies to the EU's ability to be at the forefront of global affairs. The tragedy in the Balkans and the war in Iraq have been cases in point.

The 1990s academic motto about the ‘expectations–capability gap’ reflects accurately Europe’s scorecard in the global arena. Even in the first years of the twenty-first century, these trends seem to continue unabated.

The conundrum of today’s world calls without doubt for a new global governance mode in order to find global solutions to global and regional problems. In an international system where balance of power politics is still the toolkit for global engagement, Europe’s role is viewed as a grand strategic imperative. The question remains, however, whether Europe can emerge as a true global power. Or will China, Russia and other rising powers such as India emerge in a more powerful fashion? What is the future of transatlantic relations? Europe’s main priorities, its world perspectives and policies of engagement are discussed in this chapter.

Europe’s (Soft) Power and Multilateralism

In contrast to the traditional concept of global power, which advertises military capabilities as well as economic power to pursue diplomatic goals and undertakings, the power of Europe in the world is seen to be based on five core norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These normative aspects represent the milestones that have identified Europe as a legitimate actor in world politics and a source of a unique power of attraction, what Nye has called ‘soft power’. In this sense, the main priority of the EU as a global actor is to retain its civilian character in global affairs by advancing peacekeeping operations, facilitating conflict-prevention missions and promoting a multilateral framework for negotiations as the art of sustaining peace and stability around the world.

Soft power, however, means nothing if it is not backed up by the EU’s ability to advance as an agent of hard power. Robert Cooper has been quite clear in arguing that ‘hard power begets soft power’ (2004, p. 176). Hard power does not necessarily mean that Europe would resort to military means to ensure peace and stability, only that it has the capability and has developed a shared understanding of its power potential. Without a doubt, the EU cannot compete with the US militarily, at least in quantitative terms. But in other critical policy domains the EU sustains global power and it applies this power quite effectively. In environmental issues the EU has led the debate globally, while in the economic realm it is at least on equal footing with the US. Also, its collective presence in the international

arena is nothing less than impressive by virtue of its large global network of diplomatic representation. Overall, while the EU is not a full-fledged strategic actor, it is a most important power pole in international affairs and affects the workings of the system. In the late 1990s, Rosecrance argued that the EU's strength is that it can reverse the international balance of power (1998, p. 16). Rather than causing other actors to counterbalance it, the EU has an enormous power of attraction through the unique nature of its regional cooperation. Rosecrance concluded that because of its economic strength, which generates partnerships, political unity may not even be needed for the EU to have a major effect in international politics (p. 19). For Kupchan, the EU does not have to acquire superpower status with global interests and commitments to affect the polarity of the international system (2003, p. 211).

At the same time, it is hard for anyone to disagree with the notion that the EU has not really pulled its act together and that it needs to sharpen its presence in multilateral fora. If we look at how the Europeans handled the ascent of the G-20 in 2009, the unavoidable conclusion is that there was a clear lack of strategic approach. According to Gowan,

there was poor coordination between the UK and Italy over hosting the G20 and G8 in the first half of 2009. After the G8 summit, Nicolas Sarkozy began talking about the need for an intermediate G14, whereas Angela Merkel appeared to believe the G20 was now the only viable option. Since then, Eurogroup president Jean-Claude Juncker has put up a rearguard action in defence of the old G7, although he also wants a seat in the G20. A clear EU vision on the future of these forums remains absent. (Gowan, 2010, p. 4)

In short, while Europe is in a strong position to help build a multilateral world order, it must first agree internally on how to do it. And this cannot but be evident in the realm of the EU's external relations.

The academic and policy discourse on multilateralism is immense and diverse. Multilateralism is defined in many ways, but common to all descriptions are the importance of rules, institutionalised cooperation and inclusiveness. Demand for multilateralism increases as new international challenges arise. Globalisation connects the world in ways both positive and negative. Trade, capital, ideas, people, technology, information, diseases and crime all flow more freely. Patterns of interaction between world regions are changing. New powers are rising. Alternative development paths and models of capitalism are being debated. International terrorist

networks constitute a profound security challenge. New sources of conflict over global warming, migration and resource scarcity are emerging.

The EU has already developed certain principles of ‘effective multilateralism’ as elaborated in the European Security Strategy of 2003. It claims actively to promote multilateralism with all its policies, especially those with an external focus. ‘Effective multilateralism’ is often seen as the natural and inevitable foreign policy option of the EU. However, despite the general acceptance of multilateralism in Europe, the numerous views that exist on multilateralism make this unlikely. Rather, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, formulators of European foreign policy used the positive connotations of multilateralism to create a strategic concept that can unite the different European views on multilateralism under a single umbrella. Their aim was to promote and enhance (a) internal cohesion within the EU, (b) strategic coherence regarding European means and ends and (c) legitimacy for the EU’s international actions. The truth, however, is that the EU has yet to develop a coherent doctrine of multilateralism: a common point of reference about the rules that can guide the construction of multilateral solutions. And this is evident both in the realm of transatlantic relations as well as in the European policies of engaging China, Russia and India.

A Benchmark for Transatlantic Relations

During the 2000s, the transatlantic partnership found itself in a crisis that reached beyond the Iraq conflict. Differing perceptions of threat, diverging interpretations of the role of multilateral organisations and areas of tension in economic arenas presented grave challenges to the transatlantic relationship. In such an environment the question is: Do transatlantic relations still matter? This is a query all the more important as Europeans have been questioning US President Obama’s commitment to the transatlantic relationship and Americans have been questioning the relevance of Europe in the twenty-first century.

In Europe, the election of Barack Obama did wonders for the image of the US, which had been tarnished especially under the presidency of George W. Bush. More than two years into his presidency, Obama still benefits from a prolonged honeymoon period in most of Europe, much more so than he does at home. Yet at the same time, many Europeans feel they have been neglected by Obama. A series of public snubs and dis-

appointments, such as Obama's absence at the Berlin Wall celebration in November 2009, his skipping the US–EU summit in May 2010 and the failure of the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009 have reinforced many European assessments that point to an Administration that no longer believes in the relevance of Europe. The truth, or at least part of it, is that when Obama assumed his duties, the EU was not fully ready to respond to the American return to multilateral strategies, and this resulted in disappointment in Washington.

On the American side, the importance of the transatlantic economic relationship is obvious, and so is the feeling that Americans and Europeans are part of the same political and economic family. However, the nagging European fear that Europe is no longer the source of or solution to the world's problems seems to have been confirmed by American actions. In trade, the US has all but given up on a meaningful multilateral agreement and is instead focusing its efforts on a multitude of bilateral deals in which Europe is not a party. In foreign policy, the US is concerned about advancing and in some cases restoring its relations with Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China, and the transatlantic relationship seems increasingly irrelevant, especially as long as the Europeans cannot get their house in order and speak with a single voice. So do transatlantic relations still matter? The answer can by no means be unidimensional. Transatlantic relations still matter but not as much as they used to, in large part because of the inability and unwillingness of the EU and key European players to act or think strategically vis-à-vis the outside world (Meunier, 2010, p. 16). The world has changed, but the transatlantic partners have not fully adapted. According to Meunier,

the evolution of NATO is a case in point: nobody would invent it today if it did not already exist. It is not clear what purpose it fulfills, what security dilemma it responds to, or how it surpasses other, competing international security fora. Whereas the Americans pushed hard for EU and NATO expansion, a policy that ran through both Clinton's and Bush's presidencies, this now appears to have been taken off the table. Instead we now have the realist 'reset' with Russia. (Meunier, 2010, p. 16)

The reset, undertaken in the hopes of eliciting cooperation on Iran, entailed the end of missile defence installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, the abandonment of the push to expand NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia, some sort of deal not to make waves regarding Russian meddling in Kyrgyzstan and an acquiescence in Europe's tacit decision to

suspend or slow down EU enlargement to Turkey and other destinations on the new European periphery. This means that while transatlantic security relations may not matter as much to the traditional transatlantic allies, it is true that their impact on those traditionally outside the European context remains profound.

At the same time, when it comes to globalisation, both pillars of the transatlantic relationship display a remarkable convergence of interests and objectives, mostly because their economies are so interdependent, being each other's main economic partner. There is the undisputed fact that the European market is five times larger for the US than the Chinese market is, and 56% of total American investments are currently in Europe (Meunier, 2010, p. 16). This interdependence and the enduring commonality of their social and economic interests lead Europe and the US to be crucial anchors of global economic governance, whether in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or in the G-20.

The transatlantic relationship is also crucial for dealing with a changing strategic environment because it is Europe, not China or India, that will be the second global superpower, in both military and civilian terms, for most of the twenty-first century. This is already true today, though few people, including Europeans, realise it. 'Excessive pessimism about Europe's decline stems in part from a tendency to focus on headline-grabbing problems, such as those that often dominate the US–China relationship, rather than stable and incremental cooperation, such as dominates the US–European relationship' (Meunier, 2010, p. 16). It is certainly not wrong to concede that most twenty-first century global problems can be managed mostly by using 'civilian' power, which rests on high per capita income, high technology, international institutions, a robust civil society, close alliances with influential actors, and attractive social and political values. By this measure, Europe is the world's second superpower. Active global power projection is increasingly a luxury good available only to those states with high per capita incomes – which is why China and India do so little of it. Even in the military area, Europe, with 21% of the world's military spending, has 100,000 troops active in global combat situations, compared with China or India, with 4% and 3% of global military spending, respectively, and a couple of thousand troops abroad each. Hence the endless debates about institutionalising, centralising and strengthening European foreign policy as preconditions for the exercise of Euro-power are beside the point:

power does not need to be centralised to be useable in the networked world of the twenty-first century.

Whether Europe has been weakened by its successive difficulties, from the constitutional debate to the debt crisis, or whether Europe does not get enough credit for being an actual superpower, what is indubitable is that it is in need of a new narrative in order to be taken seriously. Until then, transatlantic relations may not seem as attractive to the US as they used to. Yet with the rise of new global and regional powers, it increasingly seems that Europe and the US are in the same boat when it comes to today's challenges. To manage these challenges successfully, transatlantic relations need a new mindset based on the premise that a multipolar world is already with us and affects foreign policy options and consequently, the ability of both the US and the EU to shape international politics. To that end, a new transatlantic agenda must be crafted that reflects both the new global realities and the political realities in Europe and the US. This will not be an easy task. In the absence of a defining and bonding threat like the one during the Cold War, every act of solidarity and policy convergence will be subject to negotiation (Larrabee and Lindley-French, 2008, p. 17). Above all, the US should demonstrate that it is more open and sensitive to the views and influence of its European partners, and in return, Europe needs to develop a more global view, not only in terms of its ability to engage in security situations around the world but also in terms of the many political and economic issues that constitute the crux of contemporary security challenges. Becoming a fully fledged strategic actor requires identifying specific EU interests and defining concrete objectives and priorities in order to effectively direct resources and policies. Thus, the EU must proactively engage the US, abandoning its usual reactive stance that enhances the perception of EU's irrelevance in Washington.

The Middle East and Iran are cases in point. Describing the role of the EU in the Middle East is not an easy task. And this results from the fact that the Middle East conflict is not a specific problem but a multidimensional and interregional challenge. For more than five decades, the Middle East has been bedevilled by various seeds of conflict. The classic Arab-Israeli conflict is the base from which other clashes emerge and are successively implanted. The war in Iraq exacerbated the situation even more, and its implications have not yet been thoroughly accounted for. For some, the US unilateralist policy in the Gulf did little to defeat Islamic terrorism while widening the gap between East and West. In this damaged land-

scape, the EU has to play a double role: it must cooperate with the US in order to promote multilateralism in the wider region, and it must establish a new regional policy based on its founding norms of democracy and peace in the Middle East.

However, Europe's record has been more than depressing so far. It is widely acknowledged that the US has the upper hand in the Middle East and Europe can be only deemed a follower. This means that its strategy is dependent on US strategy. According to Dunne, 'under the Obama administration, the US has moved closer to European positions on the Arab–Israeli peace process and the promotion of democracy and human rights in the Middle East, at least at the level of rhetoric' (2010, p. 1). It is true that Barack Obama's arrival heralded an unprecedented convergence of US and EU positions on conflict resolution. Obama signalled his commitment to achieving a 'two-state' solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict early on. Unlike Bush, whose 'vision' of a two-state solution was an aspiration, Obama was unequivocal, and he laid out the requirements for all parties for serious negotiations to begin. Europe's espousal of the two-state goal has been explicit for years. Irrespective of the parties' views of the conflict, Europeans have consistently used international law as their central reference point. By contrast, the US has placed more emphasis on finding agreement between the parties themselves.

The appointment of Senator George Mitchell as US envoy to the Middle East confirmed Washington's wish for direct meaningful negotiations to restart, and the administration's clearer position on the need to freeze construction in Israeli West Bank settlements was definitely more in keeping with European positions. 'Moreover, the new US willingness to engage Syria and attempt to woo it away from the Iran/Hezbollah/Hamas camp has been consonant with European views' (Dunne, 2010, p. 2). Regarding democracy and human rights in the Middle East, the Obama Administration's approach of 'mutual interest and mutual respect' towards the Muslim world and its emphasis on human development as much as on the need for democracy also narrowed transatlantic differences and brought US policies into closer alignment with European preferences, advocating a slower, more patient approach to promoting democracy and human rights, although all of the above are subject to the new and unforeseen pressures generated by the events in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere in the Arab world in early 2011. While US and European positions are seen to be closer, important differences remain on certain issues and on how best

to advance towards shared goals. Europeans could not hide their disappointment when the Obama Administration backed down from its initial insistence on a full Israeli settlement freeze, and this has only served to aggravate their confusion about the overall US strategy on critical issues regarding Hamas and East Jerusalem (p. 2).

And of course, there is always the possibility that transatlantic differences over Israel's behaviour could sharpen, particularly should violence surge again in Gaza or the West Bank and Israel react as it has in the past. At the same time, it is well accepted that there has been no significant increase in transatlantic cooperation per se. The US is still trying to monopolise the initiative and has not substantially engaged Europe. The appointment of Mitchell, although positively received in European capitals and in Brussels, has also highlighted the fact that the role of the Quartet (the UN, US, EU and Russia) has been downgraded. The truth is that

it has been much less active during the Obama administration than it was in the Bush era largely because there is an active US envoy. In terms of substantive positions inside the Quartet, the United States and EU have often been in agreement, but many Europeans resent that the Quartet functions as little more than an international rubber stamp for US policy decisions, and one employed with decreasing frequency at that. (Dunne, 2010, p. 3)

At the end of the day, the problem is obvious: there is a profound lack of a clear strategy on how to put the peace process on a well-defined path (Dunne, 2010, p. 4).

In the case of Iran, by the time Obama took office, the efforts of the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) together with Javier Solana to persuade the Iranians to halt their uranium enrichment programme had failed, and the problem appeared to be worsening. Obama came to the rescue. He persuaded the Israelis, who were threatening unilateral military action against Iran, to allow him time for a new diplomatic initiative. He then reached out to the Iranians, and the US formally joined the international negotiations with Tehran. After an apparent breakthrough in summer 2009, the whole issue was overtaken by turmoil inside Iran, triggered by the disputed presidential elections in June 2009. By the end of that year, the US was soliciting support for new UN sanctions against Iran. For these, British and French support in the Security Council has been forthcoming, but Russia has proved ambivalent and China is opposed. Meanwhile, EU members have shared Washington's anxieties about how to respond to the ongoing internal power struggle in Iran – for fear of playing into the hands of the

hardliners there. As a consequence, proponents of military action in Washington and Israel have become more vocal again, and the question of how best to deal with Iran is far from being answered. European support for more sanctions does not translate into support for military action if these fail.

For the EU, it is imperative to find ways to work together with the US to find a compromise solution. More specifically, an EU diplomatic vision should be developed to focus on three goals: first, to persuade the Iranian government to be more cooperative in order to find a common solution regarding its nuclear programme; second, to bring under a common security umbrella the local actors and powers, including Iran, in order to promote peace and stability in the region; and last, to formulate a substantive multi-lateral policy in order to align Iranian domestic politics with the international standards and norms.

And of course, there is 'AfPak'. The war in Afghanistan represents an ongoing strategic headache. Transatlantic cooperation on the Afghanistan–Pakistan strategy was bound to become easier with President Obama in charge. And so it did, at least at first. Obama's demands for a greater European role in 'AfPak' AfPak (Afghanistan and Pakistan) were initially met. European governments deployed more troops and agreed to a new NATO training mission for the ANSF (Afghanistan National Security Forces). A total of \$500 million in additional civilian assistance to Afghanistan was pledged at the NATO meeting in April 2009. According to Korski (2010, pp. 1–2), after autumn 2009 the US–European policy cooperation began to falter. The problem is that in practice Europeans never stopped treating Afghanistan as a US responsibility, with little engagement in joint strategising and operational planning.

Concerning Pakistan, little has changed since the Bush administration. EU governments have not been convincing in their desire to see the country as a strategic rather than a development challenge. EU aid to Pakistan, largely unchanged from the late 1970s until last year, is still a fraction of the \$10 billion in US aid to the Islamabad government and of the EU's overall development budget. Moreover, with the exception of Britain, no EU member state has a meaningful military or development relationship with Pakistan. Korski (2010, p. 2) has rightly indicated that transatlantic policy cooperation is rather limited, and this has not been in the interest of either side. Again, the problem is that the EU has been incapable of developing a coherent strategy. The launch of the EU Action Plan for Afghanistan and

Pakistan in October 2009 has been heralded as a good step but is far from strategic in its approach. And this is because there has been no real debate to determine exactly what Europe wants from the NATO mission and how important it thinks the region's stabilisation is (Korski, 2010, p. 2).

Progress in terms of the promotion of peace and stability is very low, and a multilateral approach should be strengthened. In this respect, the EU in cooperation with the US as well as the UN must provide for a multi-dimensional, peace-oriented framework in order to sustain political stability in the region and, what is more important, to foster incentives for the economic development of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will not be easy, especially since the increased resources needed are not readily available. The grave economic problems at home have pushed the Afghanistan war, Pakistan and most other security issues lower on the list of national policy debates.

Engaging the Rising Powers

The need to establish strategic partnerships with emerging global players was identified as an EU objective in pursuing effective multilateralism in the 2003 European Security Strategy. China, India, Brazil and of course Russia have been effectively altering the global balance of power, and engaging them is nothing less than a strategic necessity.

According to Fox and Godement, 'Europe's approach to China is stuck in the past. China is now a global power: decisions taken in Beijing are central to virtually all the EU's pressing global concerns, whether climate change, nuclear proliferation, or rebuilding economic stability' (2009, p. 1). Indeed, Chinese policies strongly affect the world's and the EU's economic well-being. China's policies in Africa are transforming parts of a neighbouring continent whose development is important to Europe, – '[y]et the EU continues to treat China as the emerging power it used to be, rather than the global force it has become'.

Almost every serious political analyst puts Chinese capabilities in the global arena, both in economic and strategic issues, at the top of the world politics agenda. Zakaria has spoken sharply about the return of Chinese power in world politics, recalling the period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when China was the leading global power (Zakaria, 2009). In this respect, Europe has much to gain by developing a 'comprehensive

strategic partnership' with China (Caira, 2010). The positive trade-offs could be perceivable not only in the area of economic interaction but also within the wider sphere of political and security spaces. Towards this goal, the two sides have made measurable steps in the past decade, given the extent of formal and informal political meetings whose purpose has been to reinforce relations on issues of their interests (Caira, 2010). Economic and trade relations have developed considerably as a result of a policy of constructive engagement, which has been upgraded to include a significant security-strategic dimension (Casarini, 2006, p. 39). The EU's China strategy is based on a conviction that China, under the influence of European engagement, will liberalise its economy, improve the rule of law and democratise its politics. The underlying idea is that engagement with China is positive in itself and should not be conditional on any specific Chinese behaviour. This strategy has produced a web of bilateral agreements, joint communiqués, memoranda of understanding, summits, ministerial visits and sector-specific dialogues, all designed to draw China towards EU-friendly policies.

The rising interdependence, however, between China and the EU in both political and economic terms does not mean that the two global powers do not face problems that are testing their relations. China remains an authoritarian regime, and its value-based as well as normative structures do not align with the civilian project that the EU is promoting in world politics. The difference is profound, and as Fox and Godement have indicated,

China's foreign and domestic policy has evolved in a way that has paid little heed to European values, and today Beijing regularly contravenes or even undermines them. The EU's heroic ambition to act as a catalyst for change in China completely ignores the country's economic and political strength and disregards its determination to resist foreign influence. Furthermore, the EU frequently changes its objectives and seldom follows through on them. The already modest leverage that EU Member States have over China, collectively and individually, is weakened further by the disunity in their individual approaches. The result is an EU policy towards China that can be described as '*unconditional engagement*': a policy that gives China access to all the economic and other benefits of cooperation with Europe while asking for little in return (Fox and Godement, 2009, pp. 1–2).

Most EU member states are aware that this strategy, enshrined in a trade and cooperation agreement concluded back in 1985, is showing its age. They acknowledge its existence, largely ignore it in practice, and pursue their own, often conflicting national approaches towards China. Some challenge

China on trade, others on politics, some on both and some on neither. The results speak for themselves. The EU allows China to throw many more obstacles in the way of European companies that want to enter the Chinese market than Chinese companies face in the EU – one reason why the EU's trade deficit with China has swollen to a staggering €169 billion, even as the EU has replaced the US as China's largest trading partner (Fox and Godement, 2009, p. 2). Efforts to get Beijing to live up to its responsibility as a key stakeholder in the global economy by agreeing to more international coordination have been largely unsuccessful. What does it take, then, to upgrade China–EU relations to the level of a strategic partnership? First, there needs to be reciprocity in mutual pledges and commitments. Second, and more fundamentally, it is necessary that the EU not deviate from principle on some key issues, such as human rights, weapons non-proliferation and reciprocal treatment. Third, priorities need to be clearly selected and fleshed out (Godement, 2008, pp. 75–6).

In the case of Russia, the relationship with the EU has been tested many times in the past. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent loss of Russia's attractiveness in world politics, especially in ideological terms, the EU and Russia have made considerable efforts to reinforce their common perspectives. The signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994 created a secure ground for bilateral political and economic cooperation. Yet the promises created under this framework ended bitterly in 2007, devastating the flourishing environment of such agreements. In 2008, the conflict over Georgia was the dramatic event that shifted the political demarcation between the EU and Russia. The outcome of the Russian–Georgian conflict strengthened the impression that Russia had regained exceptional rights in the post-Soviet space. After a short period of consideration, the EU returned to business almost as usual in its relations with Russia. The bilateral summit was not suspended, and the negotiations on the framework agreement continued. However, the Russian–Ukrainian crisis in 2009, which resulted in a great energy anxiety in the EU, further dislocated the bilateral relationship. With Russia losing the reputation of being Europe's reliable energy supplier, the key concept of an emerging energy community that could serve as a cornerstone of the bilateral partnership suffered a severe blow. According to Moshes,

these developments suggest that the process of mutual alienation of Russia and Europe not only did not stop. It has accelerated, all bureaucratic rhetoric and, more importantly, mutual economic interest notwithstanding and, at least in the

short term the chances for the reversal of this trend are not very strong. (Moshes, 2009, p. 2)

The growing economic association of the EU and Russia in the last decade has proved to be a short-sighted attempt to close the political breach of the two powers in the wider region of Southern Europe and Central Asia. The EU has a multilateral policy as far as security and economic issues are concerned; Russia continues a bipolar approach, 'looking at the West as a competitor or an enemy but not as an ally' (Piccardo, 2010, p. 124). Meanwhile, the list of disputes on the bilateral agenda is becoming longer, not shorter. Major controversies exist around energy and the EU's and Russia's common neighbourhood. For the EU, Russia, with its stagnant oil and gas production, will not remain a reliable long-term supplier, while at the same time issues relating to EU enlargement and Kosovo constitute conflict potentials.

Indeed, it is very difficult to make predictions about such an unusual relationship. The current economic crisis has transformed Russia from a country with rising surpluses to a country which has to go to the markets for loans. This course could bring to the fore a new balance in the making of Russian and EU foreign policy. Russia's attitude towards the West is ambiguous, but its desire to 'Westernise' its domestic political system is also a variable that should be seriously considered. In this respect, Putin and Medvedev have to take bigger steps towards the modernisation of the Russian economy, giving parallel impetus to the transformation of Russia's domestic politics and the important role the EU can play. A more cooperative approach by the EU should be crafted in the sense that Europe fully understands Russian perceptions regarding the prospects of EU and NATO enlargement as well as the security framework that Europe is trying to build in the southeast. Without Russia, the far-reaching EU project for peace and stability in its wider neighbourhood would be unfinished.

Turning to India, the past two decades have witnessed India's considerable efforts to transform its international status from a developing country to a nation with growing power in world politics. As Srichandan has indicated,

Europe was late, but not too late to recognize India's potential that it is much more than a big market. The EU is the largest trading partner of India, a major provider of FDI, a purveyor of high technology, engaged as well in socio-economic cooperation. The elevation of the bilateral relationship to Strategic Partnership has opened new vistas of opportunities. Relation between the EU and India is now

being held as a significant factor in shaping the EU's plan to engage with Asia and to deal with issues of global importance. (Srichandan, 2009).

However, EU–Indian relations are not free of hardship. While the EU associates the concept of effective multilateralism with a strengthening of the UN, India tends to pursue a more selective form of multilateralism in order to assert its national interests (Srichandan, 2009). Also, on issues of international trade, non-proliferation, human rights and so on, both have different outlooks that inhibit the strengthening of a strategic partnership. This has been evident by their opposing views in the latest Doha Round and in their approaches to the policy debates on climate change. Although this gap is profound and complex, their shared principle of democracy originating in their long historical development comprises a stable base for mutual efforts towards global peace and stability. Europe should realise that Indian society, with its democratic roots, would be a credible promoter of the democratisation project the EU is eager to promote.

Conclusion

The array of the EU's external relations is impressive indeed. However, is it enough to elevate the EU to the status of a true global actor? Without a doubt, the EU can only have an impact if it acts as a global actor. Europe must resolutely choose to act as a united pole in a multipolar world. Only then will it be relevant to the world and to other global actors. To this end, Europe urgently needs a 'grand strategy'. And a grand strategy requires a great discourse. The debate over 'normative power Europe' is useful and relevant, but it lacks strategic vision and it has limits that are found well below any meaningful aspiration to a global role. True, an EU strategy exists 'on paper', but it is hard for the Union to realise its identity as a strategic actor because of the nature of the European integration project as a 'too often, too-many-levels game'; a great game indeed, but one that rather inhibits the emergence of a solid political vision. This lack of political vision is now more critical than ever. In an interdependent world Europe cannot secure its prosperity on its own. The fate of Europe's prosperity is now determined by decisions taken in many corners. Europe needs to play a leading part in shaping the global transitions that are underway to preserve security and prosperity. It is overwhelmingly in Europe's interest to take a lead, both in words and in deeds. There is the risk that some others may

not follow, but there is the certainty that if leadership is not given, the prospect for greater security and prosperity in the twenty-first century will be dim.

As an inward-looking and uncertain Europe, mistrusted by its citizens and with its attention focused on marginal improvements to present policies, the EU cannot hope to perform a global role. To succeed, Europe must see itself in the mirror of the world. It must define for itself a role in advancing security and prosperity and then deploy the policies and resources necessary to play that part.

In addressing the challenges and responsibilities of articulating coherent and effective external policies, the member states must work together in the solid context of a common European perspective. According to the Commission (2006, pp. 5–6), the success of EU external action will depend on three main factors. First, there needs to be political agreement among member states on the goals to be achieved through the EU. This requires a strong partnership between EU institutions and a clear focus on a limited number of strategic priorities where Europe can make a difference, rather than dispersing efforts through overextension. Second, it depends on whether the available policy instruments are suited to the task at hand, are backed with the necessary resources and present clear advantages. Third, effective external action will be determined by the role and responsibility of EU institutions and the legal environment. All three factors indicate the great need for coherence and coordination between different actors and policies. When coherence is weak and coordination unsatisfactory, the EU loses potential leverage internationally.

At present, Europe does not have a common global policy. It has a Common Security and Defence Policy – which is neither common nor defence – focused more on traditional diplomacy than on the cross-cutting global agenda that a global European diplomacy needs today. It also has a development assistance policy aimed at alleviating global poverty. Europe is investing in building joint rapid reaction forces and is undertaking 11 stabilisation operations across the globe, from Bosnia to Indonesia. These form part of the EU's wider engagement with bilateral and regional partners and with global institutions. More visible are the national foreign policies of key member states. This is a formidable array of assets, but these assets deliver less value to Europeans than they should because there is no informing vision behind their use. The challenge is to harness them together in pursuit of a coherent vision of Europe's role in the world.

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The European External Action Service: Consequences for EU Institutions and Foreign Relations¹

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With the signing of the 2007 treaty reforming the European Union (the Lisbon Treaty), the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created. The underlying intention, to streamline EU external initiatives, had first been floated in 2003 during the proceedings of the European Convention that drafted the EU constitutional treaty. The EEAS is therefore an element of the reform package involving institutions responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), an element crucial to the success of these reforms. They entail eliminating national presidencies in foreign policy, appointing a permanent European Council chair and strengthening the mandate of the High Representative for the CFSP by making him or her to be the European Commission Vice President responsible for external relations.² Although several years had passed since the Intergovernmental Conference adopted the constitutional treaty, many politicians, diplomats and officials in EU member states remained oblivious to the implications of the EEAS's establishment. The confusion surrounding treaty ratification relegated political reflections on the consequences of implementing new solutions to the background. Ultimately, after a failed referendum in Ireland, the implementation of the treaty ground to a halt. Meanwhile, the need to give careful thought to this issue

¹ The topic of this chapter has been previously discussed by the authors in more detail; see Osica, Trzaskowski and Popielawska (2009).

² At the same time, during Javier Solana's term, the High Representative was stripped of his mandate as the Secretary General of the Council, even though he held the latter post in name only.

had to do primarily with the succinctness of Article 27 of the Treaty on European Union,³ where it states that

in fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.

As a result, when the member states sat down at the negotiating table in the fall of 2009 to implement the treaty's provisions, they lacked a comprehensive vision of the EEAS.

To understand the reasons why the Intergovernmental Conference established this new agency and the consequences of its creation for the future institutional dimension of the CFSP, it is necessary to briefly describe the development of the EU's external relations. Only in this context can the challenges involving the first stage of the EEAS's implementation – officially completed on 7 July 2010 by the decision of the Council – be shown.

The Evolution of Commission and Council Roles in EU External Relations and Its Systemic Consequences

The evolution of the institutional foundations of the EU's foreign policy should be seen in the context of a whole array of actions undertaken by the EU under the external relations umbrella. In addition to the CFSP they include external economic relations, development and humanitarian aid, as well as numerous other initiatives for world peace and stabilisation pursued within the first pillar, where the Commission plays a key role. This is a result of agreements signed in Maastricht. The noble purpose behind the CFSP as established by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was to situate foreign policy in the same institutional framework as other EU policies (excepting the Court of

³ Unless indicated otherwise, all article numbers refer to the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (formerly the Treaty establishing the EEC).

Justice) so as to ensure conformity and coherence among the EU's various external initiatives. Infusing this policy with an intergovernmental character – with a separate decision-making process independent of the Commission and the European Parliament – resulted in a schizophrenic situation whereby EU foreign policy was pursued within two different pillars, the first of which is subject to the Commission and the second of which falls under the authority of the Council (Duke, 2000, p. 100). This situation led to Community and intergovernmental overlap of competencies and a lack of coherence, negatively affecting the efficacy of the EU's external initiatives.⁴

The simultaneous development of the EU's external relations since the end of the Cold War – within the scope of the Commission's policies and the Council's initiatives – created a number of problems. Most importantly, tensions mounted between the Commission, responsible for the implementation of overall external policy (and its economic dimension in particular), and the Council Secretariat, charged with implementing the CFSP – that is, general policy guidelines. The strong position enjoyed by the Commission, a result of powers conferred upon it by the treaties and by institutional development, has been and continues to be the reason why the Commission is seen as the *de facto* EU representative in international affairs, although acting according to the mandate agreed to by the Council. The High Representative for the CFSP did not have comparable authority. This is a consequence not only of the limited powers accorded by the treaty and the High Representative's dependence on the support of the member states but also of the High Representative's modest institutional and financial resources. It suffices to mention that the Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) along with the 120-plus delegations have combined staffs of about 7,000, and this personnel is not only ample but also possesses considerable experience in representing the EU externally. Meanwhile, the entire staff of the Council Secretariat involved with the CFSP was about 370 people. This situation constituted a problem not only for the Council Secretariat but also for many member states which believed – and not without reason – that the external relations initiatives pursued by the Commission are not neutral in character from a foreign policy standpoint and should be better coordinated with the Council's policies.

⁴ The evolution of the Commission's and Council's roles in EU external relations is examined by Osica, Trzaskowski and Popielawska (2009), Spence (2006) and Westlake (2004).

This is especially so since the Commission possesses the majority of instruments necessary to pursue an effective foreign policy, a huge budget and the aforementioned delegations.

The competition between the Commission and the Council Secretariat did not constitute a significant problem for a long time. After the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999 and the post of the High Representative for the CFSP was established, both institutions got along exceedingly well. The credit for that goes to the good relations between Chris Patten, the erstwhile Commissioner for External Relations, and Javier Solana, who was the Secretary-General/High Representative of the CFSP at the time. The problems began with the development of the CFSP and the crisis management missions. With EU military missions it is rather easy to distinguish the actions overseen by the Council from those undertaken by the Commission. It was the missions that were civilian in character – which, incidentally, dominate the EU agenda, as member states are reluctant to develop military capabilities within the EU – that challenged the relations between the two institutions. The Commission, accustomed to training police or customs officers, providing aid to local administrations or observing elections, believed from the beginning that appending a civilian component to military missions would inevitably lead to conflicts of competencies and duplication of efforts. Although in its ruling on the so-called ECOWAS case, the European Court of Justice clearly found that in a situation where the EU wants to simultaneously achieve two distinct aims (e.g., security and development aid) the initiatives must rely on Community method, conflicts of competencies between the Secretariat and the Commission remained the norm.⁵ The issue of coordinating the EU's civilian–military external initiatives was further complicated by the separate processes within the Common Security and Defence Policy that rely on their institutional culture whereby the civilian and military structures are developed. Because of the tendency to employ an integrated crisis response that combines the civilian and military components, coordination within EU structures was an additional factor that complicated cooperation between the two institutions. The answer to the question of who was to play first fiddle in the field, the Commission or the Council, depended on several

⁵ Especially since this ruling was not totally coherent and the resulting problems would not be resolved until the Lisbon Treaty was ratified. For further details, see Van Vooren (2009).

factors such as the geographical area, historical considerations and whether there was an EU military mission or a special external policy representative in a given area.

In response to the conflicts of competencies the EU pursued a number of initiatives, recommending more frequent meetings between Council Secretariat and Commission officials, urging attempts at common reporting and encouraging preparation of joint analyses or comprehensive planning relating to crisis management missions. The EU also experimented with the mandate of special EU representatives who simultaneously held the role of European Commission representation chiefs in cases such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Addis Ababa. It was obvious to all interested parties that the existence of two competing decision centres within the framework of EU external relations undermined the effectiveness of any and all EU initiatives in the international arena.

For the reasons discussed herein, one of the most important goals of the Lisbon Treaty was imbuing EU foreign policy with greater effectiveness. The main institutional innovation that was supposed to contribute to fulfilling these ambitions was the decision to strengthen the position of the High Representative for the CFSP by naming him or her as the European Commission Vice President and Commissioner responsible for External Relations. The logical consequence of this decision was the provision in the Lisbon Treaty for the creation of the External Action Service of the European Union. Thus, the appointment of a quasi minister of foreign affairs – mentioned by the constitutional treaty – was accompanied by the decision to create a diplomatic service.

Important Institutional Changes Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the Area of External Relations

The idea to create the EEAS was developed in the process of a gradual constitutionalisation of the EU and reflects the differences in thinking about EU institutional form. On the one hand, EU initiatives in external relations are subject to pressures from larger countries attempting to make the functioning of the EU conditional upon the strategic control of member states. This was manifested in the significant strengthening of the European Council's role in the constitutional treaty and subsequently in the Lisbon Treaty, which stipulate appointing a permanent representative for

the Council. On the other hand, this process reflects the intentions of the majority of the smaller member states, whose goal is to strengthen the Community method. An attempt to subordinate the High Representative for Foreign Affairs to the European Commission was a concrete expression of this in foreign policy.

An analysis of the origin and the potential consequences of establishing the EEAS requires a review of the most important institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to the EU legal order in the area of external policy. One of the most significant decisions of the Convention that prepared the first draft of the constitutional treaty was to substitute the rotating presidency in the European Council with a permanent presidential post (Whitman and Juncos, 2009). The scope of the new president's powers was a bone of contention between small and large member states from the outset of the Convention's deliberations. The latter – France, the United Kingdom, Spain and to a certain extent Germany – saw the establishment of the new post as an opportunity to ensure continuity of effort at the European Council and to strengthen the presidency's political profile in external relations. Therefore the Council President was to possess a strong position vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council Secretariat, allowing him or her to influence EU action strategy. However, the small member states saw the new post as a threat to the position of Commission President, upsetting the institutional balance in favour of the European Council, whose agenda is overwhelmingly defined by the policies of the large EU member states. The compromise that was reached anticipated limiting the powers of the Council President, whose role would continue to involve preparing for and presiding over the European Council proceedings, as well as stimulating the discussion and seeking consensus among the member states. In accordance with Article 15 (and its points 5 and 6), the European Council President represents the EU externally in foreign policy and security matters, albeit exclusively at his or her own level and without detriment to the powers of the EU High Representative for the CFSP. Thanks to the intervention of smaller member states and Germany, the post of Commission President – elected directly by the European Parliament – was also formally strengthened, in a way that balances out the increasing inter-governmental trend.⁶ The compromise between large and small member

⁶ Although in practice this procedure does not differ significantly from what is currently in place.

states allowed for the preservation of relative balance between the Council and the Commission; its side effect is the lack of a clear demarcation of competencies between the European Council President and the EU High Representative for the CFSP. It is not difficult to imagine that this situation could lead to tensions and rivalry at the expense of CFSP coherence and efficacy and thus have an effect opposite to that intended (Trzaskowski, 2005).

Another significant reform introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is the extensive strengthening of the position of EU High Representative for the CFSP vis-à-vis the Commission and member states. This measure had to do with the move away from the rotating presidency in the area of foreign affairs. The office of the High Representative replaces the foreign affairs presidency in the Council, and so its main objective is to imbue the CFSP with continuity. The High Representative is also supposed to work with the Council President, although as previously mentioned the detailed division of tasks and competencies has not been carried out in this particular case.

The strengthening of the High Representative's role was above all intended as an answer to the institutional dualism of EU foreign policy. The High Representative was co-opted as a member of the Commission with the rank of Vice President and at the same time appointed to the post of Commissioner overseeing the entire EU foreign policy. However, considering that the combination of the first and second pillars is merely in the form of a single person here – for it does not lead to standardisation of the legal order, nor does it affect the way decisions that remain distinct in the intergovernmental foreign and security policy and in Community external policy (trade, development, enlargement, neighbourhood) are made – the only change (albeit significant) resulting from this appointment is the potential increase in the coherence of initiatives undertaken by the Commission and the Council.

Putting two hats on the head of the High Representative has great significance for the position of the EEAS in the EU's institutional structure. The implementation of treaty provisions gives rise to numerous problems, most notably a potential conflict in loyalty, for the High Representative simultaneously answers to two frequently competing bodies. Will the Council – by way of applying direct pressure on the High Representative – not become excessively engaged in the everyday conduct of external policy, which has until now been overseen by the Commission, thus threatening the latter's exclusive control in this area? Will the High Representative

not become the Council's 'Trojan horse' in the Commission (Wouters, 2004, p. 85)?⁷ For everything indicates that the High Representative will be closer to the Council than to the Commission. After all, the Representative acts as the Foreign Affairs Council chair and is responsible for conducting the CSFP on behalf of the Council, that is, the member states. The combined role may also induce a different trend, strengthening the community method in EU foreign policy.⁸ The High Representative will not merely be a member of the Council but also a full-fledged member of the Commission, although one must not forget that the position is bound by the latter's procedures only to the extent that it is consistent with fulfilling functions as a member of the Council of Ministers (Treaty on European Union, Article 18). The High Representative therefore has an obligation towards the member states in the Foreign Affairs Council to represent and promote the Commission's perspective as well. The degree of the High Representative's loyalty to the Commission will to a large extent depend on how relations in the college are arranged. Will the Representative really be *primus inter pares* as regards external relations overall? According to the Treaty (Article 18.4), she or he is 'responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action'. How will this superior role be realised in practice, however? Until now, the hierarchy of the Commission has not worked very well and the role of the Vice President has mostly been treated symbolically. Will the Vice President, Lady Ashton, be able to give orders to colleagues? Will she be able to preside over the internal meetings of all the other commissioners responsible for external relations (such as enlargement or development)? Will the other commissioners be able to play the role of true deputies? How will she manage cooperation with the Commission President who will not, after all, renounce all of his powers relating to representing the Commission externally? In short, will the Vice President feel that external policy within the Commission's framework is really in the hands of the Commission President (Crowe, 2008, pp. 17–18)? Some of these questions remain unanswered, the July 2010 Council decision notwithstanding.

⁷ Sometimes one even hears concerns that the two-hat formula may infringe upon the collegiate nature of the Commission (Howorth, 2004, p. 502).

⁸ Even the Council officials are subject to a 'Brusselisation process', whereby they start to mind the Community interest as a whole, frequently putting it above the interests of their own countries.

The Direction of Effort and the Final Compromise

The proposal to establish the EEAS first surfaced in 2003, during the deliberations of the Convention working on the constitutional treaty. However, members of Working Group VII, which prepared changes in the area of EU external initiatives, focused mainly on reaching a compromise on the status of the Foreign Affairs Minister, as the position held now by Lady Ashton was called back then. The group agreed that the minister should be backed by an integrated service responsible for external actions. However, there was no consensus on the exact scope of activities of the proposed service nor on the exact manner in which it should be institutionally embedded (European Convention, 2002). Convention participants who were in favour of the minister's being a member of the Commission only (and therefore without any institutional affiliations with the Council) – the Benelux countries, the German Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fisher and the European People's Party (EPP) – wanted the new service to become part of the Commission. Meanwhile, the goal of France and the United Kingdom (but also of Sweden and Denmark) was to weaken the minister's links with the Commission. As a result, a compromise was adopted and it was resolved to address all differences of opinion at a later time. In 2004, the Intergovernmental Conference approved the compromise reached by the Convention without changes. History repeated itself two years later, and the provisions relevant to the EEAS found their way into the Lisbon Treaty unchanged.

According to the agreement reached during the Intergovernmental Conference, the EEAS personnel is to be comprised equally of Commission staff, Council staff and diplomats delegated by the member states. For the EU institutional order the establishment of the Service implies the centralisation of initiatives and competencies of the bodies involved in external relations. The EEAS is therefore not merely a new institution as far as the treaty is concerned, but rather a *new institutional formula* within which Commission and Council structures responsible for foreign, security and defence policies will operate.⁹ Thus, the EEAS under the leadership of the High Representative has the potential to become an efficient tool to pursue EU interests in external relations. The most important goal behind the

⁹ Although it will be an institution as far as the financial and employee regulations are concerned.

creation of the Service was to try to infuse EU foreign policy with greater coherence by eliminating the tensions between Community external policy and the intergovernmental CFSP. The EEAS may also contribute to the abolition of unnecessary duplication of effort between Council and Commission structures and to the ‘politicisation’ of Commission delegations worldwide so as to enable them to also play a role akin to classic diplomatic representations. The creation of the EEAS may also entail a greater involvement of the entire structure of member states’ foreign affairs ministries in the development of the CFSP, thus contributing to an increased level of trust among states.

Following a successful second referendum in Ireland and the ratification by the Czech President Vaclav Klaus, the prospect of the Lisbon Treaty’s implementation on 1 December 2009 compelled EU member states to once again deal with the challenges inherent in establishing the EEAS. After concluding the first, rather preliminary stage of discussions about the Service, member states turned their attention to the issue of staffing EU positions and in particular the election of the European Council President and the new High Representative for the CFSP (and European Commission Vice President at the same time). With the 19 November 2009 European Council decision, Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy was elected the permanent President of the European Council, while EU Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton was elected High Representative. These appointments were made even as many issues relating to the EEAS remained unresolved. Lady Ashton found herself facing a real challenge. The enormous expectations involving the creation of the EU diplomatic corps – as the EEAS has quickly come to be commonly referred to – necessitated the reconciliation of contradictory positions held by the member states. The fact that the decision establishing the new Service had to be made in agreement with the Commission and the European Parliament rendered the process especially tricky.

In the course of negotiations the European Parliament rose to the rank of one of the most important participants in this process. Although officially it only had the right to be consulted in the decision to establish the EEAS (Treaty on European Union, Article 27), it exploited this right to the fullest from the outset by pushing for compliance with its propositions concerning financial and employee regulations for the subsequent stage of EEAS development. The European Parliament had adopted an official position during the October 2009 plenary session, before the decision on staffing the

key posts created by the Lisbon Treaty was even made (European Parliament, 2009). The MEPs insisted that the EEAS be positioned as close as possible to the Commission (some even wanting to incorporate the Service within the Commission's structures), calling on the College of Commissioners to get involved in the EEAS creation process as actively as possible. Support was also expressed for establishing an administrative link between the EEAS and the Commission, which would serve as a guarantee for the European Parliament to maintain its budgetary prerogatives and thus to indirectly control EU diplomacy. There was also a renewed proposal to establish a European diplomatic academy, which would promote EEAS homogeneity (this idea was first floated in a European Parliament report in the year 2000).¹⁰ The MEPs further suggested entrusting the EEAS with the responsibility for the EU's development policy.¹¹ The new agency's place within EU structures quickly became one of the most controversial issues, which during this critical time in the EEAS's creation had a particularly strong mobilising effect on the EU's third (i.e., non-governmental) sector. The European Parliament report also included a strong demand that there be geographical balance among the new agency's personnel. This was mainly a product of concerns that the EEAS structures could become dominated by the largest EU member states as well as upshot consequence of the bitter experience of new member states in placing staff in EU institutions, especially DG RELEX, that is, the Directorate-General of the Commission, which was to become the main part of the EEAS, particularly in the early stages of its existence.

The first Council document, in the form of a report from the Swedish Presidency, was published on 23 October 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009). It held Lady Ashton responsible for issuing a proposal on the establishment of the EEAS so that it could be considered by the Council before the end of April 2010. This made for a tight deadline. The High Representative was to be assisted by the relevant agencies of the Commission and the Council Secretariat, as well as those of the member states that had strongly insisted they be involved in the process of creating the EEAS from the very start. The report, touching upon organisational, financial and staffing issues involving the EEAS as well as on the question of the Com-

¹⁰ European Parliament (2000).

¹¹ Although in its opinion concerning the report the European Parliament Committee on Development was rather less steadfast; see *ibid.*

mission's world delegation, was not binding but it defined the scope of future discussions on the subject. During the subsequent negotiations it has been clear that member states did not want to allow for the new agency to be placed too close to the Commission. In the ongoing discussions involving the EEAS, member states have exhibited a clear tendency to strengthen their own role vis-à-vis the new structure and to ensure that their participation in the process of its creation was adequate.

In accordance with the recommendations stipulated in the presidency report, a so-called High Level Group (HLG) comprising representatives from the Commission, the Council and the member states was set up under Catherine Ashton.¹² The group of advisors did not, however, include any European Parliament representatives, as this institution did not at this stage play a role on par with those played by the Commission and the Council.¹³ The clandestine nature of the work involving the creation of the new agency compelled MEPs to form a coalition with representatives from various expert circles and organise a special working group called Friends of the EEAS. This group conducted informal work parallel to the HLG in an effort to influence the latter's activities. Among others, the Friends of the EEAS included two former chairs of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee – Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (PL, EPP) and Elmar Brok (DE, EPP). Brok, as an official EP rapporteur for the CFSP acting on behalf of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee, along with Guy Verhofstadt (BE, ALDE), Constitutional Affairs Committee Member, attentively followed the work in progress and presented their own comments on an ongoing basis, thus attempting to influence the direction of the efforts. On 17 March 2010 they jointly issued a non-paper in which they once again called for the establishment of the tightest possible administrative, organisational and budgetary ties between the EEAS and the Commission, thus reiterating their support for imbuing

¹² The group consists of the following individuals: Secretaries General Catherine Day (the Commission) and Pierre de Boissieu, Directors General João Vale de Almeida (DG RELEX) and Robert Cooper (DG E), Patrick Child (responsible for all the Commission's delegations to third countries) and Helga Schmid (Policy Unit Director), James Morrison (Ashton's cabinet chief) as well as representatives of the Trio Presidency of the EU comprising Spain, Belgium and Hungary.

¹³ Although subsequently the High Level Group meetings were observed by Eva Palatova from the European Parliament Secretariat.

the former as much as possible with Community character.¹⁴ In contrast with the idea previously floated in the Council, whereby only one Secretary-General would be appointed under the High Representative, they also advocated the appointment of three political deputies for Lady Ashton.¹⁵ These deputies would be accompanied by three commissioners responsible for development, neighbourhood and humanitarian aid, respectively, so as to enable Lady Ashton to fully coordinate EU external actions, which – as the European Parliament always maintained – constituted the overriding aim behind treaty changes anyway. According to some very ambitious proposals for EEAS configuration submitted in the European Parliament, the new agency would absorb the tasks of all three above-mentioned commissioners. However, neither the member states nor the Commission approved.

Finally, after difficult negotiations between the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament, political consensus on the EEAS was finally reached under the Spanish Presidency in April 2010. Thus, the Service finally took on a tangible shape (Council of the European Union, 2010a).

As anticipated, it has been decided that the EEAS is to be an autonomous institution, one that is separate from the Commission and the Secretariat (the Decision does not include the term *sui generis*, which was used previously). To ensure that the EEAS remains independent with regard to managing its own administrative budget and personnel, it has been built upon the foundation provided by Article 1 of the Financial Regulations, which thus makes it an EU institution. Its task is to lend support to the High Representative in his or her three roles – as the High Representative for the CFSP, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Vice President of the European Commission – as well as to ensure coherence and coordination with other EU external action policies by means of cooperation with member states' diplomatic services and relevant Council Secretariat and European Commission agencies. The EEAS is also meant to 'assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective func-

¹⁴ Subsequent versions of this draft document as well as other documents prepared by MEPs responsible for various aspects of the EEAS, including the financial, appeared throughout the spring.

¹⁵ One for each of the respective 'hats' of the High Representative as Vice President of the Commission and President of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

tions in the area of external relations'. The Service, under the authority of the High Representative, is to comprise a central administration in Brussels and EU delegations to third countries as well as to international organisations. The responsibility for managing the Service falls on the Executive Secretary-General supported by two deputies, as well as on the Senior Director-General for budget and administration. The EEAS will consist of several Secretariats-General comprising geographic desks covering all countries and regions of the world as well as multilateral and thematic desks,¹⁶ a Directorate-General for administration and a Directorate-General for crisis management along with CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) structures with regard to which there was no immediate consensus on their position. The report emphasised these structures' exceptional character, indicating that they would constitute a separate unit overseen directly by the High Representative in her 'intergovernmental hat', that is, in the Council and not in the Commission. By the same token there now exists differentiation between EEAS personnel. EU delegations scattered around the world – previously subordinate to the Commission – have now also become a part of the EEAS. Each delegation is administered by a Head of Delegation having authority over all staff in the delegation, even if it is comprised not only EEAS employees but also Commission personnel (from the Directorate-General for Trade, for example). The issue of potentially assigning consular functions to EU delegations has also been clarified. The idea that the EEAS would take on any responsibility whatsoever that hitherto rested with the member states in these matters has been dropped; instead, it has merely been acknowledged that the agency will serve as a resource to member states only upon their explicit request.¹⁷

Meanwhile, EEAS personnel have also become the object of much controversy. Ultimately, treaty provisions regarding the provision of equal shares of personnel by the Commission, Council Secretariat and member states have also been expanded to emphasise that staff delegated from the latter is to make up at least one-third of EEAS personnel once the Service

¹⁶ The exact Council Secretariat and Commission structures that will migrate under the EEAS have been enumerated in the annex to the Council Decision.

¹⁷ Interestingly, mention of reciprocal information exchange between the delegations and EU member states' embassies has been removed from the final version of the Decision, which merely demonstrates the reserve with which the member states have approached cooperation with EU delegations on the ground.

has fully matured. To ensure equal treatment among staff they will be granted *temporary agent* status, thanks to which they will be subject to the same regulations as EU personnel. Out of concern for the quality of member states' representations it has also been decided that the above proportions apply to employees at the AD level (so-called administrators). In response, during the consultation process (which will be discussed below) the European Parliament succeeded in introducing a provision according to which EU permanent officials would have at least a 60% share in this category of employees, thus limiting member states' room for manoeuvre. A compromise solution on the issue of EU development policy and EEAS participation in programming its external actions instruments – leaving strategic planning up to the EEAS, while conferring the implementation of aid upon the Commission – has also been adopted. The High Representative and the EEAS are to cooperate with Commission agencies throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation of the Community instruments. The EEAS shall be accountable for preparing decisions of the Commission regarding the strategic, multi-annual steps within the programming cycle. All proposals for decisions will be prepared according to the Commission's procedures and will be submitted to the Commission for adoption. The main instruments of development policy (EDF, DCI) and neighbourhood policy (ENPI), where all changes at all levels will be prepared jointly by the EEAS and the Commission under the responsibility of a respective Commissioner, remain an exception. This is in response to the accusation that it is impossible to call the High Representative to account in case these two policies – pursued basically by the Commission – end up directly under her authority.

The adoption of Lady Ashton's proposal allowed for official consultations with the European Parliament to be finally opened. Although, as already mentioned, the European Parliament did not possess co-decision powers at this stage, it quickly became a central entity. The charisma of the main rapporteurs as well as the number of parliamentary committees¹⁸ involved in the discussion and the multiple meetings devoted to this subject held within the Parliament unquestionably contributed to this situation.

¹⁸ Besides the two committees whose involvement was greatest – the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Constitutional Committee – there were five additional parliamentary committees involved: the Development, International Trade, Budgetary Control, Women's Rights and Gender Equality committees.

Meanwhile, the strength of the MEPs had to do with the prospect of changes that needed to be made to the Financial Regulations and EU Staff Regulations to accommodate the EEAS, and these decisions are made by the Parliament jointly with the member states (European Parliament, 2010). Lady Ashton submitted a declaration of political accountability to the European Parliament in which she guaranteed the MEPs the possibility of calling the newly nominated heads of key EU foreign posts as well as EU Special Representatives before the Foreign Affairs Committee prior to them assuming their positions. It has also been agreed that in case of Lady Ashton's absence she will be represented before the Parliament either by the relevant Commissioner or by the presidency representative, depending on the competencies required for a given meeting (corresponding with her functions as either Vice President of the Commission or High Representative) (Ashton, 2010). The reason was that the MEPs wanted her to be represented only by the people who are accountable, thus excluding *fonctionnaires*. In the final document the issue of geographical representation was also finally resolved (Council of the European Union, 2010b, Art. 6(6)).¹⁹

The EEAS: Towards a More Coherent European Union Foreign Policy?

The Council's July 2010 decision marked the end of the first stage of the creation of a European diplomatic corps. The compromise that was ultimately reached was a far cry from the radical scenario some experts had predicted. It quickly became apparent that the member states were reluctant to establish an agency encompassing the entire range of EU external action. This was seen as a threat to their own prerogatives in the area of foreign policy. Does the EEAS – the way it has been structured – contribute, then, to the fulfilment of postulates advanced by the Lisbon Treaty calling for better coordination and coherence of the EU's external actions? Will it allow the EU to play a greater role in resolving today's global problems? Will it finally enable the EU to turn its economic might into political influence? These are some of the questions that, paradoxically, were rarely

¹⁹ At this stage there was no consent to introduce national quotas, although in its July 2010 resolution on the EEAS the European Parliament cited precisely such a regulation. See European Parliament (2009, Rec. 7).

asked during the process of creating the EEAS, when the attention of interested parties was mainly focused on internal discussions concerning the division of competencies or the precise institutional set-up of the Service. These are all important issues, to be sure, but ones that are completely unimportant to EU citizens and external observers alike.²⁰ The questions about collaboration between the High Representative and the Council and the Commission Presidents remain just as relevant as the ones involving cooperation between structures accountable for EU external actions which partially reside outside the EEAS. Even given its more limited scope than, for instance, the European Parliament might have wished for, the EEAS does offer the possibility of ushering in a greater coordination of EU actions and certainly enables a common diplomatic EU culture to be instituted. However, it is the cooperation between member states and the EEAS that will be of crucial importance, for without the political will to forge a common EU foreign policy, no amount of institutional changes will matter.

Postscript

The EEAS has been up and running since 1 January 2011, when staff from the European Commission and the Council was transferred to the Service. Clearly, due to the organisational challenges and a very bumpy start caused by the budgetary crises, which put the whole EU machinery on hold in late 2010, the Service has currently not yet progressed much beyond its very beginnings. Given the opportunity, however, the authors could not refrain from commenting on its performance in those very first months, understanding at the same time that any definite judgements would be much premature.

One cannot yet say that the EU is now better equipped to face today's challenges. Especially because events have given the new Service very little time to gain experience. First European leaders were confronted with the President Lukashenka's brutal violence directed at his competitors in the December 2010 presidential elections, which the EU had hoped to see as proof of more positive change in Belarus. Second, who could have expected that in the first few months of 2011 Europe together with the rest of

²⁰ See Missiroli (2010), Lefebvre and Hillion (2010) and Weiss (2010).

the world would be witnessing the most astonishing events on its southern flank. Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and most recently the fighting in Libya have put every foreign ministry across the world on alert, raising questions about their further development and, in the case of the EU, about their potential impact on their closest neighbours. Although this has not been very widely mentioned in public, it has become clear that one of the most urgent challenges facing member states is that people are fleeing in great numbers from territories either overtaken by the growing unrest or recently freed. The initial lukewarm expressions of support for the changes taking place in the South have in time changed into a mix of great hopes and hidden fears that now need to be translated into a concrete set of policies and instruments, through which the EU can influence developments on the ground and manage their impact at home. Clearly, there is a role for the EEAS there.

It is not the purpose of this postscript, nor yet the time, to analyse these events from the perspective of the new Service. These first months of its functioning allow, however, for some remarks. First, as predicted, the process of establishing the Service has continued to be difficult. Dominated by inter-institutional tensions and the national perspectives revealed by member states in setting it up and filling its most senior posts, the initial phase had made a rather discouraging impression. The final institutional setup remains thus one of the main factors that will determine the functioning of the EEAS in the future. Second, ready or not, the Service's role in the current events, especially vis-à-vis the member states with traditional interests in the region, will greatly influence its image as the vital instrument for forging a common foreign policy of the Union. Lady Ashton, to the surprise of many observers, has emerged as a quite autonomous player, causing thereby much frustration on the side of the member states that counted on much greater possibilities for influencing the new diplomatic service. On the other hand, the infancy of the Service and the far from complete process of implementing the Lisbon Treaty leave Lady Ashton with a rather limited set of tools to manage the crisis. What will emerge from these two processes remains to be seen. Without doubt the EEAS has come to life in a very interesting time.

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Japan in Times of Epochal Change

Malcolm Cook

Introduction

Today's Japan is a great exemplar of the title of this volume, *International Politics in Times of Change*. It may well suit the title better than any other country covered. This chapter will argue that Japan is the early stages of an epochal change both domestically and internationally, a change whose final outcomes are far from clear but one that is likely unavoidable. This process is already leading today's Japan to act very differently than it has in the recent past. In the 1990–91 Gulf War, Japan, despite intense pressure, put no boots on the ground. In the invasion of Iraq 13 years later, Japan provided the second largest contribution of troops from Asia. Conventional wisdom on Japan is increasingly neither wise nor useful (Cook and McKay, 2006).

This makes watching Japan from the comfort of a critical, scholarly distance exciting. For the Japanese, however, the present fluid situation is not so comfortable or comforting. Their estimation of their country and its future declined drastically from 1993 to 2003. The 11th (and most recent) nationwide survey on Japan's national character by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics makes grim reading. In 1993, 80% of respondents held positive views of Japan's economic strength, while by 2003 this had fallen to 40%. In 1993, 70% had positive feelings about their standard of living; by 2003, these feelings had dropped to 50% (cited in Kolter, Sugawara and Yamada, 2007, p. 110).

A state's international politics, at its most basic, is shaped by changes in its domestic circumstances and its external environment. Today, Japan's domestic situation is in the throes of major structural change to which government policy is only now starting to respond. Japan's age dependency

ratio skyrocketed to 33% in 2007, the highest in the world. In 1980, it was only 13%, then the lowest ratio in the G-7 (Nariai 2010, p. 26).¹ Yet at the same time, Japan is burdened with the highest level of gross public debt in the world, hovering at around 225% of GDP. This leaves the government minimal fiscal room to respond to the demands of its ageing population or its increasingly tense regional environment, an environment that is the crucible for the historic shift of power to the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Asian landmass (Bubalo and Cook 2010, pp. 12–13).

The pressure of these structural changes is fundamentally altering the Japanese political system after decades of continuity. In August 2009, Japanese voters rejected the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). For the first time in more than half a century of free and fair elections, Japan witnessed a complete transfer of power, with the LDP no longer in control in either house of parliament. In the 480-seat lower house, the LDP managed to lose 177 more seats than in the previous election, while the victorious Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) managed to win 195 more.

At the same time, Japan's position in the inter-state system and in Asia is undergoing significant and psychologically powerful change. In 2010, Japan lost the mantle it had treasured for half a century as the world's second-largest economy, second only to its security guarantor and largest economic partner. Not only that but it lost the position to its centuries-old rival and now largest trading partner, China.² In one fell swoop, in the minds of many in Japan and outside, Japan is no longer as significant a global power as it was and no longer the leading power in Asia. Yet modern Japan's self-image and global identity has been greatly shaped by its history as the first advanced Asian economy and Asia's economic leader.

Becoming accustomed to the demotion to 'number three' globally and 'number two' in Asia is not proving easy (Kojima, 2009, pp. 35–7). The sense of lost global stature and domestic direction has played an important supporting role in Japan's recent political upheaval. Likewise, Japan's demographic decline and fiscal quagmire are behind its demotion in the global and Asian orders.

¹ The age dependency ratio is the ratio of people 65 years and older to those between 15 and 64 years of age.

² In purchasing power parity terms, India's GDP was rapidly creeping up in 2009 on that of Japan, while China's GDP was already more than twice the size of Japan's (World Bank, 2010). In market exchange rate terms, China's GDP only surpassed Japan's last year, while India's is still far behind.

The re-emergence of China as Asia's leading economic and military power poses serious tangible challenges to Japan and its decades-old foreign policy settings. The rise of China and its 'lips and teeth' alliance with North Korea is casting doubt on the territorial integrity of Japan and its long-held desire for a peaceful, prosperous and open East Asia. At the same time that Japan's domestic challenges require a more inward-focused society, its external environment demands that Japan act more decisively regionally and globally.

The Epochs of Modern Japan

Today, some wonder if Japan is 'normalising' (Soeya, Welch and Tadokoro, 2011; Hughes, 2004); some assert that Japan has 'reawakened' (Armitage and Nye, 2007, p. 2); others call for Japan to 'grow up and become an adult' (Terashima, 2009, pp. 20–1). These verbs reflect the long-standing view that post-war Japan, like Germany, has been an abnormal, passive power, shunning force and leaving its external security in the hands of the United States. As descriptions of contemporary Japan, 'normalising' and 'awakening' also harmonize with the standard periodisation of modern Japanese history into distinct political epochs with each featuring a very different approach to international politics. And, like this chapter, the terms suggest a new epoch is in the making.

Japanese modern history and the country's approach to international politics has so far been defined by three epochs: the Tokugawa shogunate from 1603 to 1868 and its *sakoku* policy (seclusion from the West, particularly Christianity)³; the Meiji Restoration era from 1868 to the 1930s and its search for greater power status through emulation (Suzuki, 2005); and post-war 'abnormal' Japan. Each of these periods, while maintaining considerable continuity with its predecessor, was presented by its leaders as a national project to create a new order and identity for Japan in tune with the modern world.

The duration and the comprehensive nature of each of these periods justify the use of the term epoch. In both the Tokugawa and the Meiji Restoration eras, Japan's political system, economy and approach to interna-

³ For more information on Tokugawa Japan's *sakoku* policy, see Kazui and Downing Videen (1982), and Toby (1977).

tional politics were comprehensively intertwined. The Tokugawa shogunate's goal was to bring peace and stability by stopping externally driven change, with the foreign policy of *sakoku* and the rigid enforcement of the class structure domestically as two key mechanisms. Likewise, the Meiji Restoration's *fukoku kyōhei* ('enrich the country, strengthen the military') slogan captured and supported the close intertwining of this epoch's drives to industrialise and to accumulate military power to protect Japan against the dominant West. This intertwining allowed both epochs to last long after the first signs of decline and backwardness became apparent. The Meiji Restoration began 15 years after Commodore Perry's historic visit of 1854, and many of Japan elites were already deeply worried about the direction of the country in the 1930s, a period of economic stress and growing political violence. This time lag also helps explain why the shifts, when they happened, were so sharp and emotional.

In the last days of the Second World War, Ōkita Saburō, one of the most important founders of Japan's post-war foreign policy, was quoted expressing hope that after its defeat, Japan would not be allowed to re-arm, as 'Japan did not have the qualities of a first-class power, but she could excel as a second-class power' (cited in Ōkita, 1983, p. 26). Yoshida Shigeru, the most important architect of post-war Japan, had been imprisoned for his opposition to Japan's wartime actions. The most well-known intellectual figure of the Meiji Restoration and the policy of *kaikoku* (open country), Fukuzawa Yukichi, urged the Japanese to turn their backs on Asia (tradition) and embrace Western (modern) ways (Van Ness, 2010, p. 92). The Meiji Emperor heeded the call, cutting off his topknot and mandating that government officials wear Western clothing during business hours and official functions.

The domestic and international circumstances of Japan in the periods just before the change from Tokugawa to Meiji and from wartime to post-war Japan aided the looming shifts and the widespread rejection of the *ancien régime*. Both shifts came at a time when Japan's economic order was at the point of exhaustion. At the end of the long Tokugawa shogunate, the Confucian class structure that had placed the samurai warrior class well above the economically productive merchant class was collapsing under samurai debts and growing public unrest (Vaporis, 2000). Likewise, Japan's actions in the Second World War delivered economic destruction and isolation to its population: as much as 40% of the country's industrial

base was destroyed, and Japan did not return to 1935 levels of production until 1950 (Yoshida, 2009, p. 7).

In both shifts, Japan's territorial integrity and autonomy were also in grave danger as a result of policy decisions taken by the leaders of the dying epoch. The 1854 visit to Yokohama of Commodore Perry's 'black ships', with their modern guns proving far superior to the samurai way of the sword, sounded the death knell of the Tokugawa shogunate. The policy of *sakoku* aimed to seclude Japan from the rise of the Western global order and keep Japan closed. But Perry's arsenal precluded this.⁴ Similarly, Japan's defeat in the Second World War led to its occupation for the first time, the loss of its colonies and the beginnings of territorial disputes with all of its neighbours which continue today. More than six decades later, Japan is still trying to come to terms with who was responsible for Japan's entry into and actions during the Second World War. This soul-searching is not limited to the pacifist left, either, as shown by Watanabe Tsuneo's brave efforts at historical reckoning in the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Japan's leading – and conservative – newspaper (Alford, 2006).

The Post-War Epoch

The epoch now fading was constructed from the ashes of Japan's defeat in the Second World War. The most important domestic foundation of this epoch is the so-called 1955 system of Japanese politics, a system that was lauded from the 1970s to 1990s as key to Japan's extraordinary success, and then lacerated as the main cause of Japan's economic and political stagnation and comparative decline.

The 1955 system, named after the year the conservative parties in Japan merged into the LDP, had two basic features. The first was one-party rule by the LDP, but in a parliamentary setting where it had to make some compromises with the left-leaning opposition.⁵ The party's predominance in rural electorates and the electoral system's extreme bias towards rural votes aided its dominance (Cook, 2004, p. 2), as did the refusal, first by the

⁴ For how the arrival of the 'black ships' opened up Japanese thinking about international politics, see Totman (1980).

⁵ The future of this merger was far from guaranteed. One of its main architects, Miki Bukichi, mused at the time that the merger might not last out the decade (cited in Kitaoka, 2009, p. 15).

Socialist Party and then the Social Democratic Party, to offer mainstream policy platforms. The second feature was the bureaucracy's very strong hold on policymaking, with senior bureaucrats working with senior LDP politicians in an informal manner to determine policy. Both the office of the prime minister and the cabinet were comparatively weak, particularly as the LDP was a faction-ridden party facing little opposition and prone to changing leaders. The practice of senior bureaucrats sitting next to their ministers in parliament and answering questions posed to their minister clearly symbolised the unique relationship between Japan's legislature and bureaucracy under this system (*Japan Times*, 1998). As Kitaoka argues (2009, p. 16), this political system excelled at fine-tuning policy but was not well-suited for addressing structural challenges.

Economic success, both in GDP growth terms and in favouring politically important constituencies, was the main source of legitimacy for LDP rule and for Japan's growing international reputation (Okimoto, 1989, pp. 177–228). The economic model for this epoch focused on supporting Japan's export-oriented manufacturing sector through monetary policy, official development aid (Potter, 1998) and official forbearance in the face of powerful vertically integrated *keiretsu* structures (*keiretsu* is a set of companies with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings) and aversion to foreign direct investment.⁶ The success of Japan Inc. let LDP politicians and bureaucrats adopt and support economically irrational but politically beneficial protectionist and fiscal policies for rapidly ageing agricultural, uncompetitive small business, services, bloated construction sectors and the bureaucracies created to support them (Broadbent, 2002).⁷ This approach to domestic economic policy was reflected at the international level. Japan has long been a strong supporter of an open multilateral trading system with powerful exceptions for agriculture, some service areas and in open international bidding for government contracts. Japan has taken the lead in creating financial and trading regimes for the Asia Pacific. Tokyo has been and is the chief architect and largest funder of both the Asian Development Bank and APEC (Funabashi, 1995; Wan, 1995).

⁶ In 2007, UNCTAD's *World Investment Report* ranked Japan 134th in inward FDI performance but 27th in inward FDI potential.

⁷ Asakawa (2009, pp. 28–9) investigates the benefits of Japan's agricultural policies to its powerful Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. He notes that this ministry employs about 70% of the government's total statistical officers.

Befitting the causes of the shift to the post-war epoch, Japan's foreign and security policy in this period are the most distinct from the previous epoch. After the Second World War, Japan's political leadership separated the pursuit of economic wealth from that of military might and focused on the former. This choice was aided when in 1947, before Japan regained autonomy, its present 'Peace Constitution' was enacted, including the famous Article 9, which states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

This article is at the heart of Japan's 'abnormality', as it has been interpreted to mean that Japan can only develop purely self-defence forces (the official name of its military) and cannot contribute to collective self-defence. The psychological and policy impact of Article 9 has been greatly ameliorated by its resonance with post-war popular opinion's sturdy support of pacifism (Miyashita, 2007). Over time, the spirit and letter of Article 9 has been embedded through legal and administrative limits on Japan's accumulation and use of military force. The most famous of the administrative restraints are the commitment to spending no more than 1% of GDP on defence,⁸ the three non-nuclear principles⁹ and the principles on arms exports.¹⁰ All were developed under LDP governments, are still in place today and have rarely been contravened despite pressure from the US, Japan's tense regional environment and the fact that these are principles rather than law. Many within the LDP have long sought to amend (or abolish) Article 9 and these restraints, but the fear of a public backlash, negative responses from Japan's neighbours and the political need to make compromises with the opposition have left these desires largely unsated. These circumstances have led successive Japanese governments to see Japan's foreign and security policy as resting on three main pillars: Japan's

⁸ Armitage and Nye (2007, p. 22) note that the CIA ranked Japan 134th in terms of defence spending to GDP.

⁹ The three principles are not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

¹⁰ For more information on these export-limiting principles and their development, see MOFA (2010).

alliance relationship (in narrow and broad senses) with the US; engagement in Asia, and particularly with South Korea and China; and support for an open, rule-based liberal order globally.

Undoubtedly, the first of these pillars is the most important; the North American Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is its most prestigious and powerful. Hence, Japan's strategic vision is not one of concentric circles emanating from its land mass but one whose first consideration is often the US and then Asia. In the post-war epoch, the long-running debate about whether Japan should be an Asian power in contrast to the West or a global power in Asia was won by the latter when it came to strategic matters.¹¹

Japan's political and policy adherence to the spirit of Article 9 also led Tokyo to seek new ways of defining power and Japan's international contribution, including promoting itself as a 'civilian great power' and advancing concepts such as human security that broaden the idea of security well beyond 'guns and bombs' (Inoguchi and Bacon, 2005; Paris, 2006). In this epoch, Japan sought to enhance its stature and influence and achieve its foreign policy interests through strong support and activism in global and regional institutions. Japan has long been the second largest and most regular provider of funds for the United Nations, even though the Charter defines Japan as an 'enemy state' and Japan does not sit as a permanent member of the Security Council. For years, Japan was also the world's largest aid donor.

Closer to home in Asia, Japan sought leadership and re-acceptance through similar means with its massive aid programme heavily focused on East Asia. Japan, as discussed above, has also consistently taken the lead in creating and supporting regional organisations. Japan's colonial past and actions in the Second World War, though, significantly limited Japan's leadership potential in East Asia in this epoch, with both China and South Korea particularly sensitive towards any overt signs that Japan's leadership is hinting at international political assertiveness. Despite Japan's financial and organisational leadership, it is telling that the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank are in metropolitan Manila.

¹¹ This victory has never been complete with many Japanese, including politicians and policymakers, who feel the United States casts too large a shadow over Japan. One Japanese politician even justifies Japan's pro-whaling policy as a way of demonstrating autonomy from the United States and the West (Hirata, 2008, p. 191).

In this epoch, Japan was undoubtedly more powerful than China. From this position, Tokyo sought closer cooperative relations with China, particularly between the Chinese Communist Party and the LDP. China became the major destination for Japanese aid. In the case of China, Japan's economic interests in supporting China's opening up from 1978 (the same year Japan and China signed a peace treaty) and its foreign policy goals for a peaceful and stable regional order and improved relations with its major neighbours coalesced. Japan's muted response to the Chinese Communist Party's 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen is often held up in contrast to Western powers as an example of Japan's more conciliatory and neighbourly approach (Katada, 2001).

Signs of a Shift

For the past 15 years, all the elements of the post-war epoch have come under sustained and growing challenge. Kitaoka's view that the 1955 system was good at fine-tuning but not at structural change has been confirmed. While the post-war epoch was characterised by recovery and resurgence, with Japan as the clear economic leader in Asia, now Japan is grappling with decline. This fundamental challenge to Japan's identity and global position has sparked growing debates inside and outside government about the effectiveness of government policy across the whole policy gamut. These debates and Japan's structural challenges are slowly but surely dismantling the post-war epoch.

In 1993, LDP maverick Ozawa Ichirō wrote *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*. Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, Japan's youngest prime minister, framed the foreign policy of his brief stay at the top in 2006–7 around his clarion call for a new Japan, *Toward a Beautiful Nation*. While Ozawa and Abe are political rivals, both books are a call to reject major elements of Japan's post-war order and identity.

Domestically, 1993 was a watershed year for the shift as it was the first time that LDP lost control of the powerful lower house of parliament to a ragtag coalition of opposition parties, some which had splintered off from the LDP itself. During its short 10-month rule, the coalition was able to push through a new electoral law that reduced the system's bias towards the LDP (Christensen, 1996). After 1993 it seemed that the LDP, in a period of false dawn, might have turned around its long-running decline in

the polls during the exciting period of Koizumi Junichiro from 2001–6. Yet Koizumi became Japan's most popular Prime Minister by campaigning against the 'forces of resistance' in the LDP and promising to change Japanese politics by changing the LDP (Cook and McKay, 2006, pp. 24–6). Once he stepped down as Prime Minister, the LDP resumed its downward slide, reaching complete defeat in August 2009.

The tight bonds between the LDP and Japan's bureaucracy were also unwinding slowly well before 2009, and this process of political empowerment has accelerated under the DPJ. Hashimoto Ryutaro, LDP leader from 1996 to 1997, worked hard to strengthen the Office of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretariat to change the balance of power in the policy-making process (Shinoda, 2005). This push by politicians to regain ascendancy in the policymaking process continued and was strongly bolstered by growing public disaffection with Japan's economic woes and bureaucratic bungling, particularly in the sensitive and state-controlled pension system and in the larger financial system.

The DPJ's 2009 election manifesto focused on the need to end what Kan Naoto calls the 'bureaucratic cabinet' system (Kan, 2009, pp. 28–31) and create a system led by the prime minister and cabinet along the lines of the Westminster model. Soon after their electoral victory, the DPJ sent a delegation to the UK, led by Kan himself, to study the British system of parliament and legislative–bureaucratic relations. This sparked a fair amount of resistance from within the bureaucracy, and policy confusion since, but the DPJ is still committed to this reform.

Japan's international economic policy approach is under severe challenge in a period when bilateral trade agreements have taken over from stalled regional and multilateral trade talks. Japan's stubborn and politically strong agricultural protectionism greatly limits its ability to strike deals with its major trading partners. According to Hatakeyama (2009, p. 15), Japan has the lowest free trade agreement (FTA) penetration ratio, with only 15.6% of its exports in 2008 going to countries with which it has an FTA. In comparison, China's FTA ratio came in at 24.2%, South Korea's at 40.2% and the US's at 45.5%.

Japan does not have an FTA with any of its major national trading partners. In every case where Japan has successfully negotiated an FTA it has opened up its agricultural sector less than the other side. Japan now faces the choice of continuing to protect its shrinking agricultural workforce by traditional measures and lose out on FTA opportunities to competitors like

South Korea and China, or change its approach to farming policy. The costs of fine tuning are rising at a time when the average age of Japanese farmers is 65 years old and Japan's business community is pushing hard for Japan to join the FTA bandwagon (Tabuchi, 2010).

Between 1999 and 2005, the Japanese aid budget in dollar terms was more than halved, from \$15.5 billion to \$6.8 billion. Today, Japan is only the third largest aid donor behind both the US and the UK, despite an economy roughly twice the size of the latter. Japan's precipitous drop in aid has been driven both by concerns over its rising public debt and a new appreciation, expressed clearly in the government's 2006 review, that Japan's aid dollars were not advancing the country's national interests effectively. Not only has Japan chopped aid, it has reallocated it to focus more on foreign policy outcomes and strategic partners. In 2003, India replaced China as the single largest recipient of aid from Japan, a position it has held every year since. In 2008, the Japan International Cooperation Agency stopped new aid loans to China.

This tougher approach to international politics featuring a change in approach to China permeates Japanese international policy well beyond the world of official development assistance. Against conventional wisdom, the end of the Cold War has not led to a weakening of the US–Japan alliance (Smith, 2006) or to a Japan that is more comfortable with a passive security policy focused on defence of its main islands. Rather, the diversification of security threats globally and the redistribution of strategic power within Asia has led to a more globally active Japan seeking a stronger alliance relationship with the US. The stark difference between Japan's refusal to send troops to the UN's Gulf War while the Cold War was still not dead and its decision to send troops to Iraq despite the invasion not having the UN stamp of approval is only one example of this turn towards 'reluctant realism' (Green, 2003). Japan is now more assertive against potential threats to its territorial integrity, particularly to its remote islands and disputed territories. Institutionally, the elevation of the former Japan Defence Agency under the Office of the Prime Minister to the Ministry of Defence in 2007 reflects this shift in Japan's international politics.

Few in the days after the Second World War would have guessed that the location of Japan's next permanent overseas military base would have been in North Africa. Yet Japan is constructing a base in Djibouti to support its active contribution to the anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and beyond. This deployment of Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces

since March 2009 was strongly encouraged by the Japan Shipowners' Association and All-Japan Seamans' Union (MOFA, 2009). Japan's navy is increasingly active in the Asia Pacific, with Japan being one of the four countries in the Control Group that organised the major foreign naval responses to the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami (the other three were the US, India and Australia.) The Asia Pacific has seen a blossoming of regional naval exercises, from the 2004 opening up of the US–Thai Cobra Gold exercises and India's 2007 invitation to Japan, Australia and Singapore to join it and the US in their Malabar exercises, to the formation of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the expansion of Australia Kakadu exercises. In all cases, Japan has become an active participant.

A generation ago few Australians would have guessed that Australia would become the second country after the US to sign a security agreement with Japan. Yet in March 2007, the two Second World War enemies signed the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation that in 2010 led to a bilateral defence logistics treaty and the start of talks on closer intelligence sharing. In 2009, Japan signed a similar agreement with India. There is now even talk of a weaker, less prominent agreement with South Korea, Japan's former colony.¹²

Following the end of the Cold War, the US–Japan alliance was strengthened, focusing beyond the major islands of Japan. This trend has continued under the new DPJ government, despite initial signs to the contrary. A recent report to Prime Minister Kan, commissioned by his DPJ predecessor, on Japan's future security needs hinted that Japan should reconsider its three non-nuclear principles (particularly that of not housing nuclear assets of another country) and called for changes to the arms export limitations to allow for more defence industry cooperation between Japan and the US.

One of the clearest and most important impacts of this report is its call for Japan to move away from its decades-old approach to defence based on static deterrence, with assets located mainly on Japan's major islands. The December 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines are focused on 'dynamic deterrence', particularly on Japan's remote islands. This includes shifting personnel from Hokkaido south to the Nansei Islands off Okinawa and close to China and Taiwan, and making forces and assets more mobile. Furthermore, the Guidelines call for a reduction in land forces and tanks

¹² Information from interviews with senior defence officials in South Korea and in Japan, July 2010.

and an increase in the number of submarines from 16 to 22, in Aegis destroyers from four to six, an additional helicopter carrier and more missile defence capabilities (Park, 2011, p. 4).

These Guidelines indicate that within Japan's strict fiscal limits, the new government is seeking to both better defend its far-flung territories and strengthen its interoperability with the US through a stronger focus on missile defence. This more assertive tone and new focus on the defence of far-flung and often disputed territories are largely driven by concerns over China's growing power and assertiveness and that of Russia. Late last year, Japan and China faced a diplomatic crisis over the disputed Senkaku Islands that led Japan to seek, successfully, assurances that these were covered by the US–Japan alliance. Soon after, Russia's Prime Minister Medvedev, with a full media contingent, visited what Japan calls the Northern Territories that both Japan and Russia claim. This led Prime Minister Kan to term the visit 'an unforgivable outrage' and declare 7 February as Northern Territories Day (*BBC*, 2011).

As with the changes to Japan's political order, these steps by Japan to become a more assertive security actor have public support. The rise of China over the past 30 years and the more recent nuclear-tipped belligerence from China's ally, North Korea, have reinforced public support for the US–Japan alliance and for Japan to be less passive in defending its territory and region. Prime Minister Koizumi did not suffer from his decision to send troops to Iraq, while the deployment to the Gulf of Aden has caused little furore. In a recent opinion poll in the left-leaning *Asahi Shimbun*, 72% of respondents agreed that Japan should increase military cooperation with the US, while 57% agreed that Japan should provide logistical support to the US in case of a conflict over Taiwan, 48% agreed with Japan's strengthening of its forces on the Nansei Islands in the face of China, and only 36% supported the opposite (cited in Roggeveen, 2011).

Conclusions

Although Japan is in the throes of another epochal change, the shape of the new epoch it is entering is far from clear. Some Japan watchers even worry about the stability of its democratic system (Auslin, 2011), while others see Japan as rising from abnormality. In the last decade, Japanese international policy has become less generous, more assertive and more active.

Relations with the US have strengthened as Japan's security environment has worsened, and Japan's fiscal realities leave it no choice but to rely more on the alliance. The primary focus on relations with the US is being supplemented by growing strategic relations with Australia, India and Vietnam and by tougher approaches to China, North Korea and potentially Russia.

Economically, Japan is less willing to throw money at issues and institutions. Tokyo, though, may finally overcome its agricultural protectionist tendencies to gain greater market access to its main export markets. Japan's emerging political system will likely mean more policymaking power in the hands of politicians, a more distrusting polity and more frequent changes of government. All this sounds quite normal for a mature democracy allied to the US and living in a dangerous neighbourhood where it is no longer number one.

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PART II

THE EMERGING GLOBAL PLAYERS

China's Growing International Role

Robert G. Sutter

China's Growing Prominence and Influence

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China has risen to become an international power second only to the United States. China's burgeoning economy has become a key driver of international economic growth, especially as the global economic recession at the end of the first decade diminished growth in the European Union, the United States and Japan. China's growth remains heavily resource intensive. This means that it has an important impact on the prices of international commodities, leading to good growth and profits for resource exporters worldwide (*Xinhua*, 2010).

China has accumulated massive foreign exchange reserves, reaching more than \$2.6 trillion in 2010. This has come about in part because of large Chinese trade surpluses in recent years along with large capital inflows into China for investment. In 2010 China remained a top recipient of foreign direct investment, taking in investments worth \$100 billion. Meanwhile, the Chinese administration invests these surpluses in foreign securities, notably those of the US government, thereby sustaining a low value of the Chinese currency to the US dollar that is beneficial for Chinese trade. The Chinese administration also has used its financial surpluses to purchase long-term supplies of oil, gas and other resources needed for China's growth in the coming years (Morrison, 2009b and 2010).

The Chinese administration's economic policies and practices, the initiatives of competitive Chinese companies affiliated with national, provincial or other Chinese governments and some private Chinese enterprises have deepened and broadened Chinese interaction in world markets. Often with extensive financial support from government-run Chinese banks, enterprising Chinese companies have become salient in world markets as

sellers of Chinese products, builders of infrastructure projects and purchasers of commodities (Brautigam, 2010). China has become the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India and the countries of Southeast Asia, the largest trading partner of Africa and among the largest traders in Latin America and the Middle East. China relies heavily on the European and US markets to absorb manufactured exports and is the second-largest trader in both markets (Morrison, 2009a).

Chinese economic growth has allowed Chinese officials to improve conditions in various priority areas. Spending on the Chinese military has increased annually by double-digit rates for the past two decades. The Chinese military is the largest and strongest in Asia. Its capabilities along China's rim increasingly challenge the ability of the US, heretofore the leading military power along Asia's eastern rim, to sustain free access to areas near China. US ability to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by China is increasingly challenged; US military freedom of navigation in waters along China's periphery and the use of those waters by China's neighbours also are contested by the Chinese government, backed by the expanding power projection capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (United States Department of Defense, 2010).

Domestically, Chinese officials are devoting enormous efforts to developing advanced capacities in transportation, electric power and industry that will push China to higher levels of economic competitiveness. They also have increased spending on education, health care and social security programmes. Until now, the majority of Chinese people had to rely on their own savings or other resources to deal with these critical areas of life, or do without (Morrison, 2009a).

Chinese and international commentators are calling for major changes in global governance to take account of China's leading role. China is well positioned as the sole representative from Asia and from the developing world among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Beijing is pushing for reforms in international financial institutions that would give China a much more prominent role in setting their policies. China sometimes expresses dissatisfaction with the US-led management of the global economy (Glaser, 2010).

China participates actively in new international groupings, notably the G-20, that give much greater emphasis to the interests and needs of large developing countries than did previous leading international economic groupings like the G-7 or G-8. China has collaborated closely with Brazil,

India and Russia in a new international grouping known as the BRIC. Another new grouping includes South Africa along with China, India and Brazil, known as BASIC. Beijing has deepened international collaboration in the variety of Asian regional groupings that have emerged in the past two decades.

Signs of debate among Chinese foreign policy decision-makers in the past two years have accompanied more assertive Chinese international actions to protect Chinese interests in the face of perceived foreign intrusions. The US and China's neighbours have borne the brunt of Beijing's demands – sometimes backed by military exercises, patrols and other actions by security forces – regarding the use of nearby seas claimed by China. Beijing has rebuffed Indian border claims as both sides improve military capabilities along the disputed boundary. It has taken tough action against European leaders who have interacted with Tibet's Dalai Lama, and it pressured European and other governments over the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident in 2010.

Assessing China's International Ascendance and Its Implications

Prominent international dignitaries have called upon the US and China to take the leading role in global politics by forming a G-2 alignment to deal with salient international problems. Recent books and commentaries speak in terms of China 'ruling the world' and China 'shaking the world', warning that the US and other world powers will have no choice other than to give way as China takes world leadership (White, 2010).

Such assessments have not gone unchallenged. Some specialists warn that differences in interests and values between Beijing and established world powers like the US are too extensive to allow for close collaboration. They oppose a US–China G-2 that would give a secondary position to newly rising developing countries like India, Brazil and Indonesia along with the developed countries in the G-7 (Clarke, 2009).

Others point to Beijing's seemingly weak record on international leadership. Evan Medeiros, before entering the administration of President Barack Obama as Director for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council, advised that 'China's worldview and its international strategy produce a unique reluctance to be a global leader. China wants the status

and influence associated with global activism but it fears the burdens of leadership' (Medeiros, 2009, p. 252).

This chapter duly acknowledges, as outlined above, the advances in China's role in world affairs, but it also shows that Beijing's leadership in international politics is likely to remain limited and encumbered. The limitations stem in part from the longstanding Chinese reluctance to undertake significant costs, risks and commitments for the sake of broader international benefits that do not have a tangible and immediate benefit for narrowly defined Chinese interests. The encumbrances stem in part from the complexities associated with China's rise in a highly competitive international environment in the Asian region surrounding China. Also briefly noted are some of the substantial domestic factors that impede Chinese leadership in Asian and world affairs.

China's Reluctance to Lead Under the 'Win-Win' Formula

Whether or not to undertake the 'burdens' of leadership has remained a key issue in the ongoing debate in Beijing regarding China's appropriate role in twenty-first-century world affairs. Chinese officials often call for China to take an increasingly prominent and leading role in world affairs. However, recent practice along with interviews with senior Chinese foreign policy officials show clear limits to Beijing's willingness to undertake obligations associated with world leadership and dealing with international crises and issues (Sutter, 2010b).

Reflecting mainstream assessments of China's overall foreign policy strategy, Zhang and Tang (2006), two prominent specialists in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, have identified four core concepts underpinning China's strategy in world affairs:

1. a drive for great power status in world affairs;
2. a need for a stable international environment supportive of China's economic development;
3. a restraint on the part of Chinese leaders in world politics in order to avoid onerous obligations and commitments that would hamper China's growth and development. Such restraint was notable during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s; and
4. a recognition by the leaders following Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997) that China's success at home and abroad depends on ever-closer interaction

with world affairs that requires China to take up more international responsibilities than in the past.

The study goes on to highlight four features of China's current strategy, related to the four concepts above:

1. great power diplomacy involving strong Chinese efforts to maintain good relations with the US and other international powers, and to underline Beijing's image as a great power at home and abroad;
2. active and positive diplomacy and other interaction with China's neighbours to create a buffer and hedge of protection in the event that the ups and downs of US–China relations cause the US to resume negative pressure against the Beijing government;
3. a growing but still incomplete Chinese interaction with regional and international organisations, many of which were viewed with suspicion by Beijing in the past but have come to be seen as beneficial for Chinese economic, security and other objectives; and
4. a selective but growing Chinese willingness to undertake international responsibilities and commitments that in the recent past were shunned as costly drains on Chinese development.

In practice, according to Zhang and Tang, the Chinese strategy involves several important initiatives:

1. seeking comprehensive cooperation and partnerships with all states around China's periphery and important governments elsewhere in the world.
2. emphasising and demonstrating Chinese self-restraint in order to add to a benign image of China as not a threat but an opportunity for the world.
3. developing a Chinese approach to economic development that opens the Chinese economy ever more widely to international influence so that as China rises in economic importance, the benefits of its rise are spread widely throughout the world and China's new position is less likely to be seen as a threat to the international economy or to the economies of countries that interact with China.
4. increasing Chinese involvement with regional and other multilateral bodies. This effort is designed to enhance Beijing's international profile on the one hand while channelling Chinese power into these institutions, thereby reducing the suspicions of neighbours and significant world powers, notably the US.

Regarding taking up the costs and responsibilities of international leadership, such systematic and authoritative assessments highlight a continued tendency on the part of the Chinese leadership to avoid onerous obligations and commitments that would hamper China's growth and development, even though China's success at home and abroad depends on ever closer interaction with world affairs, which requires China to take up more international responsibilities than in the past.

China's 'Win-Win' Principle

The Chinese administration uses a 'win-win' principle to bridge the two seemingly contradictory objectives just noted. It also uses the win-win principle to reassure other countries, international groups or other world actors that are affected by China's rise; Beijing says that Chinese behaviour and interaction with these world actors will benefit them as well as China (Chambers, 2005).

The Chinese administration pursues reassurance by developing common ground and putting aside differences. Under the win-win principle, Beijing makes it clear to foreign governments, organisations and others that it will work with them in areas of mutual interest and that China does not expect them to do things that they would not ordinarily do. There are a few exceptions to this general rule. China usually demands adherence to the 'one China principle' that does not allow contacts with Taiwan, and it expects the foreign party to avoid contacts with the Dalai Lama, the Falun Gong and prominent dissidents from Xinjiang and other parts of China. In general, this Chinese approach has been widely welcomed by foreign countries, international organisations and others seeking closer interaction with China.

What gets less attention by Chinese officials and media commentary and yet is quite important in explaining the extent of China's willingness to undertake costs, risks and commitments associated with global leadership is the other side of the win-win formula – what it means for China. In general, the principle means that China is prepared to work with the other party in areas of mutual interest, but Beijing is not going to take actions or adopt changes in policy and behaviour that it ordinarily would not. In practice, this principle shows China willing to take on greater international roles that enhance Chinese national pride and status but do not require onerous costs or risks. Beijing also shows little interest in cutting back on

the many assistance programmes it continues to receive, even though other more needy developing countries go without.

The international community has recently become more aware of the limits of China's willingness to undertake commitments for broader international concerns that do not provide a direct win for narrowly defined Chinese interests. Thus, China's refusal at the Climate Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 to undertake commitments that might impede its economic development received prominent media attention. Underlining Beijing's concurrent avid pursuit of its own interests in the climate change regime, China remained among the largest beneficiaries the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol; the mechanism promotes the acquisition of clean energy technology for free from developed countries (Sutter, 2010b, pp. 9–11).

Also highlighted recently has been China's refusal or reluctance to take actions that might jeopardise its national interests by dealing with nuclear proliferation threats posed by North Korea and Iran. President Obama personally charged China with 'wilful blindness' to North Korea's military aggression against South Korea (Jacobs and Sanger, 2010). Also well known is the pattern of Chinese unwillingness to provide substantial funding for a variety of costly emergency aid projects, such as the Tsunami relief effort for southern Asia in 2004 and the avian flu crisis in following years. China's initial pledge of \$10 million to flood-ravaged Pakistan in the summer of 2010 seemed small given the country's status as China's longstanding friend. China eventually followed through with more substantial aid, highlighted during the visit to Pakistan by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in December. (Sutter, 2010b, p. 7).

China's growing contributions to UN peacekeeping fit the win-win pattern. The services of Chinese troops are paid for by the UN peacekeeping budget. The personnel gain valuable experience when they deploy and pursue operations in various foreign locales in the company of troops from other nations (International Crisis Group, 2009). China has increased its commitment to the UN peacekeeping budget but it remains small, below that of Italy. Meanwhile, China's contribution to the overall UN budget moved in 2010 to a level of 3.2% from a previous level of 2.7%. By comparison, the US share is 22%, Japan's is 12% and Germany's, is 8%. China's current level is the same as that of Spain (*China Daily*, 2009).

Though Chinese foreign aid efforts abroad receive considerable international attention, especially in Africa, their cost is offset and probably

surpassed by the estimated \$6 billion a year in assistance Chinese officials receive from OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the UN Development Programme and more than 20 other UN agencies working in China, and other donors (Sutter, 2010b; Wong, 2010).

China's Encumbered Rise in Asia

In 2011, more than 20 years after the Tiananmen Square incident and the end of the Cold War, several features of the Asian order reflect major advances in Chinese influence and prominence, though limitations and setbacks affecting Chinese influence and interests have also been evident. The US, Asian powers and a number of smaller regional governments have generally sought to cooperate with China, while preparing for contingencies in case the recent Chinese moderation in Asia shifts to a more aggressive or disruptive course (*The Far East and Australasia*, 2011, pp. 6–9).

Chinese assertiveness in the past two years over claims to rights in disputed nearby islands and seas has placed the US and several other governments on guard; they have generated counter-actions that on balance seem to further complicate China's ascendance in Asia. These governments remain determined to preserve their interests and independence of action in the face of changing Asian power dynamics characterised by China's increasing influence, thereby preserving a regional order where China remained far from dominant (Medeiros et al., 2008).

An implication of this situation for China's future role in world affairs seems to be that China probably will remain preoccupied with complicated power dynamics in Asia for some time to come. A China unsure of its standing in the surrounding Asian region will not be in a good position to exert dominant influence in regions further away (*The Far East and Australasia*, 2011, pp. 8–9).

Domestic Preoccupations

The difficult and protracted task China has faced in Asia is reinforced by China's vast array of domestic challenges and preoccupations. These include securing smooth leadership succession and Communist Party unity, battling pervasive corruption in order to foster good governance for Chi-

nese constituents; sustaining strong economic growth to ensure employment and material benefits for the vast majority of Chinese people, boosting administrative support for those left behind by China's economic modernisation so that the gap between rich and poor in China will stop widening and even narrow somewhat, ending grossly wasteful use of China's limited resources and those imported from abroad, and finding efficient and economical means to gradually reduce the widespread environmental damage caused by Chinese economic development.

Given these preoccupations as well as China's heavy interdependence with the US, it appears that the Chinese leadership, unless provoked, will seek to avoid substantial confrontation with the US over issues in Asian and world affairs. Though some opinion leaders in China have argued recently in favour of challenging the US in Asian and world affairs in defence of Chinese interests, senior Chinese leaders have adhered to a more reassuring approach. They have sought to avoid complications as China exploits what it views as the current period of generally peaceful and advantageous strategic opportunity for China's development and the advancement of Communist rule in China (Lampton, 2010).

Asian Developments

Significant limitations and shortcomings seen in China's relations in Asia start with China's relationship with Japan, arguably Asia's richest country and the key ally of the US (*The Far East and Australasia*, 2011, pp. 4–9; Sutter, 2010a, pp. 153–285). The record in recent years shows that China usually has been unsuccessful in winning greater support from Japan, despite many positive economic and other connections linking the two countries. During the tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–6), China engaged in an effort to isolate Japan and diminish its prominence in Asian and world affairs. In general, the effort did not work well and was quickly put aside once Koizumi left office. Recent relations worsened because of disputes over territorial and resource claims in the East China Sea, intrusions of Chinese naval vessels into Japanese claimed areas and competition for influence in Southeast Asia and in the United Nations.

Asia's other large powers, India and Russia, have shown ambivalence about relations with China. India's interest in accommodation with China has been very mixed. The border issue between the two countries runs hot

and cold, as does their competition for influence among the countries surrounding India and in Southeast and Central Asia. The limited progress in Sino–Indian relations became overshadowed by a remarkable upswing in India’s strategic cooperation with the US. Meanwhile, Russian and Chinese interest in close alignment has waxed and waned and appeared to remain secondary to their respective relationships with the West. Key differences were on display in 2001, when President Vladimir Putin abruptly reversed policy strongly supported by China against the US development of a ballistic missile defence system, and again in 2008 when Russia sought in vain Chinese support for the Russian military attacks on Georgia.

Until recently, China had a very negative record regarding relations with Taiwan. Taiwan’s election of a new government in 2008 bent on reassuring Beijing changed relations for the better. China’s economic, diplomatic and military influence over Taiwan grew. However, the political opposition in Taiwan has remained opposed to recent trends and is improving its standing with Taiwan voters in the lead-up to the March 2012 presidential election.

Strong Chinese nationalism and territorial claims have complicated Chinese efforts to improve relations with Asian neighbours, including South Korea. South Korean opinion of China declined sharply from a high point in 2004 because of nationalist disputes over whether an historic kingdom controlling much of Korea and northeast China was ‘Chinese’ or ‘Korean’. South Koreans became increasingly suspicious over growing Chinese trade with and investment in North Korea along with enhanced political support for the Kim Jong Il regime; China’s efforts seemed designed to sustain a viable North Korean state friendly to China – an objective at odds with South Korea’s goal to reunify North and South Korea, with South Korea being dominant. China’s refusal in 2010 to condemn North Korea’s killing of 46 South Korean sailors in the sinking of a South Korean warship and the killing of South Korean soldiers and civilians in an artillery attack strongly reinforced anti-China sentiment.

Chinese diplomacy has endeavoured to play down Chinese territorial disputes in Southeast Asian countries, but clear differences remain unresolved and have become more prominent in recent years, especially over disputed claims in the South China Sea. On balance, the continued disputes have served as a substantial drag on Chinese effort to improve relations with these countries.

China's remarkable military modernisation and its sometimes secretive and authoritarian political system have raised suspicions and wariness on the part of a number of China's neighbours. They have sought more transparency regarding Chinese military intentions as they endeavour to build their own military power and work cooperatively with one another and the US in the face of China's military advances.

China's record of aggression and assertiveness towards many Asian countries remains hard to live down. It also means that China has few positive connections on which to build friendly ties with its Asian neighbours. Chinese interchange with them depends heavily on the direction and leadership of the Chinese government. Non-government channels of communication and influence have been limited.

The so-called overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asian countries are an exception. These people have provided important investment and technical assistance to China's development and represent political forces supportive of their home country's good relations with China. At the same time, however, the dominant ethnic, cultural and religious groups in Southeast Asia have often had a long history of wariness towards China and have sometimes promoted violent actions and other discrimination against ethnic Chinese.

Limitations and complications also show in the areas of greatest Chinese strength in Asia – economic relations and diplomacy. Double counting associated with processing trade has exaggerated Chinese trade figures. Double counting was estimated to represent 30% of China's reported trade with Southeast Asia. Over half of Chinese trade was conducted by foreign invested enterprises in China; the resulting processing trade saw China often add only a small amount to the product, and the finished product often depended on sales to the US or the EU. Taken together, these facts seem to undercut China's stature in Asia as a powerful trading country.

The large amount of Asian and international investment that went to China in the past two decades did not go to other Asian countries, hurting their economic development. China invested little in Asia apart from in Hong Kong, a reputed tax haven and source of 'round-trip' monies leaving China and then returning to China as foreign investment.

Chinese aid figures are not clearly presented by the Chinese administration. What is known shows that China's aid to Asia has been minimal, especially in comparison with other donors, with the exception of Chinese aid to North Korea and Myanmar. China's large foreign exchange reserves

have served many purposes for a Chinese administration that was trying to maintain stability amid many domestic preoccupations. This has not translated to large Chinese grants of assistance abroad. China's attraction to Asian producers of raw materials was not shared by the workers in Asian manufacturing. Asian entrepreneurs have tended to relocate and invest in China and appear to do well. Asian manufacturing workers appear to suffer as they do not receive the benefits of Asian investment going to China; the workers see Asian investment in China creating jobs in China, often at the expense of jobs in their home countries.

In keeping with China's win-win diplomacy, the sometimes dizzying array of meetings, agreements and pronouncements generated by active Chinese diplomacy in Asia has not hidden the fact that China remains reluctant to undertake significant costs, risks or commitments in dealing with difficult regional issues.

North Korea remains a special case in Asian and world affairs. It reflects an unusual mix of Chinese strengths and weaknesses in Asia. On the one hand, China provides it with considerable food aid, oil and other material support. China is North Korea's largest trading partner and foreign investor. China often shields Pyongyang from US-led efforts at the United Nations to sanction or otherwise punish it over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development, proliferation activities and military aggression against South Korea. The US and other participants in the Six-Party Talks rely on China to use its standing as the foreign power with the most influence in North Korea to get Pyongyang to engage in negotiations over weapons development and proliferation. On the other hand, North Korea repeatedly rejects Chinese advice and warnings. North Korean officials tell American and other officials of their disdain for China. Nonetheless, Chinese leaders are loath to cut off their aid or otherwise increase pressure on North Korea to conform to international norms for fear of a backlash from the Pyongyang regime that would undermine Chinese interest in preserving stability on the Korean peninsula and in north-eastern Asia. The net effect of these contradictions is that while China's influence in North Korea is greater than that of other major powers, it is also encumbered and limited.

The Role of the United States and Asian Governments

China's rise in Asia remains influenced by an Asian environment heavily determined by the power, policies and practices of the US and governments of Asia (*The Far East and Australasia*, 2011, pp. 7–8). Assessments of American strengths and weaknesses show that the US will remain the leading power in the Asian region for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, Asian powers and other governments concerned with preserving independence in the face of China's rise often work closely with the US in developing contingency plans to offset adverse implications of Chinese policies and behaviour.

Media and specialist commentary as well as popular and elite sentiment in Asia has tended in the twenty-first century to emphasise the shortcomings of US policy and leadership in Asia. Heading the list have been widespread complaints with the Bush Administration's policies regarding Iraq and North Korea, and assertive and seemingly unilateral US approaches on wide-ranging issues including terrorism, climate change, the UN and Asian regional organisations. The US has appeared alienated and isolated, and increasingly bogged down with the consequences of its invasion of Iraq and perceived excessive emphasis on the so-called war against terrorism (Abramowitz and Bosworth, 2006). The Obama government has worked to reverse these trends but is depicted as weak and preoccupied with the economic recession of 2008–9 and the US-led war in Afghanistan.

This emphasis on the negative in viewing the US in Asia has overshadowed but failed to hide four sets of US strengths in the region that far exceed those of China and other nations. Those strengths have endured and grown in the recent period; they appear to provide a solid foundation for US leadership in twenty-first-century Asia (Sutter, 2009).

Security

In most of Asia, governments are strong, viable and make the decisions that determine direction in foreign affairs. Popular and elite media and other opinion may influence government officials in policy towards the US and other countries, but in the end the officials make decisions on the basis of their own calculus. In general, the officials see their governments' legitimacy and success resting on nation building and economic development, which require a stable and secure international environment. Unfortunately,

Asia is not particularly stable and most governments privately are wary of and tend not to trust each other. As a result, they look to the US to provide the security they need to pursue goals of development and nation building in an appropriate environment. They recognise that the US security role is very expensive and involves great risk, including large-scale casualties if necessary, for the sake of preserving Asian security. They also recognise that neither rising China nor any other Asian power or coalition of powers is able or willing to undertake even a fraction of these risks, costs and responsibilities.

Economy

The nation-building priority of most Asian governments depends on export-oriented growth. Chinese officials recognise this, and officials in other Asian countries recognise the rising importance of China in their trade. At the same time, they all also recognise that half of China's trade is conducted by foreign invested enterprises in China, and half of the trade is processing trade – both features that make Chinese and Asian trade heavily dependent on exports to developed countries, notably the US. In recent years, the US has run a massive and growing trade deficit with China. In 2008, the total US trade deficit with Asia was valued at more than \$350 billion at a time of an overall US trade deficit of over \$700 billion. Asian government officials recognise that China, which runs a large overall trade surplus, and other trading partners of Asia are unwilling and unable to bear even a fraction of the cost of such large trade deficits, which nonetheless are very important for Asia governments. Obviously, the 2008–9 global economic recession had an enormous impact on trade and investment. Some Asian officials are talking about relying more on domestic consumption, but tangible progress seems slow as they appear to be focusing on an eventual revival of world trade that would restore previous levels of export-oriented growth involving continued heavy reliance on the US market. China is no exception to this trend. Despite complaints about US stewardship in the world economy, the Chinese administration avoids pushing controversial policies that would further undermine international confidence in the existing economic system and thwart meaningful efforts at economic recovery (Liu, 2009).

Government Engagement and Asian Contingency Planning

The Obama Administration inherited a US position in Asia buttressed by the Bush Administration's generally effective relations with Asia's powers. It is rare for the US to enjoy good relations with Japan and China at the same time, but the Bush Administration carefully managed relations with both powers effectively. It is unprecedented for the US to be the leading foreign power in South Asia and to sustain good relations with both India and Pakistan, but that has been the case since relatively early in the Bush Administration. And it is unprecedented for the US to have good relations with Beijing and Taipei at the same time, but that situation emerged during the Bush years and was strengthened with the election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008.

The US Pacific Command and other US military and security organisations have been at the edge of wide-ranging and growing US efforts to build and strengthen webs of military relationships throughout the region. In an overall Asian environment where the US remains on good terms with major powers and most other governments, building military ties through education programmes, on-site training, exercises and other means enhances US influence in generally quiet but effective ways. Part of the reason for the success of these efforts has to do with active contingency planning by many Asian governments. As power relations change in the region, notably on account of China's rise, Asian governments generally seek to work positively and pragmatically with rising China on the one hand, but on the other hand they seek the reassurance of close security, intelligence and other ties with the US in case rising China shifts from its current generally benign approach to one of greater assertiveness or dominance (Medeiros et al., 2008).

Non-government Engagement and Immigration

For much of its history, the US exerted influence in Asia much more through business, religious, educational and other interchanges than through channels dependent on government leadership and support. Active American non-government interaction with Asia continues today, putting the US in a unique position where the non-government sector has a strong and usually positive impact on the influence the US exerts in the region. Meanwhile, more than 40 years of generally colour-blind US immigration policy since the ending of discriminatory US restrictions on Asian immigration in 1965

has resulted in the influx of millions of Asian migrants who call America home and who interact with their countries of origin in ways that undergird and reflect well on the US position in Asia. No other country, with the exception of Canada, has such an active and powerfully positive channel of influence in Asia.

Conclusion

China's reluctance to undertake costly or risky international commitments, its extensive domestic preoccupations and encumbered rise in Asia show that China's economic growth, military build-up and international prominence will not soon translate into leadership in world affairs. If all goes well, China at some point will become the world's largest economy and its position as Asia's leading military power will be reinforced. Greater influence in world affairs will come from these developments, but the influence will remain constrained unless China undertakes a broader view of its interests, undertakes commitments that come with leadership and deals effectively with domestic constraints and complications in Asia.

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Decoding China's Political Future and Foreign Policy: An Operational Code Analysis of Hu's and Wen's Belief Systems

Huiyun Feng and Kai He

Introduction

Is China a status quo power? This is a highly debated question in international relations. Some suggest that China's strategic culture dictates that China is a state oriented towards *realpolitik*, and that it will challenge the international order when its military capabilities become strong enough (e.g., Johnston, 1995). Others argue that Chinese leaders' belief systems have evolved across generations and that the new generation of Chinese leadership holds defensive beliefs, which make China a status quo power by nature if the external environment is benign (e.g., Feng, 2007 and 2009). The debate over China's future foreign policy orientation is a timely topic given China's rapid ascent on the global stage. However, neither strategic culture nor leadership beliefs alone directly determines a country's foreign policy. China's domestic political system, whether democratic or authoritarian, plays at least as important a role in shaping China's foreign policy behaviour. On the one hand, a democratic political system might modify China's strategic culture, even if it is offensive in nature, through institutional constraints or public opinion mechanisms. On the other hand, an authoritarian political system may distort Chinese leaders' belief systems, even if they are oriented towards maintaining the status quo, because of severe and brutal political struggles inside an authoritarian political environment. Although it may be going too far to argue with certainty that a democratic China would be more peaceful than an authoritarian one, a democratic political system could at least ensure greater credibility and accountability for China's foreign policy behaviour towards the outside world.

In this chapter we focus on China's political future in order to shed some light on its foreign policy orientation. Will China become a democracy?

While optimists suggest that China is experiencing a gradual or inevitable democratic transition (Gilley, 2004; Zheng, 2004), pessimists argue that China is either stagnating in its ‘trapped transition’ (Pei, 2006) or becoming a ‘resilient authoritarian regime’ (Nathan, 2003). One of the key issues in the debate is related to different perceptions regarding the role of Chinese leaders in the country’s democratisation. In the view of optimists, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have brought about a democratic hope for China’s future (Gilboy and Heginbotham, 2001; Chang, 2007). However, some pessimistic scholars suggest that the Hu–Wen administration is strengthening the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather than pursuing greater political openness (Fewsmith, 2005).

Will Hu and Wen lead China down a democratic road or maintain China as an authoritarian state? Employing operational code analysis from political psychology, we examine the belief systems of these two leaders in this chapter. Through examining public speeches and statements delivered by Hu and Wen, especially regarding domestic issues from 2005–7, we focus on four key questions in analysing the operational codes of Hu and Wen:

1. Do Hu and Wen have democratic-oriented beliefs?
2. Do Hu and Wen share similar beliefs?
3. Will Hu and Wen choose cooperative and democratic means to achieve their goals?
4. How much control over historical development do Hu and Wen perceive for themselves; that is, do they believe they can control China’s future?

We suggest that Hu and Wen share a similar belief system, especially regarding domestic issues. Both of them have democratic-oriented beliefs that perceive a tolerant and cooperative political universe. In addition, their beliefs incline them to use cooperative and democratic means to achieve their political goals. However, both of them also believe that they are relatively weak in their ability to implement their political goals. China’s political future depends on whether Hu and Wen can consolidate their political power and strengthen their beliefs regarding political control over historical development in order to lead the democratic transition in China. Although Hu’s and Wen’s pro-democracy beliefs plant peaceful seeds in China’s foreign policy, some dangers still exist during the democratisation period.

Leadership Study and Operational Code Analysis

Hu gradually came to power as Secretary of the CCP in 2002, while Wen assumed office as Premier in 2003. Hu and Wen are seen as the fourth generation of Chinese leadership, following Mao Zedong (1949–76), Deng Xiaoping (1979–89) and Jiang Zemin (1990–2001). Given the secrecy of China's domestic and party politics, most research on China's domestic politics and leadership focuses on factionalism within the Communist Party. Based on Hu's and Wen's backgrounds and personal career paths, scholars have identified Hu and Wen as *Tuanpai*, the faction associated with the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL). Jiang's faction is called the 'Shanghai Gang', since most of Jiang's close allies were promoted from Shanghai after he came to power in 1989 (e.g., Vice President Zeng Qinghong and the former Executive Vice Premier Huang Ju).¹ Therefore, China's political future is seen to be an internal fight between Hu's *Tuanpai* faction and Jiang's 'Shanghai Gang' within the CCP (Li, 2001).

Factionalism is not a new topic in the study of Chinese politics (Tsou, 1995; Huang, 2000). However, a major problem in using the factionalist approach to analyse Chinese politics lies in the validity of research sources as well as in the predictive power of the factional model. It is true that there are factions in any political party, including the CCP. However, factionalism in Chinese Communist politics has its own unique qualities. If Western factionalism is 'formal', featuring open debates and struggles, Chinese factionalism is 'informal', characterised by secrecy and personal relations (*guan xi*). As Lucian Pye concludes, 'the "informal" [factionalism] is very nearly the sum total of Chinese politics' (1995, p. 39). If China's factionalism is informal in nature, it becomes quite a difficult and ambitious undertaking for scholars to clearly categorise different factional struggles, such as the *Tuanpai* faction versus the Shanghai Gang.

The predictive power of factionalism is limited in Hu's and Wen's case. Since Hu and Wen started to consolidate their power, the influence of the Shanghai Gang led by Jiang and his protégés has waned dramatically. The *Taizi Dang* – a new faction – has emerged rapidly in Chinese politics. *Taizi Dang* in English is 'the Princelings', referring to the children of the Communist elite in China. Xi Jinping, China's current Vice President, is a

¹ Huang died in 2007, leading to more rumours about the future of the Shanghai Gang.

rising political star in China and his father was a high-ranking official in the Mao and Deng eras. Xi is apparently a member of the so-called new faction of *Taizi Dang*. However, the relationships among the *Taizi Dang*, Hu's and Wen's *Tuanpai*, and Jiang's Shanghai Gang are complex in nature, and which faction will win China's secret political struggle is difficult to predict. Therefore, relying on the factional approach to predict China's future political direction is risky at best.

In this chapter we apply a different approach to studying China's leadership, employing operational code analysis from political psychology. Operational code analysis is a cultural construct oriented towards researching both individual and collective beliefs (Schafer and Walker, 2006a). We have argued elsewhere that the most likely path for China's democratisation is a top-down approach (He and Feng, 2008). This means that China's political leaders will play a decisive role in driving China's political transformation. Here we focus on Hu's and Wen's belief systems, employing operational code analysis to examine the psychological foundation and the orientation of their beliefs in shaping China's political future.

As the fourth generation of Chinese leadership, Hu and Wen have not had revolutionary experiences like their predecessors. The first two generations of Chinese leadership, represented by Mao and Deng, had belief systems with relatively radical ideals (Feng, 2007). Jiang also had a short revolutionary experience in his younger years and was later educated in the Soviet Union. Although Jiang was not a revolutionary leader like Mao and Deng, he was influenced by the Cold War ideological struggle. Hu and Wen, as the fourth generation of leadership, have no direct experience of the CCP revolution. More importantly, they were educated as technocrats in China without an overseas educational background. However, the impact of globalisation, high interdependence among nations and China's policies of reform and opening up make it likely that Hu and Wen, along with subsequent generations of China's leadership, will be more attuned to the impact of the international environment. In other words, the non-revolutionary leaders are more likely to be influenced and shaped by the international environment in the context of globalisation.

Although Hu and Wen officially insist on Communist ideology, the widespread democratic waves in the world inevitably influence their belief systems and their domestic decision-making. We suggest that the two leaders' decision-making is a function of their beliefs in the context of the strategic environment. While the factional approach focuses on exploring the envi-

ronment a leader faces as defined by the complexities of party politics, the psychological analysis of leaders' beliefs examines the motivational and cognitive sources of their behaviour and decision-making within that context.

Operational code analysis has evolved as a psychological approach in leadership studies. Based on Nathan Leites' prototypical studies of the Bolshevik operational code (Leites, 1951 and 1953) of the 1950s, Alexander George formalised the method of operational code analysis by suggesting 10 questions as a tool to gauge and analyse any individual's belief system (see George, 1969 and 1979; also Schafer and Walker, 2006a). These are as follows:

Philosophical Beliefs

- P-1** What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
- P-2** What are the prospects for the eventual realisation of one's fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
- P-3** Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
- P-4** How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?
- P-5** What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Beliefs

- I-1** What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
- I-2** How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
- I-3** How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?
- I-4** What is the best timing of action to advance one's interests?
- I-5** What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Traditionally, operational code analysis has mainly been applied in foreign policy analysis. Scholars use the Verbs in Context System (VICS) of content analysis to quantify leaders' public speeches and statements

according to George's 10 questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Based on these questions, Ole Holsti (1977) constructed six types of operational codes of leaders. Stephen Walker (1977, 1983) later revised Holsti's typology into four types of belief systems with three master beliefs: (P-1) nature of the political universe; (I-1) strategic approach to goals; and (P-4) ability to control historical development. Based on Holsti's and Walker's typology and the VICS content analysis tool, many scholars have applied operational code analysis to analyse foreign policy by unpacking decision-makers' belief systems (see Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998; Marfleet, 2000; Feng, 2005; Malici and Malici, 2005; Schafer and Walker, 2006b). However, operational code analysis is rarely applied to domestic political analysis.

There may be two reasons why operational code analysis has not been used in domestic politics. First, unlike international politics, domestic politics do not have a clear cognitive line between Self and Other. In foreign policy decision-making, there is always a clear Other, whether the United States for Soviet leaders in the Cold War or terrorists for US leaders after 9/11. In the domestic domain, political elites may change their positions overnight, and the identity boundary between friends and foes is less clear than in international politics. Second, in international politics, leaders' choices can be categorised as either cooperation- or conflict-based decisions towards peace or war. However, in domestic political struggles, the dichotomy between cooperation and conflict seems less applicable or useful.

We suggest that both these problems in using operational code analysis for the study of domestic politics can be addressed through reinterpreting P-1 and I-1 beliefs. First, although political leaders may change their domestic positions more frequently than they do their foreign policies, operational code analysis can still be applied to reveal the fundamental beliefs of leaders. The primary goal of political leaders is to survive in domestic political struggles (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). A leader's political life depends as much on domestic as on international performance, and this is particularly true for the leaders of democratic countries. Thus, a P-1 belief can also indicate a leader's belief in the nature of the domestic political universe.

P-1 is coded continuously from cooperative (+1) to conflicting (-1) in the VICS indices. If a political leader sees the political universe (P-1 belief) as conflicting (-1), he or she is more likely to be an authoritarian leader in order to survive in a hostile environment. In other words, an authoritarian

leader is more likely to perceive a conflicting political environment in which his or her opponents are treated as enemies rather than competitors. By contrast, if a political leader holds a cooperative view of the political universe (P-1= +1) in the domestic domain, he or she is more likely to be a democratic leader who values political tolerance towards political opponents.

Second, a leader's belief in strategy (I-1 belief) could reveal his or her domestic policy orientation. In international politics, leaders can choose between cooperation and conflict as their strategic choices under different I-1 beliefs. I-1 belief is also coded continuously from +1 (cooperation) to -1 (conflict) in the VICS indices. Similarly, in domestic politics, a cooperative I-1 belief more likely indicates moderate political behaviour, while a conflicting I-1 belief more likely leads to a radical strategy. It should be noted that leaders' beliefs in the nature of the political universe (P-1) may or may not be identical with their belief in strategy (I-1). While P-1 belief indicates leaders' perceptions and beliefs regarding 'others' or the external environment, I-1 belief reflects how leaders, by themselves, cope with challenges from others.

The operational code typology of leadership			
		P-1 Belief (Nature of the Political Universe)	
		Democratic	Authoritarian
I-1 Belief (Strategy)	Moderate	1	2
	Radical	3	4

Type 1: Moderate Democratic Leader
 Type 2: Moderate Authoritarian Leader
 Type 3: Radical Democratic Leader
 Type 4: Radical Authoritarian Leader

Figure 1. The operational code typology of leadership

Therefore, based on P-1 and I-1 beliefs, we can construct the 2 X 2 leadership typology shown in [Figure 1](#), which identifies four types of leaders: radical–democratic, moderate–democratic, radical–authoritarian and moderate–authoritarian. It is worth noting that the dichotomy between democratic versus authoritarian in this typology indicates leaders’ beliefs about political tolerance rather than the regime type they may represent and to which they may belong. A radical democratic leader tends to possess a high political tolerance value but his or her political strategy towards opponents is competitive. A moderate democratic leader has a similar political tolerance value but displays political behaviour that emphasises cooperation rather than competition. A radical authoritarian leader is a dictator who has low political tolerance and prefers harsh policies in order to crack down on any opponent. In contrast, a moderate authoritarian leader is more likely to choose some ‘soft’ policies to strengthen his or her power but at the same time will not be tolerant towards fundamental challenges from opponents.

Another key belief in operational code analysis is P-4 belief, indicating whether a leader believes that she or he has strong control over historical development. This belief is coded continuously from weak (0) to strong (+1). In domestic politics, P-4 belief is also useful in revealing a leader’s personality. Leaders who have a strong belief in historical control, that is, a high P-4 value, are more likely to be decisive and strong decision-makers, that is, more likely to implement their beliefs. In contrast, a low P-4 value leader is more likely to be a weak, indecisive person who is easily influenced by others and less likely or less capable of operationalising or implementing beliefs. P-4 belief is not included in the leadership typology with P-1 and I-1 because it is treated as an auxiliary belief with an emphasis on the personality of leaders.²

² Since this is a preliminary study in using operational code analysis in the domestic politics domain, we will not discuss other operational code beliefs in the following statistical analysis.

The Operational Codes of Hu and Wen from 2005–7: What Kind of Leaders Are They?

Data and Research Questions

To answer the research questions posed at the beginning of this chapter on the Chinese leadership and its implications for China's democratisation, we can use our operational-code-based leadership typology to find preliminary answers. First, we use one-way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) to test whether Hu and Wen share similar belief systems, that is, whether Hu's and Wen's P-1 and I-1 beliefs are not significantly different. Second, we use VICS indices (P-1 and I-1 values) to locate Hu and Wen on a quadrant of leadership typologies and identify what type of leaders they are. Third, based on their P-4 (belief in historical control) values, we can predict whether Hu and Wen are strong and decisive enough in order to move China towards democracy. For the P-4 test, we compare Hu's and Wen's P-4 beliefs with a reference group of world leaders. The following are the research questions for the empirical tests.

- Q-1** Do Hu and Wen share similar belief systems, especially P-1 and I-1 beliefs, so that we can treat them as a leadership team?
- Q-2** What type of leaders are Hu and Wen, according to the operational code leadership typology?
- Q-3** Are Hu and Wen strong leaders (P-4) who can lead a democratic transition in China?

The data analysed here include Hu's and Wen's public statements regarding domestic issues from January 2005 to July 2007. Hu's sample is 21 speeches while Wen's sample is 16 speeches on domestic issues. In addition, we collected 21 speeches by Hu and 22 speeches by Wen on international issues to compare with their speeches on domestic issues. Purposeful sampling rather than random sampling was applied to collect and select all of their available speeches to analyse the aggregated sample frame. The speeches are usually longer than 1,000 words. The factors of leader and issue are introduced as independent variables with the three master beliefs (P-1, I-1 and P-4) as dependent variables. In September 2004, Hu took over control of the last but most important position – the Chair of the Central Military Committee – from his predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Although scholars have observed that Jiang's influence remained,

late 2004 was the time that Hu took charge of the party, the state and the military (Fewsmith, 2002). Therefore, the year 2005 is chosen as the starting year for sampling.

Table 1. Hu's and Wen's domestic belief differences in an ANOVA test

Independent Factor: Leader	Main Effects (N=80)	
	F (1, 35)	P Value (two-tailed)
P-1	1.376	.249
I-1	.676	.416
P-4	2.517	.122

Table 2. Hu's and Wen's operational code mean scores

Beliefs	Norming Group (255) *	Hu Jintao		Wen Jiabao	
		Domestic (21)	International (21)	Domestic (16)	International (22)
I-1	0.334	.658	.799	.583	.760
I-2	0.139	.311	.375	.278	.417
I-3	0.304	.442	.471	.347	.327
I-4a	0.509	.335	.201	.417	.240
I-4b	0.525	.419	.361	.399	.464
I-5AP	0.427	.610	.658	.573	.539
I-5PR	0.073	.050	.090	.062	.132
I-5RE	0.167	.170	.154	.158	.208
I-5OP	0.147	.105	.058	.130	.081
I-5TH	0.047	.011	.017	.036	.017
I-5PU	0.138	.055	.027	.043	.021
P-1	0.250	.603	.706	.533	.696
P-2	0.118	.413	.500	.373	.479
P-3	0.148	.223	.213	.179	.201
P-4	0.212	.136	.150	.187	.165
P-5	0.968	.968	.968	.962	.968

* The norming group scores are provided by Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA. The norming group contained 255 written speeches by 35 world leaders.

Results

Table 1 shows the comparison of Hu's and Wen's operational code beliefs regarding domestic issues by using a one-way ANOVA test. We see that Hu's and Wen's domestic operational code belief systems have no signifi-

cant statistical differences for the three master beliefs. Therefore, we can conclude that Hu and Wen as a new generation of the CCP's leadership can be treated as a team in our analysis. Table 2 shows the summary of the mean scores of Hu's and Wen's operational code beliefs in comparison with other world leaders. We see that Hu's P-1 belief is .603 while Wen's P-1 belief is .533. The I-1 beliefs for Hu and Wen are .658 and .583, respectively. By using a t-test, we can compare Hu and Wen's P-1 and I-1 scores with the norming group of world leaders. We find that Hu's and Wen's P-1 and I-1 values are significantly different from the norming group ($p < .01$).³ Based on the operational code leadership typology, we can locate Hu and Wen in the typology in Figure 2 as moderate democratic leaders (Type 1). They appear to hold a higher value of political tolerance in their beliefs than does the average world leader. In addition, regarding their policy orientation, they appear more likely to conduct a moderate rather than radical strategy ($I-1 > 0$).⁴ Still, these beliefs only indicate their political tolerance towards their opponents. Both men remain political leaders in an authoritarian regime. Will or can they act on these beliefs to democratise Chinese politics?

From the P-4 scores, we see that both Hu and Wen have a low P-4 value at .136 and .187, respectively. Compared to the world leader norming group's P-4 value (.212), Hu and Wen seem to believe they have a fairly low control over historical development. We used a t-test to compare Hu's and Wen's mean P-4 score with the norming group's average and found that the differences are significant ($t\text{-Hu} = -38, p < .01$; $t\text{-Wen} = -8.33, p < .01$). We infer that both Hu and Wen are more likely to be relatively weak leaders, either because of their personalities or because of their external environment. Consequently, they may not be able to implement their democratic beliefs fully or rapidly within the context of China's political institutions.

³ T-test for Hu's P-1 is $t=70.6, p < .01$; T-test for Hu's I-1 is $t=40.5, p < .01$; T-test for Wen's P-1 is $t=47.16, p < .01$; T-test for Wen's I-1 is $t=31.12, p < .01$.

⁴ One indicator of this propensity might be Hu's and Wen's re-evaluation of former Marshall Lin Biao's case in the Cultural Revolution.




Figure 2. Hu and Wen in the operational code typology model of leadership

However, both Hu and Wen hold higher P-1 and I-1 domestic values than does the average world leader. One caveat is that the world leader norming group values are primarily based on traditional operational code analyses in the foreign policy domain. The average P-1 belief indicates how these leaders perceive the nature of the foreign political universe, and the average I-1 belief shows what strategy they will use to deal with external challenges. It is possible that the low values of the P-1 and I-1 beliefs

of world leaders in the foreign policy domain reflects the pessimistic realist view of world leaders about international politics because of the anarchic nature of the international system. In domestic politics, world leaders may or may not have very different P-1 beliefs.

Table 3a. Hu's key beliefs in an ANOVA analysis of difference over domestic and international issues

Independent Factor: Issue	Main Effects (N=41)	
	F (1, 40)	P Value (two-tailed)
P-1	4.334	.044
I-1	2.676	.110
P-4	.458	.502

Table 3b. Wen's key beliefs in an ANOVA analysis of difference over domestic and international issues

Independent Factor: Issue	Main Effects (N=37)	
	F (1, 36)	P Value (two-tailed)
P-1	10.684	.002
I-1	5.925	.020
P-4	.613	.439

Although the norming group data in domestic politics are not available, we can compare Hu's and Wen's domestic P-1 belief and I-1 belief with their international-issue-based P-1 and I-1 beliefs. From [Table 2](#), we see that Hu and Wen have higher values for P-1 and I-1 in the international arena than in domestic politics. Hu also has a higher value of P-4 for international politics than for domestic affairs. Wen's P-4 value in international politics is slightly lower than that in domestic politics. From the ANOVA test, we see that Hu's P-1 difference between domestic and international issues is statistically significant ($p < .05$), while his I-1 and P-4 differences are not (see [Table 3a](#)). From Hu's case, we can conclude that a leader's P-1 belief value may vary in domestic and international politics. In order to precisely compare Hu's and Wen's beliefs with those of other world leaders, new norming group data focusing on domestic political issues are needed for further research.

Nevertheless, Hu's high P-1 belief in international politics suggests that he is a cooperative leader in world politics. Hu's international P-1 value is higher than his domestic P-1 value. This means that he is more cooperative

in international politics than in domestic politics, although the positive value of P-1 indicates that he is also a politically tolerant leader in domestic politics. This can partially explain why Hu launched the ‘peaceful rise’ foreign policy after he came to power in 2004. The ANOVA test also shows that Wen’s P-1 and I-1 beliefs in international politics are statistically different and higher than his domestic P-1 and I-1 beliefs (see [Table 3b](#)). This confirms that the new generation of China’s leadership prefers cooperation to conflict in international politics. This consensus is a continuation of Deng’s policy of development in a peaceful environment.

Discussion

Recalling the three research questions (Q-1–Q-3), we can infer that Hu and Wen have similar beliefs in the nature of political universe and strategy. The positive high value of P-1 and I-1 beliefs indicates that both Hu and Wen hold democratic beliefs regarding political tolerance and their approach to dealing with opponents is moderate. However, the relatively low value of P-4 indicates that they have a relatively weak belief in their control over historical development. It means that Hu and Wen may not be able to implement a democratic transition in China even though they hold democratic beliefs (P-1).

The reason for this belief in a relative lack of control may lie in the differences between domestic versus international issues. In international affairs, a leader represents his or her country, which strengthens the leader’s belief in making decisions. In domestic politics, however, a leader does not have such strong support as in international politics. Therefore, a leader’s P-4 control belief may be relatively weak. However, the ANOVA test shows that the scores for Hu’s and Wen’s domestic P-4 beliefs are not statistically different from their international P-4 beliefs. Therefore, we can preliminarily conclude that Hu and Wen believe in relatively weak control in both the domestic and international political arenas.

Specifically, the low P-4 value for the domestic arena may reflect the reality that Hu and Wen do not yet have complete control within China. Factional politics, particularly the threat from the Shanghai Gang and *Taizi Dang*, are still a serious challenge to Hu’s and Wen’s leadership. In 2006, Hu and Wen, with support from former Vice President Zeng Qinghong, removed the former Mayor of Shanghai Chen Liangyu, a long-time ally of

Jiang. This is surprising, because Zeng used to be Jiang Zemin's supporter. He seems to have played a 'kingmaker' role in the political struggle between Jiang and Hu and Wen. Zeng is also one of the founding fathers of the *Taizi Dang*, which represents the interests of the children of the revolutionary elites inside of the CCP. Since the link between the Shanghai Gang and *Taizi Dang* is entangled, Hu's and Wen's *Tuanpai* faction will continue to be seriously challenged. The rise of Xi Jinping in 2008, a key member of the *Taizi Dang*, suggests that the political control of Hu's and Wen's *Tuanpai* faction is at least compromised by the influence of the *Taizi Dang*. This empirically vindicates the weak score for P-4 (control over historical development) for both Hu and Wen in operational code analysis.

Also, Hu and Wen's control of the military is still weak. Although Hu replaced Jiang as the Chair of the Central Military Committee in 2004, the real military power may still be in Jiang's hand. Many key People's Liberation Army leaders (like General Guo Boxiong) were promoted and cultivated all along by Jiang. The Beijing Guards are under the control of another Jiang protégé. For any Chinese leader in the future, how to obtain total control of the military is an unavoidable challenge.

Finally, mounting social problems may also weaken Hu's and Wen's beliefs regarding historical control. The loosening central control over the provincial governments, adding to domestic instability, seriously threatens the Communist Party's rule. Increasing wealth disparity among regions and among different groups of people, social problems resulting from unemployment, the medical care system, the social safety net, education, inflation and rural–urban differences all severely challenge the CCP's domestic governance and legitimacy based on economic development.

Implications for China's Foreign Policy

China is a country experiencing an unprecedented transformation. Decades of rapid economic growth have pushed China to face the challenge of political reform. Whether and when China embraces democracy largely depends on the new generation of China's leadership. In this chapter we have examined the operational code of China's current leadership, the Hu and Wen system. We conclude that Hu and Wen have relatively democratic and tolerant beliefs within domestic politics. Their domestic policies are

also more likely to be moderate rather than radical because of their cooperative beliefs regarding strategy. A gradual political transition may be on the horizon in China. However, Hu's and Wen's weak political control in domestic politics, due to challenges from other political factions inside the CCP, may seriously compromise their goal of democratisation. The political struggle of Hu and Wen with conservative forces will likely shape the political future of China in the next decades.

If China turns to democracy in the coming decades, its foreign policy orientation will remain peaceful. From Hu's and Wen's operational code, we can see the convergence of Chinese leaders' beliefs about the political universe (P-1) in both domestic and international domains. This convergence suggests that if Chinese leaders hold democratic and tolerant beliefs that eventually lead to democratisation in China, their beliefs about international politics are more likely to be cooperative in nature. The interplay of leaders' cooperative beliefs and a democratic system will lead China's foreign policy in a peaceful direction.

One caveat is worth noting. As some scholars suggest, states during democratisation are more likely to be involved in conflicts because political elites may manipulate belligerent nationalism through public opinion to pursue their political goals (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). This situation may happen in China. As our analysis shows, Hu and Wen have relatively low control of domestic politics, which may preclude the realisation of their political goals. China's next generation of leadership after Hu and Wen may face a similar dilemma because of the inherently weak political legitimacy associated with a non-election-based power transition. If the new leadership starts a process of political reform and liberalisation, it will face harsh challenges from conservative forces inside the CCP. Fierce domestic struggles between the reformists and the conservatives in China during democratisation may influence China's foreign policy decision-making. Will China be a status quo power? It is still too early for a definite answer. China has a long way to go to become a democracy, and its future is still unwritten.

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A Former Superpower Coming Out of Hibernation: Today's Russia in World Politics

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Introduction

Today's Russian Federation is the legitimate successor to the former Soviet Union. The breakup of the latter, almost two years after the end of the Cold War following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, did not drag the former into disintegration or demise. Despite the withdrawal from territories that had been under Soviet rule in the 'near abroad' and around the Soviet flag worldwide, and despite the Chechen secessionist movement, Moscow remained the glorious capital of a Russia that, while profoundly wounded in its greatness and international prestige, was nevertheless territorially united and nationally sovereign.

The first post-Soviet years coincided with Boris Yeltsin's one-time renewal of a four-year presidency term. This period saw Russians endure an acute downgrading of their power base while going through a shocking and distressing transition to a market economy and democracy. In late 1998, one year before Yeltsin handed over office, this process of deterioration reached its culmination.¹ Russia was nearly bankrupt in the aftermath

¹ The year 1997 signalled the return of Russia to positive GDP growth (0.9%) for the first time in five years, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, during which its economic activity experienced a sharp overall contraction of about 54% (in 1992, -19.4%; 1993, -13%; 1994, -13.5%; 1995, -4.2%, 1996, -3.4%) (IMF, 2001, p. 70; 2000, p. 197). In 1998, in contrast to the IMF's GDP growth estimates of around 1% and positive expectations, the 'Russian economy plunged into deep crisis' which made evident not only 'the importance of arresting and reversing Russia's economic decline' but also an urgent need for the 'international community . . . to be prepared to assist a strengthened commitment to reform that can prove to have domestic political backing' (IMF, 1999, p. 15; 1998, pp. 17, 24).

of a large default on domestic debt and a devaluation of the rouble. Yeltsin's Russia, despite the fact that its human and material resources had declined, was still perceived as a great power, thanks to its permanent membership on the UN Security Council, its mighty nuclear arsenal and its vast territory at the centre and occupying just over one-quarter of Eurasia – but a declining second-tier power nevertheless.² Not only did it clearly lack the global politico-ideological standing and power projection of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), it was also suffering from an immense identity crisis originating in its multi-faceted decay and hardship.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the rise of Vladimir Putin to power signalled the reversal of downward trends.³ During the course of his two terms in office as President, he not only proved able to capitalise on Russia's assets to the utmost but also, in so doing, was able to embark on an array of radical reforms. In mastering Russia's human and material potential and possibilities, he managed to effect its recovery and restore its leading role in Europe and Asia with an influential say in international affairs. Essentially, at the time Putin was inaugurated as President, Russia stood on the edge of a power collapse and on the margins of world politics. The question had long before been asked whether Russians could ever become capable of living 'not merely with the world but in it' (Remnick, 1997, p. 44). Eight years later, in mid-2008, when Putin handed the presidential post over to Dmitry Medvedev, Moscow found itself at the centre of the international stage and on the way to becoming a first-tier great power. The Putin leadership could claim to have intercepted Russia's fall

² At the time, although the capacity of the Russians to develop new strategic nuclear weapons might soundly be argued (Lodal, 2001, p. 71), they felt that they could still claim superpower status on account of their existing nuclear forces (Eyal, 2000, p. 13).

³ Two caveats are appropriate here. First, Vladimir Putin was, to outward appearances, a man of the Yeltsin era. He became Prime Minister in August 1999 when, of course, that era was drawing to a close, as a result of an appointment made by Yeltsin and approved by the Russian Parliament. But Putin was also his own man. It was before March 2000 that he stood for the presidential elections and was invested with an unambiguous popular mandate. Four years later, he triumphantly won his people's confidence again. Second, in contrast to the IMF's initial projections for 1999 – that in the aftermath of the 1998 debt default, Russia's GDP would further contract by 7% – the economy moved into positive territory and grew by 5.4%, inaugurating a multi-year period of strong performance (IMF, 1999, p. 16; 2001, p. 70).

and restored it as 'an equal in the society of the most developed states' (Sakwa, 2008c, p. 298). If nothing else, Putin's leadership gave the go-ahead for the present Medvedev Administration to further develop market and civil society freedoms of all sorts at home and stand his country's ground against the US and other great powers in the international arena (*The Economist*, 2009d; *Financial Times*, 2008).

From this angle, the advent of Medvedev could hardly be considered the end of the Putin era. One obvious reason is that shortly after Putin stood down as President, he took over the post of Prime Minister and has continued to actively engage in state governance at centre stage. The other reason is that Medvedev appears to be following the course set out by Putin; at least in that sense, they are both marching to the same tune of reasserting Russia's great power aspirations.

Some caution is needed, nonetheless. Russia's comeback as a pre-eminent global actor with its own national desire for a leading international role and regional reach should be taken as a given. In self-assessing the main achievements of his Presidency just before he stepped down, Putin proclaimed that his achievement had been a 'resurrection for Russia, with a strong independent state and a strong foreign posture'.⁴ Along this line, in the limited war with Georgia in August 2008, Medvedev, in the first serious test of both his capabilities and his intentions to pursue Russian national interests, tuned his stance to Putin's moves, reaffirming the Kremlin's intention to make clear that it is back again, fully prepared to forcefully advance its foreign policy objectives in its 'near abroad' (Shearman and Sussex, 2009; Allison, 2008).⁵ Similarly, at the third NATO–Russia Council Summit meeting, held during the 19–20 November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, Russian leadership, driven by the discernible impulses and pressures of a rising great power, was able to eliminate all doubts as to its firm determination to play for high stakes in world politics.⁶

⁴ Quoted in *The Economist* (2008a). Then, the consensus among Russian elites was that Russia is a normal modern great power pursuing its hold on domestic strength in terms of political stability, economic prosperity and social cohesion, and an international power in terms of influence, reach and prestige (Oliker et al., 2009, p. 87).

⁵ Compare to Nygren (2008), who argues that the effort to restore a powerful Russia in the 'near abroad' is driven by geo-economic rather than geo-political goals and perspectives.

⁶ NATO and Russia agreed to 'set on path towards strategic partnership'. To this end, they decided to work together towards reviewing common security threats

But the gist of the matter is that contrary to the view of many media commentators and practitioners, this resurgence and reassertion should not be misunderstood as a sign of aggressiveness and expansionism. Russia's re-emergence is meant purely to imply that 'it is once again a force in world affairs' (*Financial Times*, 2007). It is neither a superpower nor the major leading power in the heart of Eurasia. Nor is it powerful enough to defy the imperatives of globalisation and, by extension, to create and head an anti-US coalition acting as an anti-globalising force.⁷ It is prudent enough to realise that it scarcely has a present and a future should it opt for zero-sum confrontations with the rest of the major powers or decide to go all the way alone (Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 2004). Unlike its predecessor, which sought to surpass the West and break the rules of world politics for its own benefit, today's Russia could arguably be claimed to be a revisionist force to the degree that it is striving to play its full part by the existing set of rules but in line with its parochial interests and strategic preferences on an equal footing, at least institutionally, with the established great powers. It is scarcely surprising, for instance, that Moscow makes no secret of the fact that it supports, in the words of its minister for foreign affairs, 'an integrated approach to solving the problems of the Euro-Atlantic region in a trilateral format' (Lavrov, 2007, p. A15). No matter its seemingly forceful assertiveness, what it aspires to is, on the one hand, to tailor

and the likelihood of a joint missile defence shield development project. Also, Russia pledged to become more intensively involved in logistically assisting NATO operations in Afghanistan. See NATO (2010).

⁷ Some scholars, identifying the process of globalisation with the advance of liberal values and Western-style capitalism under the hegemonic guidance of Washington, would assert that despite rhetoric to the contrary, Russia continues to place emphasis on the economic role of the state and protectionism. In that regard, it resists globalising trends, in a feverish effort to 'undermine the US supremacy as a force of political and economic globalisation', thereby preparing the ground for a multipolar international system (Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos, 2010). In principle, I dispute the claim in that Russia understands globalisation, and in some way market economy and democracy, only in terms of liberalisation and through the lens of US hegemony. Specifically speaking, too, it is one thing to argue that Moscow is trying to 'establish a Russian-led regional zone in her near abroad', stave off 'further EU economic expansion in the East' and 'compete on an equal footing with the US'; it is another claim altogether to label these goals anti-liberal, anti-market and anti-Western and regard them as designed to favour regional integration at the expense of globalising dictates (Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos, 2010, pp. 79, 87).

its policies to its power deficiencies and the constraints thrown up both by the evolving international environment and its domestic politics, and on the other hand, to foster relations of cooperation as an equally high-ranking strategic partner in a kind of collective leadership, primarily, with the EU and the US.

In short, we are presently living in a time of power transition, in addition to experiencing the dreadful effects of the global economic crisis and the EU's ensuing sovereign debt crisis. In the light of still highly unstable conditions in world financial and capital markets but amid a hesitant pick-up in international economic activity, a power shift in global economic balance from the developed West to the developing East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, is set to gather momentum inasmuch as the pace of recovery seems to be more restrained in advanced economies than in emerging ones.⁸ In this context, Medvedev's and Putin's Russian economy having posted, after a 10-year period of rapid expansion, a 7.9% contraction in 2009 alone and a 3.7–4.0% rebound the following year, is anticipating further growth of close to 4.3% in 2011, at or just above the world's likely 4.2% (IMF, 2010, pp. 2, 181; OECD, 2010). Robustly rebalancing its growth, Russia appears to re-emerge into confident statehood and shows a strong propensity for greater activism and fully fledged engage-

⁸ One critical aspect of the current shifting trends in the global economic gravity is that in 2010, emerging and developing economies expanded very strongly at an annualised rate of 7.1%, compared with the mere 2.7% growth in advanced economies. In 2011, robust though slightly moderated activity is expected to continue on about the same uneven track in favour of emerging and developing economies, where the annual GDP growth rate is forecast to reach 6.4%, against 2.2% in advanced economies (IMF, 2010, p. 2). The other critical aspect is that from the 1990s to the present, the contribution of the industrially advanced countries to global output has slowly but persistently shrunk. In 1990, their annual share of the world's aggregate GDP and exports of goods and services was 54.4% and 75.9%, respectively, with US world shares standing at 22.5% and 13.6% and the European Community at 18.5% and 42.0%, respectively. Almost 12 years later, in 2009, advanced economies accounted for 53.8% of aggregate GDP and 65.5% of exports of goods and services, with the US share being 20.4% and 10.0% of the world's whole, respectively, and the Euro area's 15.1% and 28.3%. Also, within the span of a decade, of the emerging and developing countries, the economic rise of China has been significant to spectacular. Its share in world aggregate GDP climbed from 11.2% in 1999 to 12.6% in 2009, and in world exports of goods and services from 3.1% to 8.5%, respectively (IMF, 2010, p. 170; 2000, p. 187; 1993, pp. 121–2).

ment in international affairs, mainly through and by placing increased emphasis on strategic alliances and multilateralism.

Unlike in the recent past, however, the Kremlin's leadership today is not struggling to halt its decline in hard and soft power or to reassert its claim to a leading great power role. Whether it will ever be able to redevelop its capabilities and restore its international status and reach is no longer at stake. Nor is there a question of how it is going to rebuild and exercise its greatness. Rather, Moscow is solidly on the rise, and the consensus is that it is set to continue growing strongly and focusing with much self-consciousness and more plainly on its core national interests. On that count, it could be said to have articulated and possessed a coherent grand strategy with the priority of attaining the top rank in the form of a first-tier great power acting as an influential partner in a concert-based leadership on the world stage.⁹ This grand task is detailed into clear-cut constituent goals that appear to be widely accepted domestically, which are to augment and enhance the efficient use of its power resources; to re-carve out a privileged zone of interest, coupled with the creation of a tailor-made security architecture in the space of the former Soviet Union; and to scale up its political and economic presence in the international and regional landscape.

Russia, as a matter of fact, is not in search of a comeback in world politics. That is quite a grand strategic *acquis*; the undertaking to replay a major global role is both acknowledged and contested on a daily basis. Having

⁹ Much ink has been spilt over the question of whether grand strategy is a conscious design with the property of in-built planning. This in turn picks up on a much-debated theme about the definition and the instrumentality of concepts. Thus, a brief ground-clearing clarification is necessary.

It goes without saying that concepts appear to give rationality and unity to the reality. But no matter how rigorous or all-encompassing the conceptualisation is, a term is nothing less than an abstract mental construct that serves as a building block for making sense of current evidence and historical experience. From this viewpoint, therefore, grand strategy is an intellectual tool of codifying concrete parts of human arrangement and action.

Shifting the focus, too, one may argue that grand strategy exists *per se*, in one form or another. Whatever coherence or inconsistency in design and management, the state acts or reacts by choices and moves in an orderly or disorderly way. So what is practically debatable in this regard is not so much whether the state has a rational master plan for effective action as whether the decisions it makes work or not. In essence, the term grand strategy denotes that a particular combination of means and ends carries choices and moves into effect, and all that is more or less subject to scholarly scrutiny.

completed an idiosyncratic Russian-style transition to democracy and the market economy, what is still unclear is the pace of growth and development, and how this will determine the degree to which Russia is capable of giving shape and substance of a contributor to its role. And so it is the competence of the performance, not the skill, the eligibility and the way to do things that is still in question. Indeed, as the new international system evolves, the primary challenge ahead for Russia is to consolidate and strengthen its gains. This will require Russia to frame its place in the global scene more precisely, intelligently manage its tendency to reassert itself and set in play effective strategies, in order to ensure that it will continue to create and aggregate sufficient power to support its aspirations. It is precisely from this angle – in view of the major steps taken in the course of the first decade of the current century to restore, maintain and enhance Russia's capacity for resurgence – that this chapter seeks to bring out the differences of degree, if not proportions of change, in strategic choices. In the pages that follow, my aim is to provide a concise account of the trends that determine the grand strategy roadmap of a former superpower, a powerful bear waking from a long winter's sleep.

Putin's Presidency Before the Global Credit Crunch

The Putin Administration was characterised by both the end of Russia's decline and the start and persistence of its power regeneration. From the outset, at least apparently, it made certain central grand strategic choices, which were to arrest decline, accelerate recovery and restore the country's standing in the international arena. The ultimate aim was to integrate Russia 'into the system of Great Powers on equal terms' (Lukyanov, 2008, p. 21). In this context, the grand-strategic means that Putin used to accomplish these goals were mainly three: rallying and making the most of Russia's human and material resources, pushing through sweeping domestic reforms and stepping up foreign policy moves to regain its regional reach and reassert its political right to engage in the management of international affairs.¹⁰

¹⁰ Unless cited otherwise, insights, data and references for the discussion that follows are drawn from Fakiolas and Fakiolas (2009, pp. 94–102; 2004, pp. 386–7, 392–97) and Fakiolas (1998, pp. 84–90).

Mastering Resources

To begin with the first instrument, Putin and his advisers showed wisdom in starting the effort of national rejuvenation by taking charge of Russia's legacy assets, from its vast territorial size and abundance of natural resources to its ample skilled workforce. In terms of geographical area, Russia, while smaller than its predecessor, is still the largest country in the world (17.1 million square kilometres), about four times the size of the EU and twice the size of the US and China. To this should be added the fact that it is a Eurasian country that – having common frontiers with the EU and China, among others – offers a large, geographically close market with high prospects for profitable investments and commercial transactions. In terms of raw materials, too, it is a superpower. It holds the world's first- and second-largest reserves of natural gas and coal, respectively. With nearly 18% of the world's proven oil reserves, it occupies first place in the world's listing of combined oil and gas reserves, and energy resources in eastern Russia alone are estimated to far surpass the Caspian Basin's total (Goldstein and Kozyrev, 2006, pp. 163, 176; Eyal, 2002, p. 24). It is common knowledge that in the coming decades, the plentiful reserves of available natural resources will underpin Russia's growth and development and sustain its pre-eminence as a global producer and exporter of resources. Equally important is the fact that Moscow is endowed with a pioneering tradition in military research and applications, coupled with a longstanding excellence in physics, chemistry, mathematics, earth sciences, medicine and surgery, nuclear manufacturing and space transport and equipment.

Thus, having inherited from the former Soviet Union a huge wealth of minerals and more than one-third of its capabilities of all sorts, Putin proved able not just to convert them into realised, actual power but also to exploit their development potential to Russia's advantage. His assertive energy diplomacy was a case in point.¹¹ Taking advantage of the proximity and the good relations with Brussels and Beijing, he worked hard to complete deals towards the establishment of energy networks between Europe and Asia or to cultivate the perception that his country could reliably and safely meet their energy needs at preferential prices and through the cheapest transfer route by pipelines and grids.¹² Also, it is no coincidence

¹¹ Compare to Monaghan (2007) for quite a different view.

¹² As the literature on the subject is extensive, see Hall and Grant (2009), Bozhilova (2009), Proedrou (2007) and Baran (2007).

that Putin based the resurgence of Russian exports and GDP growth on the increased production and export of energy resources. Under his leadership, the percentage share of fossil fuels, primarily of oil and natural gas, in Russian income generation rose steadily, as did the corresponding share of Russia's mining industry production, which grew to account for more than one quarter of its GDP. In fact, the Russian economic recovery was heavily dependent on raw materials, driven as it was by high energy prices. This in turn allowed the Kremlin's leadership to register a record \$500 billion in gold and foreign exchange reserves in late 2008, thereby climbing to number three in world ranking (after China and Japan) at a time when the Russian economy was on its way to experiencing strong stresses and downturns as a result of a still developing global financial crisis. Furthermore, Putin was very busy stimulating Russian advanced weaponry exports (from light arms and anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles to heavy tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, destroyers and submarines) and arranging agreements and signing contracts with a number of countries in order to sell cutting-edge Russian technology for the construction of nuclear reactors, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing stations, space launches, electricity plants and uranium storehouses.¹³

Domestic Reforms

As regards the grand strategic tool of domestic reforms, Putin explicitly worked to rebuild a strong state, re-establish the fundamentals of political order and refuel the real economy. Towards this end, he gave top priority to the restoration of state authority and restructuring of government institutions. He took a series of decisions to strengthen the power prerogatives of the presidency and shape it into the overriding pillar of the political system, with a view to centralising and enhancing the state's capacity for decision-making and implementation. His task was to renovate the ruling regime so as to set the stage for the Russian state to not merely reinstate its power at home but also begin restoring its greatness abroad.

Of the reformist measures the Putin Administration enacted, four seem to have been the most critical. The first was to renew the governing coal-

¹³ Russia today is, after the US, the world's second-largest arms supplier. Over the years 2005–9, it was estimated to account for 23% of global arms transfers (SIPRI, 2010, p. 14). Nonetheless, its energy sector exports continue to dominate by over three-fifths its total exports (Oliker et. al., 2009, pp. 47–8).

tion with associates and state functionaries devoted to his cause. A second measure was to demarcate the boundaries of constitutional power among the executive, the legislative and the judiciary.¹⁴

The third reform was to reframe the sway of politics over economics, that is, to reassert the central authority of the state over business elites (Sakwa, 2008b). To that end, Putin reset the rules of the game for business activity but without turning the market competition upside down or bringing back a command economy. Entrepreneurs, and especially the notorious so-called oligarchs, were advised to stay out of politics, pay their taxes, conform to the law and avoid bribing public servants. As long as they adapted to the new situation and displayed strong attitudes of cooperation, the Kremlin abstained from investigating economic crimes they had allegedly committed during the extensive privatisations of the Yeltsin years. The tycoons who refused to pledge fidelity to the state and insisted on seeking to control both politics and economics were accused of fraud and corruption. Some were forced to flee abroad. Others were arrested and imprisoned on charges of large-scale tax evasion. Scarcely surprising, the more Putin got his own ranks on board and showed firm determination to impose the rule of state institutions over business, the more his popularity soared, and so oligarchs lined up on his side. If nothing else, the majority of tycoons who toed the line had no reason to oppose Kremlin leadership, insofar as their business activity remained intact and social tranquillity was safeguarded. The same held true for Russian society. Most Russians were irritated that the oligarchs had made huge fortunes out of their country's misfortune at a time of power collapse and were accustomed to doing business in defiance of the law; their excessive affluence was another irritant. Hence the few prosecutions of oligarchs were seen in the Russian people's eyes as properly 'advancing a political and economic system,

¹⁴ The Kremlin is said to have coined this measure as the materialisation of 'sovereign democracy'; the main components of which are 'democracy, the sovereignty of the Russian state above all, and material well-being' (Oliker et al., 2009, p. 10). But in the process of this materialisation unfolding, the executive was criticised for having overshadowed the other two branches of power, restrained democratic balances and checks, weakened state accountability, manipulated the media and limited the opposition; the result being that Russian politics evolves into neither democracy nor authoritarianism (Oliker et al., 2009, pp. 10–15; Pallin, 2008; Hanson, 2007). Compare with Worth (2009), who asserts that Putin managed to balance between economic liberalism and political authoritarianism but without harmonising the state with society.

where many people . . . could enjoy property and political access' (Caranghan, 2007, p. 64). In short, Putin's moves on this count were in tune with popular feeling. No matter whether, or how much, human and property rights and liberties were violated, the aftermath of this acute clash found the Putin Administration stronger and more capable of defining the presidency's domain and aligning the allegiance of the Russian business community with the central authority.¹⁵

The centralisation of executive power, along with the reassertion of the state over the economy, played a formative part in realising the fourth and last measure, which was to advance economic transformation under state control. In contrast to Yeltsin's neoliberal restructuring of the Russian economy, Putin might be said to have embarked on a state-driven but market-oriented economic modernisation. This choice was a matter of grand strategic consideration rather than one of re-nationalising a sizeable segment of the economy and resetting the economic activity under state ownership. Private capitalist forces were left free to work in conditions of open and fair competition in areas where the state was not intent on doing business or controlling resources and rents in the name of national interest. Otherwise, foreign investments were blocked or curtailed, companies' operating licences were suspended and sales and privatisation projects were postponed or held back.¹⁶

One main result of this extended state interference in the economy seems to have been the rise of a 'neo-corporatist state-sponsored model of economic development' that has prepared the ground for Russia to create

¹⁵ Many analysts continue to blame the Medvedev-Putin leadership for shortcomings in the application of justice, the legitimising of police violence and the principles of constitution, accountability and good governance in Russia. But whatever the repression, mistreatment and violation, the days of Soviet totalitarianism and brutality are definitely over. Though scarcely spoken aloud, the right to be oneself and speak one's views freely is a political *acquis*. The Russian people enjoy numerous freedoms, 'to travel, open businesses, go to church, watch satellite television or use an uncensored internet – unthinkable 20 years ago' (Buckley, 2006). Beyond any doubt, 'today's Russia is hardly the Soviet Union. It has basic freedoms and a large private sector' (*The Economist*, 2009e).

¹⁶ In 2006, for instance, the Kremlin introduced a bill to exclude foreign investments from 39 sectors, including aerospace and defence. A year later, a number of foreign investors were denied permission to acquire a controlling stake in about 550 Russian firms active in nationally sensitive industries (Anderson, 2006/7, pp. 71–2).

and transform state holding companies into ‘national champions’ in such key sectors as energy, arms and aircraft manufacturing (Sakwa, 2008b, pp. 187–90). Indeed, it was not until the Putin era that Russian firms, in particular state-owned champions, began to venture abroad by obtaining a significant or majority equity participation in enterprises located in the former Soviet republics, Europe and Africa. In terms of geography, in that regard, Russia has fared well, since it has extensive ground and maritime frontiers with the world’s biggest markets: the EU, China, Japan and the US. Clearly, the more Russian companies play by the rules of world markets with a view to a global customer base, the greater the prospects for them to become multinationals, hence competitive and profitable on a sound basis. The other major result of the expansion of the Russian state’s economic role was that it enabled Putin to keep state finances in check and boost growth;¹⁷ even though the enduring structural deficiencies of energy export dependency and the credit and investment shortage facing the Russian economy remained (Robinson, 2009).

Foreign Policy

In using foreign policy as a means to implement his grand strategy, Putin brought to a halt his predecessor’s swings from appeasement to confrontation with the West. He reoriented Russian foreign policy towards active international engagement in world politics but with self-interests, assertive ambitions and freedom of action.¹⁸ Russia was to remain its own country, after its own great power image. It was reset to restore its position by combining ‘adaptation to international norms with a reversed area of autonomy and scope for indigenous development’ (Sakwa, 2008a, p. 244). This change was made to enable Russia to stand for itself on the world stage more vigorously. Two moves were of paramount importance in this respect after the failed rapprochement with George W. Bush’s US in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

¹⁷ During Putin’s Presidency, Russian GDP growth rates averaged over 6.5% (in 2000, 10%; 2001, 5.1%; 2002, 4.7%; 2003, 7.3%; 2004, 7.2%; 2005, 6.4%; 2006, 8.2%; 2007, 8.5%; 2008, 5.2%) (IMF, 2010, p. 181; 2008, p. 264), and was higher than the 5% world average and two to three times higher than those of the US and Europe.

¹⁸ Compare with Mankoff (2009), who argues that this change began during the Yeltsin era.

The first was to integrate Russia into the world economy. In addition to assisting Russian firms in investing and completing deals abroad, emphasis was placed on Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. By the time Putin stepped down from the presidency, the task of penetrating the international energy and weaponry markets had been met with much success, while the issue of WTO membership remained unresolved as a result primarily of US objections.

The second primary move was to foster solid relations with the EU and China. On many occasions, Russian leaders voiced the conviction that although they did not aspire to join the EU, they were part and parcel of Europe in terms of geography and mentality, and that their political, economic and security future lay with it.¹⁹ Putin (2006, p. 10) himself declared that 'Russia is a member of the European family in spirit, history and culture . . . when I consider the future of our relations I do not see any areas that are not open to equal, strategic cooperation based on common objectives and values'.

Prioritising cooperation with the EU did not mean that Putin's relationship with it was free of friction and setbacks (Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 2005). On balance, however, it tended to be positive and rewarding in diverse areas, expanding from trade and energy through the fight against organised crime and corruption to space. In 2000, for example, Moscow and Brussels decided to reactivate and upgrade their 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) by launching an energy dialogue. Two years later, the EU conferred on Russia the status of a market economy. This allowed the Kremlin to contest anti-dumping practices, benefit from lower tariffs and reduce its debt burden. In 2003–5, too, the two parties used their PCA to adopt roadmaps for establishing common spaces in four areas: economics, freedom/security/justice, external security and education/culture. And it was before Putin's term as President ended that Russia and the EU agreed on starting negotiations over the renewal of the PCA.

Putin also made great strides in coming to terms with China. At first, he took the initiative to settle nearly all the outstanding disputes between the two countries, including that over their borderline, which was the cause of

¹⁹ For example, Igor Ivanov (2003, p. 13), Putin's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, believed that 'Russian culture and civilization are European' and that common interests between Russia and Europe 'fell victim to the logic of cold war bloc'.

the two countries' military clash in the late 1960s. Moreover, Putin built on the common fear of the US's unilateral assertiveness and its meddling in Chechnya and Taiwan. Thus, he coordinated his moves with the Chinese leaders through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in order to direct the future of Central Asia. To this was added a number of agreements ranging from Chinese purchases of Russian weapon systems and equipment to joint investments intended for the interconnection of their energy pipelines and electricity grids. But let me close this section and move on to briefly outline how the ends are currently being related to the means in Medvedev's grand strategy.

Medvedev's Presidency amid the Global Economic Crisis

Putin's Russia indisputably broke away from Yeltsin's. It overcame the odds to stop its fall and set off a recovery, staging a comeback as a key global player. The aftermath of the Putin presidency was the regeneration and reassertion of Russia's greatness, directed as it was by a grand strategy that was founded, as I analysed above, on an effective combination of certain objectives and tools. This strategic asset presented the newly elected President Medvedev with the challenge of managing, in close cooperation with his mentor Prime Minister Putin (whom Medvedev had appointed), Moscow's resurgent great power aspirations in a manner that would make room for it to reap the rewards without stirring up its peers' exasperation or provoking counterbalancing moves. To this was added the fact that Russia's leaders were called upon to steer domestic power transition and to give shape and substance to their rising international role on the eve of a terrible turbulence in financial markets that was to drag the world economy into deep recession. In fact, the global economic crisis and its spillover impact on the Russian economy²⁰ could be said to have facilitated adjustments in perspectives and purposes in order to impinge on the Kremlin's grand strategy more promptly.

Medvedev, therefore, appears to have articulated the consolidation and preservation of Russia's presence in the ranks of great powers as its ultimate grand strategic aim, with a view to climbing to first-tier standing as an outstanding partner in a globally concerted collective leadership. He ral-

²⁰ For insightful reports, see *The Economist* (2008b; 2009c; 2009b).

lies to this task being fully confident that 'Russia's contribution will be in demand worldwide' on the grounds that 'the policies of the leading world powers will be . . . more focused on strengthening global security, rather than securing the dominance of any particular nation' (Medvedev, 2009). Even though this choice marks a measure of overall continuity when compared with the Putin grand strategy, it involves both a discernible difference of degree to the extent that it sets out on a path towards *profound* and *enhanced* greatness, and a proportion of change to the extent that it centres on varied constituent goals – that is, to improve its conversion of power resources, to safeguard its position as 'first violin' in its periphery and to sensibly advance and capitalise on its rise in world politics.

The crucial dimension of Medvedev's grand strategy is that the main means it uses, in addition to Putin's respective instruments portfolio,²¹ is the one intended for dealing with Russia's strategic liabilities, of which two are considered important, at least for the time being. One limitation is that the Russian economy rests heavily on the extracting sector rather than on machinery, high-tech manufacturing and services. About two-thirds of Russian exports are energy resources, metals and other raw materials.²² The other problem concerns the weaknesses or degradation of Russia's Soviet-era infrastructure and public services as demonstrated by a vast array of occurrences, ranging from accidents in industrial plants and transit networks through submarine tragedies to wildfire disasters and terrorist bombing devastations. These two liabilities are currently the target of a series of restructuring measures labelled the modernisation project.²³

²¹ A comment regarding the EU as a foreign policy tool must be recorded. Medvedev seems to place an increased emphasis on Moscow's relationship to Brussels. Whether or not this is destined to evolve into a firm strategic partnership depends on the way the two parties manage the outstanding issues of energy security and geopolitical flux in their joint near neighbourhood. All other things being equal, the dominant trend is positive. The driving force behind it is the fact that while the EU accounts for roughly 50% of Russian exports (European Commission, 2010, p. 174), Russia can serve as the EU's principal energy supplier and market for exports and investments.

²² Russia appears to be 'more dependent on oil and gas than it has ever been', insofar as oil and gas revenues are estimated to 'account for 50% of Russian budget revenues and 65% of its exports' (*The Economist*, 2008c). At the same time, its innovation score in 2008 ranked it 51st in the world (*The Economist*, 2010a).

²³ Shortly after he rose to power, Medvedev announced plans to budget \$1 trillion in the next 10 years to renovate the country's crumbling infrastructure

Hence modernising, innovating and diversifying the economy are Medvedev's primary grand strategic means to serve the ends of maintaining and enhancing Russia's capacity for pre-eminence. It is no accident that modernisation remains at the top of the Kremlin's agenda (Medvedev, 2009; *The Economist*, 2010b). But the degree to which this grand strategy is likely to be rewarding for the consolidation of Russian greatness remains to be seen.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

Moscow is back again on the world stage; it is great once more. Encapsulating a view widely shared among decision-makers in the West, an influential international media magazine comments: 'Of all the great power relationships . . . Russia is the most awkward not only because it has been getting ever harder to deal with but also because it cannot be ignored' (*The Economist*, 2009a).

Indeed, today's Russia is still on the rise, on target to becoming a first-tier great power. It is fully self-confident and assertive but is inspired by 'the spirit of global cooperation' (Medvedev, 2009). It no longer stakes out demands for resurrection and respect. It aspires to contribute. What is at stake, nonetheless, is Russia's capacity to consolidate, maintain and reinforce the potential for growth and development. The endurance and enhancement of its greatness will be decided on that count.

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(Buckley, 2008). In mid-2010, too, the Kremlin announced its intention to sell stakes in state companies worth \$29 billion in order to reinforce private forces in the Russian economy (Weaver, 2010). In late 2010, finally, the creation of Skolkovo, a special zone intended for Russian and foreign investors to finance the research and production of cutting-edge technology, was completed (*The Economist*, 2010c).

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India's Rise Leads to New Foreign Policy Challenges

Harsh V. Pant

In June 1991, the government of India pawned 67 tons of gold to the Bank of England and the Union Bank of Switzerland to shore up its dwindling foreign exchange reserves. The US dollar was in great demand. By November 2009, after nearly two decades of reform and globalisation, the shoe had moved to the other foot: India bought 200 tons of gold from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The country's reserves stood at \$285 billion – compared with \$2 billion in 1991 – and the demand for greenbacks had dimmed.

These signs point to an optimistic outlook for India's rise as a global economic powerhouse which, in the view of some observers, seems as bright as the gold the country has recently acquired. From a nation that was mortgaging its gold reserves in the 1990s to one whose foreign exchange reserves are overfull, from a nation that was marginal in the global distribution of economic might to one that is increasingly emerging as a centre of the modern global economy, India has indeed come a long way. And this economic heft is rapidly translating into military and political power, making India a key player in the emerging global balance of power (Pant, 2008, pp. 1–14).

This chapter outlines the trajectory of Indian foreign policy in recent years, with a focus on India's interactions with the US and China as well as with its own immediate neighbours. In doing so, it underscores two of the most significant challenges India faces as the country tries to come to terms with its rapid ascent in the international system: exploiting the existing balance of power to its advantage and asserting its leadership in the South Asian region.

India and the US: Deepening Engagement amid a Shifting Balance of Power

One of the most remarkable aspects of Indian foreign policy in recent years has been New Delhi's gravitation towards Washington despite years of mistrust during the Cold War era. India's recent rise has been described by US President Barack Obama as being in the best interests of both India and the US as well of the world. Obama not only invited Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the first state guest of his presidency in November 2009, but also visited India a year later.

After playing down expectations, the US President made all the right noises in India. The most significant was his declaration that the US will back India's bid for a permanent seat on an expanded United Nations Security Council. This was a major policy shift that India had long been clamouring for and Washington had been reluctant to offer. By suggesting that he looks 'forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member', Obama warmed the hearts of Indian policy-makers who have long viewed American support as a litmus test of international acceptance (Wax and Lakshmi, 2010). There was no reservation or hesitation in Obama's gesture, which was probably the strongest endorsement the US has given to any country for permanent UN membership.

On Pakistan, too, Obama was deferential to Indian sensitivities. He maintained that that 'it is in the interest of India and Pakistan to reduce tensions between themselves and the US cannot impose solutions to these problems'. He also put Pakistan on notice by making it clear that 'there can be no safe haven for terror' and suggested that the US 'will continue to insist on Pakistani leadership to bring the Mumbai attackers to justice' (Wax and Lakshmi, 2010).

The real focus of Obama's visit was, however, economic. Obama realises that America's economic revival is the key to his re-election in 2012 and his media managers termed his trip in November 2010 as important for developing links with the booming economies of Asia. This was reflected in Obama's comment that 'when American people ask me why you are visiting India [*sic*], I want to say that India just created 50,000 jobs and so we should not be talking about protectionism' (*Indian Express*, 2010). Outsourcing has been a problem area and the Obama Administration's handling of it has irked India's corporate sector. Prime Minister Singh

reflected this concern when he emphatically argued that 'Indians were not in the business of stealing jobs from the US' (*Indian Express*, 2010).

During Obama's visit, more than 20 deals worth more than \$10 billion were signed by the corporate sectors of the two countries. These deals included the sale of military transport aircraft, civilian airplanes, mining equipment and jet engines. The issues of various barriers to trade and infrastructure bottlenecks were raised by Obama as problems in attracting greater American investment, underlining the continuing difficulties in US-India economic ties.

Other key agreements signed by Delhi and Washington during Obama's visit included a pact on setting up a joint clean energy research and development centre, a Memorandum of Understanding on a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, a global disease protection centre, energy cooperation and a pact on technical cooperation for the study of monsoons. India and the US also agreed to work closely on agricultural development and women's empowerment in Afghanistan as well as to boost joint efforts to promote a reliable information and communications infrastructure with a goal of free, fair and secure access to cyberspace.

The two governments decided to put in place a four-part export control reform programme that includes American support for India's membership in multilateral export control regimes, removing India's defence- and space-related entities from the American 'Entities List', an export licensing policy realignment and cooperation on export control. In line with Obama's declaration that India is no longer a rising power but has 'arrived', both countries have announced a dialogue on the Asia Pacific, which will expand current consultations to include East, West and Central Asia. It is also a signal to an increasingly assertive China that other states in the region will respond to Chinese projection of power.

However, while Obama managed to make the right noises in Delhi, many in India still wonder if he will be able to deliver on all that he has promised. The expansion of the UN Security Council will not happen anytime soon, and there is no consensus among the five permanent members about the scale and scope of this expansion. China remains opposed to any new member from Asia sitting at the high table. The process is complicated and will take a long time to come to fruition. So in many ways it was a cost-free option for Obama to declare his support for India's membership and then wait and see what happens. Whatever the ultimate outcome,

Obama did manage to ameliorate some of the concerns in New Delhi about his administration's earlier policies towards India.

There was uneasiness in the Indian policymaking community when Obama took office, as much the result of administration change in the US as of the economic crisis affecting Washington. George W. Bush, deeply suspicious of Communist China, was personally keen on building strong ties with India. He was willing to sacrifice long-held US non-proliferation concerns to embrace nuclear India and acknowledge it as the primary actor in South Asia, de-hyphenated from Pakistan (Pant, 2009b). The result was the landmark US-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact that reversed decades of US policy opposing nuclear cooperation with India, a nuclear weapons state that continues to refuse to sign the NPT. In addition, the pact won acceptance for India's de facto nuclear weapons state status at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the international cartel that controls trade in nuclear technology and fuel and that was established as a response to India's defiance of the global nuclear order in 1974. This recognition now allows India to take part in international nuclear commerce, a ringing endorsement of India's growing weight in global affairs and an acknowledgment of its growing intimacy with the world's only remaining superpower.

But the Obama Administration's concern about protecting the non-proliferation regime, the immediate challenge of dealing with a growing Taliban threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan and unprecedented economic challenges led it to a very different set of priorities and agenda in which India had a marginal role. At least initially, Obama talked of India only in the context of the need to sort out Kashmir so as to find a way out of the West's troubles in Afghanistan. Talk of a strategic partnership between the two democracies disappeared. The new administration toyed with the idea of a 'G-2', a global condominium of the US and China whereby China could be expected to look after and 'manage' the Asia Pacific.

Given the heavy US economic dependence on Beijing, a G-2 alliance may have made perfect sense for the US but it left India marginalised in the strategic scheme of things. From being viewed as a rising power and a balancer in the Asia Pacific, India in the early days of Obama was back to being seen as a regional South Asian actor whose only relevance for the US was in making sure that Pakistan fought the Taliban with full vigour without getting preoccupied in Kashmir. The smaller countries of East and Southeast Asia, not to mention India's immediate neighbours being wooed

by China, could not but note the shifting balance of power that Washington's manoeuvring signalled and India was concerned that they might adjust their own policies in response.

But soon the chimera of G-2 met its inevitable demise, and Washington has had to fight to retain its pre-eminence in the Asian balance of power. The choice of the four countries that Obama visited in November 2010 – India, South Korea, Indonesia and Japan – was aimed at reminding China that the US still retains its role as principle balancing force in the region. All four worry about China's rise and its recent attempts to assert its interests more forcefully in the region. There is a clamour for American leadership, as none of the regional states wants China to emerge as the dominant actor. The expectation is that a stronger US presence in the region provides greater stability. The US has tried to calm nerves in Asia with its recent moves and pronouncements vis-à-vis China. But there are still widespread doubts in the region about America's willingness and/or ability to provide counterbalancing capabilities with respect to China.

Even as India's ties with the US have once again gathered momentum, Sino-Indian relations have stalled. Like most states in the region India too has a key stake in the trajectory of Sino-US ties. As a new balance of power takes shape in Asia, and China becomes more assertive, India hopes to emerge – and many other states in the region want it to – as an indispensable element in that architecture. Even as New Delhi is being sought after to play a greater regional role, it has to tread a careful path given a rapid deterioration of Sino-Indian ties in recent years.

India and China: A Rivalry Takes Shape

India for years tried to brush significant disagreements with Beijing under the carpet, but New Delhi policymakers are now being forced to acknowledge, grudgingly, that the relationship is increasingly contentious. Prime Minister Singh has suggested that 'China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality . . . It's important to be prepared' (Scrutton, 2010).

This is despite the fact that bilateral relations between India and the People's Republic of China have come a long way after reaching their nadir in the immediate aftermath of India's nuclear tests in May 1998. China had been singled out as the number one security threat to India by India's

Defence Minister just before the nuclear tests (*New York Times*, 1998). After the tests, the Indian Prime Minister wrote to the US President justifying Indian nuclear tests as a response to the threat posed by China.¹ Not surprisingly, China reacted strongly and diplomatic relations between the two countries plummeted to an all-time low.

After more than a decade, relations between India and China, at least superficially, seem to be on a much firmer footing, as they have tried to reduce the prospect for rivalry and expand areas of cooperation. The visit of the Indian External Affairs Minister to China in 1999 marked the resumption of high-level dialogue and the two sides declared that they were not threats to each other. A bilateral security dialogue was also initiated that has helped the two countries openly express and share their security concerns with each other. Both China and India continue to emphasise that neither side should let differences impede the growth of functional cooperation between them. They also decided to expedite the demarcation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and the Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary question, set up in 1988, has been meeting regularly.² As a first step, the two countries exchanged border maps on the middle sector of the LAC. More recently, both nations have finalised a set of political ‘guiding principles’ that will govern the parameters of the dispute settlement. China has expressed its desire to seek a ‘fair’ resolution to the vexed boundary issue on the basis of ‘mutual accommodation, respect for history, and accommodation of reality’ (Joseph, 2005).

At the global level, the rhetoric is all about cooperation and the two sides have worked together on climate change, global trade negotiations and in demanding a restructuring of global financial institutions in view of the global economy’s shifting centre of gravity. At the bilateral level, however, things came to such a pass that China took its territorial dispute with India all the way to the Asian Development Bank in 2009, where it blocked an application by India for a loan that included development projects in the

¹ The text of the letter was published in the *The New York Times* (1998).

² The JWG was set up in 1988 during then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China to explore the boundary issues and examine probable solutions. As a follow-up in 1993, the two sides signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas. Thereafter the India–China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officials (EG) was set up under the JWG. Both the JWG and EG have been meeting regularly.

Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China continues to claim as part of its own territory. Buoyed by the perception that the Obama Administration plans to make its ties with China the centrepiece of its foreign policy in light of growing American economic dependence on China, China has displayed a distinctly aggressive stance towards India. The Chinese suggestion to the US Pacific Fleet Commander that the Indian Ocean should be recognised as a Chinese sphere of influence has raised hackles in New Delhi. China's lack of support for the US–India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact, which it tried to block at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and its obstructionist stance in bringing to justice the terrorist masterminds of the November 2008 carnage in Mumbai have further strained ties (Pant, 2009b, pp. 289–91). Moreover, China blocked India's membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation, while India became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) despite China's opposition. China has been non-committal on India's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and has obliquely warned against India's military presence in Central Asia.

Sino–Indian frictions are growing and the potential for conflict remains high (Pant, 2010). Alarm is rising in India because of frequent and strident territorial claims by China along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. Indians complain that there has been a dramatic rise in Chinese intrusions into Indian territory over the past two years, most of them along the border in regions of Arunachal Pradesh that China refers to as 'southern Tibet'. China has upped the ante on the border issue. It continues to challenge Indian government's role in Arunachal Pradesh, asserting its claims over the territory, but what has caught most observers of Sino–Indian ties by surprise is the vehemence with which Beijing has contested every single recent Indian administrative and political action in the state, and has even denied visas to Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh. The recent rounds of boundary negotiations have been a disappointing failure, with a growing perception in India that China is less than willing to adhere to earlier political understandings on how to address the dispute.

China's rapid economic growth in the past decade has given it the capability to transform itself into a military power (Goldstein, 1997/98). Its rapidly modernising military is a cause of great concern for India. China's military may or may not be able to take on the United States in the next

few years, but it will surely become the dominant force in Asia (Khalilzad et al., 1999, pp. 37–62). India is concerned about the opacity that seems to surround China's military build-up, with an emerging consensus that Beijing's real military spending is at least double the announced figure. The official amount given by the Chinese government does not include the cost of new weapons purchases, research or other big-ticket items for China's highly secretive military, and as a result, the real figure may be much higher than China acknowledges.

India seems to have lost the battle over Tibet to China, despite the fact that Tibet constitutes China's only truly fundamental vulnerability vis-à-vis India (Garver, 2001, pp. 32–78). India has failed to limit China's military use of Tibet despite the great implications for Indian security, even as Tibet has become a platform for the projection of Chinese military power. India's tacit support for the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile has failed to have much of an impact, either on China or on the international community. Today even the Dalai Lama seems ready to talk to the Chinese, because he realises that in a few years Tibet might be overwhelmed with the Han population and Tibetans themselves might become a minority in their own land.

Even though China has solved most of its border disputes with other countries, it is reluctant to move ahead on that front with India. No results of any substance have emerged from the Sino-Indian border negotiations. Even as the talks continue endlessly, momentum seems to have flagged (Garver, 2001, pp. 100–9). So far only the maps of the middle sector of the LAC, the least controversial part of the boundary, have been exchanged, and even those still require confirmation. China has adopted shifting positions on the border issue, which might be a tactic designed to keep India in a perpetual state of uncertainty. China is ready for an early settlement of the border dispute only if India concedes strategic territory. China's claims along the LAC also seem to be growing and may therefore explain the reluctance so far to exchange maps on the western and eastern sectors. With China controlling about 35,000 kilometres of territory in Aksai Chin in the western sector and laying claim to almost all of Arunachal Pradesh (about 90,000 square kilometres) in the eastern sector, no early resolution of the boundary dispute is in sight. For its part, China sees a close Indo-US relationship as an attempt by the US to encircle it, especially as the relationship comes with an increasing US military presence and influence throughout Central and South Asia after 9/11. China had reacted strongly against the

idea of a 'democratic quad' consisting of India, Japan, Australia and the US and their joint military exercises (Pant, 2007).

India's challenge remains formidable. It has not yet achieved the economic and political profile that China enjoys regionally and globally. But it gets increasingly bracketed with China as a rising power, an emerging power or even a global superpower. Indian elites, who have been obsessed with Pakistan for the past 60 years and more, suddenly have found a new object of fascination: India's main security concern now is not the increasingly decrepit state of Pakistan but an ever-more-assertive China that is widely viewed in India with having a better ability for strategic planning. The defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 has psychologically scarred the elite's perceptions of China and these are unlikely to change in the near future. China is viewed by India as a growing, aggressive nationalistic power whose ambitions are likely to reshape the contours of the regional and global balance of power with deleterious consequences for Indian interests. It may well be that the recent hardening of China's posture towards India is a function of its own sense of internal vulnerabilities but that is hardly a consolation to Indian policymakers, who must respond to an Indian public opinion that increasingly wants the nation to assert itself in the region and beyond. India is rather belatedly gearing up to respond with its own diplomatic and military overtures, setting the stage for Sino-Indian strategic rivalry.

India and Its Neighbourhood: Delhi's Growing Marginalisation

From New Delhi's perspective, one of the most significant aspects of its emerging rivalry with Beijing is China's rising profile in India's immediate neighbourhood. Pakistan's 'all-weather' friendship with China is well known, but the reach of China into other South Asian states has been extraordinary. China's assistance to Myanmar in constructing and improving port facilities on two islands in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea is the first step to securing military base privileges in the Indian Ocean (Garver, 2001, pp. 85-6). These can be used as listening posts to gather intelligence on Indian naval operations and as forward bases for future Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean (Bhaskar, 2000). China's increasing presence in the Indian Ocean is occurring at the same time that

Indian naval expansion has slowed down. This may have great strategic consequences, because India's traditional geographic advantages in the Indian Ocean are increasingly at risk, with deepening Chinese involvement in Myanmar (Pant, 2009a).

The fundamental underpinnings of the Sino–Indian bilateral relationship remain highly uncertain. China has tried hard to maintain a rough balance of power in South Asia by preventing India from gaining an upper hand over Pakistan, consistently assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes to counterbalance India's development of new weapons systems. India's preoccupation with Pakistan reduces India to the level of a regional power, while China can claim the status of an Asian and world power (Cohen, 1983, pp. 24–31). It is instructive to note that even though India and China share similar concerns regarding Islamic terrorism in Kashmir and Xinjiang, respectively, China has been unwilling to make common cause with India against Pakistan.

China's rising profile in South Asia is no news. What is astonishing is the diminishing role of India and the rapidity with which New Delhi is ceding strategic space to Beijing on the subcontinent. Even as China becomes the largest trading partner of most countries in South Asia, including India, New Delhi's strategic hold on South Asia is weakening. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka view India as more interested in creating barriers against their exports than in spurring regional economic integration. India's protectionist tendencies have allowed China to don the mantle of regional economic leader. Instead of India emerging as a facilitator of socio-economic development in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan, it is China that is making the greater impact through the developmental assistance it offers.

India's attempts to keep China out of the subcontinent have clearly not worked, and it is time to re-evaluate its South Asia policy. China's strategy towards South Asia is premised on encircling India and confining her within the geographical coordinates of the region. This strategy of using proxies started with Pakistan and has gradually evolved to include other states in the region, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal (Pant, 2011, pp. 29–50). China is entering markets in South Asia more aggressively through both trade and investment, improving its links with South Asian states through treaties and bilateral cooperation. Following this up by building a ring of road and port connections in India's neighbourhood and deepening military engagements with states on India's periphery, China has firmly entrenched itself in India's backyard. This quiet assertion

of China has allowed various smaller countries of South Asia to play China off against India. Most states in the region now use the China card to defend against the predominance of India. Forced to exist between two giant neighbours, the smaller states have responded with a careful balancing act (Dabhade and Pant, 2004).

India's structural dominance in South Asia makes it a natural target of resentment among its smaller neighbours. India's looming presence in the region makes for a unique paradox in which the core regional power itself is seen as constituting a security threat. Most states have bilateral disputes with India. Bangladesh remains concerned about India exploiting its geographical position to redirect water flows while India's control over Nepal's and Bhutan's transit links makes these two smaller countries susceptible to pressure from New Delhi.

These disputes have led to a climate of political animosity and suspicion which has resulted in limited cooperation. A power imbalance among states makes it difficult for a regional organisation to work effectively. India in South Asia is far ahead of all the regional states in its economic power, military might as well as its global influence. This makes other, small states in the region apprehensive of India's intentions. While they recognise the importance of India in facilitating faster economic growth in the region, they are also reluctant to work with India for fear that India will use regional mechanisms such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to further its 'hegemonic ambitions'.

Yet there is no hope for regional economic and diplomatic cooperation in the absence of Indian leadership. India is likely to be the driving force of the South Asian economy in the years to come, and rather than being apprehensive, the neighbouring countries must take advantage of this situation. If South Asian countries can cooperate to make use of India's developed market and technological supremacy in the fields of information technology, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and in the auto sector, they will only be helping themselves. India's failure to counter China's rise has made it even more unlikely that such cooperation will evolve productively. As the two regional giants compete with each other in the near future, they will be more focused on their relative gains vis-à-vis each other than on the absolute gain that regional cooperation can bestow.

Conclusion

India is witnessing rising turmoil all around its borders. The instability in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar is a major inhibiting factor to India's rise as a regional and global player. India is currently surrounded by weak states that view its hegemonic status in the region with suspicion. The conundrum that India faces is that while it is seen as unresponsive to the concerns of its neighbours, any diplomatic aggressiveness on its part is also unwelcome. The structural position of India in the region makes it highly likely that Indian predominance will continue to be resented by its smaller neighbours even while instability in its immediate neighbourhood also has the potential to upset its own delicate political balance. However, a policy of 'splendid isolation' is not an option for India, and India's desire to emerge as a major global player will remain just that, a desire, unless it engages with its immediate neighbours more meaningfully.

Indian foreign policy will have to grapple with Delhi's increasing marginalisation in its own neighbourhood at a time of a rapidly changing geopolitical balance of power, with China rising even as the US struggles to retain its primacy in the international system. Throughout the Cold War, India zealously guarded its non-aligned foreign policy posture. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, that policy started to unravel since the two blocs from which India wanted to guard its strategic autonomy no longer existed. India is today confronted with the challenge of re-defining non-alignment. While rhetorically it may still make sense for India to proclaim its non-aligned status (*Indian Express*, 2007), in practice it has no option but to cultivate its ties with major powers in the international system. The most controversial is India's growing closeness to the US. While some in India are suggesting it is on the verge of becoming a client state of the US, India has been very careful to cultivate other major powers as well. China's rise has altered the regional balance of power for India, and New Delhi is struggling to protect its interests in a regional and global environment where the US has started to look inwards. How India manages these challenges will, to a large extent, determine its place in the global interstate hierarchy in the coming years.

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Brazil's Upward Spiral: From Aspiring Player to Global Ambitions

Pedro Seabra

Introduction

With the dawn of the twenty-first century, the heated debate regarding the future of the current global order has gained new contours. Already fuelled by the end of the Cold War and the inherent geopolitical prospects it implied, the world's unipolar moment appeared ripe enough to be challenged by a new crop of second-ranking powers seeking to take a shot at the prearranged balance and establish their positions amongst the world's decision-making elite.

Events such as the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent display of American military might have appeared to bring such claims to a temporary halt, but the financial crisis of 2008–9 only added further substance to the theories surrounding the 'twilight of Pax Americana' and heralding 'the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world powers' (Layne and Schwarz, 2009). Fareed Zakaria would call it 'the rise of the rest', noting that the lesson was clear: the giants are 'on the move, and, naturally, given their size, they will have a large footprint on the map' (2008, p. 21).

In this context, beyond the usual suspects – India and China are evidently frontrunners – a great amount of attention is being devoted to Brazil, as the South American nation works its way up through the top echelons, ultimately seeking to have its voice heard in every major capital when it comes to international politics.

Indeed, under the recent leadership of former President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, Brazil reached new heights of foreign assertiveness and displayed an international dynamism that surprised many, frightened a few, but embodied nothing short of what many Brazilians had craved for so long: the generalised recognition of Brazil's tremendous potential to

serve as a leading actor on the world stage. This deeply enshrined belief in a national exceptionalism and in the country's capabilities has helped to craft a global foreign policy with the ambitious objective of propelling Brazil from the regional context to the international frontline.

Building on its internal credentials and achievements, Brazil has thus touted its enviable economic indicators – a growth in GDP of 7.5% in 2010, for example – as evidence of the country's resistance to the devastating effects of the financial crisis, hence consolidating the image of a prosperous emerging economy. In other fronts, its social breakthroughs – as showcased in a study by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, which points to almost 20 million Brazilians rising from extreme poverty since 2003 (Neri, 2010) – offer Brazil greater credibility as it attempts to take on a leadership role addressing world issues such as famine, sustainable development or climate change.

Naturally, as for any emerging power, the means to achieve international reform are limited if Brazil plays it by the book. In other words, if it chooses not to go down the path of direct confrontation or military build-up,¹ it is left with searching for unlikely allies and partnerships that can add further substance to its reforming agenda. Likewise, investing in multiple institutional bodies also serves the purpose of diversifying Brazil's clout and enhancing its profile as a respectable international partner, while also multiplying its choices abroad. However, a certain degree of incompatibility with the agendas of the prevailing powers – who naturally see in the eagerness of nations like Brazil an excessive rashness in achieving their goals without working through the pre-established status quo – is also to be expected. Albeit far from absolute, a widespread perception of a low-intensity animosity between this new/old set of players has thus gradually made its way into the international opinion-making psyche.

With that in mind, this chapter will attempt to shine a light on Brazil's current international positioning – with its particular interests and guidelines in mind – seeking to demonstrate how the country has expanded and developed its foreign policy in order to magnify its voice on the world stage, along with examining the inherent geopolitical consequences. I will therefore begin with a brief acknowledgement of how current foreign in-

¹ However, despite lagging behind in international military expenditure, Brazil has significantly invested in the enhancement of its military capabilities in the past few years; see Seabra (2010a).

terests have come to build upon previous Brazilian governments' foreign policies and indicative principles. Second, I will focus on two concrete policy vectors: Brazil's investment in multilateral structures – either at a global or at a regional level – and the burgeoning ties with several emerging partners, always formed with the ultimate aim of asserting its global stance. Consequently, this chapter will demonstrate that such an elaborate and intricate foreign policy does not come without certain difficulties and obstacles, especially when wrangling with other actors' own interests. Conclusions will then be drawn as to the sustainability of the present approach, the risks it entails and its future prospects under the country's new leadership.

Structuring a Modern Foreign Policy

With the formal end of the military regime in 1985 and the full return to democracy, Brazil was faced with much more than a mere political transition. Pressures to reform the country's institutions, persistent economic instability, debt moratoriums, rising inflation and frequent disputes over international trade issues ultimately heralded the end of the previous economic model of import substitution. For a country that perceived its foreign threats and risks as driven basically by economic and not military or security motivations, the collapse of any development framework was bound to constitute a 'critical juncture' for Brazil's foreign policy (Hirst and Lima, 2006, pp. 22–23).

Still, that did not prevent the pursuit of a constant goal in the country's history: the achievement of autonomy in international relations, a notion understood as 'a country's capacity to practice a foreign policy free from external constraint placed upon it by powerful countries'. Indeed, Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009, p. 8) suggest that in the past two and a half decades, Brazil has ultimately sought to achieve such a goal, albeit under changing understandings of the meaning of autonomy. If at first the country opted for 'autonomy through distance' – by contesting the norms and principles of international institutions and refusing the growing liberalising agenda – the 1990s signalled a turnaround, with the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso clearly acting upon his self-professed 'autonomy through participation' approach that inevitably still marks the present political establishment.

By re-establishing Brazil's credentials as a modern liberal democracy with an effective state and a coherent economic policy (Hurrell, 2010), Cardoso sought to influence the very principles and rules governing the international system. In other words, Brazil realised that its own goals would be further advanced if the country undertook a path of active engagement with the international community and the existing structures. Consequently a significant investment in institutionalising international relations became widely visible, given that international organisations were supposedly based on universal binding rules that could enhance Brazil's still-diminished power, especially when faced with the geopolitical context after the Cold War and the above-mentioned unipolarity.²

Developing a common regional bloc soon became another factor essential to the country's foreign policy approach, mostly under the influence of the Brazilian–Argentinean axis, itself fully energised by the future prospects that such an endeavour seemed to promise. Indeed, sustained by the 1991 Treaty of Asunción and the creation of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Brazil saw in this project the opportunity to further consolidate its power projection within the international framework. However, even at the early stages, it was clear that the need to retain a certain level of autonomy in relations with other countries from the region prevented any supranational initiatives from ever reinforcing the organisation. Simply put, the benefits of an 'open regionalism' model clearly stopped when they began to conflict with Brazil's own national interests.

It was in this context that President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva came to power in 2003. Given widespread doubts about his ability to adhere to orthodox macroeconomic policies – which ultimately proved to be unfounded – consolidating previous foreign policy gains and international respect became absolutely crucial. But even so, two possible roads remained open: to continue down the path of autonomy through cooperation by creating international norms, standards and institutions – the so-called strategy of credibility (Lima, 2005); or to choose instead to enhance autonomist views by refusing to admit any kind of shortfall in Brazil's power and following an activist policy, with the aim of reaching 'autonomy through diversification' (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2009).

² However, an *a posteriori* evaluation of Cardoso's liberal agenda is not so unanimous; see Cervo (2002).

By now it is clear which option was taken. Indeed, the heterogeneity of relations and the expansion of the country's interests were sufficiently highlighted throughout Lula's two terms inasmuch as they even came to shape the international community's own view of Brazil. This perception can be best exemplified by the analysis of two specific self-evident ventures: the reliance on the multilateralist tradition, and the alliances made with 'unexpected' players.

The Multilateral Stage

Brazil's participation in multiple international and regional organisations has always been understood as a key part of any national foreign policy strategy. Indeed, the structural constraints that persistently held Brazil back from rightfully assuming its place in the world's inner circle were naturally less in question if the country prioritised the strengthening of multilateral fora. Likewise, given Brazil's explicit adherence to a number of international principles – such as self-determination, non-intervention or the respect for international law, to name a few – this course of action was understandably always favoured by the political leadership (Lima, 2008).

However, Brazil soon came to realise that more than patching over internal shortcomings or an intrinsically institutional approach, involvement in the development of a myriad of international institutions could greatly substantiate and further advance its growing foreign gravitas. Although not exactly an existential breakthrough, this idea clearly gained new urgency over the period of Lula's presidency, as the highly valued but constantly elusive permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council was upgraded to the ultimate cornerstone of the country's entire diplomatic agenda.³

For a country so determined to reshape the post-Second World War international order and its inherent structures – mostly seen as unrepresentative of the evolving global power shifts – the pursuit of a Security Council seat could easily be considered a paradox. But that is not how the country sees it: for Brazil it is essentially a matter of reforming the system from within, not pushing it to complete oblivion. The existing institutions, albeit flawed, still embody everything that Brazil stands for; nowhere is that

³ For more on Brazil's efforts towards such a goal see Arraes (2005).

more in evidence than in the Security Council, with membership affording precisely the kind of visibility and projection that Brazilian diplomacy craves with such determination.

Nevertheless, despite such convictions, Brazilian efforts have hardly paid off. Aligning with the remaining members of the so-called G-4 – Germany, India and Japan – might have provided added credibility to their common demands, but it also ultimately forced Brazil into a corner, at the mercy of the other alleged international competitors for the coveted seats. Moreover, even its leadership of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the list of supporters for Brazil's candidacy – including the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, as well as the US's non-opposition – proved essentially meaningless to reaching the country's main goal, with no prospects of change in the near future.

Be that as it may, the efforts behind such a campaign also had the merit of bringing Brazil into the spotlight. No longer was the country hesitant or shy about its foreign ambitions – Brazil wanted a seat at the table and was not backing down anytime soon. This logic was equally valid for other podia, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IBD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).⁴

But it would be from the ashes of the 2008–9 financial crisis that Brazil would secure its most precious win. Indeed, in light of the general consensus over the need to include the fast-emerging economies in the international oversight architecture, the G-20 with its crucial Brazilian membership soon became the preferential forum for tackling such issues in preference to the now outdated G-8. Furthermore, Brazil also took this opportunity to further pressure the international community into moving forward with much-delayed reforms in the decision-making processes of the Bretton Woods Institutions, more precisely of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The agreement reached at the end of 2010 regarding changes in voting powers and specially designed to give more say to emerging economies – Brazil included – confirmed the country's growing responsibility and sway in an increasingly globalised economy.

⁴ Nevertheless, despite the political will to place key Brazilian officials in this wide range of institutions, efforts have proven less than successful (*Valor Econômico*, 2010).

Other arenas also proved quite beneficial to Brazil's aspirations. For example, since the 2003 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, Brazil has assumed a leading role in international trade negotiations under the framework of the still incomplete and unsuccessful Doha Round, mostly against the protectionist policies and trade-distorting practices of the developed world. Likewise, Brazil's visibility during the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit also further established the country's credentials in the ongoing climate change efforts.

However, despite this constant global exposure, the surrounding South American region and its own institutions still took up a fair amount of Brazil's focus. Indeed, despite the visible lack of institutional progress, the structural development of Mercosur remained a key priority in Brazil's political discourse, as trade consolidation was officially touted as the ideal incentive for further regional integration. Moreover, as Mercosur's limitations became more visible, a new project gained traction, this time centred on promoting greater political cooperation and coordination among all South American nations. Actively encouraged by Brazil and with great ambitions enshrined in its founding act, the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) was created as yet another multilateral body in which the subcontinent could try to defuse certain prevailing and overheated local tensions. With this in mind, the subsequent creation of the South American Defense Council was thus considered another step towards such a goal.

Naturally, the multilateral option in the region takes on a different tone from when it is employed in the world at large. In the former scenario, Brazil sees these above-mentioned organisations as useful vehicles for binding the surrounding countries into a common project, under its 'magnanimous' influence and guidance – albeit frequently falling short of decisively or successfully pushing them towards its own agenda. When addressing much wider international contexts, however, Brazil opts instead to assimilate world causes and assert a reforming stance as this is more likely to produce immediate foreign policy dividends for its strategy of international insertion. Either way, there is no question that Brazil practises what it preaches, as it clearly supports a cooperative worldview that ultimately serves the country's own objectives rather well.

Emerging Ties

Among Brazil's recent foreign policy choices, one approach in particular appears to have grabbed the most headlines: the development of diverse relationships with several other major and/or emerging powers. Although internally such ties are basically expected on Brazil's foreign path, abroad they have come to provoke a sense of uneasiness and doubt as to the merits of a South American giant aligning itself with such an odd and significantly distinct set of players.

A good example concerns precisely the catchy acronym BRIC – which implies that Brazil, Russia, India and China supposedly now constitute an alternative power bloc, seeking to present themselves as expanding economies and inescapable political heavyweights, with subsequent demands for greater recognition from the currently faltering and discriminatory international order. More precisely, ever since the name was first coined, BRIC has been surrounded by fateful and mostly accurate predictions of future global economic dominance, be it in economic growth, purchase power, trade or in world currency reserves (O'Neil, 2001).⁵ The inevitability of such an outcome appeared unstoppable and therefore quickly became an undisputed part of international policymakers' analyses. In this context, as globalisation moved forward in consolidating the BRIC's economic ascendancy, such a loose association of aspiring countries began to identify possible issues on which they could coordinate policies and present a unified front before the rest of the international community. To that end, the official summits that have followed since 2009 have helped confer a sense of institutionalism and regularity to these gatherings, while frequently resorting to a reformist discourse as well as to calls for greater inclusion in the resolution of a wide array of global challenges, including financial regulation, energy supply or climate change.⁶ More than anything, it is thus possible to ascertain that these countries 'have come to embody twenty-first-century skepticism with markets and with institutions that date from the 1940s' (Roett, 2010, p. 14).

It is therefore understandable why Brazil chose to invest in such a grouping. Indeed, fully aware of its peripheral status in the international

⁵ See also Wilson and Purushothaman (2003).

⁶ The first official Heads of State Summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009, while Brasilia hosted the second in April 2010.

architecture, the country knows that it can never aspire to any kind of hegemonic power abroad. It prefers instead to use its own shortcomings as a way of finding common ground with 'similar' – in this case, the term should always be interpreted loosely – countries and focus on distinct and occasional areas of interest that they can jointly advocate in multiple world stages. In such a classic case of 'soft balancing', Flesher is quick to point out, the potential to substantially influence future policies with direct impact on the global order is exponentially greater when Brazil effectively collaborates with the above-mentioned countries (2010, p. 152).

However, because of the publicity and media focus surrounding the BRICs, another alternative framework is frequently forgotten or left on the sidelines of international politics: comprising India, Brazil and South Africa, the IBSA forum is only too often overshadowed by the overlapping BRIC influence. Nevertheless, it can probably claim greater structural cohesion among its members, with a shared commitment to democratic political regimes and the non-existence of antagonistic strategic interests among its members. The visible focus on sector cooperation and the common goal of obtaining a comprehensive UN reform make up its working agenda. Still, all cards were reshuffled at the end of 2010 with the announcement of South Africa's 'upgrade' to BRIC membership.

For its part, Brazil is all too comfortable with the necessary political juggling between these two platforms – evolving as they might be – as the country skilfully uses them to build as much consensus possible around its own agenda. It is not really a question of ignoring visible disparities in economic weight, political regimes, social stability or actual foreign projection, but instead of enhancing and projecting specific common goals before the established powers, like the widely touted reform of international institutions.

Still, aside from this focus on a constant set of emerging powers, Brazil has also managed to secure a leading role in the least-developed world. That much is possible to ascertain when looking back over Lula's two terms. Indeed, the widely publicised reinforcement of so-called South–South relations ended up being a laudable approach, earning Brazil a debt of gratitude from many countries that suddenly became recipients of Brazil's newfound interest. Africa, in particular, received special attention as demonstrated by Lula's own 12 official visits to 27 different African countries, as well as by the significant expansion of the diplomatic network on the ground. Generalised technical cooperation in agricultural projects by

the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (EMBRAPA), ethanol development incentives, copious no-strings-attached financing and massive loans by the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (BNDES) to national firms doing business with such countries all came to symbolise this specific approach (Seabra, 2010b, p. 53). Even development aid skyrocketed, with values almost on par with similar contributions by typical major donors like Canada or Sweden (*The Economist*, 2010).

Nevertheless, behind these selfless efforts to assist the continent, one cannot fail to see, yet again, another piece of Brazil's foreign policy puzzle. Indeed, although on a different plane than the BRIC/IBSA stages, the development of preferential ties with the third world is not completely unbiased – Africa's voting weight at the UN, for example, was surely not overlooked in Brazilian calculations. But it is precisely this ability to conciliate the nurturing of fruitful relations with often disregarded or misrepresented partners – whether it be the Chinese juggernaut or the insular Cape Verdean archipelago – with the pursuit of its own national interests that has ultimately best characterised Brazil's foreign policy in the last few years.

Clashing Interests

Understandably enough, Brazil's foreign agenda was bound to differ from those of many established world powers. As it happens, Brazil is not particularly fond of the present status quo, which the country sees as an outdated institutional relic inherited from a post-Second World War mentality. However, the problem with such a determination is that it usually comes with a certain level of opposition and antagonism – often underestimated and/or neglected – in international relations and which frequently ends up undermining any original foreign policy designs. Although it never translated into an all-out confrontation, Brazil's overactive foreign policy has inadvertently left a sour taste in many world capitals, puzzled before such a new, expressive and vocal agenda.

Needless to say, relations with the US have always been on full display. In fact, whether labelled as a convenient partnership – under Cardoso's rule, for instance – or as a collaborating rivalry, bilateral ties between these two countries have publicly weathered many ups and downs throughout the years. More importantly, the spillover effects of the US's involvement

in the political instability of many South American countries are still a constant reminder to Brazilian elites. Consequently, a traditional sense of mistrust and suspicion remains among local policymakers. Every US move in the area has therefore come to be seen as an attempt by the US to extend its influence and interfere in Brazil's backyard: the ongoing Cuban blockade, tense ties with Venezuela, the hesitancy during the Honduran crisis, plans to deploy military bases in Colombia or the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet in the South Atlantic are all examples that, from a Brazilian perspective, unequivocally substantiate the need to publicly stand up against such an 'intrusion' in its sphere of interests.

Nonetheless, Brazil also faces another set of challenges in this region. If on the one hand it would not mind achieving a 'consensual hegemony' over the surrounding neighbourhood (Burgess, 2009), on the other hand it is increasingly aware that such a scenario is not so easily attainable. Given the attempts of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez to hijack the regional spotlight, or Argentina's wishes to bypass Brazil's economic and trade preponderance, it is clear that the picture of a unified South American front backing Brazil's foreign assertiveness is not without its flaws.

World trade negotiations have equally proven far from friendly. The downfall of the US-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005 might have provided a short-lived victory for Lula's government, but the persistent stalemate that followed throughout the Doha Round has done little to answer Brazil's demands. Similar obstacles also exist between Brazil and the EU. Despite the significant commercial ties and the establishment of a high-level Strategic Partnership in 2007, bilateral relations remain painfully dependent on an elusive free trade agreement with Mercosur, which has been a constant point of intensive debate with no end in sight. But when it comes to trade disagreements, the US is, yet again, the chief contender. Ever since the WTO's squabbles in the early 1990s, both countries have endured a repertoire of persistent trade disputes, with Brazil unflinching seeking an end to the vast American agricultural subsidies, whether on ethanol, orange juice or cotton. The US, in turn, continued to distrust the weak Brazilian intellectual property rights regime and called for more market openness.

However, it was 'Lula's Persian gamble' (Sweig, 2010) that attracted the most criticism and public scrutiny of Brazil's ambitious foreign agenda. Indeed, when in May 2010 a Brazilian-Turkish mediation effort produced a fuel-swap deal over the Iranian nuclear programme and presented it as a

diplomatic breakthrough in the Islamic Republic's standoff with the international community, the reactions that followed were probably not what the Lula government had hoped for. Instead of being hailed as skilful peace brokers, Brazilians were labelled as too 'naive' for having believed themselves capable of addressing such complex matters and for becoming entangled in another Iranian 'stalling tactic' (Barrionuevo, 2010). This move, however, must be understood in its context, since Lula had already embarked on his comprehensive 'fresh approach' to the Middle East conundrum, seeking to open the floor to the intervention of new players, including in the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The hosting of all major local actors in Brazil and Lula's own on-site visits were claimed as heralding a new phase of Brazilian engagement with the region and with its inherent international security risks.⁷ However, much like the Iranian affair, results proved mostly disappointing and Brazil's efforts were ultimately fruitless, never producing any real change on the ground.

At the same time, neither are Brazil's newfound allegiances exempt from dissent. For example, China's growing weight in Brazilian economy – as of 2010, it has become its biggest trading partner and largest foreign investor – is already leaving Brazil apprehensive about these disproportionate ties. Furthermore, despite recognising China as a market economy in 2004 – a move incessantly sought by the Asian giant but not yet formalised – Brazil has so far failed to capitalise on this goodwill gesture by converting it into meaningful political dividends in multilateral institutions, thus replicating a similarly disappointing pattern with the BRIC/IBSA platforms.

Nevertheless, an expansive foreign policy is always certain to result in attrition in a number of relationships with several key international players. The US, in particular, witnessed the above-mentioned endeavours with some apprehension as they interfered with its own geopolitical calculations. But despite the dismaying and questionable outcome, Brazil's purposes were not that intricate: in order to achieve the increased influence that it so publicly hoped for, the country had to invariably weaken the dominant power – most often, the US – in previously targeted specific environments (Brands, 2010). Likewise, occasional opposing interests do not necessarily invalidate overall common agendas or goals, which is something that can be easily said of both the US and Brazil's emerging partners.

⁷ For an analysis of Brazil's undertakings in this region see Maihold (2010).

In that sense, possible policy contradictions with the remaining super-power and/or 'inconvenient' foreign alignments are essentially understood as a necessary price to pay for Brazil's growing influence.

Final Remarks

Throughout the past 10 years, Brazil has experienced a boom in its foreign projection across a number of different and diverse international stages. Without question, Lula's tenure granted the country a kind of visibility abroad never before witnessed by the country's elites. In that sense, the country has now become an indisputable voice on such issues as climate change and economic governance, actively promoting its case against the established quorum and loudly presenting its demands for broader reforms in the international decision-making process. Even George Kennan's description of Brazil as a future 'monster country' (1993, p. 143) capable of exerting significant influence in the world at large is now frequently brought up as a supposedly exemplary prediction of such a prominent ethos.

However, the path towards the fulfilment of a coveted autonomy, and especially towards the diversification of foreign relations previously mentioned, has not been taken lightly. Indeed, much of its present foreign exposure is essentially due to Lula's dynamic presidential diplomacy, which proved in itself a serious variable to be reckoned with. Even so, one could also argue that if it weren't for a prosperous economic environment – widely agreed to be the result of Cardoso's Plano Real and sustained by consistently high commodity prices – Brazil would not have had the resources, nor the predisposition for that matter, to embark on such ventures, much less to sustain them.

Moreover, at home this policy evolution was only made possible by an odd combination of historical-ideological inclinations from Lula's own Worker's Party (PT), the political preferences of all intervening actors – including Foreign Policy Adviser Marco Aurélio Garcia, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and Secretary-General Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães – and the Itamaraty's long-lasting diplomatic traditions (Almeida, 2010).

In that sense, Brazil's foreign policy naturally came to embody different aspects and vectors from all these conceptual sources. The examples above illustrate precisely such a context. Indeed, while investment in international

institutions remained a constant, much as during previous governments, the very public efforts put into courting other emerging powers and the expansion of Brazil's range of action are clearly symptomatic of a slight change of direction, wherein a frequently anti-hegemonic and sovereign tone gained a new volume and was skilfully used both to consolidate Brazil's stance in the surrounding region and to present the country as a worthy and supposedly unbiased international actor. Inevitably, frictions with the world's inner club and most notably with the US were bound to happen, as the multiplicity of new allegiances and the skilful use of different world stages to advance its goals gave Brazil enough political clout to openly challenge the structural foundations of the established international order. Eventual associated risks, however, were not properly assessed. For example, as McDonald and Stewart (2010, pp. 18–20) point out, for any successful UN reform, much still 'depends on new-member behavior' and how it is perceived by the remaining international community. Accordingly, episodes like the one with Iran proved themselves essentially counterproductive to Brazil's foreign image and aspirations.

Nevertheless, amid this whole self-perceived autonomist quest, the deep sense of pragmatism displayed by Brazil's foreign policy should also be taken into account. In reality, despite all the public objections on world security issues like Iran and the criticism of American military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, both Brazil and the US continued to deepen their bilateral relations. The 2007 ethanol cooperation agreement with the George W. Bush Administration or the landmark Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 2010 with President Barack Obama already in office clearly demonstrate that for all the official discourse of 'anti-unipolarity', Brazil understands the need to actively cooperate with the US in a number of issues of common interest. The same could be said of Brazil's relations with Europe, as exemplified by the signing of a number of strategic partnerships – with France, for instance – in the military/defence field. As a result, the desired transition to a multipolar world ought to be seen in a more benign and cooperative light than the country has probably presented in the past few years.

Still, it is legitimate to question how accurate this scrutiny remains, especially given the political transition in Brasília, with Dilma Rousseff assuming the reins of the country. If her past endorsement of Lula's major achievements and orientations are any indication, it can only be expected that Brazil's course will remain essentially unaltered. There will naturally

be some slight adjustments, as Dilma's Brazil is considerably different from the one that Lula inherited from Cardoso. Brazil's foreign interests are now much more attainable and in reach without the need to loudly advocate an absolute change of the international order at all costs. Likewise, Brazil will probably refrain from excessively projecting its influence and political capital on every pressing international issue that might arise. Finally, the surrounding region will also certainly be the object of a renewed focus, since the fragilities of its integration project undermine Brazil's own designs, while internal matters such as the economy and social inequality will likely grab Dilma's immediate attention for the time being (Seabra, 2010b; Stuenkel, 2011).

But if goals hardly differ, neither do the means of achieving them. Relying on multilateral fora to curb Brazil's internal shortcomings and promoting burgeoning ties with alternate players have so far proven fairly useful to Brazil in obtaining more international exposure and projection, and therefore can only be expected to remain the preferential approaches in the prosecution of the country's agenda.

All in all, it is impossible not to recognise Brazil's recent achievements in the pursuit of a place among the world's great powers. From the 'eternal country of the future', Brazil has now turned into an indisputable actor in international stages and a leading voice with considerable influence in its own region. However, many obstacles, both internal and external, still remain on the path towards full inclusion in the evolving international order. In order to overcome them, Brazil must not only continue projecting its foreign assertiveness in a timely manner, but also do so while aware of the delicate balance and necessary sensitivity to effectively engage in a comprehensive and widely accepted reform of the international order.

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PART III

ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Problem of Order in an Anarchical Society

Harry Papasotiriou

Power is necessary and at the same time dangerous. In domestic politics, we have accepted the dominance of the power of the state in order to escape from the Hobbesian state of nature. Nonetheless, we do not want – at least not since the events of 1688, 1776 and 1789 – the dominant power of the state to result in absolute monarchy or some other kind of tyranny. We want state power to provide order and security, but without threatening our liberties. The dangerous aspects of state power have been emphasised by liberal thinkers such as Bertrand de Jouvenel (1962). But the power of the state has been tamed and domesticated in advanced countries through democracy, checks and balances, the separation of powers and all the other constitutional mechanisms that protect individual rights and liberties.

The problem of how to tame power, which is necessary for order, takes a different form when considering the anarchical society of sovereign states. In the absence of an authority higher than sovereign states, international order can only be maintained by the great powers. Sovereign states need international order and its benefits, but they chafe at every kind of submission to the great powers, seeking to preserve as much as possible of their substantive national independence. The great powers are necessary for providing international order, but they are also dangerous when they use their power at the expense of weaker states – and even more dangerous when they fight great wars against one another. The tension between the imperatives of international order on the one hand and the imperatives of substantive national independence on the other is always present in the anarchical society of sovereign states and is a constant source of friction and disagreement. States are apt to compromise some of their substantive independence for the sake of the security provided within a hegemonic alliance, the prosperity facilitated by a hegemonic international economic

system and other benefits of international order. But at the same time they will seek to keep as much of their freedom of action as possible.

The importance of the great powers in providing international order has been emphasised by the English School of international relations. Hedley Bull (1977, p. 263) stated that the great powers contribute to international order in two ways: (a) by managing relations among themselves; and (b) by using their superior resources in a manner that provides some degree of central management of the affairs of international society as a whole. Bull's analysis concerns the modern international society of sovereign states that is conventionally seen as originating in the Treaty of Westphalia. Adam Watson has examined international societies across world history, from the ancient Sumerians to the modern anarchical society of sovereign states. In his conclusions he declares that

[t]he gravitational pull towards hegemony, and the ubiquity of some hegemonial authority in societies of independent or quasi-independent states, stands out so clearly from the evidence that the question arises why studies of states systems and political theory underestimate or even ignore it. (Watson, 1992, p. 314).

At the same time, great powers are indisputably dangerous. International law is based on the principle of mutual respect for state sovereignty. However, when Krasner examined state sovereignty over the last few centuries, he found that it was violated by the more powerful states at the expense of weaker states so often that he described it as 'organized hypocrisy'. Krasner (1999) means by this concept that the central rules of international law have great endurance over time but are also violated often by the more powerful states.

The great powers are particularly dangerous when they fight each other. The greatest and most destructive conflicts are the 'hegemonic wars', in Gilpin's terminology, namely the general power struggles involving all great powers in which their ordering and hegemony is at stake. The distribution of benefits in the international system tends to adjust to the international distribution of power if this remains relatively stable over the long run. But because of uneven growth, the moment inevitably arrives when new rising powers will become more powerful than the old established powers that benefit from the old international order. The rising revisionist powers will question the status quo and will seek to replace it by new arrangements conducive to their own interests and values. If the declining status quo powers do not consent to such a rearrangement, the resulting

confrontation may take the form of a general hegemonic war, as has happened about every one hundred years since the seventeenth century. Small powers are sucked into the vortex of such general wars and often suffer disastrously. When the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 186–210).

International society feels the need for international order particularly acutely after the end of such catastrophic hegemonic wars. The great treaties that constitute the main landmarks in the evolution of international order were concluded after hegemonic wars: the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years' War, the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714 after the War of Spanish Succession, the Treaty of Vienna and the Concert of Europe in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations in 1919 after the First World War, and the UN Charter in 1945 after the Second World War. Philip Bobbitt (2002, Book 2, Part 2) would add to this list the Charter of Paris in 1990, which formally signalled the end of the Cold War. In each of these cases, however, the spirit of international harmony and consensus following the catastrophic war proved short-lived. Soon international order was threatened once more by clashing national interests, security dilemmas, heavy-handed hegemonic practices by the great powers and other phenomena of international instability.

The pursuit of international order proves to be a Sisyphean task for reasons that are inherent in the nature of the international system. Some sovereign states hesitate to submit for the sake of international order to the great powers. The great powers, which have the necessary power to provide international order, are apt at the same time to pursue their national interests selfishly, sometimes becoming themselves sources of instability. Uneven growth changes the distribution of power at either the regional or the global level, causing difficult and at times violent changes in the status quo. Given that such phenomena derive from the anarchical nature of the international system, the attainment of international order is always limited either in time or in space. Absolute order, of the kind attained within well-functioning states, could conceivably be reached internationally only if nations surrendered their independence and submitted to a world government.

Some international societies in world history were much more hegemonic than others. Rome, Byzantium and China, for example, constituted the imperial cores of international societies, the weaker members of which

formally accepted their inferiority and dependence on the imperial centre, though without thereby relinquishing all or even much of their freedom of action. Classical Greece, on the other hand, was marked by a strong anti-hegemonic legitimacy: a series of hegemonic powers were eventually brought down by anti-hegemonic coalitions that fought in the name of the liberties of the Greek city states (Watson, 1992).

The modern society of sovereign states that emerged in Europe after the Renaissance is also based on a strong anti-hegemonic legitimacy, much like that of classical Greece. Consequently, its most prominent feature has been the balance of power. According to A. J. P. Taylor, in its modern history

Europe has known almost as much peace as war; and it has owed these periods of peace to the Balance of Power. No one state has ever been strong enough to eat up all the rest; and the mutual jealousy of the Great Powers has preserved even the small states, which could not have preserved themselves. (Taylor, 1971, p. xix)

This last point is illustrated by the fact that the Second World War began when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany because it had invaded Poland. The great powers keep watch over each other, usually protecting small states so that none of the great powers will grow so powerful by conquering small states as to be able to threaten the balance of power.

The balance of power has been seen as fundamental to the system of sovereign states, the precondition for the very existence of the system. If the most powerful state is able to conquer the other great powers, it will be able to conquer all states and replace the society of sovereign states with a world empire. Consequently, for their very survival the sovereign states will coalesce in order to counterbalance a power that grows to the degree that it threatens to conquer them. It has therefore long been argued that state behaviour will produce a balance of power, whether by conscious design or not. As early as 1605, Botero argued that 'given the plurality of princes it follows that a balance of power is useful and good not as a result of volition, but circumstances' (Haslam, 2002, p. 94), a point established with greater scientific rigour by Kenneth Waltz (1979) in our day. Hedley Bull (1977), who analysed international politics from the point of view of the society of sovereign states, maintained that the balance of power is the society's most central institution. The insistence on a balance of power is echoed in the twenty-first century by the calls of French leaders for the restoration of multipolarity in international politics.

While the society of sovereign states has historically resisted any bid by one power to dominate it, it has required some forms of hegemonic authority to provide order. Three kinds of authority need to be emphasised. First, there has been the collective leadership exercised by the great powers to promote system-wide order, such as when the landmark treaties mentioned above were issued. In the eighteenth century, an era of power politics and shifting alliances that may give the impression of weak great power cooperation, Edward Gibbon referred to the Europe of his time as ‘one great republic’ (1994, vol. 2, p. 511), indicating the degree of order provided in common by the great powers in spite of their frequent conflicts. In the nineteenth century, the Concert of Europe was formally a system of collective hegemony, as is the UN Security Council in regard to the enhanced powers of its permanent members. In its various forms, collective hegemony has provided some degree of system-wide order without violating the principle of the balance of power.

Second, great powers have established spheres of influence, providing hegemonic order to a subset of units within the society of sovereign states. The division of Europe and other parts of the world into two rival alliances during the Cold War is a prominent example. Such hegemonic spheres have not threatened the stability of the overall system so long as they were compatible with the balance of power. But, historically, if one power threatened to acquire so large a sphere of influence as to increase its power to the point of threatening to overthrow the balance of power, it was resisted.

Third, there have been examples of unipolar hegemonic authority exercised in specific areas in ways that did not threaten the domination of other powers, in other words, that did not threaten to overthrow the balance of power. One instance was Britain’s unilateral use of its naval mastery in the first half of the nineteenth century to abolish the slave trade in the seas and oceans (Krasner, 1999, pp. 106–8). Another example was the open international economic system promoted by Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the British economy was producing half the industrial product of the globe (Krasner, 1976). It is true that the open international economic system was in Britain’s national interest, since it created asymmetric economic dependences with its weaker trading partners. Nonetheless, the system did not threaten them with Napoleonic-type domination and it did secure economic growth and prosperity for them over the long run.

One can conclude from these cases that the exercise of hegemony in the society of sovereign states has been intolerable only if it is incompatible with the balance of power. While the sovereign states are loath to surrender their freedom of action, they may be willing to do so to some degree for the benefits of order offered by the leading powers, so long as they are not threatened with domination and conquest.

Some linear progress can be said to have been made regarding international order from the point of view of international law and international institutions. Undoubtedly, international law regarding international security matters is more effective today than in the past. International borders in our time are generally stable; territorial and border disputes are more limited than in the past. In the eighteenth century Prussia's Frederick II did not hesitate to invade the Hapsburg Empire without any pretext in order to annex one of its provinces; in history he is known as Frederick the Great (Asprey, 1999, chap. 3). Such a naked and cynical territorial expansionism is no longer acceptable in our time. With the rise of nationalism and the establishment of the nation state over the last two centuries, nations fiercely defend their native lands. As a result, provinces no longer change hands as easily as before. International law and international institutions reflect *de jure* this new *de facto* situation. The only major recent case of naked territorial expansionism without any pretext, in the manner of Frederick the Great, was the violent annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, which was promptly reversed by the international community in 1991.

Nonetheless, the inviolability of borders, which is a central principle of international law, will at times clash with political and social developments. It is worth pointing out that the present territorial status quo does not reflect some principle of justice. It is not based on a perfect correspondence of nations and states, since there are nations with no state and states with many national groups; nor is it based on the principle of self-determination or any other moral norm. It is simply the result of past warfare. Some nations that were powerful in the past are favoured, such as Russia, which acquired and consolidated its rule over the vast territories to the north of China during the period of Chinese decline in the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth centuries. Moreover, while some nations were able to attain their independence by successfully rebelling against foreign yokes, others, such as the Kurds and the Chechens, remain under the domination of other nations. Changes in the distribution of power and in the political dynamics of ethnic societies put the existing territorial status quo in question every

now and then. If China, with one-fifth of the world's population, becomes at some future point much more powerful than Russia, it may wonder why the territorial status quo in northeast Asia should favour Russia on account of the distribution of power in some distant past. The Kurds and the Chechens may at some point in the future attain their independence. In various parts of the globe there are secessionist movements, instances of irredentism and civil war, illustrating the intention of political groups to question the existing territorial status quo.

In our time the maintenance of international order in the face of violent crises depends to a very large extent on the will of the United States. The reason is that only the US possesses today the military capabilities to project force in every quarter of the globe. As a result, when the 'international community' is required to intervene militarily in order to bring a crisis under control, this usually means the US with some auxiliary powers. But the US is not always prepared to act as the world's police force. It reacted swiftly and forcefully to Iraq's conquest of Kuwait in 1990, since the world's oil supplies were at stake (Berman, 2004, p. 3). But it was unwilling at first to get involved in the Yugoslav crises of the early 1990s, which the Europeans were unable to manage even though they took place on their own continent; as a result the decisive intervention by the international community came rather late. More recently, the US was unwilling to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Darfur massacres; as a result these crises became major humanitarian catastrophes.

Occasionally the United States is itself the source of international instability, as happened with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent initially botched occupation. The parts of the international community that disagreed with this invasion were unwilling to treat the United States as an outlaw and were forced sooner or later to follow the American line, at least formally if not substantively. In the Iraq case, though the UN Security Council was at first unwilling to agree to the invasion, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime it authorised the American occupation and the purpose of installing a democratic regime through Resolution 1483/2003 (22 May 2003) (Allawi, 2007, p. 106). This post facto legitimisation of the American project in Iraq did not contribute measurably to Iraq's short-term stability, illustrating the problems for international order in cases where the destabilising factor is the one power that can usually act to maintain international order.

The institutional mechanisms for maintaining international order, such as collective security, presuppose good relations among the great powers; that is, they presuppose a peaceful and cooperative state of affairs among them rather than being a mechanism for bringing it about. The main constraint on the application of collective security is that it sometimes conflicts with two cardinal values of the society of sovereign states: the balance of power and international order. When the imperatives of the balance of power and international order conflict with the legal or substantive imperatives of collective security, the former are likely to prevail.

A clear illustration of the conflicting imperatives of the balance of power and international law is provided by the events of 1939–40. In that period both Germany and the Soviet Union pursued violent policies of territorial expansion. They partitioned Poland after Germany's invasion of that state, while the Soviet Union invaded Finland and annexed the Baltic States. From the point of view of international law Britain and France ought to have declared war on both aggressors. Yet it was only Germany that threatened to overthrow the balance of power. Hence the two Western European powers declared war only on Germany and remained passive in the face of Soviet expansionism. Had they also declared war on the Soviet Union, they might have ephemerally been doing more to uphold international law, but at the cost of assisting Germany's bid to overthrow the balance of power and dominate all Europe.

Collective security is also apt to be abandoned whenever its application will drastically increase disorder. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated international law much like the German invasion of Poland, but it did not threaten the balance of power. Had the principle of collective security been applied – and ignoring for a moment the veto system in the UN Security Council – the US and other leading powers ought to have declared war on the Soviet Union. Yet clearly a third world war would have been too high a price to pay for the sake of collective security in a case in which the balance of power was not at stake. In cases where a strict application of collective security is apt to turn small wars into larger conflagrations, it is often in the interest of the society of sovereign states that collective security is not applied, for the sake of international order.

Given the veto system in the Security Council, legal collective security can only be applied whenever the aggressor is not a veto-wielding permanent member and there is a consensus on its application among the five permanent members. The consensus did not exist during the Cold War, and

has not always been there even in the post–Cold War era of generally good relations among the great powers. Indeed, collective security is not applied often, in spite of the violence that has ruined large parts of the world since the end of the Cold War. Highly selective application of collective security (e.g., in the former Yugoslavia but not always in sub-Saharan Africa), dependent in practice upon whether the US (or occasionally France and Britain in Africa) is sufficiently motivated by interest or other preferences to invoke it in order to launch an internationally sanctioned intervention, has robbed collective security of its force as a legal rule and has transformed it in the eyes of many into an instrument of hegemony.

Ideological homogeneity facilitates the promotion of international order. At least to some extent, an international order entails the projection on the international sphere of the domestic values of the most powerful states. If all states have the same or at least compatible domestic values, they will be more likely to reach a consensus on the specific form and content of an international order. This is the case even if they fight against one another. In the eighteenth century, prior to the French Revolution, frequent wars took place among the great powers. But because the great powers had similar domestic values, they were in agreement about the main features of the European international order. Therefore, the wars that they fought were limited in terms of their objectives and the means deployed. If there is ideological heterogeneity, however, the very form and content of an international order may be at stake in conflicts. Wars are therefore more likely to escalate until the one side is overthrown and the other imposes its notions of international order. According to Henry Kissinger,

[a]n international order which is not considered just will be challenged sooner or later. But how a people perceives [*sic*] the fairness of a particular world order is determined as much by its domestic institutions as by judgments on tactical foreign-policy issues. For that reason, compatibility between domestic institutions is a reinforcement for peace. (Kissinger, 1994, p. 79).

Ideological homogeneity is not a necessary condition for international order. On the contrary, the sovereign states system emerged after the religious wars of early modern Europe precisely as a system of coexistence and cooperation among states with different religions. Ideologically heterogeneous states can participate in a common international order so long as they do not seek to impose their ideology on each other. This is reflected by the centrality of the principle of the mutual respect for state sovereignty

in international law, as well as by the principle of non-intervention in other states' domestic affairs. Still, an international order with ideologically heterogeneous states will be based on a more slender set of common values and principles than an order that includes ideologically homogeneous states.

In the realist tradition the influence of ideology on state behaviour tends to be minimised. According to realism, states act according to their national interests, defined primarily in terms of security and power relations. Whenever the imperatives of ideology clash with the imperatives of the balance of power, a realist would predict that the latter will prevail. Three examples demonstrate this point. First, in the seventeenth century the French Premier Richelieu, a cardinal of the Catholic Church, led France into the Thirty Years' War on the side of the Protestants in order to weaken the Catholic Hapsburgs, who had amassed so much power as to threaten to dominate all Europe. If the Hapsburgs had crushed the Protestants in Germany and the Low Countries, they would have become powerful enough to crush France in turn. *Raison d'état* therefore dictated that France should support the enemies of the Hapsburgs, even if in ideological terms Catholic France was on the side of the Hapsburgs.

Second, the rise in German power in the later nineteenth century led France and Russia to an anti-German *entente*. At that time France had the most democratic political system among the European great powers and Russia the most absolutist. Germany was ideologically between the two. But it was so powerful that it brought together the two great powers that were at the opposite ends of the European ideological spectrum.

Third, in the 1970s the US and China drastically improved their relations in order to balance Soviet military might. Nixon's opening to China took place during Mao's Cultural Revolution, a particularly extreme version of Marxist revolutionary fervour. Nonetheless, Mao did not hesitate to move closer to his greatest ideological enemy in order to balance the ideologically closer but militarily and geopolitically more threatening Soviet Union.

At times, however, ideology plays a more central role in international politics. This is especially the case whenever some great powers are taken over by messianic regimes that seek to overthrow the existing system of sovereign states and replace it with a single society encompassing all people – the messianic utopia. Such revolutionary powers tend to cause especially intense and bloody confrontations, since they justify enormous sacrifices for the sake of the utopia. According to Martin Wight,

[t]here are three outstanding examples of these international Revolutionists: the religious Revolutionists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the French Revolutionists, especially the Jacobins; and the totalitarian Revolutionists of the twentieth century. (Wight, 1991, p. 10).

It is worth pointing out that three of the four bloodiest wars in history involved such revolutionary powers, namely the Second World War, the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and the Thirty Years' War (see Table 1). In each of these conflicts the revolutionary power threatened the balance of power; nonetheless, the revolutionary aspect of the struggle made these conflicts more intense. Among the four bloodiest wars in history, only the First World War can be said to have been caused strictly by realist reasons – uneven growth and a change in the distribution of power – and not to have involved, at least at the outset, some international revolutionary utopianism.

Table 1. The greatest wars in history, battle casualties

Second World War	1939–45	19,131,683
First World War	1914–18	9,450,000
Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleon wars	1792–1815	2,532,000
Thirty Years' War	1618–48	2,071,000

Note: The victims of these wars were much higher than these numbers suggest: not included are the victims of genocides and all those who died because of famines and epidemics caused by the wars.

Source: Ferguson (2001, p. 426).

Even if a revolutionary power coexists peacefully with the other states, it will have an unsettling effect. It will tend to make the pursuit of international order more difficult by interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. Such a state of affairs existed during the Cold War, especially during its more confrontational phases, when each side sought to undermine the regimes of the other side by political means. Under such circumstances international order becomes more fragile and more limited in regard to its substantive content. It will also tend to assume the character of a temporary arrangement; agreements including both sides of the ideological divide will be seen as interim truces before the ultimate triumph over the dangerous enemy.

The prevailing ideology in today's post-Cold War world is liberalism, the ideology that triumphed in the great confrontations of the twentieth

century. Philip Bobbitt maintains that the present international order was founded with the Charter of Paris, which was agreed upon in November 1990 by the members of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), a forum including both sides of the Cold War that was founded with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975). The Charter of Paris grew out of the Helsinki agreements of 1975, but had a much more explicitly liberal orientation. It stated, 'We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government for our nations'. It saw respect for human rights as 'an essential safeguard against an over-mighty state' (Bobbitt, 2002, p. 637). Such notions contributed to an evolution of international law in the direction of weakening state sovereignty for the sake of protecting human rights. More generally, the international order of our time is characterised, in regard to its substantive content, by the political and economic liberalism of the West.

Ideological heterogeneity does exist today. China does not accept political liberalism. Russia is sliding towards its own unique version of authoritarian democracy. Some parts of the developing world remain under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that reject some or even all aspects of Western liberalism. But these illiberal or quasi-liberal states are not revolutionary, since they do not seek to spread their ideology and overthrow the existing system of sovereign states. On the contrary, their regimes insist on the principles of mutual respect for state sovereignty and non-intervention in other states' domestic affairs, hoping thereby to survive against the liberal drive of the dominant group of nations.

Among those who resist the dominant liberalism of our time, only radical Islam can be said to have the attributes of a genuine revolutionary movement – revolutionary in terms of rejecting the existing sovereign states system and its prevalent norms (ideologically it is, of course, very reactionary). Radical Islam seeks to overthrow the existing Muslim states and unite the Muslim world under a utopian Islamist caliphate, hoping eventually to prevail across the world. Moreover, its various branches have unleashed armed struggles, mainly conducted by non-state actors, in which limitless bloodshed is justified for the sake of the utopia.

Liberalism itself has a revolutionary aspect. It does not seek to overthrow the existing sovereign states system, but it hopes to bring about its radical transformation by promoting worldwide ideological homogeneity. It maintains that if all states were to become liberal, a completely new international system would emerge in which warfare would no longer take

place. The central argument behind this liberal messianic vision is that democracies do not fight wars *among each other*. There have been warlike democracies across the ages, from ancient Athens to the present US. However, according to the liberal 'democratic peace' argument, even the most warlike democracies only fight against non-democratic states. If this claim is true, there is a formula for eternal world peace: all states must become democracies (Russett, 1993; and Weart, 1998).

Woodrow Wilson, who in 1919 brought liberal notions of a peaceful new international order to the centre of world politics, was aware of the messianic aspect of liberalism. He was so convinced of the world-historical importance of his mission that he thought of it as 'a practical scheme to carry out [Jesus Christ's] aims' (Fromkin, 1995, p. 235). Unfortunately, his scheme did not prove practical; it was followed by the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century. However, the optimistic liberal view of history inexorably advancing towards the worldwide triumph of a pacific liberal order revived in the 1980s and '90s, when a great wave of democratisation swept over much of East Asia, almost all of Latin America and, most stunningly, the Warsaw Pact countries. Because the democratisation of these countries led to the end of the Cold War and the normalisation of relations among the former adversaries, the 'democratic peace' argument seemed to be confirmed. Ever since, most of the world seems to be moving in the direction desired by the liberals, though Francis Fukuyama's argument about the end of history seems in retrospect to have been premature even from a liberal perspective (Mandelbaum, 2003, Part 3).

The conviction of liberal idealists that the march of history will eventually lead to the global triumph of liberalism and that the result will be world peace is reflected in the rhetoric of the leading liberal powers. US President Clinton maintained in 1994 that the best strategy for enhancing American security and building a lasting peace was by supporting the advance of democracy elsewhere, since 'Democracies do not attack other democracies' (*Washington Post*, 26 January 1994). Similarly, his successor, President Bush, declared in 2004 that he had 'great faith in democracies for the promotion of peace'. For this reason he strongly supported the view that 'the way forward in the Middle East, the Greater Middle East, is by promoting democracy' (*Washington Post*, 13 November 2004). In the same vein, in 1999 the EU's External Affairs Commissioner, Christopher Patten, justified the EU's effort to promote respect for human rights and

democracy internationally with the argument that 'free societies tend not to fight each other and not to be bad neighbours' (Patten, 1999).

Great powers have always sought to promote their domestic values internationally in order to facilitate the establishment of an international order favourable to them. In this sense the desire of the present liberal great powers to spread liberalism internationally is not in itself unusual. But the manner in which the spread of liberalism is pursued is of great importance. On one end of the spectrum there are consensual international procedures, which are compatible with the principle of the mutual respect for state sovereignty. In the intermediate range of the spectrum there are various kinds of pressures and sanctions, either unilateral or multilateral, which aim to force illiberal states to adopt liberal measures such as respecting human rights. In parallel, liberal states indirectly promote the growth of a civil society within illiberal states by supporting the activism of NGOs (non-governmental organisations). At the other end of the spectrum there is the violent overthrow of illiberal regimes and the substitution of democracies. This manner of promoting the spread of liberalism is apt, if it becomes a general practice, to revolutionise international politics and result in major instability for the sake of an ultimate liberal messianic vision.

By invading Iraq the US took a step in this direction. Since that project resulted in a protracted and difficult engagement, it is unlikely to be followed soon by further moves in the same direction. Here it will suffice to point out the inherent dangers in every effort to bring about an ideological homogenisation of the international system through violence. In the anarchical society of sovereign states, the violent imposition of even the most desirable ideological principles is likely to produce anti-hegemonic reactions. This does not mean that the American venture in Iraq was doomed from the outset, but that it was an inherently high-risk affair likely to cause alarm among the world's illiberal regimes and bring them closer together.

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System and Units in an Ordered Plurality

Dimitris N. Chrysochoou and Dimitris K. Xenakis

Introduction

This chapter examines the way global transformations are shaping the political structures of the world system. It addresses the question of whether the system remains trapped into a state of structural anarchy or whether it moves towards a legally and politically structured plurality in which states are no longer seen as the only actors bestowed with ‘the right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern accordingly’ (Held, 1996, p. 342). These among other trends related to the rapid expansion of global governance – ‘the process through which political, economic and civil societies negotiate, on a planetary scale, social arrangements based on the principle of conflictual cooperation’ (Lamy and Laïdi, 2002, p. 7) – advanced schemes of regionalisation, the effects of neoliberal globalisation, and the density of transnational connections (Held, 1996) have led to an unprecedented rise in global activity. A related issue is whether such trends were matched by a corresponding increase in international authority in the direction of a ‘global moral community’ (Taylor, 2003, p. 7), or whether they served the interests of states, reshaping their traditional patterns of action in ways compatible with their own survival or even strengthening. This chapter suggests that the global system promotes novel forms of organised shared rule that are supportive of furthering the pace and range of global arrangements, without fundamentally threatening the prominence of states in the conduct of world politics. The resulting pattern has been what might be termed a condition of ‘ordered symbiosis’ among the members of the emergent global plurality.

Rethorising World Politics

Global changes, and the patterns of conduct they give rise to, have shaped the foundations of the new order and, with it, the dynamics of institutionalisation across an expansive range of collective action arenas – ‘each with its distinctive forms of logic and implications for other domains’ (Held, 1996, 340). But that was not the outcome of what Ruggie (1998, p. 23) called ‘collective intentionality’; rather, it was the product of structural and functional adjustments to a multilogical universe, where ‘further internationalization had been positively linked with greater differentiation’ (Taylor, 2003, p. 5). The new global arrangements combined the diffusion of power and an attachment to the values (and practices) of diversity and differentiation with a notable increase in the scope and level of collective institutional action. These trends, reflective of a volatile and uncertain if at times turbulent world order (Rosenau, 1997), have had a transformative but not necessarily negative impact on the character of statehood: states may no longer assert their authority on classical Westphalian attributes and entitlements – what shaped the identity of the modern territorial state ‘as the guarantor of the rights, duties and welfare of subjects’ (Held, 1996, p. 338) in a ‘company of sovereigns’ (Taylor, 1993, p. 4) – but have discovered new ways of sharing their sovereignty with and within institutionalised systems that are in favour of more global management (Taylor, 2003).

In today’s multifaceted world characterised by what Held et al. (1999, p. 455) describe as ‘overlapping communities of fate’ – ‘a condition in which the fortunes and prospects of individual political communities are increasingly bound together’ – the once-organic unity of sovereignty and statehood inspired by the Westphalian system is being challenged, if not eroded by emerging structural disjunctions in both conceptual (or ideational) and empirical (or operational) terms such as ‘state–nation/identity’ (Bush and Keyman, 1997; Ifantis 1996, p. 4). State sovereignty no longer refers to complete independence from external interference – ‘the entitlement to rule over a bounded territory’ (Held, 1996, p. 342) – but rather it is interpreted in more flexible ways able to accommodate new forms of political organization and collective decision-making within multilateral cooperative settings. True, states retain their prominence at the systemic level – their decisive role as the basic, albeit not the exclusive or unquestioned political units of the global international system – but they are now part of the gradual but consistent internationalisation of governance

and authority, combined with new forms of codetermination among differently sovereign units as well as between them and a plurality of non-state actors – all performing their functions under conditions of organised globalisation:

Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or inter-regional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power. It involves a stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time such that, on the one hand, day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on the other, the practices and decisions of local groups or communities can have significant global reverberations ... What is new about the modern global system is the stretching of social relations in and through new dimensions of activity – technological, organizational, administrative and legal, among others – and the chronic intensification of patterns of interconnectedness mediated by such phenomena as modern communications networks and new information technology. (Held, 1996, p. 340).

All the above compel one to recast the way the global plurality organises its functions and regulates its activities, and the extent to which heterogeneity, differentiation or even forms of fragmentation shape the conduct of global politics. For ‘processes of globalization do not necessarily lead to growing global integration; that is, by a world order marked by the development of a homogeneous or united society and politics’, given that the ‘growth of dense patterns of interconnectedness and among states and societies can increase the range of developments affecting people in particular locations’ (Held, 1996, p. 341). Any attempt to assess the dialectical interplay between domestic and global politics and, from a similar angle, between state autonomy and the authority of global international organisation, prompts a reconceptualisation of the emergent global system and its profound effects on the theory and practice of sovereign statehood – and, from a democratic standpoint, of changes in views of ‘peoplehood’ and what constitutes the ‘common good’ in increasingly intertwined polities.

For all their differences in style, method or intellectual traditions, world politics theorists share a common purpose: to shed light on the nature, culture and dynamics of international conduct, why and how global processes and institutions impact on the governing qualities of states – both on their policy autonomy, defined as ‘the actual power the nation-state possesses to articulate and achieve policy goals independently’ (Held, 1996, p. 342) as

well as on their formal constitutional authority, defined as the polity's prerogative to act authoritatively within the limits of the rule of law – how transnational forces generate new patterns of collective action, how the latter constrain autonomous strategic thinking on the part of states, and how to make sense of an ever-more contested field of inquiry that has become subject to diverse interpretations. Confronted with these challenges, some scholars focus on the 'big picture' – the state of the discipline or the social and political ontology (or ontologies) of the world system – while others relate the changing norms and conventions of sovereignty with the ways states share in the authority of global institutions. But regardless of their epistemological dispositions, they all resort to the domain of theory as a path to knowledge acquisition and critical reflection; the reason being that international theory is linked both to the 'ethical standards used to judge international conduct' (Griffiths, 2007, p. ix) as well as to the praxis – the actual conduct – of world politics: the ways normative and empirical propositions relate to scholarly discourses and to real-life situations.

Theory and good social science are thus mutually reinforcing. For theory generates pluralism, pluralism produces choice, choice creates alternatives, alternatives formulate debate, debate encourages communication, communication increases awareness, awareness minimizes dogmatism and, this way, there is a propensity towards a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under scrutiny. A related assumption here is that theory helps to link the study of specialised issues – the microcosm of specific activity, events or predicaments – with collective human conduct and the latter with the making of specific choices, thus revealing important connections between ideas and actions, structures and functions, norms and facts, concepts and practices, wholes and parts. Theory in the social sciences is not defined by its ability to produce categorical statements, as in the positivist tradition of experimental natural science, but rather by its ability to 'reflect' – *theorein*, to quote Arendt (2005), being the 'gaze' that leads to knowledge. Conversely: 'Attempts to avoid theory . . . not only miss interesting questions but rely on a framework for analysis that remains unexamined precisely because it is implicit' (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1990, p. 284); but more than that, theory offers a way of linking together the ideational constructs that assign meaning and purpose to human conduct with the empirical facets of the world 'as is'. Also: 'We need to be aware of the conceptions we use since they determine our perception of things' (Church, 1996, p. 9). In Allison's words, 'different conceptual lenses lead analysts to

different judgements about what is relevant and important' (1971, p. 253). Hence Hamlyn's point that 'one cannot get at reality except from within some system of concepts' (1995, p. 31). Groom writes: 'All social activity requires choice and that choice cannot be exercised without some criteria for judgement – in short, a theory, a conception, a framework' (1990, p. 3).

Some theorists project a general view of the whole, looking at the development of macro-systemic patterns; others concentrate on the component depictions of the larger picture, revealing certain of its aspects; others turn to the study of different worldviews and how they account for different realities; and others focus on what counts as legitimate lines of inquiry (Wendt, 1991). Underlying these epistemological dispositions is Puchala's (2003) call for 'edification' in the study of contemporary international relations:

What those of us who study international relations might agree on is that that we are seeking edification. This is different from objective truth, which is at least elusive and possibly mythical. Edification, Richard Rotry wrote in his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, means human intellectual and spiritual growth arrived at by considering and contrasting constantly new or alternative ways of describing reality.¹ Each project—that of mythology, religion, history, art, or science—has its own discourses, and each of these yields interpretations of human being and human affairs by its own methods and its own justifications. Edification comes from a continuing conversation among discourses. Would it not be refreshing if such continuing conversation, and not periodic great debates, became the intellectual mode of international relations? (2003, p. 225).

In more abstract terms, Rosamond notes: 'Theories are necessary if we are to produce ordered observations of social phenomena' (2000a, p. 4); a view shared by Stoker: 'Theories are of value precisely because they structure all observations' (1995, p. 17), and because 'they help to construct the world they describe' (Rosamond, 2000b, p. 155). Or, in the absence of a theoretical model or what Kuhn famously called a 'paradigm', 'all facts are likely to seem equally relevant' (1962, p. 15). Theorising is thus of the essence in any scientific context, whatever the prescribed mixture of evidence and method or whether the focus is on the familiar or the unique.

Notwithstanding the divergence between 'power and meaning' (Laïdi, 1998), the asymmetries and disjunctions produced by the relocation of

¹ Rotry (1979, p. 361).

authority toward multiple venues (Rosenau, 1997) and the development of 'independent political resources at regional and global levels as a necessary complement to those in local and national polities' (Held, 1996, p. 353), the dialectics of the new global system forced states to re-evaluate their conduct by means of adapting to an environment that called for greater cooperation and for a conscious and, given the circumstances of the day, rationalist effort to share in the authority of international institutions.

The assumption was that it was possible for the new system to act in the interests of increased multilateralism and to sustain an ordered global plurality assisted by the pluralisation of liberal democratic polities, 'the internationalization of domestic activities' (p. 352), the growth of global economic and financial regulation, and a normative commitment to peaceful social and political change. States, among other actors at the world systemic level, have thus engaged themselves in a process of adaptation to the new systemic realities which were supportive of states' capacity to function in partnership with and within cooperative systems: to share the burden of costs, risks and uncertainties in a world characterised by an ever growing enmeshment of previously disconnected policy (and polity) issues and of formerly distinctive styles of as well as incentives for governance.

It is against the background of profound changes in the operational and behavioural attitudes of states – of self-reflective modifications in strategic calculations and normative orientations – that the latter embarked upon a conscious redefinition of their relationship with the new global system and its rules of conduct. Linked to that is the question of whether the system can generate a commonality of norms of conduct guided by a cooperative culture that can produce mutually rewarding interactions; whether states, acting in and through multiple 'networks of transaction and coordination' (Held, 1996, p. 340), can sustain a symbiotic relationship (Taylor, 2003) with the normative and empirical realities of global international organisation so as to turn the effects of change into a call for institutionalisation.

Scholars are faced with the task of assessing how global transformations – their synergies and connections, tensions and antinomies – impact on the constitution of international society and whether such transformations can keep it together as a connected plurality whose members prefer to structure their interaction on common rules, rather than on their relative influence and power. Hence the challenge to make sense of an elusive – empirically and conceptually – global plurality and to evaluate how its emergent

authority structures can be positively linked to the governing capacity of the constituent and, from a constructivist angle, mutually constituted units.

One may legitimately ask: Is it a world of states pursuing their individual interests under conditions of structural anarchy – given the absence of a higher authority with a state-like capacity to enforce its laws – and able to preserve their integrity from real or perceived threats? Or is it a reflection of a post-Westphalian world order and thus of profound change in the ways states decide to exercise their authority? Put differently, is the world system still heavily dependent on territorial states concerned with their own security (Taylor, 1993) or is it increasingly shaped by transnational systems and global governance institutions and regimes? Taylor writes:

This is a world in which links are established between the internal arrangements of the state and international society, and, indeed, in which international society has legitimate access to those arrangements. This a world in which attention is focused, not on the eternal verity of sovereignty, but upon the changes in the conditions under which it is exercised . . . This is also a world in which the culture of international society is seen to be itself capable of development so that it begins to play a positive role in the process whereby the interests of states are defined. (p. 251).

As to the question of change in the global system, is change driven by states themselves or by the mutual constitution of ‘agents’ and ‘structures’ (Wendt 1995) as asserted by international theorists who subscribe to a sociologically inclined epistemology? Or is it caused by both? Kostas Ifantis writes:

One could argue that changes in the nature of the units act as a catalyst for the way in which the system functions as a whole. Put simply, this means that the nature of international relations is being altered: the system changes because and when the physiognomy of the component units changes . . . The change in the system’s constituent features has as a result its restructuring. (2008, p. 114).

Contemporary writings on world politics confirm that it is not only material forces that should attract the interest of international relations scholarship, as neorealist writers would have us believe, but also the impact of ideas, dialogical practices, normative understandings, collective meanings, and social norms on the constitution and assorted value spheres of world society. This question can be also posed thus: Is the world system developing into a formally structured whole, is it merely a reflection of antago-

nistic units, or does it confirm Nye's (2002) account of the global condition as a plurality of diverse forms of power distribution? The view taken here is that the system becomes a hybrid construct whereby actors seek to enhance their cooperative potential based on settled rules of the game as well as a 'self-help system' based on Hobbesian 'state of nature' reflexes. This dialectical – antithetical and synergetic – fusion, if not osmosis between opposing views of world order, ranging from a legally constituted Kantian 'peace' founded on cosmopolitan values, to hyper-realist conceptions of a lawless global arena composed of quarrelsome states that perceive their values and integrity as being in mutual conflict with those of others (Taylor, 1993, p. 4), motivates one to rethink the ethical frames and power configurations of world politics and how they are shaping its conduct.

Structural Transformations

The crucial question is what the future of world politics would bring about (Cronin, 1999, p. 103): rivalry, turbulence and chaos or coexistence, equality and democratisation? Reconceptualising patterns of international conduct includes a wide range of options. On the pessimists' camp, these range from Huntington's (1996) 'clash of civilisations' to Holsti's (1999) prophecy of 'coming chaos', Hoffmann's (1998) notion of 'world disorders' and Krasner's (1999) idea of 'organized hypocrisy'. For the more optimists, however, comes Fukuyama's (1992) 'end of history' thesis, while for others the world becomes a reflection of 'proactive cosmopolitanism' informed by 'a globalization of moral concern' (Taylor, 1999; 2003, p. 7), in that civilised international conduct is not only part of the world's value-system, but it is also reflected in the workings of its political structures.

Before these divergent projections of a world in transition to a poly-architectural structure – and of a world politics in search of a viable equilibrium between order and fragmentation, change and affirmation – liberal theorists projected a notion of 'complex interdependence' (Keohane and Nye, 1977), while others turned to the impact of systemic change (Rosenau, 1992). But there were those who spoke of 'the internationalising of the state' (Cox, 1994) followed by those who stressed the need for a 'global

covenant' (Jackson, 2003; Held, 2004) as the basis for a civilised world, and then by those who stressed the merits of 'embedded multilateralism':

a system of rules of increasing density, and ways of creating and modifying them, which became embedded in the sense that they generated a culture of support, but also a calculation of increasing costs if they were broken. (Taylor, 2008, p. 9).

As states 'are locked into a diversity of processes and structures which range in and though them, linking and fragmenting them into complex constellations' (Held et al., 1999, p. 445), organising world politics reflects 'the growing interpenetration of foreign and domestic policy' (Held, 1996, p. 345), the fact that '[m]arkets, and societies, are becoming more sensitive to one another even when their distinctive identities are preserved' (p. 344), and the enmeshment of civilisational spheres, 'each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging' (Xenakis and Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 28). It also became evident that, through sovereignty sharing practices, states can achieve more than by acting alone; a condition that accords with the metaphor of the 'eclipse' of sovereignty: the latter may not be as visible as it used to, but it would be wrong to assume that it has ceased to exist (Chryssochoou, 2009, p. 135); rather, it has become 'divided among a number of agencies ... and limited by the very nature of this plurality' (Held, 1996, p. 352). These views confirmed that 'any conception of sovereignty which assumes that it is indivisible, illimitable, exclusive and perpetual form of public power – embodied within an individual state – is defunct' (Held, 1996, p. 347) and suggested that sovereignty was a reflection of extensive power-sharing within common systems; the most advanced being the European Union in the form of an 'organized synarchy; a novel form of composite polity called upon to reconcile the parallel demands for safeguarding the autonomy of the parts – and, at the level of their respective publics and public spheres, diversity – with a sense of systemic unity. To the extent that synarchy is an instrumental means of understanding the operations of advanced modes of codetermination, it indicates a way in which the sovereignty of states becomes an expression of their right to be involved in the common exercise of shared powers. It thus refers to a general system of shared rule among highly interdependent states and citizens that escapes the classical categories of political authority, resting instead on the dialectical fusion of segmental autonomy and collective polity formation. (Chryssochoou, 2009, p. 131).

The new sovereignty discourses were reflective of a new state of symbiosis, according to which state and global international organisation 'were each being developed in association with the other' (Taylor, 1993, p. 252); the point made here is 'the acceptance of a weakening of the right of exclusive domestic jurisdiction with regard to the legitimate actions of international organizations ... There was a new synthesis of the two kinds of rights – those of the collectivity and those of the separate states' (pp. 251–2). But symbiosis also implies 'a duality of national concern, with, first, the identification of the common interest – the promotion of the community – and, second, the reconciliation of that with the separate national interests' (p. 114). The collectivity, in other words, is being strengthened through a process of consolidating the strength of its parts (p. 114). Whether or not one detects strong integrative dynamics at the global level, the development of symbiotic patterns between the whole and the parts – at both regional and global levels as the theory has it (p. 114) – is an indication of a new ethos, even of a new 'social episteme' (Taylor, 2003, p. 247). The result is that states 'relate to global organizations in new ways ... without preventing any one of them from doing this separately, or denying their existence as separate states' (Taylor, 1993, p. 114); ways that are compatible with the strengthening of the common global arrangements.

The emergent forms of codetermination among states – at both regional and global levels, although more profoundly in the former case – have significantly altered the ability and, crucially, the strategic culture of states to shape their future in their own terms, bestowing the exercise of sovereignty with a participatory quality, and signalling a radical departure from the idea of states exercising supreme and exclusive control over their territories (Philpott, 2001, pp. 16–7). But what was also stressed was the fact that states were now taken as sovereign on the basis of their ability to become 'citizens' of a larger, much less hierarchical as compared to the sub-units, but still ordered 'political society' (Taylor, 2003): 'The sovereign was the entity which was accountable to the higher unit, and states which evaded this obligation were increasingly seen as falling short of the standards expected in the state-citizens of international society' (p. 53). Taylor adds:

One reason for this was an increasing objection to the classical realist argument that what went on within states was no concern of any outsider. It was entirely appropriate for the international community to make the attempt to put right violations of individual rights, since the cosmopolitan moral community was indivisible:

individuals throughout the world have rights in common and owed obligations to each other. Such rights were increasingly interpreted as meaning both individual political and civil rights, as well as the right to basic means of support. Although the efforts of the United Nations, and other international organizations, were entirely inadequate in this regard, the principle of their involvement in order to promote these rights was increasingly accepted. (p. 21).

Sovereignty was still being made by states, but it also became part of the constitutive role of the whole (p. 52). This gave rise to a condition of ‘consonance’: system and units complemented each other in mutually reinforcing ways (p. 213). The former organised its functions and the ways it connects to the latter in a manner that no longer permitted ‘the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations’ (Krasner, 1999, p. 9). Thus an imaging of sovereignty that escaped the idea of states defying ethical standards as ‘the rightful basis for acting on behalf of the political community and for representing it in a manner which is authoritative and accountable’ (Held, 1996, p. 342). The twin spatial facets of sovereignty were now linked to rights of legitimate and justifiable action: claiming to enjoy normative legitimacy was not the exclusive prerogative of states, but was rather shared with a collectivity of states in the form of a principled international society. Thus also a ‘grand underlying dialectic’: ‘the sovereignty of states obliged them to meet the norms of the international community but the norms of the international community were a product of the sovereignty of states’ (Taylor, 2003, p. 54):

These perceptions of sovereignty arose in the context of the turn of the millennium. They included, in particular, extensions of the role of international institutions, especially the United Nations and the European Union, and the emergence of a more proactive cosmopolitanism which stressed an overlay on diverse cultures of universalizing values. All of this was in the process of *becoming*: it was a consequence of the happy coincidence that the end of the Cold War left the democratic liberal states in a position to push their values. (p. 54).

Keeping in mind that the world is composed of a plurality of global authorities best described as a network of institutionalised norms, structures and practices that impinge on state behaviour, and that such agencies, by focusing on ‘shared problems involving the global commons’ (Held, 1996, p. 351), such authorities are seen as an effective remedy to systemic anarchy. But at the same time, one also has to be reminded of the following:

The sweep of history had moved in a surprisingly short space of time from a short spell of optimism to a pessimism about the prospect of a new world order. The trouble was that any observer had to acknowledge that the optimistic and the negative potential existed side by side, though it was unrealistic to ignore the optimistic one. (Taylor, 2003, pp. 258–9).

This may be an indication that the new order seems to rely more on a politics of collective negotiation and norm setting. Although, as Langhorne argues, '[o]nly when the process of change has produced a really new world order reflecting the realities of the distribution of power among both the old and the new possessors of it, will a new system develop able to extrude similar pressures to conform' (1998, p. 2; quoted in Taylor, 2003, p. 212). In a world system shaped by the idea of 'governance without government' (Rosenau, 1992), global institutions grow in importance. It was even possible to argue that the expansion of global institutional activity 'reflected and promoted moral interdependence' (Taylor, 2003, p. 28); that global authorities had a normative obligation to respond to infringements of civilised conduct, if not 'a right to moral action' in order 'to protect a norm' (p. 221) and that seemed compatible with the 'desire by most states for some form of international governance to deal with collective policy problems' (Held, 1996, p. 345). International regimes, defined by Cox as 'recognized patterns of practice that define the rules of the game' (1981, p. 128), by fostering ruled-based conduct, preserve the symbiotic relationship between state and global authorities. Such trends were part of a wider systemic evolution: the progressive growth of global institutionalisation. This is not to imply that there was 'an *uncontested* international authority' (Taylor, 2003, p. 251); yet it was indicative of a discernible pattern, albeit not a predetermined one, that could lead to higher levels of global organisation. Although the shortfalls of regime theory are well-reported in the *acquis académique*, the theory claims to possess a plausible answer as to why states are bound by certain norms of behaviour: whether or not cooperation is an *a priori* objective of states, international regimes, for all their conceptual vagueness, offer a venue for negotiated agreements based on a perception of reciprocity that transcends self-interested action:

When states accept reciprocity they will sacrifice short-term interests with the expectation that other actors will reciprocate in the future, even if they are not obliged to do so ... It is the infusion of behaviour with principles and norms that distinguishes regime-governed activity in the international system from more con-

ventional activity, guided exclusively by narrow calculations of interest. (Krasner, 1983, p. 3).

It is worth noting that the normative potential of regimes has been explored further by constructivist theorists who argued that the international system is socially constructed (Wendt, 1995); the most powerful statement of how social practices co-constitute world politics being Wendt's 'Anarchy is what states make of it' (1992). Jackson and Sørensen explain that states 'are not prisoners of the anarchical nature of the state system'; they 'construct one another in their relations and in so doing they also construct the international anarchy that defines their relations (2003, p. 258). In sum:

If "anarchy is what states make of it" there is nothing inevitable or unchangeable about world politics. Nothing is certain or given. Everything is inter-subjective and thus uncertain. Everything is in flux. The existing system is a creation of states and if states change their conceptions of who they are, what their interests are, what they want, etc. then the situation will change accordingly because the situation is nothing more or less than what they decide and do. States could decide, for example, to reduce their sovereignty or even to give up their sovereignty. If that happened there would no longer be an international anarchy as we know it. Instead, there would be a brave new, non-anarchical world ... beyond sovereignty and in some fundamental aspects beyond modernity too. Moreover, if everything is uncertain and in flux it would be impossible to predict what international relations will be like tomorrow. Among other things, that means that a predictive and explanatory social science of IR could not be achieved. (Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 258).

A Conclusion

For all the intellectual richness of international political thought, classical and contemporary, conventional and 'neo', 'first-order' and 'post', empiricist and ideational, two archetypal representations keep recurring: one projects a legally constituted international community, where the deviants are forced to comply with its laws; the other relates human conduct to the relentless struggle for survival in a world of rivals. In the vast grey area between these antithetical images, lies a variety of views on what drives structural change, how global transformations shape the political structures of the world system and how they affect the norms and conditions of

sovereign statehood, and why states choose to participate in collective systems despite the limitations imposed on their authority. Such intermediate possibilities have been explored with reference to the impact governance institutions have on policy outcomes, the declining authority of states to act as the sole masters of their destiny, the idea of cosmopolitan democracy (and global citizenship) as a promising analogy to the ancient Stoic philosophy of a universal moral community, a republican-inspired vision for a European *civitas composita* in the form of a ‘polities’ polity’ made up of diverse but constituent states and publics (Chrysochoou, 2009), and to dialogical, reflectivist, and identity-based views of international conduct.

Yet in a world politics that is rather unlikely to develop into a genuinely congruent domain of entirely peaceful, ethically-driven and deontologically oriented patterns of conduct and forms of governance, one should counsel against the idea of raising high expectations for the construction of a world-wide ‘identitive community’ (Taylor, 1993, p. 2). And that, among other reasons, because states have effectively managed to re-affirm their centrality in world politics, albeit at the expense of their – arguably, much idealised – Westphalian past. But this is not all there is to it. For there is still hope for the qualitative transition of the world system from a global plurality to a global polity. Put differently, from a collectivity of sovereignty-conscious and, as realists had long claimed, interest-calculating and power-maximising states ‘concerned with the attainment of internal goals’ (Taylor, 1993, p. 3) to a collectively and even democratically determined ‘global commons’ (Held, 1996, p. 351). In other words, there are grounds for envisaging the development of a universal political community that could challenge the dominant view that ‘the nation state is the most appropriate locus of democracy’ (p. 359), while assigned the task of promoting ‘the entrenchment of a cluster of rights and obligations ... in order to provide shape and limits to democratic decision-making’ (p. 355), and taking the form of an authoritative, representative and transparent association of democratic polities (p. 355) – or, from a rather more progressive but not necessarily integrationist or homogenising view, a global polity in its own right characterised by its distinctive sense of global ‘demos-hood’.

It is though these normative assertions that the cosmopolitan democratic ideal aims to capture the imagination of a global political domain, whose politics extends beyond the traditional democratic attachment to ‘the idea of locality and place’ (p. 356), and whose functions are capable of radically altering, if not transforming the character of statehood and, with it,

the conduct of world politics. Without this depiction implying in any sense the withering away of the nation-state, it portrays its gradual transformation into an organic but still distinctive component part of what might be described as ‘a global republic of many’. What makes this imaging appealing is that it is entirely compatible with the parallel demands for unity and diversity or for synarchy and autonomy. That is to say, for a new possibility of multiple forms of democratic association, including ‘the recovery of an intensive and participatory democracy at local levels as a complement to the deliberative assemblies of the wider global order’ (p. 357). The resulting condition is ‘a political order of democratic associations, cities and nations as well as of regions and global networks. In such an order, the principle of autonomy would be entrenched in diverse sites of power and across diverse spatial domains’ (p. 357). And all that, against the background of an ever-dynamic global setting that, at this particular stage of its historical and institutional evolution, combines

an international order involving the emergence of a global economic system which stretches beyond the control of any state (even of dominant states); the extension of networks of transnational relations and communications over which particular states have limited influence; the enormous growth in international organizations and regimes which can limit the scope for action of the most powerful states; and the development of a global military order, and the build-up of the means of “total” warfare as an enduring feature of the contemporary world, which can alter the range of policies available to governments and their citizens. (Held, 1996, p. 339).

Whether the system remains anchored to its anarchy or develops into an ordered and formally organised structure, theorising about the global plurality, its conceptual elusiveness, but also its potential for systemic change and growth – for stronger forms of global political organisation and for novel patterns of international authority and conduct – will figure prominently in future scholarly writings. And even though the theoretical controversy over its ambivalent ontology will most likely continue to persist, it will refer less to zero-sum notions of politics and governance at the systemic level, and more to the idea of states negotiating collectively mutually rewarding outcomes and investing in reciprocal activities that would allow them to survive the tides of fragmentation and face up to a common future through, rather than despite their active engagement in the global plurality.

Thus a promising challenge to be taken up by theorists of world politics is to detect and develop a general notion of the whole – what was pre-

viously referred to as the ‘big picture’ – through an evolutionary theory of the global plurality, ‘rather than an account of what are construed as the eternal verities of international society’ (Taylor, 1993, p. 251); a theory that, on the one hand, holds the promise of a global order based on stable, structured and symbiotic forms and patterns of interaction and, on the other, marks a departure from idealised and utopian projections of a single, unified, compact and congruent global setting. Thus also a normatively balanced and theoretically promising task of revisiting the state of a discipline in an era of profound change as well as uncertainty about the future shape of world politics and the capacity of states to remain its primary political actors; yet one which, for all its potential shortcomings, is a step closer to making states realise the potential rewards of ‘who shares wins’.

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Ethnic Conflict and ‘Democratic Peace’: 20 Years Later

Irini Chila

Introduction

Ethnic conflict has been analysed in the literature using several approaches, the most important being ethnicity and ethnic identity, modernisation,¹ security dilemmas² and economic competition for ethnic goals.³ These approaches raise questions about with the causes of ethnic conflicts and their implications within the internal and international order. One of the main concepts in the discourse between scholars and policymakers on the eruption and resolution of ethnic conflicts is that of ‘democratic peace’.⁴ This concept has become key in the arguments and justifications for using different means of conflict management.⁵

¹ Karl Deutsch (1961, p. 494) supported the concept of ‘social mobilisation’, which he conceived as ‘an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life’.

² Barry Posen (1993) has extended the concept of the security dilemma, first developed by the realist school of international relations, to the study of ethnic conflict.

³ Horowitz claims that economic rivalries cannot explain in a straightforward manner ethnic conflict. Even though it may be true in multi-ethnic societies that certain groups are more privileged than others and advance their status in society because of their economic supremacy, Horowitz believes that it is hard to claim that economic antagonisms within a certain society can lead to ethnic conflict. He also stresses that the various theories and approaches to ethnic conflict have neglected to address questions relating to ethnic conflict and economic competition between groups in a satisfactory manner. There is apparently a need for more research in this area; see Horowitz (1985, pp. 134–5).

⁴ For an analysis of basic principles see Russett (1993).

⁵ There is a variety of conflict management methods, ranging from official and unofficial mediation to outside military intervention by states and non-state

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate, more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the notion of democratic peace as an approach to understanding and managing ethnic conflicts. The chapter is divided in three sections. In the first I examine the domestic and international issues determining the rise and evolution of ethnic conflicts. This is followed by an analysis of ‘democratic peace’ as a tool of international conflict management in order to assess the emphasis placed on the relationship between the effects of democratisation and the outbreak of violence within states after the collapse of the Cold War. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the effectiveness of the international community’s response in ethnic conflict resolution, utilising examples from South-Eastern Europe.

Domestic and International Issues

Following the end of the Cold War, many articles and studies appeared in international relations periodicals and reports trying to answer the question of how to prevent the explosion of ethnic violence and what role the international community should play in this context.

Ethnic conflict and violence were common in the first decade after the breakdown of the bipolar system. In the absence of the former balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, an era of vicious local conflicts was unleashed, uncontained by superpower restraints and East–West confrontation. As a result, the nature of armed conflicts has changed in some respects in comparison to those of the past. The impact of conflicts on international politics gave way to concerns about religious fundamentalism, environmental degradation, massive migration, ethnic problems and national aspirations in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.⁶ New challenges were posed to international and regional security. Many of these conflicts arose over causes that were

actors. But the latter has raised many questions about its legitimacy and efficiency and the intentions of key actors. For a classification of these methods, especially during the post-bipolar era, see Zartman and Rasmussen (1997).

⁶ A conflict is a number of perceived differences in issues or positions between two or more parties at a moment in time involving religious, cultural, political or social values or beliefs. Due to its dynamic character, the conflict’s level of intensity changes over its duration; see Swanström and Weissmann (2005, p. 9).

not of the classic kind – interstate conflicts pertaining to borders, territorial control and so on – but were over values such as liberty, self-determination and the consolidation of ethnic identity in multi-ethnic societies. This in turn changed the nature of warfare into something more localised than it had been in the past.⁷ The struggles in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, Rwanda and other places have therefore posed serious challenges to scholars, policymakers and international organisations seeking methods and techniques for the settlement and resolution of such deadly conflicts.⁸

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the international community has debated the most appropriate mechanisms for peace settlement. Questions around arrangements that might be used to persuade communities or ethnic groups in a heterogeneous society of the benefits of post-conflict stability or of the cost of the resumption of violence have preoccupied analysts and practitioners during the last 20 years. These questions were further shaped by variables such as the characteristics of ethnic conflicts, the role of third parties and the international environment (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001).

Thus in recent years the classic means of management and resolution have been subject to constant change, especially by state and non-state actors who have adopted new methods and techniques for the management of ethnic conflicts. Moreover, these methods have been faced with 'internationalised internal armed conflicts', so called because of spillover effects like illegal migration, the action of different terrorist groups across states boundaries, illegal arms trade and so on in the regional or international environment. In this new environment, the limits of traditional terms such as conflict resolution, conflict management, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building became more and more complex, as the application of these methods in managing ethnic conflicts was confronted with the

⁷ One of the first works that attempted to study ethnic conflict on a multidisciplinary basis through the social sciences and in connection with international relations was that of D. L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, especially chapter 3 on 'Conflict Theory and Conflict Motives'; see Horowitz (1985, pp. 95–139).

⁸ Although there is a lack of consensus regarding the interpretation of concepts like conflict management, conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy within the academic and policy community, an understanding of the conflict cycle is essential for an understanding of how, where and when to apply different strategies and measures for conflict prevention and management. For definitions of these terms, see Swanström and Weissmann (2005, p. 5).

elimination of the sources of incompatibility between antagonist parties and their positions. These methods included the monitoring of a peace agreement and the introduction of structural measures to preclude a relapse into conflict until the imposition of a solution by the use of force.

The Characteristics of Ethnic Conflicts

In the beginning of the 1990s a wave of ethnic conflicts swept across parts of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Balkans,⁹ provoking a 'new world disorder' (Lake and Rothchild 1996, p. 41) and thus undermining the optimism that followed the end of the Cold War. This phenomenon prompted different explanations for the causes of ethnic violence and the ways of managing them, promoting measures both by local elites and the international community. States and non-state actors emphasised the contagious character of ethnic conflicts and their transnational effects, spreading across national borders (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, pp.1–32). Thus international relations theorists tried to correlate domestic sources of conflict with changes in the international system and the dissolution of multi-ethnic states, while political scientists, sociologists and international law analysts tended to examine ethnic conflict from other points of view such as the historical, cultural, social, political or legal.

Sociologists have emphasised the origins of ethnic violence (Smith, 1991, pp. 27–43), considering the historical enmity between rival ethnic groups¹⁰ and the differences in language, cultural, racial or religion as the main sources of conflict.¹¹ Ethnicity that is rooted in past practice of vio-

⁹ Ethnic conflicts are disputes between communities which see themselves as having distinct heritages over the power relationship among communities, while civil wars are contests between factions within the same community over how that community should be governed. For this definition, see Kaufmann (1996, p. 138).

¹⁰ According to Max Weber (1968, pp. 389 and 395), an ethnic group is defined as a body of individuals who share cultural and racial characteristics, especially common ancestry or territorial origin, which distinguish them from members of other groups.

¹¹ Monica Toft (2001, pp. 1–5) presents five theories about the origins of ethnic conflict. One of these is the 'ancient hatreds' school, according to which the violence breaks out when a long-standing rival ethnic group threatens another ethnic group's boundaries.

lence and hatred produces emotions of collective fear, distrust and suspicion that can explode into violence (Smith, 1986; Connor, 1994).¹² Additionally, ethnicity is linked with social uncertainty¹³ and fears of what the future might bring, which emerge as one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture (Newland, 1993, p. 161).¹⁴ The feeling of fear can arise when certain groups believe they will be assimilated in a hegemonic state or into a dominant culture, especially when such assimilation involves a weak minority and a strong majority within the same state. In this case the minority group fears for its safety and survival in light of attempts to assimilate it politically, economically or culturally, and ethnic hatred evolves very rapidly.

These developments, combined with weakness in the state and local leaders 'who are more concerned with partisan gains than the general welfare' (Krasner, 2002, p. 10), not only make difficult the management of these conflicts but also mean that violence is much more likely to erupt. In this case the state sets the terms of competition between groups and instead of playing the role of 'peace builder' becomes an object of group struggle (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 9). Under such conditions, political leaders or 'political entrepreneurs' produce a kind of social polarisation within a multi-ethnic society which in turn magnifies the strategic dilemmas and potential of conflict (Lake and Rothchild, 1996, p. 53). One example is Bosnia, where the transitional administration established after the Dayton Agreement did not work because of the lack of interest from political leaders to make it work due to their commitment vis-à-vis their nationalist constituents (Krasner, 2002, p. 10). Clearly, the role of nationalism as a tool of manipulation used by political leaders in order to gain or to remain in power is an important factor. In this respect, state weakness is considered as a key variable in explaining ethnic violence following the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Balkans and the former Soviet

¹² This is the 'primordialist' approach.

¹³ It is worth noting that in addition to the 'primordialist' approach to ethnicity, there is also the 'instrumentalist' one. According to instrumentalists, conflict is stimulated and manipulated by the political elites in order to pursue their own interests, while for the constructivists conflict is an effect of the pathological nature of the social system which individuals can not control. See Lake and Rothchild (1998, p. 6).

¹⁴ For evidence of a relationship between the social construction of ethnic identities and the probability of ethnic war, see Fearon and Laitin (2000).

Union, but also in African states such as Somalia, Liberia and elsewhere (Lake and Rothchild, 1996, p. 43).

According to Krasner there are clear links between ineffective domestic sovereignty and internal violence: the former implies the absence of an independent authority structure capable of regulating activities within the borders of a recognised territory. This kind of authority structure can ensure stability in the social order, including respect for human rights (Krasner, 2002, p. 2). Otherwise the outcome may be a 'troubled' society in which a failed or weak state blocks economic well-being, undermines the security of its population and violates the basic human rights of its inhabitants. This reflects, among other things, the general inability of state to offer sustained leadership to society, which is likely to result in conflict. Given that the lack of effective authority constitutes an obstacle to the implementation of a society's agreed-upon rules, state weakness might be a factor of insecurity (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001, p. 185).

Another factor that is linked with sentiments of insecurity and fears for the future survival of ethnic groups is control over territory. According to Monica Toft, the control of a piece of territory is linked to the physical survival of ethnic groups and the preservation of their identity. Ethnic identity constitutes a part of the historical past of each group and its perception about the maintenance of communal trends such as race, language and religion. These factors are associated with a given piece of territory (Toft, 2001, p. 6). If the warring parties all view the same territory as indivisible, this results in an asymmetry of interests and, consequently, the outbreak of violence is inevitable.¹⁵

Considering the state's role brings a different perspective to the security issue. For the state, security is associated with an independent authority structure exercising effective governance within a recognised territory. Krasner calls this 'international legal sovereignty', a concept in line with

¹⁵ Monica Toft has examined the connection between indivisibility, territory and ethnic war. She argues that the precedent-setting concerns come through states' fear that granting independence to one group may encourage others to also claim independence, which may have negative consequences for territorial integrity and domestic stability. In order to test her theory, Toft (2001, pp. 26–36) uses as a case study Russia's dealings in Tatarstan and Chechnya. The difference between the two cases is that the first one demanded greater autonomy from Russia and the second one independence. This was the main reason that violence broke out in Chechnya but not in Tatarstan.

Westphalian sovereignty, the non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states (Krasner, 2002, p. 2). However, in certain cases, ethnic groups living in this state can challenge the 'owner' of the state in order for them to preserve their ethnicity which is perceived to be in danger. This can lead to a situation such that the power of the state can be seen as divisible, and to an effort to seek a new balance of power within the 'old' regime structure. A possible partition is seen as a guarantee that satisfies the 'subjective belief' in common descent and is therefore envisaged.¹⁶

The weakness of the state and the ensuing insecurity that could result because ethnic groups leave a state are directly related to the security dilemma. The dilemma follows when the state cannot protect the needs of ethnic communities, and each community tries to mobilise their capabilities in order to ensure their security. This produces a vicious cycle of violence where – under conditions of anarchy¹⁷ – each group constitutes a threat to the other: the increase in the security of one side is perceived as a threat to the security of the other (Posen, 1993, p. 104). This is a basic assumption of international relations theory, according to which 'many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others' (Jervis, 1978, p. 169). After the collapse of the multi-ethnic state in the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union as the central authority, the so-called sovereign state (Posen, 1993, p. 104) has disappeared, leaving behind a number of heterogeneous groups in search of their own safety.

Thus, a dynamic of increasing security capabilities for offensive goals by ethnic groups creates a vicious and unending cycle of power competition for security reasons. As a consequence, the competing parties, because of their lack of information about the intentions of their rivals, 'amass more power than needed for security and thus begin to threaten others. Those threatened will respond in turn' (Jervis, 1978, p. 167). This reinforces the dynamic of conflict, because the military capabilities attained by one group for defence are difficult to measure and can be also used for offence. In other words, relative power has an element of subjectivity in that what seems sufficient to one state's defence will seem offensive to its neigh-

¹⁶ According to Horowitz, this is close to Max Weber's conception of ethnicity, which embraces groups differentiated by skin colour, language, religion etc., and is reflected in tribes, races, casts etc. Cited in Sambanis (2001, p. 261)

¹⁷ Posen (1993, p. 103) argues that the collapse of imperial regimes can be viewed as a problem of 'emerging anarchy', which in international relations theory is the absence of a sovereign authority regulating states' behaviour.

bours (Jervis, 1978, pp. 174-176). This lack of information about the intentions of the other side can drive one of the disputing parties to a preemptive use of force. When the benefits from pre-emption are significant, the cycle of violence is inevitable. As Robert Jervis observes concerning interstate relations, 'in international politics, one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others' (Jervis, 1978, p. 170). Furthermore, in interstate relations the lack of an 'international sovereign not only permits wars to occur but also makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals that they recognize as being in their common interest' (p. 167).

What are the conditions that increase the possibility of offensive over defensive action? Posen argues that a significant variable is geography (1993, p. 108). The security dilemmas are more acute when more opposing ethnic groups are dispersed within the same territory and as a result the front lines are not well-defined. In such a case, each group has an incentive to increase its tactical offensive advantage in order to drive out enemy populations pre-emptively and finally create homogenous enclaves that are more practical to defend (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 148). The problem becomes more complicated if this part of a territory has special value in terms of material resources and the groups have decided to ensure that 'the necessary supplies will continue to flow in war time'.¹⁸ That is, territory is tied not only to the group's identity but also to geo-strategic and material gains. Accordingly, the level of violence becomes greater and the pursuit of a solution more difficult. Even a group that would prefer a solution that would require it to live together with antagonistic parties in a heterogeneous state will nevertheless come to the conclusion that the constraints are too great, and that it would be better for each ethnic group to live separately in different homogeneous states. This option is more often recommended for consideration where groups are territorially concentrated (Horowitz, 1985, p. 588).

One of the main problems with multi-ethnic states is in the difficulty of ethnic cooperation in a war-shattered society, where war itself destroys the possibility for transformation from a conflictual approach to a win-win

¹⁸ This observation is of great significance and can explain the imperialistic tendencies of certain countries, such as Japan before the Second World War. Japan's invasion in China can be explained by its lack of a self-sufficient economy and the resulting need to increase its area of control. See Jervis (1978, p. 168).

solution. It is worth noting that not all scholars agree with the partition approach.¹⁹ More specifically, Toft believes, first, that this kind of solution does not account for the significance of the homeland for rival ethnic groups; and second that their concentration in enclaves can create more violence between a majority and a minority group (Toft, 2001, p. 43). As far as the granting of statehood as a possible solution to ethnic violence is concerned, this is another serious question demanding an in-depth and attentive analysis that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. It suffices to recall the dilemma that confronted the international community when the Federal State of Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991. Granting independence to an ethnic group threatens the state's sovereignty and challenges the territorial integrity of the state, leading to its dissolution.²⁰ Granting independence to or recognising it in one ethnic group creates a precedent for other groups, offering them a 'window of opportunity' to claim their right to self-determination.²¹ That was the major risk following the democratisation process in the Balkans and in states of the former Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War.

¹⁹ Kaufmann (1996, p. 150) argues that '[e]thnic separation does not guarantee peace, but it allows it. Once populations are separated, both cleansing and rescue imperatives disappear; war is no longer mandatory'. This is based on the assumption that any solution aiming at restoring the multi-ethnic state's character by rebuilding its structures and reconstructing ethnic identities is not capable of diminishing the security dilemma. For the option of partition as a solution to ethnic violence, see Sambanis (2000, p. 437).

²⁰ Nicholas Sambanis, using a data set of all civil wars since 1944, has attempted to test empirically the hypotheses elaborating by the 'partition' theory. His analysis shows that there is no clear correlation between the need for partition and ethnic heterogeneity. Even if the eventual separation of ethnic groups – the larger ones – and a redrawing of borders reduces the probability of new wars, we have to take into account the likelihood of violent secessionist activity resulting from the creation of a multitude of mini-states. Taking as an example the African states, he argues that 'even if this solution reduces the incidence of internal war, it will almost certainly increase the incidence of international war' (Sambanis, 2000, pp. 478–9).

²¹ Toft (2001, pp. 4, 8) makes a clear distinction on territorial issues between the differentiated perspectives of states and ethnic groups. For states, territory is an expression of power. By that logic, their struggle is focused on maintaining or increasing material resources for defence or conquest. In contrast, for an ethnic group territory has a subjective value and it is viewed as bound up with its identity and survival as a group.

Another crucial issue that has been preoccupying scholars and policy-makers for the last 20 years is how to end ethnic conflicts. Given the interest of the international community in advancing democratic peace as an ‘instrument’ of conflict management, I will try, in the second part of this study, to approach the problems arising from this concept and its efficacy as a strategy for managing ethnic conflicts.

‘Democratic Peace’ as an Instrument of Crisis Management

The evolution in the international system that has taken place since 1989 has brought to the fore the application of democratic values as a ‘remedy’ for conflict management. Following this logic, respect by the state authority for the basic rules of human rights is considered necessary for ensuring internal stability and institution building to promote better governance in post-conflict societies. Once this authority cannot ensure ‘effective domestic sovereignty’ based on the rule of law and a shared understanding of justice (Krasner, 2002, p. 2), the consequences can spread across national borders,²² threatening international peace and stability.²³ A number of analysts and policymakers consider that state failure could be an endemic problem in the international environment, in the sense that poor governance is associated with civil wars and civil strife (pp. 3–4). Given this problem, states need to justify their actions in terms of solidarist²⁴ and transnational norms and to seek – in relation to the preferences and interests of states – legitimacy from international institutions in order to discourage acts that threaten international peace and stability.²⁵

²² For an analysis of consequences of the collapse of ‘effective sovereignty’ in troubled societies and in failed, weak or abusive states, see Krasner (2002, pp. 3–5).

²³ We have to approach the diffusion of ethnic conflict at the international level from different points of view, taking into account the causes of ethnic violence but also the ability of states to create a stable and legitimate political order. In any case, the analysis of such a crucial question demands another paper. For the reasons and conditions under which ethnic conflicts constitute a problem for international stability, see Lake and Rothchild (1998, pp. 23–32).

²⁴ For this group of theorists, see Wheeler (2000, pp. 11–12).

²⁵ According to Andrew Hurrell (2007, p. 9), ‘the precarious and insecure political foundations of liberal solidarism and other alternative modes of governance

This approach emphasises the relationship between regime change and the restoration of democratic values as a mechanism for discouraging ethnic antagonisms. Accordingly, it examines the evidence regarding democracy and conflict prevention where political elites are predisposed to resolve internal problems in a peaceful manner. Thus, a foreign policy respecting international norms arises from within a given polity and the principles that prevail there.²⁶

The crucial questions arising from the above thesis are these: Who should take responsibility for the defence of these values and principles? How can they be implemented? And in the name of what criteria? According to one school of Western analysts and policymakers, political and economic liberalisation could force states to enhance their links with one another as well as with international institutions in order to pursue mutual goals.²⁷ Even if we accept that the leaders of democratic states have a large stake in promoting better governance in failed, failing and post-conflict countries because of the spread across state borders of humanitarian crisis effects,²⁸ the international community has to respond to these questions on a consensual basis. This means building coalitions in order to advance common values instead of the ad hoc practices and actions associated with the doctrine of preventive war or 'war on terrorism'. In other words, the differences between states could increase the uncertainty in the global system and opportunities for cooperation will wither.

mean that the aspirations of this normatively ambitious international society remain deeply contaminated by the preferences and interests of powerful states'.

²⁶ A significant factor has to do with the role of citizens in shaping the decisions of elites. J. Rawls (2002, p. 89) emphasises the positive impact of democratic values on the peaceful choices made by citizens, since they will pay the price of a war-based solution.

²⁷ The idea of democratic peace is associated with the lack of war between liberal democracies. For a collective study that includes some of the most influential articles on this question, see Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1996). For other studies, see Doyle (1983); Russett (1993); Owen (1994); Dixon (1994).

²⁸ Krasner's main argument is that although democracy is the most effective tool for sustaining institutions, it is not the only one. He proposes as a more promising policy option that of 'shared sovereignty'; that is, a 'voluntary agreement between recognised national political authorities and an external actor such as a state or a regional or international organisation' (Krasner, 2005, pp. 69–70).

The Response of the International Community 20 Years Later: An Assessment

Political elites and public opinion in Europe and the United States have, as we have seen, focused on the democratic peace approach,²⁹ especially after the collapse of authoritarian regimes, which was one of the sources of ethnic tensions. The question, 20 years after the changes which took place in South-Eastern and Central Europe and elsewhere, is whether democratisation has succeeded in mitigating ethnic tensions.³⁰ Regardless of whether democratisation by definition provides an opportunity for further political participation and the promotion of new constitutional arrangements, historical experience has revealed a number of problems in relation to ethnic conflicts. The presence of strong ethnic stereotypes, the claims of ethnic identity, the leaders' tendencies to see their interests best fulfilled in extremism and not cooperation – all these factors make bargaining among groups more difficult (Nevers, 1993, p. 71).

The collapse of Communism in the Balkans created a vacuum that the new political elites could not fill because of their inability or lack of willingness to initiate new policies based on negotiating solutions across ethnic lines.³¹ Thus, the predictions of a correlation between the democratisation process and the elimination of ethnic antagonisms in different cases in Africa, the Balkans and South-Eastern Asia have not proven sound.³²

²⁹ The term 'democratic peace' has been at the heart of an international relations debate between realists and liberals from the beginning of the 1990s. This debate was largely about the emphasis given by a number of analysts and policymakers to the causal relationship between domestic political structures and international political outcomes. For the concept of democratic peace, see Doyle (1983 and 1986). Christopher Layne (1994, p. 5) who criticises the concept, argues that democratic peace is more of a proposition or a hypothesis than a theory, because the causal relationship between independent (democratic structures) and dependant (absence of war between states) variables is neither proven nor adequately explained.

³⁰ I should note that I do not claim to develop the correlation between the two notions but to assess the existing theoretical questions in light of several cases. For the conditions under which democratisation has the potential to help mitigate ethnic tensions, see Nevers (1993, p. 71).

³¹ For an analysis of the Balkan area in the post-Communist period, see Larrabee (1995, pp. xii–xxviii).

³² For some interesting attempts to analyse this argument, see Doyle (1983); Russett (1993); Oneal and Russett (1997); and Owen (1994).

The transition to 'ethnic peace' in places where there existed a long period of social, political, economic and military uncertainty and history of conflict is extremely difficult. The weakened states that followed the collapse of Communist regimes, not only in South-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union but also in Somalia, Liberia and other African states, have been unable to help eradicate inequalities in war-torn societies. Instead, the struggle to remain in power has for some leaders a greater value than the initiation of policies guaranteeing the protection and security of their citizens (Lake and Rothchild, 1996, p. 43; Kaufmann 1996, p. 157).

A broader question is whether democratisation can lead these states to a lasting peace. Experience has shown that in a number of cases examined from the beginning of the 1990s it has failed to meet this goal (Paris, 1997, p. 76; Hyde-Price, 1994, p. 224). More specifically, the political activity resulting from pluralistic democracy and the holding of elections can actually reinforce existing social inequalities. This fact, instead of consolidating a stable democratic system, can be exploited by ambitious political leaders seeking to strengthen their position. Furthermore, electoral activity can create expectations that cannot be fulfilled within the existing political institutions.

Even if we accept the peaceful nature of democratic values,³³ democracy is not simply a mechanism. Ethnic groups have to become conscious of the benefits of resolving their differences peacefully. This involves a mechanism of self-supporting peace that presupposes mature social and state structures willing to promote efficient institutions, the rule of law, social justice and political participation. The implementation of democratic mechanisms in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda³⁴ does not seem to have satisfied the optimistic expectations of some scholars, analysts and policy makers who focused on democratic reforms as a tool of peace.³⁵

³³ Martin Wight (1998, pp. 50–9), in his classical study on the 'Three Traditions' of political and international theory, argues in relation to Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' that democratic governance as a precondition of perpetual peace tends to equate international relations with the situation of internal politics.

³⁴ For reasons for the failure of crisis management mechanisms, focusing on the Rwanda case, see Clapham (1998).

³⁵ According to Karin von Hippel (2000, p. 193) 'the implementation of democratic reforms in a war-torn state needs to consider three elements: establishing security, empowering civil society and strengthening democratic institutions and co-ordinating international efforts. All three are linked and can not be implemented without the others'.

Another factor is an ethnic group's historic attachment to a particular territory and the right to control it. The loss of control of homeland territory may be viewed as the dilution of a national group, the loss of power and a consequent diminution of national identity (Toft, 2001, p. 11). For instance, the Serbs considered Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian nation because in the fourteenth century their ancestors had sacrificed their lives to resist the Ottoman Empire. Thus, even if ethnic Serbs constituted a minority of the Kosovo population, they had, according to this view, a legitimate right to claim its control. Violence erupted when both Serbs and Albanians saw Kosovo as their legitimate homeland: the first for historical reasons and the second as representing the majority (p. 13). As we noted above, this demand by one ethnic group to territorial sovereignty is of major importance because it sets a precedent for other ethnic groups to claim sovereignty rights (pp. 15–16 and 36–9).

Economic transformation and the transition from a planned system to a market economy are an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of political and economic organisation into war-shattered states. This model, which claims to establish peace through political and economic liberalisation, might prompt the resurgence of violence instead of the consolidation of peace,³⁶ creating economic inequalities between the poor and the more prosperous urban class.³⁷ This is because, unlike in industrialised states, which face this problem 'by implementing welfare policies designed to redistribute income to poorer segments of society . . . in countries fragmented by ethnic violence this policy frequently results in the widening of distributional inequalities . . . [and] the increase of unemployment' (Paris, 1997, pp. 74–6).

All of these problems pose a number of serious obstacles to the assumption that the democratisation process is connected with conflict prevention

³⁶ The conflictual character of democracy and the social competitions that emerge between ethnic groups vying for their share of power aggravates these differences and challenges the establishment of a stable political system; this is especially true where there are political leaders who take advantage of inter-ethnic divisions to stay in power, inasmuch as the continuation of conflict facilitates the attainment of their political objectives. See Nevers (1993, pp. 71–3).

³⁷ Roland Paris (1997, pp. 56–7) argues that 'creating a stable market democracy is a conflict-ridden and lengthy process, particularly in the fragile political environment of a war-shattered state. Furthermore, these states with a history of violence can not manage the societal competition induced by political and economic liberalization'.

or resolution. Therefore, translating liberal ideology in determinist terms is insufficient in societies where the perceptions of threat and the precedents of historical violence, poverty and social and political inequalities are commonplace (Layne, 1994, p. 14).

Another component of liberal ideology concerns the imposition of democratic values through the use of force in order to end human suffering. Though the idea of humanitarian war has been considered in the writings of classical and contemporary scholars, the use of this notion by states during the eighteenth and nineteenth century was relatively rare (Wheeler, 2000, p. 46).³⁸ In the twentieth century up to the end of Cold War, the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention according to articles 2 and 4 of the UN Charter constituted a fundamental principle of the bipolar order. The nature of the international system and the competition between superpowers undermined the possibility of consensus on the nature of humanitarian intervention and the conditions triggering the use of this right (Holzgreffe, 2003, p. 18). The post-Cold War practice of humanitarian intervention was incorporated in the allied intervention in Iraq in 1991, in 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia and in Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti. In all these cases an international concern over human rights violations or human suffering triggered a humanitarian response by force and supported more or less explicitly by Security Council authorisation. The basic argument was that the internal situation in these countries constituted a 'threat to international peace and security' which could justify even the circumvention of state sovereignty for the sake of humanitarian goals.³⁹ This signalled a shift from the Westphalian order to one in which humanitarian concerns could trump the principle of non-intervention. More spe-

³⁸ These include collective intervention in favour of Greek insurgents in 1827 and in Lebanon in 1860 to stop the massacres of the Maronites by the Druzes. During the period from 1945–89 there were three cases: the Indian action in East Pakistan/Bangladesh in 1971, the Vietnamese action in Cambodia in 1978 resulting in the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge government and the Tanzanian action in Uganda resulting in the overthrow of the dictatorial government of President Idi Amin. For an analysis of these cases, see Wheeler (2000, pp. 46 and 55–136).

³⁹ The legitimisation of this policy and the validity of arguments used by policy-makers to justify the use of force dominated discussions between scholars of both international law and international relations. Holzgreffe (2003, pp. 49–52), focusing on this debate, argues that we have to rethink the concept of humanitarian intervention. For a critical approach to the moral and political aspects of this concept, see Hoffmann (1995/6, pp. 40–5).

cifically, the unilateral resort to force by NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 without the authorisation of the UN Security Council was considered a dangerous precedent leading to the emergence of a parallel system of collective security beyond that of the UN system. In that case NATO, instead of acting as the agent of the UN with a mandate approved in the Security Council, moved towards a military intervention that was not managed by the global organisation.⁴⁰

It is true that many of the conflicts in the post-bipolar period have had a different character from those that the UN was designed to address. The UN and the UN Charter reflect the existing character of the post-Second World War interstate system, in which aggression and international war constituted the main problem of international relations. The outbreak out of several internal conflicts after 1989 drove the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 'Agenda for Peace' to place a great deal of emphasis on democracy and human rights, pointing to connections among democracy, human rights and international peace. For the UN, however, involvement in ethnic conflicts was new, especially those where a communal or ethnic dimension presented risks for international engagement whether in the form of mediation, peacekeeping or military intervention (Roberts, 1993, pp. 219–32).

But if we take into account that a number of ethnic crises call for UN action in defending humanitarian aid relief or protecting populations threatened by a state authority, the risk is to be involved in an internal situation where the distinction between the victim and the aggressor is not so obvious (Mearsheimer, 1994/5, p. 31). In such a case, the different ethnic groups try to establish a balance of power vis-à-vis their opponent by reinforcing their military capacity, which increases the mutual threat perceptions and undermines the peace efforts of the international community.

If the goal of democratic peace is to alter the institutional arrangements of target states by imposing democratic values in states suffering from internal conflict, the results so far have been dubious. For example, in the case of Bosnia, while the Serbs were persuaded to sign the Dayton Peace Agreement on December 1995 in order to avoid the continuation of NATO

⁴⁰ For a discussion of the role of regional organisations in the reformed global security architecture after 1990 and the lessons that can be derived from the handling of the Cambodian, former Yugoslavia and Somali interventions, see Mayall (1996).

bombing against them, this act should not be seen to include a commitment to respect the unitary character of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan state in the future.⁴¹

Looking back 20 years later, we can see that attempts by Western states and international organizations to make democracy work in other states have had modest results. Take South-Eastern Europe, for example: the international community cannot yet ensure a peaceful future for this part of Europe. Democracy building is a complex process that demands self-sustaining 'win-win'⁴² institutions on the one hand, and on the other requires the international community to develop the capacity to ensure a long-lasting peace, something a democratic peace itself cannot guarantee. Be it in Bosnia, in Somalia, in Iraq or elsewhere, crises of this kind pose a risk to an already unstable international order. The international society has to attend to the challenge of addressing these crises in a comprehensive manner (Von Hippel, 2000, p. 206).

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⁴¹ It is worth mentioning that today many scholars consider peace building in Bosnia a success. For a revisionist view see Dzelilovic, 2009, pp. 201–214.

⁴² This term is used by Krasner (2005, p. 81) in the context of his assumption of 'shared sovereignty'.

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The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Modern World: Trends and Straining Regimes

Miles A. Pomper and Cole J. Harvey

In the modern world, the most lethal weapons are not necessarily limited to the most economically advanced states. Technologies that were once available only to first-order powers, like uranium enrichment, gene splicing and the freeze-drying of microbes, are now within the grasp of less developed states such as North Korea, Iran and others. Increasing demand for nuclear power and the expanding possibilities of biological research and development could lead more states to acquire dual-use capabilities that can be applied to either a civilian or military programme. The worldwide transition from a bipolar security dynamic to a unipolar and now increasingly a multipolar dynamic has led states to emphasise regional security agendas that may make access to weapons of mass destruction more attractive. At the same time, the international regimes put in place to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are straining under the influence of these forces. This chapter will examine these broad trends that may influence the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the coming years.

The Development and Spread of Technology

The technologies and processes that are required to produce weapons of mass destruction and their precursor materials are increasingly within the reach of developing states, as technological know-how becomes more widespread and the scientific and manufacturing sectors of these states mature. From uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to the pharmaceutical and biotechnical industries, capabilities that are necessary for the development of weapons of mass destruction are no longer confined to the developed world.

Uranium Enrichment and Spent Fuel Reprocessing

A nuclear weapon must use either highly enriched uranium or plutonium as its fissile core. Uranium must be enriched from its natural state so that the fissile isotope uranium-235 makes up a greater portion of the material, while plutonium must be extracted from used fuel drawn from a nuclear reactor. Each process also has potentially peaceful applications (see ‘The Dual-Use Dilemma’, below), and each is within the reach of developing states under the right circumstances.

Uranium in its natural state contains only 0.7% of the fissile isotope uranium-235, with non-fissile uranium-238 making up nearly all of the remainder. In order to be useful in most nuclear reactors, the proportion of uranium-235 in a particular batch must be increased via a family of processes collectively known as uranium enrichment. No matter which process is used – gaseous diffusion, centrifuge, laser enrichment or others – enrichment separates the smaller uranium-235 isotopes from the larger uranium-238. By international consensus, uranium enriched to less than 20% is considered low-enriched (LEU), while 20% and above is considered highly enriched (HEU). Uranium enriched to 90% or more is considered weapons-grade, though HEU of any enrichment is technically weapons-useable.

Large-scale uranium enrichment carried out during the Manhattan Project in the United States relied on the gaseous diffusion process, which requires vast facilities and huge quantities of electricity and water (USEC, 2009). Gaseous diffusion has been steadily replaced by centrifuge enrichment, which is faster, less energy intensive and can be carried out in smaller facilities. Centrifuge enrichment has spread from its origins in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union to developing countries such as Brazil, India, Iran and Pakistan. These states are able to use their domestic manufacturing industries to produce the centrifuges, even if some parts must be sought from abroad.

In centrifuge enrichment, uranium gas is fed through vertical cylinders that spin at high speeds, drawing heavier uranium-238 isotopes towards the outer wall of the cylinder. Uranium gas with higher concentrations of uranium-235 remains closer to the centre. As in diffusion, this process is repeated over and over again in cascades, gradually increasing the concentration of uranium-235 in the stream.

Centrifuge enrichment offers substantial energy savings over the older diffusion method. A modern centrifuge plant being installed in the United

States will require approximately 95% less electricity than a similarly sized diffusion plant (USEC, 2007, p. 3). Even in a developing country, a centrifuge facility could require as little as a fifth of the electricity required to run a diffusion plant (Sharp and Rodriguez-Vietitez, 2009, p. 10). Uranium gas can be fed through the centrifuge cascades relatively quickly, and they can be operated in dispersed facilities, or even underground (Kemp and Glaser, 2007). Centrifuge technology is complicated, but it is possible for states with a modest industrial base, such as Iran, to produce them in large numbers (Albright, Brannan and Shire, 2008, p. 3). An operational centrifuge enrichment facility can be difficult to detect (Albright, Brannan and Shire, 2008), as the international community's experience with Iran's covert enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom testifies.

Unlike uranium, which is found in nature, plutonium must be generated during a nuclear reaction. Roughly 1% of the material in a batch of spent fuel from a typical power reactor is plutonium, with most of the rest being non-fissile uranium and radioactive fission products. Reprocessing, a chemical process, separates plutonium and uranium from the more radioactive fission products (World Nuclear Association, 2010). The plutonium can then be refashioned into reactor fuel or, alternatively, used in the core of a nuclear weapon.

Spent fuel reprocessing is a relatively uncomplicated industrial activity for a state to undertake, the main challenges being the acquisition of spent nuclear fuel (which requires an operational nuclear reactor) and radiation shielding for the facility's workers. While commercial-scale reprocessing meant to support a state-wide nuclear power industry requires large facilities and significant expense (Orszag, 2007, p. 10), a small-scale reprocessing centre intended to produce plutonium for weapons is an undertaking within the capabilities of many states. India, for example, built its reprocessing facility between 1961 and 1964 with no outside assistance (Nuclear Weapons Archive, 2001). North Korea constructed its reprocessing facility at Yongbyon in the late 1980s, also without any known outside aid (Global-Security.org, 2003).

As early as 1978, a United States General Accounting Office report concluded that 'there is considerable worldwide experience in building and operating reprocessing plants', that small reprocessing plants could be built with commercially available materials, equipment and information and that the construction of such a plant by a non-nuclear-weapon state was technically feasible (p. ii). In an earlier analysis, the US Department of

Energy noted that the materials necessary for constructing such a facility could be made or imported by countries with wine-making, dairy or petroleum industries (United States General Accounting Office, 1978, p. 5).

Spent fuel reprocessing has only been practised in the five recognised nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), along with India, Japan and North Korea. Nevertheless, the technology required to separate plutonium from spent fuel is easily accessible; the primary impediment is acquisition of the spent fuel in the first place.

Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals

Concerns about the potential proliferation of biological or chemical weapons to new states or terrorist groups are also driven by technological developments. However, in the case of chemical and biological weapons, the pace of development is not the slow enhancement of mechanical processes such as uranium enrichment, but rather the rapid pace of advances in the biological and chemical sciences. Both fields are also characterised by a ‘dual-use dilemma’: many areas of biological research that aim to combat disease could also be exploited for hostile purposes, and much of the technological infrastructure of a biotechnology or pharmaceutical facility could potentially be diverted to the production of harmful agents.

The spread of biotechnology capacity and know-how is global, and far more pronounced than the spread of technology related to nuclear power. The US National Academy of Sciences found in 2006 that

- the number of biotech companies in Brazil grew from 76 in 1993 to 354 in 2000;
- the number of biotech companies in Israel increased from about 30 in 1990 to about 160 in 2000;
- the number of publicly listed South Korean biotechnology firms grew from one in 2000 to 23 by 2002;
- the Japan Bioindustry Association has about 300 corporate members, 100 public organisation members and 1,300 individual members (from universities);
- 59 countries were represented at the BIO 2005 annual conference, which drew nearly 19,000 attendees to Philadelphia in June 2005 (National Research Council, 2006, pp. 85–6).

The United States, Canada, European countries and Japan are leaders in biotech fields, each accounting for hundreds of firms (National Research Council, 2006, pp. 85–6). Brazil, China, India and Russia are also emerging players in the field (p. 79). The report concludes that ‘Biotechnology is no longer the restricted playing field of a few privileged nations, but is truly a global enterprise’ (p. 26).

While the expansion of these fields of research and industry promise great benefits for public health, agriculture and other spheres of life, they also pose a risk. As early as 1993, a United States Office of Technology Assessment report found that ‘[biological] agents would be relatively easy and inexpensive to produce for any nation that has a modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical or fermentation industry’ (1993, p. 86).

Chemical Industries

The technology behind classical chemical weapons of the kind that were extensively used during the First World War (such as phosgene, a choking agent, and sulphur mustard, a blister agent) is well-known, relatively unchanged and not difficult to master. The diffusion to developing countries of peaceful chemical industries, such as those that produce fertiliser, pesticides and pharmaceuticals, as well as the globalisation of chemical trade, has put basic chemical warfare agents within the technological reach of more than a hundred countries (United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, p. 16). Although the chemical precursors for blister and nerve agents are subject to export controls, these restrictions are not always adequately enforced.

More sophisticated chemical agents, such as nerve agents that interfere with the human nervous system, are more difficult to produce. The simplest of these, tabun, is made from four widely available precursor chemicals, none of which is highly corrosive. Iraq was able to synthesise moderately pure tabun during the Iran–Iraq War (United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, pp. 14–25). More advanced nerve agents, such as sarin, soman and VX are more difficult to manufacture in militarily significant quantities because they involve corrosive precursors and technically challenging processes, but these factors would probably amount to a ‘nuisance’ rather than a true obstacle to a determined state (p. 25).

New technologies, such as highly compact chemical microreactors, promise to make chemical reactions safer, more efficient and less detectable. According to a 2002 scientific study, microreactors have the potential to

be used in military or terrorist applications. They can be fabricated by common technologies, of course, only by highly skilled personnel at present; but in the future, without any doubt, they can be fabricated in a regular workshop. With the knowledge of chemical fundamentals and advice found on the Internet, fabrication of chemicals scheduled 2–3, and in some cases even scheduled 1 [the most dangerous] by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is no longer restricted to a chemical lab (Löwe et al., 2002, p. 2274).

Modern pharmaceutical chemical facilities are capable of using computer-controlled microreactors to rapidly develop libraries of thousands of different but closely related chemical compounds. These compounds are then tested for biological activity against proteins or cells (Wheelis, 2002, p. 49). This can be done so rapidly and in such large quantities that while searching for beneficial compounds, the pharmaceutical industry finds roughly 50,000 substances each year that are highly toxic (Wheelis, 2002).

The Dual-Use Dilemma

One challenge facing those who wish to curtail the spread of weapons of mass destruction is the dual-use nature of some materials and technologies related to their development. Technologies with civilian and military applications create challenges for export control regimes and can give rise to ambiguous research and development programmes, such as Iran's uranium enrichment ventures. These difficulties are present in the nuclear field, but are even more pronounced in the chemical and biological sciences.

Dual-Use Technology and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

As described above, uranium enrichment is necessary to supply fuel for most nuclear reactors but can also be used to create the fissile material necessary for a nuclear weapon. Several relevant organisations predict a sizeable expansion in the nuclear power industry in the coming years, though that opinion is not unanimous (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010, p. 5). The International Atomic Energy Agency (2009b, p. 7) projects that nuclear power generating capacity will expand by 27 to 101% by 2030. The World Nuclear Association (2009) is even more optimistic, projecting that nuclear power generating capacity in 2060 could range from two to ten times its capacity in 2009.

Should the demand for civilian nuclear energy increase in response to growing populations, greater wealth and a desire for decreased dependence on fossil fuels, the demand for uranium enrichment will likewise increase. The expansion of dual-use technologies like uranium enrichment increases the risk that proliferation-minded states will use an ostensibly civilian programme to mask a weapons programme. Even in a state that begins a uranium enrichment programme with peaceful intentions, the technology imposes no inherent self-limits. With a change in circumstances or leadership, the same centrifuges can be used to develop the cores of nuclear weapons.

This principle is not confined to uranium enrichment. For example, Japan has used spent fuel reprocessing to extract 5.9 metric tons of plutonium from used fuel from nuclear power plants. Given the political will to do so, Japan could use this fissile material to produce over one thousand nuclear weapons (Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2008, p. 5). Doing so would be a major break with long-standing Japanese policy and would require an investment of political, scientific and financial resources, but the presence of reprocessing facilities and plutonium in Japan opens up such a possibility.

Iran provides the primary contemporary example of an ambiguous dual-use programme. It claims that its uranium enrichment programme is entirely peaceful, though its behaviour has fed suspicions that Tehran's ultimate goal is to possess at least a latent weapons capability, if not a full-fledged nuclear arsenal. Notably, Iran did not notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the existence of its facilities at Natanz or Qom until they were publicly revealed (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2003 and 2010a).

It should be noted that acquiring a uranium enrichment or reprocessing capability is not the same as acquiring nuclear weapons. A crude nuclear explosive device is not particularly complicated from an engineering standpoint – it can be as simple as a gun barrel firing one mass of enriched uranium into another. However, creating a nuclear warhead small enough to be mounted on a long-range missile is technically highly demanding, as is making the missiles themselves. What an enrichment or reprocessing capability does provide, however, is the ability to develop in relatively short order the fissile material necessary for such a weapon.

Biotechnology, Pharmaceuticals and Biological Weapons

Whereas the nuclear fuel cycle only has two dual-use exit ramps that can lead to nuclear weapons production – uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing – the biological field is rife with dual- or multi-use technologies, processes and even microorganisms and biological agents themselves. Botulinum, for example, is one of the deadliest known toxins, with estimates suggesting that 70 millionths of a gram can kill an average adult (Federation of American Scientists, n.d.). However, the same toxin in highly dilute form is marketed as Botox (World Health Organization, 2002), which is used by medical professionals to treat muscle spasms and facial wrinkles.

Similarly, research on medicines and vaccines requires the study of natural pathogens that may be used in a biological weapons programme, such as the bacteria that cause plague or anthrax. Thus as Gregory Koblenz (2009, p. 65) notes, ‘The medical and health authorities in many countries have legitimate reasons for conducting research on the virulence, pathogenicity, immune-response-avoidance, and antibiotic resistance of dangerous pathogens.’

Genomics and genetic engineering offer an even more compelling future for public health as well as a risk of exploitation for hostile purposes. Already the genetic information of numerous pathogens has been decoded. This information could allow for the development of more effective defences against disease-causing bacteria and viruses, but it could also aid a weapons developer to synthesise viral pathogens that are difficult to acquire from nature, or to create more potent or communicable forms of these agents (Block, 1999, pp. 56–60). Gene therapy, by which foreign DNA is introduced into a patient to treat disease by means of a genetically engineered virus, has some potential to be exploited for weapons purposes, although doing so would be technically difficult (p. 62).

One anecdote illustrates the possible dangers of the progress of genetic engineering. In a 2001 study, Australian researchers described how they had modified the DNA of the mousepox virus with the intent of using it as a contraceptive vaccine to render mice infertile for purposes of pest control. Unexpectedly, however, the researchers found that the modified virus killed even mice that had been vaccinated against mousepox (Selgelid, 2009, p. 720). The discovery raised the possibility of a vaccine-resistant form of smallpox, a deadly and communicable disease against which vaccination is currently the only defence, although antiviral drugs are under development (Centers for Disease Control, 2007).

Industrial Chemicals

Many of the precursor chemicals used to synthesise chemical weapons are widely used in civilian applications. Thiodiglycol, the immediate precursor for sulphur mustard, has a legitimate use in the production of ballpoint pen ink. Some of the chemicals used in the production of nerve agents are commodities ‘used in commercial industry at the level of millions of tons per year’ (United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, p. 29).

New technologies that are aiding in chemical research and discovery could also be used to develop chemical weapons. Computer-controlled chemical synthesis and high-throughput screening techniques allow scientists to rapidly test large numbers of chemicals for a desired biological activity, a valuable contribution to the search for new medicines that could also be misused to search for more deadly toxins. Automated control of chemical processes has also ‘reduced the level of skill and experience needed’ to perform routine chemical production, which could in turn limit the number of personnel required by a chemical weapons programme (Parshall, 2002, pp. 2260–1).

A stockpile of a chemical agent alone does not make for a chemical weapons capability. The agent must be deliverable in some fashion, such as through a spraying device or warhead. Such a device can be as simple as an airplane- or helicopter-mounted spray tank, like those used to spray pesticides in an agricultural setting. Low-flying aircraft are vulnerable to air defences, however, so a state is more likely to use artillery shells, bombs or missiles to distribute its chemical agents. Such weapons are not beyond the reach of developing states, as Iraq demonstrated during the 1980s (Ali, 2001, p. 49).

The Demand Driver: Asymmetric Deterrence in a Unipolar Security Dynamic

In 2003, it was revealed that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had been using his network of suppliers and middlemen to peddle fissile material and uranium enrichment components (and in some cases, nuclear weapons designs) to Iran, Libya and North Korea (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). That Khan’s customers were states with uneasy or hostile relationships with the United States is no coincidence. Possessing weapons of mass destruction, or at least the means to construct

them, can be perceived by the leadership of such states as a means of deterring the world's military juggernaut, as well as a tool to expand their regional clout. Even a small number of crude nuclear weapons could deter a US military strike, while chemical and biological weapons capabilities could give military planners pause.

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended a period in which the global security dynamic was largely bipolar. Around the world, many countries relied on either the United States or the Soviet Union to guarantee their security. This dynamic was most vividly on display in Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact allies faced each other across borders that were often armed and patrolled. However, the two superpowers also jockeyed for influence in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America.

Following the dissolution of the USSR, the global security environment became in many ways a more complicated place. Where the primary dynamic had previously been a tense superpower standoff with occasional proxy wars, the post-Cold War era was characterised by ethnic strife, nationalism and regional conflicts and competition, with only the United States capable of projecting military force anywhere in the world.

Responding to this dynamic, those states that could not expect to rely on the support of the United States – or were openly hostile to it – looked for means of insulating themselves against US military power while also bolstering themselves against their regional rivals. Iran's first deals with Khan for centrifuges and design information came in 1987, pre-dating the fall of the Soviet Union by several years (United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, p. 4). However, Iran was at the time embroiled in the Iran–Iraq War, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union supported Baghdad.

Iran, Libya and North Korea – and Iraq, a potential Khan customer – were all labelled 'rogue states' by the United States during the 1990s for their 'aggressive and defiant behavior', pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and 'recalcitrant commitment to remain on the wrong side of history' (Lake, 1994).

The motivating factor is a state's perception of its own security environment, where it may be surrounded by unfriendly states supported by a global superpower. Iran inhabits a region where most of its neighbours are US allies or partners and one country – Israel – is nuclear armed. North Korea and its southern neighbour are still technically at war, and South Korea is home to a sizeable US military contingent. To the east is Japan, another principal US ally. This is not to suggest that the United States and

its allies are responsible for the problems posed by Iran and North Korea. It is important, though, to understand that from the point of view of the regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang (and in earlier periods, in Baghdad and Tripoli), their states exist in unfriendly regions where their neighbours are backed by a global power whose military proved its devastating abilities in the 1991 Gulf War, mid-1990s engagements in the Balkans and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This sense of vulnerability provides the demand side of proliferation, just as expanded manufacturing capabilities and the Khan network have provided the supply side.

Regimes Under Strain

Three international agreements form the foundations of the arms control and non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Each agreement has its own strengths and weaknesses, but all are under strain from the spread of technology and the dual-use nature of the technologies they are meant to regulate.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with its 189 state parties, forms the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The treaty, which entered into force in 1970, is founded on a three-part bargain: the five recognised nuclear-weapon states pledge to work towards disarmament, the non-nuclear-weapon states commit not to develop or acquire such weapons and all agree to share in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Though the treaty is essential to the broader non-proliferation architecture, it faces challenges of verification and universality.

The existing standard for verifying compliance with the NPT's requirements is a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. A CSA allows the IAEA to monitor a state's declared nuclear facilities and materials, but does not permit the IAEA to investigate undeclared sites that could be home to covert nuclear activity. In response to the discovery of a covert Iraqi nuclear programme following the 1991 Gulf War, the IAEA developed an Additional Protocol that grants the agency enhanced powers to verify compliance with the NPT.

The Additional Protocol is currently a voluntary measure for NPT state parties. As of 3 March 2010, 86 countries had brought an Additional Protocol into force (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2010b). Some countries with relatively developed nuclear industries, such as Argentina and Brazil, have not signed on to the Additional Protocol, along with a few countries with questionable non-proliferation credentials, such as Syria (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2010b). Iran signed an Additional Protocol in 2003 but has not brought the agreement into force (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2010a). As the Iranian case illustrates, the nature of certain technologies like uranium enrichment requires adequate verification to ensure that dual-use capabilities are exclusively used for peaceful purposes.

The IAEA's failure to detect Iraq's pre-Gulf War nuclear programme in the absence of the Additional Protocol is not the verification regime's only shortcoming. The IAEA also failed to uncover Iran's Natanz and Qom enrichment facilities, as well as the Libyan and Syrian nuclear programmes. All three countries were subsequently exposed by outside groups or governments (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004 and 2009a).

Another major challenge confronting the NPT is the issue of universality. Three nuclear-armed states have never joined the treaty: India, Israel and Pakistan. A fourth, North Korea, withdrew from the treaty in 2003. North Korea's withdrawal highlighted one of the treaty's possible loopholes – a state may join the treaty, benefit from the exchange of nuclear technology and then withdraw from the treaty to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea tested its first nuclear device in 2006. The United States and other concerned treaty members have proposed measures to narrow the loophole by requiring, for example, that IAEA safeguards remain in place on imported nuclear technology or material even after withdrawal (Harvey et al., 2010, pp. 31–3).

The Biological Weapons Convention: Trust, Don't Verify

The state parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) commit themselves not to develop, produce or otherwise acquire biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes or the means of delivering those agents and toxins as weapons. However, unlike the NPT and the CWC, this treaty has no formal verification measures (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2009). Beginning in 1991, the state parties to the BWC estab-

lished a working group of all interested states parties to develop a verification protocol for the treaty. However, in 2001 the United States announced that it would no longer support the development of the verification protocol on the grounds that the proposed verification measures would have little effect on states covertly developing biological weapons, yet could harm the scientific and commercial interests of law-abiding states (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2009). Washington's opposition effectively torpedoed the prospects of a BWC verification protocol for the foreseeable future.

The difficulty of verifying compliance with the BWC is an outgrowth of the inherent dual-use (or multi-use) nature of advanced biological science. As Koblentz notes,

The core problem in verifying compliance with biological arms control and disarmament agreements is that the capabilities for conducting the research, development, production, and testing of biological weapons are virtually identical to those employed by defensive programs and in legitimate civilian enterprises (2009, p. 54).

Additionally, a 1993 report of the US Office of Technology Assessment stated that 'In contrast to chemical-warfare (CW) agents, no specialized starting materials are required for the production of biological and toxin agents except for a small seed stock of a disease-producing organism' (United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, p. 86).

The idea of seed stock calls up one of the other difficulties of verifying compliance with the BWC. Pathogens can be cultivated in the laboratory using samples from the environment. Because microbes are capable of self-replication, small samples can be rapidly scaled up to large stockpiles. This makes any inventory of biological agents, analogous to the IAEA's inventories of fissile material, very difficult to verify. 'A small vial of freeze-dried seed culture', the OTA report notes, 'grown in a fermenter in a nutrient medium kept at constant temperature, can result in kilograms of product (e.g., anthrax bacteria) in as little as 96 hours' (United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, p. 87).

The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Success Story?

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in April 1997 and has 188 state parties as of August 2010 (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2010). The wide-ranging agreement requires

state parties to eliminate their existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and forbids the development and production of new ones, as well as the use of chemical weapons in warfare. Unlike the NPT, which only obliges the recognised nuclear-weapon states to work towards disarmament ‘in good faith’, the CWC requires all states to destroy all of their chemical weapon stocks according to a set timeframe.

The CWC also established the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is responsible for monitoring compliance with and implementing the CWC at the international level. The OPCW has a 500-strong secretariat and an annual budget of €75 million. The OPCW is responsible for inspections of government and commercial chemical facilities; since the entry into force of the convention, the OPCW has conducted over 1,800 inspections. The CWC is also the first arms control agreement that allows concerned states to request a challenge inspection of another state, although this measure has never been used since the treaty entered into force.¹

At present, two main challenges confront the CWC, neither of which is as profound as those facing the NPT and BWC. The first is the slow pace of the destruction of existing chemical weapons. Both the United States and Russia, the states with the largest stockpiles, have announced they will miss the April 2012 deadline for complete disarmament by several years (Horner, 2010). The failure to comply with the convention in this regard has more to do with the parties’ desire to dismantle the weapons safely than with a desire to maintain the weapons indefinitely, however.

The second challenge is an imbalance in the inspections regime, which favours verification of dismantlement at the expense of industrial inspections (Batsanov, 2006). The limited number of on-site inspections makes it more difficult to verify that chemical industry facilities are not being secretly diverted to produce chemical warfare agents. For example, in a 2010 compliance report, the United States expressed concern over the alleged spill of an undeclared schedule 1 (most dangerous) chemical from an undeclared pharmaceutical factory in China (United States Department of State, 2010).

¹ For more details, see <http://www.opcw.org/our-work/non-proliferation/>.

Conclusion

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their essential components in the modern world is being driven by technological development and by the increasing technical capacity of developing states. These trends can be seen in the spread of uranium enrichment technology beyond the original nuclear-weapon states and in the worldwide diffusion of chemical and biological research, development and production. The dual-use nature of many technologies and processes in the nuclear, chemical and biological industries makes controlling the export of sensitive components more difficult, can create uncertainty regarding the nature of research or industrial programmes, and can provide states with well-developed civilian industries with an inherent weapons capability.

At the same time, states that feel their security is threatened by the overwhelming military advantage of the United States in the post-Cold War era may seek weapons of mass destruction, or at least the ability to produce them, as a means of asymmetrically deterring US intervention. This provides an incentive for some states to take advantage of the above trends to develop an unconventional weapons capability.

The international agreements meant to forestall the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are straining to varying degrees under these pressures. The oldest of these, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is grappling with the dual-use dilemma, the spread of nuclear power and associated technologies and the inadequacy of its original IAEA verification measures. The Biological Weapons Convention lacks any verification measures whatsoever while facing similar challenges. The Chemical Weapons Convention is the best positioned, though it too faces some verification issues.

Despite these challenges, these three treaties represent the foundation of the non-proliferation regime. They must be preserved in their essential elements and updated to reflect the changing times. The development of the IAEA Additional Protocol stands as an example of a potential modification to a treaty that could aid in ensuring that positive trends like rising economic development do not lead to the proliferation of humanity's deadliest weapons.

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The Terrorism–Democracy Nexus and the Trade-Off Between Security and Civil Liberties

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Ten years after the events of 11 September 2001, terrorism continues to generate intense media interest, political dialogue and public scrutiny. Few would question the proposition that the nature of international security changed fundamentally on 9/11 and that terrorism is now the pre-eminent security preoccupation of Western states. Through well-publicised discussions about its constitution and consequences, terrorism, and especially the questionable notion of a ‘new’ terrorism, has been framed in the prevailing public discourse as an all-pervasive societal threat that deliberately targets innocent civilians, motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology and aimed at causing maximum destruction. In turn, the official response to this ‘new threat’ has crystallised in the emergence of a new global counterterrorist paradigm which justifies the global war on terror, relying on a strategy of military pre-emption, coercive interrogation methods, the use of domestic surveillance activities and many homeland security practices previously considered unnecessary or morally abhorrent (Jackson, 2007; Crenshaw, 2008).

This new global paradigm calls for a re-striking of the security versus civil liberties trade-off. The acceptance of both the new paradigm and the associated alleged necessity of a trade-off between security and civil liberties, I maintain, is in essence based on two large presumptions: (a) that democracies, because of some idiosyncratic regime properties epitomised by their respect of civil liberties, are associated with increased terrorist activity; and (b) that the late 1990s witnessed a sea change in the character of global terrorist activity with the rise of an identifiably ‘new’, and more dangerous, brand of terrorism. However, and as Crenshaw aptly points out:

It is critical to examine systematically the assumptions on which the appeal for the new paradigm is based and to question both their logic and empirical foundation before accepting them as self-evident. Accounts of a ‘new’ terrorism have not always been grounded in sufficient knowledge of history or understanding of contemporary terrorism. The point is not that there has been no change in terrorism over the past century but that the changes that have occurred need to be precisely delineated. (2008, p. 120).

This cautionary remark captures accurately this chapter’s overall purpose, which is to raise a voice of scepticism over the analytical value, empirical veracity and eventual policy efficacy of the two core assumptions above that form the basis upon which the new global counterterrorist paradigm is constructed. In order to pursue that analytical goal, I first examine the ‘new’ wave of terrorism and argue that although the notion of its novelty may have served as a convenient conceptual shorthand for policymakers, its analytical accuracy is questionable (Field, 2009). Rather, ‘the departure from the past is not as pronounced as many accounts make it out to be. Today’s terrorism is not a fundamentally or qualitatively “new” phenomenon but grounded in an evolving historical context. Much of what we see now is familiar and the differences are of degree rather than kind’ (Crenshaw, 2008, p. 120). I then revisit the terrorism–democracy nexus and question the allegedly most robust findings in the extant literature on methodological grounds. In essence, I argue that the established positive correlation between democracy and terrorism is based on contaminated data that systematically distort the actual relationship between the two. I conclude with some general remarks on the implications and policy efficacy of the current counterterrorist paradigm.

‘Old’ Versus ‘New’ Terrorism: What’s in a Name?

The concept of a ‘new’ terrorism was coined in the academy well before 9/11. Indeed, the late 1990s witnessed the emergence of a burgeoning literature that sought to analyse the characteristics and consequences of this ‘new’ wave of terrorism; two years before the 9/11 attacks, Walter Laqueur (1999), an eminent historian of terrorism, noted that a ‘revolution’ was taking place in the character of terrorism (see also Hoffman, 1998; Lesser, 1999). Proponents of the concept and associated argument drew attention to a radically altered form of terrorist threat which was, compared

to the ‘old’ terrorism, deliberately aimed at innocent civilians, motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology and aimed at causing maximum destruction. So revolutionary was the transformation and so sharp the distinction from the ‘old’ terrorism of the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s that the threat of a ‘new’ terrorism seemed to be calling us ‘to construct new frameworks for thought and analysis’ (Kegley, 2003, p. 4).

But what’s in a name? That is, ‘does it really matter what the kind of terrorism perpetrated by groups such as al-Qaeda is called?’ (Spencer, 2010, p. 15). Put differently, are we simply engaged in a meaningless debate over semantics that academics might delight in but that has no crucial impact on the policy world, or is there something more important than labelling at stake here? My contention is that there is. Words, frames and the ideas that inform them matter a great deal by means of having both a constitutive and causal effect on political phenomena and choices (Gofas and Hay, 2010). Indeed, ‘calling a problem “new” forces one to automatically buy into the belief that the appropriate solutions must also be new’ (Spencer, 2010, p. 15). With that in mind, it is small wonder that the shock of 9/11 was a turning point.¹ The concept of a ‘new’ terrorism, which was until then a matter of academic and policy-elite deliberation, immediately provided a ready-made, and rather simple-minded, master narrative for a new framework of thought and policy prescription that moved the threat of terrorism to the core of the security agenda on both sides of the Atlantic.

Having established the importance of the issue, we can now turn to an examination of the analytical value of the ‘old’ versus ‘new’ terrorism divide. In order to evaluate whether ‘new’ terrorism is as novel and unique as conventional wisdom holds, I will invoke three main variables – operational range, motives, and tactics – that will allow us to construct ideal types of ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism. The resulting picture is captured in the terms of [Table 1](#).²

¹ It is tempting here to note that, as Croft and Moore (2010, p. 821) aptly observe, ‘western security thinking has an interesting history of being “shocked” into change by singular events: the massacre of Srebrenica, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the launch of Sputnik, the annihilation of Hiroshima – all had similar effects on “our” thinking. Western security thinking, at least since the end of the Second World War, has seemed to rely on “shocks” for its evolution.’

² The table draws inspiration from similar ones developed in Neumann (2009, p. 29) and Gunaratna (2010, p. 18).

Table 1. ‘Old’ vs. ‘new’ terrorism (ideal types)

	‘Old’ Terrorism	‘New’ Terrorism
Operational Range	within home region (territorial orientation)	outside home region (transnational orientation)
Motives	political/nationalist ideology	religious fanaticism
Tactics	restrained violence	extreme violence

In constructing these ideal types, I am replicating the stark distinction drawn in the existing literature between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, considering each separately. Yet it is important to emphasise that in so doing, I am by no means committing to such a dichotomisation of past and present terrorist activity. Indeed, in the remainder of this section, I reject precisely such a rigid distinction by questioning the analytical value of a ‘new’ terrorism and by arguing that there is a significant continuity of well-established terrorist practices and behaviours rather than a revolutionary change.³ It is to this matter that I now turn our focus by briefly examining the three variables listed in the left column of [Table 1](#) in the order they appear.

Operational Range

Advocates of the notion of a ‘new’ terrorism point out that the campaigns of ‘old’, traditional terrorist groups were of a territorial geographical orientation and restricted within the home region. This applied not only to the old ethno-nationalist groups but ‘also applied to the adherents of supposedly global ideologies such as the Marxist terrorists in Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s who mostly had just one center of gravity towards which their activities and operations were directed’ (Neumann, 2009, pp. 18–19). Contrary to this traditional pattern of operational range, what we have witnessed with the onset of ‘new’ terrorism is the formation of terrorist groups that have become increasingly transnational in reach and orientation (pp. 20–21). This is because ‘old’ terrorism was mostly associated with a nationalist or separatist agenda and, hence, with the political situation in a specific country or region, while ‘new’ terrorism has a much more expansive geographical agenda associated with a revision of the

³ For a similar line of argumentation in favour of evolution, rather than revolution, see also Field (2009), Spencer (2010), Tucker (2001) and Duyvesteyn (2004). For a balanced defense of the notion of ‘new’ terrorism, see Neumann (2009).

global status quo and the establishment of a new religious world order (Field, 2009, p. 198). Consequently, ‘the “new terrorism” is more than a threat to individual states and represents a challenge to the international system as a whole’ (p. 198).

Given the extent to which the transnational network of al-Qaeda has colonised our collective political imagination, to talk about the globalisation of contemporary terrorist activity, or even more to the point, about the globalisation of martyrdom (Moghadam, 2008), is verging on the banal, as it simply repeats what has been commonly established. Yet things are not always as commonsensical and uncontroversial as they may first appear. To draw general conclusions on the basis of high-profile cases, even spectacular ones like that of al-Qaeda, is to commit the most cardinal of methodological sins – selection on the dependent variable in order to make a point. Put differently, and as Laqueur rightly reminds us, ‘the student of terrorism has to consider the general picture; any fixation on one specific aspect [or case] of terrorism is bound to lead to wrong conclusions’ (2003, p. 8). Indeed, a look at the data points in the opposite direction to that suggested by the perception that terrorism has become globalised. Goldman (2011) conducted an empirical, regression-based study of the globalisation of terrorism thesis where the dependent variable was the geographic spread of terrorist attacks from 1968 to 2007. The results of world trends for the universe of terrorist organisations and attacks are telling and suggestive of a *de*-globalisation (or localisation) rather than a globalisation of terrorism during the last decade. In Goldman’s words,

[I]n the 1990s and even more so in the 2000s, terror attacks become deglobalized (geographic contraction rather than expansion), as the number and percentage of terror organizations carrying out attacks outside their home base regions declined . . . In the first decade (1968–1977) about 17% of terror organizations carried out attacks outside their home base regions; these figures were 13% in the third decade (1988–1997). The corresponding figures were 24% for the second decade (1978–1987) but less than 5% for the last (1988–2007). (Goldman, 2011, p. 50).

In light of data such as the above, which directly question current conventional wisdom and associated prevailing myths, one can hardly resist recalling one of CSI character Grissom’s famous lines: ‘forget about the suspect [as constructed by the prevailing narrative] and focus on the only thing that can’t lie: the evidence’.

Motives

From the perspective of the ‘new’ terrorism school of thought, ‘old’, traditional terrorist groups were motivated by secular concerns stemming from political ideology, national-separatist aspirations and ethnic conflict, and rational political reasons like the mobilisation of working class masses or independence for their ethnic group. In contrast, ‘the phenomenon of the new terrorism differs fundamentally from the more familiar politically motivated terrorism’ (Simon and Benjamin, quoted in Field, 2009, p. 197). Its motives ‘are derived exclusively from religious doctrines that emphasise transformational and apocalyptic beliefs, usually associated with Islam’ (Crenshaw, 2008, p. 122). In turn, this religious motivation produces ‘radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality and a Manichaeian world view’ (Hoffmann, quoted in Spencer, 2010, p. 7).

Furthermore, it is argued that this Manichaeian value system, generated by fanatical religious motivations, works hand in glove with a dramatic shift in the willingness of terrorists to negotiate. Contrary to ‘old’ terrorists, whose specific demands were often rationally negotiable (Spencer, 2010, p. 6), ‘today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it’ (Morgan, quoted in Spencer, 2010, p. 8).

There is no doubt that religion is a core defining feature of contemporary terrorist activity. But is this religious imperative so novel and unique as to legitimise the concept of a ‘new’ terrorism? Spencer provides a balanced reply, worth quoting at some length:

Historically, religious terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon. According to David Rapoport, religiously motivated terrorism aimed at killing nonbelievers has existed for thousands of years. From the first-century Zealots to the thirteenth-century Assassins, and even up to the nineteenth century and the emergence of political motives such as nationalism, anarchism, and Marxism, ‘religion provided the only acceptable justification for terror’. Religious motivation is not so much a new characteristic as it is a cyclic return to earlier motivations for terrorism. (Spencer, 2010, p. 9).

I would go one step further than Spencer. Even if we do accept, for the sake of argument with the advocates of ‘new’ terrorism, that we are witnessing the rise of a new wave of terrorism, there is one more lesson to be drawn from Rapoport’s work on ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’

(2004).⁴ Once modern terrorism is placed in a historical context, the questionable advent of a religious fourth wave of terrorism is best seen as a development in the evolution of terrorist waves, which, like preceding ones, has not only a beginning but also an end. Indeed, in a recent empirical study that attempted to identify the lifespan of Rapoport's terrorist waves, Weinberg and Eubank (2010, pp. 598–9) argue that 'the preceding waves of terrorist violence dissipated after approximately a generation, a period of roughly 20 to 30 years. The present wave has lasted for just about that length of time now' – an observation that leads them to believe that the current fourth wave may be already 'on a downward trajectory' (p. 601).

Finally, the argument that the absolutist religious motives of 'new' terrorism have marked a significant shift in the willingness of terrorists to negotiate and compromise, commonsensical though it may first sound, calls for a more balanced qualification. Field sets the record straight by pointing out the following:

In many cases secular motivations can be as uncompromising as religious principles. Witness the unwavering conviction of the suicide bombers associated to the secular Tamil Tigers, the leftist Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the ethno-separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) . . . The decision to seek a negotiated settlement is affected by a whole range of factors, including the political climate, the strength of the terrorist group and the strength of counter-terrorism measures . . . It is simplistic to suggest that the willingness of a terrorist group to negotiate is uni-causal and simply determined by whether the organization has secular or religious motivations. (Field, 2009, pp. 201–2).

Tactics

The third area in which advocates of the concept of a 'new' terrorism argue that a significant change has occurred relates to tactics employed and the associated attitude towards violence. Essentially, 'old' terrorism, because of its pursuit of legitimacy, 'adopted a utilitarian approach to the use of violence, usually as part of a broader political campaign' (Field, 2009, p. 199). In general, 'the "old" terrorism is considered to be much more restrained and specific in targeting. The traditional terrorist wanted people watching, not people dead, according to Brian Jenkins' now famous apho-

⁴ Each of Rapoport's historical four waves of modern terrorism has had its own distinctive leitmotif: anarchism, national liberation, social revolution, religious transcendence.

rism' (Crenshaw, 2008, p. 128). Contrary to this traditional attitude, 'new' terrorist groups display 'an increasing willingness to use excessive, indiscriminate violence (Spencer, 2010, p. 7). Hoffman explains this transformation in the following terms: 'Whereas secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system, religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving but as "outsiders", seeking fundamental changes in the existing system' (quoted in Crenshaw, 2008, p. 124).

There is no doubt that the level of terrorism-induced lethality and civilian casualties has been on the increase in recent years. But is that evidence enough to adopt the above descriptions, along with the associated dichotomy of 'old' and 'new' terrorism, as accurate? The answer is in the negative once we take into account the following: Crenshaw captures neatly how misleading the distinction of 'old' versus 'new' terrorism can be by pointing out that 'levels of selectivity and restraint vary across groups and across time, but not according to a religious–secular or past–present divide (2008, p. 128). Let me note here that one major cause of high civilian casualties is the adoption of suicide missions. Yet this is a tactic that has been employed by both secular and religious groups. Indeed, 'indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks have long been a characteristic of terrorism' (Spencer, 2010, p. 10), and 'the supposedly rational "traditional" terrorists frequently attacked innocent civilians, often by detonating bombs in public areas with little or no warning' (Field, 2009, p. 203). Robert Pape, who has studied the phenomenon of suicide terrorism extensively, notes that 'although religious motives may matter, modern suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic Fundamentalism. Islamic groups receive the most attention in Western media, but the world's leader in suicide terrorism is actually the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group . . . whose ideology has Marxist/Leninist elements' (2003, p. 343).

Finally, the related conventional perception that 'old' terrorists deployed violence strategically and in a restrained fashion because violence for them was a means to a political end whereas 'new' terrorists are deploying violence in an extremist fashion because for them violence is an end in itself is overly simplistic. This notion also fails to recognise that both 'old' and 'new' terrorists can use, and have used, violence strategically. Even the attacks of 9/11 by al-Qaeda, the canonical case for advocates of a 'new' terrorism, 'were not simply a form of cathartic punishment; they also served a

broader strategic purpose with the aim of coercing the government of the United States into changing its foreign policy’ (Field, 2009, p. 203).

As I hope the above brief juxtaposition of the ‘old’ versus ‘new’ terrorism has helped to indicate, the analytical value of the notion of a ‘new’ terrorism is at least questionable, if not flawed. But if this is so, then why has this idea of a fundamentally new terrorism proved so attractive? Crenshaw (2008, p. 133) hits the nail on the head by pointing out that defining religious, jihadist terrorism as new is an effective way of framing the threat so as to mobilise both public and elite support for major policy changes. This is precisely what is at stake in a name.

Revisiting the Terrorism–Democracy Nexus

As Robert Goodin, a distinguished professor of social and political theory, has observed: ‘Political theorists, like everyone, have a limited range of tools in their intellectual toolkits. Presented with real world events, they rummage around to see what among their standard equipment best fits this occasion’ (2006, p. 170). In view of that, it is no wonder that when confronted with something as spectacular and unsettling as the events of 9/11, what came most immediately to the mind of political theorists was the ‘Hobbesian war of all against all’ (p. 170). Given that at the centre of the prevailing post-9/11 public discourse lies the notion of a catastrophic terrorist threat, the notion of a ‘new’ terrorism has also served as a vehicle via which terrorism ‘has been presented as a Hobbesian problem, calling forth the standard Hobbesian solution, an increasingly absolutist state’ (p. 175). Indeed, as Goodin further observes, ‘shades of an absolute Hobbesian ruler are seen in the “restriking of the balance between liberty and security” that is proceeding apace in the wake of 9/11’ (p. 174).

This problematic notion and alleged necessity to re-evaluate the trade-off between security and civil liberties finds support not only in the alarming discourse of ‘new’ terrorism, but also (and obviously inadvertently) in the existing literature on the relationship between democracy and terrorism, whose findings suggest a positive association between the two. The purpose of the remainder of this section is to question the empirical valid-

ity of this body of literature, but before doing so let me first briefly review the arguments put forward.⁵

Terrorism is the outcome of a complex set of co-constitutive factors that function at various levels of causation. Despite the progress made in the study of the phenomenon, we still lack a general theory for its genesis. Nonetheless, a number of suspected generating factors have been proposed in the literature. The most prominent fall within either of the following two categories: *direct* or *permissive*. Direct factors refer to grievances generating political, social and economic conditions that ‘directly inspire and motivate’ terrorist activity (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 381). Under the assumption that terrorism is a result of strategic choice, terrorist groups will try to maximise their return and minimise the cost of engaging in terrorist activities. Hence, when we refer to permissive factors we consider conditions that ‘provide opportunities for terrorism to happen’ (p. 381) by either maximising its potential return or minimising the cost, or both.

The idiosyncrasy of democracy is that its regime attributes correspond to both direct and permissive factors. On the one hand, the so-called political access school argues that democratic societies are expected to be associated with less terrorism. That is because the very essence of such a polity allows its citizens to express and channel their grievances through established institutional venues and eventually resolve them in a non-violent fashion. In effect, ‘democratic states increase the expected return of legal activity and offer multiple channels of non-violent expression without the threat of government retaliation’ (Eyerman, 1998, p. 154).

Yet a different reading of how regime attributes enter the decision calculus of terrorists points in the opposite direction. According to the so-called strategic school, democracies ‘encourage’ terrorism by decreasing the price of, and the risk associated with, engaging in terrorist or other violent activities (Eyerman, 1998). Indeed, democracies lower the price of illegal activities because of their commitment to civil liberties. These civil liberties, like freedom of movement and association as well as human and minority rights, provide fertile ground for the creation and function of terrorist groups. Moreover, the prerequisite in democratic legal systems of rigorous proof for conviction makes democracies more vulnerable to terrorist operations (Schmid, 1992). It is this permissive effect of civil liberties that leads Rohan Gunaratna, head of the International Centre for

⁵ The remainder of this section draws on Drakos and Gofas (2007; 2006a; 2006b).

Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore, to argue that ‘because of this political liberalism, North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand remain ideal arenas for the operation of terrorist support networks’ (2010, p. 19).

Most commentators seem to agree that liberal democracies have provided a conducive environment for the emergence of terrorism, which is thus positively correlated with the level of democracy. Ross argues that ‘the lion’s share of terrorism takes place in democracies’ (1993, p. 321), and most of the empirical studies on the subject seem to support this view (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Weinberg and Eubank 1998; Li, 2005; Li and Schaub, 2004). Indeed, recent high-profile events, such as the 9/11 attacks, the train bombing in Madrid and the coordinated attack on the London transport network, lend a degree of *prima facie* credence to the argument, as they highlight the vulnerability of democracies to acts of terrorism.

It should be noted, however, that democracies may erroneously appear to be experiencing more terrorist activity than non-democracies because of the high propensity of the latter to under-report terrorist attacks (Schmid, 1992; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994; Lai, 2003; Li, 2005; Drakos and Gofas, 2006b). This is a long-standing suspicion in the literature on terrorism that raises serious concerns about the validity of extant findings. The issue is known as the problem of under-reporting bias and, in essence, posits that *observed* terrorist activity might well be an under-statement of *actual* terrorist activity, as only the events that found their way into open sources, such as the media, have actually been reported and, hence, recorded in existing databases. In effect, despite the insights that the extant literature has generated, it may not have fully specified the manner in which terrorism and regime type are linked, since the hypothesised presence of an under-reporting bias has been raised without having been adequately addressed.

At this point, let me provide a simple synopsis of the discussion thus far. [Figure 1](#), below, summarises the expectations from the three above-named factors, namely direct effect, permissive effect and under-reporting effect, that affect *observed* correlation between regime type and terrorism.




Figure 1. The terrorism–regime type nexus

In the row below ‘Regime Type’ we see the two extreme opposing poles of the polity spectrum, namely strong autocracies and full democracies. So as the diagram portrays, when it comes to, say, democracies, we expect a minimisation of the grievances-generated direct effect. Hence, we expect democracies to be associated with low terrorist activity [TER (Low)], as the political access school would have it. At the same time, what we also expect to observe in democracies is a maximisation of the permissive effect, because of their commitment to the rule of law. Hence, we expect democracies to be associated with high terrorist activity [TER (High)], as the strategic school would have it. As these two sets of expectations indicate, the discussion at the theoretical level remains inconclusive.

What complicates matters even further is the presence of the reporting effect, according to which we expect democracies to be associated with high terrorist activity. Indeed, as Drakos and Gofas put it, ‘we cannot know whether the *observed* higher terrorist activity in democracies, as opposed to the low activity *observed* in autocracies, is the result of the direct Polity effect (usually dubbed in the literature as the encouragement effect) or of the increased reporting propensity associated with democratic regimes because of the freedom that their press enjoys’ (2007, p. 140). This is exactly why they argue that terrorist activity, regime type and the reporting effect

form a conceptual trinity (Drakos and Gofas, 2006a; 2007). In their attempt to investigate empirically whether the ‘reporting effect’ argument is valid, they conclude that ‘underreporting is indeed present, implying that the databases used by applied researchers represent an understatement of true terrorist activity worldwide’ (Drakos and Gofas, 2006a, p. 734). On the basis of this recent finding, it can be argued that the established positive correlation between democracy and terrorism is based on contaminated data that systematically distort the actual relationship between the two. In effect, to attribute the observed high terrorist activity in democracies to their respect of the rule of law is methodologically highly questionable.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter has been to raise a voice of scepticism regarding the two main assumptions on which the new global counterterrorist paradigm is based. In so doing, it tried to revisit the dilemma for liberal democracies posed by terrorism by questioning the alleged necessity to strike a new balance between security and civil liberties in favour of the former. The threat of terrorism is certainly real and will remain with us. Yet the prevailing narrative that presents terrorism as an all-pervasive societal threat has grown out of proportion and has created a widespread atmosphere of anxiety and a chronic state of ‘ontological hysteria’ where political fear bleeds into the fabric of daily life (Jackson, 2007).⁶

In this context, finding a delicate balance between security and civil liberties is not an easy task. Yet as Cole argues, this major policy imperative of our times ‘will succeed only if it sees the rule of law values as an asset in that campaign, not an obstacle’ (2010, p. 364). Aharon Barak, president of Israel’s Supreme Court, captured this spirit of renewed commitment to civil liberties and the rule of law in the following way:

A democracy must sometimes fight terror with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important components in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties (quoted in Cole, 2010, p. 364).

⁶ For an in-depth analysis of the role of fear in politics, see also Beck (2002), Furedi (2002), Robin (2004), Glassner (1999).

Thus, security and civil liberties should not be seen as locked in a zero-sum game, and their balance in democracies as needing re-evaluation. Indeed, the current official response to the threat of terrorism might not just be potentially damaging to democracy but also, by being unnecessarily exaggerated, counterproductive.

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International Terrorism: The Neglected Domestic Dimension

Anthony Glees and Julian Richards

Introduction

This article argues that the concept of ‘international terrorism’ provides a useful means of understanding one of the major security threats now facing the global community. We suggest that the validity of the concept has generated a sensible twin-track intelligence-led security strategy linking domestic with external activity and is an approach well designed to contain the virulence of international terrorism.

It is true that the concept was initially defined too narrowly, implying it was external in origin and perpetrated by foreign groups without domestic purchase. Few understood initially that within Western Muslim communities (believed to be well integrated and comfortable with Western ways) there might exist a small but highly dangerous minority, ready to adhere to the same extremist and violent ideology that had created terrorism overseas. Even once this fact was recognised, it became politically helpful to disregard it in public. Despite this, ‘international terrorism’ has held up as a concept that accurately describes one of the most serious threats to face the West.

Establishing effective security and counterterrorism measures as a core task of democratic governments has led to their frequently being described in negative terms as ‘national security states’ (for example, an obsession with secrecy, an obsession with internal and external enemies and the acquisition by armed forces and intelligence services of inappropriate power within a policy well discussed in Ripsman and Paul, 2005). Whilst accepting that there has, of course, been an almost exponential growth in budgets and activities of the military and intelligence communities of Western states and an increase in the duties with which they are tasked, we reject

the view that this is in some way wrong and has led to the curtailment of essential freedoms in Western democracies. Rather, we argue that providing security from attacks organised by international terrorists and preventing the radicalisation of young Muslims who are citizens of Western democracies are rational and acceptable means of preventing democracies from being undermined by terrorists and extremists. Whilst the former group may attempt to change the policies of elected governments by violence and the fear of it, the latter will attempt to use democratic freedoms in order to deconstruct them, something that will inevitably lead to violence either from the extremists themselves or from those who wish to resist them.

This article concludes by arguing that the sustainability of Western counterterrorism strategies must today be in doubt. Their external dimension is under close scrutiny because of the extreme difficulty in making decisive headway in the war in Afghanistan and the concomitant spread of international terrorism bases into Africa and the Mediterranean region. Internally, their validity and acceptability are increasingly questioned by Muslim citizens of Western democracies (who wrongly see themselves threatened by security policies rather than terrorism) and by self-termed civil liberties groups who reject the security measures on which these strategies rely as infringements of their legal rights. Although external and internal policy successes can be identified, these also contribute to declining support for the counterterrorism strategies, not least because if security agencies are able to thwart terrorist attacks before they happen, the public will inevitably underestimate the threat, especially compared with their assessment had the attacks had taken place.

International Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 2000 as a Political Concept

One key issue arising from an analysis of any counterterrorism strategy is the vocabulary that political leaders and authorities use to speak about it. It might be reasonably asked, what exactly *is* ‘international terrorism’, and how does it differ from ‘national terrorism’? Is the term ‘international terrorism’ a descriptor of the *origins* of the phenomenon or of its *area of activity*? Is it terrorism produced in one country but impacting on others, or is it something that is formed in different countries spontaneously? Is there a

link between ‘international terrorism’ and Islam generally? Is it, as Tony Blair argues, the outcome of a ‘strain of Islam’ that will confront us for a generation (*Metro*, 2010)? Or is Islam not part of the equation at all?

In politics, the words used are always loaded. For a national political audience, ‘international’ connotes something from outside the homeland (the verbal opposition, as in any airport, is ‘domestic’ versus ‘international/foreign’). ‘International terrorism’ could therefore be construed as either a foreign phenomenon that affects citizens of the homeland only when they visit the country where the terrorism exists (and is therefore of marginal concern, if any, to most voters), or a foreign phenomenon that affects one’s homeland (and is therefore of very immediate interest). One way to address the former threat would be to stay at home to avoid it; for the latter it might be to keep terrorists out of one’s country, or even take the fight to their country and deal with them there. Equally, however, the term can be used to avoid the charge that a particular community or a group within the homeland is being targeted. In this case, remedies will consist both of domestic and foreign strategies, but the term ‘international terrorism’ may make it difficult to accept that there is a real domestic dimension to the problem.

At the same time, a strategy against terrorism is a policy that makes demands not just on those who deploy it but also on those who, in a democracy, are needed to support it. Thankfully, most citizens eschew conflict whether at home or abroad. The term ‘international terrorism’ quickly became useful partly because it was indeed an accurate descriptor of the threat (where it implied that a foreign-sourced ideology of terror had also gained supporters within a Western state) but also because it was politically easier to use this term rather than ‘jihadism’ or ‘Islamism’, as it deflected attention away from the homeland. British governments in particular soon learned that even the formulation ‘violent extremism’, in wide use since July 2005, is disliked by Muslim communities, who see themselves (not surprisingly) as the targets of official attempts to ‘counter violent extremism’. Many regard ‘extremism’ in the pursuit of their religion to be a virtue and not a vice, and an ‘extreme’ adherence to the peaceful religion of Islam is, they argue, the best protection against ‘international terrorism’. Nor do they consider ‘Islamism’ a danger, because, they say, the construction of a state of political Islam is both a duty of those who adhere to it and one to be undertaken peacefully and without violence on the part of those who press for it.

However, the term 'home-grown' is still used to describe domestic terrorists even though it is inaccurate because the ideology that has subverted such individuals has divorced them entirely from any sense of belonging to the Western homeland in which they may have been born or educated. This is not merely a function of the ease of international travel (and the impact of training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan where so many British terrorists were taught their craft) but because the Internet and satellite TV, as well as resistance to integration into Western lifestyles has ensured that the old distinction between 'at home' and 'abroad' no longer has meaning.

By now, almost a decade after 9/11, it is fair to say that the terms employed by governments and academic analysts have been subject to continuous change, partly in light of new evidence but all too frequently because of what are seen as the requirements of domestic politics, local sensitivities and a reasonable reluctance to demonise the innocent. That said, in any mature democratic polity, it is important always to describe phenomena as accurately as possible. Changing nomenclature is always tiresome because it is an obstacle to understanding and to effective policy.

Here, then, the term 'international terrorism' describes a phenomenon that transcends the distinction between what is foreign and what is domestic, and is one that affects people in many countries in a similar way. It is ideologically driven by a specific (mis-)interpretation of the faith of Islam for a political purpose and for this reason it can also be called 'Islamism'. It is not the necessary expression of the political attitudes of any ethnic group – indeed, Muslims everywhere are its chief victims – but as long as the ideology is framed in the context of Islam, Muslim communities are the particular target of this form of international terrorism. It may have domestic inputs (arising from perceived domestic injustices, resentments or inequalities), but it may also have foreign inputs (arising from the foreign policy or foreign actions of the homeland).

Just as the terrorism of the Baader-Meinhof Gang or the Red Brigades was the outcome of an ideology that saw itself as reaching across national borders, therefore generating violence and extremism (as well as political support) in countries other than Germany or Italy, and was fuelled by acts of violence and extremist thinking in other states and communities, so today's variant of international terrorism – Islamism – is first and foremost a political doctrine of change, developed both in the Islamic world and in the West, to be brought about through violence. Victor Mauer (2006, p. 93) distinguishes between terrorism from the 1970s and 1980s, whose roots, he

suggests, are 'primarily domestic', and the 'thoroughly transnational' nature of jihadist terrorism. However, despite the important differences between terrorism then and now, it would be wrong to discount the linkage between international and national terrorist ideology more than a generation ago and Islamism today; indeed, a core grievance uniting both is the politics of the Middle East and the Israel–Palestine dispute. Because of its global nature, Islamism is indeed countered both at home and abroad, in different ways and using different strategies. However, it is essentially the same phenomenon whether it is found in the West or elsewhere in the Islamic world.

The Development of Policy to Counter International Terrorism: The International/Homeland Nexus

In June 2000 the US National Commission on Terrorism published what today seems a watershed report in an attempt (sadly unsuccessful) to get the US administration (and perhaps the world more generally) to take more seriously the threat from what the Commission called 'international terrorism'. The report was a response to the notorious declaration by al-Qaeda of 23 February 1998 instructing Muslims to kill Americans anywhere in the world and had, of course, been preceded by several attacks on US citizens and buildings prior to that point, both in the US and overseas (Caruso, 2001). What few were willing to accept was that this was a genuine statement of intention to commit terrorist acts on a global scale against Americans. What made it particularly chilling was that by this time al-Qaeda could demonstrate that it did not merely possess the intention to act but had the capability to do so as well. Under the chairmanship of L. Paul Bremer III, the 10 commissioners who wrote the report predicted that 'international terrorism pose[d] an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America' by terrorists who sought 'to inflict mass casualties . . . both overseas and on American soil'. They were 'forming loose transnational affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United States'. The report stated that there must be an 'imperative to find terrorists and prevent their attacks'. At the same time it warned that 'combating terrorism should not be used as a pretext for discrimination . . . [T]errorists often claim to act on behalf of ethnic groups [or] religions . . .

[in fact] they are only a miniscule fraction of any such group' (US National Commission on Terrorism, 2000, p. iii).

The report urged all US authorities to step up their efforts to gain intelligence about terrorist plans, 'to disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities and private sources of support . . . and ensure that federal, state and local officials are prepared for attacks that may result in mass casualties'. The first priority, the report suggested, was to 'prevent terrorist attacks' using the 'full scope' of the authority of US intelligence and law enforcement communities to do so. Furthermore, the report declared that the US should target all states that supported terrorists, singling out Iran, Syria and Afghanistan ('which should be designated a state sponsor of terrorism') for special attention.

It is important to flesh out the key themes in the 2000 report: that international terrorism was a source of danger to the US at home and abroad, that international terrorists were a loose affiliation of individuals who came together because of a religious or ideological affinity constructed around a common hatred of the US, that it was vital to identify international terrorists and prevent their attacks but that in doing so nothing should be done that might allow a charge of discrimination to be made against the authorities and that state supporters of terrorism should be subject to 'sanctions'. The policy options, then, were to safeguard the borders of the US to keep terrorists out and to use every means available to defeat anti-American terrorists on their home turf.

The report made it plain that al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups possessed both the intention and capability to attack the US. However, precisely because America rather than its allies were seen as the target, America's allies were slow to understand that the report had important implications for them as well. In the years that followed, the evidence that it was not only America that was in the firing line went on to form the basis of much subsequent counterterrorism strategy and policy.

Yet about one vital conceptual area – the notion of 'home-grown' terrorism – the report, significantly, had nothing to say. There was no hint that the external threat would clone itself into an internal one that would exploit US citizens or those who had lived there for years. It was seen as exclusively external. The policy goal was therefore to develop the protection of the US homeland from an overseas attack. The report insisted that

[i]nternational terrorism once threatened Americans only when they were outside the country. Today international terrorists attack us on our own soil. Just be-

fore the millennium, an alert U.S. Customs Service official stopped Ahmad Resam as he attempted to enter the United States from Canada – apparently to conduct a terrorist attack. This fortuitous arrest should not inspire complacency, however. On an average day, over one million people enter the United States legally and thousands more enter illegally. As the World Trade Center bombing demonstrated, we cannot rely solely on existing border controls and procedures to keep foreign terrorists out of the United States. (US National Commission on Terrorism, 2000, p. 2).

In meeting this goal, the US attempted to list those external groups or nations who might harbour terrorists ready to mount an attack against it. This remains a prime concern, and currently the US Department of State (2010b) provides a list that speaks of ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’, of which it says there are 46. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (i.e., the department of foreign affairs) is responsible for composing the list. As recently as 1 September 2010, the Pakistani Taliban organisation TTP was added to this blacklist. Its leader had claimed responsibility for the murder of 53 people in Quetta and allegedly promised attacks on the EU and the US, stating ‘our war is against America and Pakistan security forces’ (Crilly, 2010).

It is interesting that the US Department of Homeland Security (2010) does not provide any list of domestic terrorist organisations, or foreign organisations operating within the US. Indeed, to search on the department’s website for such organisations or even for ‘domestic terrorism’ yields no results, although it is clear that the department is aware of the existence of both foreign organisations operating in the US and entirely ‘home-grown’ terrorists (like the Unabomber or Timothy McVeigh) (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The Department continues to suggest that where terrorism is a problem to the US homeland, this will be caused not by conflicted US citizens but by ‘foreign terrorists’ whose violent extremism is the product of conflicts abroad.

The critical linkage between international terrorism and what might happen on British soil was made explicitly by the UK government only after the July 2005 terrorist attacks. After 9/11 British authorities had obviously understood that Western states might be targets for international terrorists but, like the 2000 US National Commission, they did not believe that British citizens would become terrorists even if they had by this date become their targets.

The first steps towards the development of a systematic and coherent policy for the UK were taken in 2002. Its existence and the four key elements it addressed ('Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare') became public knowledge in 2005 (revealed in *The Sunday Times*, 10 July 2005). The 'Prevent' part of the policy, its most innovative and striking initiative, was updated in various ways, including through higher education, in 2006 and 2007, then again on 3 June 2008 in respect of local authority and policing issues, on 8 October 2008 in respect of primary and secondary schools and again on 24 March 2009 (Communities and Local Government, 2008a and 2008b; National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, 2010). Britain's EU partners have taken much of 'Prevent' on board in their policymaking. The explicit aim was to prevent violent extremism from occurring in the first place, with the implication that this meant intervening in activities that might lead to it but that were themselves not acts of violent extremism. Very clearly, such a goal would prompt examination of the means by which it was to be achieved as well as the political and ethical justification of proactive security intervention. This indeed is what took place.

By July 2006 the British government had begun to push the idea that domestic anti-terrorism policy was concerned with British groups who might be connected to international terrorist organisations, and that Britain was at risk from both sets of people. The aim of the policy was 'to reduce the risk from international terrorism' but the strategy included measures to tackle the 'radicalisation' of individuals in the UK (Security Service MI5, 2006). This was described the next year as the 'first cross-government counterterrorism strategy' (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 6).

In March 2008, the presentation of the policy was changed but its elements remained the same. There was mention of the 'interdependent world' and 'international terrorism' (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 5) and 'new' threats emanating from this interdependency, but also 'the more traditional security threats . . . of terrorism' (p. 6). For this reason the government was determined to maintain a 'set of capabilities at home and overseas'. Even so, the government's listed 'new powers to tackle terrorism' were all aimed at tackling home-grown terrorists and those radicalising them rather than at combating foreign terrorists or keeping them out of the UK altogether ('control orders, extended stop and search powers, new offences of acts preparatory, encouraging and glorifying terrorism and training for terrorism', p. 7). It was plainly with these domestic targets in mind that the government added: 'our approach to national security is clearly grounded in a

set of core values . . . human rights, the rule of law . . . , justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all' (p. 8).

Yet the government also stressed that the importance of collective action with the UN, the EU and NATO was the 'most effective way of managing and reducing the threats we face' (Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 9). Only further on did one read that 'the UK faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists claiming to act in the name of Islam. Although they have very little support among communities in this country and their claims to religious justification are widely regarded as false, the threat is greater in scale and ambition than terrorist threats we have faced in the past' (p. 12).

The linking of the idea of an interdependent world, the nation and the citizen was developed the next year in the government's March 2009 security statement 'Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare', which once again repeated the case that its aim was 'to reduce the risk we face from international terrorism' (HM Government, 2009, p. 3). Here, however, we learn that 'Al-Qaida [*sic*] and similar groups are the main international terrorist threat . . . British citizens working with Al-Qaida were responsible for the 7 July 2005 London bombings in which 52 people were killed' (p. 5).

In the US, Michael Chertoff (2007, pp. 2 and 4), President Bush's Homeland Security Secretary, provided a similar account of US policy objectives when he spoke of the importance of 'engaging with key communities to promote civic engagement . . . an effective strategy to prevent and counter domestic radicalization requires that we not only engage these communities, but also take proactive steps to build trust and respond to issues of concern to Americans of different ethnicities, cultures, and faiths'.

This strategy has also been explored in a recent study of 'home-grown terrorism' published in 2009, examining the radicalisation process in respect of 117 individuals in both the US and UK (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009). The authors also stress the importance of what they describe (perhaps wrongly) as 'the Muslim community' reaching out to the authorities. The study follows on the heels of earlier ones by the New York City Police Department and many others (Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Gles and Pope, 2005, p. 79).

As Klausen (2009) notes 'Prevent' is a uniquely a pre-emptive, proactive and highly complex security policy. Logically it contradicts the government's focus on *violent* extremism and terrorism, because the security community is expected to intervene *before* extremism becomes violent (in order to prevent it). The trigger for action by the security community is an

intention to use violence, not the holding or dissemination of extreme views by themselves. By November 2007 the government was spending at least £400 million on 'Prevent', with a further £45 million given to police forces specifically for 'Prevent' purposes, with additional resources provided for Britain's secret intelligence agencies. The policy attempts to identify extremists, counter their messages and disrupt their activities, wherever possible securing convictions using the raft of counterterrorism laws at the government's disposal. In order to do any of this, however, it is first necessary to win over what is laxly described as 'the British Muslim community' in order to derive the intelligence from it on which operational activity against violent extremists relies. If the work done by the Security Service, MI5, may best be characterised as 'fire-fighting', here the task is one of 'fire prevention'. The police, in the form of counterterrorist units (CTUs) and a special branch, are at the forefront of this work, operating in close liaison with MI5 and other agencies.

Current Expenditure on Combating International Terrorism

Almost a decade after 9/11, what is today a bitter and difficult war against supporters of international terrorism has become a major item of government activity and expenditure. Accurate figures for the amount spent in the US are impossible to ascertain, not least because the budgets of the CIA are secret. We do know that the US is spending some \$700 billion on defence this year (US Department of State, 2010a). We know, too, that, in 2010, the FBI, which has the responsibility for counterterrorism, employed 34,000 people in the US and beyond with a budget of \$6.4 billion (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). Of the CIA (which is banned from collecting information on US citizens) we know only that in 1998 the total spending on intelligence-led activity was \$26.7 billion. The budgets for subsequent years have not been disclosed (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010).

In the case of the UK, the cost of its armed forces is now estimated to be £40 billion, equivalent to 25% of Britain's current budget deficit (HM Treasury, 2010), and according to the Stockholm-based International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), its expenditure is the third-largest in the world after the US and China (SIPRI, 2009). A large proportion is spent on fighting the war in Afghanistan. Apart from that, the fight against international

terrorism makes additional heavy demands on the taxpayer in other areas; the work of the intelligence community and the police being two such examples. Precise figures do not exist, but we know that the budget for the Single Intelligence Account for the secret agencies was £2,203 million for 2009–10, and is £2,354 million for 2010–11 (compared with 2008 this is an increase of 15%; with 2009, of 8%; and with 2010, of 7%). We are also told that the Security Service, MI5, spent 74% of its resources on ‘international counterterrorism’ during 2008–9, a yearly increase of 6% (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2010, p. 11). On the same year, the Secret Intelligence Service spent 37% of its effort on international counterterrorism and the government communications centre (GCHQ) 33% (pp. 8 and 13). Elsewhere, we learn that Britain’s Foreign Office spent £35 million on international counterterrorism in 2008–9; £36.9 million in 2009–10; and will spend £38 million in 2010–11 (although this may now be subject to a cut) (House of Commons, 2010). To these sums we must also add the money that the police and the other government ministries spend on counterterrorism. The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism based within the Home Office but with extensive outreach into other ministries and agencies has spent £4 million on payments to local authorities alone since being set up in 2007 (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2010). It is therefore not hard to see how the entire cost of Britain’s fight against international terrorism must now be a multi-billion pound undertaking.

Current Debates

Currently, in both the US and the UK, policymakers seem torn between wishing to indicate that with new governments, a new policy to counter international terrorism has been developed, and needing to accept fully that the old policies made sense and, frankly, lacked any realistic alternative.

Neither a new American president nor new UK leaders in 2007 and 2010 have led to any high policy change of substance even if its presentation has changed with announcements of pull-out dates. Those who believed or hoped that President Obama would immediately withdraw US troops from Afghanistan or leave Pakistan to solve its own security issues have been disabused. Indeed, in his inaugural address, the new President went out of this way to explain that ‘Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred . . . for those who seek to advance

their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents . . . we will defeat you' (BBC News, 2009a). Referring to the war in Afghanistan in July 2009, Obama said: 'This is not an American mission, it is one that the Europeans have as much if not more of a stake in, than we do. The likelihood of a terrorist attack in London is at least as high, if not higher, than it is in the United States . . . We cannot allow either Afghanistan or Pakistan to be a safe haven for Al Qaeda, those who with impunity blow up train stations in London or buildings in New York' (BBC News, 2009b).

During a visit to Pakistan on 28 April 2009, Gordon Brown, then British Prime Minister, described the region as a 'crucible of terror', adding: '[T]here is a line of terror, a chain of terror, that goes from Afghanistan and the border area of Pakistan right back to our streets of all our countries. If we do not take action here, and do not fight back against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, then people are less safe and more insecure as a result' (quoted in Prince and Farner, 2009).

And in July 2009 Brown declared: 'People see the importance of winning the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan so that the battle against the terrorists does not come to the streets of our country' (quoted in Simpson and Kirkup, 2009). Brown (2009) repeated the same argument in a letter to Alan Williams, Chairman of the House of Common's Liaison Committee: "[O]ur purpose is clear: to prevent terrorism coming to the streets of Britain. . . If in Pakistan, the Taliban are allowed to overwhelm Pakistan's democracy, Al Qaeda would once again have greater freedom from which to launch terrorist attacks across the world'.

This message was also delivered by the outgoing head of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who spoke (also in July 2009) of the need to 'finally lay to rest the notion that there is any distinction between security at home and security abroad' (quoted in Hale, 2009). The sentiments were echoed wholly in David Cameron's statement of 6 August 2010 (after a meeting with the President of Pakistan). Cameron spoke of the 'mutual interest' in developing a 'strategic partnership' between the UK and Pakistan, not least 'in the absolutely vital area of combating terrorism, keeping British troops safe in Afghanistan and keeping people safe on the streets of Britain' (Number 10 TV, 2010).

In a nutshell, British (and Western) security policy was predicated firmly on the view that Islamist terrorism in Britain was the product of a political extremism whose base was mainly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa and which was fired by a particular use of Islam. It had to be

fought (and prevented) both on the streets of Britain and by continuing to wage war in Afghanistan. If Britain (and its allies) did not prevail in the latter, the streets of Britain (and those of its allies, but especially British streets) could witness many acts of terrorism.

Today, then, it is clear that the threat of Islamist terrorism endures and is a serious threat in the view of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (meaning an attack in the UK is ‘highly likely’) (Home Office, 2010). Furthermore, the threat is still seen as a global one requiring both strong intelligence-led security measures at a domestic level and a war in Afghanistan at the international one.

Yet there are signs of confusion and change on the horizon, whether domestic or overseas. Within the UK, a new coalition government demonstrates conflicting policies. On the one hand, its first piece of legislation was the abolition of ID cards, which had been designed to enhance security and track terrorism suspects. In announcing the measure, the Home Secretary Theresa May declared that ‘this will begin the process of reversing the erosion of civil liberties and restoring freedoms’ (quoted in Doyle, 2010). She got important support from Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, the head of Britain’s Supreme Court (and the UK’s most senior judge), who said, ‘[T]he respect for human rights is a key weapon in the ideological battle in the so-called war on terror’ (quoted in Wagner, 2010); Shami Chakrabarti (2010), the outspoken critic of all anti-terrorism legislation, welcomed the changes and opined that ‘the government should hold its nerve in the face of the securocrats’ scaremongering’. To claim that documentary proof of identity in a mature liberal democracy was an attack on civil liberties was patently absurd, whoever might make it. That this view now seems to have become government policy is extremely worrying. It mirrors the views expressed by academics such as Shamit Sagar (2006) and Stuart Croft (2007), who coordinates a major, UK taxpayer-funded project on security, and echoes earlier statements by lawyers and academics (Glees, 2009).

On the other hand, Britain’s Security Minister Baroness Neville Jones told the BBC in July 2010 (on the anniversary of the London bombings five years previously) that the threat to the UK remained severe but was now more dispersed – across Yemen and the Horn of Africa, for example. International terrorism had become ‘more varied in geography and techniques but still directed at this country’. She added, importantly: ‘Where nothing happens, it isn’t because of a reduction in the threat but because of

the more effective defences against it. The evidence of absence is not absence of evidence – this is really true in this case’. At the same time she said, significantly, that the government was aware of the ‘risk of alienating communities’, which was ‘one of the hardest challenges’ (BBC News, 2010).

It is obvious that the fight against international terrorism, which is so costly in terms of lives and money, is not immediately a policy designed to court popularity. At the same time, however, citizens are not only demanding that their governments provide security – large numbers of them are also prepared to back tough policies to underwrite it. Whilst it is true that there has been some extremely vociferous opposition to both domestic anti-terrorism legislation (particularly when Blair was Prime Minister) as well as to the use of military force, there is little evidence to suggest that this opposition is popular among voters generally.

However, those who frame and execute high policy are increasingly on the defensive as the confusion over what are, and are not, civil liberties shows. There is a strong coalition, visible throughout the Western world, within the influential public opinion-forming academic and legal professions who challenge security policy on the grounds that it is simply a cynical ploy by those who uphold ‘the national security state’. Even if in the UK ‘Prevent’ is proving a considerable success, it is expensive and increasingly attacked both by British Muslims and civil libertarians (Glees, 2009). The policy requires counterterrorist police units (CTUs) to win the trust of what is variously called ‘the Muslim community’ or ‘communities’ whilst at the same time collecting intelligence of potential violent extremism from it or them. This leads to arrests and trials and is intended to do so in order to ‘prevent’ terrorism. But many British Muslims increasingly believe the police are spying on them and singling them out for attention from which non-Muslims are spared. In a real sense they are right; what they do not accept is not merely that this is to their own advantage, since Muslims are the largest single victims of Islamism, but that Muslim communities must be targeted because of the link between the ideology of Islamism and Islam (Dodd, 2009; confidential information, 23 and 25 March 2010).

In political terms, as Joppke (2009) has noted, ‘Prevent’ can be demonstrated to have gained useful intelligence from British Muslims, not merely at the cost of Muslim disquiet (which could itself lead to radicalisation) but because it tacitly underpins and supports, through its targeted attention on

Muslims, the notion that Muslims in Britain are a ‘community’ or ‘communities’ different from other British communities. This will make separateness an enduring feature of British life, eschewing the idea that Britain should be an inclusive polity in which ethnic origin or religion is an invalid descriptor of citizenship. Indeed, government funds have been used to promote the resilience of these communities specifically because there is a belief that a resilient community will be able to contain extremism, or if it is not, then to inform the authorities of that fact.

This mirrors the widespread but empirically untested theory that extremists can be detoxified by an exposure to Islam, even extreme interpretations of it, rather than by being introduced into Western rational approaches to religious beliefs, a policy which goes to the heart of official thinking in the UK (Glees, 2009/2010, p. 2). The highly influential strategic thinker and author, David Kilcullen (2007), has advanced arguments similar to those used by the British government. He has acted as advisor to Condoleezza Rice, General Petraeus and the Australian government; David Miliband, the former British Foreign Secretary, has very recently blogged, ‘some of the best thinking about terrorism has been done by Kilcullen’ (Miliband, 2009). Kilcullen notes that several authors have pointed out that Salafism and terrorism rarely occur together (Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are examples):

[I]f theology is a poor predictor for violence, it follows that radicalisation (which includes political or theological components, or both) is relevant to counterterrorism in its political, not its theological dimension. Indeed a focus on Islamic beliefs (equating ‘radical’ theology with violent extremism) may be an analytical sidetrack. Rather than theological exegesis, the evidence suggests, it makes more sense to focus on recognised behavioural and sociological indicators of propensity to violence. As Marc Sageman has shown, biographical, psychological and sociological factors are more useful predictors for terrorist activity than religion. (Kilcullen, 2007, p. 651).

He argues that the primary threats are violence and terrorist-linked subversion, which seeks to manipulate and exploit the sociological and ethnographic features of immigrant communities. Islamic theology is a strictly secondary factor, and a focus on Islam as such is likely to be an analytical dead end. Kilcullen’s answer (2007, p. 651) is the same as that provided by a quote from François Burgat: ‘[I]f the categories you apply tend to criminalise 95% of the world’s Muslim population, then you need to re-think your categories’. Kilcullen concludes that an approach based on trusted

networks and close collaboration with communities is most likely to succeed' (p. 647).

Whereas 'integration' and 'community cohesion' were once seen as the best way to prevent terrorism, currently integration is no longer regarded as a 'silver bullet' (Whitehall source, 23 March 2010). As for community cohesion, whereas this was hitherto regarded as meaning that Muslims should be fully integrated into British society, the concept now refers to strengthening the various Muslim communities in the UK (Whitehall source, 23 March 2010).

However, such policy options may be high-risk ones. If the view that radicalisation may be prevented by individuals who are exposed to extreme views of Islam is shown to be wrong, the price paid will be heavy. Similarly, it is difficult to convince voters, including Muslim ones, that Muslims are themselves not a source of terrorism whilst at the same time behaving as if this is exactly what they are. Finally, the authorities now argue that radical (even extreme) views are perfectly acceptable in a democracy whilst also regarding radicalisation as a potential threat. This lack of clarity combined with the fact that anti-terrorist legislation is widely regarded with suspicion by the English judiciary (and also by the Liberal Democrats who are now in government) all seem likely to generate change in policy.

On a more fundamental level, the fact that the police are involved in counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism policy gives them an intelligence role that should probably be left entirely to security agencies such as the FBI, MI5 or the German intelligence agency, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). This, too, will generate unease which is not always unjustified. But it also demonstrates clearly that Western states understand that suppressing terrorism in parliamentary democracies (that facilitate peaceful change) may ultimately involve the use of state power.

A recent publication by the Dutch national coordinator for counterterrorism (National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, 2010) indicates clearly the pressures now being exerted to change both the way that policy is executed and the principles that underpin it. One contributor sneers at the entire concept of a 'war on terror', mistakenly praising Obama for jettisoning it (p. 37); another attacks 1970s German policy against the Baader-Meinhof Gang on the grounds that finally facing down the terrorists was 'the most serious weakness of the ruling government', adding that 'the security forces, the regional authorities, the judiciary and the governing par-

ties themselves were undermining their own narrative with actions that appeared to contradict their . . . policy of adherence to democratic values and the rule of law' (p. 15). The notions that to ultimately use force (as the German government did) is a denial of the rule of law and that the terrorists could have been won over through dialogue is not just wrong but would have led to many more killings of innocent victims. If governments refuse to uphold the rule of law against terrorism they abrogate their most basic duty.

The war against external international terrorism (which continues to be focused on the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan), another manifestation of state power, is also subject to growing criticism. Recent private briefings by US and UK commanders have stressed the importance of gaining any kind of success which would allow troops to be withdrawn (private information, Westminster, 8 June and 12 July 2010).

The war's definition as a 'counter-insurgency' has not been helpful, not least because the term is confusing (to the Taliban and many Arabs, it is Westerners who are the insurgents) and because drawing lessons from the history of colonial wars against nationalists and communists seems hard to square with the necessity of scoring at least some victory in order to gain an advantage over those terrorists who will never surrender. The concept of counter-insurgency also owes a great deal to Kilcullen (2007, pp. 650, 652 and 658), whose solutions require soldiers to be state builders as well as warriors, a task they are ill-equipped to execute.

Conclusion

One thing is clear: for the foreseeable future international terrorism will continue to generate real threats to the security of Western democracies, especially the US and the UK. Existing policies will face increasing challenges, not least because their success has made the need for them less obvious. However, no responsible policymaker believes the threat will disappear, although how it is presented may have to change. Privately, influential voices can be heard arguing that the struggle against international terrorism will continue to demand strategic solutions and that targeted intelligence-led security activity, both at home and abroad, will replace mass screening by the police and conventional military intervention.

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