

Stefan Szücs
Lars Strömberg (Eds.)

Local Elites, Political Capital and Democratic Development

Governing Leaders in
Seven European Countries

BUNDESTAG GRUNDGESETZ POLITISCHES SYSTEM EUROPÄISCHE UNION
WAHLEN VERFASSUNG INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN POLITISCHE THEO
RIE PARTEIEN INSTITUTIONEN POLITISCHE KULTUR POLITISCHE ELITEN
PARLAMENARISMUS DEMOKRATIE MACHT REGIERUNG VERWALTUNG FÖDER
ALISMUS POLITISCHE SOZIOLOGIE GLOBALISIERUNG POLITISCHE KONNU
NIKATION PARTEIENSYSTEM RECHTSSTAAT GERECHTIGKEIT STAAT POLI
TISCHE ÖKONOMIE POLITIK BUNDESTAG GRUNDGESETZ POLITISCHES
SYSTEM EUROPÄISCHE UNION WAHLEN VERFASSUNG INTERNATIONALE
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STAAT GERECHTIGKEIT STAAT POLITISCHE ÖKONOMIE POLITIK BUNDES
TAG GRUNDGESETZ POLITISCHES SYSTEM EUROPÄISCHE UNION WAH
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Stefan Szűcs · Lars Strömberg (Eds.)

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Preface

Local Elites, Political Capital and Democratic Development is another solid step forward in a significant, decentralized research program, Democracy and Local Governance (DLG), which was initiated in the summer of 1991 -- just after one of the final great political transformations of the 20th Century. Other research reports (B. Jacob, et al., *Democracy and Local Governance: Nine Empirical Studies*, Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, 1999) have extended the scope of the Democracy and Local Governance Research program to other countries. This book is a point of departure not only from those research reports but also from almost all other research on local democracy in that it is based on observations at three points in time and introduces the concept of political capital as an explanatory variable. It also demonstrates the power of general theoretical frameworks in advancing knowledge by focusing additional empirical research in theoretically productive ways.

The structure of the research design in this report is quintessentially comparative: it is cross-system (seven countries); cross-time (at least three points in time for five countries); and cross-levels, i.e. local-national – it is, in fact, global. This not only enables the isolation of differences among countries but also the identification of sequential dynamics of change.

The results of the research show the importance of local political change through elections in democratic development, the role of „political capital“ composed of commitments to core democratic values and informal governance networks in establishing democratic practices, and the significance of a sequence of initial anchoring of the locality to global, non-economic relationships to secure democratic institutions. These findings move far beyond the first organizing hypotheses of the Democracy and Local Governance research program that connected the local and global changes to the democratic values of local political leaders and local democratic practices only in broad ways. The supplemental theoretical structure of this research establishes the importance of the democratic orientations of local leaders to local democratic development, the impact of early nurturing of local linkages with global forces, and the crucial role of local political networks and values for national democratic development.

This research examines the Northern European/Baltic region. The multi-year data collection on local leaders and governments in these countries required a

strong scholarly commitment by the collaborators, a devotion to the discipline of data, theoretical imagination, and an understanding that today all social science research must be sensitive to forces in this, our new global era.

The Democracy and Local Governance project continues in a loose decentralized fashion. Additional data have been gathered on Russia in 2003 and Belgium has just completed its first phase of research on a sample of localities. One of the big questions that the Democracy and Local Governance project can begin now to address is whether important change in the social and political worlds comes abruptly or occurs as a process moving at varying rates. Another, more specific question, is whether the Second (Global) Democratic Revolution of the late 1980s represented a point of departure toward a different political future or a momentary event in history, ending with no impact except as a little noted memory. This research indicates that great changes do occur as big events and then move on depending on local conditions, in some cases moving forward and in other cases reverting to previous states. Some of the countries in this study, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are engaged in a process of democratic development but Belarus appears to be going back to previous political modalities. Russia may be standing at a cross roads that may lead to a different kind of political system but within a general European context or one with no clear historical precedent.

This research also has yielded information that reminds us that while understanding change requires a broad vision for grasping its outlines, it also requires careful research for understanding those changes that are more complicated than they first seemed. The late 1980s was rife with political change, and we are faced with the challenge of understanding the dynamics of those events. The reports contained in this book are a clear contribution to understanding the fact that momentous changes matter only in so far as they become embedded in everyday life, which these researchers have carefully examined in these studies of democracy at the grass roots.

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On behalf of all collaborators, as the editors of this volume, we would like to warmly thank all involved in the making of this book. Especially, we are grateful to The Royal Swedish Academy for providing the resources necessary for implementing new research in the Former Soviet Union in the late 1990s, as well as for their contribution to host an international conference at The Center for Public Sector Research (CEFOS), Göteborg University in 2000, which became the starting-point for making this book. Many valuable comments and support have been given during the work with this book, not the least from our colleagues at Göteborg University: Thank you all!

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Introduction:

Studying Local Elites and Democratic Development

Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg

In what ways are local governing elites important for the success or failure of effective and sustainable democratic development? In order to answer this question, we study the interaction between local elite change and general democratic development in seven European countries throughout the 1990s. Although we know a great deal about the importance of institutional conditions of democracy, manifest in mutual interaction among a separation of powers, a rule-governed state apparatus and long-term experience with political pluralism and growth of social capital (Tocqueville 1835, Dahl 1961, Dahl 1971:226, North 1990, Putnam 1993, Hadenius 2001, Rothstein 2002), we still know little about the *political capital* accumulated at the local government level (Bourdieu 1991:172, Mouzelis 1995, Szücs 1998a, Hadenius 2001:264). With the term political capital, we refer to the governing elites' ability to mobilize resources that are directly or indirectly related to stable democratic development in differentiated, complex societies (see also Mouzelis 1995:201). Thus, our inquiry is about the specific local governing qualities that interact with national democratic progress and stability. Our longitudinal and comparative approach of analysis across cities in both advanced democracies like the Netherlands and Sweden, as well as five new democracies of the former Soviet Union, allows us to study universal characteristics of local elite change. Above all, it permits us to search for the components of a local political capital that are favorable for successful national democratic development, as well as to reveal the path for developing such political capital at the local government level.

The scarce knowledge about local governing elites and their political capital is not a result of a lack of challenging theories or limited data. Since the 1980s, political-administrative change and reform has continued to be a main research issue, both within the social sciences (see, for example, Peters & Pierre 2003), and for the leading local politicians and administrators who are trying to improve the conditions in their cities and handle the new social, political and economic forces of globalization. Despite the introduction of a number of new theories of political-administrative change (which we describe in this chapter),

and in spite of more than a decade of gathering empirical data about local elites in repeated surveys – performed before and after the collapse of the former Soviet Union – we still have only scattered evidence about how and why local governing elites may effect the general development of sustainable and effective democracy (Jacob, Ostrowski & Teune 1993, Teune 1995, Baldersheim et al. 1996, Baldersheim, Illner & Wollmann 2003, Szücs 1995, 1998a, Jacob, Linder, Nabholz & Hierli 1999, Teune 2002a, 2002b, Cusack 2003, Mikene 2004).

Only a little more than a decade ago, three of the most recent members of the European Union – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – were still Soviet Republics under strict authoritarian rule. However, while democracy has developed successfully in the new Baltic nations, positive democratic development is less evident in other post-Soviet nations. In this book, we aim to contribute to the understanding of local elites in relation to these different kinds of development. For example, does the very composition of the local elite impede or strengthen democratic development? What is the interaction between political culture - including increasing commitment to core democratic values - and the success or decline of democracy? How important are local networks for the development of democracy? What is the democratic effect of globalization in the local community?

To aid us, we have new theories and systematically collected data from the international research program *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG). The data covers repeated surveys from between 15 to 30 top political and administrative leaders in over a hundred middle-sized European and Eurasian cities. The study will take us across the 1980s and 1990s, going from local political and administrative leaders in Sweden and the Netherlands – through the Baltic cities – to the cities of Belarus and Russia.

A Decade of Great Change and its Dependence on Local Conditions

In democratic political theory, political elites are often seen as a main determinant for the establishment or the stable maintenance of democracy (Schumpeter 1947, Lijphart 1977). For example, according to J. Roland Pennock (1979) “The most important determinants of success or failure in a democratic or would-be democratic regime will be found in the quality and characteristics of the political elite, the higher levels of political activism” (Pennock 1979:207-208). Robert A. Dahl, one of the most prominent theorists of democracy and democratization, especially regards local government as an important platform for political and administrative elites and activists to develop political capital for democratic leadership. In *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (1971) Dahl con-

cludes: “[s]ince somewhat autonomous representative institutions below the national level can provide opportunities for the opposition to acquire political resources, help to generate cross-cutting cleavages, and facilitate training in the arts of resolving conflicts and managing representative governments, a strategy of toleration requires a search for ways of developing subnational representative governments” (Dahl 1971:226).

With regard to the general development of democracy, according to the World Bank’s global program *Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002*,¹ the data shows that among the Western European countries, Sweden often gets the very highest governance scores (see, Appendix A). Further, the data indicates that democratic governance has improved most clearly in Sweden between 1996 and 2002 when compared to the Netherlands. Other worldwide data displays that Sweden scores among the highest on different measures of globalization. Sweden also scores highest among the European countries on so-called social globalization (Dreher 2003).² Although we have found no worldwide data collected on the impact of xenophobia, the development in Western Europe across the 1990s is quite clear. Unlike the Netherlands, France, or Germany, populist or neo-fascist parties have not maintained an important position in Swedish politics (Golder 2003:448). The only populist party in Sweden, the right-wing *New Democracy* (*Ny Demokrati*), failed to keep their seats in the 1994 election that they won in the 1991 parliamentary election. The party was discontinued because of a massive opposition from the other parties in parliament and because of their inability to build local party organizations.

The three Baltic nations improved their democratic governance from 1996 to 2002 on every aspect measured by the World Bank. However, between the two surveyed countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), we find a negative development of democratic governance during the 1990s. In Belarus and Russia, the negative scores from 1996 declined even further. In fact, among the European countries, Belarus had the greatest negative governance development. Social and economic globalization is significantly higher in the Baltic nations as well, compared with the two CIS countries (Dreher 2003).

Thus, the state of democracy is somewhat dubious a decade or so after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the great wave of democratization that followed. The most successful transformations towards democracy have been car-

¹ The program measures different dimensions of democratic governance, covering 199 countries for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. See, *Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002*, *The World Bank* (Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2003).

² Axel Dreher’s Globalization Index measures include three aspects of globalization: economic, social and political.

ried out in the Baltic region, that is, in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: their membership in the European Union as of May 2004 is perhaps the most obvious sign of the dramatically increased quality of democracy in these three former Soviet republics. Russia and especially Belarus on the other hand, constitute two cases where democracy has failed to function in a similar more successful way. Russia of today may be labeled a guided democracy, while Belarus constitutes the only remaining larger country in Europe that can still be labeled a dictatorship. Why is this? What is the long-term interaction across the 1990s between changing characteristics of local political-administrative elites and the great variation in the success of democratic development in these five former Soviet republics?

Advanced Western democracies have also had new problems with the development of democracy during the 1990s. Almost all advanced Western European democracies have reported decreasing public participation – both in terms of voter turnout and the number of members in political parties – as well as in declining trust in the governing elites and the rise of new populist and neo-fascist parties (Pharr & Putnam 2000, Putnam 2002, Golder 2003, Rydgren & Widfeldt 2004). In some countries, like the Netherlands, this development has been more clearly evident than in other quite similarly developed Western welfare states, like Sweden. What can explain this? What is the interaction between local elite change and tendencies toward increased variation in the success of democratic development in these advanced European democracies during the 1990s?

Our point of departure, in line with the international program *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG), which this study emanates from, is that the processes of democratization are determined locally, “[...] at the grass-roots level where claims for personal recognition can be made” (Ostrowski & Teune 1993:8). Although this is a study of elites and their political capital, it does “[...] not presume that effective influence in social mobilization is necessarily hierarchical. Public vitality may spring as much, if not more, from the qualities of those who lead first hand, as from the leadership of the few at the center and the top” (Jacob 1993:2). Thus, our central aim is to study the development of democracy from the viewpoint of the governing local political and administrative elites in middle-sized cities, ranging in population size from about 25,000 to 250,000 inhabitants, where a large part of Europe’s population live. The purpose of this study is twofold. Based on the work of the native researchers’ own analysis, the first aim is to describe and try to explain change in the composition and the contexts of the local elites, as well as their principles and practices. By comparative analysis across countries and cities, the second aim is to study in what ways local political-administrative governing elites more generally are important for

the success or failure of effective and sustainable democratic development. The central question is explanatory: *What are the local governing conditions for the development of democracy?* Thus, while the research is empirical, the main purpose is theoretical.

Our general assumption is that throughout the 1990s, changing governing characteristics and qualities of the local political and administrative elites influence democratic success and decline in a country. From the early 1990s on, several new theories have been advanced about how and why local elites and their manner of governing have changed as a result of the new social, economic and political world order that emerged after 1989. One common and central element of these new theoretical approaches concerns how and why governing political and administrative elites have changed and coped with new political, social and economic internationalized contexts. Thus, although these new theories differ in many ways, they have three important characteristics in common. First, they claim that the governing elites face radically changed contexts. Governing elites increasingly respond to globalization and internationalization of economies. Second, it is argued that these new contexts and constraints bring about a new elite political behavior – principles and practices – as they try to maintain their efficiency and legitimacy. Finally, these theories all set out that in turn, these changes in elite political behavior have a profound effect on the development of democracy more generally: “The theoretical connection between globalization and local politics is through democratization. The working hypothesis is that globalization would open-up the political barriers and boundaries of countries and expand collective alternatives, a necessary condition for local political units to become politicized and receptive to democratic politics. [...] One implication of this is that the global involvement of localities would impact the democratic values and behavior of local political leaders” (Teune 2000:3).

Our intention is to study local elites and democratic development from the point of view of the new theories of political-administrative change and public sector reform. Over the last two decades of the 20th century the state has been challenged by a multidisciplinary theoretical approach of decentralized political-administrative change. In the aftermath of the early 1990s, mainly inspired by economic theories - based on the idea of gaining efficiency by rolling back the state - the reform movement of the *New Public Management* (NPM) theory has become almost global in its “new orthodoxy” of solving public efficiency problems more professionally with the means of decentralization, down-sizing, lean production and privatization (Olsen 1997). With the private sector as an ideal - using the supermarket as a metaphor for a new model for political-adminis-

trative control (Olsen 1988:241-242) – the NPM movement normatively paved the way for neo-liberal public sector reform.

NPM theorists of the early 1990s were the first to generally prescribe decentralization of public sector functions in order to improve efficiency (Hood 1991, 1995, Pollitt 1993). Important NPM models include (1) the goal of efficiency, by the means of (2) decentralization and downsizing, (3) search for professional excellence and innovation and (4) accountability by performance, evaluation and service orientation (Ferlie et al. 1996, Wollmann et al. 2000, 2003). Throughout the 1990s, the NPM movement increasingly became regarded as a “shopping basket” or a “hybrid” of public political-administrative reforms, which increasingly also put emphasis on centralization in combining managerial and contractual elements (Christensen & Lægreid 2002).

A second theoretical approach is political in the sense that it rests in a challenge of the vertical political organization. This approach claims that in order to understand today’s politics, due to increasing complexity in decision-making, we must look at theories of *Governance* and multilevel networks of the political-administrative elite rather than studying the government (Kooiman 1993, Pierre 2000, John 2001). Theorists of *Governance* have placed more direct emphasis on new forms of public steering and decision-making based on loose, horizontal and flexible networks of individuals – especially between government and non-government actors and non-state solutions of collective action - to coordinate policy and solve public problems (Kooiman 1993, Stoker 1998, Pierre 2000, Stoker 2000, John 2001). Some theorists even claim that the impact of changing contexts since the late 1980s and early 1990s have forced a shift from government to governance, that is, to be “flexible, innovative, and adoptive, to ‘reinvent’ themselves” (Andrew & Goldsmith 1998).

A third new approach of local elite change mainly rests in the challenge of traditional social or sociological theory. The common ground for the theories of *New Political Culture* (NPC) and Robert D. Putnam’s theory on *Social Capital* (Clark & Hoffmann-Martinet 1998, Putnam 1993, 2000, 2002), as well as theories on *Glocalization* and *Local-Global Relations* (Robertson 1992, Teune 1995) define a new style of policy and politics challenging older theoretical traditions of clientelistic politics and class politics. The NPC theory in particular describes increasingly tense relationships between elites and the public at the local level, due to the decline of class politics and the rejection of traditional political cleavages, which in turn forces the leaders to deal with legitimacy and effectiveness by adopting selective and populist policies (concerning, for example, new policies on tax cuts, immigrants and environment), as well as finding new ways of increasing public interest, and trying to involve new groups and citizens outside

the government (Clark & Rempel 1997, Clark & Hoffman-Martinot 1998, Clark & Lipset 2001).

Our inquiry is twofold in relation to these new theories. First, we still know very little about the *universal* impact and verification of change among the local political and administrative elites in accordance with these new theories. Have autonomy and power become more decentralized and their actions more efficient during the 1990s as suggested by the advocates of New Public Management? Have the local problems become more serious and complex, and have the networks of the local elites become larger and more horizontal, as the theory of Governance would suggest? Have their politics and policies become less ideological, and more populist, as suggested by advocates of the New Political Culture? And have their relations become increasingly local-global?

Second, we know little about the *democratic* impact and verification of these new theoretical movements. According to these new theories, what specific local governing qualities significantly strengthen or impede democratic development? Our curiosity especially concerns: (a) whether a change toward more professional, decentralized, autonomous and efficient local elites is greater in countries where democracy has developed more successfully; (b) whether the growing number of networks to handle increasingly complex problems runs parallel with more successful democratic development; and finally (c) whether a change toward more personalized leadership, pragmatism, populism and local-global relations, as expressed by the local elites, correlates with a more successful democratic development.

The Model of Analysis

The model of analysis presented in Table 1.1 includes ten hypotheses about shifts in the characteristics of the local elite. The general assumption is that each of these ten characteristics has changed significantly during the 1990s from what was claimed by traditional theories of political-administrative control, thus verifying the challenges of the new theories. In our model of analysis, the traditional theoretical characteristics of governing elites are originally derived from the Weberian vertical model of political-administrative control, based on the idea that political-administrative elites are driven by legal rational motivations. The common ground for the new theories of a horizontal model of political-administrative control is, as we suggest, influenced by what may be defined as liquid rational motivations. This general theoretical suggestion is inspired by Zygmunt Bauman's theory of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000). Our basic assumption is that the pressure to manage the new and ever changing, or "liquid"

contexts of fluctuating European borders, markets, networks and moving people, results in the local governing elites adopting a number of new characteristics in accordance with the suggestions of the new theories of political-administrative change and reform. Our model of analysis, displayed in Table 1.1, suggests ten hypotheses of the significant changes that occurred throughout the 1990s.

The first aspect of elite change in our model of analysis deals with the question of local elite composition, assuming that local politics and administration are further following the path of modernity by going from “representation” to “professionalism.” In line with NPM theory and its focus of the search for excellence, we assume that the local political-administrative elite becomes increasingly professional during the 1990s. This would be most clearly evidenced by an increasing proportion of them being university educated over time. However, in line with both NPM theory with its public choice approach, and NPC theory with its focus on legitimacy - especially among the local elites in the new democracies of the former Soviet Union - it would be equally reasonable to expect an increasing representation by many new political and administrative leaders entering the local political system in the early 1990s, after the fall of authoritarianism and the old cadre.

The second, third, fourth and fifth elite characteristics in our model of analysis involve assumptions about the growing seriousness and complexity of local problems faced by the political-administrative elites, and whether their power and autonomy have become increasingly decentralized to solve these problems effectively. Thus, for the second elite characteristic of our model we want to know whether and to what extent local problems have gone from “simple” to “complex” as the theory of Governance would suggest (Pierre 2000:4, John 2001:9). Here, the analysis will focus on the development of the number and the seriousness of local problems mentioned.

Table 1.1

Elite Changes According to Traditional Theories and New Theories

Local Elite Characteristics	Traditional Theories (Legal Rational)	New Theories (Liquid Rational)
1. Composition	Representative	→ Professional
2. Problems	Simple	→ Complex
3. Policies	Regulation	→ Effectiveness
4. Power	Centralized	→ Decentralized
5. Issues	General / Welfare	→ Populist/ Selective
6. Influence	Collegial	→ Personal
7. Networks	Vertical	→ Horizontal
8. Values	Ethical	→ Pragmatic
9. Party Politics	Special Interests	→ Public Interest
10. Context	Local-National	→ Local-Global

While traditional public administration theory focused on the legal-rational model of political-administrative control as a tool for policy implementation, a central emphasis of NPM theory is placed on the need for a shift from detailed state regulation of policies to public policies characterized by local efficiency (Christensen & Lægreid 2002). The third elite characteristic of our model is designed to investigate whether effective action (“effectiveness”) is increasingly taken, as suggested by NPM theory. The fourth local elite characteristic is based on the assumption of NPM theory that there has been a shift from “centralized” to “decentralized” power and autonomy in order to act on local problems. A fifth elite characteristic, hypothesized along with NPC theory, is that effective action is increasingly taken on new selective and/or populist issues, such as problems with the cost of local government, environment protection and immi-

gration. The assumption is that the policies most effectively solved by the local political-administrative elite have shifted from “general/welfare” issues towards “populist/selective” issues.

The sixth and seventh elite characteristics of our model deal more exclusively with the means of power – personal influence and networks for support – of the local governing elites. A central question in this regard deals with to what extent the influence over what is accomplished in the community has moved from being “collegial” to “personal” as claimed by NPC theory. This will be studied empirically by looking at whether personal influence has increased during the 1990s, according to the respondent. The analysis in response to the hypothesis on changed networks will look deeper into whether the networks of the local elites have shifted from being “vertical” to “horizontal” as some Governance theorists argue (see, for example, Haus & Heinelt 2005:19), by analyzing to whom the individual leader turns when seeking support from others.

Shift number eight in our model assumes a significant change in values and ethical commitment of the local elite. Undisputable evidence suggests that elites are extremely important for political culture, mainly because of their influence over the values and orientations of the general public (Lijphart 1977, Higley & Gunter 1995), but also because they often share similar, but more strongly expressed value patterns compared to the general public (Converse 1964). In the book *The New Political Culture* (1998), Terry Nichols Clark and his associates show profound local social change that they argue will have a great impact on the attitudes, beliefs and values of the local political-administrative elites. Using data from the international *Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Program* (FAIU), they especially find cohorts of younger mayors less ideologically convinced (Clark & Inglehart 1998:21-31). The basic idea of NPM theory also assumes a global shift in norms and values turning from ideological or ethical to economical or pragmatic, “[...] which plays down the importance of public sector ethics and institutional-cultural constraints” (Christensen & Lægreid 2002:18). Therefore, in our model when we talk about a shift in values changing from ethical to pragmatic, we assume that there has been a significant change in central democratic values like citizen participation, acceptance of opposition and conflict (political pluralism) and political equality (Szücs 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b). However, according to previous findings of the international *Democracy and Local Governance* program (Jacob, Ostrowski & Teune 1993, Teune 1995, Jacob, Linder, Nabholz & Heirerli 1999), we must stress that there is a difference between the local political-administrative elite’s core democratic values and more specific leadership orientations.

With the ninth characteristic of our model of analysis, we move from assumed ethical shifts to suggestions of a new role for local party politics. Accord-

ing to NPC theory, due to new social contexts, local politicians and parties are increasingly forced to meet public interests before the special interests of local power (Clark & Inglehart 1998:12). We assume that when we ask about why parties are important, the majority of the elite will think “public interests,” such as involving people in politics, are more important than “special interests,” like forming majorities in bodies.

Our tenth and final characteristic of local elite change focuses on the impact of the contexts of local elites: “Being linked to the global would be indicated by the local leaders’ perceptions about the local impact of foreign imports and exports; media; environmental pollution; and workers and tourists in their localities” (Teune 2000:3).

By the verification or falsification of these assumptions about changes in the characteristics and qualities of the local elites, we hope to improve the knowledge about why some European democracies succeed while others declined. The goal is to be able to prescribe strategies of building and maintaining the components of a locally rooted political capital, needed in order to bolster a successful democratic development.

The Research Design

With the model of analysis and country comparative data, we will be able to determine what specific aspects of the new theories on local elites can be verified in accordance to our twofold inquiry. The first question of inquiry is about the universal verification of the new theories according to our model of analysis. One method of checking for differences in local elite characteristics that may represent components of a latent political capital is to study leaders from very different political systems. By the method of *the most different systems design*, Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970) recommend that cases should be chosen that eliminate all irrelevant system factors in the analysis, analyzing to what extent a phenomenon is valid regardless of the systems within which observations are made (Przeworski & Teune 1970:35-37): According to Przeworski and Teune: “In the most different systems design, the question of at which level the relevant factors operate remains open through out the process of inquiry. *The point of departure is the population of units at the lowest level observed in the study, most often individuals.* The design calls for testing whether this population is homogeneous” (Przeworski & Teune 1970:36). Hence, one should select systems “that differ as much as possible and yet do not differ on the phenomenon under investigation” (Sartori 1991:250, cf. Ankar 1993:117). According to Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, differences should be of

general character because it implies that the situations under consideration have been chosen for their exemplarity, like “new democracies” and “advanced democracies” (Dogan & Pelassy 1984:127, Szücs 1998a:30).

Our second question of inquiry is about the specific elite characteristics that impede or strengthen democratic development during the 1990s in Europe. This requires a research strategy of comparing cases as similar as possible. This method of comparing similar cases is called *most similar systems design* (Przeworski & Teune 1970:32). The aim is to select cases as similar as possible on all aspects other than the phenomenon that needs to be explained: “The strategy sets out to neutralize certain differences in order to permit a better analysis of others; the aim is to achieve a large measure of control” (Anckar 1993:16). According to this method, we will select cases that have the same type of system characteristics, such as the two quite similar cases of advanced democracies and welfare states like Sweden and The Netherlands and the five cases of new democracies that all belonged to the Soviet Union at one time.

A novelty of this study in regard to the most similar systems design is the factor of comparison across time. While the selected advanced democracies of the Netherlands and Sweden still represent quite similar cases of two extended but halted European welfare states, there are, as we have shown, growing democratic differences during the 1990s. As has happened in several European advanced democracies, the Dutch political system has turned slightly unstable, while the political system in Sweden has remained quite stable. In the new democracies of the former Soviet Union, the divide between democratic success and decline is even more distinct.

This research strategy of combining the most different systems design and the most similar systems design - sometimes defined as *mixed systems design* (Frendreis 1983) or a *matched systems design* (Szücs 1998a) – has two major advantages. First, it enables us to discover universal change regardless of system and development within that system. Second, it gives us the opportunity to find the elite characteristics connected with increasing symptoms of decline in an advanced democracy (The Netherlands) and failure in a new democracy (Belarus, and to some extent Russia). But above all we are interested in finding those local elite qualities or components of political capital that grow in a successfully developed new democracy (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or remain strong in an advanced democracy in which the welfare state has been halted, but has not experience any destabilization of democracy (Sweden).

Table 1.2
The Mixed Systems Design of the Study

		Most Different Systems	
		<i>New Democracies</i>	<i>Advanced Democracies</i>
Most Similar Systems (<i>In the Early 1990s</i>)	<i>Democratic Development Turned Successful/ Stable</i>	Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia	Sweden
	<i>Democratic Development Declined/ Turned Unstable</i>	Belarus, Russia	The Netherlands

Comment: Naturally, the development of Sweden and the Netherlands is less obvious compared to the diverging democratic development of the former Soviet Union. The main difference between Sweden and the Netherlands that we want to explain is the increasing system instability of the Dutch democracy (Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2003, Golder 2003, Rydgren & Widfeldt 2004).

Methods and Techniques

The study is based on a number of similarly conducted studies, carried out within the international collaborative research program *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG). Systematically gathered data across time and across cities, countries and political systems allows for detailed analysis of both longitudinal and cross national analysis (see, Appendix B). Quite often the researchers from each of the studied countries – that also have provided chapters for this book - have been able to follow the elite changes in the very same sample of towns and cities throughout the 1990s.

The empirical body consists of interviews revealed through a standardized survey questionnaire. The original questionnaire items and the instruments, developed jointly by the collaborating researches, are used throughout the study (see, Appendix C and D). All analyses are presented in a format that does not identify individual respondents or communities. In order to acquire a representative sample of municipalities and leaders from each nation, the selection of communities and respondents to be surveyed was made by each national team. Between 20 and 30 middle-sized cities were selected in each country through a random and a stratified selection process, distinguishing cities by size and re-

gional differences in order to obtain a representative sample. The sample of leaders selected in each city represents the top of the governing elite hierarchy. Thus, 10 to 30 local political and administrative leaders were selected in each of the sampled cities, including mayors, elected officials, leading local council members, leading administrators and sometimes leading activists in parties or movements. Personal two-hour face-to-face interviews were carried out among the local leaders in Belarus, Lithuania and Russia, while the interview questionnaire was conducted by mail in Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands and Sweden. There is a consistency in the findings that the Baltic nations reported in this study regardless of the different methods being used. This indicates that the reliability is quite high in spite of the different survey methods applied. Generally, the samples contain towns and cities ranging in size from 25,000 to 250,000 residents. In countries with a large number of smaller municipalities, the sample also contains a selection of communities with less than 25,000 inhabitants in order to get a representative sample from each country studied.³

The history of the program goes way back to the very first multi-level analysis of politics, conducted within the program *International Studies of Values in Politics* (ISVIP) on local elites in the mid 1960s in the U.S., India, Poland and former Yugoslavia (Jacobs et al 1971). The U.S. study was later repeated and extended to local elites in other Western democracies, including Sweden and the Netherlands in the 1980s (Eldersveld, Strömberg & Derksen 1995). A new starting point for the local elite studies within the ISVIP network – now under the new name - *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG) - came in the early 1990s when some of its leading scholars saw an unique chance to study the situation of the local elites during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition towards democracy that followed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. In a first book of analysis from the DLG program, the local elite in ten countries were compared. The book covers both Western Democracies, such as Sweden and Austria, as well as Central European nations such as Poland and Hungary and new nations within the former Soviet Union, like Belarus, Russia and Ukraine (Jacob, Ostrowski & Teune 1993). From these early 1990s' data, one comparative study has further focused on democratic leadership orientations among European local elites (Szücs 1998a). A second book of national reports from the DLG studies covers a broader sample of countries (Jacob, Linder, Nabholz & Hierli 1999). It contains studies of local elites in China and the U.S. as well as first takes of surveys in other European countries such as Iceland,

³ The words “municipality”, “community”, “commune”, “town”, and “city” are used interchangeably to refer to the local units of government in this study.

Switzerland, the Czech and Slovak Republics and the former Soviet Union (Uzbekistan).

This volume represents the third study of local elites within the framework of the DLG program. For the first time within the program, this study contains longitudinal analysis of local elites in relation to the general development of democracy in Europe across the 1990s. By simultaneously comparing both new and advanced democracies and determining that each has developed differently during the 1990s, it is possible to answer the program's main inquiry about local elite change and its influence or interaction with the general development of democracy. From the countries within the DLG program, we have selected a handful of national studies for this study, which include:

1. A first round of interviews that was made in the 1980s with local political and administrative leaders in the Netherlands (1989) and Sweden (1985). The two samples include almost 1,000 leaders from 40 towns and cities.
2. A second round of interviews, conducted in the early 1990s, which includes a second take on the same 20 Swedish cities studied in the first wave, plus first takes of interviews in cities of Belarus, Russia and Lithuania.
3. A third round of interviews that was conducted in the mid 1990s, which includes a second take on Belarus, Lithuania, Russia and the Netherlands.
4. Finally, a fourth round of interviews that was made in the late 1990s, which included a third point in time for surveys performed in Belarus, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden. In addition to this, similarly conducted studies were also carried out for the first time with local elites in Estonia and Latvia.

Overview of the Book

Part I – *Western Democracies* is comprised of two chapters dealing with the development of democracy and local governance among local elites in the Netherlands and Sweden. The uniting theme of the chapters from Michiel S. de Vries, Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg is about if, and if so how, the local governing elites have changed and adopted new strategies in relation to the new pressures of a halted welfare state and globalization. Both chapters cover longitudinal analyses from the 1980s to the late 1990s.

Part II – *The New Baltic Democracies* includes a longitudinal analysis of the Lithuanian local elite made by Arvydas Matulionis, Svajone Mikene and Rimantas Rauleckas. Rein Vöörmann analyzes the situation of the local elite in the late 1990s in Estonia; Edvins Vanags, Lilita Seimuskane and Inga Vilka do the same for Latvia. These three analyses of the Baltic States give us the opportunity to find out in what respects the local elite matter for more successful transitions toward democracy.

Part III – *The Commonwealth of Independent States* contains longitudinal analysis of the development of local elites Belarus, made by Janna Grischenko, Natalia Elsukova and Elena Kuchko, and in Russia, by Zhan Toschenko and Timour Tsibikov. These analyses will give us insight in the characteristics of local elites when the development of democracy is halted.

Part IV – *Comparative Analysis across Countries and Cities* brings us back to our main introductory inquiry of universal and democratic change. In what ways are local governing elites important for the success or failure of effective sustainable democratic development? The aim is to determine the components of a political capital that may strengthen democracy more generally in a country. The analysis in this final part of the book will reveal longitudinal stability and change throughout the 1990s among the political-administrative elite in each individual city while controlling for both national and system characteristics. The findings will produce suggestions about elite qualities that change universally as well as the components that are mutually independent and reinforcing for the development of democracy and may therefore be defined as political capital. The analysis will also demonstrate the path of developing political capital by revealing the sequence in which the components of political capital grows in only some of the new nations of the former Soviet Union.

Part I
Western Democracies

The Untouchables: Stability among the Swedish Local Elite

Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg

The development of local government from the 1950s to the late 1970s represents one of the most obvious efforts to modernize the political system during the 20th Century. The number of local governments was reduced from about 2,500 before the first reapportionment reform 1952, to 280 after the last amalgamation reform in the mid 1970s. This development paved the way for an increase in each local government's revenue income base, as well as an expanding public sector, local party politicization and transformation from administration by laymen to administration by professionals (Strömberg & Westerståhl 1984). In Sweden as well as in the other Scandinavian countries, the modernization of the political system more generally has resulted in a development of a nationally regulated, but nevertheless locally governed welfare state (Szücs 1993, 1995, Strömberg & Engen 1996).¹

Recent Development of the Local Government System

During the 1980s and 1990s, the expansion of local government was halted. A slight decline in the strength of Swedish local democracy is perhaps most clearly seen in the fact that the level of voter participation has gradually decreased across the period. In the 1985 local elections, 90 percent of the electorate voted. In the 1998 local elections, 79 percent of the electorate voted (Szücs 2001). As a means to increase local-self government and autonomy, the new 1991 Local Government Act (1991:900) gave each local government the right to decide its political organization for itself. However, its implementation has mainly led to a reduction of the number of local government boards and laymen

¹ For an extended description of the development of Swedish local government, see our contribution in *Democracy and Local Governance: Ten Empirical Studies* (1993) edited by Betty Jacob, Krzysztof Ostrowski and Henry Teune.

politicians in many communities. During the same period, the development of the locally governed public sector is characterized by deregulation of local government, changing state-local relations (especially decentralization of national state and regional responsibilities to the local government level), privatization and outsourcing of local government services, and public sector down-sizing (Strömberg & Szücs 1993, Szücs 1993, 1995, Eldersveld, Strömberg & Derksen 1995, Wise & Szücs 1996, Amnå & Montin 2000, Bäck 2000). One of the most important functions of Swedish local government has been that of local self-taxation. However, during the 1990s, central government both implemented temporal limits on local self-government taxation, as well as a new system of redistribution of local income from "rich" to "poor" communities that remains today. Thus, although Swedish local self-government has increased as a result of the new 1991 Local Government Act in legal and organizational terms, in economical and practical terms, self-government has probably become increasingly restricted.

Naturally, the period of the 1980s and 1990s also witnessed great international change and globalization. The phenomenon of local-global relations is certainly a growing concern for the local elite in many Swedish communities when, for example, an international company suddenly wants to move their entire production to another part of Europe or the world. Thus, after the events of 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the Swedish membership in the European Union and the trend of globalization in general, one might suspect that foreign impact in the local community has increased.

However, we still know very little about how all of these changes have affected the Swedish local elite and its governing. One major question of the Swedish research program is: In what ways has Swedish democracy and local governance changed and why, and to what extent has the governing elite managed to adapt to local, national and global changes during the 1980s and 1990s? This is the inquiry of the Swedish study and the longitudinal analysis performed in this chapter.

The Sample of Communities and Leaders

The data consists of three surveys conducted in 1985, 1991 and 1999 with the leading local politicians and administrators in 20 Swedish communities.² With

² We want to thank Cecilia Bokenstrand, Carin Kling and Sanna Johansson for their previous involvement in the data-collection.

this sample, it is possible to follow the Swedish local elite during nearly two decades of local government. The results presented in this chapter focus on a comparison of these 20 communities studied throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The sample of Swedish local governments and leaders was selected to represent a group of middle-sized cities and their local top governing elite, and to match the other countries' samples within the *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG) program.³

When the sample was first drawn in 1984-85, the local units were sampled with regard to population size, left or right political party majority coalition in council, and level of economic development (Strömberg & Bokenstrand 1989). The five largest communities in the sample have a population size of between 100,000 and 250,000 inhabitants: about 4 percent of the Swedish communities fall within this group. The second five communities selected have a range of between 50,000 and 99,999 inhabitants: approximately 10 percent of all Swedish communities are this size today. The third group of communities has a population between 25,000 and 49,999 inhabitants: around 20 percent of the Swedish communities lie within this group. Five communities with less than 25,000 inhabitants were also selected. This group represents two thirds of all Swedish communities. The three big cities of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are not included in the study.

The surveyed politicians come from the central executive board (all members) and the chairman and vice chairman from the units functioning as the building board, the health and environmental board, the social board, the school board, the culture board and the recreation board. A large proportion of the selected politicians also serve as members of the council. As a result, they are certainly the most influential politicians in their communities. The sample of administrators in each city consists of the chief administrator, the chief financial officer, the personnel manager and the leading administrator for each of the selected political boards.

According to these sample rules, in 1985, 664 leaders were selected of which 469 were politicians and 195 were administrators. In the 1991 survey, the sample consisted of 666 local leaders which included 470 politicians and 196 ad-

³ In the 1999 survey, in order to control for several possible types of sample bias, a control sample of leaders was drawn from an equally large sample of 20 other Swedish communities. The findings of the control group match the findings of the 20 studied communities in almost every aspect. Thus, the local elite in the additional 20 communities of the control sample do not generally differ from the local elite sample in the 20 communities studied across time (Szücs & Strömberg 2000).

ministrators. In the 1999 study, 644 leaders come from the communities previously studied in 1985 and 1991 (475 politicians and 169 administrators).

The Swedish study was conducted by mail surveys in 1985 (December 1984 to February 1985), 1991 (May-June) and 1999 (April-May). The response rate is quite high. About 70 percent of the selected local elite participated in the 1985, 1991 and the 1999 surveys. Some local leaders have participated in at least two surveys (17 percent participate in both the 1991 and the 1999 study). An extended analysis of the response rate shows that there are no major differences or systematical bias between groups of leaders or community types (Szücs & Strömberg 2000).

Background and Characteristics of the Swedish Local Elite

The institutional background of the Swedish local elite is very much characterized by continuity and stability. In the 1985, 1991 and 1999 study, about or over 70 percent of the governing elite (according to our definition and sampling rules) are politicians. The average leader has held his or her present position for about 8 years. Nevertheless, he or she has been in public service for quite a long time, 16 to 18 years, in all the three surveys (Table 2.1).

The changes in institutional background of the Swedish local elite are minor in character. There is a slight tendency for the number of administrators in the local elite to decrease to some degree while the share of top politicians increased during the two decades studied. In addition, it seems that there is an increasing proportion of new individuals entering the local elite. The number of leaders with a maximum of two years in their present position as well as their total public service increased in the 1999 study.

Table 2.1
Institutional Background 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Percent)

Background Characteristics	Year		
	1985 (N)	1991 (N)	1999 (N)
Type of Elite			
Politician	71 (351)	72 (319)	74 (326)
Administrator	<u>29 (146)</u>	<u>28 (121)</u>	<u>26 (112)</u>
	100 (497)	100 (440)	100 (438)
In Present Position			
- 2 years	-	10 (44)	20 (86)
3-10 years	-	60 (256)	51 (220)
11- years	-	<u>30 (128)</u>	<u>29 (125)</u>
		100 (428)	100 (431)
In Average (Mean)	-	8	8
In Public Service			
- 2 years	2 (10)	1 (6)	5 (22)
3-10 years	20 (96)	20 (84)	29 (121)
11- years	<u>78 (369)</u>	<u>79 (336)</u>	<u>66 (275)</u>
	100 (475)	100 (426)	100 (418)
In Average (Mean)	18	18	16

The analysis of the differences in social background of the Swedish local elite shows the same continuity (Table 2.2). The average age of the Swedish local leader in 1985, 1991 and 1999 is 52 years. The changes within different age cohorts are small as well. Most leaders, over 40 percent, come from the middle class. The proportion of religiously active (weekly or monthly visit in church) is somewhat reduced, from 17 percent in 1985, to 14 percent in 1991 and 1999. About 30 percent of the leaders have a parent who performed or performs a corresponding political or administrative task as the respondent. This is figure is about twice as high in proportion when compared to the other countries of this study. When we divide the leaders into politicians and administrators, we can see a finer distinction. While as many as 34 percent of the politicians within the Swedish local elite have parents who have held a corresponding position as the respondent, only about 15 percent of the administrators share this kind of family

heritage background. Thus, among the Swedish local top administrators, the proportion of the local elite having a family heritage is quite normal compared with other European countries.

Table 2.2
Social Background 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Percent)

Background Characteristics	Year		
	1985 (N)	1991 (N)	1999 (N)
Age (mean)	52	52	52
Age Cohorts			
-39	11 (56)	8 (38)	11 (47)
40-49	27 (130)	36 (155)	22 (97)
50-59	40 (197)	35 (152)	49 (210)
60+	<u>22 (107)</u>	<u>21 (89)</u>	<u>18 (76)</u>
	100 (490)	100 (434)	100 (430)
Gender			
Male	82 (406)	76 (330)	66 (289)
Female	<u>18 (91)</u>	<u>24 (105)</u>	<u>34 (146)</u>
	100 (497)	100 (435)	100 (435)
Education			
Primary	23 (116)	16 (116)	7 (28)
Secondary	27 (131)	25 (106)	28 (123)
University	<u>50 (250)</u>	<u>59 (253)</u>	<u>65 (280)</u>
	100 (497)	100 (426)	100 (431)
Class (father's occupation)*			
Working-class	28 (126)	32 (129)	28 (110)
Middle-class	55 (254)	45 (180)	43 (170)
Upper-class	<u>17 (76)</u>	<u>23 (90)</u>	<u>29 (116)</u>
	100 (456)	100 (399)	100 (396)
Active Parent			
Held corresponding position	31 (152)	32 (140)	29 (128)
Religious Activity			
Regularly **	17 (80)	14 (56)	14 (58)

* There are some difficulties with coding the respondent's class background from an open-ended question concerning the father's occupational status. Therefore, these results should be taken with some care.

** At least once a month.

The few substantial changes found in the composition of the Swedish local elite especially concern gender and education. The number of female leaders has increased across time from 18 percent in 1985, and 24 percent in 1991, and to 34 percent in 1999. The educational level has also increased. The proportion of leaders with some sort of university education has increased from 50 percent in 1985 to 65 percent in 1999. One goal of the central government concerning the composition of the Swedish political elite on all levels of the political system during the 1990s has been to increase gender equality. According to our findings, this aim has gradually been implemented among the local elite. Thus, although the composition of the Swedish local elite is today somewhat more characterized by gender equality, the development has not paved the way for more generally equalized representation compared with the composition of the general public. In fact, the rise in the level of highly educated leaders might rather suggest a development of declining representativeness.

Local Problems and Effective Action


The longitudinal pattern of the governing conditions facing the local elite in 1985, 1991 and 1999 shows first and foremost that the *local problems* most leaders see as very serious and increasingly complex typically concern the economy. Problems with cost of local government were at their peak in 1991 when 58 percent of the local leaders regarded the issue as very serious. This can be explained to a great extent by a large increase in the salaries of local employees (Engen & Strömberg 1996). Still in 1999, 40 percent continue to view the cost of local government as a very serious problem. However, problems of the local economy also concern revenues. Problems with unemployment and migration from the community tend to reduce local revenue. In 1999, 44 percent said that unemployment was a very serious problem for their community compared to only 18 percent in 1991. Also migration from the community is an increasingly alarming problem for the local elite in some communities. In the 1991 study, only 7 percent thought it was a very serious problem for their community, compared to 1999 when close to 30 percent said that migration was a very serious local problem.

A second tendency seen in Figure 2.1 shows the increase in viewing central public sector tasks as very serious problems. The most evident changes in this respect concern the rising perception of serious problems in education, living standards, health care and immigration.

The issue that decreased the most as a very serious problem during the period studied was pollution. In 1985 and 1991, nearly 10 percent of the leaders cite pollution as a very serious problem. In 1999, only 4 percent see pollution as a very serious problem. A corresponding change has also been shown in studies of the general public's opinions on the environment (Bennulf 1999:70).

Figure 2.1


Very Serious Local Problems 1985, 1991, 1999 (Percent)



Taken all together, we can see that the average elite perception of local problems has significantly increased over the two decades studied. In 1985, the mean of the problem perception scale was .76; in 1991 it increased to .78; and in 1999

the scale mean increased to .87. The scale ranges from 0 (no problems) to 2 (very serious problems). This increase in problem perception is statistically significant at the .01 level. Thus, there is a statistically significant and systematic increase of local problems across the 1980s and 1990s. Probably, the general decline of the Swedish welfare state, and in particular the decrease in social benefits, paired with the economic crises of the early 1990s, paved the way for an increasing perception of viewing local problems as very serious.

Figure 2.2
Effective Action 1985 and 1999 (Percent)*



* This question was not included in the 1991 survey

Naturally, this increase may depend on the lack of *taking effective action* on these different local issues. If this is the case, there should be a corresponding decrease in the perception of viewing that effective action was taken on these

different local issues across the same period studied. Taken all together, however, there is no statistically significant decrease in effective action taken on a scale from 0 (no action) to 2 (effective action). The effective action scale has decreased from .92 in 1985, to .87 in 1999. This decrease is not statistically significant.

Looking at the leaders' opinion on each separate issue, as shown in Figure 2.2, there are several interesting differences between 1985 and 1999 (the question about effective action was not included in the 1991 survey). An increasing lack of effective action is especially noticeable for the issues of unemployment, living standards, health, housing, public improvements, culture/recreation and social improvements. If we compare the results of Figure 2.1 and 2.2, we can see that the increase in problems in some of these tasks are paired with the perception of less effective action taken in these very same areas.

Nevertheless, there are also important local issues where actions were more effectively taken in 1999 compared with 1985. Most interestingly, it is the issue of the local economy in which the local elite has become most efficient. In 1985, about 15 percent of the leaders say that cost of local government and economic development are issues effectively taken care of. In the 1999 study, more than 20 percent say that effective action is taken in these economic issues. For the issues of pollution and migration, there are slight increases in effective action across time as well. Throughout the period studied, however, it is in the area of education that most leaders see effective action taken.

Powers and Responsibilities

Above all, it is in the areas of employment, indigent support, health care, public safety and immigration that the perception of the power and autonomy of local government has decreased across the studied period. The perception of losing local government power is as high as 20 percent in each of these areas between 1985 and 1999 (Figure 2.3). Since some of these functions are formally national state or regional county government tasks – for example unemployment, public safety, health care and immigration – the drop in perception of power/autonomy may be seen as less serious. It seems that local-central relations in these functions of the Swedish welfare state have declined resulting in local government having less power to act.

At the same time, there are issues where the Swedish local elite feel that they attained more power and autonomy for acting effectively. In 1985, only 48 percent of the Swedish governing elite said that local government had enough


power and autonomy to act effectively on issues concerning primary and secondary education. In 1999, 74 percent of the leaders say that local government has the power and autonomy to act effectively in this area. Thus, the decentralization of primary and secondary education from the national state to the local government level has indeed given the rulers of Swedish local government a greater sense of the power and autonomy to act. Taking care of pollution and the local environment is a second area where the local elite has gained power and responsibility during the period studied. The feeling of having the power and autonomy to act effectively in dealing with local pollution has risen from 54 percent in 1985, to 66 percent in 1999. This finding is in line with research on Sweden's environmental governance, which shows how government at the national state level has successfully implemented new environmental policy at the local government level (Lundqvist 2001).

Taken all together, however, there is a significant decrease in the perception of local government power between 1985 and 1999. The local power/autonomy scale score in the 1985 study was .69, and the corresponding score in the 1999 survey was .63. This scale ranges from 0 (*local government lacks power*) to 1 (*has power*). This decrease in the perception of the local government's capacity to act effectively is statistically significant. Thus, the significant increase in the perception of local problems among the Swedish local elite may be the result of growing problems with local self-government, i.e. by not having enough power and autonomy to act effectively.

When the Swedish local elite was asked their opinion about what governmental level in society should be primarily responsible for different public sector tasks, the support for local government was quite high across the whole period of study. Thus, regardless of the decreasing perception the power and autonomy to act, the Swedish local elite's strong support for local government being primarily responsible for these different public sector tasks has not changed much. The average score on the "should be responsible" scale for local government goes from .70 in 1985, to about .75 in 1999 (Figure 2.4). The regional and national state governmental levels received a score of .56 in 1985, decreasing to .49 in the 1991 study, and finally increasing to .51 in the 1999 study. Thus, again in 1999 the regional and national state levels received increased support for being primarily responsible for the different public sector tasks.

Figure 2.3

Autonomy and the Power to Act Effectively 1985 and 1999 (Percent)*




* This question was not included in the 1991 survey.

At the same time, the average support for organizations and individuals themselves being primarily responsible follows the opposite path. The need for civic primary responsibility increased between 1985 and 1991, but decreased again in the 1999 survey. These findings can also be observed in the research on the development of opinions among the general public, where the support for public sector solutions was at its lowest level in the early 1990s (Johansson, Nilsson & Strömberg 2001:104). The main finding, however, is that support for local self-government as the main provider of public sector services is strong and unchanged across the period studied.

Figure 2.4

Opinion about the Primary Responsibility for Public Sector Functions 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Means)



Comment: The scale goes from 0 (no primary responsibility) to 1 (primary responsibility for all public sector functions for each category).

Influence and Support


The work with the local government budget is the one issue that involves the largest proportion of leaders. More than 40 percent say that they have great influence over the local budget and revenue. Further, the longitudinal tendency is that an increasing group of the leaders say they have great influence over the local revenue and budget. The lowest levels of influence are registered for public safety (which is a national state responsibility) and health care (which is primarily a regional county government task).

Looking at the largest increases in elite influence across the period, primary and secondary education is the only area besides the budget where elite influence has increased across the period studied. It seems the decentralization of education in the late 1980s from the national state level to the local government level most probably explains this increase in local elite influence over what is accomplished within primary and secondary education. The issue where the perception of influence has decreased the most across the period is in housing. This change is probably best explained by the de-politicization and privatization that occurred during the 1990s in the housing area of politics (Lundqvist 1992). De-

creasing influence is also noted in the areas of public improvements, culture and recreation and social services. This is most likely a reflection of the severe economic situation in many Swedish communities (see Figure 2.2 as well).

Figure 2.5

Personal Influence 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Percent “great influence”)




The scale mean of the average influence was .70 in the 1985 study, increasing to .72 in the 1991 study, and finally decreasing in the 1999 study to .68. The scale ranges from 0 (no influence), 1 (some influence) to 2 (great influence). These small changes across time are not statistically significant. Thus, on average, personal influence has not increased among the Swedish local elite in a way that supports the theory of a new political culture in which personal influence has become more important (Clark 1998).

On the question about the governance networks and to whom a leader usually turns to in situations in which *support from others* is necessary, about 70 to 80 percent of Swedish local leaders turn to local party leaders and local party

organizations, local elective officials, other local political leaders, and top local administrative officials (Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.6

Persons/Organizations to turn to for Support 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Percent)



The core triangle of the Swedish local power elite includes its administrative and political executive as well as its local party organizations. Thus, local governance equals local government: those most frequently contacted for support within the local elite group are also the most powerful according to the formal organization of local government. This finding displays the very definition of power within an elite, i.e., the most powerful are indeed those within an elite to whom most leaders turn to when support from others is needed.

The most important contact for support outside the political system is the local media and public, generally in the town or city. Almost one out of two of the local governing elite mentions local media and about one third mentions the general public as contacts to whom they might turn to when support from others are needed. The least powerful in terms of these networks for support includes local civic action groups and local religious leaders. Only about ten percent within the Swedish local elite contacts these persons or groups when support from others are needed. Among these most and least involved, the general pattern of support networks in local governance has not changed across the period studied.

Nevertheless, there are several interesting changes in the Swedish local elite's networks as well. First, higher levels of government and administration are less frequently contacted across the period studied. In the 1985 study, 37 percent of the leaders mention higher party leaders when support from others are needed. In 1991, somewhat fewer, 31 percent, say that these contacts are available for support. In 1999, 28 percent of the leaders mention higher party leaders as a support group. The same tendency of decreasing contacts with higher levels of government is seen in the contacts with higher administrative officials. In 1985, 30 percent mention higher administrative officials as an important support group. In 1991, somewhat fewer, 22 percent mention higher administrative officials as a contact for support. In 1999, the amount of leaders turning to higher administrative officials for support is even less, only 16 percent. These findings might represent the effects of the decentralization of power from the national state level to local government (Szücs 1995).

Second, we find a slight decrease in the contacts for support of trade unions, from 26 percent mentioning this contact for support in 1985, to 21 percent in 1999. Thus, the increasingly stressful conditions for public sector employees across the 1990s (Szücs 2001, Szücs, Hemström & Marklund 2003, Szücs 2004), is indeed accompanied by a decrease in the interest of the support from trade unions.

Finally, the most radical increase in contacts for support from 1985 to 1999 concerns local neighborhood organizations. The increase goes from between 16 to 18 percent mentioning that they contacted local neighborhood groups for support in 1985 and in 1991, to 28 percent saying so in 1999.

To conclude, all throughout the studied period, a major part of the network of support contacts concerns key persons or groups within the internal, local political and administrative elite. The major changes are that contacts between the elite and local civic organizations have increased and support contacts with trade unions and higher levels of government, politics and administration have

decreased. Thus, there is a tendency of network change in Swedish local government in which civil society becomes more important while the vertically corporative state functions have become less important.


These findings are also confirmed in an analysis of the number of contacts mentioned by the Swedish local elite in 1985, 1991 and 1999. There is a slight increase in the total average number of support contacts between 1985 and 1999. This increase in contacts for support exists despite a statistically significant decrease in the internationally comparable scale of *non-local* support contacts. It decreases from an average .38 in 1985 to .28 in 1999. This change also corresponds to the finding of a decreasing perception of power and autonomy, especially in national and regional responsibility areas of the public sector, as shown in Figure 2.3. Thus, there is tendency of *horizontally* growing networks in local governance where support from the local level - and especially neighborhood organizations - becomes more important, while, the *vertical network* of support from the political and administrative hierarchy is declining or has at least become less vital.

The Values of Democracy and Local Governance

The development of the Swedish local elite's values is characterized by great stability during the period studied. There are hardly any value changes at all between the three studies performed in 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Figure 2.7)(for information about the value scales, see Appendix C). The values most committed to are citizen participation, openness and political equality. The support for the value of conflict, minority rights, economic development, capitalism and localism is somewhat lower. The least shared values concern economic equality. The standard deviation from the scale mean for the value of economic equality is quite high in all three studies, which shows that issues of economic equality still represent the most highly contested value. In general, the more left leaning the party in Swedish politics, the more positive the deviation toward a redistributive value of economic equality. This partisan ideological tension, often called the Left-Right continuum (*vänster-högerskalan*), remains one of the main characteristics in Swedish politics. It is often found to be the main line of cleavage when studying beliefs among Swedish political elites (Strömberg 1974, 1977, Holmberg 1974, Putnam 1976:87-92, Szücs 1998a:201).

Figure 2.7

Local Elite Values 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Means)




Comment: The scales goes from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

There are only two statistically significant value changes during the period. First, the value of political equality increased between 1991 and 1999, going

from a scale mean of 49 in 1991, to a scale mean of 58 in 1999 (the value scales ranges from a minimum of -100 for strongly disagree to maximum 100 for strongly agree). The value of citizen participation has increased somewhat, from a scale mean of 61 in 1991, to 63 in 1999. However, compared to 1985, when the scale mean was 66, there actually is a slight decrease. The second striking change is shown in the increasing support for values of capitalism (and the corresponding slight decrease in values of economic equality). This indicates a shift towards a more conservative, pro-capitalist position among the Swedish local elite.

Figure 2.8
Minority Rights 1991 and 1999 (Means)



Comment: The scale goes from 0 (not mentioned) to 1 (mentioned) for each minority rights item and concern three different minority populations in Sweden (The Same population, Muslims and Finnish immigrants).

The discussion of *minority rights* in Sweden has led to the implementation of a new law on minority languages and more autonomy given to the Swedish native Same/Laplander population (this group has had their own regional parliament since the mid 1990s). Discussions of expanding rights to other ethnic minorities during the 1990s concern both the quite large population of Finnish immigrants,

as well as rights for immigrants of the Islamic faith. Because minority rights is often a local or regional concern, we asked the local leaders if these three minorities in Sweden should have the right to their own church etc, schools, press, representation in elected bodies, official language, cultural organizations and political parties.

The same question was asked in the 1991 and the 1999 surveys. On a scale ranging from 1 (should have their own...) to 0 (not mentioned), the strongest support for the minorities, concerns the right to their own cultural organizations. The findings in Figure 2.8 show that less support is given to minorities having their own representation in political bodies, their own political parties, schools and official language. However, looking at the general change across the studied period, it is in these very areas where the greatest increases have occurred during the 1990s.

Yet another claimed central democratic value is that of *social tolerance*. In the 1991 and the 1999 study, the respondent was asked to sort out various groups of people that the local leader would not like as neighbors. Generally, the least wanted groups as neighbors are drug addicts, criminals and right wing extremists. About 60 to 70 percent say that they don't want these groups as neighbors.


The largest increase in intolerance is shown toward right wing extremists. In 1991, 31 percent said that they did not want to have a right wing extremist as a neighbor. In 1999, right wing extremists were not wanted as neighbors by about 60 percent of the leaders. Clearly, the rise of right wing extremism in some Swedish communities during the 1990s has created greater awareness toward these groups. In some cities, locally based right wing extremist and neo fascist groups have become a real threat to local leaders. In some cases, local leaders have even gained national publicity in their fight for democracy and democratic values against such locally based neo-nazi groups. At the same time, however, there is an increased intolerance toward *left* wing extremists, from 14 percent 1991, to 23 in the 1999 study. This increase probably has to do with new, left extremist groups, for example animal rights groups, that have performed violent actions in some specific communities.

The only increasingly accepted group are alcoholics (down from 33 percent not wanted as neighbors in 1991, to 25 percent in 1999) and people with AIDS (down from 13 percent not wanted as neighbors in 1991, to 4 percent in 1999). Groups accepted by a great majority of the Swedish local elite both in 1991 and 1999, include colored people, large families, Muslims, immigrants and homosexuals.

Finally, yet another basic democratic parameter concerns *interpersonal trust*. Trust was measured in the 1991 and the 1999 study, and it is quite high. The slight decrease of the Swedish local elite saying that most people can be trusted – from 92 percent in 1991, to 90 percent in 1999 – is not statistically significant. Thus, the level of interpersonal trust is quite high and stable.

Figure 2.9

Groups not wanted as Neighbors 1991 and 1999 (Percent)




Cleavages and Conflict in the Community

According to the leaders' perceptions of the extent to which differences within the local population tend to divide people in the community, Figure 2.10 shows that differences in education have increasingly become the main dividing factor in the Swedish community. The amount of leaders saying that education is dividing people in the community “very much” has increased from 26 percent in 1985, to 47 percent in 1999. Differences in income and social origin represent additional factors that are increasingly dividing people.

However, there are other differences that are seen as less divisive in 1999 compared with 1985. Typically, these differences concern political cleavages, like differences in political views and differences between manager and employee. Regardless of the rising threat of locally based right and left wing extremism, as seen in Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10 shows that polarization in political views in the Swedish community is declining, and had already done so in the early 1990s. Instead, across the period studied, it is economic and social issues that are increasingly dividing people according to the surveyed leaders.

Figure 2.10

Perception of Differences Dividing People in the Community 1985, 1991 and 1999 (Percent “very much”)



Nevertheless, when the local leaders come to the question of *community conflict*, it seems that these increasing economic and social cleavages have not yet

reached the level of real and serious conflict. In 1985, 1991 and 1991, fewer than one third of the leaders claim that there are major conflicts that interfere with community action to meet community problems, and less than 15 percent say that these conflicts come very much in the way of the development of their community. This means that an overwhelming majority of the Swedish local elite does not see any conflicts that interfere with effective community action whatsoever. Thus, regardless of the rapid rising perception of divisive economical and social cleavages locally, the perception of serious community conflict has not changed between 1985 and 1999.

Participation, Influence and Political Action by Leaders

The question about perception of *citizen participation in the community* is asked in relation to how it was in the municipality five years ago. According to the local leaders, citizen participation in community affairs remained quite stable across the 1990s. In both the 1991 and the 1999 study, more than 50 percent of the leaders think that peoples' participation in the community is the same compared to five years ago. However, about 30 percent think it is less compared to five years ago, and only about 20 percent think it is greater compared to five years ago.

In 1991 the average leader has carried out between one and two of five different suggested political actions including signing a petition, participating in a boycott, demonstrating, unofficially striking and/or occupation (mean 1.43). The index ranges from a minimum of -5, indicating that the respondent would never do any of the mentioned actions, to 5 where the respondents have carried out all five mentioned forms of political activism. In the 1999 study, there is a slight increase in the average sum of political actions mentioned (1.53). This increase is statistically significant at the .01 level. Further, it is both what is commonly defined as legal actions, as well as illegal actions (occupation and wild cat strikes) that increase from 1991 to 1999.

When the Swedish local elite is asked about their perception of which ways people can best influence decisions, it is the formal ways of the political system – through parties and elections – that are viewed as the most powerful. These manners of influence are followed in strength by more informal methods of influence, such as personal contacts, but interest groups and media are often men-

tioned as well.⁴ Quite surprisingly, few leaders mention the local self-governing organization of the Swedish community as the best way for ordinary people to influence public decision-making.

Local-Global Relations

In the 1991 survey, the Swedish local leaders were asked for the first time about their local-global relations. The first finding here shows that the average Swedish local leader's geographical identity has only slightly changed toward a more local-global direction during the 1990s. In both 1991 and 1999, each local leader was asked about his or her first choice of identity, with alternatives ranging from local, regional, national, Nordic, European, to the world. Figure 2.11 reveals that an overwhelming majority of the leaders, in both 1991 and 1999, said that they identify most closely with their own local community. The increase is quite moderate, from 59 percent in 1991, to 63 percent in 1999.⁵

National identification came first for 26 percent of the leaders in 1991, but compared to the 1999 study, there is a decrease in national identity. In the 1999 study, 20 percent of the local elite said that they identify the most with the national level. Only 6 percent of the leaders identified with regional level in both 1991 and 1999. The lowest identification mentioned is in relation to the Nordic group of countries: no one in the 1999 study maintained a primarily Nordic identity. Only three percent said that they primarily have a European identity. The share of leaders that primarily identify with the world as a whole - thereby having a global identity - increased from 6 percent in 1991 to 8 percent in 1999. Thus, Swedish membership in the European Union has not led to an increasing European identity, at least not in the sense that a larger proportion sees Europe as their first choice of identification. Rather, while the national level receives less identification, there is a slight tendency for the local and global levels to have become more identifiable. Even though the trend of globalization and international change has not yet radically altered the geographical identity of the Swedish local elite, the findings of the other survey questions on *foreign impact in the local community* show more powerful and radical change. Among Swed-


⁴ Unfortunately, the question was posed in different ways in the 1991 and the 1999 survey. In 1991, the respondent could mention only three options, while in 1999, the respondent was allowed to select any number of ways for people to influence decisions. However, the difference between the 1991 and 1999 surveys does not alter the overall pattern of the best ways for people to influence.

⁵ The survey question was slightly different in 1991.

ish local elite, the average perception of foreign impact on their own community has increased substantially between 1991 and 1999. Clearly, it is economic foreign impact (foreign investment, exports, imports) that has increased the most in the Swedish community during the 1990s. According to the perception of the local leaders, it is foreign investments above all that has increased the most between 1991 and 1999. In 1991, only 13 percent mentioned that foreign investments had "a great deal" of impact on their own local community. In 1999, the amount of leaders stating that foreign investments have "a great deal" of impact on their community increased to 26 percent (Figure 2.12).

Another foreign impact that has increased quite noticeably during the 1990, is tourism. In 1991, only 11 percent of Swedish local elite mentioned that tourism had "a great deal" of impact on what happened in their community. In 1999, in the same cities, 22 percent of the local elite say that tourism has a great deal of impact.

Figure 2.11
Primary Identification 1991 and 1999 (Percent)




Taken all together, the foreign economic score, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 2 (a great deal), increased from 1.13 in 1991, to 1.24 in 1999. The Foreign Economic Impact Score includes the questionnaire items of exports, imports and foreign investments in the community. This increase in perception of foreign economic impact is statistically significant at the .01 level. However, during the same period of study, the increase (from .82 in 1991, to .84 in 1999) in the scale

measuring foreign impact from people from other countries (foreign tourists, workers, media and pollution) is not statistically significant. The total foreign impact score (economic plus people) has increased from .95 in 1991, to 1.00 in 1999. This change is statistically significant at the .05 level.

Figure 2.12

Foreign Impact in the Community 1991 and 1999 (Percent “a great deal”)



What does this increasing perception of foreign impact on local communities mean: to what extent is the increase in foreign impact really a tendency of globalization in the local community? When the Swedish local elite is asked an open-ended question about the *most important country for the future of the community*, the largest increase in impact actually concerns a Nordic or an European neighborhood country (Figure 2.13).


In 1991, only 4 percent of the Swedish local elite mentioned a Nordic neighbor country as the most important for the future of their own commune. In

1999, 24 percent of the local leaders mentioned a Nordic neighborhood country as being the most important for the future of their community.

Other European neighbor countries (with exception of Germany) have gained in popularity as well. In 1991, only 6 percent mention another European neighbor country as most important for the future of the community. In 1999, almost 20 percent of the local leaders mention another European neighbor country as being the most important for the future of their community. Looking at different countries separately, Germany remains quite the same across time, with about 20 percent of the leaders mentioning it as the most important for the future of their community.

Figure 2.13

Most Important Countries for the Future of the Community 1991 and 1999
(Percent)



Comment: open ended question; more than one country could be mentioned as most important for the future of the community.

Finally, reaching out more globally, the USA was mentioned much more frequently as the most important country for the community in 1999 study. In 1991, 5 percent mentioned the USA in this respect. In the 1999 study, this group of local leaders increased to 10 percent. Nevertheless, Russia also increased from 2 percent mentioned in 1991 to 5 percent in 1999 as the most important country for the future of the community.

One explanation to this rapid increase is that more countries were mentioned as most important for the future of the community. The average number of countries mentioned increased from .37 in 1991 to .77 in 1999. Nevertheless, although there are tendencies of potentially growing local-global relations, according to the local elite, it is still Nordic and European neighbor countries that constitute the greatest importance for the Swedish community.

Parties and the Future of Democracy

When the local leaders were asked about the future of Swedish democracy more generally, the main goal for Sweden the next ten years is to develop citizen participation. In 1991, when they were asked about the main goal for Sweden for the next ten years, 31 percent first mentioned "giving people more say in important questions." In the 1999 study, the percentage of the local elite first mentioning this participatory goal increased to 43 percent. This finding is also in line with the Swedish national government's goal of increasing citizen participation (SOU 2000:1). However, while there is increasing support for this goal among the local elite, the proportion of leaders saying that the main goal for Sweden should be "protecting freedom of speech" stayed exactly the same in both 1991 and in 1999 (29 percent). Also the alternative "maintaining order in the nation," remained unchanged from 1991 to 1999 (23 to 24 percent).⁷


The question about the perception of the general functioning of democracy in Sweden shows that 30 percent of the Swedish local elite said "our democracy is functioning well." 68 percent said that "our democracy is functioning but has many shortcomings." Only 2 percent thought "our democracy is functioning so badly, that there will be no democracy if this continues."

⁷ The goal "Fighting rising prices" as the main goal for Sweden decreased from being first mentioned by 17 percent in 1991, to only 4 percent saying so in 1999. Since the development of Swedish economy during the 1990's was not characterized by inflation, this survey question becomes less relevant to compare across time.

Nevertheless, one of the major particular threats to Swedish democracy is the radical decrease in the number of members in Swedish political parties (Widfeldt 1997). Therefore, we want to end this presentation with a new survey question about the importance of political parties. When it comes to the importance of political parties, the Swedish local elite becomes quite pragmatic (Figure 2.14).

Figure 2.14

Why Political Parties are Important 1999 (Percent)



According to the local leaders, parties are first and foremost very important for forming majorities in decision-making bodies, followed by recruiting candidates for public offices, meeting the electorate's interests, forming alternative programs, and competing in elections. Quite surprisingly, the least mentioned argument for the importance of parties concerns the issue of "involving people in politics." This pattern was the same regardless of whether the leader belonged to the administrative or the political elite. Thus, regardless of whether the leader is an administrator or politician, when it comes to the importance of parties, the

most important reasons for having parties at all typically concern practical issues such as forming majorities. The least important reason is involving people in politics.

This last finding is quite remarkable considering how high the Swedish local elite continues to treasure the values of citizen participation, increasingly desiring citizen participation to be the overarching goal for Sweden the next ten years, and selecting parties as the overall best way for ordinary people to influence politics. The lack of connection between why parties are important and the suggestion of parties as the best way for people to influence reveals a hidden organizational gap between the political elite and the ordinary citizen in Sweden.

Conclusions

During the last two decades of the 20th century, the expansion of local government as the main provider of welfare state activities in Sweden has been halted. The development of the Swedish local welfare state since the early 1990s has been characterized by public sector deregulation, decentralization, privatization, and down-sizing, as well as decreasing electoral participation and a decline in membership in political parties. Bearing this picture in mind, the longitudinal analysis of the Swedish local elite performed in this chapter mostly shows quite stable and unchanged development of the characteristics of the Swedish urban governing elite. The data stems from 20 middle-sized cities, where about 30 of the most prominent top politicians and chief administrators were surveyed in each Swedish community in 1985, 1991 and 1999.

The most striking finding when comparing the background characteristics of Swedish local elite across the 1980s and 1990s, is that of stability. The social and institutional background of the Swedish local elite has changed very little across the 1980s and 1990s. In each performed survey, about 70 percent are politicians. They have held their present position for in average eight years, but many have been in public service for quite a long period of time -- 17 years on average. Although there is an increasing group of leaders who have been in public positions for only a short time, there is no sign of a younger strata of leaders occupying the top of Swedish local government. In 1985, 1991 and 1999, the typical leader of the Swedish local elite is a middleclass male in his early fifties. Quite many, about 30 percent, have at least one parent that had the same type of political or administrative position as the respondent. The changes in the composition of the Swedish local elite mainly concern gender and educational level.

The number of female leaders at the top has increased to 34 percent and the proportion of university educated has grown to 65 percent.

The findings of the local governing conditions show that local problems have become significantly more serious. While the ability to act on these problems has not changed, the perception is that local government has become less autonomous and powerful, especially in dealing with problems in which regional and national state government are primarily responsible.

The leaders' democratic values have changed very little across the 1980's and 1990's. Thus, contrary to what is sometimes claimed about the Swedish local political and administrative elite, the ethics and the belief system of the Swedish local elite are remarkably stable. The most shared values include citizen participation, openness and political equality. We find only two statistically significant value changes. There is an increasing commitment in the value of political equality and a growing support for capitalism. The most contested value concerns economic equality, which indicates that the great polarization between left wing and right wing politics, the so-called left-right continuum of Swedish politics, remains strong among the local elite. Generally, opinions on minority rights, social tolerance and interpersonal trust have changed very little as well. Thus, regarding important components of the belief system of the Swedish local elite, the support for democratic values is somewhat increased and the general pattern remains unchanged.

Stability in terms of personal influence and networks of interaction, are likewise high across the two decades studied. Most leaders – and increasingly so from 1985 to 1999 – say that they have great personal influence in deciding local budgets and revenues. The findings also show horizontally growing governance networks, where support from the local level – and especially neighborhood organizations – becomes more important, while the vertical networks of support from national and regional political and administrative hierarchy are somewhat declining. Thus, these findings of declining vertical networks and growing horizontal networks is most likely an effect of the efforts to decentralize important public sector responsibilities from the national state and the regional levels of government to the local levels during the 1980s and 1990s.

One important change in the development of the Swedish local elite is shown in how the home community is evaluated by the leaders across time. First, there is an increasingly greater awareness among the leaders of the differences dividing people in their own community. The greatest increases concern rising differences in education, income and social origin. However, the level of real and serious conflict remains low and unchanged during the period studied. Second, the findings show important changes in connection to the issue of local-

global relations of the local leaders. Although the geo-political identity has changed very little – most leaders first identify themselves with their own local community or the nation – other findings clearly show the effects of increasing foreign impact in the community. There is a particularly large increase of different types of economic foreign impact in the Swedish community. This rising impact includes investments and exports, as well as tourism. Although an increasing proportion of leaders view the USA and Russia as the foreign countries most important for their own local community, the substantial rise in importance involves other Nordic or European neighbor countries as well.

The last part of this chapter deals with the functioning and future of Swedish democracy. Most local leaders, and increasingly so across time, think that the most important goal for Sweden the next ten years is to give people more say in important questions. When the methods for doing so are evaluated by the leaders, the best ways for people to exert influence is through the formal channels of political parties and voting.

Nevertheless, a comparison of these findings with the local leaders' opinions about why parties are important reveal a very pragmatic view toward these forums of formal influence. On the question of why parties are important, the answer "involving people in politics" turns out to be the least regarded issue! Instead, most leaders say that parties are important for forming majorities, recruiting candidates for public office, for looking out for the electorate's interests and for electoral competition. This last finding is quite remarkable considering how high the Swedish local elite treasures participatory values and suggests the party system as the overall best way for ordinary people to influence politics. Thus, if there is a crises of Swedish democracy it mainly has to do with the malfunctioning of the representative democracy. The great challenge of the Swedish local elite is, therefore, not only to cherish and seek the participatory citizen by involving them in networks, but to invite them to join the life of the local party organizations.

From Despair to Complacency: The Development of the Dutch Local Elite

Michiel S. de Vries

Introduction

In this chapter, we present some of the findings and main tendencies from comparing three Dutch surveys within the *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG) research project conducted in 1989 (Eldersveld, Strömberg & Derksen 1995), late 1996, (de Vries 1997, 2000) and early 2000.¹ But we first briefly describe the institutional structure of government in the Netherlands and sketch some of its main developments.

Local developments in the Netherlands occur rapidly. In 2000 alone, there were 23 border corrections and municipality consolidations in process. Strengthening local government and enabling them to provide an integrative and high quality package of services to the citizens serve as the basis for these developments. According to the Ministry of the Interior, this is only possible when municipalities are of a certain size.

Ideas about this size have varied significantly through time. At the beginning of the 19th century under French occupation (1810-1813), it was thought that Dutch municipalities had to have at least 500 inhabitants (Kossman 1978). In the previous century, this was continually increased. In 1978, it was increased to a minimum of 10,000 inhabitants, and in 1986 the Dutch organization for municipalities (VNG) suggested 18,000. The number of municipalities has decreased accordingly. There were 1,209 in 1850, 1,121 in 1900, and 1,012 in 1950. Developments accelerated after this. There were 842 in 1975, 633 in 1995, and at present (2003), less than 500 municipalities remain. This has led to an increase in the number of middle-sized municipalities with 20,000 to 50,000

¹ The 1989 survey was carried out by Wim Derksen, Professor at the University of Rotterdam, together with Jeanet Pronk, Yoka van Eck and Hermine Rietman. The data from this study are previously published by Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado in the book *Local Elites in Western Democracies. A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands* (Eldersveld, Strömberg, Derksen 1995).

inhabitants and a disappearance of almost all of the small municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants. Out of geographical necessity – some are small islands - some of those small municipalities have remained independent in spite of having less than 5,000 inhabitants. Currently, about 70 percent of all Dutch municipalities belong to the target group of the DLG project, that is, communities with between 25,000 and 250,000 inhabitants. Only Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague have more inhabitants.

A second development in the Netherlands, occurring between 1980 and 2000, is the increasing decentralization of responsibilities for public policies. The Netherlands calls itself a decentralized unitary state. This means that municipalities have a certain degree of autonomy, authority and responsibility in a large number of policy areas. The most important tasks for municipalities are housing, social welfare, health and education, traffic and transport and culture and recreation. In the middle of the research period, more than 90 percent of all financial resources were invested in these areas.

In the early 1990s the concept of institutional and social renewal was introduced. This implied, among other things, a decentralization of policies - previously under the responsibility of national government - to the local level. This was, for instance, the case for welfare, social assistance, education, health, and environmental policies. Another trend related to this institutional renewal involved the privatization of a number of tasks. Waste disposal and electronic infrastructure (cable TV) were the most conspicuous examples.

While this autonomy resulted in different regulations in various municipalities, it is nonetheless a restricted autonomy. This is reflected in the meaning of the unitary state. The central government can annul local decisions if they are contrary to the general interest, i.e. national policies. Furthermore, the central government delegates tasks to municipalities that function as implementation agencies. In a number of the most important policy areas, such as housing, education, health and social welfare, central government establishes the legal framework, which is often very detailed, for the municipalities to implement.

In recent decades, relations between national government and municipalities have changed. While tasks and responsibilities have been decentralized, there has been a simultaneous decrease in the financial means available for executing policies. In addition, municipalities seem to have become less dependent on national government since a larger proportion of the grants they receive are general grants, i.e. grants without restrictions with regard to usage. Nevertheless, local autonomy for collecting taxes and levies in order to finance policies is still very low compared to other countries. The new national government even plans to annul the housing tax, the only local tax in the Netherlands. This makes the Dutch institutional structure an aberration in an international comparative

perspective. The expenditures of local government exceed those of national government while independently generated local income is one of the smallest in Europe.

The trends and discussions that resulted in the changing institutional structure came about in part from the decline in electoral turnout. It declined from 93 percent in 1966 to a mere 58 percent during the last municipal elections in 2002. This development suggests an increasing lack of political interest, trust and commitment among citizens. A fragmentation of the votes and the growth of so-called local parties having no counterpart at the national level can also be seen. The mean number of political parties represented in the municipal councils rose from an average of 6.33 in 1986 to 8.11 in 1994 (Korsten 1998:280). The share of local parties, i.e. those not represented in the national parliament, rose from 1.1 to 26 percent in the same period. All in all, this points at structural changes in the composition of municipal councils and boards of mayor and aldermen.

Structural Features

The Dutch municipal structure has a number of characteristics that differentiate it from those in most other countries. These characteristics, and the constant discussion about them, reflect the uneasy relationship between national and sub-national levels that is based in long-term historical developments dating back to before the Napoleonic era.

For instance, the mayor is not directly elected but appointed by the national minister of the interior on behalf of the queen. Before his or her appointment, the mayor is frequently not even an inhabitant of the municipality, but a mayor of another smaller municipality, a national politician or administrator at the ministry of the interior, or an alderman in another municipality. Neither the local population nor the municipal council has a decisive vote on such appointments. This phenomenon has been under constant discussion. Especially the social liberal party "D66" has made this issue one of its spearheads. This has resulted in several governmental commissions researching the merits of the system, but without any clear results up to now. In 2002, a law was introduced to make the direct election of mayors possible, but the outcome of the local election must still be approved by the national minister of the interior and such an election has only taken place in two small municipalities since the law was passed.

Until, 2002, the political side of the Dutch local government structure was characterized by a system called monism. The (executing) aldermen were simul-

taneously members of the (controlling) municipal council. In 2002 this changed. Aldermen are no longer members of the council and can be recruited from outside the council it became possible for outsiders to be appointed as aldermen. The purpose was to transform the monistic system into a dualistic system in order to prevent those politicians who run the day-to-day affairs from voting on their own actions. This dualism was introduced in order to make local politics more attractive and to increase citizen involvement. The effects of this trend toward dualism at the local level are not yet known.

The last issue to be mentioned is the increasing number of scandals in municipalities and problems with public integrity. While scandals do not occur that often, their impact has been large. Media attention and the individuals involved people who were in the public eye, resulted in several measures for countering fraud and corruption.

The Sample of Communités and Leaders

The data consist of three surveys, conducted in 1989, 1996 and 2000. The respondents were the leading local politicians and administrators in 23 to 33 Dutch municipalities.² The remainder of this chapter centers on the outcomes of these surveys and the trends that became visible during the 12 years under investigation. We first took a random sample of Dutch municipalities with a number of inhabitants between 25,000 and 250,000. Because of the changing size of municipalities and the consolidations that occurred, we could not make an additional selection between cities with less than 25,000 inhabitants, between 25,000 and 99,000 and above 100,000. Most municipalities are in size between 25,000 and 99,000 inhabitants and the largest cities – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht – were excluded from the sample.

In the surveys conducted in 1989, 1996 and 2000, with 305, 423 and 283 respondents respectively, the political respondents were the senior politicians, the

² On seven municipalities data at all three points are gathered. Partly, this is due to the previously mentioned process of mergers among municipalities, which also involved units in the 1989 sample. Another explanation is that some municipalities refused to co-operate with this research for a second or a third time. A secondary analysis showed that those cities surveyed repeatedly do generally not differ that much from the other cities studied at each time with regard to responses concerning the problems in the municipality, the effectiveness of local policies, their values and the other questions to be discussed below.

floor leaders of the political parties, the aldermen and the mayor. The administrative respondents were the town clerks, the members of the board of directors and the department heads. The response rate was 60 percent for the 1996 sample and 45 percent for the 2000 sample. The questionnaires were sent by mail after consultation with the chief public administrator and the mayor.

Background and Characteristics of the Dutch Local Elite

The institutional characteristics of the Dutch local elite are presented in Table 3.1. There was a high succession-rate within the local elite in the early 1990s. Average experience in the current position in the middle of the 1990s is much shorter than at the beginning of the research period, although it rises again at the end of the period. This is understandable since the succession of important positions in the Netherlands mostly seems to occur in peaks, the last peak being the one around 1994. This is also indicated by the length of experience in the public office. The local elite in the middle of the 1990s had to wait a long time before they were promoted to the senior level (15 years on average). Their average time in their current position is 6 years.

The figures on social background are presented in Table 3.2. The average age is nearly constant, namely just below 50 years. There is a concentration in the ages of the local elite of between 40 and 60 years of age. Belonging to the local elite and being younger than 40 years or older than 60 years is becoming increasingly rare in the Netherlands. The participation in the local elite of younger/older individuals decreased from 28 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 1996 and to 15 percent in 2000.

Another striking phenomenon is that despite numerous affirmative action policies, the leading positions in Dutch municipalities are still dominated by men. Female local elite in the Netherlands is a rare phenomenon.

With regard to educational background, we see a concentration of highly educated people. Where it was still possible to acquire a position among the local elite in the 1980s without having a university degree or a diploma from a polytechnic, it became increasingly difficult to do so in the 1990s. Less than half a percent of the local elite has only primary education and decreasing proportion has only secondary education, from 17 in the 1980s to 9 percent in the 1990s.

Table 3.1
Institutional Background 1989, 1996 and 2000

Background Characteristics	Year 1989 (N)	1996 (N)	2000 (N)
Type of elite			
Politician	66 (201)	51 (217)	50 (130)
Administrator	<u>34 (104)</u>	<u>49 (206)</u>	<u>50 (131)</u>
	100 (305)	100 (423)	100 (261)
In present position			
-2 years	26 (77)	40 (165)	37 (95)
3-10 years	52 (157)	45 (178)	47 (119)
11- years	<u>22 (65)</u>	<u>15 (93)</u>	<u>16 (41)</u>
	100 (299)	100 (416)	100 (255)
In average (mean)	7	6	6
In Public Service			
-2 years	24 (69)	11 (44)	15 (38)
3-10 years	39 (115)	29 (122)	29 (69)
11-years	<u>37 (115)</u>	<u>60 (250)</u>	<u>56 (148)</u>
	100 (294)	100 (416)	100 (255)
In average (mean)	10	15	16

Furthermore, an increasing proportion of the local elite comes from a family in which (mostly the father) had a similar position in the municipality. Although these percentages are still low, they are higher in the 1990s than in the late 1980s. This might be a consequence of the decreasing number of active party members in the Netherlands, which is nowadays below 4 percent. It could well be that this decline resulted in a larger percentage of active members coming from politically engaged families. Still, the differences are relatively small. Within the local elite, a higher education at the university or polytechnic level dominated in the 1980s and continues to dominate.

Lastly, we see a decrease in the percentage of the local elite that claims a religious affiliation. This dropped from 56 percent to 41 to 43 percent. Among local politicians, the percentage of Catholics especially decreased. Both catholic and protestant affiliations decreased substantially among public administrators.

Table 3.2
Social Background 1989, 1995 and 2000

Background Characteristics	Year 1989 (N)	1996 (N)	2000 (N)
Age (mean)	48	48	49
Age cohorts			
-39	17 (50)	14 (59)	8 (22)
40-49	44 (132)	47 (195)	38 (97)
50-59	28 (85)	33 (139)	47 (122)
60+	<u>11 (35)</u>	<u>6 (24)</u>	<u>7 (17)</u>
	100 (302)	100 (417)	100 (258)
Gender			
Male	88 (264)	84 (351)	84 (219)
Female	<u>12 (37)</u>	<u>16 (69)</u>	<u>16 (41)</u>
	100 (301)	100 (420)	100 (260)
Education			
Primary	1 (4)	1 (2)	1 (1)
Secondary	17 (50)	13 (54)	9 (24)
University/ polytechnic	<u>82 (242)</u>	<u>86 (355)</u>	<u>90 (232)</u>
	100 (296)	100 (411)	100 (257)
Active parent			
Held corresponding position			
Father	12 (30)	16 (67)	14 (37)
Mother	1 (1)	3 (12)	2 (4)
Religious Activity			
Believer	57 (170)	42 (176)	44 (111)

Local Problems and Effective Action: From Crisis to Prosperity

In the first section we discussed some developments in the institutional structure in the Netherlands in the last 12 years. The Netherlands as a whole developed from a country facing a serious economic crisis in the 1980s to a prosperous

country at the end of the millennium. During the 1980s, the national budget deficit peaked at about 11 percent of GNP. This changed into a surplus in 2000. The same development took place in the realm of unemployment. The high unemployment of the 1980s changed into a labor shortage in 2000. This resulted in a general euphoria among national politicians and also among the local elite. Both were quite satisfied with their accomplishments.

In spite of the good economic news, there are still waiting lists for health services, 16 percent of the population continues to be classified as poor, there are approximately 900,000 people termed disabled, and there are problems in maintaining the quality of education. The question used here is whether such problems are perceived at the local level. These responses are shown in Figure 3.1.


The findings show that the euphoria at the national level is reflected in the perceptions of the Dutch local elite. Compared to 1989, an increasing number of them consider the problems diminished, if not disappearing totally during the 1990s. This is the case for all policy fields including education, unemployment, living standard (poverty), health, recreation and culture, pollution, social improvements, immigration, migration and economic development. As to the other areas, there are still very serious problems according to some of the respondents, but the number of them believing this to be the case has diminished significantly. This goes for the cost of local government, public safety, housing and infrastructure.

The mean importance of local problems has decreased from 0.95 in 1989 to 0.66 in 1996, to 0.56 in 2000 (this change is statistically significant). The scale ranges from 0 (no problems) to 2 (very serious problems), which indicate that the average perception of local problems today is quite modest.

This general feeling of satisfaction among the Dutch local elite may well be related to their perception of the effectiveness of their policies. That this is indeed the case in the Netherlands is shown in Figure 3.2. There is a general increase in the perception of policy effectiveness among the Dutch local elite. However, this change mainly occurs between 1989 and 1996: the mean effectiveness does not change significantly between 1996 and 2000. On a scale from 0 (no action) to 2 (effective action), the average score has increased from 1.06 in 1989 to a quite high level during the 1990s (1.28 in 1996 and 1.27 in 2000).

Figure 3.1

Very Serious Local Problems 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Percent)




Nonetheless, during the whole period studied, a sharp increase can be seen in the perceived effectiveness of policies in nearly all areas, except that of public improvements. Notwithstanding this general increase in optimism about ones' own accomplishments, the absolute figures on the effectiveness of the separate areas are still sometimes below 50 percent. For instance, while more members of the local elite conceive the recent policies on migration, health, minorities and public safety to have been effective, the majority continues to disagree.

The most significant improvements can be found in the cost of local government, pollution policies, living standards, economic development, unemployment, culture and recreation, social improvements and education. In the 1980s, a minority of the local elite was satisfied with the policy effectiveness, but this changed into a majority in the 1990s.

The general feeling of the Dutch local elite seems to be that things are going swell in their community and that their own policies have accomplished this.

Figure 3.2
Effective Action 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Percent)



This is a strange outcome, especially when one looks at those policy areas about which the local elite is most satisfied in terms of policy effectiveness, that is, pollution, cost of local government, economic development and unemployment. These are the areas in which local government in the Netherlands has hardly any influence.

Powers and Responsibilities

In the introduction we mentioned that during the research period, many responsibilities and tasks were decentralized in the Netherlands. This is reflected in the Dutch local elite's perception of local autonomy, as presented in Figure 3.3.

It seems that in the Netherlands, local government's autonomy and power to act has increased. The perceived autonomy increases from an average of 50 percent in 1989 to 59 percent in 1995 and 61 percent in 2000. The mean scores of the internationally comparable variable on the autonomy of local government correspondingly significantly increased from 0.39 in 1989, to 0.51 in 1996 and 0.52 in 2000. This scale ranges from 0 (*local government lacks power*) to 1 (*has power*).

Especially in those areas about which the local elite is increasingly satisfied, the perception of their autonomy also increased. This applies to issue areas such as living standards, economic development, unemployment, and pollution. The percentage of the local elite being satisfied with their power to act in these areas more than doubled during the research period.

In other 'non-problematic' areas such as social improvements and culture and recreation, the perceived autonomy was already quite high at the beginning of the research period. That more than 90 percent of the respondents feel they have enough autonomy in these areas reflects the near unanimity about the autonomy to act in these areas.


Only in the fields of health, public safety, public improvements, and minorities, is there no visible, significant increase in the perception of local autonomy.

When looking at the normative side of local-central relations, the perception of the local elite changes accordingly. Increasing numbers of the local elite favor local responsibility for policy making in several areas.

The same policy areas in which significant changes were seen with regard to problems, policy effectiveness and autonomy, are now also in the public eye. Problems concerning pollution, economic development, living standards, unemployment and education are increasingly seen by local elites as policy areas for which they themselves should be primarily responsible instead of the central level.

Figure 3.3

Autonomy and the Power to Act Effectively 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Percent)




On average, over all of the policy areas a decline is visible during the research period from 47 percent of the local elite thinking that the central level should be

primarily responsible in 1989, to 32 percent in 1996 and 34 percent in 2000. A corresponding increase can be seen in their opinion about primary local responsibility. This view increases from on average 33 percent in 1989, to 51 in 1996 and 47 percent in 2000 (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4

Opinion about the Primary Responsibility for Public Sector Functions 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Percent)



Comment: Average percentage over 15 policy areas (including four national specific areas)


Influence and Support

Diminishing problems, thanks to the effectiveness of local policies, and increased autonomy might paint a picture of a complacent if not arrogant local elite. For the individual members of the elite, however, this is not the case. When asked about their personal influence in a number of policy areas, they seem to be modest (Figure 3.5). The figure shows that the majority of the local elite does not think that they personally have a large influence on developments in the policy areas. It is only in the areas of social improvements, cost of local government, culture and recreation and public improvements that more than a quarter of them feel they have great influence. In the other areas, they do not generally perceive their own influence to be large. Together with the findings presented above, this indicates that the Dutch local elite thinks their policies are

effective, but that they personally have only a minor role in this. One might interpret these findings as an overrated view on the impact of their policies and an undervaluing of their own role.

Figure 3.5

Personal Influence 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Percent “great influence”)




If we look at the findings of the average score of the influence in average, however, there is a statistically significant increase from 0.62 in 1989, to 0.80 in 1996 and 0.76 in 2000. The scale ranges from 0 (no influence), 1 (some influence) to 2 (great influence). Thus, although there is an increase in the feeling of average personal influence over what is accomplished in their community, the average leader still maintains a modest view of their own power.

Given this modesty it is important to look at their networks and to whom they usually turn to when support from others is necessary. The figures are presented in Figure 3.6. If one thing stands out in this figure, it is that the vast majority of the local elite stays within city hall when looking for support. Political and administrative colleagues belong to the core of their network. More than

three quarters of the respondents state that they seek support from these groups. This pattern is stable during the research period.

Figure 3.6

Persons/Organizations to turn to for Support 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Percent)



Thus, the direct colleagues within city hall are the only ones belonging to the core of the network. Local party leaders lost their central position during the

research period. Where 78 percent of the local elite turned to local party leaders in 1989, this contact has decreased to a mere 29-31 percent in 1996 and 2000. Local policymaking in the Netherlands seems to have become depoliticized.

To try to explain this is, first of all, a question for further research. But an explanation might be found in the return to the practice of depoliticization in the Netherlands, which was so common until the late 1960s. A partial explanation can also be found in the purple cabinet, which formed in 1994 at the national level, as well as the many and increasing 'rainbow coalitions' at the local government level, and the changing mood in municipalities: the politicization taking place in the 1970s and early 1980s diminished again in the 1990s. The members of the broad coalitions in which parties from the far left to the far right are involved, did not (and perhaps could not) contact their local party leaders in order to keep political interests out of the policy process.

The position of political organizations has not been taken over by societal groups. While in 1989, 41 percent of the local elite still turned to business leaders, 37 percent turned to the local media, 36 percent to higher party leaders, and 18 percent to local trade unions, in 2000 only 24 percent of the local elite turns to business leaders, 20 percent of them to the media, 13 percent to higher party leaders and only 7 percent to trade unions. The only societal group gaining position in the network of the local elite is the neighborhood group, which is now turned to by 38 percent of the local elite compared to 22 percent of them 11 years earlier. Nevertheless, they have not yet gained the same central position as the political parties had before. Between 1989 and 2000, the average sum or number of contacts for support decreases from 4.16 to 3.55. This decrease is statistically significant for both local networks and higher-level networks (higher party leaders and higher administrative officials).

To conclude, in spite of the international image of the Dutch 'poldermodel' in which everyone is involved in the co-production of policies, the outcomes presented here point to an increasingly inert Dutch local elite during the 1990s. The previously relatively broader network, including actors in political parties and organized societal groups, is transformed into a narrower, city hall centered governance network.

Values of Democracy and Local Governance

An interesting question is whether the changing local governance circumstances in which a much more positive feeling emerged among the Dutch local elite is reflected by a change in their attitudes, opinions and values. Figure 3.7 presents the changes in values between 1989 and 2000. While the majority of these val-

ues changed very little, i.e. the value of openness, participation in the eyes of the local elite, their views on minority rights and political equality, a few significant value changes have taken place.

With regard to the conflict scale, the Dutch local elite more frequently agrees with the notion that conflict resolution is ineffective. Goal achievement is nowadays seen as much more important than 12 years ago. Many more local leaders give it precedence over conflict resolution. Thus, harmony and consensus are considered less important, and the part of the local elite willing to postpone decisions in order to keep consensus is nowadays less than half compared to twelve years ago. While they are more willing to modify actions, they no longer accept postponement.


With regard to local-central relations, i.e. localism, there is a tendency that local elites are increasingly aware of the importance of national developments and are less parochial in stressing the importance of the local level vis-à-vis the central level.

The most important value change has, however, taken place with regard to economic inequality. The majority of Dutch local elites is no longer bothered by economic inequality in which leveling incomes and creating opportunities for the poor are central. There is a simultaneous increase in the support of capitalism and a decrease in values of economic equality. The neo-liberal ideology of the 1990s seems to have become dominant.

Values about minority rights changed very little during the research period. The order of rights in terms of which are favored is roughly the same. The Dutch local elite is least in favor of minorities having their own official language. This is followed by a hesitance to give them the right to their own schools, their own political parties and their own media. The local elite is more in favor of minorities being represented in elected bodies and having their own churches and their own cultural organizations. The changes from 1996-2000 are presented in Figure 3.8.


Finally, the level of interpersonal trust among the Dutch local elite is quite high and stable. In the 1996 study, 86 percent said that most people could be trusted. In the 2000 study, almost the same proportion, 85 percent, reported the same.

Figure 3.7
Local Elite Values 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Means)



Comment: The scales goes from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

Figure 3.8
 Minority Rights 1996 and 2000 (Percent)



Cleavages and Conflict in the Community

The Netherlands is a very stable society and this is reflected in the perception of the local elite regarding the existence of conflicts within the community. Figure 3.9 shows that while there are very few serious conflicts within the community according to the respondents, the antagonisms that do exist are becoming more serious.


With regard to educational differences, income differences, discrepancies in political views, cleavages between manager-employee and between those favoring social change and those opposing it, the percentage of local leaders who believe that serious conflicts exist have more than doubled over the last 12 years. This finding is also supported by the fact that the average score from the differences enumerated in Figure 3.9 shows a radical increase (from 0.52 in 1989 to 0.83 in 1996 and 0.78 in 2000).

The largest differences according to Figure 3.9 are ethnic, political and income-based in the community. However, they are negligible compared to the conflicts within city hall. This refers to the question about local conflicts interfering with effective policy making. More than 30 percent of the respondents who perceive such conflicts, always refer to conflicts between politicians, be-

tween administrators, between the council and the board, or between the politicians and the administrators. Although the extent of such intra-city hall conflicts seems to have diminished over the years, it remains the most important form of conflict within municipalities. When we asked about the degree to which these conflicts interfere with community development, the proportion saying “very much” increased from 19 percent in 1989, to 34 percent in 1996 and 39 percent in 2000.

Figure 3.9

Perception of Differences Dividing People in the Community 1989, 1996 and 2000 (Percent “very much”)



Participation, Influence and Political Activity by Leaders

Although the local elite does not turn to the public in general when it needs support for its policies, it perceives a growth in public participation. At any of the three points in time, between 55 and 59 percent of the Dutch local elite perceived an increase in public participation, whereas only a stable proportion

of 10 percent perceived a decline in public participation in the last five years. This picture did not change between 1996 and 2000.

As to the political actions they would personally undertake or have undertaken themselves, we only have data from 1996 and 2000. These data reflect a law-abiding political elite. Less than 5 percent ever joined an unofficial strike, and less than 10 percent ever participated in an occupation. Between 31 and 36 percent of the local elite have joined a political boycott (probably against South Africa during the apartheid regime), but between 55 and 57 percent attended demonstrations, which are legal.

More importantly, two-thirds of the local elite state they would never join an unofficial strike or an occupation. They dislike illegal political action, and they consider these illegal forms of action to be ineffective means for accomplishing one's goals in general. Taken all together, the average sum of activism does not significantly increase (the index ranges from a minimum of -5 indicating that the respondent had never participated in any of the mentioned actions, to 5 where the respondent had attended all five mentioned forms of political activism). Beneath this stability, however, there is a growing acceptance of illegal actions, while the interest for legal actions decreases (these changes are statistically significant).


According to the Dutch local elite, the best way for people to influence decisions is through political parties, personal contacts, local self-governance and attending meetings. About two-thirds or more see this as effective means. Less effective are actions through committees, the media, voting in referenda, parliamentary elections, movement groups, and trade unions.

Thus, individuals should try to gain influence in the same way that the political elite succeeded in doing so, i.e. especially through political parties and personal contacts. The average number of ways mentioned to influence remained quite stable between 1996 and 2000 (between 4 and 5 ways are mentioned by the average leader), as did the average score for the conventional (0.34) as well as unconventional ways for people to influence decisions (0.60). The scale range is from 0 (not mentioned) to 1 (mentioned).

The central role that the local elite gives to political parties in the decision-making process is conspicuous. "You want influence, try to gain it through a political party" the figures seem to suggest. Thus, in general the Dutch local elite attaches great value to the functions of political parties.

Figure 3.10


Best Ways for People to Influence Public Decisions 1996 and 2000 (Percent)



In their opinion, political parties still have a major role to play in local affairs in recruiting candidates for the local elite; forming majorities in the municipal council and competing in local elections; meeting the public and formulating alternative policies; and involving people in politics.

Figure 3.11

Why Political Parties are Important 1996 and 2000 (Percent “very important”)



However, as Figure 3.11 shows, the role of political parties is first of all formal, second, procedural and notable in the last place, substantial. The vast majority agrees that political parties are needed for recruitment, forming majorities and competing in elections. They are not viewed as important for formulating alternative programs. This finding is again an indication that in politics as we know it, the fight over the distribution of scarce resources and the question posed by Lasswell, ‘who get what, when and how?’ is no longer prominent in the Netherlands. Politics seems to have become something formal and necessary for the regular succession of the local elite, but with little relevance for substantial choices in the policy making process.

Nevertheless, in the eyes of the local elite, the motives for joining a party and party membership are primarily substantive. We asked the local elite what the prime motives were for becoming a party member. Most important are substantial functions, for instance, gaining political influence, working for personal convictions, supporting democratic institutions, contributing to community development and gaining political experience. At some distance, we see the more personal-oriented motives, such as keeping a family tradition, promoting one's own interests, helping other people, fulfilling their civic obligation and getting to know people.

To conclude, the outcome is ambiguous. The motives for becoming party-members are primarily substantive and, compared with other means, the best way to exert influence on decision-making is through political parties. However, the function of political parties as such is conceived to be primarily functional and institutional with substantive functions coming last.

Local-Global Relations


The survey conducted also contained a question about the geographical identity of the local elite. Do they primarily feel an identity with the local level, the regional level, the national level or even above that? Figure 3.12 presents the results.

As expected, most elites primarily feel related to the local level. More than half of them feel local first. Next comes the national identification -- about 30 percent identify themselves primarily with the nation and feels first and foremost Dutch. Third comes the region, which plays an important role especially in the northwestern area (Fryslan), and the southern province of Limburg. The distribution among the identity levels seems stable through time. Globalization tendencies have not yet reached the Dutch local elite. Less than ten percent primarily identifies with a supra-national level, be it the union of the Low Countries (Benelux), Europe or the World as a whole.

This parochialism is also seen in the perception of the local elite on trends of globalization and its impact on the community. Imports, exports, foreign media, pollution, foreign workers and investments have very little impact according to most of the respondents. Only foreign tourists have a great impact on the community according to one quarter of the Dutch local elite (Figure 3.13).

Nevertheless, when comparing the views of the local elite in 1996 and 2000, with the exception of imports, exports, and investments, the non-economic aspects of globalization seem to have an increasing impact on Dutch communities.

Figure 3.12
 Primary Identification 1996 and 2000 (Percent)




The total foreign impact score, ranging from 0 (no at all) to 2 (a great deal) shows a small but significant increase in foreign impact in the individual leader’s community, from 0.74 in 1996, to 0.80 in 2000. However, this slight increase depends on the increasing foreign impact of people. The mean of the total people scale shows a statistically significant increase, from 0.67 in 1996, to 0.75 in 2000. The change in the total economic scale, however, is not statistically significant.³

³ Not many Dutch municipalities experience direct impacts from international investments, imports and exports. It is mainly in major cities, like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Maastricht (positioned at the border with Germany and Belgium) and Haarlemmermeer (with the airport Schiphol in it) that imports and exports are of direct and growing importance. In middle sized cities which are the selected ones in this research, the general opinion seems to be one of increasing doubts about the effectiveness of local policies to attract foreign investments. Such policies were popular in the 1980s, with every municipality having its own jumelages, and wanting to participate in international trade delegations. Many cities banded these policies in the 1990s. An explanation might also be

Figure 3.13

Foreign Impact in the Community 1996 and 2000 (Percent “a great deal”)



that in the 1980s the economy of the Netherlands was in a bad shape. In the public opinion this was explained mainly by decreasing exports. Unemployment was explained in general by the lacking international economic growth. In 2000 the Dutch economy was booming and unemployment in the Netherlands had nearly disappeared. Therefore, one did not think that much anymore about the economic consequences of globalizing tendencies at the local level. This is reflected in the views of the Dutch local elite.

⁵ One should notice that in the Dutch questionnaire the local elites were asked to pick 2 out of 4, implying there is no rank order between the two problems perceived to be most important.

The Future of Dutch Democracy

When the local leaders are asked about the future of Dutch democracy and the main goal for the Netherlands in the next ten years, they first want to emphasize the maintenance of order. Around four out of five of all local leaders mention this as the most important challenge. The development of participation and freedom of speech is perceived as much less important, mentioned by approximately 40 to 47 percent, in the different years of study. Given the stable state of the Dutch economy, fighting inflation comes in last and is mentioned only by 26 percent in 1996 and 20 percent in 2000. In terms of Inglehart, it is not so much the post-material values that have priority, but one of the pressing material values (Inglehart 1971).⁵ This is understandable when we consider the persistence of the problem of public safety and the disappearance of most of the other societal problems mentioned above. It was also one of the main issues during the 2002 elections and the ruling elite was accused of neglecting this problem.

Conclusions

This chapter presented a description of three rounds of surveys conducted in 1989, 1996 and 2000 in the Netherlands. The general picture is that in 2000, local leaders in the Netherlands are exhibiting increased satisfaction. The overwhelming majority denies the existence of serious policy problems and social conflicts. Compared to 12 years before, the policy problems have significantly diminished. While the extent of social conflicts increased somewhat, they are still scarce. The effectiveness of local policies in recent years as well as the increased autonomy of local elite to act in those policy areas might well be the cause of this. According to most of our respondents, Dutch communities are a wonderful places to live. This change in problem perception goes hand in hand with changing values among the local elite. We see a depoliticized local elite, in which the free market ideology has increasingly started to dominate; that increasingly favors decisiveness over consensus seeking; that attaches mainly formal functions to the existence of political parties; that is increasingly inert in its network and whose network is restricted to colleagues within the city hall. It is also an elite that is increasingly narrow in background and does not witness much influence of globalization on their community.

We started this chapter by pointing out the peculiarities of the Dutch institutional structure and the role of local-central relations. Throughout this chapter, we have shown that it is not only this institutional structure that is peculiar; the Dutch local elite who dominated during the last decade of the past millennium

also possesses some characteristics that are not likely to be found in other countries. Increasingly satisfied -- perhaps even complacent -- is the best summary of the developments within the local elite in the Netherlands.

The 2002 elections showed that the population did not share this attitude. At that moment, it became clear that not only the formal distance between voters and those elected had increased, but also that there was a gap between the values shared by the local elite and the population. This increasing distance between the elite and the population might well explain the revolution that took place at those elections. Many of the former members of the municipal councils were not re-elected and the population seemed to demand the rise of a new local elite. The parties winning that election were known for criticizing the existing elite for their inertness, their failure to solve -- especially race related -- ethnic problems and the idea that problem solving can be done in a managerial depoliticized way, stressing efficiency out of a dominance of free-market ideology and materialistic values. The expectation of the voters was that the new elite would develop new policies emphasizing effectiveness instead of being just efficient. It remains to be seen whether the new elite will be able to accomplish this.

Part II
The New Baltic Democracies

Toward Democratic Governance: The Lithuanian Local Elite

Arvydas Matulionis, Svajone Mikene and Rimantas Rauleckas

Recent Developments of the Local Government System

The most important basic changes of the Lithuanian local government system occurred on March 11, 1990, with the Parliamentary declaration of re-establishing the Independence of the Republic of Lithuania. The transition from the authoritarian system to a democracy required the further clarification of the functions of local government through a number of laws.¹ The legal basis for a real development of democratic local governance was set between 1994 and 1995. By implementing the Law on Territorial Administrative Units and Their Boundaries, the former system of two levels and five categories of 581 administrative units was replaced with a system of two levels and two categories of 66 administrative units.

This was an important decision because it established the boundaries of state and municipality functions more precisely. The law's intention was to decentralize some ministry functions to the counties, but in practice, most of the functions of municipalities were transferred to counties instead, which created tension between the first and second levels of administration. Although many municipality functions were defined quite accurately, the national ministries delegated too few functions to counties in an attempt to retain the decisive role.

The current structure of local government includes (1) the higher administrative units or counties, which are assigned and supervised by the state govern-

¹ The most important are the Law on Local Self-government (adopted 7 July 1994 and amended thirteen times), the Law on Elections to Local Government Councils (adopted 7 July 1994 and amended seven times), the Law on the Status of Local Government Councilor (adopted 7 February 1995), the Law on Territorial Administrative Units and Their Boundaries (adopted on 19 July 1995 and amended twice), the Law on Governing of the County (adopted 15 December 1994 and amended eight times), the Law on Temporary Direct Governing in Urban and Rural Local Governments (adopted 28 March 1995 and amended twice).

ment, (2) the lower level administrative units (municipalities), which, depending on the type of residential area, are designated as rural or urban, and (3) around five hundred neighborhoods, which do not have status as territorial administrative units (these communities possessed the rights of local governments before the reform). Lithuanian local governments, though not subordinate, cooperate with the central government on a number of issues such as, establishing the direction of development in the fields of education, culture, health care, social security and territorial planning.

According to the Law on Governing of the County (adopted in 1994), the county administration and the county governor: implement state policy in the fields of social support, education, culture, public health, territorial planning, administration of memorials, land use and land reform, agriculture and environmental protection; coordinate activities of ministry units and other government institutions in the territory of the county and of executive institutions of local governments in implementing regional programs and rural development; identify priorities of and prepares programs for county development; and monitor and control legal aspects of the activities and regulative acts of municipalities in the county.

The Law on the Foundation of Local Self-Government (1990) gave the municipalities extensive powers, but as early as 1992, some important functions – i.e. deciding priorities for social service activities, the right to regulate local economy, establish social service organizations, etc. - were taken from municipalities thereby lessening their autonomy. But in general, the scope of municipality functions as well as their decision-making powers were broader from 1990 until March 1995 than they were after March 1995 (Gustas 2001).

In March 1995, new councils began their work under new laws on Local Self-Government and on Governing the County. Functions related to social supply, education, culture, health care, territory planning, cultural objects, land use, land cadastre (land registry), agriculture, natural resources, environmental protection were removed from the municipalities and assigned to county administrations in an attempt to centralize functions because of the inability of local governments to cope up with all ascribed tasks. The Law on Local Self-Government divided local authority into autonomous authority (municipalities have freedom of action, initiative and decision making in these competences) and state delegated authority. The law included a paragraph in which municipalities may solve other community problems that are not ascribed to state institutions, thus municipalities were given power to autonomously decide on new problems.

Another way of describing the main categories of municipality functions is to examine where major expenditures occur. The data provided by Ministry of

Finance for 1997-98 show (data taken from Gustas 2001) that the main areas are as follows: general state services (4 percent in 1997 and 5 percent in 1998), public order and public protection (1 percent both in 1997 and 1998), education (approximately 50 percent of all expenditures), health care (5 percent in 1997 and 1 percent in 1998), social protection/security and guardianship (11 percent in 1997 and 12 percent in 1998), housing and communal economy (14 percent), sports, recreation and culture (4-5 percent correspondingly), fuel and energy provision services (2-3 percent), transport and communications (3 percent), other economic activities (less than 0.1 percent), and expenditures for minor functions (6-7 percent).

The problems with executing municipality functions are: (a) unclear delineation of functions among levels of authority and (b) insufficient financial autonomy of municipalities for executing prescribed functions (state delegated functions are underfinanced; municipalities have insufficient local tax collection opportunities to self-finance autonomous functions), but there are problems with the quality of local management and the competence of local personnel as well.

Conflicts among the central, regional and local levels of authority primarily concern the distribution of authority and revenues. As far as funds are concerned, conflicts arise because of the activities of the State Control Office that supervises the appropriate use of state budget funds; often too few funds are assigned to municipalities. The prevailing political parties at the central and local levels are an influential factor in the authority distribution conflicts. If one party is the leading power in Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) and an opposition party holds the most local government councils, then local governments can oppose the transfer of functions to county administrations (this was the situation in Lithuania from 1992 until 1996). Accordingly, these conflicts decrease when the same political parties dominate at both the central and local levels.

Two major forces have been competing in both national and local elections since the restoration of independence: the political left of the former Communist Party and the political right representatives of the Sajūdis movement (later conservatives).

From the 1990 local and national elections to the 1992 national elections, the political right (more precisely, representatives of the Sajūdis national movement) dominated in the national parliament, and local government was dominated by the political left. Between the national elections in 1992 and 1995 local elections, the left block dominated at both the local and national levels. Between the 1995 local elections to the 1996 national elections, right block parties played the major role at the local level councils, but the political left retained the majority in the parliament. After the 1996 national elections and the 1997 local elec-

tions and until the time of our last survey in 1998, right block parties were dominant at both the local and national levels.²

Our surveys of the local governing elites coincided with the 1990-1992, 1995-1996 and 1997-2000 periods. For the first two periods, we expected tensions between political blocks and levels of authorities to be more pronounced in our data than in the last case when the right block was most influential at both levels and conflicts were not expected to be as intense.

Naturally, the period from 1990 also involved great international change and globalization. The globalization process had an impact on cross-border cooperation between municipalities. Some current partnerships with municipalities of other countries have been established for several decades, but the recent tendency is cooperation between neighboring districts of Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Latvia. Lithuanian municipalities have bilateral agreements mostly with Poland, Germany and Scandinavian countries, though relationships with the United States, France, Italy, Taiwan, Greece and Japan have also been developed. Partnerships with counties and municipalities of other countries are increasingly related to the implementation of joint projects in social care, water purification and tourism (Beksta & Petkevicius 2000).

Anticipating EU membership, many Lithuanian municipalities are looking forward to new challenges. First of all, the term of local office has been ex-

² In the 1990 national elections, the Communist Party of Lithuania won only twenty-three of the 141 seats and Sajūdis representatives formed the majority - 70 percent (Krupavicius 1996:47). In 1990 local elections, Sajūdis national movement representatives lost to the former Communist Party, later transformed to Democratic Labor Party (LDLP), which won about 40 percent of local offices. In October 25, of the 1992 national elections, the LDLP (former Communist Party) and other left block parties won an absolute majority of seventy-three seats (51 percent). The strong political left was demonstrated once again in the direct presidential election of February 14, 1993, when Brazauskas, leader of LDLP, won the elections with the final vote 61 percent against his opponent. In the 1995 local elections, the Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives (reformed Sajūdis) together with other right block parties won majority of council seats (28.8 percent for Conservatives, 16.6 percent for Christian Democrats (LChDP), total 53.2 percent for all right block parties). Left block parties (LDLP and Peasants' Party) won 27 percent seats in local councils (Lietuvos rytas, 27 March 1995, p.3). On 20th of October and 10th of November, 1996, the TS (LK) - Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives (transformed Sajūdis movement) won 51 percent of Seimas seats, while LDLP - Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (Lietuvos demokratine darbo partija) only got 9 percent. In the 1997 local elections, again the Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives - and LChDP won in majority of the municipalities.

tended to four years. Moreover, and this is especially important, not only Lithuanian citizens, but foreign citizens in compliance with some basic conditions (e.g., are registered in specific municipality and etc.) can vote and be elected. Thus, municipal councils elected at the end of 2002 will have new features.

All of these changes that occurred during the period of our surveys of local government leaders -- three times throughout the 1990s (1991, 1995 and 1998) -- certainly influenced the performance of Lithuanian local governance and democracy.

The Sample of Municipalities and Leaders

The Lithuanian data consists of three surveys, performed with the leading local politicians and administrators in 20 Lithuanian municipalities in 1991, in 21 municipalities in 1995, and in 21 municipalities in 1998.³ All of the surveys were executed in the same municipalities.⁴ The three largest cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipeda are not included in the study. Each sample of local governments and leaders was selected according to the requirements of the *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG) program.

In selecting territorial units, three factors were evaluated: (1) population size (city groups were selected for populations of 100,000 and larger, and district groups for 50,000 and larger); (2) the balance of urban and rural dwellers (district groups were divided into selections where urban dwellers constituted less than 20 percent or more than 20 percent of the population); and (3) the proportion of ethnic Lithuanians (groups were divided into selections where Lithuanians made up more than 80 percent or less than 80 percent of the population).

The number of municipalities included in the sample according to the population size (Demographic Yearbook 1991) is shown in Table 4.1.

³ The results of the first survey are presented in A.Matulionis, L.Kuzmickaite, V.Jonaitis, I.Juozeliuniene, A.Karalius (1993). The Lithuanian National Report. In Jacob, Betty M., Krzysztof Ostrowski, & Henry Teune (eds.) *Democracy and Local Governance. Ten Empirical Studies*.

⁴ In 1995 one municipality was added to the sample because due to the Law on Territorial Administrative Units and Their Boundaries, number and sizes of municipalities were changed, and as a result a new specific municipality, consisting largely of Russian minority, was established.

Table 4.1

Selection of Lithuanian Local Governments
(Sample According to Population Size 1991)

Population size	Total number of local governments (Percent)	Local governments included in the sample (N)
Less than 30,000	9 (16)	3
Between 30,000 and 50,000	23 (42)	10
Between 50,000 and 70,000	12 (22)	7
Between 70,000 and 100,000	6 (11)	2
Over 100,000	5 (9)	2
Total	55 (100)	24*

* The overall sample size is 20, but in four cases, urban and rural municipalities of the district are amalgamated to one.

The sample of politicians consists of mayors, vice-mayors, chairmen of the most important boards of the council (e.g., health protection, economics and finance, social, education, culture and recreation boards) and other members of the council (belonging to different political parties). All chairmen of the boards are also members of the central executive board.

The sample of administrators consists of the chief administrator and the major chief managers (economy, education, culture, social services and welfare and heads of neighborhoods).

According to these sampling rules, in 1991, 289 local leaders were selected. In the 1995 survey, the sample consisted of 312 local leaders and the 1998 survey consisted of 308 local leaders, coming from the same local governments studied 1991 and 1995. Thus, all three surveys were conducted in the same municipalities and include a quite similar number of respondents from the political and administrative elite within Lithuanian local government.

Background and Characteristics of Lithuanian Leaders

The institutional background of Lithuanian local government elite is defined by whether the leader is mainly a politician or an administrator and the number of years in the present position and/or total number of years in public service. In the 1991 study, about 49 percent of the leaders (according to our definition and sampling rules) were politicians, in the 1995 and 1998 studies the share of

politicians in the sample is about the same, correspondingly 39 and 42 percent (Table 4.2).

In all three studies, the average leader has had his or her present position for about 5 years, and has been in public service in an average of five years in 1991, nine years in 1995, and seven years in the 1998 survey (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2
Institutional Background 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)

Background Characteristics	Year		
	1991 (N)	1995 (N)	1998 (N)
Type of Leader			
Politician	49 (113)	39 (115)	42 (131)
Administrator	<u>51 (118)</u>	<u>61 (180)</u>	<u>58 (177)</u>
	100 (231)	100 (295)	100 (308)
In Present Position			
- 2 years	67 (195)	72 (224)	42 (121)
3-10 years	20 (57)	22 (67)	49 (144)
11- years	<u>13 (37)</u>	<u>6 (19)</u>	<u>9 (27)</u>
	100 (289)	100 (310)	100 (292)
In Average (Mean)	5	6	5
In Public Service			
- 2 years	26 (43)	28 (47)	25 (73)
3-10 years	36 (59)	53 (88)	60 (173)
11- years	<u>38 (64)</u>	<u>19 (32)</u>	<u>15 (44)</u>
	100 (166)	100 (167)	100 (290)
In Average (Mean)	5	9	7

Comment: Civil society representatives (priests, businessmen, public activists) who were interviewed in the 1991 study are excluded from this table.

One main tendency of change seems to be that a new cadre of local leaders is settling in quite slowly. Both so-called old-timers (leaders with more than 11 years in present position or total in public service) are gradually leaving the system, and there are fewer newcomers (leaders with less than two years in present position). At the same time, the proportion keeping their position for 3 to 10 years is gradually increasing during the period of study.

Table 4.3

Social Background 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)

Background Characteristics	Year		
	1991 (N)	1995 (N)	1998 (N)
Age (mean)	43	44	45
Age Cohorts			
-39	46 (131)	32 (98)	29 (88)
40-49	32 (91)	39 (120)	41 (126)
50-59	15 (42)	21 (63)	21 (64)
60+	<u>7 (21)</u>	<u>8 (23)</u>	<u>9 (28)</u>
	100 (285)	100 (304)	100 (306)
Gender			
Male	82 (235)	57 (177)	69 (213)
Female	<u>18 (53)</u>	<u>43 (134)</u>	<u>31 (95)</u>
	100 (288)	100 (311)	100 (308)
Education			
Secondary	5 (15)	2 (8)	3 (11)
Special secondary	7 (19)	12 (36)	12 (36)
University	<u>88 (254)</u>	<u>86 (266)</u>	<u>85 (261)</u>
	100 (288)	100 (310)	100 (308)
Class (father's occupation)			
Working-class	71 (164)	-	76 (188)
Middle-class	27 (62)	-	23 (56)
Upper-class	<u>2 (5)</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1 (3)</u>
	100 (231)	100 (248)	100 (247)
Active Parent			
Held corresponding position	-	9 (26)	6 (17)
Nationality			
Lithuanian	97 (275)	97 (266)	97 (298)
Other	3 (8)	3 (7)	3 (10)
Religious Activity			
Regularly *	20 (56)	31 (97)	33 (101)

* Once a month or even more often.

The analysis of *social* background shows the same pattern of change (Table 4.3). Although the average age of the Lithuanian local leader remained quite stable (43 to 45 years of age), the proportion of leaders in this age group (40-49 years of age) is constantly increasing, while young leaders (less than 39 years of age) is decreasing across the period studied. This pattern of change gives a further indication of system settlement after the period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy with a growing group of middle-aged leaders.

Quite similar changes occurred in the leaders' social class background (parents' occupational status). In the 1991 study, 71 percent of local leaders had a working-class background. In the 1998 study, this group increased slightly to 76 percent. Correspondingly, the group of leaders stemming from middle-class families decreased from 27 percent in 1991 to 23 percent in 1998. Leaders stemming from upper-class conditions remained the smallest group both in 1991 and 1998.

Few leaders have parents that hold or held the same type of position as the respondent. In 1995, 9 percent of the leaders had a parent who performed or performs a corresponding political or administrative task as the respondent. In 1998, this figure decreased to 6 percent.

The national composition of local leaders remained absolutely stable; 97 percent of leaders throughout the period are Lithuanians. The proportion of religiously active (weekly or monthly visit in church) increased, from 20 percent in 1991, and 31 percent in 1995, to 33 percent in 1998. There are also some substantial changes in the composition of gender. Female leaders have increased considerably, from 18 percent in 1991 to 43 percent in 1995, and decreased to 31 percent in 1998. The educational level remained stable. The proportion of leaders with some sort of university education remained stable, 86 percent in 1991, 86 percent in 1995 and 85 percent in 1998.

Local Problems and Effective Action


The analysis of local problems perceived by local government as very serious show that the most important and urgent issues concern unemployment, economic development and education. In 1991 the problem of unemployment was seen as a very serious local problem by 33 percent of local leaders. In 1995 this figure dramatically increased to 84 percent, and in 1998 it reached its peak with 86 percent of local leaders regarding the issue as very serious.

The perception of the problem of economic development has increased rapidly as well, from 1991 when 51 percent of local leaders considered the problem very serious, to 72 percent in 1995 and 76 percent in 1998.

The third most important problem concerned education. In 1991, 51 percent said that education was a very serious problem. In 1995, this problem was considered very serious by 62 percent of the leaders and in the 1998 survey it increased even more, to 67 percent.

Figure 4.1

Very Serious Local Problems 1991, 1995, 1998 (Percent)



Other issues that were seen as very serious problems locally in 1991 were problems of housing, public safety and environmental pollution. These issues have declined in strength across the period studied.

The perceptions of problems such as poverty, health, social improvement and cost of local government fluctuate during the period studied. In 1991, the issue of poverty (living standard) was seen as very important problem only by 15 percent of the leaders. The health problem was seen as very serious by 59 percent at that time. These two issues of the poverty and health became very important in 1995 when 73 percent of local leaders viewed these problems as very important. In 1998, these issues have decreased slightly in significance; between 58 and 57 percent of the leaders perceived them as very important.

More generally, we can see that the average local leader's perception of local problems has increased over the period studied. In 1991, the mean of problem perception scale was 1.25; in 1995 it increased to 1.43, and in 1998 it declined only somewhat, to 1.36. The scale goes from 0 (no problem) to 2 (very serious problem). The increase from 1991 to 1998 is statistically significant at the .05 percent level.

If this increase in local problems depends on the inability to *take effective action* in different local issues, there should be a corresponding decrease in the perception of effective action taken in these local issues. However, the results do not conform to this proposition because the perception of effective action generally increased across the period studied. The mean of the effective action scale increased from .85 in 1995, to 1.05 in 1998. The scale ranges from 0 (no action) to 2 (effective action). This difference is statistically significant at the .05 percent level. Thus, in spite of the perception that their action was more effective during the 1990s, the Lithuanian local leader is still generally confronted with increasingly serious local problems.


Looking at the leaders' opinions on each separate issue, as shown in Figure 4.2, there are significant differences between 1995 and 1998 (the question about effective action was not included in the 1991 survey). Only the changes in effective actions related to immigration and minority relations (national specific question, not included in Table 4.2) are insignificant.

In 1998, compared with 1995, an increase in the effective action is evident for all of the issues. Especially large increases are noticeable in taking effective action in solving problems of education, social improvements, public improvements, cost of local government, pollution, culture and recreation, poverty, health, and housing. Thus, in dealing with these issues, local leaders have become more efficient.

For other issues such as public safety, unemployment, economic development and immigration, there were increases in perception across time as well, though of less magnitude (i.e., the changes are less than 7 percent).

Figure 4.2

Effective Action 1995 and 1998 (Percent)*



* This question was not included in the 1991 survey

Powers and Responsibilities

Looking at the leaders' perception of autonomy and power to solve these problems, several changes occurred across the period. In the areas of employment, economic development and immigration, the perceptions of power and auton-

omy of local government declined. In 1991, 53 percent of local leaders felt they had the power to act on the problem of unemployment. In 1995, only 26 percent thought they had such power, and in 1998 this group decreased to 23 percent. A similar constant decrease in perceived power can be seen for the issue of immigration, where the perceived power decreased from 78 percent in 1991 to 47 percent in 1998. The perceived power for the issue of economic development also decreased, from 53 percent of in 1991, to 29 percent in 1998 (Figure 4.3).

However, there are some issues where Lithuanian local government leaders felt that they acquired more power and autonomy to act effectively. A considerable increase in the perception of the power and autonomy to act effectively is noticeable in the issues of education, pollution, housing and a slight increase for the issue of health services.

The perception of the power and autonomy to act effectively in areas of public safety, poverty, social improvements and culture and recreation shows an U-shaped pattern of remaining more or less at the same level in 1991 and 1998, but decreased in 1995.

Since the issues of employment, economic development and immigration are formally national state or regional county government tasks, the decrease in perception of the power and autonomy to act effectively for these issues may be treated as less serious. Moreover, there is an increase in perception of the power and autonomy to act effectively in the areas that are more directly local government responsibilities, such as education, health services, pollution, and housing.

The mean of the power and autonomy scale has decreased from .56 in 1991, to .53 in 1995, and slightly increased again in 1998, but these changes are statistically non-significant. This scale ranges from 0 (lacks powers) to 1 (has powers).

The data on opinions of Lithuanian local government leaders about what level or authority in society that should be primarily responsible for different public sector functions further proves that the support for giving power to the local government level is decreasing when comparing the 1991 and the 1998 studies (Figure 4.4).

The average score for local government as primarily responsible for different public sector issues decreased from .58 in 1991, to .36 in 1998. The score means also decreased from .07 to .05 for NGO's, and from .08 to .03 for leaving these different responsibilities to the people. Instead, local leaders tend to pass more responsibility to the state and regional government: the average score for state/regional government as primarily responsible increased from .46 in 1991 to .56 in 1998. These scales range from 0 (no responsibility) to 1 (primary responsibility). All mean differences are statistically significant at the .05 percent level except for the differences across time of NGO organizations. Thus, the national

and regional levels of government received increased support for being primarily responsible for the different public sector tasks.

Figure 4.3

Autonomy and the Power to Act Effectively 1991, 1995, 1998 (Percent)





Figure 4.4

Opinion about Primary Responsibility for Public Sector Functions 1991 and 1998 (Means) *



* This question was not included in the 1995 survey

Comment: The scale goes from 0 (no primary responsibility) to 1 (primary responsibility for all public sector functions for each category of responsibility).

The fact that county administrations, or territorial state administrations, were established in 1995-96, with functions taken both from ministries and municipalities might be one of the major reasons of subjectively giving more responsibility to levels above the municipality authority level in 1998.

Influence and Support

Looking at the largest increases in leaders' influence across the studied period, culture and recreation are the areas in which the leaders' influence increased the most (Figure 4.5). Influence over culture and recreation increased from 14 percent in 1991 to 24 percent of the leaders in 1998 saying that they have great

influence over these issues. Furthermore, the longitudinal tendency is for an increasing number of the leaders to say that they acquired great influence over public improvements, education, social services, and the activity of political organizations.

The number of local leaders saying that they have influence over local revenues and budget decreased sharply between 1991 and 1995, from 14 to 5 percent, and increased again to 9 percent in 1998. The lowest levels of influence are registered for health, pollution, public safety, immigration, agriculture, housing, and economic development.

The scale mean of the average influence score was .60 in the 1991 study, and then it decreased to .49 in the 1995 study. In the 1998 study, it increased to .63. The scale range is between 0 (no influence) and 2 (great influence). The changes in mean from 1991 to 1995 and from 1995 to 1998 are statistically significant at the .01 percent level, while there is no statistically significant difference between the 1991 and 1998 mean scores.

It seems that these changes in the perception of influence can be explained by the formal redistribution of power between the governments. We tend to think that the decrease in 1995 in perceived influence was the result of new laws on self-government, i.e., successive establishment of counties and reduction of municipality functions and rights. Tension between the dominant left block parties at the national level and dominant political right in the local councils reinforced the effects of new legislature. The increased influence in the late 1990s most probably occurred because of the dominance of the right block at both the national and local levels in 1998 and the effects of learning how to cope in a new legal situation.

According to the perceptions of local leaders, local government has the power to act in the areas of culture and recreation, public improvements, education, social services, and pollution (see Figure 4.3), and correspondingly, the local leaders perceive that they are more influential in the very same areas (Figure 4.5).

The local leaders were asked to whom they turn in situations in which *support from others* is necessary. The findings show that most Lithuanian local leaders turn to local top administrative officials, local elective officials and close friends (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.5
Personal Influence 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent “great influence”)





Figure 4.6

Persons/Organizations to turn to for Support 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



In 1991, 35 percent of the leaders mentioned the need to contact local top administrative officials when support from the others was needed. In 1995, 69 percent mentioned local top administrative officials as a support group, and in 1998 the number of leaders turning to this support group was only somewhat fewer, 65 percent. A strong increase is also noticeable in the contacts with administrative colleagues at their own level: the percentage of the leaders who mentioned colleagues as a support group increased from 5 percent in 1991, to 36 percent in 1995 and 47 percent in 1998. Higher administrative officials as a support group also became more important in 1998 when compared to 1995. Thus, it seems that it is the administrative network, both vertically and horizontally, that becomes gradually more important across the studied period (these increases can hardly be explained by the slight increase of administrators in the 1998 sample).

Signs of increase are also noticeable in support from neighborhood organizations (from 5 percent in 1995 to 26 percent in 1998) and higher party leaders (from 7 to 14 percent between 1995 and 1998), although for the latter group we have only two points in time to consider.

Looking at the support from close friends, local elected officials, and local party leaders, these categories do not change significantly over time. In the 1991 study, 33 percent of the leaders mentioned close friends as a support group, in 1995 somewhat fewer, 30 percent, said that these contacts are available for support, and in 1998, the group of leaders turning to close friends for support increased again to 37 percent. Similarly, in 1991, 29 percent of local leaders say that the contacts with local elected officials are available when support from others is needed, in 1995, it was 25 percent, and in 1998, 26 percent of the leaders turned to local elected officials for support.

The interesting fluctuations across the period can be found in seeking support from the public generally, where the findings in 1991 and 1998 are almost identical, but there is a statistically significant decrease in these contacts in 1995.

Local media and business leaders as support groups in general were less emphasized over time, and a major and significant decrease occurred in 1995.

The least preferred groups to which local leaders turned for support are religious leaders, groups in local party organizations, local civic action groups and trade unions. These groups do not show any signs of change. The only significant difference is shown by a decrease in contacts with religious leaders. In 1991, 11 percent of the local government leaders mentioned religious leaders as a group they turned to when support from others is needed. In 1995 only 3 percent of the leaders turned to religious leaders and the church for support, and in 1998, only 2 percent of leaders turned to religious leaders. This is an interesting

tendency because it seems that leaders who regularly attend church increased from 20 percent in 1991 to 33 percent in 1998, while the number of leaders turning to the religious leaders and the church for support decreased (a more comprehensive analysis of what really caused this tendency to occur is beyond our study).

To conclude, a major part of the network of support contacts consists of local administrative elite, and their importance increased during the period studied. The major increases are in contacts with local administrators and higher-level administrative officials, while support contacts with local media, business leaders and religious leaders have decreased. Thus, we can see the tendency of network change in Lithuania where contacts with administrative hierarchy becomes more important while some contacts with civil society become less important when support from others is needed.

This finding can be compared with the analysis of the number of contacts mentioned by the Lithuanian local leaders in 1991, 1995, and 1998. There is a decrease in the total number of support contacts between 1991 and 1995 from an average 2.8 in 1991 to 2.4 in 1995, and an increase in 1998 to 3.1. These results differ significantly only between 1995 and 1998. However, the average of *local* support contacts increased from .26 in 1991 to .35 in 1995 and to .37 in 1998. This increase is statistically significant at the .05 percent level when comparing the scores for the years 1991 and 1998. The average of *non-local* support contacts also increased, from .14 in 1995 to .20 in 1998. This latter increase is also statistically significant at the .05 percent level. The range for these last two scales goes from 0 (no average support) to 1 (support).


Thus, both the vertical and the horizontal networks seem to have grown during the period. As for the horizontal dimension, the importance of administrative groups appeared to grow at the expense of weakly expressed network contacts with local party leaders, local media, business leaders, religious leaders, local civic action groups and trade organizations.

Values of Democracy and Local Governance

The Lithuanian local government leaders' values changed across the period studied. The value most committed to is honesty, followed by economic development, localism and capitalism. The support for the value of minority rights and economic equality is somewhat lower. The least shared values concern political equality, conflict and participation. These values receive negative scores on average, but most importantly for each study across the 1990, the elite

becomes significantly less negative toward these important values of democracy as time goes by (Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7
Local Elite Values 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Means)



Comment: The scale goes from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

Looking at the changes in values during the period, we note that all value scales, except the conflict and honesty-openness scores, display statistically significant changes between the 1991-1998 period (mean differences more than approximately 5 relative units mark statistically significant results). Mostly, the mean score differences between 1991 and 1998 data are significant at the .05 percent level, but non-significant during the 1995-1998 period.

First, the value of economic development increased between 1991 and 1995, going from a scale mean of 33 in 1991 to a scale mean of 43 in 1995 (all value scales go from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree)). Second, the value of economic equality increased from a scale mean of -1 in 1991 to 13 in 1995. The third value change occurred in value of capitalism, where the scale mean decreased from 33 in 1991 to a scale mean of 23 in both 1995 and 1998. In the same period from 1991 to 1995, there is a fourth statistically significant increase in the value of citizens' participation scale. This value changed from a negative score of -37 in 1991 to a scale mean of -15 in 1995. Finally, the minority rights value decreased from a scale mean of 26 in 1991 to 19 in 1995 while the localism value increases from mean of 26 to 31 across the same period.

In the 1995-1998 period there are only two statistically significant changes, i.e. in values of political equality and participation. In 1995 the scale mean for the value of political equality received a negative score of -11, and in 1998 it received a positive score of 1. The value of participation increased significantly from 1995 to 1998, and it is the only value that shows a pattern of constant and significant increases across the whole period of study.


Thus, important values for the development of democracy, such as public participation, conflict acceptance and political equality, receive negative scores by the average Lithuanian leader. Nevertheless, there is a significant positive development of these values.

The values discussed above were operationalized by sets of general indicators and some of them can be compared with more direct indicators regarding certain areas vital to the functioning of local democracy. As we shall see, changes in values of participation, conflict acceptance, minority rights and localism are supported by the data displayed and discussed below.

Since minority rights is one of the requisites of democracy, the Lithuanian local government elite was asked if the minorities in Lithuania should have the right to have their own church, schools, press, official language, cultural organizations, representation in the elected bodies, and political parties (Figure 4.8). The strongest support for the minorities concerns the right to their own cultural organizations, churches, press, school and representation in elected bodies. Less support is shown for minorities having their own political parties. The weakest


support concerns the right to official language. Generally, during the studied period there is a decline in the perception of minority rights: there are statistically significant decreases in support of the right to political parties, schools, churches and press. This finding also corresponds to the detected significant decrease in the minority rights value scale.

Figure 4.8
Minority Rights 1995 and 1998 (Means)



Comment: The scale goes from 0 (not mentioned) to 1 (mentioned) for each minority rights item.

Figure 4.9 Groups not wanted as Neighbors 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



Another claimed central democratic value is that of *social tolerance*. The local leaders were asked to sort out various groups of people that they would not like as neighbors. Generally, the least wanted groups were alcoholics, drug addicts, criminals, and homosexuals. About 55 to 80 percent say that they do not want these groups as neighbors (Figure 4.9). The level of intolerance toward these various groups in general declined. There is a very slight increase of intolerance toward right-wing extremists. Changes of 5 or less than 5 percent mark insignificant changes in other categories.

A final basic democratic parameter concerns *interpersonal trust*. According to the results for the period studied, trust generally does not show signs of linear increase or decrease. There is a radical decrease of Lithuanian local government leaders who believe that most people can be trusted between 1991 and 1995 - from 56 percent to 35 percent. In 1998, the proportion of local leaders stating that most people can be trusted increased again to 45 percent. All of these differences of interpersonal trust are statistically significant at the .05 percent level. Thus, there are great shifts in many values, which also show the importance of longitudinal data from new democracies.


Cleavages and Conflict in the Community

Comparing the results across the studied period on the question of *community conflict*, we see the following positive changes: In 1991, 94 percent of the Lithuanian local government leaders claim that there are major conflicts that interfere with community action to meet community problems, and 35 percent say that these conflicts significantly interfere in the development of their community. In 1995, 70 percent of the leaders asserted the existence of the conflicts in their communities, and only 18 percent said that these conflicts were harmful for their community. The results on the question of community conflict remained almost the same in 1998, when 68 percent of the leaders mentioned the existence of the conflicts in their communities, and 19 percent viewed these conflicts as interfering with effective community action.

The data across the period on the leaders' perceptions of the extent to which differences within the local population tended to divide people in the community showed a gradual increase in the differences in income. The proportion of leaders saying that income is dividing people in the community "very much" has increased from 28 percent in 1991 to 36 percent in 1995 and to 39 percent saying so in 1998.

Figure 4.10

Perception of Differences Dividing People in the Community 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent “very much”)



Differences in political views and between those desiring social change and those opposing it represent other factors that are dividing people, though these differences are seen as less divisive in communities in 1998 than in 1991.

Nevertheless, the differences in political views remained the most important differences dividing people in the community. In 1991, 52 percent of the local elite said that the differences in political views are dividing people in the community "very much". In 1995, the group of leaders saying so decreased to 40 percent, and in 1998 it again increased to 42 percent.

Other differences dividing people do not show a clear pattern except differences between manager and employee, which decreased radically from 18 percent in 1991 to between 8 and 9 percent later on.

Thus, across the 1990s, the perceived cleavages dividing communities in Lithuania generally declined, with the only exception being income inequalities that tend to divide the community more. The average score for these community differences does not change in a statistically significant manner across time: .77 in 1991, .76 in 1995 and .78 in 1998. The scale goes from 0 (not at all) to 2 (very much). However, as shown the perception of divisive local cleavages is changing in nature rather than in strength: while income inequalities are growing, other kinds of cleavages are becoming less divisive.

Participation, Influence and Political Action by Leaders

Conditions for public participation in Lithuania emerged during the course of *perestroika* initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. The economic liberalization - in 1985 in the Soviet Union - soon turned to a national and political movement in the Baltic republics. The rebirth in Lithuania grew into the political Sajūdis movement, which was founded on the 3rd of June 1988 by representatives of the intelligentsia. The entire country was joining Sajūdis groups and holding peaceful meetings, Sajūdis meetings brought together hundreds of thousands of people. The Sajūdis movement supported Gorbachev's policies, but at the same time it promoted Lithuanian national issues such as restoration of the Lithuanian language as the "official" language, revelations of the truth about the Stalinist years, protection of the environment, cessation of construction on a third nuclear reactor at the Ignalina nuclear power plant, and disclosure of secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Under the flag of Sajūdis, the symbols of the independent country of the inter-war period were reintroduced publicly, the February 16th Independence Day was widely celebrated in 1988, and the guidelines for restoration of an independent state were defined. Under demands of the Sajūdis, the Lithuanian communist legislature issued a declaration in May 1989

stating that the laws of Lithuania superseded those of the Soviet Union. The illustration of overwhelming participation was a mass protest held on the 23rd of August 1989, the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact), when approximately 2 million people from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia filled the Vilnius-Tallinn road, holding hands and forming the living chain, known as The Baltic Way.

In February 1990, Sąjūdis representatives won national election to the Supreme Council, and on the 11th of March, the Act of the Restoration of Independence was proclaimed. On the 9th of February 1991, an absolute majority of the population of Lithuania voted on a referendum for the restoration of an independent state. Later on, the reality of a liberalized economy lessened the emotionally based participation.

The turnouts of the national elections may provide general indications of changes in citizens' political participation: 72 percent in 1990, 75 percent and 65 percent (second round) in 1992, and 53 percent and 38 percent (second round) in the 1996 elections. Thus in the early transition period of 1988 to 1992 citizen participation was higher than in mid-1990s.

The question about the perception of *citizen participation in the community* is asked to determine whether it was more intense in the municipality ten and five years ago. According to the local leaders, citizen participation in community affairs has remained quite stable compared with participation ten years ago. In both the 1995 and the 1998 study, more than 50 percent of the leaders (55 percent in 1995 and 53 percent in 1998) think that participation in the community is greater compared to ten years ago. Mean differences between 1995 and 1998 data are non-significant.

Lithuanian local government leaders were also asked about citizen participation in community affairs five years ago. When they evaluated the opportunities for people to influence local government decisions, some 60, 24 and 29 percent of local leaders in year 1991, 1995 and 1998 respectively said that, compared to five years ago, there was greater participation by the people in local affairs in the community. All of these differences are statistically significant.

Thus, local leaders' perception about peoples' participation in local affairs of the community declined rapidly from 1991 to 1995, and from 1995 to 1998 it slightly increased again. Our data on participation shows that the year 1991 represents the period of superior citizen participation in local community affairs compared with the later period. These findings are not completely compatible with evaluation of participation ten-years-ago, though clearly political participation was greater in 1995 than in 1985 (the beginning of "perestroika"), but not

necessarily greater in 1998 than in 1988 (during the “Sajūdis” national movement).

The Leaders' *political activism* in expressing his/her opinion through collective action was evaluated using a scale of political activities that leaders are inclined to perform if needed. The mean score of Lithuanian local government leaders' activism in 1991 was -1.45 (the standard deviation is very high at 1.71), in 1995 it was -1.10 (with a standard deviation of 2.19), and in 1998 it was 1.26 (with a standard deviation of 2.18). These changes in the activism score are not statistically significant. However, the leaders increasingly accepted legal political actions: the mean in 1991 was .37, in 1995 it was .60, and in 1998 the mean was .67. Sum scores of legal political action differ significantly comparing 1991 and 1995 as well as between 1991 and 1998.

The most popular forms of political activity are signing petitions, attending legal demonstrations, and joining boycotts. Generally, leaders rejected illegal forms of protest: in 1991 the mean was -1.62, in 1995 it was -1.43, and in 1998 the mean was -1.57. The illegal action score only changed significantly when we compared 1991 and 1995 scores. The leaders were not inclined to join to unofficial strikes and to occupy buildings or factories - the leaders who indicated that they have done or might do such actions decreased across time. Obviously, past political activities of the leaders, and particularly the degree of their involvement in political opposition during the national rebirth period against the Soviet regime, may have influenced their present evaluations of acceptable forms of political actions, but most probably it is the rules of the political “game” that have become more sophisticated and solutions of conflict become increasingly institutionalized.

In connection to these questions, the Lithuanian local government leaders were asked what the *best ways people may influence decisions of authorities* were. On the top of hierarchy of major ways to influence government decisions were referendums and voting, the use of the media, meetings and public debates (results of 1991 and 1998). This represents a mixture of both formal and informal ways of wielding influence. The presidential elections and committees solving specific issues were felt to be less significant, and the least significant ways for people to influence decisions were through trade unions, personal contacts with decision-makers, social movements and organizations (Figure 4.11).

The dominant ways are relatively stable in a sense that they remain in the top ranks with the 1995 data as an exception. Some of the ways for people to influence government decisions - such as referendums and voting, parliamentary elections, political parties, presidential elections, social movements and organizations - eventually lost some of their importance (it is worth noting that these

are mostly formal methods of political participation), while local government as a way of influencing decisions grew in importance. The 1995 survey findings are exceptional with regard to the evaluation of media as well as meetings and public debates, which were not considered as being among the best ways to influence authorities in 1995 and were considerably below the 1991 and 1998 levels. On the whole, local leaders in 1995 can be characterized as emphasizing formal ways of influence, i.e., political participation and ways of influence connected with more "rightist" political views in 1995, when compared with 1991 or 1998.

Right wing (conservatives with LChDP) won a major number of council seats (54 percent) in local elections in 1995, just as in the 1997 elections (45 percent). Therefore, the exceptional evaluation in 1995 of media, meetings and public debates as ways of influencing authorities is difficult to interpret as being solely due to the political background of local leaders. No significant and negative tendency is related to any of the parties in 1995; a lower valuation of media and meetings/debates is common to all respondents.


Thus, the 1995 data does not provide any suggestions as to why media and meetings/public debates as ways of influencing authorities are recognized by very few leaders in 1995. It seems that higher or lower valuations of mass media and meetings is not systematically related with dominant party and party affiliation in general. Lower scores for mass media and meetings in 1995 are a common pattern for all parties and non-party members. Therefore, other explanations, like mass media scandals are more plausible causes. However, the 1991 data shows that Social Democrats tended to perceive the mass media as effective means of influencing decisions just as environmental movement members are keen about meetings and public discussions. In 1998, only Central Union members tended to identify mass media as effective means of influencing authorities, and Homeland Union (conservatives) tended to view the mass media as an unimportant means for people to influence decisions.

When the Lithuanian local leaders were asked about the *importance of political parties* in the country and in their own community, 35 percent said that the political parties are very important in the country. In 1998, this group increased to 54 percent. The local leaders' perception of importance of the political parties in their own communities has changed in the same direction: in 1995, 22 percent of the leaders said that political parties in their own communities are very important, and in 1998, the percentage of leaders thinking that political parties are very important in their own communities increased to 33 percent.

Thus, according to the perception of Lithuanian local government leaders, the importance of political parties' increased at both the national and community levels, although political parties were perceived to be more important in the

country than in the community. Therefore, for the first time in the 1998 survey, the Lithuanian local elite was asked about the most important abilities of political parties.


Figure 4.11
 Best Ways for People to Influence Public Decisions 1991, 1995 and 1998
 (Percent)



Almost 70 percent of the Lithuanian local government leaders referred to the ability of political parties to compete in the elections. The second most important activity was the ability to form majorities in the governing bodies.

Figure 4.12

Why Political Parties are Important 1998 (Percent)



Thus, local leaders think that political parties are typically able to fulfill such issues as competing in the elections, forming majorities, and recruiting candidates for public offices (Figure 4.12).

The most remarkable finding was that, according to the Lithuanian local elite, the weakest ability of parties was involving people in politics. The results

regarding the parties' weak ability of involving people are quite compatible with other findings: for example, the Lithuanian local leaders rarely consider parties the best way for citizens to influence politics (only 16 percent in 1998), but instead consider referendums (39 percent in 1998) and media (39 percent in 1998) as best ways.

Further, as we show in the final section of this chapter, the maintenance of order, not citizen participation, is the overarching goal for most Lithuanian local leaders. Thus, one could argue that these results reveal a clearly expressed gap between democracy and the local governing elite in Lithuania.

Local-Global Relations

The Lithuanian local leaders were asked about their local-global relations for the first time in 1991. In a first general question, the local leaders were asked about their choice of geographical identity, with alternatives ranging from local, regional, national, Baltic, East European, European, to world wide identity.

Figure 4.13 shows that the dominant position remains the national identification with Lithuania as a whole. In 1991, 73 percent of the local leaders identified themselves with Lithuania, in 1995 the proportion of leaders identifying themselves with Lithuania decreased to 36 percent, and in 1998, 50 percent of the leaders said that their first choice of identity was Lithuania.

Identification with the locality or town of residence generally also received strong support. The identification with the locality was quite weak in 1991: only 14 percent of the leaders identified themselves with the locality where they live. However, in 1995 as many as 55 percent of the leaders said that their first choice of identity was the locality or town of residence. In 1998 this opinion remained quite strong with 36 percent of the leaders identifying themselves with locality in the first place. The exceptionally high self-identification with locality in 1995 survey – 55 percent of leaders compared to 14 percent and 36 percent in 1991 and 1998 accordingly - could be viewed as party based phenomena:

The general finding is that LDLP, the main left block party, tends to be most locally orientated, while right block parties – Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives and LChDP – were primarily nationally orientated throughout 1991-1998. Thus, although parties vary in distinct patterns of self-identification in 1991-1998, the changes of dominant parties in local government do not explain exceptionally high self-identification with locality in 1995. In 1995 all parties were more locally oriented compared to in 1998 and 1991.

A better explanation may be that national rebirth and nation state restoration is inseparable from elevated, uncritical and optimistic feelings towards the na-


tion and the state in the early and the late 1990s in Lithuania. However, this cannot be supported by evidence from our data.

The identification with the region of county increased somewhat during the studied period, from 8 percent of the leaders identifying themselves with the region or county in 1991 to 9 percent in 1995 and to 13 percent in 1998.

The least identification is shown in relation to the world as a whole, towards the Baltic region and towards Europe. No one in the 1998 study primarily had a Baltic identity. Only 1 percent in 1991 and 1998 (in 1995, no one) said that they primarily have a European identity. There were 3 percent of the leaders in the 1991 study primarily identifying themselves with the world as a whole, but in 1995 and 1998, no one primarily identified with the world as a whole.

Figure 4.13

Primary Identification 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)




Thus, there is a slight tendency for the local level (below national) to become more expressed. Wider geopolitical identities than the national level do not show any signs of being internalized, as processes of globalization would suggest.

The Lithuanian local government leaders were also asked about foreign impact on their communities (Figure 4.14). The findings show that the perception of foreign impact on the leaders' own community increased considerably between 1991 and 1998. Most clearly, it is the economic impact (foreign investments and exports) that has increased the most in the Lithuanian communities across the studied period.

Figure 4.14

Foreign Impact in the Community 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent "a great deal")



The importance of foreign investments has increased the most during the period. In 1991, only 21 percent of local leaders mentioned that foreign investments had “a great deal” of impact on their own local community. In 1995, the number of leaders saying that foreign investments have “a great deal” of impact on their community increased to 33 percent, and in 1998 it increased even further to 55 percent.

Exports are another foreign impact that has increased dramatically. In 1991, 25 percent of the Lithuanian local government leaders said that exports had “a great deal” of impact on their community, in 1995, 35 percent of the leaders mentioned that exports had a great deal of impact, and in 1998, as many as 49 percent of the leaders perceived exports as having a great deal of impact on what happened in their communities. It is also worth noting that imports and exports exchange places in the hierarchy of impact categories in the 1998 study.

According to the perception of the local leaders, the impact of foreign tourists, foreign language TV and radio also increased. The decrease of environmental pollution impact from other countries was significant only between 1995 and 1998.

Taken all together, there is a total increase in foreign impact on the Lithuanian community, mostly due to perceived economic influence. The increase of foreign impact (from .84 in 1991 to .96 in 1998) is statistically significant at the .05 percent level. These foreign impact scores range from 0 (no impact) to 2 (great impact).

The foreign economic impact score increased from 1.1 in 1991 to 1.4 in 1998. The foreign economic impact score included the questionnaire items of Exports, Imports and Foreign Investments in the community.

The perception of foreign impact from foreigners dropped from .66 in 1991 to .60 in 1998, however, this change is statistically non-significant. The Foreign Impact from People Score includes the questionnaire items of foreign media, pollution from other countries, foreign tourists, and foreign workers.

Thus, the Lithuanian local elite’s opinions reflect an increasing impact of global processes, given that the increase in foreign impact relates to globalization-based processes in the local community.

Finally, the Lithuanian local leaders were also asked an open-ended question about the *most important countries for the future of their communities* (Figure 4.15). In 1998, the most important countries were Germany (54 percent of the leaders mentioned this country as the most important for the future of their community), Poland (40 percent), Sweden (36 percent), Russia (33 percent), and Denmark (31 percent). Only 8 percent of the leaders mentioned France; 4 percent said Italy; and 3 percent saw the USA as the most important country for the future of their community. A surprisingly small number (13 percent) mentioned

Estonia as the most important, but 21 percent of the leaders mentioned Latvia as the most important country for the future of their own community.

There might be some possible explanations: long-term cooperation dating back to communist era; geographical closeness (neighbouring countries); or other historical reasons.

However, in the case of each country, the importance of the country for the future of Lithuanian communities depends on some or all of the reasons mentioned.

The first one might be old cooperation between Lithuanian and other countries' municipalities. Lithuanian municipalities established partnerships during the communist era, when cooperation with other pro-communist European countries and Soviet republics was encouraged that remain today (sixteen Lithuanian municipalities have agreements with Polish towns and some have bilateral agreements with Germany and Scandinavian municipalities).

Poland, a neighbor country, is related to Lithuania both historically and culturally (for more than two hundred years (1569-1795) both were one republic).

Germany is important for historical/cultural reasons, and additionally for economic reasons (if we will look at the economical indicators, we will see that the export from Lithuania to Germany in 1998 made 13 percent, and import was 18 percent of total export/import of the country).

For obvious reasons, *Russia* is important to Lithuania. As with Poland, part of Lithuania was a part of the Russian Empire, and later in the 20th century, part of the USSR. Consequently, not only cultural, but also strong economic ties were developed (exports from Lithuania to Russia in 1998 made up 16.5 percent, and imports were 21 percent of total exports/imports of the country).


Latvia is important as a neighboring Baltic republic, having a similar language and cultural heritage with old ties between municipalities and economic ties between the countries (exports are 11 percent).

Thus, we think that cultural factors and geographic distance between the countries are key variables explaining closer ties between countries and municipalities. The experience of Soviet Union membership still has some effect on partnerships between Lithuania and some countries of the former USSR, but cultural and culturally based economical ties with Finland and Sweden are more decisive than those with former USSR members.

With regard to *Scandinavian* countries, Lithuanian municipalities mostly cooperate with Swedish and Danish municipalities. The importance of these countries is primarily the result of more recent cooperation (humanitarian aid, water purification and other ecological projects that are supported by Sweden and Denmark) than economic reasons.

Figure 4.15

Most Important Countries for the Future of the Community 1998 (Percent)



Comment: Open-ended question. More than one country could be mentioned as most important for the future of the community.

The relationships with the more distant United States, France and Italy have been developed recently, and are seen as less important among the local elite for the future of Lithuanian communities.

The Future of Democracy

Lithuanian local government leaders were asked about the main goals for Lithuania for the next ten years. The main goal, according to the perception of the local leaders, is to maintain order in the nation. One interpretation of this finding is that Lithuanian local leaders still consider strong centralized leadership to be advantageous. In 1991, 74 percent of local leaders mentioned, "maintaining the order in the nation" first. In the 1995 study, the number of leaders who mentioned this goal first increased to 85 percent, and in 1998, this figure decreased to 81 percent.

The proportion of local leaders who perceived that the most important goal for Lithuania is "fighting rising prices" increases from only 7 percent in 1991 to as much as 63 percent in 1995 and only decreased to 50 percent in 1998.

The third most important national goal, according to the leaders' perception, is "giving people more say in important government decisions". The proportion of leaders who said that this participatory goal is the most important for the country gradually increased from 15 percent in 1991, to 25 percent in 1995 and to 40 percent in 1998.

The proportion of leaders who said that the main goal for Lithuania should be "protecting freedom of speech" increased from during the studied period from 4 percent in 1991 to 15 percent in 1995 and to 19 percent in 1998.

Comparing the results of 1991 with the other two studies is not possible in absolute values, because in 1995 and 1998 the respondents could choose between more than one answer, whereas in 1991 they could only choose one. Nonetheless, stability of national goal hierarchy and major change (importance of fighting high prices) in its structure is quite clear.

The question about the perception of the *general functioning of democracy* in Lithuania showed that in 1995, only 1 percent and in 1998, 5 percent of the local leaders said, "our democracy is functioning well." In 1995, 66 percent and in 1998, 81 percent said, "our democracy is functioning but has many shortcomings". Finally, 33 percent of the leaders in 1995 and 14 percent in 1998 of the leaders said, "our democracy is functioning so badly, that there will be no democracy if this continues."

Thus, again it seems that the system of democracy is becoming more established in Lithuania since substantially fewer leaders claimed the worst alternative for democracy in the 1998 study when compared to earlier studies.

Conclusions

There were at least two main changes in the local government legislature between 1990 and 1998: in 1990, when general ideas on local self-government were introduced in the Fundamentals of Local Government Law, and in 1995, when territorial boundaries and the system of municipalities were reconsidered, and territorial state governor offices - county administrations - were established and functions were redistributed between municipalities and counties. These legal changes set the foundations for local self-governance and increased the opportunities for local self-government in the sense that self-governments as institutions were established and were made accountable to voters through elections. But as far as financial autonomy from the center and viable citizen influence were concerned, little changed.

The analysis of the Lithuanian local government leaders' backgrounds during the period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy shows both stability and change. The most profound change in regard to the leaders' institutional background seems to be that a new cadre of local leaders is slowly settling in. Both so-called old-timers (leaders with more than 11 years in their present position or total in public service) are leaving the system, as fewer newcomers (leaders with less than two years in present position) come into the system. This result is also supported by the fact that the average Lithuanian leader is becoming older; especially the proportion of leaders between 40 and 50 years of age is constantly increasing. The other important change is that the number of female leaders in Lithuanian local government has increased considerably, especially between 1991 and 1995, though it slightly decreased again in 1998.

The development of local elite governance shows that the perception of local problems has increased, as has the perception of having the power to act effectively. This development is paired with the leaders' perception of having less power and autonomy concerning those issues that are formally national state or regional county government tasks. Nevertheless, there is an increase in perception of the power and autonomy to act effectively in the areas that are more directly local government responsibilities. The data on the opinions of Lithuanian local government leaders on what level of society should be primarily responsible for different public sector tasks shows that the support for local gov-

ernment in this regard is decreasing. The local leaders tend to pass more responsibility to the State and regional levels of government. According to the perceptions of local leaders, local government has the power to act in the very same areas in which they perceive that they are more influential.

Regarding the support groups or persons to which local leaders turn to when support from others is needed, a major part of the network of support contacts consists of the local and higher administrative elite, and their importance increased during the period studied. Thus, we can see the tendency of network change in Lithuania, where a horizontal and vertical network of contacts with administrative hierarchy becomes more important, while a horizontally shaped network of contacts with civil society becomes somewhat less important. However, the general average numbers of support contacts tend to increase over time.

The most shared values are honesty, followed by economic development, localism and capitalism. The least shared values concern political equality, conflict acceptance and participation; on average, these values received negative scores. Nevertheless, the values of democracy in local governance show clear positive signs of change. The most radical changes in values of democracy and local governance occurred in the early transition period from 1991 to 1995. The most prominent increase between 1991 and 1998 occurred in the values of public participation and political equality. Another indication of the positive development towards conventional democratic ideals is that the value of political equality received higher positive scores compared to previous studies. The minority rights value constantly decreased, but it still remained positively expressed. The latter result is supported by the fact that minority rights - such as right to have their own church, press, schools and parties - are valued less. Nevertheless, social tolerance toward many other groups has increased. The level of interpersonal trust is unstable across the studied period.

Real and serious community conflict declined radically between 1991 and 1995, but did not change between 1995 and 1998. The main transformational processes took place between 1991 and 1995. We would argue that shifts in perceived conflict character reflect the realities of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Income inequalities are perceived as becoming more divisive in Lithuanian communities, while different political views and adherence/opposition to social change are perceived as less divisive. Thus, this may be a sign of the decline of ideological cleavages.

The findings of the local-global relations issues in our study show that the geo-political identity has changed slightly. Most leaders first identify themselves with Lithuania, followed by the locality or town of residence, and the latter shows signs of becoming more expressed across the studied period. Other

findings on local-global relationships clearly show the effects of an increasing foreign impact in the Lithuanian community, mostly due to perceived economic influence (foreign investments and exports). Imports have ceased to be perceived as the strongest foreign impact item, and have gradually been overtaken by perceived foreign investments impact of exports. While the foreign *economic* impact increased, the perception of foreign *people* impact has remained stable. Thus, the Lithuanian local leaders' opinions seem to reflect the increasing impact of objective global processes.

The last part of Lithuanian chapter is related to the functioning and the future of democracy in Lithuania. In evaluating the general functioning of democracy in Lithuania, the largest and increasing proportion of local leaders think that democracy in Lithuania has many shortcomings. Most importantly though, is that across the studied period, the number of those thinking that it functions so badly that it is the end of democracy is gradually lessening.

When evaluating the major methods for citizen to influence government decisions, which is the essential feature of "healthy" democracy, local leaders choose both formal and informal ways, i.e.: referendums and voting on the one hand and the use of the media, meetings and public debates on the other. Nevertheless, the local governing elites rarely consider parties as the best way for citizens to influence politics. When we asked about political parties' abilities, leaders think that political parties are primarily able to fulfill such issues as competing in the elections, forming majorities, and recruiting candidates for public offices. Their weakest ability is involving people in politics. Thus, parties are still not perceived as effective means for citizens to influence and get involved. While the maintenance of order continues to be the overarching goal for Lithuanian local leaders, citizen participation is gradually becoming more important.

Estonian Local Elites a Decade after the Transition to Democracy

Rein Vöörmann

Towards a New Local Government System

The formation and implementation of a modern local government system in Estonia began even before Estonia regained its independence in 1991, when the Local Government Bases Act was approved (Autumn of 1989). According to this Act, Estonian local government consisted of two tiers. Towns, boroughs and rural municipalities were units of the first tier of local government. The units of second tier local government were counties, formed on the basis of former districts. The six towns under republican jurisdiction received the responsibilities of both tiers of local government. All of the units had directly elected councils.

Nevertheless, despite the approval of the new Local Government Bases Act in 1989, a longer period of time was necessary for the first tier local government to truly become self-governing.

From 1990 to 1993, the first round of changes in the local government system was carried out. This also signaled the end of the transition period. As a result, a new system of local government was introduced, which was followed by passing of several new legal acts regulating the functioning of local government. Instead of the two-tier system, a one-tier local government system was introduced. While the tasks of local government between regional and local level had not been properly defined earlier -- because the Local Government Bases Act did not prescribe the separation of authority and functions between the regional and local levels, municipalities now obtained concrete functions and competence. Municipalities acquired their own tax base; the main fiscal sources of local government became the land tax and the personal income tax from the income of the people residing in a municipality (Local Government in Estonia, 1999).

To characterize the party system and its importance on the state level, as well as on the local level, we should first mention that during the Soviet period, Estonia was an one-party state in which the Communist Party controlled the apparatus of the state – both through its stranglehold on the means of coercion

and, more routinely, its vast nomenclature network (Arter 1996). Elections, though based on widespread participation at the national level as well as on the local level, were "non-competitive," designed to strengthen Communist Party control.

The situation started changing at the end of the 1980s. Numerous small interest groups and parties emerged. Political movements, such as the Popular Front, National Movements, the Green Movement, and the Estonian Women's Union played a remarkable role in the emergence of parties in Estonia. Another typical feature was that parties often centered on people and less often represented any kind of political idea or ideology. Because of personal disagreements, parties fragmented and new parties were formed. Thus, for example, thirty-one parties contested the Supreme Soviet elections (first multi-party elections during the Soviet occupation) in March 1990. At the first post-Soviet general election in September 1992, seventeen parties or electoral alliances contested the 101 seats in the Parliament (Made 2001). By 1997, there were 32 officially registered parties in Estonia. Since then, the number of parties has diminished, mainly due to the mergers of smaller groups with bigger parties. In addition, a political organization has to have at least 1,000 members in order to become a fully recognized party.

The most influential parties (have had representatives in Parliament) in Estonia are: Fatherland Union, Estonian Center Party, Estonian Reform Party, Moderates, Estonian People's Union, Estonian United People's Party, Estonian Coalition Party – who ended its activities in 2001, Estonian Country People's Party – who joined the Estonian People's Union in 2000.

However, it should be stated that the development of parties and their acknowledgement in society has been a rather slow process. Less than 2 percent of the electorate are party members (Utno 2001). The diminishing election activity, especially among young people, demonstrates decreasing political interest. Rivalry among the numerous parties hinders the solution of major problems in the society. The rivalry is not so visible at the local level because at that level, the most important task is solving concrete problems and responding to the demands of the citizens.

Local Government Today

Estonia consists of 15 counties, which are units of the central administration at regional level. There are 247 local government units in Estonia – 42 towns and

205 rural municipalities (2001). Generally, the local governments are quite small and range between 1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants.¹

According to the present Local Government Organization Act, the Estonian local government consists of one tier. This Act gives considerable autonomy to local government; it only determines the general principles of the institutional structure and the administration of municipalities. The statute of each municipality determines the institutional structure and the rules of procedure of the specific local authority (Local Government in Estonia, 1999).

The municipal council is the legislative body of a municipality, elected at general, uniform and direct elections by secret ballot for a term of three years. Unlike parliamentary elections in which only Estonian citizens are entitled to vote, foreigners who are legally and permanently residing in Estonia are entitled to vote in local elections, but they may not to be elected. Local council members are elected according to the proportional electoral system as single candidates or on the bases of candidate lists. Both nationally registered parties and candidate lists that are not related to specific parties can take part in elections. Thus, the single candidates and candidates from party lists that acquire more than 5 percent of the valid votes may become members of the local council.

The chairman is the head of the council. The authority of the municipal council includes: decisions related to the budget, taxes, fees and duties, loans, tax incentives, foundations of the local government; decisions related to municipal property; approval of the development plan and the statute of the municipality; alteration of the boundaries of a municipality and formation of municipal districts (i.e. without interference of the central government, according to neighboring municipalities' approval); decisions on general issues concerning the council and government; and approval of building regulations.

The executive board of the municipality is appointed to office for a three-year period. It is led by the mayor, who is also the head of the municipal administration. The latter usually consists of departments and the office staff.

Local government has to carry out a wide range of tasks. According to the Local Government Organization Act, a municipality is responsible for organizing the provision of general education, recreational activities and social care. They also take care of housing and communal matters, water supply, sanitation, public work, physical planning, municipal public transport and maintenance of municipal roads. Municipalities also organize the construction and maintenance

¹ However, there are plans to implement an administrative reform plan that would significantly reduce the number of local governments. The main aim of the reform is to increase the effectiveness of local governing (Leimann *et al* 1997, Almann 1999, Pöör 2000).

of infrastructure necessary for providing the public services (Ludvig *et al*, 1999).

Municipalities have their own tax base, i.e. local budgets are separated from the state budget. The taxes paid into local budgets are divided into two categories: 1) State taxes imposed by law and constituting the main taxation base of municipalities - *personal income tax* (26 percent of an employee's income) of which municipalities receive 56 percent, collected from the income of the inhabitants of a municipality, *land tax* which is fully paid into local budgets and *resource tax*. 2) Local taxes imposed by local councils pursuant to law. Local council may also, for example, impose local income tax, sales tax and road and street closure tax. However, only a few municipalities have imposed these taxes.

In addition, the support fund allocates financial resources from the state budget for supporting the local budgets. The purpose of the fund is to balance excessive differences among the income bases of different municipalities and also to provide also the weakest municipalities with the possibility to rendering public services to its inhabitants. Municipalities also receive grants allocated for specific purposes, mainly to support municipal investments (Local Government in Estonia, 1999).

The Sample of Municipalities and Local Leaders

In 1998 Estonia joined the *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG) project, an international collaborative research program on democracy and the process of democratization at local level (Jacob *et al*, 1971; Jacob, Ostrowski & Teune 1993). Thus, the Estonian data consists of only one survey, performed in 1999, carried out as a joint project by the Institute for International and Social Studies, Tallinn Pedagogical University and the Euro University in Tallinn. While we are unable to compare the present data with data from the beginning of 1990s to analyze what has changed since that time, the Estonian data provides an opportunity to present a picture of the beliefs, values and behavior of local officials (the terms "local officials" and "local leaders" are used interchangeably in the text).

The first step in the preparation of the fieldwork was becoming familiar with the DLG program and translating the original international questionnaire, updated in 1995, into Estonian and Russian. All other preparatory work (sampling, printing the questionnaires etc.) was done during the spring of 1999. The fieldwork was started in June. During June, July and August of 1999, 201 municipal officials in 35 towns all over Estonia, except Tallinn, participated in the study. Every respondent received a mail questionnaire and answered according to the

instructions provided in the questionnaire. The survey was not conducted in rural municipalities. These 201 local leaders were selected according to the population size of the town (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1

Distribution of the Respondents by Type of Town/City

Number of In habitants	Number of Towns/ Cities	Number of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Less than 5,000	15	27	13
5,001 - 10,000	9	27	13
10,001 - 25,000	7	45	22
25,001 - 100,000	3	55	28
More than 100,000	1	47	24
TOTAL	35	201	100

The respondents' social background characteristics show that the sample consists of a group of people between 22 and 70 years of age, where the average age is 45 and 52 percent are male. The share of Estonians was 79 percent, and the others are mainly Russians. As many as 78 percent have some sort of university education, and quite a few have a working class or middle class background. Nineteen percent of the respondents have parents who held or hold a corresponding position as the respondent. Quite a large number, 81 percent, claim that they are atheists or indifferent to religion (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2
Social Background (Percent)

Background Characteristics	% (N)
Age (mean)	45
Age Cohorts	
-39	32 (63)
40-49	31 (61)
50-59	29 (57)
60+	7 (14)
	<u>100 (195)</u>
Gender	
Male	52 (104)
Female	48 (95)
	<u>100 (199)</u>
Education	
Primary	1 (2)
Secondary	21 (41)
University	78 (157)
	<u>100 (200)</u>
Class (father's occupation)*	
Working-class	58 (102)
Middle-class	38 (67)
Upper-class	4 (7)
	<u>100 (176)</u>
Ethnic group (Language of questionnaire)	
Estonian	79 (158)
Russian	21 (43)
	<u>100 (201)</u>
Active Parent	
Held corresponding position	19 (38)
Religion	
Lutheran	11 (21)
Catholic	2 (4)
Orthodox	6 (11)
Indifferent/atheist	81 (150)
	<u>100 (186)</u>

* There are some difficulties with coding occupational status from open-ended questions. Therefore, these results should be considered with some care.

The institutional background of the respondents is presented in Table 5.3. It shows that most of the sample consists of appointed officials or administrators (84 percent), while 16 percent are elected. Most of them, between 62 to 65 percent, have held their position in local government (present position or total in public service) for about three to ten years, and almost one-third of the officials have held their present position for less than two years. Thus, the great bulk of the Estonian local elite belongs to what may be labeled a new cadre. Nevertheless, as many as 22 percent have held positions in public service for more than eleven years, which most probably means that they started their carriers during the Estonian-Soviet era.

Table 5.3
Institutional Background (Percent)


Background Characteristics	% (N)
Type of Elite	
Politician (Elected)	16 (30)
Administrator (Appointed)	84 (157)
	<u>100 (187)</u>
In Present Position	
- 2 years	29 (50)
3-10 years	62 (107)
11- years	9 (15)
	<u>100 (172)</u>
In Average (Mean)	5
In Public Service	
- 2 years	13 (19)
3-10 years	65 (94)
11- years	22 (31)
	<u>100 (144)</u>
In Average (Mean)	8

One out of five was a member of a political party and all of the most influential parties in Estonia were represented - Estonian Center Party (5 percent of all respondents), Estonian Reform Party (4 percent), Fatherland Union (3 percent), Estonian Coalition Party (3 percent), Moderates (2 percent).

Local Problems and Effective Action

The Soviet-type authoritarian system created skepticism toward the executive power of local governments. Most problems were solved on the level of the central government, and the task of local authorities was simply to follow the “rules of the game.” This situation has changed in all Eastern European countries (Coulson 1995, Kirchner 1999). The reforms of local governance presented the administrative systems with new and different kind of tasks.

Figure 5.1
Local Problems (Percent)



Today local governments in Estonia have to deal with a wide spectrum of problems, ranging from unemployment to ethnic relations. Some of these problems

are more serious and need much more attention and time, while others are less important and can be solved but not immediately. There is no doubt that the perception of problems by local officials also differs according to the importance of the problem to a specific locality. Mapping the variation in problems perceived by local leaders provides information that is relevant for discussion of the relationship between the powers and functions of the local government, on the one hand, and the actual problems with which localities are faced, on the other hand (Baldersheim *et al.*, 1996). The survey data on the most important local problems as perceived by the Estonian local elite suggest that local officials have to consider a wide range of problems in their municipalities, and are not focused on a narrow set of municipal functions (Figure 5.1).

Unemployment is the most serious problem according to local leaders. The second and third places are occupied by economic development (or more accurately – very slow development) and poverty. The importance of these issues as problems has also been shown in several special studies on unemployment, economic development and living standard/poverty (Terk 1995, Eamets *et al.*, 1999, Eamets 1999, Kutsar 1999, Pettai 2001).

These three problems are interrelated and are typical of post-Soviet countries. Economic restructuring, which started at the beginning of 1990s, has significantly influenced everyday life. On one hand, the Estonian economic reform has been one of the most radical among the post-socialist countries, particularly with regard to its highly liberal economic principles and the modest role of the state (de Melo *et al.*, 1996). Estonia is frequently used as an example of success. On the other hand, the social cost of the reforms in Estonia has been high. The labor market of Estonia, as well as of other transitional economies, has witnessed an increase in the unemployment rate and involuntary job shifts. It was shock for the people when guaranteed employment was replaced by competition for the rapidly reducing number of jobs (Estonian Human Development 1997).

With reference to economic development in Estonia, it should be mentioned that the most common trend has been unequal regional development, in which Tallinn as the capital city obtained a major advantage compared to the rest of Estonia, especially the South or Northeast parts of Estonia. This is probably why (disproportional) economic development has appeared among the most important and frequently mentioned problems.

Economic and social changes, unemployment, uncertainty about the future etc. significantly increased the crime-rate in Estonia in 1990s. Probably as a result, public safety is also viewed as a very serious problem by local officials, however, much less so when compared with those mentioned among the first three. Local infrastructure, which should develop more rapidly, considering its underdevelopment during the Soviet period and especially in small towns, is not

seen as very urgent. It is remarkable that the cost of local government is mentioned as a problem more frequently than pollution, housing, quality of education etc. In situations when the resources of local governments are limited and they have to "count the money," increasing numbers of officials realize that local bureaucracy needs an enormous amount of money for its own existence and that something should be done to avoid large expenses.


As to the perception of problems based on ethnicity, Estonians more frequently stress problems of housing and the cost of local government, while for non-Estonians (mainly Russian leaders) the biggest problems are unemployment and economic development. For example, unemployment as a very serious problem is mentioned by 88 percent of non-Estonians (compared to 41 percent of Estonians), economic development by 72 percent (Estonians: 35 percent). Such a big share of non-Estonian local officials who think that these two issues are a very serious problem can be explained by their locality and the whole social and economic situation in the area located in the Northeast part of Estonia (in other municipalities, Estonians make up the majority), where the economic transition had very serious consequences. Several large enterprises were closed down or reorganized and many people became unemployed. This complicated situation is still reflected in the perception of problems by local municipal officials.

Taken all together, we can see that in general, Estonian local officials consider local problems as a whole as at least somewhat serious - the mean of the problem perception scale is .91 (this average score ranges from 0 (no problem) to 2 (very serious problem)).

The perception of problems by local leaders is just one aspect of local governance. Another question is: is effective action taken to solve the problems and do local authorities have enough power and autonomy to act effectively at all?

According to the survey data, the first and most general conclusion that can be drawn is that there is an inverse proportion between the importance that local officials attached to the problems and the effective actions taken to solve the problems (Figure 5.2). The same inverse proportion also applies to the importance of problems and officials' belief in the local government's power and autonomy to act effectively upon them. It should be mentioned that the same could be seen in other countries as well (Jacob *et al*, 1993). The most effective actions are taken, according to the Estonian local officials' suggestion, in the following areas: recreation and culture, education, health services, social services and welfare. At the same time, no action or some effective action, is taken to solve the problems of unemployment, poverty and economic development.

Figure 5.2
Effective Action (Percent)



The inverse proportion between the importance of problems and effective actions can be caused by several factors. First, there are some or no problems, for example in the quality of education and health services, because the problems are mostly solved as a result of effective actions already taken. A second possible scenario, which is more serious, is that all of the efforts of local governments are going in the wrong direction - instead of dealing with unemployment or economic development as urgent issues, the local governments are creating opportunities for recreation and culture. A third explanation might be that the inverse proportion between serious problems and effective action depends on the lack of autonomy and power to act effectively. As one can see from the next section, it is quite evident that it is the lack of autonomy and power to act effectively in the areas of support to the poor, economic growth, unemployment and


public safety that creates both great problems and less effective action. The mean of the effective action scale is .86 (this average score ranges between 0 (no effective action) to 2 (effective action)).

Powers and Responsibilities

In dealing with community problems, the local government needs power and autonomy. Because of this, it is interesting to see whether the local elite has enough autonomy and power to solve local problems and work effectively.

Figure 5.3

Autonomy and Power to Act Effectively (Percent)



As one can see, Estonian local government indeed has power to act upon several problems (Figure 5.3). However, this power is in some sense limited; according to the officials' opinion, the local government has enough power and autonomy to act effectively upon the problems which are considered not very serious (Figure 5.1), such as recreation and culture, quality of education, public improvements etc. On the issues that are mentioned as serious problems, unfortunately the local government lacks power. Probably because of that, few effective actions are taken in those areas that are most seriously problematic as indicated in the previous section. The local power/autonomy scale score is .61 (this average score ranges between 0 (lacks power) to 1 (has power)).

Table 5.4

Opinion about the Primary Responsibility for Different Public Sector Functions (Percent)*

Public Sector Functions	Central Government	Local Government	Local Govt. with others	Central Govt. w. local
Education	44	20	12	12
Employment	41	15	14	7
Poor people	45	23	8	12
Health services	34	31	6	11
Housing	16	57	6	10
Culture and recreation	-	63	21	-
Pollution	30	22	14	9
Social services and welfare	25	34	14	14
Minority Relations	44	13	6	3
Economic development	61	4	9	5

* Share of the respondents, who supported that statement.

On the other hand, the decisionmaking process depends on several factors; first of all, who is responsible, or who the local authorities think should have the primary responsibility – the local government or someone else. There is no doubt that "outside" forces, primarily the central government, have a consider-

able influence on local decisions. This may not be surprising since quite recently, 10 to 15 years ago, all major decisions were made at the central government level and the local authorities task was simply to implement those decisions. Today the situation has changed, but sometimes the central government, as well as local leaders, still tries to act as it did in earlier times. Because of this, local officials answers to the question, “who should have the primary responsibility for different issues” are extremely important. On every single issue, respondents were offered a choice between several institutions.

Table 5.4 presents the data on four of them – central government, local government, local government with other organizations, and central government in cooperation with local government.


As one can see, the local government came in first in the case of housing problems, social services and recreation and culture. These suggestions are supported by 63, 57 and 34 percent of the respondents respectively. Significantly fewer local officials supported the idea that the local government should be primarily responsible for other problems. An extreme example is economic growth – only 4 percent of the respondents support the idea that economic development should be the local government’s responsibility. In most cases, the most important role is given to the central government. Thus, over 40 percent of the local leaders support the idea that in case of economic growth, poor people, education, ethnic relations, and employment, the central government should have the primary responsibility. This can be expected primarily because of local governments’ limited financial resources. Another explanation for this finding is, at least partly, that the central government is still considered more important than the local government, and should therefore take primary responsibility for the problems that concern most people. Thus, it seems that the Estonian local elite want more central government responsibility in the areas regarded as most seriously problematic (economic development, employment and support to the poor), where few effective actions are undertaken locally and local government lacks the autonomy and power to act effectively.

Influence and Support

In addition to the local government, which has power and acts upon the problems as an institution, an extremely important role is played by every single local leader. All decisions of the local government are made not by anonymous and impersonal bodies, but by the human beings who make up this institution. The stronger the local officials' belief that their personal activity could make some difference for decisions and outcomes, the more effective their everyday

work should be. In this sense, let us take a look at the question of how much influence local officials believe they have on the problems that are found in their communities.

Figure 5.4
Personal Influence (Percent)




According to the DLG survey data, personal influence on the problems by local officials is, unfortunately, quite weak (Figure 5.4). The overall greatest influence over what is accomplished in the community concerns culture, recreation and sports, as well as other issues that are perceived as not very urgent or problematic (compare the findings of Figure 5.1). At the same time, 50 percent or more of the respondents say that they have no influence over what is accomplished in their community in the areas of housing, political organization activity, health, collection and distribution of public revenue, employment, economic development and ethnic relations, covering about half of the offered for the es-

timation issues. The scale mean of the average personal influence is .63 (on a scale that ranges from 0 (no influence) to 2 (great influence)).

Figure 5.5

Persons/Organizations to Turn to for Support (Percent)



An interesting picture appears if one looks at the question: “When you as a leader are in a situation in which support from others is necessary, to whom do you usually turn?” As one can see from Figure 5.5, the most frequently men-

tioned source of support is officials at the local level – local top administrative officials, local elective officials, and administrative colleagues at their own level. Quite often, even close friends (who may be also colleagues) are mentioned as a source of support. Among the non-local sources of support, first place is occupied by higher administrative officials, this group is mentioned by less than 50 percent of the respondents. Thus, it is important to stress that local officials as a source of support have a clear advantage compared with the state, county or higher administrative officials. The reason may be that the central government officials are far away, but support and help is usually needed very quickly. These findings – local support contacts have preferences comparable to non-local support contacts – are confirmed also in an analysis of the number of contacts mentioned by the Estonian local elite (the mean is .50 and .30 respectively on a scale range from 0 to 1).


The most important contact for support outside the political system is the local media – one quarter of the local governing elite mentioned it as a contact to turn to when support from others is needed. Quite remarkable is the fact that party leaders (local or higher level), as well different groups of the local civil society, such as local business groups, neighborhood organizations and/or local leaders of political movements, are seen as important sources of support by rather few leaders. An extremely unimportant role in offering support is played by the local trade unions. This is not surprising if we consider that trade unions in present-day Estonia, as a whole, have little influence.

The biggest difference between Estonians and non-Estonians (mainly Russians) is as follows – if Estonians turn to the local as well as to the state level officials for support, then non-Estonians are skeptical about state level officials; they prefer to ask co-workers for support. As a whole, it should be mentioned that local leaders use a limited number of sources of support. One of the reasons for this may be that local officials are rather doubtful concerning the questions whether most people can be trusted (as we shall see in the next section on leader values).

Values of Democracy and Local Governance

The value most committed to (the value scales ranges from a minimum of -100 for strongly disagree to maximum 100 for strongly agree) is honesty and openness, followed by, localism and economic development. The support for the value of capitalism and participation is somewhat lower. The least shared values concern conflicts and economic equality (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6
Local Elite Values (Means)




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The scales ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

An important question with respect to democracy is the attitude towards ethnic minorities. As people who come in close contact with local people in their everyday work, local officials should have quite tolerant attitude to all minority groups. For those unfamiliar with the ethnic situation in Estonia, somewhat less than one million of the country's inhabitants are ethnic Estonians, a further four hundred come from other groups, mainly Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians, many of whom came or were brought by organized migration to live in Estonia during the Soviet era. Thus, most of these so-called non-Estonians are immigrants or their children, born in Estonia. All this means that a once ethnically homogenous country (Estonians comprised 97 percent of population in 1945) became the country of residence for more than one hundred different ethnic minorities during the Soviet occupation (Estonian Human Development Report, 1995).

The vast majority of local officials support the idea that these ethnic minorities should have the right to have their own institutions and organizations, as well as representatives in the elected bodies (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7
Minority Rights (Percent)




Somewhat more questionable however, is the right to have political parties (69%). The answers to the question of whether national minorities should have the right to have their own language recognized as official are very contradictory (34%). Among local leaders with Estonian heritage, the share of respondents supporting that idea is 23 percent, while among non-Estonian leaders, the corresponding share is 65 percent (for non-Estonians their own language means Russian). Such a big difference, however, does not mean that Estonians have nationalistic point of view concerning language. According to the Language Law there is one official language in Estonia - Estonian. The Russian language, despite the opinion of non-Estonians, cannot be the second official language in Estonia due to the historical development of Estonia during the last half of century.

Further, Figure 5.8 shows that fifty percent or more of the respondents have a negative attitude towards seven out of fourteen groups (starting with homeless people and ending with gypsies). More tolerance is claimed towards groups

such as people with large families, people from a different ethnic group, immigrants/foreign workers.

Figure 5.8
Groups not wanted as Neighbors (Percent)



These findings measuring democratic values may also explain why only 46 percent of the Estonian local officials claim that most people can be trusted.

Cleavages and Conflict in the Community

The DLG survey data shows that 58 percent of the municipal officials suggest that there are no conflicts in their community, while 42 percent answer in the affirmative. Among those who notice conflicts interfering with effective action, 50 percent (21 percent from all respondents) think these conflicts "very much"

stops development. Thirty-seven percent think these conflicts to some degree hinder community development, while 13 percent do not think that these conflicts are problem for community.

These community conflicts between people may be caused by several factors. Figure 5.9 presents the data on to what extent a row of differences tend to divide people in the individual leaders own community?

Figure 5.9
Differences Dividing People in the Community (Percent)



The most important factor that may cause the conflict appears to be differences in income, which is supported by two-thirds of the respondents. This is not surprising if one takes into account that market reforms carried out in Estonia since

the beginning of 1990s have had a great influence on incomes. Some people have become relatively rich, but most are living from paycheck to paycheck, i.e. incomes differentiate notably compared with the Soviet period. All other factors besides income receive remarkably lower support. Thus, differences between the young and old and managers and employees as very important factors are mentioned by only one-quarter of local leaders. Over 40 per cent of the respondents claim that factors such as differences in religious beliefs or affiliation, urban and rural differences, and ethnic origins are not important or divisive.

Thus, the perception is that political issues are seen as less divisive in the community, while some economic and social issues are considered more divisive forces in the community. In this sense, especially the ethnic origin, which is very often considered to be a dividing factor of people in Estonia, should be mentioned as less important. It might be that differences in income divide people more deeply than the ethnic origins.

Participation, Influence and Political Action by Leaders

In terms of the practical realization of democracy, how citizens perceive the relevance of politics and how they see their own role in the decisionmaking process is extremely important. Democracy presumes that citizens are active participants, not just passive objects of the political system. Active participation expects citizens to understand the importance of politics in their daily lives, have the ability to take part in politics and believe that such participation has practical outcomes.


There are several possibilities for citizens to participate in the decisionmaking process. Some of these are believed to be more, others less effective. The DLG survey data provides an opportunity to describe how people can best influence the decisions according to the local officials' suggestion (Figure 5.10).

The first four are referendum voting (supported by 76 percent), the use of the media (62 percent), local government bodies (52 percent), and political parties (47 percent). Less important ways to influence decisions are presidential elections, committees to solve specific issues and trade unions, which are supported by 11, 20 and 26 percent of the respondents respectively. If Estonia's local leaders support referendums as the best way for people to influence politics, then non-Estonians are quite skeptical about this measure of influence, as well as about Parliamentary elections and public debates. One of the reasons why non-Estonians do not support elections and debates to the same extent as Estonians

may be their earlier negative experience in using these measures as democratic instruments.

Figure 5.10

Best Ways for People to Influence Public Decisions (Percent)




Another question which the respondents were asked concerns citizen participation in local affairs in general, but this time, in terms of a dynamic, i.e., municipal officials were asked to indicate whether citizens participated in local politics in a greater or lesser degree compared with the situation ten or five years before. The DLG survey data confirm that 39 percent think it has increased the last five years, and 61 percent think it has increased the last ten years. If we add the share of the respondents who reports on this matter "about the same," one can say that the majority of local leaders see improvement in citizen participation in local politics.

The average leader has participated in between one and two of four different suggested political actions, including signing a petition, participating in a boycott, demonstration, and/or an unofficial strike.

Local-Global Relations

The findings presented in Figure 5.11 show that the main tendency is as follows: the smaller the unit of identification, the bigger the share of officials who have identified themselves as members of that unit. Thus, 78 percent have identified themselves with a locality or town, where the local leaders live; 55 percent identify with Estonia as a whole; and 23 percent identify with the whole continent of Europe. There is an important difference in the identification between Estonians and non-Estonians. Estonians identify themselves with the locality where they live, region of country and/or Estonia as a whole more frequently than non-Estonians, whereas the Russian-speaking people identify themselves more often with Europe and the world as a whole. Thus, Non-Estonians are not as closely tied to small localities as Estonians are.


Figure 5.11
Primary Identification (Percent)



As for the most important country for the future of the community (this question was asked as an open-ended question, i.e. every respondent had the possibility of writing as many countries as he/she considered necessary), the most fre-

quently mentioned were Russia, Finland and Sweden (Figure 5.12). These three were followed by Germany, other Nordic countries and Latvia. Every eleventh respondent mentioned European countries as a whole, however, specific countries such as France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain etc. were never mentioned as most important for the future of the Estonian community. Most surprisingly, our Baltic neighbor Lithuania was also seldom mentioned. Finally, speaking more globally, for example about the G-7 countries, the US was mentioned by 4 percent of the respondents, while Japan and Canada were not mentioned at all.


Figure 5.12
Most Important Countries for the Future of the Community (Percent)



One more aspect of local-global relations is the foreign impact in the community. According to the perception of the local leaders, foreign investments have the most important role to play in the community. Many, 67 percent of the respondents, say that foreign investments have a great deal of impact in their community (Figure 5.13). Exports also have a significant foreign impact in the community (46 percent of respondents). These two, foreign investments and exports, are followed by imports and foreign tourists. Foreign workers was mentioned as having the least important impact in the community, which will probably change when Estonia becomes a member of the European Union.

Figure 5.13

Foreign Impact in the Community (Percent)



Taken all together, the foreign economic score is 1.42, the foreign people score is .70, while the mean of the foreign impact as a whole is 1.01 (these scores range from 0 (no impact) to 2 (a great deal of impact)).

Parties and the Future of Democracy


The new party system began to emerge in Estonia as well as in other Central and East European countries with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Communist party in the late 1980s. The system of the one party rule, in which the leading role belonged to the Communist Party in all sectors of society, was replaced by multi-party parliamentary systems with democratically elected and accountable governments (see, for example, Offe 1996, Lauristin *et al* 1997, Rona-Tas 1997, Holmes 1998).

The first multi-party elections in Estonia (Supreme Council - parliament) were held in 1990. All of this implies that the multi-party system in Estonia developed very rapidly. Today, political parties should play quite an important role in the political as well as in everyday life in Estonia. However, looking at the survey data one can see that there is, according to local officials' suggestion, a big difference in the influence of parties on the national and local levels. While 64 percent of the local officials claim that political parties are very important in Estonia as a whole, only 28 percent believe the same at the community level. Thus, on the latter level political parties are considered to have only some importance. As a result, it is important to take a look at why people join political parties and what the aims of political parties are.

Local leaders believe that the most important motive for joining political party is to have political influence (54 percent of the respondents consider this motive very important); second, to contribute to the development of their local community (45 percent); and third, to support democracy (38 percent). The least supported motives include keeping family tradition (3 percent) and helping others (13 percent). Figure 5.14 provides a more interesting picture as to why political parties are important.

The idea that political parties are intended to create majorities in legislative and executive bodies and to conduct electoral campaigns received the greatest support (both are supported by two-thirds of the respondents). The last two places (in other words, the most unimportant aim of the political parties) are occupied by the assertions that a political party should meet the interests of its electorate and involve people in politics – only one out of three support these ideas. Thus, the most important reasons for having parties, according to the local leaders' suggestions, are very practical (forming majorities). Thus, citizens' participation seems much less important.

Figure 5.14
Why Political Parties are Important (Percent)



As for the future of Estonian democracy more generally, the main goal for the next ten years, according to the suggestion of local leaders, is to maintain order in the nation – this statement is supported by 76 percent of respondents. The proportion of local officials saying that the main goal for Estonia should be "giving people more say in important government decisions" was relatively large (58 percent) as well. Goals such as "fighting rising prices" and "protecting freedom of speech" – important issues in the very late of 1980s in the eve of the Estonian independence – were no longer seen as very important aims for the coming ten years (supported respectively by 33 and 22 percent of the respondents). The reason might be that these goals are taken for granted in the independent and democratic Estonia.

In the perception of the general functioning of democracy in Estonia, it appears that only 5 percent of local leaders consider it to function well. As many as 77 percent agree with the statement "our democracy is functioning, but has many shortcomings," and 18 percent think, "our democracy is functioning so badly, that there will be no democracy if this continues." Thus, while the largest proportion of local leaders in Estonia see a functioning democracy, they are somewhat critical toward it. They tend to have a more promising view of democracy in the future context.

Conclusions

The formation and implementation of modern local government system, which is totally different from the Soviet centralized and controlled system, started in Estonia in the very end of 1980s. However, a longer period was needed for the local government to become truly self-governing. By 1994 the first round of changes in local government system was carried out, and the transition period was over. As a result, a new system of local government was introduced, which continues to exist today.

The Democracy and Local Governance project, carried out in Estonia in 1998-1999, provides an opportunity to analyze what local leaders think about the local problems, local officials' power to act upon the problems, personal influence, responsibility, democratic values, local-global relations, the future of local governance and democracy.

Local officials have to consider a wide range of problems in their municipalities. The most serious problem is unemployment. The second and third places are occupied by economic development (or more accurately, very slow development) and poverty. However, there is an inverse proportion between the importance that local officials have attached to the problems and the effective actions taken to solve the problems. The same (inverse proportion) applies also to the importance of problems and officials' belief in the local government's power and autonomy to act effectively upon them. Perhaps as a result of this, the housing problems, recreation and culture, social services are considered the primary responsibility of the local government, while economic growth, poverty, quality of education, ethnic relations, and unemployment are believed to be responsibility of the central government.

The value most committed to is honesty and openness, followed by rule of law, localism and economic development. The least shared value concerns economic equality. Opinions on minority rights demonstrate substantial tolerance - the vast majority of local officials support the idea that ethnic minorities should have the right to have their own institutions and organizations, as well as representatives in the (local) elected bodies.

The most important factor mentioned that probably causes conflicts in the local community appears to be differences in income. It is not surprising as the development towards the market-based society has increased the disparity in incomes. The perception of political issues is seen as less dividing in the community.

An interesting picture was revealed in connection to the issues of local-global relations. On the one hand, most local leaders first identify with their locality or town. This is in line with the old and closed system of society. On the

other hand, the most frequently mentioned countries considered important for the future of the community are Russia, Finland and Sweden or other Nordic neighborhood countries, but not the Baltic neighborhood countries.

The best ways for people to influence the decisionmaking process is through voting in referendum, use of media, and through political parties. The latter is in certain conflict with the local officials' opinion as to why parties are important - assertions that a political party should meet the interests of its electorate and involve people into politics is cited as the least important role for political parties. In addition, while the citizens' participation in the local decisionmaking process in general has increased during the last decade, according to the local leaders, there are several forms of organization, including political parties, that have not been developed enough.

The Development of Democracy and Local Governance in Latvia

Edvins Vanags, Lilita Seimuskane and Inga Vilka

Recent Development in the Local Government System

The traditions of autonomous local governments in Latvia between the two world wars were interrupted in the Soviet period. The local council elections held in December 1989 were the first democratic elections in the postwar period. The elections were competitive, with more than one candidate running for each – post, and a majority system was implemented. Local government laws were passed in February 1990 when the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR government adopted three separate laws on district, city and rural local governments. A short time before the re-establishment of the independent Republic of Latvia – a process in which the local governments played a great role (before Parliament voted on Latvia's independence, all local government council members met and voiced their support for Latvia's independence) – the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia issued laws "On Town/City Municipalities" and "On Rural Municipalities" (April 1991). Subsequently, a new law on regional (district) government was introduced in February 1992. The laws adopted in 1991 and 1992 were oriented more towards the decentralization and strengthening of local self-governments.

Thus, one of the key tasks in Latvia's transformation towards democracy was local government reform. The Cabinet of Ministers accepted the concept of reform in September 1993 with the main goals of: democratizing and decentralizing state power and administration; increasing the accountability of local governments in fulfilling the tasks delegated to them; improving the quality of public services rendered to local residents; and increasing public participation in the processes of administration. The steps in the reform of local government included: 1) implementing a new law on the election of local government councils common to rural and urban municipalities and regional governments, 2) administrative–territorial reorganization, 3) improving the local budget system, 4) creating territorial information systems, 5) establishing training institutions for the deputies and staff of local governments, and 6) organizing a system for

negotiations and communication between the Cabinet of Ministers and local governments.

The Law “On Local Governments” that passed in May 1994 was the first in the history of Latvia that applied to all types of government – rural municipalities, town/city municipalities and district governments. It is the highest governing document addressing local governments in Latvia since no provisions are made on this issue in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. In comparison with laws passed in 1991 and 1992, the 1994 law was more oriented on centralization, i.e. it increased the supervision of local governments by central government. However, the law has been amended more than 10 times since it was passed, for example some additional functions were delegated to local governments by central government. According to the law, local governments are subject to public law in the administrative sense, but they have the rights of a legal person in the scope of private law. Here, local governments are given the right to participate in entrepreneurial activities, own and manage private property and real estate, conclude agreements and engage in other private transactions. In addition, they can bring actions in court and complaints to administrative offices and they have access to information from state offices that are located in the given administrative territory.

The Parliament accepted the European Charter on Local Self-government in February 1996. Latvia has accepted twenty-nine of the thirty paragraphs of the European Charter (the paragraph not adopted is paragraph 8 of article 9, insuring access to national capital markets). However, not all principles fully comply with the Charter: for example, the principles of local self-government are still not recognized in the Constitution. Therefore, proposals are being prepared to amend the constitution to include an additional chapter on the position and role of local governments in the administrative structure.

Latvia’s local government system consists of two levels. The local level includes (at the end of 1999, when survey of local leaders was made): 72 towns and cities; 479 rural municipalities; and 7 amalgamated municipalities, which were established as a result of ongoing administrative – territorial reform since 1998. The regional level includes: 26 districts and 7 republican cities that simultaneously represent both local and regional levels of government (these 7 cities are also included in the 72 towns and cities above).

More than 70 percent of all municipalities are small municipalities with less than two thousand inhabitants. The small rural municipalities have insufficient capacity to provide all local functions. The level of socio-economic development in large municipalities is higher than in small municipalities.

After the re-establishment of independence, the functions and responsibility of local governments were increased, but administrative-territorial divisions

remained unchanged. The first attempts to amalgamate small and medium-sized municipalities in 1992 and 1993 were unsuccessful because they were prepared “from above” without participation of the local governments.

In October 1998, the Parliament passed the law “On Administrative–Territorial Reform.” The new law and reform initiatives are based on a serious analysis of the economic, social and political background and voluntary amalgamation of local governments. According to the Law, the goal of administrative-territorial reform is to create administrative territories with local and regional governments that would provide qualitative services to the inhabitants and would be capable of ensuring economic development.

The administrative–territorial reform of local governments has been implemented in two stages: 1) on the initiative of local governments through December 31, 2003; and 2) according to the projects worked out by the responsible state institution – from January 1, 2004 to November 30, 2004 (Law “On Administrative-Territorial Reform”). Amalgamation of local governments was voluntary in the first stage, but mandatory during the second stage. It was proposed that the number of municipalities should be reduced from over 500 to around 100 local governments, and from about 30 to 5 regional governments in Latvia.

The Parliament passed the Law of the Republic of Latvia “On Elections to the Town/City Dome, Regional Council, and Rural Municipality Council” in January 1994. Regular elections to councils are conducted every fourth year. In compliance with the requirements established by the European Charter on Local government, municipal councils are chosen through equal, direct, proportional elections by secret ballot. In 1994, district councils were also selected by direct election, but as a result of legislative amendments, district councils have been comprised of the chairs of municipal councils since 1997.

The 1994 law on local elections significantly reduced the number of council members. The average number of members serving on local councils in Latvia is now smaller than that of most West European countries and is almost as small as the United States.

Only registered political organizations or their registered coalitions may submit lists of candidates for municipality in which more than 5,000 residents live. Registered political organizations or their registered coalitions and voters associations can submit lists of candidates for other municipal councils. A voters association is formed by persons who sign a list of candidates signifying their support as well as individuals appearing on that list.

Voter turnout in the 1994 local elections was 58.5 percent, and in the following election 1997 it was 56.8 percent. In the 1997 local elections, voters’ associations submitted an overwhelming majority – 85 percent of the total number

of lists, parties – 14 percent and coalitions – 1 percent. The major parties participated in the 1997 local elections, but national parties have not been very involved in local politics in general. In 2001, local elections voter turnout was higher – 62 percent. This election was characterized by large pre-election campaigns, which might be one of the reasons for the increased turnout. In the 2001 elections, 54 percent of all elected council members have earned a higher education, and 45 percent have had comprehensive or secondary specialized education. Only 1 percent have no higher or secondary education. Fifty-eight percent of elected council members are men, 42 percent are women.

Besides elections, other forms of direct democracy (local referendum, public hearing, et cetera) are quite unusual in Latvia. There is no law on local referendums. According to the legislation, compulsory popular consultation is necessary before deciding on territorial plans in councils. In other issues, local government can decide whether a public hearing is necessary.

The representative body of local governments is the council. The distinction between the formation of municipal and district councils is as follows: the former is comprised of directly elected council members and the latter of the chairs of municipal councils.

The statutes of local government, formulated in accordance with the law “On Local Governments” and model statutes approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, determine the organization of the work of the council. The council’s work is conducted at its meetings and by standing committees. The council meetings must be convened at least once a month and must be open to the public. A decision can be adopted if the meeting is attended by more than one half of the council members. Unless the law stipulates, other provisions and decisions of municipal councils must be approved by a majority of the council members who participated in the meeting.

The council elects standing committees among its council members. These committees prepare issues for review at council meetings, submit statements on issues that are within their expertise, oversee the work of local government enterprises and organizations, review budget drafts, et cetera. Two standing committees – the finance committee and the social, education and cultural affairs committee - are compulsory for every local government. Other standing committees may be set up in accordance with the statutes of the local government.

The chair of the council oversees its work, coordinates the review of issues by committees, represents local government in all capacities, authorizes decisions of the council and signs agreements and other legal documents on behalf of the local government.

The chair of the council is a full-time employee of the local government. During his or her term, the chair may not pursue other employment with the exception of scientific, pedagogical or creative endeavors. Based on a proposal by the chair, the council appoints an executive director who is responsible for the activities of local government institutions, enterprises and organizations. The executive director cannot be a council member. If a local government does not nominate an executive director, the chair of the council performs these duties.

The position of the executive director is compulsory in local governments with 5,000 inhabitants and more.

The law "On Local Governments" contains no restrictions on the formation of administrative structures for Latvian local governments. Rather, it is determined in the "Statutes of Local Government Council." Administrative offices in cities and towns are usually divided into departments and sections, but such divisions do not exist in most rural municipalities since their staff does not typically exceed five to seven employees. Each local government institution and enterprise has its own internal governing structure.

Residents of an administrative territory have the right to attend local government council meetings. The meetings of the council must be held in premises appropriate to host residents, journalists, and officials of municipal and district institutions. The public has the right of free access to any decision of the council or auditing commission, orders of the chair and the protocol of open meetings of the council.

The Sample of Municipalities and Leaders

The empirical study of Latvian local political and administrative elites was conducted according to the conditions of the international research program *Democracy and Local Governance*. It represents the first major survey of Latvian local leaders, and it was performed in 1999. The local leaders answered to 435 questions, including 387 questions in accordance with international research program and 48 nation-specific questions. (The last mainly reflect the attitude of the leaders to administrative territorial reform and cooperation of local governments.) The data was collected by allowing the respondent to answer the questionnaire, as well as by in-person interviews with leaders answering the questionnaire.

The sample embraces 340 leaders in 22 cities and 2 rural municipalities. The Capital Riga was not included in the sample. Nevertheless, all of the other six republican cities and the biggest district towns were included in the sample. The

division of the municipalities participating in the study by population is shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1
Division of the Municipalities Participating in the Study

Number of Inhabitants	Number of Municipalities	Percent
Less than 10,000	7	29
10,000 to 25,000	8	33
Above 25,000	9	38
Total	24	100

The institutional background of the leaders, presented in Table 6.2, shows that 40 percent of the local elite included in the sample are politicians, 41 percent are administrators and 19 percent are leaders outside of local government (leaders of political parties or leaders of Non-Government Organizations). The average leader has had his or her present position for about 5 years, but 42 percent of the respondents are quite new in their present position, having been there for 2 years or less. Many leaders belong to a cadre of the new local elite, which has come into power after the Latvian independence. The average local leader has held positions in public service for about 8 years, thus the great bulk of the new Latvian local came to power after the fall of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s when the new Democratic Latvia took shape. About 80 percent of the leaders have had their positions for less than ten years. Quite a few of these leaders have held public positions for two years or less. Thus, it seems that the new cadre of the Latvian local elite was still taking shape in the late 1990s when the survey was performed. However, 20 percent of the leaders have had positions in public service for 11 years or more, which indicates that quite a large group of the Latvian local elite who were part of the old Soviet system is still playing a role in performing local power.

Most of respondents were male, but the percentage of female leaders (42 percent) is substantial and in exact proportion to the situation after the 2001 local elections, with 58 percent male and 42 percent female council members. The average age is 44. The largest number of the leaders is in the age group from 40 to 49 years (41 percent). There are few young people under 30 especially among politicians. The average age of politicians is 48, while the average age of administrators is 41. Only 13 percent of leaders' fathers and 6 percent of leaders' mothers have held corresponding (administrative or political) positions.

All in all, 16 percent of the leaders' parents have held the corresponding local elite position as the respondent. Looking at the class variable of the leaders' fathers occupation, 28 percent of the respondents come from upper class conditions, while 41 percent stem from the middle class and 31 percent have working class backgrounds. Regarding the leaders own occupational status, 73 percent of the leaders have a managerial position and 27 percent have a middle class related occupational status (Table 6.3).

Table 6.2
Institutional Background (Percent)

Background Characteristics	%	(N)
Type of Elite		
Politician	40	(136)
Administrator	41	(139)
Civil leader (outside local government)	19	(65)
	100	(187)
In Present Position		
- 2 years	42	(143)
3-10 years	50	(171)
11- years	8	(26)
	100	(340)
In Average (Mean)	5	
In Public service		
- 2 years	28	(85)
3-10 years	51	(157)
11- years	21	(63)
	100	(305)
In Average (Mean)	8	

Table 6.3
Social Background (Percent)

Background Characteristics	%	(N)
Age (mean)	44	
Age Cohorts		
-39	31	(106)
40-49	41	(138)
50-59	21	(71)
60+	7	(25)
	100	(340)
Gender		
Male	58	(198)
Female	42	(142)
	100	(340)
Education		
Primary	-	
Secondary	21	(72)
University	79	(266)
	100	(338)
Class (father's occupation)*		
Working-class	31	(93)
Middle-class	41	(125)
Upper-class	28	(85)
	100	(303)
Ethnic group		
Latvian	93	(317)
Russian	3	(10)
Other (Belarusian, Poles, Lithuanians)	4	(13)
	100	(330)
Active Parent		
Held corresponding position	16	(54)
Religious activity		
Regularly (every week)	8	(23)

* There are some difficulties with coding occupational status from open-ended questions. Therefore, these results should be considered with some care.

Only one-third, 34 percent, of the leaders was born in the community in which they live today. The leaders have lived in average 27 years in their community. Fifty-eight percent of the leaders are believers, and 90 percent of them belong to Christian denominations. However, only 8 percent attend church weekly. Almost one third, 32 percent of the leaders are members of political parties: 57 percent of these are members of political parties who form the ruling coalition in the Parliament, while 43 percent belong to non-ruling parties. Among the leaders who are members of political parties, 54 percent belong to parties with liberal political orientation, 26 percent belong to parties with national orientation, and 20 percent are members in parties with socialist or social democratic orientations. There are no Communist Party members among the leaders.


The questionnaire was only given in Latvian. However, 42 percent of Latvian residents are Russian speaking, while 24 percent of all residents in Latvia are non-citizens. Unfortunately, there is no information available about the ethnic composition of the local political elite. In the survey, 93 percent are Latvian, while 4 percent are Russian and 3 percent come from other ethnic minorities. In 2000 the ethnic composition in total were: Latvians, 58 percent; Russians, 30 percent; Belarussians, 3 percent; Poles, 3 percent; Lithuanians, 1 percent; and other minorities, 5 percent.

Local Problems and Effective Action

According to the local elite, the most important problem facing their community is unemployment. Only 5 percent of the leaders do not consider unemployment to be a problem in their community. Still, more than a half (52 percent) are certain that unemployment is very serious problem and 43 percent regard it as a somewhat serious problem. On average, the rate of unemployment in Latvia is about 8 percent, but in some districts it is as high as 30 percent. Economic development is also a very important problem. More than a half (52 percent) of the respondents consider it to be very serious, and 40 percent see it as a somewhat serious problem. Another serious problem, probably closely related to the other two already mentioned, is poverty: 35 percent of the respondents mention it as very serious and 59 percent regard it as somewhat serious. Almost all leaders - 90 percent of the respondents - also face problems with the cost of local government: 46 percent see it as very serious and 44 percent view it as somewhat serious. Problems with public infrastructure improvements and health services are also considered to be rather serious. Problems that were considered less serious include issues such as race or ethnic relations and migration of aliens

into the city. Almost all leaders, over 90 percent are certain that these issues are not problems in their community (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1
Local Problems (Percent)




Taken all together, using the scale of answers from 0 to 2, where 0 means no problem, 1 equals somewhat serious and 2 equals very serious, the mean of importance of problems is not high (.89). Thus, on average, local problems are average seen as a little less than somewhat serious.

The question about effective action taken in the last two or three years is closely connected with the main problems of the community. The smallest percentages of effective action are found related to those issues with the most seri-

ous problems, such as poverty (6 percent) and unemployment (10 percent). Here, 61 percent of the leaders, more than on any other issue, believe that some action was taken (but no effects).

Figure 6.2
Effective Action (Percent)



The highest percentages of effective action are found in the quality of education and recreation/culture (39 percent), social services and welfare (37 percent), public infrastructure improvements (30 percent) and public safety (28 percent). The hardest issues to improve effectively include problems with poverty and migration (6 percent), minority relations (7 percent) and unemployment (Figure 6.2). Somewhat more easy to handle effectively are problems cost of local government (27 percent), health (25 percent) economic development (18 percent) and housing (16 percent).

Taking all actions together and using the scale of answers form 0 to 2, where 0 means no action, 1 equals some action but no effects, and 2 equals effective action, the general mean is rather low at 0.90. Hence, action has been carried out to solve local problems, but the effects are sparse on average.

Powers and Responsibilities


Ineffective action, as shown in Figure 6.3, is closely connected with the circumstance in which leaders do not have enough power or autonomy. The worst situation is in areas such as unemployment, economic growth, poverty, health services and public safety. In these policy areas many local leaders say that local government lacks power and autonomy to act effectively.

The best situation is found in the areas of recreation and culture, public infrastructural improvements, social services and welfare, housing and quality of education. Local government is considered to lack the powers and autonomy mainly in the areas in which the problems are most serious and the action is the least effective. These functions are primarily central government tasks. Taking all areas together and using the scale ranging from 0 (lack powers) to 1 (has powers) the mean of local power and autonomy is medium (0.53).

The distribution of the leaders' answers on the question "Regardless of how things are being done now, who should have primary responsibility" in 12 areas are the following as shown in Figure 6.4. The most frequently mentioned are local governments with non-governmental organizations and the private sector hardly mentioned at all.

Local governments are most frequently named in five areas: public infrastructure improvements, housing, recreation and culture, social services and welfare (60 percent) and the support of poor people. According to the respondents, central government should be mainly responsible for education, health services, economic growth, minority relations, public safety and employment.


Figure 6.3
Autonomy and Power to Act Effectively (Percent)



Non-governmental organizations are regarded as mainly responsible for minority relations (19 percent) and recreation and culture (11 percent). Housing problems (13 percent) and minority relations (10 percent) are the most commonly suggested as areas in which the major responsibility lies with individuals to handle the problems themselves.

Figure 6.4

Opinion about Primary Responsibility for Public Sector Functions 1984, 1991 and 1999 (Means)



Comment: The scale goes from 0 (no primary responsibility) to 1 (primary responsibility for all public sector functions for each category of responsibility).


Influence and Support

The greatest influence over what is accomplished in their community is found in culture, recreation, and sports, education, collection and distribution of public revenue, social services and welfare and public infrastructure improvements.

The influence scale, which ranges from 0 to 2 where 0 means no influence, 1 equals some influence and 2 equals great influence shows that the average Latvian local leader has some personal influence (scale mean of influence is 1.07).

The networks of political support are quite narrow. The gravity of the administrative center and close friends and supporters seem to be quite powerful for the great bulk of the Latvian local elite when they are in a situation in which support from other are necessary (Figure 6.6).


Figure 6.5
Personal Influence (Percent)



The findings also show that leaders have little trust and do not count on receiving support from local or higher level party leaders, local business groups, local trade unions, local ethnic and religious groups, neighborhood organizations, local civic professional and reform groups and or local leaders of political movements for that matter. These groups are mentioned by less than 10 percent of the leaders. Less than 20 percent mentions local newspapers or the public and citizens generally as groups that they can turn to when support from other are necessary.

Figure 6.6

Persons/Organizations to turn to for Support (Percent)




Thus, the local civic community or social capital of the leaders seems quite limited despite the years of democratic transformation during the 1990s. Further, support from higher political and administrative levels is low as well. The political capital of the Latvian local elite seems to exist mainly in relation to the local administrative heads and close friends.

The average number of support groups mentioned is 3.3. The average score for local support on a scale ranging from 0 (not mentioned) to 1 (mentioned) groups is 0.37. The corresponding scale for non-local support groups it is lower at 0.19.

Values of Democracy and Local Governance

The positive score means for the values of economic development, honesty-openness, localism and capitalism are quite high (Figure 6.7). The leaders' values on economy are particularly homogenous and positive.

Figure 6.7
Local Elite Values (Means)




Comment:

The scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

The average support for core democratic values such as the value of citizen participation and conflict acceptance are positive, but lower. For example, almost two-thirds (64 percent) of the respondents think that widespread participation in decisionmaking often leads to undesirable conflicts, and more than a half (53 percent) think that participation of the people is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted competent leaders. The value of

minority rights gets a score close to zero, which means that the average leader takes an almost neutral position in relation to the rights of minorities. Stronger negative sentiments are found in the value of political equality. (The negative value of political equality is probably connected with the high percentage of non-citizens, and their lack of rights to participate equally in local and national elections.)

Figure 6.8
Minority Rights (Percent)




Nevertheless, despite the neutral average value of minority rights, the local leaders are quite democratically disposed when they are asked about the rights of national minorities of having their own institutions and organizations. For example, 98 percent of the leaders are certain that national minorities in Latvia should have the right to have their own cultural organizations, their own church

(97 percent), their own press 94 percent) and their own school (90 percent). However, about a half of total number of the leaders supports the rights of national minorities to have their representatives in elected bodies (52 percent) and have their own political parties (49 percent), and only 10 percent of the leaders support the recognition of the language of national minorities as official language.

Figure 6.9

Groups not wanted as Neighbors (Percent)



Another claimed central democratic value is that of social tolerance. Figure 6.9 shows groups of people that the leaders would not like as neighbors. Such groups include heavy drinkers, drug addicts, people with a criminal record and left-wing extremists. The very least objections among the leaders to have as neighbors include people with large families, gypsies, and Hare Krishna. Other social groups are indicated more rarely include right-wing extremists, homosexuals, immigrants and foreign workers.

Only 40 percent of the leaders believe that most people can be trusted. More than a half (53 percent) of the total number of the leaders is sure that you cannot be too careful dealing with other people. (7 percent of the leaders could not answer this question.)

To conclude, many leaders share values of economic development, capitalism, honesty and openness and localism. At the same time, quite a few of them continue to possess negative values toward political equality, they remain neutral in issues of minority rights and they are only slightly ready to accept conflict and citizen participation.


Conflicts in the Community

While most leaders believe that there are no major conflicts that interfere with getting things done in their community, 19 percent think the opposite. Furthermore, 17 percent of the respondents believe that these conflicts very much interfere with the development of their community.

Most of all, it is differences in income that divide people in community according to the local leaders. The second largest issue that divides people is differences in education. Differences connected to racial and ethnic origins and differences in religious belief or affiliation are the least divisive.

To summarize, by taking the means the different items using a scale of answers from 0 to 2 (where 0 means not at all, 1 equals somewhat, and 2 is very much) the mean of the differences in the community receives a score of 0.92.

Figure 6.10
Differences Dividing People in the Community (Percent)




Participation, Influence and Action by Political Leaders

The most important ways for people to participate in decisionmaking according to the local elite are by referendum, voting, use of media, local government councils and through personal contact with decisionmakers. Less powerful ways for people to influence decisions are through political parties, meetings and debates. Only about 20 percent think these ways are the best ways to gain influ-

ence. The leaders rely upon political parties very little in decisionmaking. They are indicated only in 22 percent of the cases (Figure 6.11).

Figure 6.11
Best Ways for People to Influence Decisions (Percent)



Only one-third, 31 percent of the leaders, consider participation of the people in local affairs of their community today to be greater than five years ago, 54 percent think that it is about the same, and 15 say that it is less.

Looking back to the past ten years, 46 percent of the leaders indicate that peoples' participation has increased, but one-third, 34 percent claims that it has, in fact, decreased in their town or city.


The leaders mentioned the following main motives for joining political parties: to have political influence (92 percent); to gain political experience (90 percent); to contribute to the development of their local community (89 percent); to support democracy (86 percent); and to work for personal convictions (82 percent).

In addition, 49 percent of the leaders consider political parties to be very important in the country, 47 percent say that they are somewhat important, and 4 percent claim that they are not important. Much lower is the appraisal of the political parties in local government. Only 7 percent of the leaders recognize

political parties to be very important in local government, 41 percent consider them to be somewhat important, but more than a half (52 percent) of the respondents are certain that they are not important in their own communities. When the survey was conducted in 1999, issues that political parties dealt with at national level, were quite different from local issues. However, the role of political parties at the local level is increasing (especially in the cities).

The question posed to the local elite about why parties are important may give us some leads on why parties are considered unimportant in the leaders own communities. Of six alternatives mentioned in the survey, more than a half of the respondents consider the following reasons of parties to be very important: for creating majorities in legislative and executive bodies; identifying candidates for public offices; and conducting electoral campaigns. Political parties are less important when it comes to their ability to fulfill the interests of the electorate, formulate alternative programs and involve people in politics.

Figure 6.12
Why Political Parties are Important (Percent)



Thus, for the Latvian local elite political parties are mainly important for their formal purposes, mainly seen as an instrumental tool for the functioning of the political system. Involvement of people in politics is not the reason given by the

majority of Latvian local elite when asked why political parties are important. This might also be one explanation of why so few leaders consider political parties to be important locally.

When we asked whether the leaders have actually participated in some of forms of political action, whether they might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it almost a half (47 percent) of the total number of the leaders has attended lawful demonstrations, more than one-fourth (27 percent) has signed a petition. Only some leaders have joined unofficial strikes (5 percent) and participated in occupying buildings or factories, and only 12 percent say they might do it in the future, but 87 percent would never do it. The scale mean of sum of political actions on a scale ranging from -5 (would never do any of the five mentioned actions) to 5 (have done all five mentioned actions) is -1.05. Illegal forms of actions are in average less accepted (-1.45), while legal actions in average might be, leaning towards many leaders have done at least one of the mentioned (0.45).

Local–Global Relations


The territories that leaders identify most with are shown in Figure 6.13. The leaders most frequently identify with the nation, thus the state of Latvia (85 percent) and locality or city where they live (82 percent). Region of country is indicated much less (42 percent). Belonging to the Baltic States is only mentioned in 22 percent of the cases, and this is less than the group of leaders claiming a belonging to Europe (26 percent). (The leaders on average gave 2.8 answers from 7 mentioned in the survey.)

Answering the question about the leaders' first and second choice of territorial identification, at the first place is the locality or city where the leaders live (55 percent), the state of Latvia (31 percent) comes in second, with the region (10 percent) coming in third.

The communities are impacted the most by foreign investments, exports, and imports, and the least by foreign workers. Almost half of the leaders, 43 percent, consider foreign investments to impact the communities a great deal, and 40 percent of the respondents think the same about exports and 33 percent about imports.

Using the scale of answers from 0 to 2 where 0 means not at all, 1 equals to some extent, 2 is a great deal, the mean of foreign impact of economy (foreign investments, exports, imports) is rather high at 1.25. The mean of foreign impact of people (foreign media, environmental pollution from other countries, foreign tourists, foreign workers) is lower at 0.60.

Figure 6.13
Primary Identification (Percent)




The leaders consider the other Baltic countries above all neighboring countries like Sweden, Russia, Germany, and Denmark as the most important to the future of their community. More than half have mentioned these countries as important.

Two leading countries outside Europe – the USA (15 percent) and Japan (4 percent) are rarely mentioned.

The respondents indicated on average 4.8 countries from the totally 12 countries enumerated in the questionnaire. In addition, the respondents named 14 other countries or groups of countries (on average 1.7 countries), most frequently was The Netherlands.

Figure 6.14
Foreign Impact in the Community (Percent)



Future Goals and Democracy

From four mentioned main goals for the country during the next ten years, most leaders indicated “Maintaining order in the nation” (47 percent) and “Fighting rising prices” (26 percent). The third most important goal mentioned was “Giving people more say in important government decisions” (20 percent). The goal of “Protecting freedom of speech” (7 percent) was rarely mentioned.

Only 3 percent of the respondents believe that Latvia’s democracy is functioning well, 83 percent think that it democracy is functioning, but it has many shortcomings. However, 14 percent of the leaders are pessimists because they are firm in their belief that the democracy is functioning so badly that there will be no democracy, if this continues.

Conclusions

The traditions of real local self-government in Latvia were interrupted during the Soviet period and reintroduced after the local council elections held in December 1989. The Cabinet of Ministers accepted the concept of local government reform in September 1993. The core of reform was to implement administrative and territorial reorganization in order to give more power to the local level.

The principles of local government reform in Latvia are based on the demands of the European Charter on Local Self-Government, which was accepted by the Parliament in February 1996. The highest governing document addressing local governments in Latvia is the law "On Local Governments" (passed in May 1994) since no provisions were made on this issue in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. The right to vote for local council deputies is granted only to the citizens of the Republic of Latvia.

The functions of the first level of governments – urban and rural municipalities are rather wide, but the functions of the second level – district governments – are quite narrow. The financial resources of local governments do not guarantee fulfillment of all their functions.

The findings of the survey with the Latvian local elite first show that the introduction of democratic local government in the early 1990s has affected the composition and the background of the leaders. The average leader is rather young, age 44. He or she has held his or her present position for in average only 5 years and has been in public service for in average 8 years. Thus, the great bulk of the Latvian local elite came to power after the transition to democracy. Almost one-third of the leaders are members of political parties and tend to lean more towards the right than to the left on a political scale.

The most serious problems facing the leaders in their communities are unemployment, economic development, costs of local government and poverty. At the same time the Latvian local elite feels that it is in some of these areas – including living standard and unemployment - that effective action is hardest to obtain. However, there are also examples of serious problems that are taken care of more effectively, primarily in the areas of social services and welfare and public improvements. These exceptions can be explained by the greater autonomy and power over handling these issues. In parallel, ineffective action is mainly explained by not having enough power and autonomy locally, for example concerning unemployment, economic growth and poverty. Thus, almost half of the leaders, 43 percent, think local government should be the primarily level of government responsible for carrying out different typical public sector issues.

The leaders' influence over what is accomplished in the community is also dominated by the tasks in which they have the most power and autonomy, namely culture, recreation and sports, social services and welfare and public infrastructure improvements, including the collection and distribution of public revenue. However, when a leader is in a situation in which support from others is necessary, the findings show a very narrow network of persons to whom most leaders seek support. Most leaders say that they contact the top administrative officials, administrative colleagues at their own level or close friends or supporters. Very few seek support from civil society. However, local elective officials or higher levels of administrative government are regarded by only about one-third as an option to contact for support.

The leaders' values on honesty and openness, economic development, localism and capitalism are particularly homogenous and positive. The commitment towards core democratic values such as participation, conflict acceptance, minority rights and political equality is less strong. In fact, the most strongly rejected value concerns political equality. Although a great majority shares the attitude that minorities should have the rights to their own organizations and institutions, few accept minority official languages. The level of interpersonal trust among the leaders towards the public is also quite low, and less than half claim that they trust most people.

About one-fifth think there is some sort of serious local conflict in their community. In the leaders' opinion, it is mostly differences in income and education that tend to divide people in their own community.

The leaders suppose that the most important ways for people to participate in decisionmaking are through referendum, voting, use of media and local government councils. However, political parties are recognized by more than half as unimportant in their own community. A less developed party system at the local level is also revealed by the fact that very few believe political parties to be important for involving people in politics, meeting electorate interests and formulating alternative programs. Instead most leaders see parties in an instrumental way, i.e. as being important for forming majorities and recruiting candidates for public office.

The leaders' local-global relations include findings that they most frequently connect with national state of Latvia and locality or city where they live. The most important foreign impact on a leaders' community concerns issues of economy, i.e. foreign investments and exports. A great number of the leaders rates neighboring countries like Sweden, but also Russia, Germany, Denmark and the Baltic states as most important for the future of their community.

Ten years after the beginning of the transformation to democracy, according to the Latvian elite, the country is still dealing with difficult basic problems.

During the next ten years, the main goals of the country include maintaining order in the nation and fighting inflation. Almost all of the surveyed leaders, 83 percent, think democracy is functioning, but that there still are many shortcomings.

Part III
The Commonwealth of Independent States

Local Governance in Belarus during the Regime of Authoritarian Democracy

Janna Grischenko, Natalia Elsukova and Elena Kuchko

Recent Developments of the Local Government System

After the first presidential elections in Belarus in 1994, President Alexander Lukashenka decided to rebuild local government. He wanted to reform local authorities by strengthening executive discipline and administrative effectiveness. The crisis of the previous Soviet system had permeated into every component of the government system. These system-related features of the crisis were revealed by citizen complaints against the local authorities as well.

The presidential reform included two main steps. The first phase was characterized by renewing the executive authorities and personnel reshuffles. This political act has come to be known as “the creating and strengthening of the presidential vertical.” The second step aimed at separating the executive and legislative powers of local government. Moreover, some of the older Soviets were abolished (for example, in villages and districts). According to our longitudinal data during the 1990s, the reshuffles, affected top management (chairmen of local executive committee) by 70 percent, middle level management by 54 percent and lower level staff by 34 percent. The average term of office of the “unaffected” officials was 12 years. In other words, about 30 percent of top local authorities, 50 percent of middle rank leaders and 70 percent of lower staff have maintained their positions in local government since 1986. If we compare the proportions of these two groups’ representation in local authorities, the share of people who came before and after Lukashenka is fifty-fifty on average. While changes at the top are quite intensive, lower and middle level staff remains practically stable.

The results that we consider in our report focus on the consequences of the presidential local government reform. It has undoubtedly brought effects that expanded the range of local authority and provided possibilities for active influence on all spheres of social life. However, the new local leaders do not seem to exert this influence. Why is this?

The Survey Sample

The Belarus study was performed within the framework of the international research program *Democracy and Local Governance*, and is represented by three surveys. The first survey was conducted in November 1991, a second in 1995 and the third in December 1998. The 1991 sample of local leaders was based on a random sample, and included 450 top representatives of local authorities in 30 randomly chosen areas. Similar polls were conducted for the 1995 and 1998 studies. These two retakes were oriented towards the same sample of towns and cities and covered the same number of respondents, including the executive and legislative levels of the local governance. However, the composition of the samples is not absolutely equal (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1

Sample of Belarus Local Elites 1991 and 1998 (Percent)

Leader Status	1991	1998
Chairman of local executive committee	23	11
Department head at local executive committees	25	33
Lower staff at municipal and district executive committees	8	21
Corps of elected members	38	28
No reply	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
	100	100

Comment: This variable was not collected in the 1995 survey.

There are several explanations for the evident differences in the composition of the different samples of 1991 and 1998. The significant decrease in the share of elected members is linked with the declining activity of this group in local government during the last few years. The fact is that the top of local executive authorities represented in the sample 1998 is almost half compared to the sample 1991. In general, the decrease in the highest level of authorities is explained by their refusal to answer the questionnaire because of their extremely busy schedules. Some of these leaders gave the task of answering the questionnaire to middle managers, i.e. the department heads at local executive committees.

Consequently, the share of department heads, as well as the share of lower staff, increased in the 1998 sample. Despite these changes in the representational structure, we have a real opportunity for comparisons. Since we used unified sociological instruments and similar samples of municipalities and numbers of respondents (representing all branches of local leaders, except for the judicial

branch) in both of these polls, we have an ideal opportunity to compare empirical data on the development of democracy and local governance in Belarus in seven years retrospect across the 1990s.

Backgrounds and Characteristics of the Belarus Local Elite

During the 1990s, the average term of the current official was 7 years. This shows that personal rotation under Lukashenka preserves the features of continuity. Despite the presidential attempts to renew executive authorities and following personnel reshuffles, there is a category of officials whose term of office exceeds 10 or even 15 years. Nevertheless, if we look at different groups of leaders in regard to the time they have spent in their present position, we can see some small changes. The group of newcomers who have been in public service less than two years is constantly increasing. The same pattern is apparent in the group of leaders holding their position for between 3 to 10 years, while so-called “old-timers” with more than 11 years in public service is constantly decreasing (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2

Institutional Background 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)

Background Characteristics	Year		
	1991 (N)	1995 (N)	1998 (N)
In Present Position			
- 2 years	32 (138)	32 (127)	24 (104)
3-10 years	44 (191)	49 (195)	56 (240)
11- years	<u>24 (103)</u>	<u>19 (73)</u>	<u>20 (85)</u>
	100 (432)	100 (395)	100 (429)
In Average (Mean)	7	6	7
In Public Service			
- 2 years	3 (12)	4 (9)	15 (43)
3-10 years	27 (103)	30 (61)	31 (88)
11- years	<u>70 (265)</u>	<u>66 (133)</u>	<u>54 (151)</u>
	100 (380)	100 (203)	100 (282)
In Average (Mean)	17	17	14

The findings of the changes in social backgrounds show that on average, the statistical indicators in 1991, 1995 and 1998 are practically the same. The average Belarusian local leader is about 44 years old, highly educated, with a Belarus ethnic background (Table 7.3).

One obvious change is that while a majority of local officials originated from agricultural families in 1991, in 1998 a majority came from working class conditions. Furthermore, the development has led to almost equal proportions of men and women.

The most important finding on the political orientation of local authorities is that they have become less political. When the leaders answer the question “what political party or orientation do you support?,” 21 percent in 1991 and 62 percent in 1998 answered “no one.” In other words, they expressed indifference to any political movements or even political orientations. It is also noteworthy that in 1991, 40 percent found it difficult to answer this question, while in 1998 the number of hesitating respondents fell to 13 percent (Table 7.4).

Thus, we can state that local authorities have intentionally alienated themselves to almost any political parties and movements. Neither left nor right political views are popular among the local elite. The aggregation and articulation of their interests seem to follow the way of neutrality towards some form of political integrity. This process mirrors the one in the public mentality as a whole: public opinion suggests that while citizens have not yet clearly understood their political interests, they usually express negativism towards all political parties. However, the process of depoliticizing the local political elite is a formal side of the issue. It turns out that local authorities are actually oriented towards centrism. When we asked the respondents to place their political views on a 10 - point leftwing-rightwing scale, both in 1991 and in 1998 the average was between 4 and 5.

Table 7.3
Social Background 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)

Background Characteristics	Year		
	1991 (N)	1995 (N)	1998 (N)
Age (mean)	44	43	43
Age Cohorts			
-39	29 (130)	36 (145)	27 (118)
40-49	41 (181)	43 (176)	50 (219)
50-59	25 (110)	19 (79)	19 (86)
60+	<u>2 (6)</u>	<u>4 (16)</u>	<u>5 (21)</u>
	100 (442)	100 (406)	100 (439)
Gender			
Male	77 (345)	54 (223)	52 (229)
Female	<u>23 (103)</u>	<u>46 (194)</u>	<u>48 (214)</u>
	100 (448)	100 (417)	100 (443)
Education			
Primary	-	-	-
Secondary	5 (21)	-	6 (27)
University	<u>95 (426)</u>	-	<u>94 (414)</u>
	100 (447)	-	100 (442)
Active Parent			
Held corresponding position	13 (59)	15 (64)	20 (93)
Religious Activity			
Regularly **	3 (12)	0.5 (2)	5 (19)
Class (father's occupation)*			
Working-class	25	27	40
Farmers	47	38	24
Middle/Upper-class	<u>28</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>36</u>
	100	100	100
Ethnic background			
Belarusian	81	78	80
Russian	12	16	13
Ukrainian	2	2	2
Pole	2	2	2
Tartar	0.5	-	0.5
Jew	0.5	0.5	0.5
Lithuanian	-	-	0.5
No reply	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
	100	100	100

* There are some difficulties with coding the respondent's class background from an open-ended question concerning the father's occupational status.

** At least once a month.

Table 7.4**Support of Political Party or Orientation (Percent)**


Support of political party or orientation	1991	1998
Democratic	8	3
Communist	14	11
None	21	62
Communists for democracy	2	0.4
Greens	1	1
Farmers party	2	-
Social democratic	2	2
Socialist	5	1
Liberal democratic	0.2	-
Leftist centrism	0.4	3
Centrism	1	1
Belarusian Popular Front	1	-
Agrarian	-	0.2
Belarusian Patriotic Youth Union	-	2
Movement for Justice	0.2	-
United Civic Party	-	0.2
Union of Officers	-	0.2
Women's Party Nadzeya	-	0.2
No answer	<u>40</u>	<u>13</u>
	100	100

Local Problems and Effective Action

The range of actual local problems in Belarus is widely presented among the local elite. Among the most important problems are the following: economic development, health, housing, safety and public and social improvements. All of these areas were seen as seriously problematic by a majority of respondents during the 1990s. Although a larger proportion of leaders viewed problems with economic development as very serious, a somewhat smaller number of leaders viewed housing and public safety as very serious in 1998 compared to in 1991.


Figure 7.1

Very Serious Local Problems 1991, 1995, 1998 (Percent)



Moreover the scope of serious problems has become wider. The perception of serious problems with living standard increased from 29 percent in 1991, to about 60 percent according to the Belarus local leaders. In addition, in 1991 unemployment was not observed as a very serious problem by many of our respondents. Our prediction that unemployment would expand rapidly during the 1990s in the first report from the 1991 study (Grischenko 1993:57) was correct. We were wrong, however, in connecting this process with an intensification of economic development and change. Today, we have to admit that the increasing unemployment figures were determined, first of all, by a lack of industrial production and plants and factories that were shut down. Finally, our prediction in the early 1990s about the absence of a base for ethnic conflicts in Belarus was supported by the later studies in 1995 and 1998. The problem of ethnic relations (immigration) takes a stable last place in the list of very serious problems.

Figure 7.2
Effective Action 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



If we look at the development of local problems more generally, we can conclude that there is a significant increase in the perception of local problems among the Belarus local elite. The mean of the problem perception scale increased from an average of 1.28 in 1991, to an average of 1.32 in 1995 and to 1.33 in 1998. This increase is statistically significant at the .05 percent level. This scale ranges from 0 (no problem) to 2 (very serious problem).

Nevertheless, while local problems increased, according to the local leaders, the average perceptions of effective actions in solving these problems also increased. The average of the effective action scale was 0.91 in 1995 and 1.21 in 1998 (the scale goes from 0 (no action) to 2 (effective action)). This increase is statistically significant on the .01 percent level. Figure 7.2 shows that there is a great increase in the perception of effective action all across the line of different public sector responsibilities.

According to the leaders, action has become especially effective in handling education, housing, unemployment and social improvements. Thus, in spite of the increasing effectiveness in these areas, some of these very public sector issues are still the most problematic to deal with locally as shown in Figure 7.1.

Powers and Responsibilities

The period of Alexander Lukashenka's rule is perhaps most of all linked with the strengthening of authority. In practically all of the areas mentioned in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, local authorities feel that their autonomy and power to act are increasing as well (Figure 7.3).


The effect of growing authority is especially noticeable in the sphere of education (positive estimations of local authorities' autonomy and power grew by almost 20 percent), public safety (13 percent) and even economic development (11 percent). At the same time, we have registered a decline in self-estimations of local leaders regarding their autonomy and power in the spheres of employment, minority ethnic relations and migration. Despite the fact that these areas are traditionally problem-free (for example, ethnic relations), the research results show that it is in these areas that local authorities' concerns of lacking power and autonomy are growing. It is likely that the absence of ethnic problems in Belarus in previous years has made local leaders think about control mechanisms in the sphere now, and they have discovered that they are inefficient. The growing migration concerns local leaders since they fear that developments could get out of control in this area. As for the growing lack of power and autonomy over unemployment, it was not so relevant for Belarus in 1991 as it is today. Clearly, if a problem acquires the features of a large-scale phenomenon, the tension is growing on local authorities as well.

In general, however, the development of local authorities is characterized by the increasing power and autonomy to act effectively. The local power/autonomy scale, which varies from 0 (lacks powers) to 1 (has powers), increased from 0.53 in 1991 to 0.65 in 1998. This increase in the power to act effectively is statistically significant on the .01 percent level. Thus, the period of Alexander Lukashenka's rule seems to have indeed strengthened the power of local authority as well.

Regardless of the fact that local authorities think they act more effectively and have increased their power to act effectively, the perception of serious local problems grew across the studied period. This might indicate that many leaders, despite their increased local powers, still want changes in the way primary responsibility for different public sector services are organized.

Figure 7.3


Autonomy and the Power to Act Effectively 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



When the Belarus top local officials were asked their opinion on who should have the primary responsibility for the different public sector spheres, the results show that responsibility of the national authorities in all spheres grew while the responsibility of local authorities remained the same or seriously declined over the past seven years. According to the observed data, the level of support for leaving the primary responsibility for solving community problems to the people and nongovernmental organizations is still quite low (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4

Opinion about the Primary Responsibility for Public Sector Functions 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



Comment: The scale goes from 0 (no primary responsibility) to 1 (primary responsibility for all public sector functions within each category).


The only exception is the field of culture and recreation. Local authorities are ready to carry the burden of responsibility in this sphere. We would also point out that there has been a leap of responsibility of local elite in the field of public safety, although they share this burden with the center. As for the fundamental spheres, such as economic development, local authorities feel increasingly dazed, waiting for the directives from the strong center. Thus, it is not true that hierarchical pyramid of centralized power in Belarus has begun to break up.

Influence and Support

A comparison of the data obtained in 1991 and 1998 allows us to state that there is evidently a decline in the perception of great personal influence of local authorities in some important areas. The results are especially contrasting concerning declining influence over the employment situation, the budget and administration of public funds, agriculture and immigration. The most serious decrease in personal influence concerns the local budget (Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.5

Personal Influence 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent “great influence”)



However, there are spheres that are characterized by positive dynamics. An increasingly larger proportion of leaders say that they have great influence over culture and recreation, education, housing, economic development and social and public improvements. However, under the conditions of government failures in many spheres, these positive dynamics seem to be artificial and cannot hold solid guarantees for development in the future. This is also confirmed by the fact that the influence scale mean for all these types of influences, shows that the level of personal influence did not changed significantly during the 1990s.

The average influence on a scale ranging from 0 (no influence) to 2 (great influence) shows that the average local leader has an unchanging low level of personal influence. The average score was 0.69 in 1991, 0.63 in 1995 and 0.68 in 1998.

Although the average level of influence has not changed during the period studied, the network of support contacts has changed to some extent. When comparing the changes between 1991 and 1998, we have to conclude that the number of dominant support groups for the local leaders is generally the same (Figure 7.6). The most important groups to whom the leaders turn for support are the local administrative officials, personal friends and administrative colleges of their own level. Also a relatively high percentage of the leaders indicated that they turned to local elected officials.

However, there are also some noticeable changes in the network of contacts for support. In 1991, for example, local elected officials were in first place in this sequence. Today they occupy the fourth position among those to whom local authorities prefer to appeal for support. Thus, it seems that the role of legislative branch of governance has been reduced during the last presidential term.


At the same time, the number of leaders who turn to higher level of state authorities for support increased from 12 to 29 percent. We can explain this fact by the effect of the strengthened hierarchical orientation. It is also supported by the fact that only a small percent of the local elite perceive civic organizations as a possible source of support in solving community problems. With regard to the public in general, their participation in the solving community problems has decreased from 24 percent in 1991 to 12 percent in 1998.

Finally, it is evident that leaders of the political parties and movements, as well as political parties as a whole, are unpopular among the local authorities. The same dramatic situation with parties and movements can be observed in public opinion.

Thus, the administrative power network of local support contacts appears to be closing in relation to the rest of the local community. This development is perhaps most clearly seen by the reduction of those who turn to the general public for support. However, one tendency that points in the other direction is the increased support sought from neighborhood organizations, increasing from 1 percent in 1991 to 8 percent in 1998.

Figure 7.6

Persons/Organizations to turn to for Support 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



Looking at the three internationally comparable general scores of average support contacts, it seems that development in Belarus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union is characterized by the strengthening of the vertical networks of power. The score of the non-local, higher-level contacts scale increased from 0.07 in 1991 to 0.15 in 1995 and 1998. The scale ranges from 0 (not mentioned) to 1 (mentioned), and the change is statistically significant. The average score for local support contacts does not change at all (0.40 in 1991, 1995 and in 1998). What has happened generally is that the number of contacts increased from a network of in average 2.79 contacts in 1991 to 3.12 contacts in 1998.

Hence, the increasing average of number contacts for support can most evidently be explained by the strengthening of administrative vertical networks of power. By the same token, if we look at the other tendencies of governance change, this growing vertical dependency seems to increase local effective ac-

tion, but not the local elites' influence to solve the growing local problems on their own.


Values of Democracy and Local Governance

One main task of our research was to find out about the prospects of growing democratic values at the local government level. As we can see in Figure 7.7, the most positive effects are accumulated in the values of economic development, openness/honesty and localism. These three values remain substantially unchanged among the local elite during the 1990s. At the very least, this means that local authorities are concerned about the economic development of the country. The average score for economic development is close to 50 on a scale ranging from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree) for the statements that the respondents answered about economic development.

The average negative value of capitalism significantly increased at the same time that the average value for economic equality increased. It is symptomatic in this respect that negative attitudes towards capitalism are growing, while there is an increasing recognition of economic equality. For local authorities in 1991, the euphoria of the arrival of capitalism (about 50% of respondents accepted such a way of development according to one of the capitalism value scale items) was accompanied by the negation of economic equality as a principle contradicting capitalism. We assume that the seven years of the country's painful attempts towards capitalization and market solutions have sobered the local authorities. Today, they are again speaking favorably of economic equality values as a manifestation of social justice, not linked with capitalism. The changes of increasing values of economical equality and decreasing values of capitalism are statistically significant on the .01 percent level.

We have to admit that the honest position of local authorities made it acknowledge its complete democratic incapacity. None of the instrumental democratic values received recognition of the local elite. Respondents consistently negate the value of citizen participation in making political decisions and the value of political equality. The paradox is that these two values are considered basic democratic values, not only for a general theory of democracy, but also in the Belarusian Constitution.

Figure 7.7
Local Elite Values 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)




Comment:
The scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

Most hopeful here is that the average score on the participation value scale is becoming increasingly less hostile towards participatory values. The change from -26 in 1991, to -16 in 1998 is statistically significant on the .01 percent level. The decreasing support for the value of political equality also represents a statistically significant change.

Over the past decade, local authorities have not changed their position toward the value of conflict as a way to solve contradictions. At the same time, they gave a negative estimation on the value of minority rights in 1998. We see a logical link between these two, because minorities who fought for their rights inspired the most conflicts in post-Soviet areas. Thus, the respondents cannot accept the instances of bloodshed in ethnic conflicts (although none of them occurred in Belarus), and this seems to prevent them from viewing conflicts as a positive functional method for democratic transformations. Nevertheless, the small change in the direction towards decreasing conflict acceptance between 1991 and 1995/1998 is statistically significant.

Figure 7.8

Groups not wanted as Neighbors 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)




Finally, according to our results, the respondents have continuously recognized the unchanged value of localism. This is understandable in the context of the crises of the political, social and economic fields in Belarus. However, this seemingly positive trend, which means that local authorities are concentrated on

local tasks, has a negative implication in Belarus. The fact is that it is impossible to manage a crisis without what can be called global thinking of the local authorities.

In making a general conclusion to the results of our comparison between 1991 and 1998, we still have to admit the obvious: over the past decade, local authorities have at least *not* become noticeably less democratic. This conclusion is also supported by the finding of the unchanged pattern on tolerance, measured by the question about different groups that the respondent would not have as neighbors (Figure 7.8).

A majority of the local leaders do not want to have alcoholics, drug addicts, criminals, emotionally unstable and/or homosexuals as neighbors. Nevertheless, the tolerance is far much greater towards large families, Muslims, different races, immigrants and/or left- and rightwing extremists.

Figure 7.9
Minority Rights 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



Comment: The scale ranges from 0 (not mentioned) to 1 (mentioned) and summarizes the opinion on minority rights for different national minorities according. The international standardization of these variables was carried out for the 1995 and 1998 study only.

The same pattern of stability across time is shown with regard to the leaders' orientation toward minority rights (Figure 7.9). The Belarus local leaders are willing to give ethnic minorities the rights to have their own institutions, such as

churches or holy places (0.98 on a scale from 0 to 1), schools (0.87), mass media (0.83), cultural organizations (0.75-0.78). However, relatively few supported the idea of the right to national minority political parties. The majority of our respondents rejected the recognition of all minority languages as official ones in Belarus. The only statistically significant change is that fewer leaders agree with that minorities should have the right to their own parties.

Finally, the local leaders' level of trust has decreased. In 1991, 39 percent of respondents expressed the view that most people could be trusted. In 1998 this position was only supported by 32 percent. This tendency reflects the common emotional atmosphere of less trust in the society more generally.

Cleavages and Conflict in the Community

The survey data allow us to state that the Belarus region, which was traditionally considered a relatively quiet place in the Post-Soviet era, has become even more so. In 1991, about 50 percent of local leaders mentioned the existence of major conflicts in their communities, however in 1998 only a quarter of the respondents continued to think so. In both 1991 and 1998, among those who see major conflicts, very few, only about 15 percent of all respondents, said these conflicts come very much in the way of community development.


Among the causes that stimulated social conflicts are the following: differences in incomes, differences between managers and employees, and differences between those desiring social change and those opposing it.

All of these dominant reasons for conflicts have one common feature – their economic character. There is a split in the society that has separated one small part, namely those who have successfully adapted to the absolutely new conditions of the life, from the masses who face dramatic impoverishment, and lacks both protection and certain prospects for the future. Today, this economic factor is behind almost every conflict in society, including conflicts between managers and employees; those who desire and those who oppose social changes; the contradictions between young and old; the urban-rural cleavages; and the differences between manual and non-manual labor.

It is important to note that attempts to reform the society had one common tragic characteristic: they were all accompanied by a fatal disregard for social welfare. As a result, millions of people were placed in the conditions of spontaneous self-survival and adaptation to the “shock therapy” for more than ten years.

Figure 7.10

Differences Dividing People in the Community 1991, 1995 and 1998
(Percent “very much”)




Participation, Influence and Political Action by Leaders

Political participation is a main principle of democracy. The understanding of this fact among the local leaders has increased. The results of 1998 are more optimistic in this respect. In 1991 there were only four dominant ways for people to influence decisions according to the local leaders. In the 1998 study, local leaders' notions of the opportunities for people to participate increased. The most important ways for citizens to influence public decisions remained the same, but every form of participation presented in Figure 7.11 shows an in-

creasing share of voices: referendum as a way to influence was supported by 68 percent, media received 55 percent and 51 percent suggested self-government bodies. Besides, a relatively high percentage of the respondents have chosen such methods to influence the decisionmaking as: presidential elections (36 percent) and parliamentary elections (32 percent). The weakest instruments for influencing public decisions were found to be through political parties (19 percent) and trade unions (25 percent). The average scale score for conventional ways to influence increased from 0.18 in 1991 to 0.35 in 1998. The average scale score for unconventional ways to influence also increase from 0.24 in 1991 to 0.38 in 1998 (These internationally comparable scales ranges from 0 (not mentioned) to 1 (mentioned). Both changes are statistically significant.

Figure 7.11

Best Ways for People to Influence Public Decisions 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent)



However, the estimation of the real participatory activity in the leaders' own community compared to five years ago has fallen. In 1991, approximately half of all the respondents (49 percent) affirmed that participation of people in local community affairs had increased over the last five years. In 1998, only 25 per-

cent supported this tendency. In 1991 only 14 percent was certain that people's activity decreased. In 1998 this share of the respondents was represented by 32 percent.

Thus, in brief we can speak about the contradiction between the increasing ways for people to take part in public decisions and the reduced practice and activity of the people's participation in solving local problems.

As for activity and participation by the leaders themselves and their attitudes toward different types of political activity, in the 1998 study, many still preferred the most peaceful and legal alternatives: signing petitions (have done - 28 percent, might do - 45 percent), attending lawful demonstrations (have done - 16 percent, might do - 51 percent). Not many leaders have joined unofficial strikes, boycotts, or occupying buildings, but some leaders consider these as acceptable types of political activities.

On average, the local leaders feel that their activity has decreased during the last years. The internationally comparable sum of political average score that was -2.36 in 1991 is even less prominent, -2.67, in 1998 (the score ranges from -5 to 5 and counts the sum of whether one would never do (-1) or have done (1) each of five the listed actions). The change is statistically significant. The illegal actions score also changed significantly, from -1.67 in 1991, to -1.76 in 1998. However, the legal actions score has not changed significantly (-0.08 in 1991, and -0.16 in 1998). Thus, it seems that the decreasing level of action among the Belarus local elite mainly is a result of performing less illegal forms of political action.


Local-Global Relations

The dominant position according to the 1998 data is the identification of local leaders with Belarus as one's homeland (61 percent). Following this is the association with their own native town or city (44 percent). The tendency of identifying oneself with the Former USSR decreased to only 18 percent. Europe and the World as a whole are not considered as important objects of identification from the point of view of local leaders in Belarus.

Among the factors of international impact in their local community, an increasing group of leaders across the period studied stressed that there is a great deal of both exports as well as import of goods, foreign investments and foreign media in their own community (Figure 7.12).

Figure 7.12

Foreign Impact in the Community 1991, 1995 and 1998 (Percent “a great deal”)



On average, the dynamics of the foreign impact (in comparison with 1991) increased both totally and in the economic sphere, as well as in human relations. The scale score of the total foreign impact increased from 0.44 in 1991 to 0.70 in 1998. The economic impact score increased from 0.54 in 1991 to 0.97 in 1998, and the scale of foreign personal impact went from 0.39 in 1991 to .49 in 1998. All of these increases in foreign impact are statistically significant at the .01 percent level. The range of these internationally comparable scores goes from 0 (no impact) to 2 (great impact).


The process of integration between Belarus and Russia, which began in 1996, has wide support among the respondents. Observed results reflect just this fact because the majority of local leaders indicate Russia as the most important country for mutual cooperation (about 50 percent). The second place among the countries, which are considered as the most fruitful for cooperation, belongs to Ukraine (about 30 percent). The other Post Soviet countries (about 20 percent) and Baltic region countries (about 15 percent) follow. Germany and Poland received the highest scores on importance among the Western countries (about 22 percent). Europe as a whole gets support from 12 percent of the respondents.

Parties and the Future of Democracy

The dominant goals for the future of Belarus according to the local elite in 1998 are to “maintain order in the nation” and “to fight rising prices.” This materialistic orientation is most probably the result of the deepening of economic crises, increasing inflation, the destroying of domestic industry and other negative features of the actual life that are associated with the reformation process. Unfortunately, presidential attempts to force order in society have had what might be called a disciplinary effect, rather than an economic effect. This is probably why the democratic values, such as “freedom of speech” and “political participation” are not seen as main goals for Belarus the next ten years. These last findings really deliver the dramatic essence of the transformation processes in the Post-Soviet space.

Figure 7.13

Why Political Parties are Important 1995 and 1998 (Percent “very important”)



The role of political parties in Belarus has not generally increased during the 1990s. According to the local elite, the importance of political parties has decreased both on the national and local levels. In 1995, when these questions were asked for the first time, 28 percent thought national parties were very important nationally, while in 1998 only 20 percent still thought political parties were important for the national level. Not many think political parties are very important locally: 7 percent in 1991 and only 3 percent in 1998.

The reason for these low figures on the importance of political parties may be explained by the findings about the motives for people to join parties. The most supported reasons for joining parties are characterized by quite egoistic and personal motives. Hence, for most leaders political parties are very important in order “to work for personal convictions” (53 percent) followed by “to gain political influence” (38 percent) and “to promote own interests” (23 percent).

The question about why political parties are important shows that most leaders see the utility function as the most important. For most leaders, parties are very important for “competing in elections.” The reasons political parties are least important are “involving people in politics,” and “meeting the interests of the electorate.” The changes of this pattern between 1995 and 1998 are minimal (Figure 7.13).

These results further reflect the findings of the question on the functioning of democracy. In the 1995 survey when this question was first introduced, only 2 percent of the respondents claimed that democracy is functioning well. Fifty-one percent said it functioned, but with many shortcomings, and 48 percent mentioned that it functioned badly (that there will be no democracy if this continues). In 1998, still very few, 4 percent think democracy is functioning well.

Conclusions

In summarizing the results of our research in Belarus, based on a comparison between three polls conducted in 1991, 1995, 1998, we have to admit that the conditions of democratic governance has not improved during the 1990s in Belarus. The reason can mainly be connected with the actual social-political situation. In a democratic context, we can describe the process of development as a form of pseudo-institutionalization because local governance is represented by the same party-nomenclature as in the past. These elites are unable to develop another form of social adaptation, except for the continuance of conformism. Looking at our findings, the values of democracy have not changed much during the 1990s. The local elite is still, and sometimes increasingly very much, against participatory values, political equality and capitalism, while strongly positive towards values of economic development, honesty, localism and economic equality. Thus it seems, unfortunately, that these positions generally are the one and only possibility for existence within the conditions of an authoritarian regime.

The activity of the political elite of the Belarus is characterized by a marked strengthening of its role in governing the fate of society. As seen in the empiri-

cal findings of this chapter, while their perception of very serious local problems increased across time, the perception of governance efficiency in solving these problems increased as well. During the period studied, the networks of governance also change: the links in the governance network towards the general public as well as towards the local elective officials were weakened while the administrative vertical networks of power were strengthened.

Most important here is the local elite's responsibility for the construction of social reality. This tendency is perhaps best shown in our data by the contradiction between the greater number of ways for people to influence public decisions and the leaders own political activities on the one hand, and the continual decrease in the peoples' participation in solving local problems on the other hand. Thus, this social construction considerably enlarged the variability of possible consequences, applied to a country. In the early 1990s, on one pole there was a hypothetical perspective of regulation and social transformations while directing their progressing dynamics and civilized character. On the other pole there was an alternative of purposeful destruction of the established system without evident prospects of an escape from the deadlock of the economic and political crisis. Today we have to admit honestly that people believed in the former of these, but faced the latter. It happened, because the reality in Belarus is the result of an objectification of the second authoritarian alternative. It provides the grounds for classifying the results of the political elites' activities as a defeat.

To conclude, while estimating the transformations of our society towards democracy, one cannot reject the evident: this process was accompanied by strengthening the alienation of the civil world from the political elite. It is true that today one-third of the population in Belarus expresses negativism concerning national political elites on the whole, and does not relate the prospects of the country's development to individual leaders, parties, public movements or to local governance.

The Formation of Democracy and Local Governance in Russia

Zhan Toschenko and Timour Tsibikov¹

Development of Society and Local Government System

During the 1990s, Russian society experienced one of its most difficult crises of system character that encompassed all spheres of public life, including the economy, politics, law and culture. Its major features were political system instability, disorder in domestic industries and agriculture, a catastrophic reduction of the population and a deterioration of the overall health, the impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of the citizens and a crisis of system of social services.

The decrease in Gross National Product caused a deterioration in the standard of living of the majority of the population. In 1992 – during the hardest period of reforms - about 33 percent of the population of the country became poor. Because of the reduction of the national budget, the institutions of social protection worked in a difficult situation. In 1999, the national budget was 20 billion dollars, which is half of the budget of the City of New York. The Russian financial crash in August 1998 played a significant role in lowering the standard of living of the population. Even according to conservative estimates, this event alone moved the country back to the 1994 situation. According to United Nation's criteria, the proportion of poor in our country is 46 percent or about 67 million.

The decreasing standard of living during the transition to a market economy resulted in growth of social strain; the absolute peak came in 1993. But the process of development and reform, the growing economy and the more or less steady social structure in Russian society has resulted in a decrease in this social intensity as a whole. At the same time, social depressive tendencies appeared more clearly in some regions during these years.

¹ We want to thank Alexey Kobayakov and Kirill Kobayakov helped us with the statistical analysis, and Galina Tsvetkova who helped us to organize the surveys.

In 1999 and in 2000 respectively, the growth of GNP increased 4 percent and 8 percent. Accordingly, the increase of the real incomes of the population in 2000 was 9 percent in comparison with 1999. The devaluation of the Russian Ruble in 1999 allowed to lower debts on wages of the public officials essentially. The total debt, including industry, was reduced more slowly. The authorities made certain efforts to improve the situation as well. However, the level of incomes, wages and pensions has not yet returned to 1997 levels.

It is important to bear these conditions in mind when studying the development of democracy and local governance during 1990s, as well as the foundation of system of local government in Russia. The Constitution of Russian Federation passed after referendum voting in 1993 and the Federal Law "The General Principles of Organization of Local Governance in Russian Federation" of 1995, became a legal basis of the local government system. Other normative acts were also accepted, including the laws of the Subjects of Federation, which concern the role and functions of local government. Generally, there are currently over 40 federal and over 900 regional laws, regulating different aspects of the municipal life, such as social safety, social security, municipal transport, national and cultural autonomy, municipal property etc.

However, despite advanced legislation that delineated the powers of local government bodies, this has not resulted in a real foundation of the system of local governance as an independent institution with capabilities to influence decisions on local problems. Instability in federal relations is still a major political and legal problem. The process of differentiation of powers between the federal center, the Subjects of Federation and the bodies of local government is incomplete, and problems with internal budget relations remain.

First of all, the bodies of local government lack financial assets. The local authorities are responsible for significant obligations yet they control minimal income. President Putin handles the current situation in building "a vertical of authority," which aims to strengthen state power. He advocates strengthening authority and envisions advanced local governance in this centralistic policy. He promotes reforming local government and empowering it with real authority and meaningful sources of financing.

In 1992, 1995 and 1999, our research was directed to study the real situation of democracy and local governance in Russia, including changes in its development, by revealing the problems facing local government and its leaders.

The development of the local government system is a necessary part of the reforms that were introduced in Russia beginning in the 1990s. It continues to be a major part of the transformation in the political and economic spheres of public life. The local government system is based on the idea that citizens could independently decide a significant number of issues connected to their commu-

nity. This also opens up the process for civil initiatives in decisionmaking on the important social questions.

The Sample of Communities and Leaders

The data consists of three surveys, performed in 1992, 1995 and 1999. The first survey was conducted in February-March 1992 and encompassed 36 surveyed communities and 548 leaders. In the second survey, 1,069 leaders represented 76 communities. The third survey in 1998/1999 included 67 communities with 977 leaders interviewed.

The selected leaders and local governments came from all 7 regions of the country: Central, Northwest, Volgian, South, Ural, Siberia and Far East. Local elites from 26 communities participated in all three studies. Respondents from 16 communities participated in the 1992 and 1995 surveys. Leaders from 25 communities participated in both the 1995 and 1999 surveys. Thus, to a large extent, the same local governments have been surveyed across time.

The surveyed respondents come from the very top of Russian local government, elected bodies, executive boards, political parties and public organizations. Approximately five leaders are represented from each group in each community.

Backgrounds and Characteristics of the Russian Local Elite

The institutional backgrounds of the respondents are quite stable in all three surveys (Table 8.1). However, in the 1992 study, we should say that all respondents in the sample occupied administrative posts because a multiparty system did not yet exist in practice in Russia in the early 1990s. The existing system did not allow citizens to participate in political life of the country.

The average leader has had his or her present position for about 5 years. Nevertheless, he or she has been in public service for more than 10 years (Table 8.1). Furthermore, the recruitment of leaders to local government top positions has been substantial during the 1990s. A primary tendency here was an increasing number of new leaders, with no more than two years experience in their present position. These so-called newcomers (in their present position) already represented 43 percent of the leaders quite early during the transition period in 1992. At the same time, the proportion of veterans - with more than 11 years in public service or their present position - systematically decreased, from 22 in

public service and 62 percent in their present position in 1992, to 9 and 35 percent in 1999.

Table 8.1

Institutional Background 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Percent)

Background Characteristics	Year 1992 (N)	1995 (N)	1999 (N)
Type of Elite			
Politician	0 (0)	23 (248)	25 (246)
Administrator	<u>100 (549)</u>	<u>77 (820)</u>	<u>75 (722)</u>
	100 (549)	100 (1068)	100 (968)
In present position			
-2 years	43 (226)	32 (342)	61 (549)
3-10 years	35 (187)	54 (568)	30 (274)
11- years	<u>22 (117)</u>	<u>14 (148)</u>	<u>9 (83)</u>
	100 (530)	100 (1058)	100 (906)
In average (Mean)	5	6	4
In public Service			
-2 years	7 (25)	7 (53)	39 (236)
3-10 years	31 (121)	34 (274)	26 (160)
11- years	<u>62 (241)</u>	<u>59 (461)</u>	<u>35 (214)</u>
	100 (387)	100 (788)	100 (610)
In average (Mean)	16	16	11

The average age of the Russian local leader is about 45 years old. While the variations within different age cohorts are small, we can see a decreasing tendency for leaders of less than 40 years old, from 34 percent in 1992 to only 22 percent in 1999. At the same time, there is an increase in leaders who are older than 50. Thus, despite the fact that the veterans are slowly phasing out of the new system of local government, at the same time, a new elite seems to be establishing itself, which is characterized the increasing number of leaders in the group that is over 50.

The analysis of the differences in gender and education shows no essential changes. Most leaders, more than 80 percent, have a higher education. The share of the men is about 60 percent.

Table 8.2

Social Background 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Percent)


Background Characteristics	Year 1992 (N)	1995 (N)	1999 (N)
Age (mean)	43	45	46
Age Cohorts			
-39	34 (182)	27 (279)	22 (208)
40-49	42 (226)	50 (523)	46 (436)
50-59	21 (115)	18 (188)	25 (230)
60+	<u>3 (18)</u>	<u>5 (57)</u>	<u>7 (64)</u>
	100 (541)	100 (1047)	100 (938)
Gender			
Male	57 (313)	62 (662)	58 (551)
Female	<u>43 (238)</u>	<u>38 (406)</u>	<u>42 (406)</u>
	100 (551)	100 (1068)	100 (957)
Education			
Primary			
Secondary	18 (100)	8 (86)	11 (109)
University	<u>82 (452)</u>	<u>92 (976)</u>	<u>89 (845)</u>
	100 (552)	100 (1062)	100 (954)

Local Problems and Effective Action

From the set of problems that Russian local elite face, problems concerning the local economy are the most important, and serious problems of economic development top that category. In 1999 about 90 percent of the local leaders regarded this issue as very serious, in 1995 it was 79 percent. The number of leaders who viewed this problem as a very serious problem increased substantially from 1992 to 1995 (from 20 percent to 79 percent). This development is a consequence of the crisis in Russian economy. The crisis has also resulted in increasing unemployment, and decreasing social improvement and standards of living. Changes in these issues are shown in the Figure 8.1. Problems concerning public health services and public order are alarming as well, but their parameters decreased a little in 1999 in comparison with 1995.


Figure 8.1

Very Serious Local Problems 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Percent)



Another tendency seen in Figure 8.1 shows the decrease in local elite perception of problems concerning the culture and leisure, ecology, migration and immigration. Obviously, the difficult financial and economic conditions of local governments and the population compel local elite to shift their attention from these problems to the problems connected with elementary survival of communities.

Figure 8.2
Effective Action 1995 and 1999 (Percent)*



* This question was not included in the 1999 study

Taken all together, we can see that average local leader's perception of local problems increased during the period studied. In 1992, the mean of the problem perception scale was 1.17, in 1995 it increased to 1.37, and in 1999 the scale mean increased to 1.39. This increase is statistically significant at the .01 percent level. Further, the scale ranges from 0 (no problem) to 2 (very serious), so the general level of perceived problems is quite high.

The great and increasing amount of problems faced by local elite leads to the low efficiency of the actions during all period studied, although the mean effectiveness/effective action increases from 0.90 in 1995, to 1.02 in 1999. This scale ranges from 0 (no action), 1 (some action, but no effects), to 2 (effective action). Thus, in average most leaders see some action but no effects.

Above all, it is in the field of education that effective actions were sharply reduced from 70 percent in 1995, to 30 percent in 1999 (Figure 8.1). Moreover, the increasing perception of effective actions concerning economic development does not lead us to think that these problems have decreased (compare findings in Figure 8.1).

A comparison of Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 shows that the efficiency of actions in economic development (an increase of 17 percent), in social improvement (5 percent increase), in living standard (increasing 4 percent), in unemployment (increase with 7 percent) do not diminish the perception of these problems as very serious. In other words, it seems that the decisions made by local leaders cannot influence solving problems of national character.

Powers and Responsibilities

First, the perception of power and autonomy of local government in all areas has decreased across the period studied, with the exception of the areas of pollution, culture and public improvements. Thus, 43 percent of leaders in 1992 thought that local government had enough power and autonomy to act effectively in the area of public improvements; in 1995, this group increased to 62 percent, and in 1999 it has increased to 66 percent (Figure 8.3).

Between 1995 and 1999, the opportunities for autonomous and powerful local self-government in the fields of education, public health services, housing and social improvement were reduced. These changes are most probably connected with the tightening of economic transformations, which have resulted in a decrease in the living standards of a large part of population. Moreover, the stable decrease in the power and autonomy of local government is shown in the areas of economic development, employment and support of poor people.


In 1999, local governments had the greatest opportunities for self-government based decisionmaking in the area of culture (72 percent), public safety (66 percent) and public improvements (66 percent).

Taken all together, however, there is an increase in the perception of local government power between 1992 and 1999. The local power/autonomy scale score was 0.48 in 1992, it increased to 0.56 in 1995, and then decreased again to 0.54 in 1999. It is possible to say that this issue is stable and the local govern-

ments have no sufficient autonomy to act effectively (the scale ranges from 0 (lack power) to 1 (has power)). Moreover this corresponds with significant increases of the problems facing local government and the rather low average score for effective actions.

Figure 8.3


Autonomy and the Power to act Effectively 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Percent)



The analysis of local elite’s opinions on the responsibilities for different public sector tasks shows another interesting finding. The local leaders are ready to give up a significant amount of local government responsibilities to the regional and federal governmental level. The average score on who should be primarily responsible, on a scale for local government goes from 0.62 in 1992 to 0.41 in 1999. At the same time, the regional and federal government scale increased from 0.41 in 1992 to 0.51 in 1999 (Figure 8.4).

Figure 8.4

Opinion about Primary Responsibility for Public Sector Functions 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Means)



* This question was not included in the 1999 study

At the same time, between 1995 and 1999 a declining proportion of local leaders believe that citizens and non-governmental organizations should carry out functions in public sector. The changes between 1995 and 1999 are quite large. In 1999 the scores were very low (0.02-0.04), although they peaked in 1995 (0.16-0.19). These scales on primary responsibility go from 0 (should not have primary responsibility) to 1 (should have primary responsibility). All shown changes between 1992 and 1999 in Figure 8.4 are statistically significant.


Influence and Support

The share of the local leaders capable of rendering great influence in problem solving is small. It does not exceed 15 percent of leaders (Figure 8.5). However, the mean of personal influence increased from 0.47 in 1992 to 0.66 in 1995 on a scale ranging from 0 (no influence) to 2 (great influence). This is primarily a consequence of increasing influence over public safety and education. Local leader's influence over political organizations has increased as well, from 4 per-

cent to 10 percent. It is connected with the beginning of the active process of party's foundation in Russia.

Figure 8.5

Personal Influence 1992 and 1995 (Percent “great influence”)*



* This question was not included in the 1999 study

The least influence that the local elite can render is in the area of immigration (3 percent in 1992 and 4 percent in 1995). The greatest decrease of elite influence is registered for public funds (budget and revenue), from 15 percent in 1992 to 10 percent in 1995. The low level of elite influence over problems is based on the inability to resist the difficult economic and political situation in the country.


On questions about governance networks, to whom a leader turns to in situations in which support from others is necessary, most Russian local leaders turn

to local elective and top administrative officials, colleagues and friends, but also to businessmen and local media. Above all it seems that it is the administrative and business spheres of the governance networks that have increased in strength.

Thus, in the 1992 study, 39 percent of the local leaders turned to local top administrative officials for support, in 1995 this type of support increased to 51 percent. Contacts with administrative colleagues increased from 33 to 49 percent, and contacts with higher administrative officials increased from 6 percent in 1992 to 22 percent in 1995. Moreover, there is a tendency of decreasing contacts with local elective officials across the period studied. In 1992, elective bodies held the first position as a support group (47 percent), but they moved to fourth position in 1995 (Figure 8.6).

Figure 8.6

Persons/Organizations to turn to for Support 1992 and 1995 (Percent)*



* This question was not included in the 1999 study

Opinions about business leaders as a support group have increased considerably. In 1992, 13 percent of local leaders contacted them when support from others was needed. In 1995, 32 percent mention business leaders as an important support group. These findings probably reflect the increasing role of private capital in Russian society and politics.

Both of these tendencies of increasing administrative and business contacts are likely to develop further in the future. Moreover, the average number of support groups mentioned increased from 2.38 in 1992 to 3.40 in 1995. We can say that local authorities became more open in their activity toward developing new contacts for support.

Another important finding is that an increasing number of support groups are local in character. The local support groups' average score increased from 0.29 in 1992, to 0.35 in 1995. However, the non-local average score increases as well, from 0.03 in 1992, to 0.14 in 1995. These scores range from 0 (no support contact) to 1 (support contact). All of these changes are statistically significant. Above all, it seems that these changes result from a strengthened administrative governance network.

Values of Democracy and Local Governance


The attitude of Russian local elite toward democratic values is extremely mistrustful. For example, the values of political equality, citizen participation and conflict are generally denied. Although some positive changes in these values can be emphasized. Thus, the participation value scale increased from -24 in 1992 to -20 in 1995 (Figure 8.7).

The value of capitalism has changed: there was no negative attitude to capitalism in the beginning of economic reforms in 1992, and then in 1995, a strong shift toward a negative view took place. The scale mean for capitalism in 1992 was 9, and this decreased to -10 in 1995, probably because of the great economic crises.

The failures in the economic transformations probably also led to an increase of the value of economic equality and localism. The value of economic equality increased from a scale mean of -0,5 in 1992 to 17 in 1995. The value of localism has increased from a scale mean of 25 in 1992 to 29 in 1995. At the same time, the value of minority rights has decreased from a scale mean of 18 in 1992 to a scale mean of 11 in 1995. All changes in Figure 8.7, with the exception for the value of political equality, show statistically significant variation between 1992 and 1995.

Figure 8.7

Local Elite Values 1992 and 1995 (Means)*




*This question was not included in the 1999 study

Comment:

The scales ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

Most Russian local elites believe that national minorities should have the right of representation in elected bodies, training in their native language, founding cultural organizations and political parties. The minorities include Germans, Crimean, Tartars and Jews (Avdeyev, Grischenko & Jasin'ska-Kainia (1993). But, as seen in Figure 8.8, we find a tendency toward a reduction in support for these rights during the period studied (which is also confirmed by the decreased support for the value of minority rights above, in Figure 8.8).

Figure 8.8
Minority Rights 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Percent)



Moreover, the proportion of leaders supporting the right for national minorities to have their own native language used officially was reduced by almost half. The right for minorities to have their own religion (churches and holy places) received the most stable support. It was mentioned by 96 percent of local leaders during the period studied.

Thus, despite the decrease, tolerance among the Russian local elite toward national minorities is still quite high, especially concerning the freedom of religion. As to social tolerance in general, in 1992 and 1995, the leaders were asked to sort out various groups of people that the local leaders would not like as neighbors.


About 50 to 75 percent say that they do not want alcoholics, drug addicts, emotionally unstable people, criminals, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbors, and about 20 percent of local leaders do not accept gypsies as a neighbor group. Groups accepted by great bulk of Russian local elite both in 1992 and 1995, include people of different race, Jews and Muslims.

The main changes concern the leaders' growing intolerance toward political right- and left wing extremists, which doubled across the period studied. The finding in attitude toward large families is also interesting. Intolerance to this group increased from 7 percent in 1992 to 14 percent in 1995. This is likely connected to the fact that these families suffered greatly during economic reforms and are looked upon as potential criminals by those in the study.

Finally, a positive finding concerns changes in the level of interpersonal trust. Trust toward ordinary people among the leaders was measured across the entire period studied and is stable, but quite low (30 percent in 1992, 27 percent in 1995 and 30 percent in 1999). On the other hand, there is an evident decrease in the proportion of leaders within the Russian local elite who believe that most people *cannot* be trusted -- from 63 percent in 1992, to 56 percent in 1999.

Figure 8.9

Groups not wanted as Neighbors 1992 and 1995 (Percent)*



*This question was not included in the 1999 study


Cleavages and Conflict

Income is the main dividing factor in Russian communities according to the leaders' perception. The proportion of leaders saying that income divides people in their community "very much" increased from 42 percent in 1992, to 53 per-

cent in 1995, and to 56 percent in 1999 (Figure 8.10). The economic and social transformations during the period studied probably influenced leaders to emphasize the importance of the difference between those desiring social changes and those opposing it (on average, about 20 percent of leaders). In connection to this, the importance of differences in political views increased from 7 percent in 1992, study to 9 percent in 1995 and 13 percent in 1999 study. During the period, racial, ethnic and religious origins were perceived as less divisive forces in the communities.

Figure 8.10

The Perception of Differences Dividing People in the Community 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Percent “very much”)



According to the average leader's perception of these differences taken as a whole, the situation has not changed significantly: the score of the mean differences scale is 0.81 in 1992, 0.79 in 1995 and 0.83 in 1999. The differences scale ranges from 0 (not at all) to 2 (very much).

These social and economic cleavages have not yet reached the level of real and serious conflict. Although 68 percent of leaders in the 1992 study said that there were such conflicts that interfered with community actions, in the 1995 study 47 percent took the same opinion, and in 1999 study it increased again to 61 percent. At the same time, only about 15 to 19 percent of the local elite said that these conflicts come very much in the way of the development of their territory during the studied period. Thus, the situation has not deteriorated.

Participation, Influence and Political Action by Leaders

The question about the perception of citizen participation in the community was asked in relation to how it was five years ago. In 1992, about 38 percent of leaders said that there is greater citizen participation compared to five years ago. In 1995 this group decreased by more than half, to 14 percent, and in 1999 it increased to 22 percent. Moreover, in 1992 about 25 percent of local leaders thought that citizen participation had developed less compared to five years ago. In 1995, this position increased more than twofold, to 54 percent, and in 1999 it decreased again to 45 percent. Thus, according to the perception of the local leaders, there is a tendency toward reduced citizen participation in the local community.

At the same time, the political activity of local leaders increased considerably during the period studied. The sum of political actions increased from -2.30 in 1992, to -1.79 in 1995, and -1.78 in 1999. The average sum of legal political actions change from -1.64 in 1992, to 0.25 in 1995 and 0.16 in 1999. The sum of illegal political actions increased in a more linear manner, from -1.64 in 1992, to -1.53 in 1995 and -1.31 in 1999.

In 1999, the most widespread political actions were signing a petition (48 percent) and participation in demonstrations and meetings (24 percent). In 1992, about 30 percent of leaders signed a petition and 20 percent participated in meetings. However, in 1995 political activity was at its peak with political activity of all forms, including participation in boycotts (6 percents), unofficial meetings (2 percent) and occupation (4 percent). We connect this increase in political activity with disappointment in economic and social transformations, and a sharp decrease in the standard of living.

When the Russian local elite is asked about their perception of how citizens can best influence public decisions, voting, local self-government and mass media are seen as the most powerful. These methods of influence were mentioned most often during the entire period studied. We should also note the growing role of public organizations (10 percent in 1992 and 29 percent in 1999), political parties (from 7 to 17 percent), parliamentary and presidential elections (from 11 to 25 percent, and 7 to 25 percent accordingly).

In general, the number of ways for citizens to influence decisions increased from 2.00 in 1992, to 2.67 in 1995 and 2.69 in 1999. Today the leaders believe that people have many more opportunities to influence public authorities and their activities. The mean of conventional methods of influence increased from 0.16 in 1992, to 0.27 in 1995 and 0.31 in 1999. The mean of unconventional ways increased as well, from 0.24 in 1992, to 0.27 in 1995 and 0.37 in 1999. All of these positive changes are statistically significant.

Local–Global Relations

The Russian local elite was asked about local-global relations in the 1992 and 1995 surveys. Figure 8.11 shows that local leader's geographical identity has changed slightly. About 20 percent of leaders said that they most closely identified with their own community. National identification came first for 20 percent of the leaders. Only 6 percent mentioned the region as their primary identification. In 1995, the number of leaders who identified themselves with the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) increased dramatically, probably because the CIS institutions had just been established. The least identification was found with Europe and the world as a whole.

During the period studied, foreign impact in the local community changed more radically according to the perceptions of the local leaders. The foreign impact from pollution, imports and media increased the most according to the elite (Figure 8.12).


The foreign impact total score increased from 0.51 in 1992, to 0.63 in 1995, and 0.78 in 1999. According to the Russian local elite, the average perception of foreign *economic impact* increased from 0.71 in 1992, to 0.81 in 1995 and 0.91 in 1999 study. Only 8 percent mentioned foreign investments as having “a great deal” of impact on their own local community in 1999. The foreign people impact score also increased from 0.42 in 1992, to 0.50 in 1995 and 0.70 in 1999.

However, these indexes were quite low during the entire period (the scales range from 0 (not at all) to 2 (a great deal)). As a whole, we can conclude that the

importance of local-global relations increased greatly, and that the changes are statistically significant.

Figure 8.11


Primary Identification 1992 and 1995 (Percent)*



* This question was not included in the 1999 study

Figure 8.12

Foreign Impact in the Community 1992, 1995 and 1999 (Percent “a great deal”)



Parties and Future of Democracy


In 1992 and 1995, local leaders were asked about the most important goals for Russia the next ten years. The findings show that the most important goal is the maintenance of public calm and order. In 1992, 73 percent of leaders mentioned this goal first, but in 1995 this goal was reduced almost by half, to 38 percent. Another important goal is "fighting rising prices". About 10 to 15 percent of leaders put this goal first. Both these goals arose logically during periods of social, political and economic transformations. But, about 10 percent of the leaders actually first mentioned "giving people more say in important government decisions" as the most important goal for Russia.

The question about perception of the general functioning of democracy in Russia shows that in 1999 about 58 percent of Russian local elite believed, "our democracy is functioning so badly, that there will be no democracy if this continues." About 37 percent believed that, "our democracy is functioning but has many shortcomings." Only about 1 percent of the leaders believed that, "our democracy is functioning well." Thus, we can note that more than 10 years of democracy in Russia has not been enough for its real development according to the perception by the Russian local elite.

The backwardness of democracy in the country as a whole also determined the remaining backwardness of democratic institutions, including political parties (Figure 8.13). According to the Russian local elite, parties are important for "competing in elections" and "forming majorities in bodies." But, at the same time, about 70 percent of local leaders think that parties play an insignificant role in "meeting electorate interests" and "involving people in politics." Thus, the relation between the Russian local elite and political parties is extremely inconsistent and corresponds with low level of citizen participation.

Figure 8.13

Why Political Parties are Important 1995 and 1999 (Percent "very important")



Conclusions

The 1990s marked the founding years of a local government system in Russia. During this decade, in 1992, 1995 and 1999 our research was directed on studying the real situation of democracy and local governance in Russia.

Despite the transition to democracy and great difficulties in adjusting to a new difficult social and economic situation, the institutional and social backgrounds of the local leaders were generally quite stable across the period studied. In the 1992 study, the individuals occupying administrative posts were all bureaucrats in some sense, because of the backwardness of the political system in Russia at the time. The recruitment of a new local elite seems to have increased across time since the proportion of newcomers increased as a similar proportion of veterans left the system. We also found the tendency of a decreasing number of young leaders (up to 40 years of age), and increasing number of leaders older than 50 years of age. Thus, it seems that the tendency of elite recruitment also includes an element of stabilization, with an increasing number of leaders aging within the new local government system.

From the set of the problems that Russian local elite face, problems that concern the local economy come first. This is a consequence of the instant crisis of the Russian economy. The crisis resulted in sharply increased problems of employment, social maintenance and standard of living. The increasing problems faced by local elite leads to the measured low, and only somewhat increasing efficiency of local actions during the entire period studied. Moreover, the efficiency of actions in economic development, in social improvement, in living standard, and in unemployment failed to diminish the perception of these problems as very serious. The perception of the power and autonomy of local government decreased across the period studied, with exception of the areas of pollution, culture and public improvements. Thus, an increasing proportion of local leaders are prepared to sacrifice a significant amount of their responsibilities to the regional and federal governmental levels for different public sector functions. At the same time, an increasing number of local leaders believe that individuals themselves and public organizations should not carry out functions of the public sector. The share of local leaders capable of rendering great influence over problem solving on their territories is small and stable. When support from others is necessary, most Russian local leaders turn to local elective and top administrative officials, colleagues and friends, and also to the businessmen and local media. These findings probably reflect the increasing role of private capital in the Russian society and politics.

The attitude of Russian local elite toward democratic values is extremely mistrustful. For example, the average leader denies political equality and citizen participation although there are significantly positive changes across time. The value of capitalism has changed from positive to negative. The failures in economic transformations also probably led to increasing of values of economic equality and localism.

The largest part of Russian local elite agrees that national minorities should have the right of representation in elective bodies, training in their native language, founding cultural organizations and political parties, but there is a strong tendency of decreasing support for these rights in the period studied.

Income is the main dividing factor in Russian communities according to the leaders' perception. The economic and social transformations during the period studied have also strengthened differences between those desiring social changes to those opposing it. In connection to this development, differences in political views have increased as well. Nevertheless, at the same time we found a reduction of leaders' perceptions with regard to citizen participation in the communities. The Russian local elite's perceptions about how citizens can best influence decisions include voting, local self-government and mass media. An increasing proportion of local leaders believe that people have more opportunities to influence authorities' activity. The local leader's geographical identity changed slightly. About 20 percent of leaders said that they most closely identified with their own community. National identification comes first for another 20 percent of the leaders. The least identification is exhibited in relation to Europe and the world as a whole. At the same time, foreign impact in the local community has changed radically. These changes primarily concern increasing foreign pollution, imports and influence of foreign media. The importance of local-global relations is increasing substantially.

The most important goals for Russia in the next ten years are the maintenance of public order and fighting rising prices. These goals are a logical consequence resulting from a period of social and economic transformations. The question on the functioning of democracy still reflects the seriousness of the current situation: 58 percent of Russian local elite believed, "our democracy is functioning so badly, that there will be no democracy if this continues" and 37 percent believed that, "our democracy is functioning but has many shortcomings." Thus, the backwardness of democracy in the country as a whole also influenced the backwardness of democratic institutions, including political parties. About 70 percent of local leaders think that parties play an insignificant role in meeting electorate interests and involving people in politics.

Thus, we can conclude that while Russian local governance and democratic development improved slowly but significantly during the 1990s, 10 years is not enough for the genuine development of democracy according to the perceptions of the Russian local elite.

Part IV
Comparative Analysis
Across Countries and Cities

Universal Change and the Conditions for Democratic Development

Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg

In the previous chapters, we have compared a wide range of European local elites across the turbulent 1990s. Country by country, we followed the native scholars' own analyses of the development of the local governing conditions in relation to the general progress or decline of democracy. So far, the main purpose has been to describe and explain change in the composition and contexts of local elites, as well as their principles and practices for each of the surveyed nations separately. However, our central question of inquiry in the introductory chapter of this book about the interaction between local governing and national development of democracy remains unanswered. Our general assumption is that throughout the 1990s, changing governing characteristics of the local political-administrative elites influenced the democratic success and/or decline in a country. Hence, our aim in this chapter is not only finding those governing characteristics that have changed universally regardless of the country studied. Above all, it is to search for those governing qualities or components of a political capital that most clearly interact with democratic development, and therefore might explain why democracy succeeds in some European countries and declines or fails in others.

Between the two compared Western democracies in this study - Sweden and the Netherlands – the development of democracy and national democratic governance throughout the 1990s remained most stable in Sweden (Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2003, Dreher 2003, Golder 2003). Among the new European democracies of the former Soviet Union, national democratic government and governance most clearly succeeded in the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and failed in some of the new nations within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), most clearly so in Belarus and to some extent in Russia (Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2003, Dreher 2003, see also Appendix A).

Several new theories have been advanced about how and why local governing leaders have changed and coped with new political, social and economic internationalized contexts from the early 1990s on. These theories assume that

these changes in elite political-administrative behavior have a profound effect on the development of democracy more generally. The model of analysis introduced in chapter 1 includes ten hypotheses of significant change from what was claimed by the traditional Weberian vertical model of political administrative control, verifying the challenges of the new theories (see, the model of analysis in the introductory Chapter 1).

In line with New Public Management (NPM) theory's ideas about a search for excellence (Ferlie et al. 1996, Christensen & Laegreid 2002), we hypothesize that the local elites become significantly more professional throughout the 1990s, indicated by an increasing educational level among local elites (Hypothesis 1). Further, as suggested by the advocates of NPM (Olsen 1988, Hood 1991, 1995, Pollitt 1993), we assume that the perception of local government autonomy and the power to act effectively become significantly more decentralized during the 1990s (Hypothesis 4) and their policies significantly more efficient (Hypothesis 3). As the theory of Governance (Kooiman 1993, Pierre 2000, John 2001) would suggest, we hypothesize that the perception of local problems become significantly more complex and serious (Hypothesis 2), and that the networks of the local leaders become larger and significantly more horizontal (Hypothesis 7). As suggested by advocates of the New Political Culture (NPC) theory (Clark & Rempel 1997, Clark & Hoffman-Martinot 1998, Clark & Lipset 2001), we assume that their politics become less ideological and significantly less founded in basic democratic values (Hypothesis 8), their policies become more populist selective (Hypothesis 5), as well as increasingly based upon personal influence (Hypothesis 6), while the functions of parties will rely more on public interests (Hypothesis 9). In line with the theories of Local-Global Relations and Globalization (Robertson 1992, Teune 1995, Teune & Ostrowski 1997, Szücs 1998b, Teune 2002a, Teune 2002b), we hypothesize that important relations in their towns and cities become increasingly local-global (Hypothesis 10).

The most important issue to examine empirically is the *democratic* impact and verification of these new theoretical movements. What specific local governing qualities strengthen or impede democratic development? Our curiosity especially concerns: (a) whether a change towards more professional, decentralized, autonomous and efficient local elites - in line with the theories of NPM - are greater in countries where democracy has developed more successfully; (b) whether growing networks in order to handle increasingly complex problems - along with the central ideas of the Governance theory - runs parallel with more successful democratic development; and finally (c) whether a change toward more personalized leadership, pragmatism, populism and local-global relations

correlates with a more successful democratic development, as claimed by the advocates of the theories of Local-Global Relations and NPC.


The aim is to determine the components of a political capital that may strengthen democracy more generally, controlling for both national and system characteristics throughout the 1990s. The findings will produce propositions about elite qualities that change universally as well as the components that are mutually independent and reinforcing for the development of democracy and may therefore be defined as political capital. Hence, with the term political capital, we refer to the governing elites' ability to mobilize resources along with the ten hypotheses of our model of analysis that are directly or indirectly related and contributing to stable democratic development.

Changes in the Composition of the Local Elite

A main problem in new democracies has always been that of how to replace the old cadre of the authoritarian system with legitimate and representative governing elites suitable to the conditions of democratic rule. At the same time, it may not be possible to get rid of the old cadre entirely. Their knowledge, skills and former experience may be useful during a transition period (Shain & Linz 1995). Therefore, before we start to analyze the ten assumptions of change among the local governing leaders according to the model of analysis, we must first analyze when the large replacement of the old cadre took place in the new democracies of the former Soviet Union.

Looking at our findings in Figure 9.1 that presents average *years in public service*, we find that the rates of succession have been the highest in the new democracies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In Lithuania a great part of the old cadre was replaced quite soon after the transition to democracy. The average length of the Lithuanian elite in public service was approximately ten years in the early 1990s and has since declined to seven years in the late 1990s. During the same period of time, the average length of *years in present position* has increased slightly, from less than four years in the early 1990s, to more than five years in the late 1990s. The rate of succession of the old elite seems to have been roughly the same in the two other Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia: the average length of years in public service in the late 1990s is about eight years, while the average years in present position is five years. Thus, in the three Baltic States, many leaders got their first public position in the early 1990s, during or after the transition process began, and a great number of them seems to have advanced or shifted positions since then.

Figure 9.1
Years in Public Service and Present Position (Means)



If we look at the development in Belarus, which represents the country of the former Soviet Union where democracy has most clearly failed and today constitutes the only remaining autocracy of Europe, the pattern of local elite succession is also the most troublesome. In the early 1990s, the average Belarus local leader had been in public service for 17 years. When the survey was repeated in the same 30 cities in the mid-1990s, this figure had hardly changed at all. Instead, the rate of succession of the local elite seems to have increased in the late 1990s, but not because of the introduction of democracy but rather the opposite, as an effect of Alexander Lukashenka's new regime of removing unwanted local leaders (Grischenko, Elsukova & Kuchko pp. 205-210). The rate of succession of the local governing elites follows roughly the same pattern in Russia. The

average length of years in public service was about 16 years in both the early and the mid-1990s, and it is only in the late 1990s that the average length of power declines to about ten years in public service.

Thus, while the succession of the elite seems to have increased in both Belarus and Russia, this did not occur during the early transition period but rather between the mid- to late 1990s. The quite unchanged composition of the old cadre of local governing elites in Belarus and Russia most probably hindered the development of democracy during the early transition period. When the rate of succession increased in the late 1990s, it seems rather to be an effect of the common policy of centralization (the policy of “Strengthening of the Vertical”) that was implemented in both these countries (Grischenko, Elsukova & Kuchko p. 205, Toschenko & Tsibikov p. 232).


At the close of the 20th century, the average local leader in the Netherlands and Sweden had held positions in public service for about 16 years and had his/her present position for between six and seven years. In Sweden, these figures represent a slight decrease, from an average of 18 years in public service in the 1980s. In the Netherlands we observe the opposite trend, with a quite large increase in the average length of years in public service, from 10 years in the 1980s, to 16 years in the late 1990s. Thus, while the succession of the local elite has increased somewhat in Sweden, we find the opposite trend in the Netherlands.

While the analysis of the replacement rate indicates that the choice and succession to a new and more representative local governing elite have foremost taken place in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, we still know less about the development of increasing excellence and professionalism, indicated by a significant increase in their educational level, thereby verifying our first hypothesis of the model of analysis.

In Figure 9.2, we find that the proportion of local leaders with a university degree increased during the 1990s in the Netherlands, Sweden and Russia, while there was a slight but statistically non-significant decrease from a quite high level in Lithuania and Belarus. Thus, we find no clear-cut differences between or within advanced and new democracies. Rather, the most noteworthy finding is the difference between Sweden and the other surveyed countries. Although the group with some sort of university education increased 15 percent between 1985 and 1999 - compared to between 80 and 90 percent in the other countries - still only 65 percent of the Swedish local elite have some sort of university education. One explanation here is that the composition of the Swedish local elite

sample contains more politicians (71-74 percent), compared to, for example the Netherlands (50-66 percent).¹

Figure 9.2
Respondents with University Education (Percent)



Thus, what we find is a universal pattern of high or increasing levels of university educated local elites, confirming the first hypothesis of the model of analysis about a shift toward a high or increasing professional background of local

¹ The lower proportion of university educated within the Swedish local elite is due to the fact that fewer politicians in Sweden have university education. The proportion of Swedish leading local politicians with university education has increased from 35 percent in the 1980s, to 56 percent in the late 1990s, but also among the administrative leaders university education has increased somewhat, from 87 percent in the 1980s, to 95 percent in the late 1990s. Among the Dutch local elite, the proportion of politicians with university/polytechnic education is much larger compared to the Swedish local politicians, the increase goes from 75 percent in the 1980s, to 90 percent in the late 1990s.

elites, very much in line with the NPM theory's suggestion of search for excellence.


No General Development towards More Complex Problems

Theorists often imply that the very reason for the growth of governance networks to coordinate and solve public problems is because of the increasingly complex context of problems due to the internationalization and globalization (Kooiman 1993, Stoker 1998, Pierre 2000, Stoker 2000, John 2001). Therefore, and according to our second hypothesis of our model of analysis, we expected to find the problems that the governing elite face becoming increasingly more serious and complex to solve during the 1990s. However, from the point of view of the perception of the local governing elites in our study, this assumption is not fully verified. The most continuous increase in the complexity of local problems is found in Sweden, but as seen in Figure 9.3, the increase is minimal.

Among the Dutch local elite, we found the opposite trend, as the average perception of the seriousness of local problems has continuously declined. More as expected, we found that local problems are constantly seen as most serious among the local elites in the new democracies. In particular we found an increase in Lithuania and Russia during the early to mid the 1990s, followed by a slight decline in Lithuania in the late 1990s. The average seriousness of problems in Estonia and Latvia is lower and quite close to the Swedish level.

Thus, for some of the countries, our hypothesis about local problems becoming increasingly serious and complex is not verified. This is particularly true for the Dutch development, where we notice a systematic decline in the perception of serious local problems during the last quarter of the 20th century. However, in Sweden – where the hypothesis of increasing complexity of local problems is verified most clearly – the most continuous increase in viewing problems as very serious is found in areas like education, living standards, and health care, that is, in issues where there has been political struggle about who should be primarily responsible followed by decentralization of the educational and health care systems from the state and the regional government level to the local government level (Szücs & Strömberg, pp. 45-47, see also Szücs 1993, 1995).

Figure 9.3
Seriousness of Local Problems (Means)




Comment: The Seriousness of Local Problems Scale ranges from 0 (no problem), 1 (somewhat serious) to 2 (very serious).

Increasing Policy Effectiveness

During the modern era, much of the public sector focus was directed on bureaucratic performance. Great importance was placed on the services being run by the public sector, but not how cost effective this performance was. Instead, the public performance was based on quite detailed legislation, with the objective of providing equal public services to all citizens. One common objective of the new theories of political-administrative change and reform is that of efficiency (Pollit 1993, Hood 1995). While traditional theories focused on the classical Weberian legal-rational model of bureaucracy as the tool for policy implementation, a central emphasis of the NPM theory is placed on effectiveness (Christensen & Lægreid 2002). The third hypothesis of our model is designed to investigate whether the local elite increasingly undertook such effective action or “ef-

fectiveness.” The assumption is that the governing elite view themselves as being increasingly effective throughout the 1990s.

Figure 9.4
Policy Effectiveness (Means)



Comment: The Policies Effectiveness Scale ranges from 0 (no action), 1 (some action but no effects) to 2 (effective action).

If we look at whether effective action was taken in the last two to three years concerning the issues that we asked about, we find that in general, the perception of policy effectiveness in solving the local problems is indeed increasing (Figure 9.4). The increase in policy effectiveness is statistically significant in the Netherlands between the 1980s and the mid-1990s, and between the mid-1990s and the late 1990s in Lithuania, Belarus and Russia. However, in Sweden we find no statistically significant change (the policy effectiveness of the Estonian and Latvian local elite remained at the same level as the Swedish leaders in the late 1990s). Thus, again the findings universally support the NPM theory: re-

ardless of country, according to the local elite, policies have become more effective during the 1990s (or at least not significantly less efficient, as in the case of the Swedish development).

Decentralized Autonomy and the Power to Act Effectively?


In parallel to what is claimed by the advocates of the NPM, we have so far been able to verify a high or growing professional status as well as increasingly effective action. However, the theorists of the NPM theory also claim that it is necessary to decentralize power in order to gain such effectiveness. According to the fourth hypothesis of the model, therefore we assume that there has been a shift from “centralized” to “decentralized” power and autonomy in order to act on local problems. Our empirical findings, however, show little correspondence with the hypothesis. Especially among the Swedish local elite, there is a statistically significant *decline* in the view that local government has enough power and autonomy to act effectively (Figure 9.5).

Thus, in Sweden the average local governing leader reports that they have *less* power and autonomy to act effectively in the late 1990s compared to in the 1980s. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that the Swedish average estimation of decentralization is quite high also in the late 1990s, after the decline.

The hypothesis of decentralized autonomy and power is only verified among the Belarus, Russian and Dutch elites. In these countries, we find a significant increase in the proportion of leaders saying that they have enough power and autonomy to act effectively. In Lithuania we find no significant change in local government’s power and autonomy.

Thus, a first observation that can be made from these findings represents quite a paradox: increasing decentralization is not necessarily related to successful democratic development. This is most clearly shown for the development in Belarus, where the estimated level of local powers increases from a bottom position in the early 1990s, to the very top score among the survey points of the late 1990s. Thus, although it is often claimed that democracy must be combined with strong local self-government, it seems that decentralization of power and autonomy to the local government may be equally important for hindering democratic development and remaining in a state of authoritarianism, as we found in the case of Belarus.

Figure 9.5
Autonomy and the Power to Act Effectively (Means)



Comment: The Power and Autonomy to Act Effectively Scale ranges from 0 (lacks powers) to 1 (has powers).

A second important note to make concerns the correspondence between the development of the legal status of local self-government in some of the surveyed countries, and the local elite's estimation of their power and autonomy to act effectively within local government. This is perhaps most clearly shown in the case of the Netherlands, where the legal responsibilities have been increasingly decentralized, and where, accordingly, the local elites mention increasing local power and autonomy. The comparatively low average perception of local power and autonomy in the late 1990s also reflects the still quite centralized status of the Dutch local government (de Vries, pp. 72-73). The large perception of decentralization in Sweden corresponds to the traditionally strong legal status of local self-government. The perceived decline in the perception local self-

government in Sweden may further be explained by the fact that during the early and mid-1990s, the national government decided to both restrict local taxation and to implement a system of redistribution of local income from “rich” to “poor” Swedish communities (Szücs & Strömberg pp. 39-40). Thus, rather than a universal tendency of decentralization as the new theories suggest, we find that quite centralized nations have become more decentralized, and quite decentralized nations have become more centralized.

Finally, it is important to note that the findings of how the perception of the power and autonomy of local government to act effectively correlates with the local elites’ estimation of their policy effectiveness as well as the complexity of local problems at hand actually support the NPM theory more generally. Again, the cases of Sweden and the Netherlands may serve as good examples of how the development in the two once quite similar welfare states has moved in opposite directions during the 1990s in regard to the three NPM variables of decentralization, policy effectiveness and serious local problems. The Dutch development is indeed characterized by the increasing decentralization of power and autonomy to act effectively, a growing perception of effectiveness as well as a declining complexity and seriousness of local problems. The decline in the Swedish local elite’s power and autonomy to act effectively is paired with an unchanged low level of effectiveness and increasingly serious local problems.

This correspondence of the NPM variables can also be seen in the comparative analysis of the local elites within the new nations of the former Soviet Union. Although all five of these nations share similarly high levels of local problems, it is in the increasingly authoritarian Belarus that we find the greatest increases and highest levels of both self-estimated policy effectiveness and the power to act effectively. In order to deal with severe local problems in the short run in a new democracy, it seems that authoritarianism offers tempting ways to increase policy effectiveness by the decentralization of certain forms of power and autonomy. Thus, in new democracies, the relationship between decentralization, effectiveness and democratic development are far more complicated than suggested by the new theories of public sector change and reform.

To conclude, increasing or high levels of decentralization of power and autonomy to the local government level lead neither to effectiveness or fewer serious local problems, nor does it automatically effect positive democratic development. Rather, we find empirical examples of all four possible modes in the relationship between decentralization and effectiveness. Clear support for the NPM theory of decentralization leading to effectiveness was only found among the local elites in Belarus and the Netherlands. Among the local elites in Sweden and Latvia, we find almost the opposite development, as declining or low levels of decentralization are paired with declining or a low estimation of

effective action. In Estonia autonomy and the power to act is more decentralized, but combined with a low estimation of their actions being effective. Finally, among the Lithuanian and Russian local elites we find that increasing or high levels of effectiveness is not paired with a decentralization of power and autonomy.

The Growth of New Policy Issues

According to the studies and the theory of New Political Culture (NPC), local politicians and administrators try to cope with declining legitimacy by adopting populist and selective policies, such as tax cuts and immigration policies, as well as focusing on solving new issues like environmental policies (Clark & Inglehart 1989, Clark & Rempel 1997, Clark & Hoffman-Martinot 1998, Clark & Lipset 2001). If this were correct, we would find an increasingly effective governing elite solving these kinds of issues. According to the fifth hypothesis of our model of analysis, the assumption is that the policies most effectively solved by the governing local elite have shifted from “general / welfare” issues towards “populist / selective” such as problems with the cost of local government, environment protection and immigration.


The analysis of the two advanced democracies gives the hypothesis quite strong support. In the Netherlands and Sweden, the most effective action - and the greatest increases in effective action - was made within the areas of economic development, the cost of local government and pollution (Szücs & Strömberg pp. 47-48, de Vries pp. 80-81). Further, just as we hypothesized, the increasing focus on these issues among the Western local elites goes hand in hand with declining effectiveness in traditional welfare state issues such as education, housing, public improvements, social improvements and health care. Contrary to this development, however, in Lithuania, Belarus and Russia we find that the local elite action becomes more effective across the 1990, almost regardless of the policy issue at hand.

Thus, the hypothesis of the rise of new policy issues and the decline of general welfare state issues is confirmed in the analysis of the governing elites in the advanced democracies of the Netherlands and Sweden, but our findings fail to confirm the hypothesis when it comes to the local governing elite in the new democracies. Regardless of whether a new democracy managed to develop democracy more successfully, like Lithuania, or tend to backslide into a state of authoritarianism, like Belarus, the local governing elites think that they have become increasingly effective in almost every public policy issue that we asked about in our study.

No General Increase in Personal Influence

Both the theories of Governance and NPC stress the growing importance of leadership based on personal influence and horizontal networks rather than on old models of collegial influence and vertical networks (John 2001:16). Along with this reasoning, our sixth and seventh hypotheses from our model deal more exclusively with the assumption that the means of local power have shifted in favor of increasing personal influence and horizontal networks. As claimed by NPC theory, the assumption of the sixth hypothesis of our model in particular is that the average personal influence over what is accomplished in the local community significantly increased throughout the 1990s. The findings, however, show no general increase of personal influence (Figure 9.6).

Figure 9.6
Personal Influence (Means)



Comment: The Personal Influence Scale ranges from 0 (no influence), 1 (some influence) to 2 (great influence).

Rather, we find a quite diverse pattern of the development of personal influence. Statistically significant growth in average personal influence is only found among the local elites the Netherlands and Russia. Among the local elites in Sweden, Lithuania and Belarus we find no significant changes in personal influence. The average personal influence is highest in Latvia in the late 1990s, followed by the Netherlands in the mid- to late 1990s, and Sweden in the early 1990s. For most of the compared surveys, the scale means range from 0.60 to 0.72 on a scale going from 0 (no influence), 1 (some influence) to 2 (great influence). This means that the average local leader, regardless of nation or time of study, quite modestly feel that he or she has less than “some personal influence” on what is accomplished in their own community.

From Vertical to Horizontal Networks?


Another critical test of the new theories of political-administrative change and reform - in particular the Governance theory - is conducted by examining the presumed shift in the importance of local elite networks. This is carried out by analyzing changes in who the individual leader turns when he or she is seeking support from others. According to the seventh hypothesis of our model of analysis, as some Governance theorists argue, the networks of the local elites have shifted from being “vertical” by acquiring less support from national and regional levels of government, to “horizontal” by acquiring significantly more support from others within the local government elite as well as the local civic community. Thus, the question is to what extent have the networks of the local elites shifted from being vertically organized to more horizontally organized?

Our findings do not show any universally valid pattern of growing networks. The clearest deviant case is found among the Dutch local elite, where the average number of support contacts declined from 4.16 in the 1980s to 3.55 in the late 1990s. Thus, despite the international image of the Dutch *Poldermodel* – once defined by the Netherlands’ unique manner of involving many actors and interests in the policy process – during the 1990s, the previously quite broad Dutch networks, were gradually transformed into a narrower, city hall focused governance network (de Vries, pp. 86-87).

Instead, it is among the Swedish local elite that we find the clearest case of strong and slightly increasing networks of groups or persons to whom the leaders usually turn when they are in a situation in which support from others is necessary. In the late 1990s, the average Swedish leader mentioned that he or she has more than five such network contacts. At a lower level, growing local networks are also found among the Russian, Belarus and Lithuanian local elites.

Figure 9.7

Networks of Support (Average Number of Contacts Mentioned, Means)




Comment: This question was not included in the 1999 Russian survey.

How are these governance networks composed? To what extent are these networks of growing local, horizontal character as theorists argue and we assume in our model of analysis, and to what degree are they vertical and based on hierarchical contacts with higher regional and national levels of government? We first need to look at the network of contacts for support within the local government that are open and less hierarchical or *horizontal* - that is, the average perception that the leader can turn to the very top leaders within the local elite (the local top administrative officials, the local elective officials and party leaders) in situations where support from others is necessary. Such horizontal networks are mostly developed among the governing elites in Sweden, followed by the Netherlands and Estonia (Figure 9.8).

Figure 9.8

Horizontal Networks (Local Political-Administrative Support, Means)




Comment: The Local Support Scale ranges from 0 (not mentioned local contact) to 1 (mentioned local contact). Horizontal networks include *Local Party Leaders*, *Local Elective Officials*, and *Local Administrative Top Officials*. This question was not included in the 1999 Russian survey.

The changes throughout the 1990s are generally small and statistically non-significant, with the exception of the local elites in Lithuania and Russia, where the local networks expanded significantly during the early transition period between 1991 and 1995. Contrary to our hypothesis of expanding horizontal networks, however, we find a statistically significant *decline* in the strength of Dutch local networks, which occurred mainly between the 1980s and the mid-1990s. Above all, in the Netherlands, it is the local party leaders that have lost their central position during the research period (In the 1980s, 78 percent of the

local elite turned to local party leaders, but in the 1990s this contact decreased to a mere 29-31 percent. According to Michiel de Vries, who conducted the Dutch studies, “[...] this is, first of all, a question for further research, although an explanation might be found in the return of the practice of depolitization in the Netherlands, which was so common until the late 1960s. The members of the broad coalitions in which parties from the far left to the far right are involved, did not (and perhaps could not) contact their local party leaders in order to keep political interests out of the policy process” (de Vries, p. 86).

Figure 9.9

Vertical Networks (Higher Political-Administrative Support, Means)



Comment: Scale ranges from 0 (not mentioned higher contact) to 1 (mentioned higher contact). Vertical networks include *Higher Administrative Officials* and *Higher Party Leaders*. This question was not included in the 1999 Russian survey.

Thus, contrary to one of the cornerstones of the new theories, and particularly the Governance theory, we find no universal change towards growing horizontal networks among the local political and administrative elite. Rather, stronger or slightly strengthened horizontal networks are only found in Sweden and the more successfully developed new democracies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Our previous analysis also showed horizontally growing civic networks, where support from the local community level - especially from neighborhood organizations - becomes more important (Szücs & Strömberg p. 53, Matulionis, Mikene & Rauleckas p. 118). Further, when we look at the development of the *vertical* networks of the local elites, shown in Figure 9.9, we find a statistically significant decline in leaders turning to higher regional and national party leaders or such higher administrative officials for support (in accordance with our hypothesis) only in the Netherlands and Sweden.

On a scale ranging from 0 to 1, these contacts in Sweden declined significantly from 0.38 in the 1980s, to 0.28 in the late 1990s, which represents a decrease of ten percent. In the Netherlands, the vertical network declines even more (15 percent), from 36 to 21 percent. Thus, we find that it is the vertical networks have become less important in the two Western Democracies during the 1990s. This change most probably is an effect of decentralization from national to local government levels of public sector responsibilities in the two older democracies.


Growth and Decline of Democratic Values

One important theme in our study of the local leaders' impact on democratic development concerns that of elite values. One general interpretation of the new theories of political-administrative change and reform - perhaps in particular the New Political Culture theory - is that the values of the governing elites have shifted from ethical to pragmatic. Therefore, shift number eight in our model assumes a significant change in values and ethical commitment of the local elite. In this section, with the help of value scales - each based on four to five separate questionnaire items (see, Appendix C and D) - we analyze more exactly if, how and possibly why local elite values have changed across the 1990s in the compared countries.

Ever since the first cross-country comparative studies of local elites were carried out in the mid-1960s, a main field of research has been the study of values. Even the name of this first internationally organized program - *The International Studies of Values in Politics* - shows the focus on the values (Jacob et al 1971). Many of the scholars active in this first cross-country comparative

studies of local elite studies, are also the founders of the *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG) program, which this study emanates from as well. One of the basic theoretical assumptions of the DLG group of researchers is that the values of the local elite represent a critical test of the very condition for democracy and democratic development in both new and advanced democracies (Jacob, Ostrowski & Teune 1993, Szücs 1998a, Jacob, Linder, Nabholz, Heierli 1999).

Figure 9.10
Political Equality (Value Scale Means)



Comment: The Political Equality Scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

The democratic ethic that we are interested in finding among the great number of the local governing elite in a country should, according to one condition or model (Szücs 1998a), contain a certain commitment to political equality, inter-

personal trust, social tolerance, citizen participation and political pluralism (the acceptance of opposition and conflict). Although most scholars agree upon the importance of values such as political equality, participation and opposition to be conditional for democracy (Dahl 1971), the views of what values are important for democratic development are most often contested (Dahl 1985, Szücs 1998a). One example here is the elite commitment to capitalist values. We will also be able to analyze how universal values, such as honesty developed during the 1990s among local elites in the new and advanced democracies.


First, looking at the data regarding the development of the value of *political equality*, our findings show great differences between the local elites in the advanced democracies, positively committed to the value of political equality on average, and local elites in the new democracies, still rejecting the value. Nevertheless, contrary to the hypothesis of increasing pragmatism, and with the exception of the development in Belarus, we do find stability or statistically significant increases in the commitment to political equality in all surveyed countries surveyed across time (Figure 9.10).

As shown in Figure 9.10, it is among the local elites in Lithuania that the commitment to the value of political equality has increased most clearly during the 1990s. From being critical towards the value of political equality on average in the early 1990s, the value of the average local leader has shifted to a slightly positive committed local elite in the late 1990s. Although we do not have any measurement across time for Estonia and Latvia, especially among the Estonian local elite, a positive development of the value of political equality seems to have occurred.

In the two advanced democracies, the support for the value of *citizen participation* is substantial, and highest in Sweden. In the two new democracies of Latvia and Estonia, the average commitment is slightly positive towards participation (Figure 9.11).

Although the average Lithuanian local leader in the late 1990s was still slightly negative towards the value of participation, the value has changed quite drastically, escalating from a bottom position in 1991. Also among local elites in Russia and Belarus, the rejection of the value of citizen participation has become somewhat less accentuated.


Figure 9.11
Participation (Value Scale Means)



Comment: The Participation Scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

A third central democratic value that clearly divides the local elites in the advanced democracies from the elites of the new democracies is that of accepting opposition and conflict. The value of *political pluralism* received the highest score among the Swedish and the Dutch local elite (Figure 9.12). Still in the late 1990s, political pluralism is not easily accepted or positively valued by the average local leader in any of the former Soviet republics, with the exception of Latvia in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the value of political pluralism is growing (or is higher) in the more successfully developed new democracies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, while it becomes increasingly rejected in Russia and Belarus.

Figure 9.12
Political Pluralism (Value Scale Means)




Comment: The Conflict Scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

Thus, one of the main features of post-communist environment - the lack of a culture of conflict resolution (Holmes 1997, Szücs 1998a) grew in Belarus and Russia while it slowly declined in the more successfully developed Baltic democracies. To conclude so far, in parallel to the development of other core democratic values such as political equality and citizen participation, we also find that the value of political pluralism is slowly increasing in acceptance among local elites in the more successful new democracies, while there is a decline from a quite low position in acceptance of these core democratic values among local elites with a more troublesome democratic development.

The analysis of the local elites' values of *minority rights*, however, shows no major divide between advanced and new democracies. In the late 1990s, minor-

ity rights were most highly valued among the local elites in the Netherlands, followed by Sweden and Lithuania. Estonia, Latvia and Belarus received a neutral or slightly negative score in the late 1990s. The general tendency of change, with the exception of Sweden, is that the value of minority right is declining among the European local elites studied.

Figure 9.13
Minority Rights (Value Scale Means)




Comment: The Minority Rights Scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

The clearest example of a growing gap in local elite values between the successfully and the less successfully developed new democracies of the former Soviet Union is found in the value of *capitalism*. In both Belarus and Russia, the average leader increasingly rejects the value of capitalism, especially during the early transition process, between the early and the mid 1990s. Although there is

a slight reduction in the faith of capitalism from the highest average score from the Lithuanian local elite in the early 1990s, the local elites in all the Baltic nations are quite equally positively committed to capitalism, and they are quite close to the average value of capitalism in the two Western democracies in the late 1990s. Thus, despite the common backlashes from the high expectations from democracy and a free market system, there was quite a large difference from the start in the new democracies; the average Russian and Belarus local leader maintained a quite neutral position, compared with the highly positive capitalist commitment of the Lithuanian local elite.


Figure 9.14
Capitalism (Value Scale Means)



Comment: The Capitalism Scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

According to our findings, values that are often regarded as universal, such as *honesty*, are also universal among local elites. There are hardly any differences at all in the cross country and cross time analysis shown in Figure 9.15. The only slightly deviant case consists of Sweden; the Swedish local elite score the highest among those compared, and the scale mean has not changed at all.

Figure 9.15
Honesty and Openness (Value Scale Means)



Comment: Honesty Scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

To conclude, we find little evidence of a general shift in democratic ethics among the local governing elites in the two Western democracies. The only evidence pointing in this direction is a slight reduction in the value of participation. Instead, and contrary to our hypothesis, our data most clearly shows a shift towards a growing elite commitment to democratic values and an ethic often

claimed as conditional for democratic development, such as the values of political equality, citizen participation and political pluralism, especially so in the new democracies of the former Soviet Union where democracy has developed successfully (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia).

Special Party Interests more important than Public Interests


Within the framework of *New Political Culture* (NPC), some scholars also suggest a new role for local party politics, claiming that due to new social contexts, local politicians are forced to meet public interests before special interests of local power (Clark & Hoffmann-Martinot 1998, Clark & Inglehart 1998:12). Therefore, according to the ninth hypothesis of our model, we assume that when we ask about why parties are important, the majority of the local elite will think “public interests,” i.e. involving people in politics, are more important than “special interests,” i.e. forming majorities in bodies.

In the mid-1990s, the DLG program introduced a set of questions about the importance of political parties. The findings show that political parties are considered most important for “forming majorities in bodies” and “competing in elections.” The two least important functions for political parties are “meeting electorate interests” and “involving people in politics” (Figure 9.16).

Among the Western local elites, we especially find that parties are important for “forming majorities in bodies.” In many of the new democracies, however, “competing in elections” is considered the most important function of political parties. Most strikingly, public interest such as “involving people in politics” and “meeting the electorate interests” are considered the very least important tasks of political parties. The minor changes between the mid-1990s and the late 1990s do not confirm the hypothesis about change. Rather, we find that the objectives of power – to compete and form majorities (to gain and maintain power) –are universally considered the most important in the late 1990s as well. (The view that political parties mainly are apparatuses for gaining power is also supported by the findings from a follow up question about the most important motives for people joining political parties.)

Figure 9.16

Why Political Parties are Important (Percent “very much”)



Comment: Only the two most frequent and two least frequent answers are displayed.

Changing Contexts: Increasing Perception of Local-Global Relations


A main thesis of the new theories is that the contexts of the governing the elites have changed. A common ground of argument for the theories of New Public Management, Governance and New Political Culture is that the local and regional political and administrative elites must increasingly respond to the issues of globalization and the internationalization of economies, mainly because of the growing problems with trust and legitimacy that these new issues may bring about. According to the tenth hypothesis of our model, we assume that local-global relations, measured by the level of foreign impact in the local community of the respondent, have become significantly stronger throughout the studied period. But before we look at the analysis of this final hypothesis of our model,

we want to briefly show the development of how the leaders' trust toward most people changed across the 1990s.

Interpersonal Trust

The development of local leaders' perception of interpersonal trust or generalized trust – i.e. whether most people could be trusted, or if you (the respondent) can't be too careful dealing with people – shows first and foremost a clear distinction between local elites in the advanced democracies compared with the new democracies. The level of generalized trust is quite high in both of the advanced democracies. In the Netherlands and Sweden, about 90 percent of local elites say that most people can be trusted (Figure 9.17).

Figure 9.17
Interpersonal Trust (Percent)



The local elites in the new democracies can be roughly divided into two separate groups, namely those countries where more than 40 percent among the local elite trust most people (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), and those countries where less than 40 percent of the leaders trust most people (Russia and Belarus). A critical point in the development of interpersonal trust among the Lithuanian local elite occurred in the mid-1990s when trust declined drastically. In the late 1990s, however, interpersonal trust among the Lithuanian local leaders regained a position very close to Latvia and Estonia. Belarus represents the only clear case of continuously declining generalized trust during the 1990s. Thus, it seems that the authoritarianism that developed in Belarus during the 1990s was accompanied by a diminishing trust towards ordinary people. In Russia, the level of trust was at its lowest in the mid-1990s, when only 30 percent of the local elite said that most people could be trusted.


Growing Foreign Impact in the Community

One of the most important contextual changes in our study consists of an increasing perception of foreign impact in the local community. Within the DLG program, we asked a number of questions related to the hypothesized growing phenomena of globalization in the early 1990s (Jacob, Teune & Ostrowski 1993). These were especially focused on the extent of local-global relations, with questions about the existence and degree of different kinds of foreign impacts in each leader's own town or city (Figure 9.18).

Above all, the findings show that growing local-global relations seem to be an effect of increasing foreign *economic impact* in the community. When comparing the average perception of economic impact (investments, exports, imports) in Figure 9.19 with the impact of foreign non-economic factors (media, tourists, workers) in Figure 9.20, we may conclude that a great deal of the foreign impact – and increasingly so across the 1990s - is of economic character.

Especially, in Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden, the average leader increasingly mentioned that some sort of foreign economic impacts have taken place in their own community. Thus, in these countries, we can conclude that the local elite, as well as the community that they are set to govern, are increasingly dependent on economic local-global relations. Furthermore, when foreign economic impact is singled out in Figure 9.19, the difference between Netherlands and Sweden becomes more distinct. The increase of foreign economic impact in the surveyed communities of Belarus and Russia even goes beyond the non-changing perception of the Dutch local elite.


Figure 9.18
Foreign Impact in the Community (Means)



Comment: Scale ranges from 0 (not at all), 1 (to some extent) to 2 (a great deal).

Among all of the compared countries in the late 1990s, the perception of impact of foreign investments, exports and imports is most limited in the Dutch communities. One explanation to this finding is that “[...] not many Dutch municipalities experience direct impacts from international investments, imports and exports. In middle-sized cities that are the selected ones in this research, the general opinion seems to be one of increasing doubts about the effectiveness of local policies to attract foreign investments. Many cities abandoned these policies in the 1990s.” (de Vries p. 95-96).


Figure 9.19
Economic Foreign Impact in the Community (Means)



Comment: Scale ranges from 0 (not at all), 1 (to some extent) to 2 (a great deal).

Looking at the analysis of non-economic foreign impact – media, tourists, and foreign workers – the very highest figures are again found in Sweden, followed by the Netherlands in the late 1990s (Figure 9.20). Both among the Dutch and the Swedish local elites, there is a slight increase during the 1990s in their perception of non-economic of foreign impact. The increasing perception of non-economic foreign impact in the community in both the Netherlands and in Sweden is mainly explained by the growing impact of foreign tourists in the surveyed cities during the 1990s (de Vries, p. 96, Szücs & Strömberg p. 64).

Figure 9.20
 Non-economic Foreign Impact in the Community (Means)



Comment: Scale ranges from 0 (not at all), 1 (to some extent) to 2 (a great deal).

In the new democracies, Russia constitutes the only case where there is a linear increase of non-economic foreign impact. In the late 1990s, the perception of non-economic foreign impact is at the same high level as in Estonia. The very slowest development of foreign non-economic impact is found in the Belarus communities. Thus, again we find an effect of the closed authoritarian regime of Belarus. While economic forms of local-global relations are increasing rapidly in the Belarus cities as reported by the local elites, the non-economic forms of local-global relations seem critical to the decline of Belarus’ democracy. The case of the Lithuanian local elite particularly shows the great importance of non-economic foreign impact, and especially foreign media, before and during the

transition period of the early 1990s (see, the chapter of Matulionis, Mikene & Rauleckas pp. 133-138).

Universal Patterns and Democratic Change among Local Elites

To conclude, our findings only partly confirm the ten hypotheses from our model of analysis, founded on the new theories of political-administrative change and reform. In line with the *New Public Management* theory, we do find that local elites, almost regardless of country, have an increasingly professional background, and in accordance with the theory, think that their policies have become more effective during the 1990s. However, we do not find universal support for the claim that this growing effectiveness depends on decentralization of power and autonomy to the local-government level.

In contrast to the new theories of *Governance*, we find slightly declining local, horizontal networks in the Netherlands and Belarus. In both of these countries, there is a decline in support from other persons or groups in situations when support from others is necessary -- from local business leaders, local media, and neighborhood organizations (the Netherlands), and the public in general (in Belarus). Vertical networks -- higher party leaders and higher administrative officials -- become significantly less vital in advanced democracies and significantly more important in the new democracies. However, in accordance with the theory, we do find that the local elites who have most clearly developed horizontal networks also face continuously more complex local problems, as well as the most rapid increase foreign impact - especially non-economical forms of foreign impact (in Sweden and Lithuania).

In accordance with the *New Political Culture* theory, we find that the local governing elites in both the new and advanced democracies are increasingly effective in solving new populist and selective policies, that is, in solving issues of policies limiting the cost of local government, improving economic development and increasing environmental protection. As predicted by the theory, in the Western democracies, greater effectiveness in these issues is paired with a decline in effectiveness in traditional welfare state issues such as education, housing, public improvements, social improvements and health care. In the new democracies, however, greater effectiveness is achieved almost regardless of policy issue. In contrast to the theory, we find no general evidence of the increasing personal influence of the average leader. Personal influence only increased in the Netherlands (perhaps personal leadership increased instead of networks among the Dutch local elite?). Nor do we find any evidence of a change in the view of political parties. Quite surprisingly, regardless of the

country studied, the local elite considers political parties most important for gaining and maintaining power, while the least important justification for political parties is channeling public interests involving citizens in politics. Despite this quite instrumental view of the importance of political parties, we find no evidence of a universal decline in democratic ethics. Core democratic ethics, containing values of political equality, participation and political pluralism remain strongly committed to among local elites in the advanced democracies, and they are increasingly accepted in the more successfully developed new democracies. Therefore, we argue that these values are conditional for democratic development more generally, as we have found in previous studies as well (Szücs 1998a).

Hence, we find several factors of local elite change that we think are influential for explaining democratic failure or success more generally: Our findings indicate that the replacement and choice of new leaders in the new democracies during the transition period of the early 1990s was vital. In Belarus and Russia, the succession and choice of new leaders occurred too late, in the mid-1990s, resulting in a composition of local elites even less democratically oriented, as we have shown in this chapter. Furthermore, the lack or decline of local or horizontal networks and non-economic foreign impact (particularly in Belarus) in the local community seem to negatively effect democratic progress during the 1990s. Finally, we found a growing commitment to core democratic values to be important for democratic development, and especially so in new democracies. The value of political equality, participation and political pluralism is growing (or is higher) in the more successfully developed new democracies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In the advanced democracies, we find the greatest differences in the values of political equality and citizen participation where the Swedish local elite remains somewhat more committed in comparison to the Dutch local elite.

Thus, we might conclude from our ten hypotheses of elite change according to our original model of analysis that in addition to the important criteria of replacing the old authoritarian cadre in the new democracies, there are three conditions in which local elites tend to contribute toward determining the path of more successful democratic development.

First, we find growing or strong *horizontal networks* only in European countries where democracy developed more successfully or remained stable during the 1990s, i.e. in the new Baltic democracies and Sweden. It is only in these countries that the average leader increasingly feels that he or she can turn to the very top leaders within the local elite - that is, the local top administrative officials, the local elective officials and party leaders - in situations where support from others is necessary. However, the definition of horizontal networks may

not be restricted to the fact that the internal political administrative networks are less hierarchical and more open. In both Sweden and Lithuania, our findings also show horizontally growing civic networks, where support from the local community level – from local media, business leaders, the public generally, civic action groups, and especially neighborhood organizations - becomes more important throughout the 1990s.

Second, we find evidence of a strong or increasing commitment to *democratic values* – especially political equality - interacting with more successful democratic development more generally in a country.

The third elite characteristic that most clearly separates the new democracy in which the development of democracy has been most successful (Lithuania) from the new democracy where democracy most clearly failed (Belarus) concerns the impact of foreign *non-economic local-global relations* in the local community.

In the next chapter we look more closely at the degree to which these components are mutually interdependent and reinforcing across time at the local government level, thereby representing latent local political capital. To what extent are elites in towns and cities with stronger or growing commitment to core democratic principles, such as political equality, also more or increasingly involved in horizontal networks and non-economic foreign impact in their local communities? And what comes first in the establishment of such a path of democratic development: is it the values, the networks or the non-economic foreign relations in the local community?

Political Capital and How it Grows

Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg

Our inquiry and analysis in the previous chapter helped us to pinpoint three possible key components of political capital, which most clearly interact with successful democratic development across the 1990s. The analysis showed that a positive or stable development of democracy - including a large succession and choice of new local leaders in the more successfully developed Baltic new democracies – runs parallel with growing horizontal networks, increasing commitment to core democratic values and escalating local-global relations. In this chapter, we continue our search for a latent political capital by analyzing the correlations across cities between these factors in greater detail.

We first need to verify the existence of latent political capital at the level of the individual local community: To what extent are elites in towns and cities with a greater proportion of new leaders also more committed to the value of political equality and more involved in both horizontal networks and non-economic foreign relations in their communities? In the second part of this chapter, we try to reveal the sequence of political capital growth in the case of a successfully developing new democracy. The question is: What comes first when political capital grows at the local level in a successfully developed new democracy? Is it the values, the networks or the local-global relations?

Strong Correlations among the Components of Political Capital

Our first analysis, which includes a broader set of indicators from the local elites in over a hundred cities in the early, middle and late 1990s, further verifies the importance of the key components of latent political capital for successful democratic development. The correlation analysis displays a strong triangle of correlations between non-economic local-global relations, horizontal networks and core values of democracy. The analysis especially shows the importance of gaining and maintaining strong horizontal internal local government networks (the proportion of the elite in a city that includes the very center of local politics and administration in their support network, that is, local elective officials, local

administrative officials and local party leaders). In fact, a large internal horizontal network such as this among the elite in a town or city seems as important as its civic networks (support from the general public, neighborhood organizations and religious leaders or organizations).

Table 10.1

The Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Early 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=105 Cities in Four Countries)

	Years in Public Service	Horizontal Network	Values of Political Equality	Non-Economic Foreign Impact in the Community
Years in Public Service	1			
Horizontal Network	.426**	1		
Values of Political Equality	.146	.831**	1	
Non-Economic Foreign Impact in the Community	-.072	.451**	.603**	1

** Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Looking at the strongest correlations in the mid-1990s among our key components of political capital, again we find the most important relationship between values of political equality and horizontal networks for support. Thus, in parallel with the findings of the early 1990s, we also find in the mid-1990s that the more horizontal the local government network is in a city, the stronger the commitment towards political equality is among the local elite. The correlation is quite high at .68 (Table 10.2).

As shown in detail in Appendix E, this broader pattern of political capital remains consistent throughout the 1990s: the stronger the perception among the governing elite of non-economic foreign impact in their city, the larger the

elite’s horizontal (internal and civic) networks, and the more solid its commitment to core democratic values like political equality, political pluralism and citizen participation. The strongest correlation throughout the period is between internal horizontal networks and egalitarian values among the governing elite in a community (Tables E1, E3 and E5). The correlation between internal horizontal networks and the value of political equality stays particularly consistent across the 1990s.

Thus, as the local elite leaders’ horizontal access to the very top leaders increases, so does the strength of their average commitment to the principles of political equality. As more briefly displayed in Table 10.1, the correlation between the value of political equality and internal horizontal support networks is quite high in the early 1990s (.83).

Table 10.2

The Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Mid-1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=146 Cities in Four Countries)

	Years in Public Service	Horizontal Political-Administrative Network	Values of Political Equality	Non-Economic Foreign Impact in the Community
Years in Public Service	1			
Horizontal Network	.078	1		
Values of Political Equality	-.137	.682**	1	
Non-Economic Foreign Impact in the Community	-.069	.248**	.259**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In the late 1990s, we find that the correlation between values of political equality and the horizontal network in a city is again the strongest, at .78 (Table 10.3). Thus, regardless of the year of study throughout the 1990s, we find that

the three components of political capital are highly correlated. The stronger the perception of non-economic local-global relations among the governing elite in a city, the stronger are its horizontal networks and its commitment to basic democratic values like political equality. However, the analysis in Tables 10.1 to 10.3 showed that the impact of new leaders, measured by average years in public service, is of less general importance. The only statistically significant correlations are found between years in public service and horizontal networks (.43) in the early 1990s, and in the late 1990s between years in public service and horizontal networks (.49) and values of political equality (.38). These *positive* correlations only indicate what could be normally expected, namely that longer average public service among an elite leads to stronger local networks (and more stringent value commitment in the late 1990s).

Table 10.3

The Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Late 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=195 Cities in Six Countries)

	Years in Public Service	Horizontal Political- Administrative Network	Values of Political Equality	Non-Economic Foreign Impact in the Community
Years in Public Service	1			
Horizontal Network	.491**	1		
Values of Political Equality	.383**	.776**	1	
Non-Economic Foreign Impact in the Community	.057	.509**	.529**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Nevertheless, this finding does not lead us to believe that new leaders are insignificant in relation to the components of political capital. On the contrary, as we

show in the following section of analysis, the governing elites in the surveyed towns and cities in the post-Soviet new democracies separately, exhibit significant *negative* relationships between the local elite's average years in public service and their average commitment to political equality. That is, the greater the proportion of new actors entering the local elite, the stronger is its average commitment to the value of political equality. Therefore, before we return to the question of how the strongest components of political capital have developed at the local level throughout the 1990s in all our seven surveyed nations, we first more thoroughly analyze the effect of old structures and new actors in the new democracies separately.

Two Approaches Explaining the Success and Failure of Democratization

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several different theories and even theoretical frameworks were advanced trying to explain the origin and local roots of successful democratic development (see, Putnam 1993, Baldersheim et al. 1996, Szücs 1998a, Hadenius 2001, Illner 2003, Wollmann 2003). To a large degree, however, these different theories and theoretical frameworks represent two rival paradigms within the social sciences. The first is the idea that the development of democracy is mainly determined by the shadows and structures of the past. The competing idea is that democratic development is determined by the will of new actors (often leaders) entering the political-administrative system.

Among the theories and frameworks of the *structure-oriented approach*, the path-dependency framework is probably the most influential theoretical framework. It claims the importance of preceding institutional settings in explaining the present development (North 1990, Putnam 1993). In studies of local government, this theory explains why the old Austrian-Hungarian model of unitary local government influenced the reforms the local government in many countries of East Central Europe in the beginning of the 1990s (Baldersheim & Illner 1996). This explanatory approach not only deals with the 'hardware' of past institutions, it also includes the impact of the 'software' of cultural traditions and history. According to some theorists, cultural legacies, the socialization of traditional political and administrative culture - by ingrained values and attitudes of local populations as well as its leaders - forcefully determine the present development. For example, so-called mental residues of communism have been conceptualized in order to explain ill-functioning new institutions in the post-communist societies (Elster et al. 1998).

Nonetheless, we must also recognize that while the present institutions are embedded in history, they are not predetermined by the past (Raadschelders

2002:162). According to the theories and frameworks of the *actor-oriented approach*, it is the individual leader's ability to learn from new experiences within his or her local elite that mainly determines the development of democracy (Dahl 1971:124-188, Higley & Gunther 1992:77-78, Bermeo 1992:273-291, Diamond 1993:3, 6-7). This theoretical approach is also close to Pierre Bourdieu's original capital theory. In the introduction of his famous article *The Forms of Capital* (1986, originally published in German in 1983) he claims that:

The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into the notion of capital and with it, accumulation of all its effects. Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its "incorporated," embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or group of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor (Bourdieu 1986:241).

In the less well-known article *Political Representation* (1991, originally published in French in 1981), Bourdieu gives a more detailed definition of political capital as "the monopoly of the professionals" (p.172). In this sense it may also be understood as "a power derived from the trust (expressed in a form of credit) that a group of followers place on them" (Schugurensky 2000:4). In his own writing on the issue, Bourdieu puts special emphasis on the institutionalization of political capital:

*The delegation of political capital presupposes the objectification of this kind of capital in permanent institutions, its materialization in political 'machines', in jobs and instruments of mobilization, and its continual reproduction by mechanisms and strategies. It is thus the result of already established political enterprises which have accumulated a significant amount of objectified political capital, in the form of jobs within the party itself, in all the organizations that are more or less subordinate to the party, and also in the **organs of local or central power** [...] In other words, as the process of institutionalization advances and the apparatus of mobilization grows, so the weight of the imperatives linked to the reproduction of the apparatus and the jobs it offers, tying to itself those who will fill those jobs by all sorts of material and symbolic interests, continues to grow, both in reality and in people's heads.* (Bourdieu 1991:196-197, emphasis added).

Thus, a main determinant of successful democratic development is constituted by the experience with, learning about and adoption of new democratic institutions as well as new democratic principles and practices (Balderheim et al. 1996, 2003, Rohrschneider 1999, Szücs 1998a, 2000). This approach also greatly contributes to the understanding of why local political-administrative

elites in countries with a previous proto-democratic history during the pre-communist era and with only a somewhat longer experience with democracy in the early 1990s (Hungary and Poland) shared a greater democratic ethos in comparison to the local political-administrative elites of the former Soviet Union, including Lithuania. Thus, despite Lithuania's East European pre-communist cultural and proto-democratic legacy, the absence of a democratic ethic among its elite was rather similar to the other former republics of the collapsing Soviet Union when our first empirical studies were made (Ostrowski, Teune & Jacob 1993, Szücs 1998a). This finding further strengthens the assumption about the importance of the actor-oriented approach in explaining successful democratic progress in terms of accumulated institutionalized political capital.

As we showed in the previous chapter, a large proportion of politicians and administrators, especially in the new Baltic democracies, were new in office in the early 1990s. Hence, we continue our analysis focusing on the extent to which the adoption, experience and learning throughout the 1990s within each local elite – measured by its leaders' average years in public service - may determine how the networks, values and relations of political capital grew and took shape more successfully in only some parts of the former Soviet Union.

New Actors' Influence During the Formation of Political Capital

The negative correlation between the proportion of new leaders among a local elite and its commitment to political equality remains statistically significant throughout the 1990s (-.36 in the early 1990s, -.31 in the mid 1990s, and -.42 in the late 1990s, see Appendix E, Tables E2, E4, and E6). Thus, the greater the proportion of new actors entering the local elite in a city, the stronger its average commitment to the value of political equality.


However, the correlations within each of the former Soviet republics of Lithuania, Belarus and Russia are quite low. In Figure 10.1, which visually displays a scatterplot of the surveyed governing elites in the 85 post-Soviet cities of the early 1990s in Belarus, Russia and Lithuania, we find that the higher the rate of new leaders within the local elite, the stronger is its commitment to values of political equality. The variance explained by average years in public service is .13. This means that the variance in the commitment to political equality between the cities in the three new democracies is explained by 13 percent less average years in public service in the city.

Theoretically, this finding gives support for the actor-oriented explanatory approach. In the early 1990s - before and during the fall of the Soviet Union -

regardless of the three former Soviet republics' communist past and pre-communist legacy, the shorter the average period of time in public service among the governing elite, the less strong is the elite's rejection of political equality.¹ The Belarus and Lithuanian studies were conducted in the fall and winter of 1991, while the Russian study was conducted in the spring of 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Jacob, Ostrowski & Teune 1993, Szücs 1008a).

Figure 10.1

Local Elites in New Democracies Only: The Effect of New Leaders in the City on the Value of Political Equality in the Early 1990s (Means)




Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

¹ In Lithuania, local elections were held in 1990 before the dissolution of the Soviet Union but after the parliamentary declaration reestablishing the independence of the Republic of Lithuania. As in Belarus and Russia, these elections were held before a new party structure had formed; the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the reformed Communist Party and the Sąjūdis movement) were the three dominating political structures which influenced the election turnout for city councils (Matulionis, Kuzmickaitė, Jonaitis, Juozeliūnienė & Karalius 1993:107-108, cf. Szücs 1998a).

We find the same general pattern in the mid-1990s, but compared to the plot of cities in the early 1990s, the average commitment to political equality in Lithuanian cities increased somewhat in some cities, and was on average higher in cities where the local elite had been in power for the shortest time (Figure 10.2).

Figure 10.2

Local Elites in New Democracies Only: The Effect of New Leaders in the City on the Value of Political Equality in the Mid 1990s (Means)




Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

However, we also find governing elites in a few Belarus and Russian cities advancing towards a positive or neutral view in relation to the value of political equality in cities where the average leader has remained quite long in public

service. After a few years of post-communist experience, our findings show that in the mid-1990s, democratic experience and the adoption of political equality values took place not only in Lithuania, but in a few Belarus and Russian cities as well. At the same time, the importance of new leaders entering the governing elites is somewhat reduced in comparison to the early 1990s. The variance in political equality between the elites in different cities declines to 9 percent. Thus, it seems that the importance of the actor-oriented explanatory approach declines somewhat after the early transition processes.

Figure 10.3

Local Elites in New Democracies Only: The Effect of New Leaders in the City on the Value of Political Equality in the Late 1990s (Means)



Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree).

As seen in Figure 10.3, the overall negative effect of years in public service on the commitment to political equality becomes even less important in the late 1990s. Although the differences between different governing elite's commitment to political equality grew, the variance between the average years in public service became quite narrow. Thus, approximately ten years after the Soviet collapse, the governing elites of the post-Soviet republics became increasingly different in their average commitment to political equality while their average years in public service became increasingly the same or normal.

The relatively high level of variance explained, ($R^2 = .18$) depends a great deal on a significant effect in Belarus cities between a shorter average period in public service and a less strong rejection of political equality ($R^2 = .17$).²

To conclude, these findings generally show that the value component of local political capital first grew strong in the successfully developing democracy of Lithuania mainly because of the many new leaders who replaced the old authoritarian cadre. In the early 1990s - during *the formation phase* of political capital - the adoption of new values of political equality seems to be dependent on the larger proportion of new leaders replacing old authoritarian leaders within each local elite in Lithuania. In the mid-1990s, during what we label the *consolidation phase* of political capital, we find that the difference between the Lithuanian cities in average commitment to political equality becomes smaller. The capital gained during the formation period from the many new leaders in Lithuania, becomes more widespread and consolidated within each elite by positive experiences and processes of democratic learning. Finally, in the late 1990s during the *normalization phase*, the effect of new leaders becomes more limited at the same time as the average value of political equality increases in most Lithuanian cities.

Thus, these findings mainly provide support for the *actor-oriented explanatory approach* -- especially for the analysis of the formation of political capital in the early 1990s. Before and during the fall of the Soviet Union, regardless of the three former Soviet republics' communist past and pre-communist legacy, we find that the shorter the average period of time in public service among the governing elite, the less strong is the elite's rejection of political equality. Hence, it is among these local elites with a larger proportion of new actors, sharing slightly less negative values of political equality, that a consolidation of political capital is possible in the mid-1990s. However, it is only in the late 1990s, when day-to-day governance has reached some sort of normalization,

² The scatter-plot includes the surveyed cities of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (some variables were excluded from the Russian study, therefore these cities could not be included).

that we can observe a significant increase in the acceptance of the value of political equality, foremost in the cities of Lithuania.

Although we cannot rule out the effect of the *structure-oriented approach* – the very openness for change in the Baltic new democracies is certainly highly dependent on these countries past histories – what is striking is the importance of local actors for democracy, i.e. for the formation and consolidation of a political capital needed for the successful development of democracy. We find the structural-oriented explanatory approach – and especially the path-dependence theory - to work much better in the cases where democracy and local governance most clearly failed to develop successfully (see, also Wollmann & Butusova 2003).

In this study, especially in the case of the Belarus cities, we find the path-dependency of the old authoritarian regime so strong that the normalization phase in Belarus has led to an increasing rejection of political capital values in many cities. Thus, it was mainly the successfully developed new democracies, where actors within or entering the local governing elite carried the seeds of new ideas important for political capital to slowly grow, that exhibit an increasing commitment to the values of political equality in the late 1990s.

Let us now return to the question of how the strongest components of political capital have developed at the local level throughout the 1990s in all of our seven surveyed nations.

The Growing Correlation of Horizontal Networks and Values


Although we find the strongest correlations of a locally rooted political capital between the size of the local elite's horizontal networks and values of political equality (Tables 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3), the scatterplots of the cities look quite different during the formation period of the early 1990s compared to the normalization period of the late 1990s. During the formation period, the relationship between horizontal networks and values of political equality is actually based on two separate clusters (Figure 10.4). The scatterplot clearly shows how the local elite in a Swedish city share a much more developed horizontal network combined with a substantially stronger commitment to the value of political equality.

Accordingly, the Swedish cities maintain a highly separate position in terms of political capital compared to the comparable new democracies of the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the cluster of Belarus, Lithuanian and Russian cities shows no distinct sub-patterns that separate the three new democracies. In all of the cities of the new nations, soon after the collapse and dissolution of the

former Soviet Union, we find a combination of weak and almost non-existing average horizontal networks paired with a negative commitment to political equality. Thus, we may conclude that during the early transition period towards democratization, the local elites were still part of the newly collapsed Soviet empire both in their state of mind and in practice.

Figure 10.4


Horizontal Networks and Values of Political Equality in the City of the Early 1990s (Scatterplot/Average Mean of each Local Elite)



Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree). The Horizontal Networks score include three top leaders within local government - *Local Party Leaders*, *Local Elective Officials*, and *Local Administrative Top Officials* - who can or cannot be contacted in a situation in which support from other are necessary. The score ranges from 0 (none mentioned) to 1 (all mentioned). No survey was made in the Netherlands in the early 1990s.

Figure 10.5

Horizontal Networks and Values of Political Equality in the City of the Mid 1990s (Scatterplot/Average Mean of each Local Elite)




Horizontal Networks for Support (Means)

Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree). The Horizontal Networks score include three top leaders within local government - *Local Party Leaders*, *Local Elective Officials*, and *Local Administrative Top Officials* - who can or cannot be contacted in a situation in which support from other are necessary. The score ranges from 0 (none mentioned) to 1 (all mentioned). No survey was made in Sweden in the mid-1990s.

Nevertheless, the quite tightly gathered plot of post-Soviet cities in the early 1990s literally explodes into a larger and shattered cloud of cities in the surveys of the mid-1990s. This “break up pattern” led to the consolidation of political capital in many but not all Lithuanian cities. The findings also indicate that in some cities, the local elite “stubbornly” resisted democratic development. As

shown in Figure 10.5, while the governing elite in some Belarus, Lithuanian and Russian cities remained unchanged, the governing elite in other cities have made considerable progress in consolidating political capital both in terms of growing horizontal networks and values of democracy. However, not a single one of these cities has reached the level of political capital characterizing the cities of the Dutch local elites.

Figure 10.6
Horizontal Networks and Values of Political Equality in the City of the Late 1990s (Scatterplot/Average Mean of each Local Elite)



Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree). The Horizontal Networks score include three top leaders within local government - *Local Party Leaders*, *Local Elective Officials*, and *Local Administrative Top Officials* - who can or cannot be contacted in a situation in which support from other are necessary. The score ranges from 0 (none mentioned) to 1 (all mentioned).

Finally, in the late 1990s we find that the first traces of a *European normalization at the local level* among the local elites in the most successfully developed new democracies begin to blend in with the level of political capital held by the Dutch local elites. As shown in Figure 10.6, the strongest commitment to horizontal networks and values of political capital are found in the Swedish cities, followed by the local leaders of the Dutch cities. However, the local elites in the cities of the new Baltic nations come quite close to the Dutch cities. While the governing elites in these Baltic cities have made progress in raising their political capital, in Belarus we find that the horizontal networks have not grown at all since the early 1990s. And at the same time, the values of political equality have become even more rejected compared to the state in the early and mid-1990s.

The magnitude of its horizontal network can explain as much as 60 percent of the variance in average commitment toward political equality among the individual elite in a city. That is, the broader the horizontal network, the stronger the commitment towards core democratic values. To conclude, as the analysis of the development of the two most strongly related components of political capital in Figures 10.4 to 10.6 powerfully indicates, the principles and practices of the individual local governing elite has sometimes changed quite radically through the 1990s. Throughout the last decade of the 20th century, the development of political capital has gone from two separate clusters of cities with weak or strong political capital in the early 1990s, to one single strong correlation between these two components of political capital in the late 1990s. Thus, two clusters of political capital have become one single path, where the commitment to democratic values among each individual elite is quite dependent on the strength of its local networks, both within the elite as well as in relation to the local civic community.

The Sequence of Political Capital Institutionalization

The introductory findings of this chapter, presented in Tables 10.1 to 10.3, showed that political capital consists of three basic capacities of mobilizing resources related to successful democratic development across the 1990s. Regardless of the country in the analysis, political capital among local elites consists of (1) horizontal networks, (2) basic democratic values and (3) non-economic foreign relations in the community, where the correlations between the elite's networks and values remain the overall strongest. Although we further showed that the impact of new actors/leaders on the very formation of political capital was mostly detected during the early 1990s in the Baltic nations, we still know less about what comes first when political capital grows: is it the

non-economic local-global relations, the networks or the values? Naturally, this inquiry has great implications for better understanding the process of initially anchoring the local government to secure the path toward stable democracy. If we can answer this question about the very sequence of generating political capital at the local government level, we may also develop better tools or strategies for successful development of democracy.


First, if we examine the relationship between values of political equality and horizontal networks for support in an analysis containing all of the surveys performed, we may actually show how these components of political capital change across the 1990s in a scatterplot (Figure 10.7).

When we examine Western European local elites, there are almost no changes at all among the Swedish and the Dutch leaders. Instead, and as expected, the greatest progress in developing political capital is found among the Lithuanian local elite. The path of the Lithuanian local elite goes from a quite low average of horizontal networks and values of political equality during the formation period of the early 1990s, through an improvement of local networks during the consolidation period of the mid-1990s, to a stronger position for both these democratic principles and practices during the normalization period of the late 1990s. Both these changes in growing networks and values are statistically significant (Matulionis, Kuzmickaitė, Juozeliūnienė & Karalius 1993:100, 102).

In the late 1990s, above all we find the Estonian local elite on a position closer to the scores of the elites of the two advanced democracies. However, among the elites in Belarus and Russia, we find hardly any improvement at all. Thus, Lithuania constitutes the only case where we find positive change, with Latvia in between, and where the increase in commitment to values of political equality seems to depend on the improved horizontal networks in the mid-1990s. Thus, according to these findings, at the very least, the growth of new horizontal networks precedes the value shift.

Figure 10.7


Horizontal Networks and Values of Political Equality across Time in the Compared Countries (Scatterplot/ Means)



Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree). The Horizontal Networks scale include three top leaders within local government - *Local Party Leaders*, *Local Elective Officials*, and *Local Administrative Top Officials* - who can or cannot be contacted in a situation in which support from others are necessary. The score ranges from 0 (none mentioned) to 1 (all mentioned).

Figure 10.8

Values of Political Equality and Non-economic Foreign Impact across Time in the Compared Countries (Scatterplot/Means)



Comment: The Political Equality value scale ranges from -100 (strongly disagree) to 100 (strongly agree). The Non-economic Foreign impact scale includes – *Foreign Workers, Foreign Tourism* and *Foreign Media* - ranges from 0 (not at all), 1 (to some extent), to 2 (a great deal).

Second, now looking at the development of the relationship between values of political equality and non-economic foreign impact in the community, again, a key case in the analysis is that of the development in Lithuania (Figure 10.8).

What clearly separates the local elites in the former post-Soviet republics in the early 1990s is that of non-economic foreign impact. While these local-global relations were at their peak in Lithuania in the early 1990s, at the same time in Belarus and Russia, the local elites report almost no foreign impact in their communities at all. Thus in the early 1990s, the Lithuanian local elite already observed substantially more non-economic foreign impact in their cities, and thus, the path of successful democratization - as shown in the scatterplot of Figure 10.8 - began with a high level of globalization in the Lithuanian cities, declining somewhat across the 1990s, at the same time as the average commitment to political equality increases. In Belarus and Russia, where the development of democracy has been less successful, we find that non-economic foreign impact in the cities was halted in the mid-1990s, and the progress of developing democratic values across the period studied is none.

Mainly, as seen in Figure 10.8, at the local government level in all the three Baltic nations, we find stronger non-economic forms of foreign impact combined with a greater acceptance of democratic values, which is more in line with the development of the local elites in the two advanced Western democracies.

Finally, when we look at the correlation of the development of horizontal networks and non-economic foreign impact in the city of the local elites (not displayed in a Figure), again we find that in the case of the Lithuanian local elite, the process of democratization began with greater level of non-economic foreign impact. Thus, in this case of the successfully developed process of democratization, first there is what might be called social local-global relations (indicated by strong non-economic foreign impact), which is followed by an increasing average number of leaders being involved in the horizontal networks in the city. The consolidation of these new networks lays the groundwork for the increase found in the surveys of the late 1990s in average commitment to core democratic values, which are coming closer to what is normal for other European democracies.

When we look more closely at the type of non-economic foreign impact in the surveyed cities that is most frequently reported by the Lithuanian local elites in the early 1990s, we find that the most important factor is foreign media. In the early 1990s, 80 percent mentioned the impact of some sort of foreign media, that is "foreign language TV, and Radio in their cities". Close to one-fifth of the Lithuanian local elite reported "a great deal" of foreign media impact in their communities (Matulionis, Kuzmickaitė, Juozeliūnienė & Karalius 1993:118). In the Lithuanian surveys of the mid-1990s and late 1990s, only one-tenth of the

leaders mentioned that foreign media has a great deal of impact in their cities (Matulionis, Mikene & Rauleckas, pp. 135-136). We interpret this finding as an effect of globalization on democratization – in this case driven by intense local-global relations with foreign language TV and Radio - mediating to the rest of the world the power of the democratic events at the local level. In this regard, our findings come quite close to the theoretical foundation and working hypothesis of the Democracy and Local Governance Program: “[...] that globalization would open-up the political barriers and boundaries of countries and expand collective alternatives [...], but that for this to happen “[...] a necessary condition for local political units [is] to be politicized and receptive to democratic politics” (Teune 2000:3).

Thus, it seems that the path toward successfully developed democracy - through increased globalization, followed by horizontal networks, and core democratic values – started with free elections to Lithuanian city councils in 1990 in which a majority of the democratic movement of Sąjūdis deputies won (Matulionis, Kuzmickaitė, Juozeliūnienė & Karalius 1993:107). The Lithuanian study was conducted from October to December of 1991.

To conclude, our findings suggest that apart from having a large number of the old local elite removed or replaced at an early stage of the transition process, a country will experience more successful democratic development when non-economic forms of foreign impact come first in the process of establishing the political capital necessary to secure general democratic progress in a new democracy. After anchoring the locality to foreign, non-economic relationships, the necessary development of horizontal networks follows. This, in turn, slowly paves the way for shifts towards an increasing commitment of core democratic values.

Conclusion: Democracy Needs Local Political Capital

Stefan Szücs and Lars Strömberg

This book began with the question “In what ways are local governing elites important for the success or failure of effective and sustainable democratic development?” The central question was explanatory and was aimed at ascertaining local governing conditions for the development of democracy. The assumption was that important determinants for democratic success or decline across the 1990s were based on the local governing elites’ political capital, that is, their ability to mobilize resources that are directly or indirectly related to the stable and effective development of democracy. The data comes from the international research program *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG). It covers repeated surveys across the 1990s from between 15 to 30 top political and administrative leaders in over one hundred middle-sized European and Eurasian cities, collected by national teams who have contributed chapters for this book.

Universal Changes and Political Capital in Successful Democracies

Our work contains the analysis of more successfully developed new democracies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Belarus and Russia, where the development of democracy has been more troublesome. Our two cases of advanced democracies include The Netherlands, where national democracy became less stable during the 1990s - most obviously so by the general breakthrough of populist and extreme right-wing xenophobic parties - and Sweden, which has developed differently (Golder 2003, see also The World Bank’s Governance Indicator of *political stability/lack of violence*, which is higher and increasing in Sweden compared to the Netherlands between 1996 and 2002, Appendix A, Table A1). Thus, with the strategy of a *mixed systems design* - matching cases of a Most Different Systems Design with cases of a Most Similar Systems Design (Przeworski & Teune 1970) - we have been able to compare five former Soviet republics and two advanced democracies that were quite similar within each category at the starting point of our analysis in the 1980s

and early 1990s, before the end of the Cold War period and the bipolar World order.

Our intention has been to analyze democratic development from the point of view of new theories of political-administrative change and public sector reform. One shared assumption of these theories is that changing governing characteristics and qualities of the local political and administrative elites influence democratic progress or decline in a country or a region of countries. Hence, our model of analysis contains the central elements from several new theoretical movements advanced to predict and explain such changes, including the theories of *New Public Management* (NPM), *Governance*, *New Political Culture* (NPC), and *Local-Global Relations* (LGR). Our inquiry has been two-fold in relation to these new theories about the local governing elites.

First, we wanted to know more about the *universal* impact and verification of elite change. Have autonomy and power become more decentralized and their actions more locally efficient during the 1990s as suggested by the advocates of NPM? Have local problems become more serious and complex, and have the networks of the local elites become larger and more horizontal, as the theory of Governance would suggest? Have the politics and policies of local elites become less ideological, and more populist, as suggested by advocates of NPC? And have the relations in their local communities become increasingly local-global as predicted by globalization theory?

Second, but most importantly, we know little about the *democratic* impact and verification of these new theoretical movements. Which specific local governing qualities or *political capital* significantly strengthens or impedes democratic development? Was the shift toward more professional, decentralized and efficient local elites greater in the countries where national democracy has developed more successfully? To what extent were changes toward increasingly more complex problems, horizontal networks, personalized leadership, pragmatism, populism and local-global relations mainly happening in the countries with more successful democratic development?

Effects Corresponding with Theories of New Public Management

In correspondence with NPM theory and its ideas of an increasing search for excellence, we find that local elites, almost regardless of country, have a high and increasingly professional background in terms of educational level. Because the number of leaders with some sort of university education is increasing, or is high and stable across the period studied in all countries, we can conclude that our hypothesis is universally verified (local elite characteristic number 1 in our

model of analysis, Table 11.1). However, this finding must be taken with some consideration since we have only been able to analyze and verify a high and often increasing educational level, and not the exact status of the education at hand.

Table 11.1

Elite Changes according to Traditional Theories and New Theories

Local Elite Characteristics	Traditional Theories	New Theories	Verified Change	Type of Developm.
1. Composition	Representative	→ Professional	Yes	Universal
2. Problems	Simple	→ Complex	Yes	Nations Specific
3. Policies	Regulation	→ Effectiveness	Yes	Universal
4. Power	Centralized	→ Decentralized	Yes	Nations Specific
5. Issues	General/Welfare	→ Populist/Selective	Yes	Universal
6. Influence	Collegial	→ Personal	No	Nations Specific
7. Networks	Vertical	→ Horizontal	Yes	Democratic
8. Values	Ethical	→ Pragmatic	No	Democratic
9. Party Politics	Special Interests	→ Public Interest	No	Universal
10. Context	Local-National	→ Local-Global	Yes	Democratic

Comment: When the Type of Development is *Universal*, the findings show uniform stability or change, regardless of country. When the Type of Development is *Democratic*, the findings show uniform stability or change, only in the countries where democracy have developed successfully or remained stable. When the Type of Development is *Nations Specific*, we find no universal or democratic development of the local governing elite characteristics.

Also in accordance with the NPM theory, regardless of the country studied, the local leaders think that their local policies have become more effective during

the 1990s (or in the case of Sweden, at least not significantly less effective). And regardless of the country studied, the action taken on local issues is stable or has become increasingly effective throughout the 1990s. Thus, also regarding local elite characteristic number 3 in our model of analysis, we find universal support in favor of NPM theory. However, we do not find universal support for the claim that this greater or unchanged effectiveness is an effect of decentralization (local elite characteristic number 4). The perception of decentralization, i.e. an increasing or high level of leaders thinking that local government has enough power and autonomy to act effectively, has neither changed universally, nor grown only in successful or stable democracies. Rather, the effect of decentralization on effectiveness seems to be nation specific. Especially in the cases of the Netherlands, Belarus and Russia, we find that the local elite's perception of increasing autonomy and power to act effectively goes along with increasingly effective action taken. In Sweden, we find the almost opposite pattern of change, where stability in policy effectiveness corresponds with lesser reported autonomy and power to act effectively across the 1990s. In Lithuania we find yet another pattern, where growing local policy effectiveness is paired with the perception of having less power and autonomy on average to act effectively during the period studied.

The Impact of Governance

In accordance with the *Governance* theory, we find that local elites who have most clearly developed horizontal networks (contacts for support within local government that are open and less hierarchical) also continuously face more complex local problems. However, while the increasing seriousness of local problems is found to be nation specific (local elite characteristic number 2), the change towards horizontal networks is not universal but democratic (local elite characteristic number 7). Hence, in both the new successfully developing Baltic democracies as well as the more stable advanced democracy of Sweden, we find growing or strong horizontal networks of leaders usually turning to the very top local party leaders, local elective officials and the local administrative top officials in situations where support from others is necessary. In these countries, we also find a corresponding increase in the civic horizontal networks, where support from the local community level – from media, business leaders, the public generally, civic action groups, and especially neighborhood organizations – becomes more important. Vertical networks – contacts for support with higher party leaders and higher administrative officials – become significantly less vital in advanced democracies and significantly more important in the new democra-

cies. This development probably depends on the tendency of rolling back the state, and in this case, the efforts of the national government level transferring the implementing responsibility for different policy areas, such as health care, education and elder care, to the local government level (Szücs 1995).

Signs of New Political Culture and Local-Global Relations

In line with the NPC theoretical framework, we find universal change. The local governing elites in both the new and advanced democracies that we surveyed are increasingly effective in solving new populist and selective policy problems, that is, in issues of policies limiting cost of local government and environmental protection (local elite characteristic number 5 in Table 11.1). Also predicted by the NPC theory, greater effectiveness in these issues in Western democracies is paired with a decline in effectiveness in traditional welfare state issues like education, housing, public improvements, social improvements and health care. In the new democracies, however, greater effectiveness is achieved almost regardless of policy issue, according to the local leaders' judgment.

In contrast to NPC theory, we find no general evidence of increasing personal influence among the average leader (local elite characteristic number 6). Nor do we find any proof of a change in the view of political parties. In contrast to what is theoretically claimed, we find that regardless of the country studied, its local governing elite thinks political parties are most important for gaining and maintaining power, while the least important justification for political parties are to channel public interest and to involve people in politics (local elite characteristic number 9). However, despite this instrumental view of the importance of political parties, we find no evidence of increasing pragmatism by a significant decline in democratic ethics (with the exception of the local elites in Belarus and to some extent in Russia). Thus core democratic values such as political equality, citizen participation and political pluralism generally increased significantly or remained more highly committed to in the more successfully developed democracies (local elite characteristic number 8).

Finally, as suggested by the advocates of globalization theory, again we find that a democratic type of change has occurred. Both the leaders in the more successfully developed newly established democracies of the Baltic nations as well as the older democracies share an increasingly or high and stable perception of, especially, non-economic forms of foreign impact (from media, workers and tourism) in their cities across the 1990s. Economic forms of local-global relations (foreign exports, imports and investments in the local community), in

contrast grew regardless of whether the nation's development of democracy was successful during the 1990s.

The Big Bang of Democracy: An Expanding Cluster of Local Political Capital

While we can verify significant universal increase in professional backgrounds and dependence of economic globalization in their cities, paired with a growing perception of effectiveness -- especially in solving new selective and populist issues to secure special party interests -- there are some governing qualities that only change or remain stable in the successfully developing democracies. On top of the important criteria of replacing the old authoritarian cadre in the new democracies, local political capital rests on three conditions that tend to determine the path toward more successful democratic development: (1) *Horizontal networks* -- both contacts for support within local government that are open and less hierarchical as well contacts for support in relation to the local civic community; (2) *Democratic values*, such as political equality, citizen participation and political pluralism; and, especially during the early democratic transition process; (3) *Local-global relations* in terms of non-economic forms of foreign impact in the local community. Thus, throughout the 1990s, successful democratic development in a country tends to be quite dependent on the local governing elite's ability to mobilize resources of novel global relations in the local community, followed by the consolidation of new horizontal networks and basic democratic values. The strongest correlations are found between the local governing elite's commitment to political equality and the magnitude of its internal horizontal networks.

In the new democracies, this political capital was first accumulated depending on the proportion of new leaders within the local elite who replaced the old authoritarian local Soviet cadre. In the early 1990s - during *the formation phase* of political capital -- we find that the denser the proportion of new leaders within the governing elite in a city, the stronger (or less negative) was its commitment to the value of political equality. Generally, within the three former Soviet republics compared across time, this tendency is strongest among the new governing elites in the Lithuanian cities, but there are some examples of Belarus and Russian cities as well combining a shorter period of average years in public service with a less strong average rejection of political equality. Thus, these findings mainly provide support for an *actor-oriented explanatory approach* -- especially for the analysis of the successful formation and institutionalization of new political capital among local elites in the Baltic region in early 1990s.

But what most clearly separates the new democracies of the former Soviet Union during the formation of political capital is the impact of foreign or global relations in the local community. While in Lithuania in the early 1990s, the impact of local-global relations, especially from foreign language TV and radio, in the surveyed local communities was at its peak, at the same time in Belarus and Russia, the local elites hardly noticed this kind of foreign impact in their cities. In the mid-1990s, during the *consolidation phase*, we find above all that the capital gained from the many new leaders, especially in the Lithuanian cities, becomes more consolidated by the growing importance of new less hierarchical and more open horizontal networks. In 1995, contacts for support from local top administrators increased from 35 percent to 69 percent; contacts for support from administrative colleagues increased from 5 to 47 percent, and contacts for support from neighborhood organizations increased from 5 to 26 percent (Matulionos, Mikene & Rauleckas p. 98). In the late 1990s, during the *normalization phase*, the effect of new leaders becomes more limited. At the same time the commitment to democratic values such as citizen participation and political equality increases most significantly in Lithuania. In many cities, the average democratic commitment reaches what could be expected as normal in the older democracies of Europe.

Our analysis of the local governing elites in the over one hundred middle-sized European and Eurasian cities surveyed further reveals how two separate East versus West European clusters of elites in cities with weak versus strong democratic values and horizontal networks slowly became one single cluster. Thus, quite literally, these last findings of the study expose what may be characterized as a “big bang” of political capital, where the very ignition came from successful institutional reform, generating a large proportion of new leaders and novel global relations. In the cases of the more successfully developed new Baltic democracies, this formation of political capital was followed by a quite rapid consolidation of new horizontal networks in the mid-1990s and a normalization of values in the late 1990s.

Toward a Theory of Political Capital

These conclusions invite us to contribute to democratic theory by the introduction of a theory of political capital. The theory suggested emphasizes the governing conditions favorable for both the establishment and the stable maintenance of democracy, where the networks, norms and global relations at the local level constitute three theoretical cornerstones. Thus, according to our findings, political capital may be defined as the institutionalized ability of agents or group

of agents (leaders/elites) by a power derived from trust, to mobilize external (sometimes foreign or even global) relations, horizontal (internal and civic) networks and norms locally that are directly or indirectly related to the stable and effective development of large scale democracy.

In studies of political elites, there are generally two major competing paradigms reflecting the available resources of power (which may be applied in studies of the former Soviet Union as well, see for example Szücs 1998a, Hughes & John 2003). According to the *power elite* framework, political influence is informally organized by a socially homogenous power elite, with the common interest of sustain mutual national business, government and military interests. The survival of the power elite is determined by how well it succeeds in controlling the development of new and alternative social movements and its leaders (Mills 1956). According to the contradictory *pluralist* framework, however, there is no dominant power elite securing and determining development. Rather, because power is fragmented and spread among many groups and constituencies - including the local governing elite - the behavior and values of a new generation of elites, as well as the general development, is less predictable (Dahl 1961). The findings of the first comparative study of local elites performed in the mid 1960s in the U.S., India, Poland and former Yugoslavia, could be interpreted in favor of the power elite approach, because it showed that behavior and values were generally dependent on national, rather than local conditions (Jacob et al. 1971). Another study, comparing Italian and British elites also confirmed the country variable as a first key predictor (Putnam 1973).

The second and third key determinants found in later comparative studies of local elites, however, mainly support the bottom-up pluralist paradigm. In a study of Western local elites - the U.S., Sweden and the Netherlands - performed in the mid and late 1980s, in addition to the explanatory power of the country variable, a second predictor showed that values and behavior matured and are socialized within different generations (Eldersveld, Strömberg & Derksen 1995). The third predictor of elite values and behavior that was suggested in the aftermath of the first comparative studies of local elites (Teune & Ostrowski 1973) is that of the political system. More recently conducted comparative studies, which included local elites in three phases of democratization - advanced democracies, post-authoritarian new democracies of East Central Europe and post-totalitarian regimes of the former Soviet Union - verify the importance of institutional effects (Jacob, Ostrowski & Teune 1993, Szücs 1998a, Jacob, Linder, Nabholz & Heierli 1999). In particular, both the old structural legacy of proto-democratic experience with democracy, *and* positive individual experiences and practices with democracy as a system at the local level in present time, provided for the necessary learning processes of developing democratic

values among the local elite. The commitment to democratic values in these studies from the early 1990s was strongest in the advanced democracies, followed by a neutral position in the new democracies of East Central Europe, and negative average scores in the post-totalitarian republics of the former Soviet Union. Hence, the more experience with democratic institutions, the stronger the belief in core democratic values (Szücs 1998a). Naturally, yet one new predictor of the behavior and values of local elites - found in this study - rests on the effects of global change.

Thus, while some elite characteristics can only be explained by country specific conditions, the general conclusion is that local political capital are generated by, or interact with, both global change and the socialization and learning of a generation of leaders within a certain type of political system or phase of democratization. In studies of regime transitions, a parallel conclusion is that a successful transition toward democracy is determined by a negotiated transaction or pact between the old elites and the new generation of leaders and movements (Rustow 1970, O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986). We suggest three propositions for the development of political capital in relation to the previous studies of local elites and democracy in the following sections.

After the Pact: A New Generation of Elites with New Values

First, what separates successful democratic development in the new democracies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from failing democratic development in Belarus and Russia is the early and large-scale *replacement* of the old political-administrative cadre of the authoritarian regime. One of the greatest systematic differences between the more successfully developed democracies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania when compared to Belarus and Russia consists of the lack of generational change in the composition of the political-administrative local elites in the two latter new nations. In the three Baltic new democracies, a new generation of local elites attained their first public position in the early 1990s, only shortly after the transition process toward democracy began. The replacement of the old cadre in Belarus and Russia started much later, between the mid and the late 1990s, and as an effect of common policies of centralization. In contrast to the bottom-up recruitment of a new generation according to the Pluralist elite paradigm that we find occurring so clearly in the new Baltic democracies, the replacement of the old generation in Belarus and Russia was not implemented in the early 1990s during the transition process. Instead, a large-scale top-down recruitment of local elites was carried out after the mid-1990s, and as an effect of the new common policies of strengthening the verti-

cal power”(in this book, see, Grischenko, Elsukova & Kuchko, p. 205, Toshchenko & Tsibikov, p. 232). Thus a necessary, but insufficient, local governing condition for democratic development concerns the need for a constitutionally founded pact of elite replacement which is followed by the electoral choice and appointment of the new local elites (see, detailed description of initial constitutional and local/regional institutional change in chapter 4, 5 and 6).

Transactions of Political Capital to the General Public

Second, our findings show that once the condition of democratically elected and appointed local elites is established, democratic development more generally depends on the formation of a triangle of main qualities or *political capital* that forms the necessary and sufficient platform for democratic governance. Regardless of the country studied, successful democratic development depends on the quality of three core characteristics of the local political and administrative elites: their horizontal networks, core democratic ethics and the context of local-global relations. In the cities of both the old democracy of Sweden and the new democracies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, we find growing or high levels of non-economic foreign impact in the community paired with an increased or strong, stable commitment to democratic values of political equality, citizen participation and pluralism, as well as a growing or large proportion of leaders who include the very center of local politics and administration as well as local civic community leaders in their support network. The longitudinal analysis further proves that this cluster of horizontal networks, democratic values and local-global relations across cities grew over the 1990s. The local elites in the over one hundred middle-sized European and Eurasian cities studied become increasingly closer to each other during the 1990s, thus exposing a growing European pattern of local political capital influencing large-scale democracy.

In particular, we find that the greater the horizontal network of the local elite in a city is, the stronger its commitment to democratic values is. Thus, Robert D. Putnam’s seminal study *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Northern Italy* (1993) and his theory of social capital constitute a striking comparison to these findings. According to Putnam, social capital “in complex modern settings can arise from two related sources – norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement (Putnam 1993: 171). The theory according to Putnam “helps explain why social capital, as embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy rather than the reverse: Strong society, strong economy; strong society, strong state” (Putnam 1993: 176). However, while trust constitutes a vital part of ordinary

citizens' social capital in Putnam's study, mobilization of horizontal networks, democratic values and local-global relations constitutes an essential part of the elites' political capital. Thus, according to the findings of this study, political capital among local governing elites emanates in a corresponding manner from their ability to mobilize the resources of horizontal governance networks, social foreign or global relations and commitment to core democratic values.

The Critical Path: Global Relations Followed by New Networks and Values

A third and final striking finding concerns the *sequence* of building this political capital. Among its three elements, which strengthen the establishment and maintenance of democracy, it is non-economic foreign impact in the city that - after the constitutional and initial institutional changes leading to democratic elections and appointment of the new local elites - serves as an introductory prime mover of successful democratization. This is also proven in the two cases of failures to establish democracy (Belarus, and to some extent Russia), where a lack of non-economic local-global relations seems to impede democratization. Particularly in the case of the successfully developed new democracy of Lithuania, this introductory effect of social globalization is followed by a growth of horizontal networks, which in turn precedes a shift in democratic values: new networks are more easily created than a shift in core democratic values. Thus, in Lithuania, where the old networks were weak after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we find that the new networks increase *before* the value shift.

However, based on this finding, we cannot simply claim that greater horizontal networks automatically lead to shifts in commitment towards core democratic ethics. On the contrary, in Belarus we find almost the opposite path, where local horizontal networks seem to have played a key role during the transition from the old Soviet regime to the new authoritarian regime. It was because the great bulk of the old authoritarian leaders were not replaced after the collapse of Soviet Union, that the horizontal networks of the old authoritarian regime remained quite strong during the transition process, and as a consequence there was no value shift among the Belarus local elite. Therefore, we can conclude that in Belarus, the local elites' old internal horizontal networks *prevented* a value shift among its local elite. After the mid-1990s, when President Alexander Lukashenka decided to rebuild local government, the effect was that the horizontal networks remained unchanged, while the rejection of values of political equality and pluralism (acceptance of conflict and opposition) became even more strongly accentuated.

In the advanced democracies as well, we find that the horizontal political-administrative networks of the local elites change more easily than basic democratic values. In parallel to the successful democratic development in Lithuania, we find that a growth of horizontal networks among the Swedish local elites corresponds with a slight increase in the commitment towards political equality. However, the decline in horizontal networks among the Dutch local elites does not generate a correspondingly significant value shift rejecting core democratic values. Despite the outcome of the increasingly inert Dutch local elite during the 1990s, core values of democracy remained unchanged. Hence, reduced networks do not necessarily mean that democratic values crumble. However, whereas horizontal networks and norms, as we have shown empirically, are strongly related at the local government level, one might expect that in the long run, shrinking networks might affect democratic ethics. Thus, it seems that shrinking horizontal networks is a first sign of both the breakdown of authoritarian rule *and* democratic system decline.

Causes and Effects of Political Capital

An important theoretical question within the social sciences is how political behavior, values and local contexts interact with formal institutions: What specific elite components and processes are required for the government machinery to work in accordance with the will of the people? In the previous section we showed that the three components of political capital are mutually interdependent in the cities studied and reinforcing across time. In parallel to Putnam's theory of social capital, which explains how the general public may interact for successful institutional performance (Putnam 1993:180), the theory sketched here displays how local political capital leads to the successful establishment and stable maintenance of democracy. Thus, political capital of European and Eurasian local elites - just like successful institutional performance in Putnam's theory - depends on mutually reinforcing social structures, norms and behavioral patterns.

Within the social sciences, there is a strong contemporary position of *not* trying to find the causal order or sequence of these equilibriums of mutually reinforcing structures, norms and behavior. The classical position is that **the** republic made the virtuous individual and the virtuous individual made the republic" (Vetterli & Bryner 1987:20, cf. Putnam 1993:247). And as recommended by the authors of *Cultural Theory* (1990), Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky: "Values and social relations are mutually interdependent and reinforcing: Institutions generate distinctive sets of preferences, and

adherence to certain values legitimizes corresponding institutional arrangements. Asking which comes first or which should be given causal priority is a nonstarter (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990:21, cf. Putnam 1993:247). In Putnam's own study, the source of the previous quotes, he and his colleagues conclude that: Linear causal questions must not crowd out equilibrium analysis. [More important is to understand how history smooths some paths and closes others off (Putnam 1993:181). Putnam ends his study of social capital by referring to Douglass North, and his work *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (1990). According to North, the theoretical challenges ahead lies in the analysis of [..]culturally derived norms of behavior and how they interact with formal rules[We are just beginning the serious study of institutions'(North 1990:140).

Thus, rather than simply rejecting the problem of institutional causality, we must start asking more exactly how institutional stability and change interact with norms, networks and relations at the local level;in our case, how political capital is accumulated at the local level by the influence of institutional change, and how such political capital in its turn may effect democracy and development on a large scale. Our findings not only indicate the increasing strength of local mutually interdependent and reinforced relations, networks and values in successfully developing democracies. The longitudinal analysis also suggests a theory of how this local political capital equilibrium strengthens or weakens, which in turn helps us to explain why democracy is more successfully established in some new democracies than others, (and why it show tendencies of decline in some old democracies but not in others).

In the early 1990s, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economy and political culture was almost exactly the same in the former Baltic, Belarus and Russian republics. The local elite in the Lithuanian cities rejected democratic values as strongly as the local elites in Belarus and Russia;therefore, neither socio-economic nor socio-cultural factors satisfactorily contribute to explaining the growth of the political capital needed in order to break into a new path leading to successful democratization. Thus, the only reasonable (and remaining) cause is institutional. Apart from a more favorable historical legacy of proto-democratic experience (Szücs 1983), it was the introduction of a new constitution, new local governments and a quick establishment of a new cadre of elected or appointed leaders that paved the way for the shift needed in political capital locally in both Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This did not happen in Belarus and Russia.

Our findings show that local political capital is based on the three mutually interdependent and reinforcing components of values, networks and relations. Although interdependent, we find social globalization to be the igniter in the

case of successful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The influence of social globalization, and in particular local relations to foreign media, precedes both the creation of horizontal networks and democratic values among the local elite in the successful new democracy. Thus, by these foreign relations in their cities, the newly elected or appointed political-administrative elite paved the way for both the establishment of new networks and new values. The growth of these mutually interdependent and reinforcing components of political capital among the political-administrative elite in the Baltic cities, leads to what may be defined as democratic trajectory or path dependence (Putnam 1993:180).

By the concept *Path Dependence*, we not only imply that the development of a country or a region is bound by its previous institutional history, for example by the legacy of Soviet institutions and authoritarian attitudes (Linz & Stepan 1996, Offe 1996). Rather, by path dependence we recognize that the elites in particular are locked into an equilibrium which they find it hard to break out of (Pierson, 2000, cf. Hughes and John 2003:124). As verified in our study as well, in the less successful or failing transitions towards democracy, the authoritarian path dependence remains too strong because of the limited or delayed institutional change, which hinders social globalization to take root in the cities, prevents old horizontal networks of the local elites from breakdown and stops authoritarian values from withering away:

“Although we cannot rule out the effect of the structure-oriented approach – the very openness for change in the Baltic new democracies is certainly highly dependent on these countries past histories – what is striking is the importance of local actors for democracy, i.e. for the formation and consolidation of a political capital needed for the successful development of democracy. We find the structural-oriented explanatory approach – and especially the path-dependence theory – to work much better in the cases where democracy and local governance most clearly failed to develop successfully.” (Szücs & Strömberg p. 303-304).

Naturally, the quality of the civil society, and its social capital, is an equally important determinant in this puzzle of establishment and maintenance of successful democracy. Although the social capital of the residents in a local or regional community is not the issue of this study, our findings of the importance of local elite's social global relations, horizontal networks and democratic norms for sustainable development of democracy, invite us to briefly speculate and suggest an addition to the existing theoretical framework.

Most importantly, we think that theories of democracy and democratization are in need of a stronger linkage between the social capital of the general public and the political capital of the governing elites. In other recent studies, scholars have argued that real democratization is only achieved when it has been sup-

ported by elements from the broader civil society, rather than when the management of the transition process has been left wholly in the hands of the elites (for example, see Gill 2000). Thus, we believe that successful democratic institutions require the interplay between civil society's building of social capital and the political capital accumulated by the governing elites.

At first instance, the social relations of the civic community need to be reciprocal and local-global among the governing elite. In a second step, these relations develop networks of engagement among the civic community, and internal horizontal networks among the governing elite. Finally, the social relations and networks generate norms of interpersonal trust among the general public and a democratic ethic among the governing elite. This latent system of beliefs contains not only interpersonal trust and tolerance, but also values of citizen participation, political equality and pluralism (Szücs 1998a). Thus, while no democracy can be achieved without broader elements of civil society, the final condition for the establishment of sustainable democracy depends on the ethics of the governing elites.

Three Lessons for Democratic Reformers

When we started our research on local elites within the *Democracy and Local Governance* (DLG) program, few, if any, of us taking part in our first meetings in the spring of 1991 would have guessed that the same year would be the end of the Soviet Union. Back then it was too early to learn any lessons from European development of democracy. In the first book of the DLG program (1993), the International Coordinator Krzysztof Ostrowski and Project Director Henry Teune were still unsure about the prospects for democracy in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union:

After World War I democracy in Europe was imposed and promoted as a progressive development for the defeated powers and the new or restored countries created from the collapsed or curtailed Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German, and Russian empires. The two main features of democratization then were the empowerment of elected legislatures and the expansion of the electorate. By the early 1920s antidemocratic movements and parties, including fascism and communism, could be found almost everywhere in Europe. Several countries succumbed, others resisted. Resolutions of the domestic and international conflicts of the 1920s and 1930s finally came about through the violence of a second world war, which ended with a clear division between democracy and communism. That political divide is for the moment gone. Once again new and old

old versions of democracy have been proclaimed. The boundaries previously closed countries have opened and independent political and economic initiatives are acceptable almost everywhere in a redefined Europe. But will democracy take root, or will it be a short phase in yet another political transition? That is the main question the Democracy and Local Governance research program addresses. (Ostrowski & Teune 1993:7)

After becoming new members of the European Union in May 2004, we may conclude that among the former Soviet republics, it is in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that democracy most definitively took root. In the successfully established new democracies of the Baltic nations, we have found that institutional change – new constitution, national, regional and local government reorganization, as well as a great bulk of newly elected and appointed leaders - paved the way for a peak in locally rooted structures of social globalization during the early 1990s. The early build-up of these local-global relations was followed by strengthened horizontal networks of the local political administrative elite in the mid-1990s. In the late 1990s, this positive path also involved significant changes toward a normalized democratic political culture among the local elite, particularly shown by an increasing average commitment to democratic values and ethics. Most probably, the gradual development of these three components of political capital, were supported by a growing social capital of the general public, reinforced by growing diffuse reciprocal relations and new networks of civic engagement.

Institutions Matter:

Or Why History Smoothens some Paths and Closes Others Off

The lesson for the democrats of Belarus and Russia is not only that the sequence of institutional change was quite unfavorable, because the first free local elections were held in March 1990, two years *before* the breakdown of the authoritarian Soviet regime and the new Law on Local Self-Government, passed in 1992. Since there was no time to organize, political parties, ideological platforms and constituencies did not play a significant role in these first free elections (Wollmann & Butusova 2003). This led to a development where all deputies of the old local soviets served for a five year term from 1990 and onwards, which also meant that the local and regional government structures and organization were hardly favorable for changing the conditions of the local political capital in a democratic direction. Previous comparative analysis has also veri-

fied that earlier, so-called proto-democratic institutional experiences, is a key factor in explaining differences in local political capital (Szücs 1998a:269).

The conditions for developing social capital among the general public through reciprocal relations, networks of engagement and generalized trust remained unfavorable as well: As described by Juri Avdeyev and his colleagues of the first Russian report to DLG in 1993: Even today, the citizen apathy and skepticism evident in those first elections exist in such proportions that the few parties that do exist find it extremely difficult to woo members or to raise the money necessary to help them grow" (Avdeyev, Grischenko & Jasiska-Kania 1993:148).

Thus, a first lesson is that institutions matter. The structures, principles and practices of the local governing elites who determine democratic development - in short, political capital - particularly in new democracies, are profoundly dependent on the sequence of institutional reform. The success or failure of democracy is dependent not only on how institutional change (after the fall of authoritarianism) interacts with the governing elites' political capital, but on the order of institutional change. In the Baltic nations, the breakdown of the old authoritarian local power structures and the choice of new elected and appointed local elites, *opened up a new path* leading to successful democracy by the increasing dependence of mutually interdependent and reinforcing local-global relations, networks and democratic values. In Belarus and Russia, because of the absence of a breakdown of the old power structures, no windows of opportunity were opened, and no path towards democracy could materialize because of prevailing networks of the old cadre of authoritarian local elites. In both Belarus and Russia today, in 2006, the central institutions are attempting to further restrict civil society by placing a tight limit on freedom of public assembly and the freedom of press and media.

Efficiency Reforms, Power Interests and Economic Globalization are Universal

A second lesson to be drawn from our studies of local elites is that the relationship between general democratic development and universal elite change is weak. Many of the local elite changes across the 1990s that we find universal in our analysis confirm the suggestions of political-administrative change, made by the theoretical movement of *New Public Management* (NPM), and especially its central ideas about an increasing search for excellence and effectiveness. In all of the countries in this study, the educational level of the local elite is high or increasing and the leaders think their actions taken are stable or increasingly

effective during the 1990s. Thus, it seems that effects in accordance with NPM theory have little to do with the establishment and maintenance of democracy.

In addition, the drive for power seems to be truly universal, also among local elites. Regardless of the country studied, we find universal support from the local elites that political parties are important first and foremost for forming majorities in bodies and competing in elections. At the same time, political parties are seen as the very least important for meeting the interests of the electorate and involving people in politics. Thus, we might claim that when it comes to political parties, special interests clearly precede public interests. However, this does not mean that the local elites have become more pragmatic. On the contrary, the commitment to democratic sentiments among local elites is very much interdependent with the general success or failure in establishing and maintaining the institutional foundation of democracy. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no universal values. From Sweden to Belarus, what unites the local leader regardless of country is the value of honesty. In fact, the belief in honesty is the most commonly and highly committed to of all local elite values that we analyzed.

Finally, the perception of economic local-global relations has grown universally in our study across the 1990s. In all nations analyzed in this study, including Belarus and Russia where the development of democracy has been more troublesome, the local elites have witnessed and reported an increase of economic forms of foreign impact in their communities. Few nations, like North Korea, remain closed societies for economic globalization. Even China today successfully combines economic globalization with authoritarian regime sovereignty. Thus, a peaceful democratic development from authoritarian rule not only requires non-economic global and social relations, new horizontal networks and democratic norms rooted at the local level. The chance of development leading to a new and peaceful path towards democracy also depends on a previous history of proto-democratic development and experience with the institutions of democracy (Szücs 1983, Szücs 1998a).

Values Matter: Political Capital Influences Social Capital of the Mass Public

In the advanced Western democracies, institutional structures that strictly limit undemocratic and racist tendencies, for example in the case of Sweden, seem to strengthen local elites' commitment to core democratic values, networks, and the acceptance of foreign impact and globalization in their cities. This local political capital in turn affects the civil society and the social capital of the general public, by rejecting a general development of undemocratic tendencies.

Because institutions matter, any institutional legitimizing of undemocratic tendencies, movement or parties, will not only effect popular values and the social capital of the civil society, but more importantly, it will probably influence the roots of the political system: the local elites.

Among the three characteristics of local elites that most clearly interact with the success and failure of democracy – global relations, networks and values – it is the latter, norms and ethics that seem most important both for the establishment and the maintenance of stable democracy. Our empirical findings show that values of political equality, citizen participation and pluralism all are parts of a conditional democratic ethic for development and stable maintenance of democracy. The growing commitment across the 1990s and the average acceptance of a conditional democratic ethic in the late 1990s is most evident in the successfully established democracies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The average leader has gone from slightly negative in the early and mid-1990s, to neutral or slightly positive commitment in the late 1990s. The case of Lithuania, which we have been able to probe across the whole decade, shows that the Lithuanian local political-administrative elite have left the average rejection of democratic ethics, which was so typical for all of the local elites of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Particularly in the case of Belarus, the authoritarian regime dependency generates an increasing rejection of a conditional democratic ethic that is even stronger in the late 1990s.

Thus, the third lesson of our study is that commitment to *core democratic values and ethics matter* for democratic development. It is the commitment to democratic ethics that most clearly conditions the most effective and sustainable development of democracy. However, value changes towards a democratic ethic moves fairly slow, also among elites and even among a new cadre of democratically elected and appointed local political-administrative elites. Although one of our main findings is that values, networks and global relations of the local elites are mutually interdependent and reinforcing, it seems that values remain the most critical for real democratic development.

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Appendix

A. World Index of General Democratic Development

Four important dimensions of the development of democratic governance include Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The world data base covers 199 countries.

Table A.1

Development of Democratic Governance 1996-2002 (Index -2.5 to 2.5)*

	Voice and account- ability	Voice and account- ability	Political stability / lack of violence	Political stability / lack of violence	Rule of law	Rule of law	Control of Cor- ruption	Control of Cor- ruption
	1996	2002	1996	2002	1996	2002	1996	2002
Belarus	-0,97	-1,45	-0,04	0,19	-0,96	-1,12	-0,86	-0,78
Russia	-0,34	-0,52	-0,76	-0,4	-0,8	-0,78	-0,69	-0,9
Lithuania	0,72	0,89	0,57	0,93	-0,14	0,48	-0,12	0,25
Latvia	0,5	0,91	0,67	0,82	0,18	0,46	-0,52	0,09
Estonia	0,74	1,05	0,74	0,98	0,33	0,8	0,05	0,66
Netherlands	1,62	1,63	1,39	1,37	1,84	1,83	1,99	2,15
Sweden	1,62	1,65	1,28	1,43	1,92	1,92	2,04	2,25

*Source: Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi (2003) *Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002*. Washington: The World Bank.

Table A.2

Development of Globalization Europe 1975-2000 (Dreher's Index, 0 to 10)

	Social Glob- alization Index*	Social, Economic, Political Globaliza- tion Index*	Social, Economic, Political Globaliza- tion Index*	Social, Economic, Political Globaliza- tion Index*	Institutional, Organizational, and Economic Globalization Index** 2000
	2000	1975	1990	2000	
Belarus	65,2
Russia	1,41	1,07	0,92	3,74	89,9
Lithuania	1,79	.	.	2,78	84,1
Latvia	2,25	.	.	2,99	93,2
Estonia	2,68	.	.	3,43	101,2
Netherlands	4,21	5,31	4,29	5,36	130,3
Sweden	5,63	5,18	5,11	6,24	119,2

*Source: Dreher, Axel (2003) *Does Globalization Affect Growth?* Mannheim: University of Mannheim, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre.

**Source: Johansson, Jonas (2002) *Globalization and Democracy: An Overlooked Connection*. In Elgström, Ole & Goran Hydén (eds.) *Development and Democracy: What do we Know and How?* London: Routledge.

B. The Sample of Municipalities and Leaders

The selection of municipalities for this study was made by the national teams within the framework of the *Democracy and Local Governance (DLG)*. The data for this study is taken from the highlighted national samples of localities in Table B.1:

Table B.1

Leaders and Communities Surveyed in the first 1960s program *International Studies of Values in Politics (ISVIP)* in the 1980s, and within the *Democracy and Local Governance (DLG)* program of the 1990s (Selected nations for this study in grey).

Nation	1960s (1966)	1980s (1985-89)	Early 1990s (1991-93)	Mid 1990s (1995-96)	Late 1990s (1998-2000)
1. USA	30/905	25/355		30/271	
2. Poland	30/891	30/440	30/448		
3. India	30/955				
4. Yugoslavia	30/1179		19/275*		
5. The Netherlands		20/305		23/423	23/255
6. Sweden		20/664	20/440		40/855
7. Belarus			30/449	30/417	30/450
8. Russia			36/548	73/1068	67/977
9. Lithuania			18/277	21/312	21/312
10. Ukraine			30/450	30/450	
11. Kazakhstan			26/448	24/338	
12. Hungary			30/450	30/394	
13. Check Republic			20/311	22/254	
14. Slovakia			20/300	19/218	
15. Austria				31/378	
16. Turkey				44/448	
17. Uzbekistan				30/401	
18. Switzerland				61/819	
19. Iceland				74/366	
20. Southkorea				24/811	
21. Armenia				20/360	
22. Kirgistan				20/300	
23. Germany				4/1175**	
24. Taiwan				6/372	
25. Spain				36/444	
26. Japan				30/402	
27. Estonia					51/201
28. Latvia					34/325
Total	120/3 948	65/1 324	310/4 766	658/10 068	221/3 252

* Later Slovenia ** Regions

In each study, generally middle-sized cities with between 25,000 and 250,000 inhabitants were selected through a random and stratified selection process, distinguishing cities by size, political situation and economic development level (adjustments were made according to special nation conditions) in order to get a representative sample of towns and cities from each country.

About 15 to 30 political leaders (mainly politicians and administrators, but to some extent also other political or civic community activists) were interviewed in each municipality. In Estonia, Latvia, the Netherlands and Sweden, mail questionnaires were used due to high interviewing costs. From the countries which performed interview surveys, there is no information about response rates. The composition and background of the local leaders analyzed in this book is described in each of the chapters of national reports.

C. The Value Scales

The value scales utilized in this study concern political equality, participation, pluralism (acceptance of conflict), localism, capitalism, economic equality, economic development, minority rights and honesty-openness. These are so-called Likert scales, consisting of a set of "forced-choice statements" which are used to determine the respondent's degree of commitment to, or repudiation of, a certain value.

The value scales presented in this study have a long history in cross-national comparisons of local leaders' values. These were developed in the mid 1960s by the international ISVIP research program (International Studies of Values in Politics) for the first truly cross-national study of local elites, described in *Values and the Active Community* (Jacob et al. 1971, see also, Szücs 1998a, for a recent overview and cross-national comparative analysis). The purpose of the value scales was to better deal with the methodological problems that single variable items were believed to cause in terms of general interpretation, as well as scale level measurement. It was believed that a set of items measuring leaders' orientations would be a more secure interpretation than a single item in the cross-national comparisons local elites in quite different countries.

The scales are based on a set of items, usually four to five, which are assumed to say something about a special commitment to, for example the acceptance of political equality among a group of leaders (all individual items of the value scales are displayed in question no. 8 of the questionnaire, and the construction of all value

scales are shown in the code book, see Appendix D). Thus, the respondent is given a set of statements on, for example, political equality, with which the respondent can strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree. The responses to these statements are put together on a scale with interval scale measurement properties. The homogeneity and independence of the value scale can be proved or disproved by factor and scaling analysis. If the individual items of a special scale form a latent variable or a dimension of its own, then it can be claimed to represent a value.

D. The International Questionnaire and Code Book

DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE - INTERNATIONAL CODEBOOK Description of variables prepared in accordance with SPSS procedures: VARIABLE NAME, VARIABLE LABEL and VALUE LABEL (codes). Sequence of variables corresponds to sequence of questions in the international version of the questionnaire (modified version, December 1995).

1. Identification - year of study

CODES: 85 - 1985

89 - 1989

91 - 1991

92 - 1992

93 - 1993

95 - 1995

96 - 1996

98 - 1998

99 - 1999

00 - 2000

YEAR YEAR OF STUDY

2. Identification - country

CODES: 1 - Poland 14 - Turkey 28 - Estonia

2 - Sweden 15 - Switzerland

3 - Slovenia 16 - Iceland

4 - Belarus 17 - Republic of Korea

5 - Lithuania 18 - USA

6 - Ukraine 19 - Armenia

7 - Russia 20 - Kyrgyzstan

8 - Kazakhstan 21 - Germany

9 - Hungary 23 - Spain

10 - Austria 24 - Taiwan

11 - Czech Rep. 25 - Netherlands

12 - Slovakia 26 - Japan

13 - Uzbekistan 27 - Latvia

COUNTRY COUNTRY

3. Identification - respondent

CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

RESPONID RESPONDENT IDENTIFICATION

4. Identification - community

CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

COMMUNID COMMUNE IDENTIFICATION

Q1. What do you think are the most important problems facing this community?
(TEXT FILE)

Q2. Are any of the following issues a problem for your city?

CODES: 2 - very serious

1 - somewhat serious

0 - no problem

99 - missing data

PREDUC PROBLEMS WITH EDUCATION**PRJOBLES** PROBLEMS WITH UNEMPLOYMENT**PRPOOR** PROBLEMS WITH LIVING STANDARD**PRHEALTH** PROBLEMS WITH HEALTH**PRHOUSE** PROBLEMS WITH HOUSING**PRPUBLIC** PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS**PRCULTUR** PROBLEMS WITH RECREATION AND CULTURE**PRSAFE** PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC SAFETY**PRWELF** PROBLEMS WITH SOCIAL IMPROVEMENTS**PRMIN** PROBLEMS WITH IMMIGRATION**PRPOLLUT** PROBLEMS WITH POLLUTION**PRECDE** PROBLEMS WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**PRCOST** PROBLEMS WITH COST OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT**PRMIGR** PROBLEMS WITH MIGRATION OF ALIENS

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

PRIMP MEAN IMPORTANCE OF
PROBLEMS

PRSCOPE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS
MENTIONED

Q3(*). In each of those issues was effective action taken in last 2-3 years?

CODES: 2 - effective action

1 - some action but no effects

0 - no action

99 - missing data

EFEDUC EFFECTIVE ACTION- EDUCATION
EFJOBLES EFFECTIVE ACTION- UNEMPLOYMENT
EFPOOR EFFECTIVE ACTION- LIVING STANDARD
EFHEALTH EFFECTIVE ACTION- HEALTH
EFHOUSE EFFECTIVE ACTION- HOUSING
EFPUBLIC EFFECTIVE ACTION- PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS
EFCULTU EFFECTIVE ACTION- RECREATION AND CULTURE
EFSAFETY EFFECTIVE ACTION- PUBLIC SAFETY
EF POLLUT EFFECTIVE ACTION- POLLUTION
EFWELF EFFECTIVE ACTION- SOCIAL IMPROVEMENTS
EF RACE EFFECTIVE ACTION- MINORITY RELATIONS
EFECDE EFFECTIVE ACTION- ECON. DEVELOPMENT
EFCOST EFFECTIVE ACTION- COST OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EFMIGR EFFECTIVE ACTION- MIGRATION OF ALIENS

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

EFIMP MEAN IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEMS

EFSCOPE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS MENTIONED

Q4(3a) In which of these areas do you think that your local government has enough power and autonomy to act effectively?

CODES: 1 - has powers

0 - lacks powers

99 - missing data

AUTEDUC AUTONOMY - EDUCATION
AUTJOB AUTONOMY - EMPLOYMENT
AUTPOOR AUTONOMY - SUPPORT POOR
AUTHEAL AUTONOMY - HEALTH SERVICES
AUTHOUS AUTONOMY - HOUSING PROBLEMS
AUTPUB AUTONOMY - PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS
AUTCULT AUTONOMY - RECREATION AND CULTURE
AUTSAFE AUTONOMY - CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

AUTPOLL AUTONOMY - POLLUTION
AUTWELF AUTONOMY - SOCIAL SERVICES AND WELFARE
AUTRACE AUTONOMY - RACE OR MINORITY RELATIONS
AUTECDE AUTONOMY - ECONOMIC GROWTH
AUTMIGR AUTONOMY - MIGRATION OF ALIENS

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

AUTTOT MEAN AUTONOMY

Q5(4). Regardless of how things are being done now, who in your opinion should have primary responsibility for:

CODES: 1 - mentioned

0 - not mentioned

REEDUCNG RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
REEDUCRG RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION-REGIONAL GOV.
REEDUCLG RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION-LOCAL GOV.
REEDUCOR RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION-ORGANIZATIONS
REEDUCP RESPONSIBILITY EDUCATION-LEAVE IT TO THE PEOPLE
REJOBNG RESPONSIBILITY EMPLOYMENT-NATIONAL GOV.
REJOBRG RESPONSIBILITY EMPLOYMENT-REGIONAL GOV.
REJOBLG RESPONSIBILITY EMPLOYMENT-LOCAL GOV.
REJOBOR RESPONSIBILITY EMPLOYMENT-ORGANIZATIONS
REJOBP RESPONSIBILITY EMPLOYMENT-LEAVE TO PEOPLE
REPOORNG RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORT POOR-NATIONAL GOV.
REPOORRG RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORT POOR-REGIONAL GOV.
REPOORLG RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORT POOR LOCAL GOVT.
REPOOROR RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORT POOR-ORGANIZATIONS
REPOORP RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORT POOR-LEAVE IT TO PEOPLE
REHEALNG RESPONSIBILITY HEALTH-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
REHEALRG RESPONSIBILITY HEALTH-REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
REHEALLG RESPONSIBILITY HEALTH-LOCAL GOVERNMENT
REHEALOR RESPONSIBILITY HEALTH-ORGANIZATIONS
REHEALP RESPONSIBILITY HEALTH-LEAVE IT TO THE PEOPLE
REHOUSNG RESPONSIBILITY HOUSING-NATIONAL GOV.
REHOUSRG RESPONSIBILITY HOUSING-REGIONAL GOV.

REHOUSLG RESPONSIBILITY HOUSING-LOCAL GOVERNMENT
REHOUSOR RESPONSIBILITY HOUSING-ORGANIZATIONS
REHOUSP RESPONSIBILITY HOUSING-LEAVE IT TO THE PEOPLE
RECULTNG RESPONSIBILITY CULTURE & RECREATION-NAT. GOV.
RECULTRG RESPONSIBILITY CULTURE & RECREATION-REG.GOV.
RECULTLG RESPONSIBILITY CULTURE & RECREATION-LOC. GOV.
RECULTOR RESPONSIBILITY CULTURE & RECREATION-ORG.
RECULTP RESPONSIBILITY CULT. & RECREATION-THE PEOPLE
RESAFNG RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC SAFETY-NATIONAL GOV.
RESAFRG RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC SAFETY-REGIONAL GOV.
RESAFLG RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC SAFETY-LOCAL GOV.
RESAFOR RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC SAFETY-ORGANIZATIONS
RESAFP RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC SAFETY-THE PEOPLE
REPOLLNG RESPONSIBILITY POLLUTION-NATIONAL GOV.
REPOLLRG RESPONSIBILITY POLLUTION-REGIONAL GOV.
REPOLLG RESPONSIBILITY POLLUTION-LOCAL GOVERNMENT
REPOLLOR RESPONSIBILITY POLLUTION-ORGANIZATIONS
REPOLLP RESPONSIBILITY POLLUTION-LEAVE IT TO THE PEOPLE
REMINONG RERESPONSIBILITY IMMIGRANTS-NATIONAL GOV.
REMINORG RESPONSIBILITY IMMIGRANTS-REGIONAL GOV.
REMINOLG RESPONSIBILITY IMMIGRANTS-LOCAL GOVERNMENT
REMINOOR RESPONSIBILITY IMMIGRANTS-ORGANIZATIONS
REMINOP RESPONSIBILITY IMMIGRANTS-LEAVE IT TO PEOPLE
REPUBNG RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-NATIONAL
REPUBRG RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-REGIONAL
REPUBLG RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-LOCAL
REPUBOR RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-ORG.
REPUBP RESPONSIBILITY PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-PEOPLE
REECDENG RESPONSIBILITY ECONOMIC GROWTH-NATIONAL
REECDERG RESPONSIBILITY ECONOMIC GROWTH-REGIONAL
REECDELG RESPONSIBILITY ECONOMIC GROWTH-LOCAL
REECDIOR RESPONSIBILITY ECONOMIC GROWTH-ORG.
REECDEP RESPONSIBILITY ECONOMIC GROWTH-THE PEOPLE

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

REEDUC	RESPONSIBILITY - EDUCATION NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REJOB	RESPONSIBILITY - EMPLOYMENT NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REPOOR	RESPONSIBILITY - POOR PEOPLE NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REHEALTH	RESPONSIBILITY - HEALTH NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REHOUS	RESPONSIBILITY - HOUSING NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
RE CULT	RESPONSIBILITY - CULTURE NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
RESAFE	RESPONSIBILITY - CRIME NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REPOLLU	RESPONSIBILITY - POLLUTION NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REMINOR	RESPONSIBILITY - MINORITIES NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REPUBIMP	RESPONSIBILITY - PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
REECDE	RESPONSIBILITY - ECONOMIC GROWTH NO. OF LEVELS MENTIONED
RELOC GOV	RESPONSIBILITY - LOCAL GOVERNMENT AVERAGE SCORE
REPEOPLE	RESPONSIBILITY - LEAVE IT TO THE PEOPLE AVERAGE SCORE
RESTATE	RESPONSIBILITY - NATIONAL + REGIONAL GOV. AVERAGE SCORE
RENGO	RESPONSIBILITY - ORGANIZATIONS AVERAGE SCORE

Q6(5). We would like to know how much influence you feel you have on what is accomplished in your community in the following areas:

CODES: 2 - great influence

1 - some influence

0 - no influence

99 - missing data

INFECDE INFLUENCE - INDUSTRIAL OR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INFAGRI INFLUENCE - AGRICULTURE
INFHOUSE INFLUENCE - HOUSING
INF POLLU INFLUENCE - ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
INF PUBLIC INFLUENCE - PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS
INFHEAL INFLUENCE - HEALTH
INF CULTU INFLUENCE - CULTURE, RECREATION, SPORTS
INF EDUC INFLUENCE - EDUCATION
INF POLOR INFLUENCE - POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
INF REVEN INFLUENCE - COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC REVENUE
INF SAFE INFLUENCE - PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY
INF WELF INFLUENCE - SOCIAL SERVICES AND WELFARE
INF LABOR INFLUENCE - EMPLOYMENT
INF IMMIG INFLUENCE - IMMIGRATION
 TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:
INFIMP INFLUENCE - MEAN
INFSCOPE INFLUENCE - NUMBER OF AREAS MENTIONED

Q7(6). When you as leader are in situation in which support from others is necessary, to whom do you usually turn?

CODES: 1 - mentioned

0 - not mentioned

SUPLOPAR SUPPORT - LOCAL PARTY LEADERS
SUPLOELE SUPPORT - LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
SUPLOMED SUPPORT - LOCAL MEDIA
SUPHIPAR SUPPORT - HIGHER PARTY LEADERS
SUPTADM SUPPORT - LOCAL TOP ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS

SUPLOPOL	SUPPORT - LOCAL LEADERS OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
SUPLOCGR	SUPPORT - LOCAL CIVIC, PROFESSIONAL OR REFORM GROUPS
SUPPARGR	SUPPORT - GROUPS IN LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION
SUPCOLL	SUPPORT - ADM COLLEAGUES AT OWN LEVEL
SUPHIADM	SUPPORT - HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
SUPBUS	SUPPORT - BUSINESS LEADERS
SUPTRUN	SUPPORT - TRADE UNIONS
SUPPUBLI	SUPPORT - PUBLIC GENERALLY
SUPRELIG	SUPPORT - RELIGIOUS LEADERS, CHURCH
SUPNEIGH	SUPPORT - NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS
SUPFRIEN	SUPPORT - FRIENDS
TRANSFORMED VARIABLES	
SUPPORT	SUPPORT - NUMBER OF SUPPORT GROUPS MENTIONED
SUPLOC	SUPPORT - LOCAL GROUPS AVERAGE SCORE
SUPNLOC	SUPPORT - NON-LOCAL GROUPS AVERAGE SCORE

Q8(7). Below are some questions faced in the daily life of political leaders. Please examine them closely and check the extent to which you agree or disagree with them:

CODES: 4 - strongly agree

3 - agree

2 - disagree

1 - strongly disagree

99 - missing data

ECDE1	The economic development of the nation should take precedence over immediate consumer gratification.
PART44	The complexity of modern day issues requires that only the more simple questions should be considered publicly
HONE144	Honesty and truthfulness must never be compromised at any cost.

- MAJO303** The rights of minorities are so important that the majority should be limited in what it can do.
- LONA87** National goals should not be obtained at great costs to local communities
- EQUA166** Rich people should pay more for the support of community projects than poor people.
- ECDE2** A high standard of living should be the most important (ultimate) goal of a society.
- RULAW1** Every individual and group should have the right to sue the authorities.
- POLR187** The most important thing for the leader is to follow his convictions even if this is different from what the constituency expects.
- CORE24** Public decisions should be made with unanimous consent.
- MAJO304** Any individual or an organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative.
- PART45** Widespread participation in decision-making often leads to undesirable conflicts.
- RULAW2** All decisions should be subject to appeal to an independent authority for review.
- LONA88** Although national affairs are important, people here should first worry about their own community problems.
- HONE145** Leaders should present the truth no matter what the consequences are.
- CAPT307** Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good.
- CAPT319** The government has the responsibility to see to it that everybody has a job.
- LONA89** Community progress is not possible if national goals always have priority.
- PART46** Most decisions should be left to the judgment of experts.
- EQUA167** There should be an upper limit on income so that no one earns very much more than others.

- CAPT310** Competition is often wasteful and destructive.
- PART47** Only those who are fully informed on the issues should vote.
- POLR217** When some important problems are in question, a leader should not pay attention to the fact that the majority of the people in the community oppose him.
- LONA90** We should not worry so much about national problems when we have so many in our own community.
- EQUA168** The government has the responsibility to see that nobody lives well when others are poor.
- ECDE4** Economic development should not be pursued if it means hardships for the people.
- POEQ317** Few people really know what is in their best interests in the long run.
- ECDE5** After obtaining a certain standard of living further concern with economic growth is not required.
- RULAW3** It is acceptable for the authorities to adopt laws that punish people for actions taken before law was passed.
- CORE26** Leaders who are over concerned about resolving conflicts can never carry out community programs successfully.
- PART49** Participation of the people is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted competent leaders.
- RULAW4** There are no circumstances where provisions of the constitution can be ignored by the authorities.
- POEQ313** It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything.
- AUTHOR** Elected leaders must take unpopular actions in the best interest of the people.
- CORE27** Preserving harmony in the community should be considered more important than the achievement of community programs.
- ECDE6** Only economic development will ultimately provide the things required for the welfare and happiness of the people.

- RULAW5** It is appropriate for local leaders to disobey the law if it is in the interest of the community
- CAPT311** When people accumulate wealth, it is only at the expense of others.
- EQUA170** In every situation poor people should be given more opportunities than rich people.
- CORE28** A good leader should refrain from making proposals that divide the people even if these are important for the community.
- HONE149** In order to achieve community goals, it is permissible for leaders to present facts in a one-sided way.
- MAJO301** The minority has a right to oppose but no right to resist decisions taken by the majority.
- CAPT306** The private enterprise system is generally a fair and efficient system.
- POEQ314** Certain people are better qualified to run this country due to their traditions and family background.
- HONE152** In order to avoid misunderstanding by the people, a leader should not disclose certain facts.
- CORE34** A leader should modify his actions to keep consensus.
- RULAW6** Citizens have the right to demand that public officials justify their decisions.
- MAJO320** The government has the responsibility to see to it that rights of all minorities are protected.
- HONE155** Local leaders should always publicly and truthfully speak the facts about their failures in performing social affairs.
- RULAW7** Appointed officials should have the right to adopt new laws.
- EQUA172** Discrepancies in salaries should be continually reduced.
- POLR185** A leader is obligated to follow the wishes of the community even if he thinks the citizens are mistaken.
- POEQ316** In this complicated world the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

CONF	VALUE SCALE - CONFLICT / PLURALISM
ECDE	VALUE SCALE - ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECEQ	VALUE SCALE - ECONOMIC EQUALITY
HONE	VALUE SCALE - HONESTY / OPENNESS
LOCA	VALUE SCALE - LOCALISM
PART	VALUE SCALE - CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
CAPT	VALUE SCALE - CAPITALISM
MINR	VALUE SCALE - MINORITY RIGHTS
POEQ	VALUE SCALE - POLITICAL EQUALITY

Q9(9). In various countries there is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which one of these five statements is the best in your opinion:

- 1 - owners should run their business or appoint managers
- 2 - owners and employees should cooperate in selecting managers
- 3 - state should be owner and managers should be elected by employees
- 4 - state should be owner and appoint managers
- 5 - employees should own business and select managers
- 99 - missing data

MANAGER HOW BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY SHOULD BE

Q10 (10). In many communities there are conflicts which interfere with effective action to meet community problems. Are there some major conflicts that interfere with getting things done in your community?

- CODES: 1 - yes
 0 - no
 99 - missing data

CONEXIST CONFLICTS INTERFERING WITH EFFECTIVE ACTION

Q11(11). If yes, would you please name one or two?

AVAILABLE AS TEXT FILE

Q12(12). To what extent do these conflicts come in the way of the development of your community?

CODES: 2 - very much

1 - some

0 - not at all or not mentioned

CONFLICT EXTENT CONFLICTS COME IN WAY DEVELOPMENT

Q13(13). To what extent do difference such as the following tend to divide people in your community?

CODES: 2 - very much

1 - somewhat

0 - not at all

99 - missing data

DIFAGE DIFFERENCES - YOUNG AND OLD

DIFEDUC DIFFERENCES - EDUCATION

DIFINCOM DIFFERENCES - INCOME

DIFRELIG DIFFERENCES - RELIGIOUS

DIFPOLV DIFFERENCES - POLITICAL VIEWS

DIFURBRU DIFFERENCES - URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION

DIFWORKM DIFFERENCES - MANAGER AND EMPLOYEE

DIFSOORG DIFFERENCES - SOCIAL ORIGIN

DIFETHN DIFFERENCES - RACIAL AND ETHNICAL ORIGIN

DIFCHOR DIFFERENCES - DESIRING SOCIAL CHANGE AND
OPPOSING IT

TRANSFORMED VARIABLE:

DIFIMP DIFFERENCES - MEAN

Q14(14). Which of the following ways can people best influence decisions:

CODES: 1 - mentioned

0 - not mentioned

PINFVOT PEOPLE INFLUENCE - REFERENDUM VOTING

PINFMEET PEOPLE INFLUENCE - MEETINGS, DEBATES

PINFCOMM PEOPLE INFLUENCE - COMMITTEES

PINFMOV PEOPLE INFLUENCE - MOVEMENTS, GROUPS

PINFPART PEOPLE INFLUENCE - POLITICAL PARTIES

PINFSELF PEOPLE INFLUENCE - LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

PINFTRUN PEOPLE INFLUENCE - TRADE UNIONS
PINFPAEL PEOPLE INFLUENCE - PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
PINFPREL PEOPLE INFLUENCE - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
PINFCONL PEOPLE INFLUENCE - PERSONAL CONTACTS
PINFMED PEOPLE INFLUENCE - USE OF MEDIA

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

PINFEL PEOPLE INFLUENCE - ELECTIONS (PARL. OR PRES.)

PINFCO AVERAGE SCORE OF CONVENTIONAL WAYS
MENTIONED

PINFUNCO AVERAGE SCORE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WAYS
MENTIONED

PINFWAYS NUMBER OF WAYS MENTIONED

Q15(15). Compared to five years ago is the participation of the people in local affairs in your community greater, about the same or less?

CODES: 1 - greater

0 - about the same

-1 - less

99 - missing data

LOPART5Y PARTICIPATION COMPARED TO FIVE YEARS AGO

Q16(*). And looking back to the past, compared to ten years ago, is the participation of the people in local affairs in your community greater, about the same or less?

CODES: 1 - greater

0 - about the same

-1 - less

99 - missing data

LOPART10 PARTICIPATION COMPARED TO 10 YEARS AGO

Q17(17). Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful dealing with people?

CODES: 1 - most people can be trusted

0 - cant be too careful

99 - don't know and missing data

TRUST CAN PEOPLE BE TRUSTED

Q18(16). Is there in your community a way for challenging the decisions of community leaders?

CODES: 1 - yes

0 - no

99 - missing data

CHALLENG CHALLENGE LOCAL DECISIONS POSSIBLE

If yes, in what ways? AVAILABLE AS TEXT FILE

19(*). How important are the following motives for people joining political parties:

CODES: 2 - very important

1 - somewhat important

0 - not important

99 - missing data

PAINF TO GAIN POLITICAL INFLUENCE
PAHELP TO HELP OTHER PEOPLE
PACONV TO WORK FOR PERSONAL CONVICTIONS
PADEV TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
PAEXP TO GAIN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
PAOBL TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS
PAPRES TO CONFORM TO PRESSURES OF OTHERS
PAPROM TO PROMOTE OWN INTERESTS
PASUP TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
PATRAD TO KEEP A FAMILY TRADITION
PAMEET TO GET TO KNOW OTHER PEOPLE

20(*). Are political parties important or unimportant:

CODES: 2 - very important

1 - somewhat important

0 - unimportant

99 - missing data

PAIMPCOU IN OUR COUNTRY
PAIMPCOM IN YOUR COMMUNITY

21(*). How important are political parties for the following:

CODES: 2 - very important

1 - somewhat important

0 - unimportant

99 - missing data

PAIMPCAN RECRUITING CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICES
PAIMPPRO FORMULATING ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS
PAIMPMAJ FORMING MAJORITIES IN BODIES
PAIMPINV INVOLVING PEOPLE IN POLITICS
PAIMPELE COMPETING IN ELECTIONS
PAIMPINT MEETING THE ELECTORATE INTERESTS

Q22(18*). Should national minorities in our country have the right to have their own:

CODES: 1 - yes

0 - no

99 - missing data

MCHURCH RIGHT TO CHURCHES
MSCHOOL RIGHT TO SCHOOLS
MPRESS RIGHT TO PRESS
MREPR RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION IN ELECTED BODIES
MLANGU RIGHT TO OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
MCULT RIGHT TO CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS
MPOL RIGHT TO POLITICAL PARTIES

Q23 (19). On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors:

CODES: 1 - mentioned

0 - not mentioned

DLCRIME NOT AS NEIGHBORS - CRIMINALS
DLRACE NOT AS NEIGHBORS - DIFFERENT RACE
DLLEFT NOT AS NEIGHBORS - LEFTIES
DLDRINK NOT AS NEIGHBORS - ALCOHOLICS
DLRIGHT NOT AS NEIGHBORS - RIGTH WING EXTREMISTS
DLARGE NOT AS NEIGHBORS - LARGE FAMILIES
DLEMOT NOT AS NEIGHBORS - EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE

DLIMMI NOT AS NEIGHBORS - IMMIGRANTS
DLAIDS NOT AS NEIGHBORS - PEOPLE WITH AIDS
DLDRUGS NOT AS NEIGHBORS - DRUG ADDICTS
DLHOMO NOT AS NEIGHBORS - HOMOSEXUALS

Q25(20). Here some different forms of political action that people can take. Please tell, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it:

CODES: 1 - have done
 0 - might do
 -1 - would never do
 99 - missing data

ACTSIGN POLITICAL ACTION - SIGNING A PETITION
ACTBCOTT POLITICAL ACTION - BOYCOTT
ACTDEMON POLITICAL ACTION - DEMONSTRATIONS
ACTSTRIK POLITICAL ACTION - UNOFFICIAL STRIKE
ACTOCCUP POLITICAL ACTION - OCCUPATION
 TRANSFORMED VARIABLE:
ACTIVISM SUM OF POLITICAL ACTIONS
ACTLEGAL SUM OF LEGAL ACTIONS
ACTILLEG SUM OF ILLEGAL ACTIONS

Q26(21). In which of the following groups do you identify?

CODES: 1 - mentioned
 0 - not mentioned

IDENTLOC IDENTIFICATION - LOCALITY
IDENTREG IDENTIFICATION - REGION OF COUNTRY
IDENTCOU IDENTIFICATION - COUNTRY
IDENTCON IDENTIFICATION - CONTINENT
IDENTWOR IDENTIFICATION - WORLD
 TRANSFORMED VARIABLES
IDENTINT IDENTIFICATION ABOVE NATIONAL

Q26a(21a). First choice:

- CODES: 1 - local
 2 - regional
 3 - national
 4 - group of countries
 5 - Europe
 6 - world

IDENTIF1 MOST IDENTIFIED LEVEL

Q27(22). Would you say that the following problems are very serious or no problem at all?

- CODES: 2 - very serious
 1 - somewhat serious
 0 - no problem
 99 - missing data

LOAIR ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM LOCAL - AIR
NATAIR ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM NATIONAL - AIR
WOAIR ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM WORLD - AIR
LODRINK ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM LOCAL - DRINKING WATER
NATDRINK ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM NATIONAL - DRINKING WATER
WODRINK ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM WORLD - DRINKING WATER
LOLAKE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM LOCAL - LAKES RIVERS
NATLAKE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM NATIONAL - LAKES RIVERS
WOLAKE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM WORLD - LAKES RIVERS
LOWASTE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM LOCAL - SOLID WASTE
NATWASTE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM NATIONAL - SOLID WASTE
WOWASTE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM WORLD - SOLID WASTE
LONUCE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM LOCAL - NUCLEAR WASTE
NATNUCE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM NATIONAL - NUCLEAR WASTE
WONUCE ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM WORLD - NUCLEAR WASTE
LOWILD ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM LOCAL - WILD LIFE
NATWILD ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM NATIONAL - WILD LIFE
WOWILD ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM WORLD - WILD LIFE

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

LENVIMP SUM OF ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM - LOCAL LEVEL
WENVIMP SUM OF ENVIRONMENT PROBLEM - WORLD LEVEL

Q28(23). Should your city council be responsive to local initiatives on the following issues:

CODES: 1 - yes

0 - no

99 - missing data

RESGLOBE RESPONS LOCAL INITIATIVE - GLOBAL WARMING
RESVICT RESPONS LOCAL INITIATIVE -HELPING VICTIMS
RESPOPGR RESPONS LOCAL INITIATIVE -POPULATION GROWTH
RESHUNG RESPONS LOCAL INITIATIVE -HUNGER
RESCHER RESPONS LOCAL INITIATIVE -CHERNOBYL
RESECDE RESPONS LOCAL INITIATIVE -WORLD
 ECON.PROBLEMS

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

RESLOCGL NUMBER OF ISSUES MENTIONED

29(*) How important is it for local leaders to help people to understand opportunities and problems in the world:

CODES: 2 - great importance,

1 - somewhat important,

0 - not important

99 -missing data

IMPHELP TO HELP PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND OPPORTUNITIES
 AND PROBLEMS

Q30(24). To what extent do the following have an impact on your community?

CODES: 2 - a great deal

1 - to some extent

0 - not at all

99 - missing data

IMFINV IMPACT COMMUNITY - FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
IMEXPORT IMPACT COMMUNITY - EXPORTS
IMIMPORT IMPACT COMMUNITY - IMPORTS
IMFMED IMPACT COMMUNITY - FOREIGN MEDIA
IMFPOLLU IMPACT COMMUNITY - POLLUTION FROM OTHER
IMFTOUR IMPACT COMMUNITY - FOREIGN TOURISTS
IMFWORK IMPACT COMMUNITY - FOREIGN WORKERS

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES:

IMPACTF IMPACT COM -TOTAL
IMPACFE IMPACT COMMUNITY -TOTAL ECONOMIC
IMPACFP IMPACT COMMUNITY - TOTAL PEOPLE

Q31(*). To what extent should local leaders be responsible for bringing foreign business, trade and tourism to their communities? CODES: 2 - a great deal

1 - to some extent

0 - not at all

99 - missing data

RESPFBUS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING FOREIGN BUSINESS

Q32(27). What countries are the most important to the future of your community?

CODES: 1 - mentioned

0 - not mentioned

COUGERCO GERMANY - IMPORTANCE FOR COMMUNITY
COUJAPCO JAPAN - IMPORTANCE FOR COMMUNITY
COURUSCO RUSSIA - IMPORTANCE FOR COMMUNITY
COUSCO US - IMPORTANCE FOR COMMUNITY
COUNE1CO NEIGHBOR NO.1 - IMPORTANCE FOR COMMUNITY
COUNE2CO NEIGHBOR NO.2 - IMPORTANCE FOR COMMUNITY

TRANSFORMED VARIABLES

COUCOM NUMBER OF COUNTRIES MENTIONED

Q33 (32). What should be the two main goals of this country during the next ten years?

(A)CODES: 1 - maintain order in the nation
 2 - giving people more say in important government decisions
 3 - fighting rising prices
 4 - protecting freedom of speech
 99 - missing data

GOAL1 MAIN GOALS NEXT TEN YEARS-FIRST MENTIONED

GOAL2 MAIN GOALS NEXT TEN YEARS-SECOND MENTIONED

(B)CODES: 1 - mentioned
 0 - not mentioned

GOALORD MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE NATION
GOALPART GIVING PEOPLE MORE SAY
GOALPRIC FIGHTING RISING PRICES
GOALFRSP PROTECTING FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Q34 (33). There is considerable argument concerning the meaning of democracy. What does democracy mean to you? AVAILABLE AS TEXT FILE

34a (*). With which of the following statements do you agree?

- CODES: 1 - our democracy is functioning well
 2 - our democracy is functioning, but has many shortcomings
 3 - our democracy is functioning so badly, that there will be no democracy if this continues

DEMFUNC HOW DEMOCRACY IS FUNCTIONING

Q35 (34). Present position

(A)CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

POSITION PRESENT POSITION

- (B)CODES: 1 - yes
 0 - no
 99 - missing data

POSITPOL POSITION - POLITICAL

POSITADM POSITION - ADMINISTRATIVE

POSITOTH POSITION - OTHER

Q36 (35). How many years (or months) have you held your present position?

- CODES: years
 99 - missing data

YRSPOSIT YEARS PRESENT POSITION

Q37 (36). How many years (or months) have you held a public position?

- CODES: years
 99 - missing data

YRSFIRST YEARS IN PUBLIC POSITION

Q38 (37). Have your father or mother held governmental or political positions?

CODES: 1 - yes

0 - no

99 - missing data

FATHGOV FATHER HOLD POSITION

MOTHGOV MOTHER HOLD POSITION

Q39 (38). Political affiliation/party support

CODES (NATIONS SPECIFIC).

Q40 (39). What has been your principal occupation during your life?

(A)CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

OCCUPAT PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENT

(B)CODES: 1 - professionals, upper class

2 - middle class

3 - working, lower class

99 - missing data

OCCUPATR OCCUPATION - INTERNATIONAL CODE

Q41 (40). What were the principle occupations of your parents?

(A)CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

FOCCUPAT PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION OF FATHER

MOCCUPAT PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION OF MOTHER

(B)CODES: 1 - professionals, upper class

2 - middle class

3 - working, lower class

99 - missing data

FOCCUPR FATHER OCCUPATION - INTERNATIONAL CODE

MOCCUPR MOTHER OCCUPATION - INTERNATIONAL CODE

Q42(41). How many years have you lived in this community?

CODES: years

99 - missing data

RESIDYRS YEARS LIVED IN COMMUNITY

Q43(42). Where you born in this community?

(A)CODES NATION SPECIFIC

BIRTHPL BIRTHPLACE

(B)CODES: 1 - in this community
0 - elsewhere

BIRTHPLR BIRTHPLACE - INTERNATIONAL CODE

Q44(43). How old are you?

CODES: years
99 - missing data

AGE YEARS

Q45 (44). Level of education completed

(A)CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

EDUC EDUCATION LEVEL

(B)CODES: 2 - university
1 - secondary
0 - primary
99 - missing data

EDUCR EDUCATION LEVEL -INTERNATIONAL CODE

Q46 (45). Sex

CODES: 1 - female
0 - male
99 - missing data

SEX MALE OR FEMALE

Q47 (46). Married

(A)CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

MARRIED MARRIED

(B)CODES: 1 - yes
0 - no
99 - missing data

MARRIEDR MARRIED - INTERNATIONAL CODE

Q48 (47). Religious preference

(A)CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

RELIGION RELIGION

(B)CODES: 1 - believer
 0 - nonbeliever
 99 - missing data

RELIGRRELIGION - INTERNATIONAL CODE

Q49 (48). Do you attend church weekly?

(A)CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

RELIGWKY VISITING RATE IN CHURCH

(B)CODES: 1 - regularly
 0 - not regularly
 99 - missing data

RELIGWKR VISITING RATE IN CHURCH - INTERNATIONAL CODE

Q50 (49). Race, nationality

CODES NATIONS SPECIFIC

RACENAT RACE, NATIONALITY

Q51 (50). In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views:

CODES: from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right)
 99 - missing data

POLVIEW LEFT - RIGHT POSITION

The Transformed Variables

The mathematical explanations of the transformed variables follow. The sequence of variables corresponds to the sequence of questions if the international questionnaire and code book. The following abbreviations are used:

recode preduc to prmigr (99=0.1).

count prfreq = preduc to prmigr (0,1,2).

compute primp = (trunc(preduc) + trunc(prjobs) + trunc(prpoor) +
trunc(prhealth) + trunc(prhouse) + trunc(prpublic) +
trunc(prcultur) + trunc(prsafety) + trunc(prwelf) +
trunc(prpollut) + trunc(prmin) + trunc(pecde) +
trunc(prcost) + trunc(prmigr))/prfreq.

count prscope = preduc to prmigr (1,2).

VARIABLE LABELS primp "MEAN IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEMS".

VARIABLE LABELS prscope "NUMBER OF PROBLEMS MENTIONED".

EXECUTE.

recode efeduc to efmigr (99=0.1).

count effreq = efeduc to efmigr (0,1,2).

compute efimp = (trunc(efeduc) + trunc(efjobs) + trunc(efpoor) +
trunc(efhealth) + trunc(efhouse) + trunc(efpublic) +
trunc(efcultu) + trunc(efsafety) + trunc(efwelf) +
trunc(efpollut) + trunc(efrace) + trunc(efecde) +
trunc(efcost) + trunc(efmigr))/effreq.

count efscope = efeduc to efmigr (1,2).

recode preduc to efmigr (0.1=99).

VARIABLE LABELS efimp "MEAN OF EFFECTIVE ACTION".

VARIABLE LABELS efscope "NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE ACTIONS MENTIONED".

EXECUTE.

recode auteduc to autmigr (99=0.1).

count autfreq = auteduc to autmigr (1,0).

compute auttot = (trunc(auteduc) + trunc(autjob) + trunc(autpoor) +
trunc(autheal) + trunc(authous) + trunc(autpub)+

```

trunc(autcult) + trunc(autsafe)
+ trunc(autopoll) + trunc(autwelf) +
trunc(autecde) + trunc(autmigr))/autfreq.
recode auteduc to autmigr (0.1=99).
VARIABLE LABELS auttot "MEAN AUTNOMY".
EXECUTE.

```

```

compute relocgov = (reeduc1g + rejob1g + re poor1g + reheal1g + rehouse1g +
re cult1g + resaf1g + repoll1g + reminol1g + republ1g + reecdel1g)/11.
compute repeople = (reeducp + rejobp + re poorp + rehealp + rehousep +
re cultp + resafp + repollp + reminop + repubp + reecdep)/11.
compute restate = (reeducng + rejobng + re poorng + rehealng + rehouseng +
re cultng + resafng + repollng + reminong + repubng + reecdenng)/11.
compute rengo = (reeducor + rejobor + re pooror + rehealor + rehouseor +
re cultor + resafor + repollor + reminoor + repubor + reecdeor)/11.
VARIABLE LABELS relocgov "RESPONSIBILITY -LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT AVERAGE SCORE".
VARIABLE LABELS repeople "RESPONSIBILITY - PEOPLE AVERAGE
SCORE".
VARIABLE LABELS restate "RESPONSIBILITY - NAT+REG GOVERN-
MENT AVERAGE SCORE".
VARIABLE LABELS rengo "RESPONSIBILITY - ORGANIZATIONS AV-
ERAGE SCORE".
EXECUTE.

```

```

recode infecde to infimmig (99=0.1).
count inffreq = infecde inhouse to infeduc infsafe infwelf infimmig (0,1,2).
compute infimp = (trunc(infecde)+ trunc(inhouse)+
trunc(infpollu)+trunc(infpubli) + trunc(infheal) + trunc(infcultu) +trunc(infeduc)
+ trunc(infsafe) +trunc(infwelf) + trunc(infimmig))/inffreq.
count infscope= infecde inhouse to infeduc infsafe infwelf infimmig (1,2).
recode infecde to infimmig (0.1=99).
VARIABLE LABELS infimp "INFLUENCE - MEAN".
VARIABLE LABELS infscope "INFLUENCE - NUMBER OF AREAS MEN-
TIONED".
EXECUTE.

```

```

count support = suplopar suploele suplomed suphipar suptadm suplopol
suphiadm supbus suptrun suppubli suprelig supneigh supfrien (1).
compute suploc = (suplopar+suploele+suptadm)/3.
compute supnloc = (suphipar+suphiadm)/2.
VARIABLE LABELS suploc "SUPPORT - LOCAL GROUPS AVERAGE
SCORE".
VARIABLE LABELS supnloc "SUPPORT - NON-LOCAL GROUPS AVE-
RAGE SCORE".
VARIABLE LABELS support "SUPPORT - NUMBER OF SUPPORT
GROUPS MENTIONED".
EXECUTE.

```

```

recode core24 core27 core28 core34 ecde4 ecde5 hone149 hone152
part44 part45 part46 part47 part49 capt310 capt311 capt319 poeq313 poeq314
poeq316 poeq317 polr185 polr217 majo301 (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1).

```

```

count confreq = core24 core26 core27 core28 core34 (1,2,3,4).
count ecdefreq = ecde1 ecde2 ecde4 ecde5 ecde6 (1,2,3,4).
count eceqfreq = equal66 equal67 equal68 equal70 equal72 (1,2,3,4).
count honefreq = hone144 hone145 hone149 hone152 hone155 (1,2,3,4).
count locafreq = lona87 lona88 lona89 lona90 (1,2,3,4).
count partfreq = part44 part45 part46 part47 part49 (1,2,3,4).
count captfreq = capt306 capt307 capt310 capt311 capt319 (1,2,3,4).
count minrfreq = majo301 majo303 majo304 majo320 (1,2,3,4).
count poeqfreq = poeq313 poeq314 poeq316 poeq317 (1,2,3,4).
recode ecde1 to poeq316 (1=-10000) (2=-3333) (3=3333) (4=10000).
compute confsum = core24+core26+core27+core28+core34.
compute ecdesum = ecde1+ecde2+ecde4+ecde5+ecde6.
compute eceqsum = equal66+equal67+equal68+equal70+equal72.
compute honesum = hone144+hone145+hone149+hone152+hone155.
compute locasum = lona87+lona88+lona89+lona90.
compute partsum = part44+part45+part46+part47+part49.
compute captsum = capt306+capt307+capt310+capt311+capt319.
compute minrsum = majo301+majo303+majo304+majo320.
compute poeqsum = poeq313+poeq314+poeq316+poeq317.

```

```

compute conf = confsum/confreq.
compute ecde = ecdesum/ecdefreq.
compute eceq = eceqsum/eceqfreq.
compute hone = honsum/honefreq.
compute loca = locasum/locafreq.
compute part = partsum/partfreq.
compute capt = captsum/captfreq.
compute minr = minrsum/minrfreq.
compute poeq = poeqsum/poeqfreq.

```

```

recode ecde1 to poeq316 (-10000=1) (-3333=2) (3333=3) (10000=4).
recode core24 core27 core28 core34 ecde4 ecde5 hone149 hone152
part44 part45 part46 part47 part49 capt310 capt311 capt319 poeq313 poeq314
poeq316 poeq317 polr185 polr217 majo301 (1=4) (2=3) (3=2) (4=1).

```

VALUE LABELS

```

core24 core27 core28 core34 ecde4 ecde5 hone149 hone152
part44 part45 part46 part47 part49 capt310 capt311 capt319 poeq313 poeq314
poeq316 poeq317 polr185 polr217 majo301
1 "strongly disagree"
2 "disagree"
3 "agree"
4 "strongly agree".

```

EXECUTE.

```

recode difage to difchor (99=0.1).
count diffreq = difage to difchor (0,1,2).
compute difimp = (trunc(difage) + trunc(difeduc) + trunc(difincom) +
trunc(difrelig) + trunc(difpolv) + trunc(difurbru) + trunc(difworkm) +
trunc(difsoorg) + trunc(difethn) +
trunc(difchor))/diffreq.
recode difage to difchor (0.1=99).
VARIABLE LABELS difimp "DIFFERENCES - MEAN". EXECUTE.

```

```

compute pinfel = 0.
if (pinfael eq 1) pinfel = 1.

```

```

compute pinfunco = (pinfmeet+pinfcomm+pinfself+pinfcont+pinfmed)/5.
compute pinfco = (pinfvot+pinfmov+pinfpart+pinftrun+pinfel)/5.
count pinfways = pinfvot to pinftrun pinfel pinfcont pinfmed (1).
VARIABLE LABELS pinfco "AVERAGE SCORE OF CONVENTIONAL
WAYS MENTIONED".
VARIABLE LABELS pinfunco "AVERAGE SCORE OF UNCONVEN-
TIONAL WAYS MENTIONED".
VARIABLE LABELS pinfways "NUMBER OF WAYS MENTIONED".
EXECUTE.

```

```

recode actsign actbcott actdemon actstrik actoccup (99=0.1).
compute activism = trunc(actsign) + trunc(actbcott) + trunc(actdemon)
+trunc(actstrik) + trunc(actoccup).
compute actlegal = trunc(actsign) + trunc(actdemon).
compute actilleg = trunc(actstrik) + trunc(actoccup).
recode actsign actbcott actdemon actstrik actoccup (0.1 = 99).
VARIABLE LABELS activism "SUM OF POLITICAL ACTIONS".
VARIABLE LABELS actlegal "SUM OF LEGAL ACTIONS".
VARIABLE LABELS actilleg "SUM OF ILLEGAL ACTIONS".
EXECUTE.

```

```

recode imfinv to imfmed (99=0.1).
count impfefr = imfinv imexport imimport (0,1,2).
count impfpfr = imfmed imfpollu imftour imfwork (0,1,2).
compute impacfe = (trunc(imfinv) + trunc(imexport) +
trunc(imimport))/impfefr.
compute impacfp = (trunc(imfmed) + trunc(imfpollu) + trunc(imftour) +
trunc(imfwork))/impfpfr.
compute impactf = (impacfe*impfefr + impacfp*impfpfr)/(impfefr+impfpfr).
recode imfinv to imfmed (0.1=99).
VARIABLE LABELS impacfe "IMPACT COMMUNITY - TOTAL ECO-
NOMIC".
VARIABLE LABELS impacfp "IMPACT COMMUNITY - TOTAL PEOPLE".
VARIABLE LABELS impactf "IMPACT COMMUNITY - TOTAL".
VARIABLE LABELS coucom "NUMBER OF COUNTRIES MENTIONED".
EXECUTE.

```

E. City Correlations (Extended Analysis of Chapter 10)

Table E 1.

Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Perception of Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the early 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=105 Cities in Belarus, Lithuania, Russia and Sweden)

	1. Years Public Service	2. Hori- zontal Net- works	3. Civic Net- works	4. Values: Conflict/ Plural- ism	5. Values: Partic- ipation	6. Values: Political Equality	7. Foreign Impact: Eco- nomic	8. Foreign Impact: Non- economic
1.	1							
2.	,43	1						
3.	-,12	,46	1					
4.	,10	,74	,49	1				
5.	,33	,86	,44	,87	1			
6.	,15	,83	,53	,91	,93	1		
7.	-25	,29	,36	,65	,39	,56	1	
8.	-07	,45	,40	,62	,49	,60	,67	1

Bold type=Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table E2.

New Democracies only (Belarus, Lithuania, Russia): Correlation between Years in Public Position, Network, Values and Perception of Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Early 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=85 Cities in Belarus, Lithuania, Russia)

	Years in Public Service	Horizontal Networks	Values of Political Equality	Foreign Non- Economic Impact in the Com- munity
Years in Public Service	1			
Horizontal Networks	,43	1		
Values: Political Equality	-,36	-,02	1	
Foreign Non- Eco- nomic Impact	-,30	-,14	,21	1

Bold type=Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table E3.

Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Perception of Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Mid 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=146 Cities in Belarus, Lithuania, The Netherlands and Russia)

	1. Years Public Service	2. Hori- zontal Net- works	3. Civic Net- works	4. Values: Conflict/ Plural- ism	5. Values: Particip- ation	6. Values: Political Equality	7. Foreign Impact: Eco- nomic	8. Foreign Impact: Non- economic
1.	1							
2.	,08	1						
3.	,12	,63	1					
4.	-,18	,66	,65	1				
5.	-,04	,71	,71	,82	1			
6.	-,14	,68	,65	,81	,86	1		
7.	-,34	,29	-,02	,16	-,02	,04	1	
8.	-,07	,25	,21	,30	,22	,26	,40	1

Bold type=Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table E4.

New Democracies only: Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Perception of Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Mid 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=123 Cities in Belarus, Lithuania, Russia)

	Years in Public Service	Horizontal Networks	Values of Political Equality	Foreign Non- Economic Impact in the Com- munity
Years in Public Service	1			
Horizontal Networks	,08	1		
Values: Political Equality	-,31	,08	1	
Foreign Non- Economic Impact	-,12	-,10	,09	1

Bold type=Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table E5.

Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Perception of Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Late 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=128 Cities in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands and Sweden)

	1. Years Public Service	2. Hori- zontal Net- works	3. Civic Net- works	4. Values: Conflict/ Plural- ism	5. Values: Particip- ation	6. Values: Political Equality	7. Foreign Impact: Eco- nomic	8. Foreign Impact: Non- economic
1.	1							
2.	,49	1						
3.	,23	,55	1					
4.	,16	,58	,55	1				
5.	,42	,77	,62	,81	1			
6.	,38	,78	,65	,74	,88	1		
7.	-,22	-,06	-,05	,10	-,02	,04	1	
8.	-,06	,51	,33	,50	,52	,53	,25	1

Bold type=Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table E6.

New Democracies only: Correlation between Years in Public Service, Network, Values and Perception of Foreign Impact among the Elite in a City in the Mid 1990s (Pearson Correlations, N=90 Cities in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).

	Years in Public Service	Horizontal Networks	Values of Political Equality	Foreign Non- Economic Impact in the Com- munity
Years in Public Service	1			
Horizontal Networks	,03	1		
Values: Political Equality	-,42	,02	1	
Foreign Non- Economic Impact	-,16	,17	,14	1

Bold type=Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).