Rainer Koch/John Dixon (eds.)

Public Governance and Leadership

Political and Managerial Problems in Making Public Governance Changes the Driver for Re-Constituting Leadership

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GABLER EDITION WISSENSCHAFT

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Political and Managerial Problems in Making Public Governance Changes the Driver for Re-Constituting Leadership

Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag

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Preface

We are proud to present the following collection of papers on Public Governance and Leadership. The idea behind this book goes back many years. It represents the culmination of a 15-year-long exchange between academics at German, Australian and British universities. Those deliberations inspired us to make Public Governance and Leadership the focus of this collection. Our challenge has been to identify and to bring together a group of internationally well known and renowned scholars to work on a variety of different aspects of this theme. Therefore, our thanks must first go to our contributors, all of whom worked with us to design and produce this compilation as a collective good. This work stands as evidence that very carefully built-up cross-cultural academic social capital can be used as a lever to create what we hope will be a very productive academic result.

As editors we have our creditors. It goes without saying, but nevertheless it must be said, that in bringing a multi-national publication to press requires continuous excellent technical support. Our special thanks go to all the staff members and assistants who worked on this project from the Hamburg Helmut Schmidt University. We especially want to thank Ann-Christine Hasemann, who was most professional in her preparation of the manuscript in close co-operation with all the contributors and with the publisher.

Any academic praise generated by the publication of this collection must be attributed to the efforts of the contributors. We, as editors, must, however, take full responsibility for any academic critiscism regarding the final shape that the book has taken. For any errors of fact and for all opinions and interpretations, both the authors and editors jointly accept responsibility.

Rainer Koch and John Dixon

Hamburg and Plymouth,

March 2007

Contents

4   Changes in Politico-administrative Leadership

X

7 Implementation

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1 Introduction

Rainer Koch/ John Dixon

Introduction: Problems and Questions

The main focus of the following editor collection is to discuss ways and means by which ongoing efforts to modernise the management of state and administration can be driven to higher levels of efficacy.

Currently, nearly all OECD member states have to cope with the challenge to give all the efforts to adapt management of state and administration to globalisation-driven demands to increase efficiency/ effectiveness the now necessary more 'strategic shape'. More specifically, nearly all OECD member states have to cope with the challenge that (in the course of the so-called 'second management reform waves') some more 'strategic guidance' of all still ongoing management reform activities is needed for becoming able to capitalize fully on its overall long-term efficacy-enhancing effects. Therefore, coming from such a rather pragmatic point of view a number of internationally known and renowned scholars and practitioners has been asked to elaborate on the most crucial issue in this regard on how already visible changes in overriding concepts of 'public governance' (the re-positioning of the role and function of state and administration on a society-wide basis) can be, or have been, made a lever to give ongoing processes of modernisation a much-needed stronger strategic shape. From a more substantive point of view the focus will be to elaborate on ways and means as how notably moves towards a re-positioning as an 'enabling authority' (alternatively, an 'ensuring state' or an 'activating state') can be made 'drivers' ('guiding models') for adapting public manage-ment systems across all the levels of government downward to the street level bureaucracy in a more systematic way – and eventually in a more efficient as well as more 'legitimate' or politically 'tolerable way'.

In this respect, one of the most crucial aspect to deal with are the ways and means by which already visible moves to a quite new 'steering logic' (the well known turns towards a more competition- or at least output-driven type of management) can be made the yardstick for adapting leadership patterns across all the various levels downward to the street-level bureaucracies. While this is becoming a relevant subject in its own right - at all tiers or levels from the national political level downward to single peripheral service units at the street-level - the most important focus is on specifying the extent to which such changes in 'public governance' have already a bearing on the 'inherited patterns' of 'personnel leadership' (on the inherited 'logic' of producing and delivering public services at the workplace level or at the interface to the wider citizenry). Therefore, on balance the most central issue will be to discuss positive or negative experiences of getting already given turns in the overall 'steering logic' translated from the whole of

government level into the service delivery routines of the street-level bureaucracies (of the peripheral service delivery units).

To get a rather full picture of all the political as well as managerial implications of a strategically guided process of modernisation the following collection is dealing with respective management design problems across the whole spectrum of different levels of the politico-administrative system:

−   Accordingly, there is a first group of contributions dealing with the extent to which 'governance changes' (in terms of a deliberate 're-positioning' of the role and the function of state and administration vis-à-vis all the other sectors of the society) have already been made deliberately the starting point for purposively designing and implementing management reforms – and, in turn, the starting point for re-constituting leadership (societal leadership) on a society-wide basis. In this regard, one of the first issues of interest is to determine the extent to which these changes (in terms of 'guiding models') are already embodying alternate 'regulatory modes' or 'modes of co-ordination' (in any case different from the classic rule of law model) being rich enough in contents to guide all the subsequent processes of adapting public manage-ment systems in substantive terms. However, a further relevant aspect is to explore the extent to which current concepts of public governance changes have already been successful (against the already given trends towards decentralisation, commercialisa-tion/ competition and partnering or privatisation) in developing proven means for harmonizing the continuous needs to decentralize service delivery with the inherited practices of representative democracies to lend legitimacy to state actions.

−   In the second place, there is a number of contributions focusing on finding out the way in which governance changes are already providing concepts or models as how to re-constitute leadership at the next further down level – on the whole of government level or on the level of politico-administrative leadership. In line with the already given turns of the classic bureaucratic structure of the state apparatus into the overall shape of a rather strategically oriented network configuration, the focus in this regard will clearly be on questions related to how leadership at this level has to be re-designed in terms of a rather strategically-oriented political management (function). The focus then will clearly be on demonstrating as how politico-administrative leadership (or at the whole of government level) has already led to the development of concepts giving (against the already visible trends of decentralisation, commercialisation/ marketisa-tion and contract management) enough scope to de-coupled service delivery units on

the one hand - but also providing means requiring single units to use resources in full support of upper–level political objectives. To address those questions in full the given number of contributions is aiming at covering all the diverse aspects of completely structured 'centre-to-periphery' relations.

– Finally, in terms of a last focus the contributions are circling around questions as to whether overall 'governance changes' have already found access to leadership practices at the workplace level of the street-level bureaucracy. In this regard the contributions are elaborating on the extent to which governance-change driven adaptations in 'public management logic' have already begun to turn inherited input-oriented concepts into some stronger managerial concepts of personnel leadership. Lastly, the focus is (against the given background to turn leadership into systems of individual performance management/ or approaches of contextually guided 'self–management') on discussing pros and cons of current attempts to build up skills, motivation and ethics on the part of civil servants so as to make them perform more strongly in an entrepreneurial fashion – or more analytically speaking to provoke the now necessary 'extra-role' behaviour for delivering public services at the interface to the wider citizenry.

Thus, coming rather from such a pragmatic perspective the view is taken here that a definite strategic approach has to be applied for making sure that management change processes can be driven in a more systematic or coherent and thereby in an overall efficiency–enhancing way. By bringing into play quite a variety of different concepts and experiences there is no doubt that also attempts are made here 'to trace' all the various 'conditions' or 'causes' that give rise to the growing need to adapt 'public governance' . However, what may be counting more here - in following such a pragmatic objective the approach is rather to use comparative knowledge from different fields to sort out 'factors of success' or 'best practices' for deliberately adjusting respective models, processes or regulations in practically relevant terms. Consequently, though there might be quite a mixture of different perspectives at work the prevailing purpose may be to use comparative knowledge from different fields to draw something like 'better practices' on how to bring about more suiting links between 'Public Governance' and 'Public Leadership'. In conclusion, there is the hope that this collection provides the foundation for a 'public sector type' of a 'design-oriented management science'.

Lastly, not to mention that it is not an easy task to bring people from quite different academic disciplines together to let them discuss topical issues of modernising

management of the state and public administration from a comparative perspective. To do so is of cause to bring to the table a very broad range of all the diverse problems and issues involved trying to give public management reforms a more strategic shape. The more negative effects to struggle with in this respect are then clearly that not in any case the contributions asked for are following the overall structure as strictly as desired by the editors. However, from the view of the editors this deficit is more than compensated by the stimulating character of all the single contributions on the other hand. The result, we hope, is a stimulating volume that moves the public sector modernisation discourse forward.

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2   Conceptual Background

Rainer Koch

Public Governance and Leadership: Outline of the Subject

1   Introduction

The following collection of contributions deals with strategic aspects of both design and implementation of large scale modernisations of the management of state and administration. To set the stage for all the further discussions, this introduction aims to outline in terms of a research programme how strategic aspects of that kind have be/ or can be made the subject of analysis from a rather pragmatic perspective. In line with the currently most pressing challenges, this introduction is used to demonstrate how notably ongoing 'governance changes' are to be/ or should be made drivers or starting points to give the whole process of modernising the management of state and administration the now-desired more strategic shape.

As is known from international developments, the relevance of dealing with such a subject clearly goes back to the negative impact an inadequate strategic guidance has had on the design and implementation of large scale modernisation activities so far. There is evidence from a variety of different countries that demonstrate quite clearly how a deficient strategic guidance (or rather a total lack of guidance) has resulted in an inescapable waste or loss of possible efficiency as well as efficacy gains (for a brief account Jann/ Reichard 2003). No doubt, the given story of designing and implementing modernisation activities of a different scale in the Federal Republic of Germany is but one outstanding relevant example. Therefore, coming from these experiences, the attempt is made in the following to reflect requisites and consequences as to how ongoing 'public governance' changes (mostly moves from the inherited definition of a 'welfare-state' to a rather 'enabling authority' understanding) have to/ or should be made drivers for deliberately adapting management processes in state and administration. To control the only most important means and effect relations in this respect, the question is raised as to how 'public governance' changes have to be systematically made the starting point (and have to be used as guiding models) for adapting or reconstituting leadership practices across all levels downwards – from the society-wide level down to the level of single service delivery units. The strategically most relevant question is then as to whether current approaches are proving successful to get changes in the role and function of state and administration at large more or less systematically converted into the then dominant performance criteria at the workplace level of single delivery units. Coming from a rather pragmatic perspective (which also means from a rather design-oriented perspective), the main focus in substantive terms will be to elaborate the way in which purposively set-up

designs can be used as levers to give the whole process the necessary strategic shape and, in turn, the desired extra efficiency- or efficacy-enhancing effects.

To explicate such a research programme, it becomes apparent that the common epistemological criteria/ distinction of the (analytical) philosophy of science are put into operation in the following discussion. Accordingly, the following outline is 1) firstly, going to elaborate the way in which the main subject of this programme – the currently dominant modernisation activities - is posited as a problem worth analysing from a scientific point of view. In this regard, following a rather pragmatic or practical interest of enquiry, it becomes evident that our main subjects (modernisation activities) are going to be posed as practical problems and, thereby, defined and worked on mostly from an efficiency- or efficacy-maximising perspective. Moreover, in line with these criteria, such a programme also aims at specifying analytical concepts with the help of which these problems are to be analysed and eventually brought to a solution. In this regard, it cannot really come as a surprise that 2) in this case rather concepts or approaches from a design-oriented management science are put into operation to attain the capacity to draw practically relevant or proven conclusions from the analysis. Lastly, in a last step this programme attempts to clarify which kind of results (or 'body of knowledge') are to be produced in order to meet its overall objectives. Following a rather pragmatic objective, it 3) nearly goes without saying that instead of developing progressively refined explanations, the construction of (action-oriented) models and, thereby, the creation of knowledge for practical actions or interventions will become the heart of the programme.

2   Problems and Questions

As outlined above, the main subject of the envisaged research program is to deal with current problems in both design and implementation of enduring attempts to modernize the management of state and administration (Jann et al. 2004) from a rather pragmatic point of view and, eventually, from a management science and/ or comparative public administration perspective (Wolf 2003; Goodin 1996; Christensen/ Laegreid 2002).

Therefore, from a substantive point of view, all further discussions will start from current evidence that nearly all the OECD member states are currently requested (notably in terms of so called 'second management reform waves') to bring about some further systematic extensions of an albeit started but not yet accomplished management change to become

able to capitalize on its overall long-term efficacy-enhancing effects in full (Koch 2003; Reichard 2001). Making 'management change' problems of that sort the starting point of our discussions, it is evident that, also in our case, the view is taken that all the well-known forces of globalisation have already clearly resulted in some basic (typically NPM-driven) attempts to modernise management of state and administration (especially into a transition of 'public governance', in terms of a deliberate repositioning of state and administration in relation to the wider society - alongside changes in 'management', defined in terms of structures as well as processes suitable to produce services relevant in this regard) (Pollit/ Bouckaert 2000; Bovaird/ Löffler 2003; Klenk/ Nullmeier 2004). In view of the given scale of these changes, notably attempts become relevant here as to how to make use of 'paradigm switches' to realign the management of state and administration with the drastically increased demands to improve technical as well as allocative efficiency as engendered by the enduring forces of globalisation. Consequently, in line with these changes, a first focus of all the discussions will definitely be on the way in which an envisaged repositioning of the state as a rather 'enabling authority' (being more focused on 'ensuring' rather than 'producing' public services (Deakin/ Walsh 1996; Clarke/ Newman 1997; Rhodes 1997; Schuppert 2005) is being made the main lever to constitute a paradigm switch in the management of state and administration – thereby, not only leading to a remarkable diversification in the basic modes of 'coordination' at large, but also introducing a somewhat more pluralized/ differentiated set of criteria against which services have to be produced or delivered from now on (Australian Journal of Public Administration 2002).

In this respect, from an international comparative perspective, it can easily be demonstrated how the inherited role and function of state and administration (by also being accompanied by a new approach to allocate functions and responsibilities amongst the public and the private sector on a society-wide scale) to operate as an uncontested vertically highly integrated monopoly of producing and delivering welfare services is at least gradually fading away – or coming to an end (Considine 2001; Lane 2000; Hughes 1998; Koch 1996). On the contrary, instead of assuming full responsibility for all the social as well as economic wellbeing there is growing evidence that the function of state and administration is becoming ever more confined to organizing the best possible choices of organizational forms to produce and to deliver public services from a continuously expanding spectrum ranging from classic public bureaucracy forms to some private sector forms or to a mix of both (Wilkins 2003; OECD 2002). Accordingly, comparative knowledge is telling us that already some basic attempts have been underway for a fairly long time to move the inherited structure of the state apparatus from that of a highly

vertically integrated monopoly to that of a loosely coupled network structure to provide state and administration with the necessary structural flexibility to get these choice processes organized most efficiently. Therefore, parallel to wider attempts to strengthen capabilities of self-regulation on the part of the civil society (Priddat 2006a), measures are being taken to decouple service delivery units from the presently more strategically-oriented political centres, to replace hierarchy by some more contract-driven purchaser-provider relations, and lastly to expose service delivery more systematically to competition to attain the necessary flexibilities so that in the course of service delivery, deliberate choices can be made in favour of the most productive systems of service delivery available either in state or society so far (Walsh 1995). Though, there may still be some diversity (analytically speaking 'country-specific path-dependency') involved in carrying out such a paradigm switch, it cannot be denied that this opening in favour of a wider spectrum of 'service delivery systems' (going across all the well-known differentiations from 'in-house' to 'partnering' and 'outsourcing') is clearly improving chances to produce and to deliver public services at the now-desired higher levels of technical as well as allocative efficiency (Budäus 1998). In conclusion, this discussion takes the view that all the present attempts to reposition state and administration within the wider societal context are already definitely going together with adapting basic 'modes of coordination' in the course of producing and delivering public services – resulting first in a move from the inherited bureaucratic type of service delivery to the use of a rather highly diversified set of different 'institutional arrangements', and, thereby, already putting a strong focus on running competitive tenders amongst a mix of differently constituted service providers (Halligan 1998; Wegener 2002).

However, making fundamental processes to modernise the management of state and administration the heart of all discussions, the most crucial aspect at all will be to deal with change processes which certainly may already have been underway for a long time but which have not yet resulted into the setting-up of new management regimes in terms of 'fully fledged models'. On the contrary, relying on the international state of affairs relevant in this regard, there is rather the impression that change activities of this sort have so far mainly been aiming at replacing the inherited basic 'regulatory model' or 'mode of co-ordination' – at replacing the traditional bureaucratic rule-driven type by some sort of a competition or even market-type of public service delivery (even though this again is apparently happening in a rather irreversible way because, in general, notably macro-structural changes – such as the introduction of purchaser-provider splits - have been used to get these core elements of a competition-driven type of contract management put securely in place) (Ferlie/ Fitzgerald 2002). Therefore, even from an international

perspective, there can be no doubt that all these changes have already reached the quality of a paradigm switch, on the one hand, and, consequently, are already requesting all the diverse peripheral service delivery units (whether the Executive Agencies from the UK, the bulk of Crown Entities from NZ or the Australian type of a semi-autonomous Statutory Authority) to meet continuously growing efficiency demands resulting from an intensified internal or external competition in service delivery (Löffler 2003a; Self 1993, p. 156). However, on the other hand, it also holds true that all those first basic moves in adapting the management of state and administration still clearly have to be converted into a full management system change (giving these first moves the shape of 'fully fledged models') before benefits at the highest levels possible can be expected. Having pointed all this out, it does not come as a surprise that nearly all the countries of the wider OECD member state family are, in the meantime, more than anxious to get the already achieved implementation of some 'core' elements complemented by all the other structures or processes of a then fully fledged decentralised as well as competition-driven type of contract management (Scott et al. 1999; Scott 2001, p. 37; Schick 1996).

Accordingly, after having already managed to implement first basic macro-structural changes (especially having already succeeded in replacing highly vertically integrated departmental structures by some sort of purchaser-provider splits), all these upcoming 'second waves' in modernising the management of state and administration are clearly rather directed at systematically readjusting all the other sub-functions of managing service delivery – such as the shaping of micro-organisational structures, the management of budgets and financial resources and – not to be ignored – inherited concepts or systems of managing human resources (Matheson/ Kwon 2003; Ingraham et al. 2003, p. 13; Koch 2004b; Reichard 2003). Pursuing a rather practical research interest already in principle, it cannot be denied that under these circumstances the focus of this research programme has clearly to be on specifying ways and means as to how current changes in 'public governance' concepts have already been/ or are to be made use of as levers to give the now advancing steps of modernisation the needed stronger strategic (and, thereby, also efficiency–enhancing) shape. Due to its overriding impact on the quality of management change processes, in a further step it also seems worth putting the focus even more narrowly on specifying as to whether current shifts in 'public governance' concepts (consequently also shifts towards an 'enabling authority' understanding) have already been/ or should be made drivers ('guiding models') for systematically adapting leadership practices across all the levels down to the street-level bureaucracy or, in brief, as to whether new forms of realigning 'public governance' with 'leadership' have been brought about (Broussine 2003; Löffler 2003b).

Since the overall purpose of current modernisation activities is to benefit in full from an implementation of a more competition- or even market-driven type of management, the most pressing or worthwhile issue of inquiry in this respect seems to be to figure out the extent to which rearrangements of leadership practices have already proven successful in converting changes in the 'steering logic' at the system level - namely moves towards a stronger competition– or output-driven type of management - into the now dominant 'logic' of producing and delivering services at the workplace level. Though, there might be also a need to deal with such a subject matter (with such a crucial relationship) across the full range of all the various management levels – in particular moving down from the whole of government level to that of single service delivery units - the main focus here will rather be on elaborating the extent to which concepts of personnel leadership have already been adjusted in a way that requirements of a continuously intensified (internal or external) 'marketization' (or at least a growing mix of different performance criteria) can be made core criteria at the interactive or even individual level of producing and delivering public services. In more substantive terms, in line with currently given developments, the focus will be on exploring as to whether notably moves to some entrepreneurial-type approaches of personnel leadership have already proven successful in generating the skills and motivation (as well as ethics) on the part of civil servants necessary for delivering services in the desired output-oriented manner (Brüggemeier/ Röber 2003; Wagner 1998). Though being fully aware of possible mediating effects of different forms or norms of an 'institutional embeddedness', it lastly all comes down to the question as to whether 'governance changes' have already led to remarkable changes in service delivery modes at the interface to the wider citizenry.

Therefore, making 'management change completion problems' of this sort (problems to align 'core elements' with some further sub-functions in an efficiency-enhancing way) the main subject of inquiry, it is becoming more than apparent that at the end of the day the final concern will clearly be to produce knowledge to draw something like 'better practices' for driving management changes to its full capacity – or more specifically for bringing about better adjusted links between 'public governance' and 'leadership'. As will be seen, following such a track, the focus of such a programme will be to find out as to whether, in particular, growing moves toward using concepts of a mere contextually guided 'self-management' can prove powerful enough to cope with some basically new leadership demands (Moldaschl 2002; Koch 2004b). In line with current challenges, it is to find out the extent to which such a concept of a strongly decentralised entrepreneurial-type resource management is already producing skills and motivation on the part of civil servants effective enough to meet the growing efficiency demands of an increasingly

competitively structured task environment. By way of following such a more focused question of enquiry there is no doubt that such an analysis will have to deal with/ to encounter a variety of 'paradoxes' as well as 'contradictions' (most notably with the orthodox understanding of the public sector as the non-market sector). However, such a more focused approach may already become justified because all the 'rationalisations' (or in other terms, restructuring) considered necessary in this context definitely do not fall due just by accident or by a scarcity of resources of an only short-term relevance (Emery/ Giauque 2005).

3   Theoretical Concepts

Following the requirements of a philosophy of science approach, some further concept-building measures are necessary before our practical problem of inquiry can be analysed in a fruitful or productive way (lastly also in a methodologically adequately controllable way). More precisely, from such a meta-theoretical point of view, a theoretical concept is needed explicating already upfront (in terms of a set of variables and connectives) as to how management change processes have to be analysed in order to produce proven assumptions for an improved strategic guidance. Therefore, in short, a concept is needed giving instructions as on how to identify thematically relevant attributes and how to carry out operations amongst them allowing for drawing recommendations.

Given the current streams of discussion, it is more than apparent that at least basically a rather wide spectrum of concepts ranging from empirical-analytical approaches, on the one hand, to the more functional as well as constructivist/ interpretative approaches, on the other hand, comes into play at this point. Accordingly, given the mainstream of current discussions, there can be no doubt that, at least in principle, concepts such as 'governance research', 'Neo-Institutionalism' (including a strong 'micro-political' stand) as well as 'Institutional Economics' may provide suitable perspectives for rephrasing our practically put-forward 'completion problematic' in terms of an epistemologically productive concept of inquiry (giving the conceptual premises for deriving assumptions on how to define as well as to solve these problems in a systematic way (Witt 1995; Schmid/ Maurer 2003; Benz 2004). Consequently, putting these concepts into operation the (in practical terms defined) 'management completion problem' might surely be rephrased from quite a variety of views. For example, as a problem as to how to change the set of some basic 'modes of coordination' on a society-wide scale in a politically

legitimate way or – in referring to the 'mimetic isomorphism' assumption - as a norm-driven process of imitating 'successful' solutions from some foregoing experiences or lastly as a process of making choices among some basic 'institutional arrangements' in the pursuit of minimizing transaction costs. Not to forget, that only recently the various strongly normatively grounded stipulations of the 'good governance' approach – reflecting mostly 'best practices' of running a western type of parliamentary democracy so to speak – have gained remarkable prominence in this regard. However, without necessarily leaving all these alternative approaches aside, the proposal is made here to rephrase the practical problem of completing a started management change from the pragmatic or functional view of a strongly design-oriented management science or comparative public administration perspective (Henselek 1996; Galbraith 2002).

Therefore, coming from such a design-oriented perspective, this outline is also starting from the assumption that (along with the classic 'planning' postulate) a deliberate planning and implementation of optimized organisational designs , at least in principle, operates as a device to produce superior effects in running large-scale management changes. Accordingly, in line with some topical arguments from design-oriented management theories (especially from contingency theory and configuration theory), the practical problem of inquiry is then already, in principle, rephrased from the assumption that at least some systematic alignments or linkages between 'core elements' and further 'peripheral elements' seem to be necessary to generate the expected 'surplus' (or the extra efficiency-enhancing effects) of a deliberately generated and driven management change process (Delery/ Doty 1996; Meyer/ Tsui/ Hinnings 1993). Moreover, following such a design perspective, there is not only the view that (in contrast to alternative approaches) predominantly some sort of holistic planning activities fall due in driving management changes. On the contrary, following such a track, the stand is also taken that some definite criteria have to be brought in here for designing respective links. Therefore, in specifying the concept of inquiry, this outline also favours the rather 'classic' or 'orthodox' view that connecting changes in 'public governance' to changes in 'leadership' designs or linkages being congruous with the basic model or vision of management change are always needed (Remer 2001).

This approach to use design-oriented management science to rephrase the practical problem (the problem as how to complete management changes) then, also in our case, leads to the assumption that (similar to the 'outside-in'-prescription of strategic management) rather linear or one-sided 'model- or vision-driven adjustments' of leadership concepts have to be carried out in order to reap the benefit of a guided management

change process in full. In this context, it has not been forgotten that the pros and cons of quite different strategic approaches relevant here (notably those of a 'market-based view' and that of a 'resource-based view') have already been a matter of fierce debate for a long time. Nonetheless, in light of the specificities of the public sector, the rather narrowly defined criterion is put into operation here as to whether preceding 'public governance' changes (including also envisaged changes in the relationship between the public and the private sector on a society-wide scale) can or will be made the starting point for the design and implementation of large-scale management changes. Consequently, in pursuing such a design or planning perspective, the focus will not be so much on exploring recent opportunistic practices of politics to use the language of models or visions for solely symbolic or discursive reasons – lastly, for leveraging the legitimacy of state and administrative action. Following a design-oriented conceptualisation, the concern will rather be to find out whether models or visions applied in the course of management change processes (vision such as that of an 'enabling authority') provide prescriptive information instructive enough to be used to (re-) constitute leadership across all the different analytical levels – from the societal level down to the street-level bureaucracy - in an always strategically consistent and, thereby, efficiency-enhancing manner as well (Koch/ Conrad 2004; Barzelay 2002; Reichard/ Schuppau 2002).

Falling back on design-oriented approaches of management science, such a concept then firstly presents a clear cut analytical framework as to how our practical research problem is to be addressed from a pragmatic objective of inquiry. In this context, it is especially the introduced postulate to design and to set up internally consistent management configurations which is supposed to constitute the wider framework to analyse the posited practical problem under a pragmatic heading. Strictly speaking, in relying on common variants from 'contingency theory' and 'configuration theory' (or even from 'best-practice research') in this regard, nothing other than a set of some very widely established formal criteria is proposed as the drivers of such an inquiry. Though this certainly still has to be filled up with some more substantive arguments (or is even required to calculate 'trade-offs' between a multiplicity of different criteria) also in this case requirements such as to establish 'system-environment-fits' or – even more worth noting in this context – calls to achieve 'ideal-type-like' or 'model-type-like consistencies' (amongst the expression of a plurality of organisational attributes or design variables) may have to become central concerns in bringing governance changes together with questions of management (or leadership) development from a strategic perspective. In this regard, it is true that, at least basically, no further substantive criteria/ arguments in itself (for example, no all-embracing social theory) but only a formal framework is here made a primer for

organising strategically-oriented management design processes (making also a rather narrowly defined efficacy- or utility-maximization perspective the ultimate objective). However, falling back on concept-building methods from management sciences in this way, does not mean altogether that no further proposals or templates of a more substantive (or even innovative) nature can be brought in here to realign structures or processes to new challenges. Therefore, it is definitely not out of question that (in addition to the well-known classic 'archetypes' of organisational structuring) also some more topical concepts or models from the wider field of management sciences will be referred to for settling design problems in the public sector (Picot/ Reichwald/ Wigand 2003). As a matter of fact, a larger number of concepts from management sciences – such as network management, modularisation, virtualisation or deborderings of customer-related service delivery pro-cesses – is already becoming an issue when attempts are made to generate proposals for advancing management change by following the typical rational or constructivist design approach.

However, making conceptual borrowing from the wider family of management science approaches does not mean immediately that the view is also taken that the rising demand for suitable or even innovative designs can simply be met by way of logical thinking or implementing transfers. On the contrary, from a methodological point of view the stand is rather taken here that 'innovations' may definitely also result from practical experience or more precisely from deliberately created experimental knowledge. Following this methodological stand, it is also assumed that suitable or proven solutions can or are emerging from a mix of experimental applications and some sort of creative thinking. Therefore, it is no surprise that current attempts to produce some more efficient designs for the public sector do not so much aim any longer at directly transferring 'institutional arrangements' e.g., from the private sector the public sector; as it is becoming apparent with concepts such as the 'Managed Market' or 'Regulated Self-Regulations' (Ferlie et al. 1996; Schuppert 2005) rather the attempt is made to seek for optimized applications by slightly adjusting or varying structural components of the genuine model variant or master plan. Since no ideals of natural science are made mandatory in this regard (rather the opposite - that there is room for deliberate social action), it is not required from the view of this concept that recommendations have, in any case, to be validated in terms of fully empirically confirmed generalisations or causal assumptions. Nonetheless, from a methodological point of view, it is required here that those recommendations should at least be able to claim an adequate degree of "plausibility" – either by exhibiting an ade-quate intrinsically given "operative logic" or even better by demonstrating a "better practice" in empirical or comparative terms (Koch 2004b, p. 4). To take such a stand,

there will be once the chance to get access to the wide variety of practical experiences from quite different quarters or fields (may be also already in the shape of an increasingly converging trend). On the other hand, pursuing such a fact-based or empirical orientation will clearly open up the opportunity to submit prescriptive or normative assumptions of design theory to a continuously critical debate.

4   Subjects of enquiry/ Topics of discussion

In line with this conceptualisation, the introduced research programme (in terms of single subjects) is clearly holding to deal with the way in which the overall repositioning of the state as an 'enabling authority' (together with corresponding shifts towards a stronger competition-driven contract management) is posing challenges to get 'leadership' adapted to the demands of basically changing 'steering requirements'. Since we are presupposing some sort of a paradigm shift (or sort of a system-wide change) in this regard, it is evident that our basic object of enquiry as to how to define as well as how to cope with these new challenges has to be addressed across the full range of different analytical levels – walking down from the macro- to the micro-level of the overall configuration of state and administration.

4.1   Subjects at the Societal level

Accordingly, starting from the macro-level, the first issue to deal with will be to find ways and means as to how to put in place 'leadership' (in terms of 'society-wide or national leadership') in relation to the introduction of quite a new model or vision of the role and function of state and administration vis-à-vis all the other sectors of society (Klenk/ Nullmeier 2004; Keating/ Weller 2001). Coming from a design-oriented perspective, the issue then will be to find out in targeting the international development the extent to which single countries have already been successful (under the contingencies of pluralistic democracies with differentiated market economies) in coping with the various reper-cussions of globalisation by means of introducing some new strategically relevant models or visions of state activities – notably models or visions not only suited for indicating a range of now fitting proven problem-solving techniques, but also inspiring enough to mobilise sufficient political support/ consent on the part of the electorate or citizenry.

From a normative-pragmatic point of view, the first aspect relevant in this regard is surely as to whether respective 'governance changes' (conceptually fuelled by some general 'political theories' or 'social theories') are proving to be rich enough in content to give the whole process of revamping the management of state and administration the needed stronger strategic guidance. Accordingly, it is to be critically assessed here as to whether concepts currently taken into consideration in this regard (models such as the 'enabling authority' model, the 'smart state' or 'contract state' model as well as the 'activating state' concept (Boston 1995; Kouzmin/ Dixon 2003; Schuppert 2004)) are truly exhibiting system-wide relevant 'regulatory modes' or 'management logics' suited in substantive terms to overcome service delivery deficiencies of the highly vertically integrated welfare state apparatus. Since a constructivist design-perspective is followed here, the case in point is again whether these model-drawn 'regulatory modes' or 'management logics' are in themselves instructive enough (displaying prescriptive information adequately) to get all the diverse devices of a fully developed management cycle (from organisational structuring to the management of human resources) adjusted in a congruous way – across all the levels down to the 'street-level bureaucracy'. As far as moves towards an 'enabling authority' or an 'ensuring-state' understanding (and in turn frequent switches between public and non-public or private service providers) are favoured here, it is nothing but consequent that questions as how to make use of regulatory modes such as 'competition' and/ or 'marketization' have been a prominent focus of research for long. However, due to some more recent practical experiences relevant in this regard research is now going to focus more strongly on dealing with modes such as 'partnering' and 'self-regulation' or even with forms of citizenry generated 'associations'.

As far as repercussions of 'public governance changes' on leadership issues are discussed from a society view, the emphasis of this programme is clearly not only on specifying the capacities of single model-driven changes for initiating strategically guided transformations of management systems on a system-wide scale. On the contrary, being embedded in the 'institutional' and/ or 'cultural settings' of the western representative type of parliamentary government, the focus is also to find out the extent to which the models discussed are already presenting ways and means as to how to design and guide a comprehensive process of modernisation in a balanced technically-efficient as well as politically tolerable or legitimate way. Thus, from the view of the normative requirements of representative or parliamentary democracies, reconstituting leadership is clearly not only restricted to adapt 'regulatory modes' or basic 'management logics' to the globalisation-driven demand to achieve higher levels of efficiency in resource consumption; in this respect, rather questions are at stake now as to whether 'governance changes' know (implicitly or

explicitly) how to offer means for getting decision-making implications of changing 'regulatory modes' or 'management logics' dovetailed with the hitherto given (so-called macro-political) modes of representative democracies (or of party government) to lend legitimacy to state and administrative actions - especially with the requirement to run general elections, to pass laws by parliament, and to have politically appointed executives (Etzioni 1975). In this regard, it is true that leadership-related issues of this sort may already have become relevant in that nearly all currently discussed 'governance change concepts' (the popular 'ensuring state' concept included) are also considering sometimes rather far-reaching societal reconstructions or renewals (even reallocations of power amongst the public sector and the civic society at large) necessary to implement 'management changes' smoothly.

However, for the time being, it has become a rather salient topic of discussion as how to get the already for long ongoing processes of decentralisation, fragmentation as well as self-regulation or network-bound co-production more neatly (re-) aligned or balanced again with the inherited formal forms or procedures of legitimacy – or consent-building (or simple questions of democratic accountability). As with the 'good governance' concepts, this may already have resulted in introducing some very distinct normative standards (such as openness or transparency) to reconstitute democratic government at large (Hill 2006). More specifically, the intent in this regard is rather to look for ways and means to allow further decentralisation without necessarily violating inherited norms of representative government. As is well known, to compensate for potential losses of a centrally legitimised political guidance (or even to prevent a further 'hollowing-out'), there is first the approach already for long to devolve power to some more regionally or locally based authorities (Rhodes 1997). However, a more recent variant in this regard is the attempt to make more extensive use of various cooperative or self-organising capabilities of the 'civil society' (notably in terms of stakeholder- or community-based forms of interest representation) for information-processing purposes but also to lend legitimacy to state action (Priddat 2006b). In line with the already given complexity now (typically public-choice grounded) approaches are gaining prominence making a stand to grant politics the freedom to fall back on a mix of quite diverse forms of consent-building (especially on a varying set of public as well as non-public or corporatist modes of 1st and 2nd order democracies) in a way which allows general mandates from the electorate (so-called incomplete contracts) to be converted into concrete policies at minimal 'transaction costs'. In contrast to this, there are also some more substantive approaches (such as a Public Value Management approach) underway to deal with leadership issues requiring political leadership to be reconstituted by getting managed outputs or outcomes

more strongly related again to the effects politics would like to achieve on the part of the citizenry in terms of a targeted 'public value creation' (Smith 2004).

In conclusion, from a normative point one of the most challenging aspects in this regard will be once again to explore the extent to which 'public governance' changes are already successful in striking a new balance (and at which 'trade-offs') between continuous needs to decentralise service delivery and the still given requirements of parliamentary democracies to ground political leadership on system-wide or collective forms of legitimacy building (Bovaird 2005).

4.2   Subjects at the whole of Government Level

Moving down the various analytical levels, there is no doubt that leadership problems (now in terms of 'political leadership' or in more specific terms 'politico-administrative leadership') also have to be addressed from a government and administration angle in a further step.

From a design-oriented perspective, there is a first important point that already ongoing governance changes (especially stronger turns to an 'enabling authority' or to an 'ensuring state' understanding) have in themselves resulted in some rather fundamental changes in the structures and process of producing and delivering public services at the whole of government level (of the macro-organisational structure). As is already well known, it has become obvious in this regard that, in the wake of ongoing governance changes, design-oriented relevant prescriptions from a number of institutional economics approaches (especially from principal-agent concepts) have been adopted to give the overall macro-structure of producing and delivering services the needed stronger efficiency-enhancing shape (Boston 1966). Though this all is happening in the wider institutional and cultural setting of representative or parliamentary democracies, it needs to be taken into account here that accordingly the overall structure has already – also in terms of a generally converging trend – become largely converted from the inherited (strongly welfare-state-shaped) bureaucratic or hierarchically integrated state apparatus into that of a strategic network configuration or organisation (for varying definitions and understandings see Rhodes 1997, p. 51), thereby not very different from the M-form type of a private sector corporation making a strongly de-coupled as well as highly decentralised system the structural framework to produce and deliver public services (Bishop/ Connors/ Sampford 2003; Kavanagh/ Richards 2001, p. 7). Against such a changing framework, it is evident

that the rather classic bureaucratic types of leadership – the command- and control approaches of bridging the politics-administration divide – are becoming increasingly obsolete. On the contrary, it is well known from design theory that now concepts or approaches are needed that are able to (re-) constitute 'political or administrative leadership' in terms of 'a steering-at-a-distance'(or, in other terms, in a way that different choices from a wider spectrum of differently constituted service delivery systems can be made).

Against this background, dealing with leadership questions from a government level point of view, all approaches are relevant here which aim to reconstitute leadership (traditionally termed as 'leading-from-the-front') according to the structures and processes of a strategic network configuration. Starting from a network configuration model, the concept to rebuild leadership from the peak (from a central agency or departmental perspective) in substantive terms emanates from all the other concomitantly implemented activities to set up a renewed overall macro-structure by further decoupling a decentralised periphery of service units (notably as so-called agencies), by replacing hierarchical relations through purchaser-provider splits and, lastly, by exposing service delivery to competitive processes of task fulfilment to a continuously growing extent (Bishop/ Connors/ Sampford 2003; Kavanagh/ Richard 2001, p. 7). Since the overall 'logic' of strategic network arrangements is becoming mandatory for rebuilding purposes, the most urgent problem to be addressed and solved in organisational terms (which is not very distinct from the situation of the M-form type of private corporations) is how to make leadership an agent for leveraging best possible effects from a now decentralised or even partly competitive mode of public service delivery. In this regard, it is true that a variety of different models for reshaping 'centre-to-periphery performance relations' (ranging from some more integrated to some more devolved ones) have already become a matter of either thorough conceptual debate or even of some practical tests (Halligan 2006). However, as far as the organisational 'logics' of network arrangements come into play here (as with the majority of the Anglo-Saxon countries), there is no debate that further adjustments (or refinements) fall due to establish leadership (similar with a controlling over-layer) in terms of stronger moves to a strategic or political management type of leadership.

Quite in line with the overall governance changes (notably in accordance with the 'enabling authority' concepts and its variants of an 'ensuring state 'or an 'activating' and 'smart state'), all attempts become relevant here to turn the inherited bureaucratic or integrated hierarchical model (with its 'command-and-control' policy style (Christensen/ Laegreid 2006, pp. 8-49)) into the wider organisational as well as instrumental setting of a

strategically guided contract management. Thus, also from a wider international comparative perspective, reform approaches are becoming relevant that are directed at optimizing capacities on the part of political centres to make negotiated contracts/ agreements (as bundles of property rights and financial resources) a major lever to get public services delivered from a periphery of differently constituted and mixed service providers (Considine 2006, p. 175). In this regard, concurrent attempts to step up strategic policy capacities on the part of political centres (as with the various policy redesigns of the British government) have, firstly, already brought to light that ongoing governance and management changes do not necessarily have to end up in the 'hollowing-out' of the state, but may also result in some resurrections of political centres and central agencies (e.g., Cabinet Offices or Prime Minister's Departments) as major political actors. Secondly, from all these first moves, it is also becoming evident that ongoing changes towards a more strategically oriented political management are not simply confined to strengthening the longer-term or goal-oriented character, but are also directed at optimizing available "delivery chains" or "policy distribution systems" at large (as multi-staged principal-agent relations) (Richards/ Smith 2006, p. 181). In this regard, especially the various 'implementation and delivery units' at cabinet level have already become prominent for being in charge of delivery implications in a systematic way upfront (Halligan 2005, p 28). Consequently, in line with overall governance changes, some broader leadership competences or political management competences are at stake here to provide best possible options from a "floated choice structure" (Priddat 2006b, S. 151) in terms of quite differently shaped 'distribution channels' – thereby, making flexible com-binations of different types of contracts, differently structured public and non-public (non-governmental) organisations as well as different modes of regulation a matter of deliberate choice. In responding to these demands, it is not simply to accrue power at the centres more extensively again, but rather to increase knowledge as to how to make use of given monitoring and coordination potentials more intelligently.

Since leadership is to be focused on dealing with basic 'choice activities' in this way, there is no doubt that optimization problems of a decentralised form of service delivery (or more precisely, of centre-periphery relations) will stay central to design activities in the foreseeable future. Therefore, as prominently explicated by institutional economics approaches, it will remain a central issue to explore the ways and means to provide adequate scope to the decentralised service periphery, on the one hand, but also to require single service units to use delegated property rights (notably financial resources) in full support of upper-level (political) objectives on the other hand – or, in more technical terms, to bring latent negative side effects such as aberrant or 'opportunistic' behaviour

under control. (Theuvsen 2001, p. 81; Williamson 1996, p. 68). Consequently, from such a design-oriented perspective, all these manifold adjustments will be at the heart of our discussions to give the design as well as the implementation of policies the stronger vertically as well as horizontally integrated or consistent character demanded. What counts here from an international perspective are approaches such as a stronger move to some more strategically oriented 'joined-up policies', the mushrooming attempts to set up new types of multi-staged 'principal-agent-relations' in the shape of an increasing number of regulatory commissions or also the move to apply 'zoning'-approaches or 'service level agreements' more profoundly to improve lateral modes of 'self-coordination' (Flinders 2004; Gains 2004). Yet, as the full structuring of 'distribution systems' becomes top of the agenda, international developments (especially in conjunction with experiences from the 'Beacon Scheme' as well as from the 'Best Value'-programmes) may tell us once again to have a closer look at the ways in which so-called multi-level systems of 'performance management' prove successful in making full use of the advantages of a decentralised production and delivery of public services (Boyne et al. 2002; James 2004). Therefore, without neglecting alternative approaches, it is to find out in particular why methods of 'relational contracting' and, thereby, using 'goal-setting processes' as well as retainable self-generated 'budgetary surplus' for monitoring purposes seem to work best in reaping the benefit from decentralising production and delivery of services. In this context, from the design perspective followed here, it will prove worthwhile not only to explore the positive effects of some softer regulatory devices, such as relational contracting, partnerships, and even trust for monitoring purposes, but also, if necessary, to make the positive effects of the restricted, but nonetheless necessary non-public forms of interest representation (the so-called stakeholder forms ranging from communication through consultation to co-production) available for legitimacy building purposes (Martin 2003; Bougumil 2003).

4.3   Subjects at the Organisational and Individual level

According to our own concept of enquiry, this all comes down to our major concern as to whether current activities to reposition the function and role of the state and administration as an 'enabling authority' (alongside basic moves to introduce a more competition-driven type of contract management) have already been made the yardstick for adapting leadership, in terms of both organisational leadership and concepts of individual or personnel leadership.

In this respect, the focus firstly will clearly be on the extent to which measures to break down classical hierarchical arrangements into a varying number of (internal) 'purchaser-provider splits' (by decoupling peripheral delivery functions from functions of political guidance at the centres) have already gone along with giving single peripheral service delivery units a more 'competitive shape' (Brüggemeier/ Röber 2003; Beyer 2000). Accordingly, the well-known experiences from international developments will become an issue to use, in particular the agency-type design of a post-bureaucratic organisation for positioning single peripheral service delivery units as 'efficient players' within a continuously growing competitive environment (James 2003; Pollit/ Talbot 2004). In this regard, firstly a closer look will be at how an agency-type set-up of organisational leadership structures provides proven techniques to strengthen a somewhat more entrepreneurial type of performance behaviour and, in turn, a stronger orientation towards cost effectiveness on the part of single units (Koch 2000; Müller 2005). In this context, it will then certainly remain a matter of intensive research to specify more precisely how some typical characteristics of agency-type service units (such as shifts towards contract-based types of leadership at the peak along with some more holistic approaches of case management/ casework configurations as well as a stronger interactively oriented structuring of customer relations) clearly work as requisites for addressing customer needs at higher levels of efficiency and responsiveness (Hill 2004, p. 95) . However, elaborating on respective structural changes, the main point of concern will be to find out whether these structural changes are already setting the context (are operating as the context) for making systems of (solely contextually regulated) 'self-management' dominant approaches of individual leadership.

Therefore, according to our overall concept of enquiry, the main objective will then be to find out how far leadership is now becoming directed at generating a somewhat more 'self-regulated performance behaviour' on the part of civil servants to promote the necessary switches to a stronger cost effectiveness at the interface to single customers (Moldaschl/ Voß 2003; Armbruster/ Kieser 2003). More precisely, under the given contingencies of an advancing (internal) marketization for producing and delivering public services, 'self-regulated performance behaviour' is considered a necessary capacity to bring requirements of an increasingly volatile task environment under control by way of applying 'subjective' reconstructions as well as (non-standardised) forms of 'extra-role behaviour'. Notwithstanding that some further interests in control or supervision will continue to exist on that level – it seems worthwhile here to pinpoint how 'goal-setting practices' (in particular, the whole way down to the individual work place level) as well as applying self-generated 'budget surplus' or 'profit sharing'-methods for performance

monitoring purposes can really work as suitable instruments to trigger self-induced pro-
cesses of a revolving optimized resource allocation on the part of single public servants
(notably on the part of middle managers). From a functional design point of view, a first
focus of ongoing research will be how to write individual performance contracts (or to
offer job designs) which give enough room to capitalize on the spontaneous or subjective
'self-regulations' demanded at the work place level in full – but without putting at risk the
organisational control standards needed at least to a necessary minimum. However, most
importantly in this regard will be to elaborate the conditions more fully under which
performance pay incentive schemes will be able to provide in themselves the requisites
allowing performance pay to be used as a forceful management tool also in the long run –
in other words, to make sure that the provision of performance pay (e.g., by communicat-
ing the view that extra efforts are self-enforced) does not eliminate, but rather regenerates
the intrinsic type of achievement motivation necessary to trigger 'extra role' behaviour on
the part of civil servants in a sustainable way (Weller/ Matiaske/ Holtmann 2005).

Though there might be a prevailing interest in efficiency-enhancing measures at work,
such an approach will clearly not rule out also dealing with the highly complex social-
historical prerequisites in getting public servants (quite in contrast to the implications of
the inherited bureaucratic model) to respond towards these changing working conditions
in terms of (self-regulating) 'utility maximisers'. Nor will such an approach prevent
tracing the highly specific psycho-dynamic prerequisites under which public servants are
supposed to acquire the now necessary cognitive as well as motivational capabilities to
behave themselves as 'manpower entrepreneurs' in their own right. Therefore, all in all
following such a track, these discussions will be able get a good grasp on the chances as
well as the difficulties in making the given turns of the basic 'steering logic' also the most
dominant criteria in producing and delivering public services – in brief, to make overall
changes the dominant 'production logic' at the work place level (Finkelstein 2003).

5 Objectives/ Results

In summing up, there can be no doubt that the overall objective of this publication will be
to deal with topical problems of the design and implementation of some further necessary
extensions of an already started yet not finally completed process of modernising the state
and administration.

By way of further elaborating this objective, it surely cannot be ruled out that, in this context, attempts will also be made to approach modernisation issues in more detail from a macroscopic or societal perspective, thereby, e.g., discussing (socio-economic) repercussions of governance changes more profoundly also from a more critical standpoint and, in turn, from the view of some classic social policy or even class theory reflections (Mayntz 2004). However, following a management design perspective, modernisation issues will rather be approached from the more narrow pragmatic point of view of how changes in the governance structure (alongside with/ or mediated by corresponding changes in the 'internal management') are also increasing the demand for development of some fitting or suitable concepts of leadership across all the different analytical levels we have touched on (Australian Journal of Public Administration 2002). Putting the question like this, the term governance is not to be considered as an alternative (probably more policy- or stakeholder-based) concept of management in its own right, but is rather used as a context for deriving necessary readjustments in given management practices. In line with these refinements, the objective then will clearly be to find ways and means to get changes in the overall 'steering logic' converted/ cascaded down into compatible changes of the 'logic' to produce or to deliver services at the street-level bureaucracy. Consequently, coming from first steps to introduce a competition-driven type of contract management at the whole of government level, it will become an issue to specify how basic transformations of leadership are now taken up in order to get the corresponding stronger orientation towards 'marketisation' as well as to 'competition' translated into the day-to-day routines of producing and delivering public services. Following such a track, then once again it all comes down to the question whether an increasing reliance on concepts such as 'self-management' is going to prove an effective device to give individual performance the necessary stronger 'competitive' shape (Tondorf/ Bahnmüller/ Klages 2002). Since (in line with assumptions from the 'Labour Process Debate') there still might be interests present to use rather tayloristic ways and means for controlling individual performance delivery processes (especially the way of transforming individual capabilities into work processes), it will definitely also become a subject to discuss all the tricky implications of now adopting special methods of 'self-management' (albeit in terms of the well-known oxymoron of a 'regulated self-regulation') to give management development a stronger efficiency orientation.

Putting forward such a conceptualisation, this will give a certain guarantee that all the contributions will be created under the heading of a commonly shared 'context of discovery' – this way hopefully be developed along the lines of a more or less identical 'explanatory' and/ or 'optimizing framework'. The purpose in coming forward with such

a conceptualization is firstly to ensure that in the course of discussing the repercussions of governance changes the attempt is made not only to produce causal explanations, but also to sketch pragmatic models outlining opportunities for deliberate interventions (Hollis 1996). In more substantive terms, following these lines, the purpose then clearly is not only to deliver adequate depictions or explanations of emerging changes in the overall governance structure (of state and administration), but also to give clues as how to respond to these changes in terms of the necessary adjustments of models, processes or regulations. In this regard, there certainly is a need to trace the causes or reasons for an intensified 'marketisation' of producing and delivering public services, but also to demonstrate which changes in leadership (e.g., complete moves to the organizational setting for running tenders) have to be carried out to be able to benefit from these advantages to the full. Likewise, there can be no doubt that an intelligent reconstruction of the highly complex social origins (especially the extra-organizational ones) of the nowadays highly desired 'self-management' capabilities is needed (Voß/ Pongratz 1998). Yet, also in this case, the emphasis might not be so much on identifying conditions under which these capabilities are supposed to emerge as on gaining greater insight into the ways and means of 'capitalizing' on these behavioural capacities for the sake of an improved customer-oriented service delivery. However, making such a rather pragmatic objective the main concern of enquiry, this definitely does not mean that only such a rather mundane 'utility maximization perspective' has to be applied to deal with modernisation issues. On the contrary, from a more meta-theoretical point of view, it is rather expected that a set of quite different normative stands will come into play at this point (Dixon/ Dogan 2005). Since the overall concept is to present practical relevant solutions for modernisation issues from quite different analytical levels, it is inevitable that (alongside well-known epistemological distinctions) the whole spectrum of different interests of inquiry will come into play – ranging from functional ones, on the one hand, and rather critical or reflexive ones, on the other hand.

Accordingly, it is also explicitly part of the overall programme to get our basic concept of analysis more elaborated/ fine-tuned from the angle of quite different perspectives. From a meta-theoretical point of view, such an approach clearly goes together with the attempt to signify the relative proficiency of different perspectives in delivering productive contributions relevant for a further build-up of a design-oriented management science for the public sector. In more operational terms, the idea is to make room firstly to compare the predictive or pragmatic power of assumptions from various perspectives in dealing with central modernisation issues. Along the lines already outlined above, it certainly will become again a central issue to what extent, e.g., something like 'using symbolic politics'

(including communication) or 'having a rational strategic design' is going to be assumed to be a central driver of successful management change processes. However, from a meta-theoretical point, such an approach will not only result in respective assessments, but is also supposed to provide an opportunity to speculate about further chances of integrating perspectives dealing with modernisation issues in a sound systematic fashion. Leaving some other methodological problems aside, such an attempt will then again be confronted with the rather basic problem as to how to make bodies of knowledge commensurable produced by applying quite different methods of inquiry (whether fact-based ones on the one hand, or some more hermeneutic or reflexive ones, on the other hand). Especially by juxtaposing (social-sciences based) institutional theories and (management science-grounded) design theories, it once again becomes a challenge as to how to reconcile recommendations which are either based on empirically validated propositions or on genuine logical-deductive reasoning. Though, this publication cannot settle all the given implications, there can be no doubt that any attempt to work on a further set-up of a design-oriented management science for the public sector must begin to tackle these problems.

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3 Changes in Public Governance

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Governance and the Public Interest: The Challenges for Public Sector Leaders

1   Introduction

The state's governance role in advanced liberal democracies has certainly become more problematic and more complex in the face of a diverse array of delivery modes for the provision of public policy outcomes (Dixon 2003). On a command-market spectrum these would range from 'central' (national) 'public' provision, to 'devolved' (local and regional) 'public' provision, through 'managerialised' (corporatised and commercialised) 'public' provision, 'supranational' (external to the nation-state) 'public' provision, 'communal' (private-non-profit) provision, to 'market' (private-for-profit) provision. This spectrum is complicated by the emergence of multi-organizational partnerships, as implementers of public policy, involving agencies at the same or different points along this spectrum. Each of these delivery modes constitutes a distinctive regime that influences the nature of its relationship with the state in an environment in which there may be incongruent, even incompatible, public and private (more broadly, non-public) interests or motivations. This is creating a set of new governance challenges for government. What should the role of the state be in identifying and protecting the 'public interest' in a world that is becoming more diverse, more inter-dependent and more complex, and that is prone to governance failure.

The battles fought over administrative reform are disputes between contending governance perspectives on the appropriate role of the state and what constitutes the essential essence of the public sector (Dixon et al. 2004).

2   The Concept and Modes of Governance

Governance is the exercising of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a society's affairs (Dixon 2003; Kooiman 2003). It is the process of establishing the "conditions for ordered rule and collective action" (Stoker 1998, p. 17). Kooiman (1999, p. 70) defines societal (or socio-political) governance as: "all those interactive arrangements in which public as well as private actors participate aimed at solving societal problems, or creating societal opportunities, and attending to the institutions within which these governing activities take place." Young (1994, p. ix) usefully distinguishes between 'governance systems' ("social institutions or sets of rules guiding the behavior of those engaged in identifiable social practices") and 'government systems'

("organizations or material entities established to administer provisions of governance systems"). Three modes of socio-political) governance can be identified.

'Hierarchical governance' is where politico-administrative institutions with a territorial mandate subject individuals or organizations to a set of citizenship rights and obligations designed and implemented by government.[1] The state, under this governance mode, can be characterized as the Platonic guardian state, the rulership of which rests with those qualified to govern because of their superior insights and desirable qualities, which seeks to reinforce the supremacy of the collective over the individual.

'Market self-governance' is where self-regulating markets enable buyers and sellers to negotiate enforceable contracts, with a zero noncompliance tolerance and full restitution as the ultimate sanction.[2] They conduct their affairs in accordance with their contractual obligations within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract. Kooiman and van Vliet (2001, p. 360) see this as subsumed under the broader rubric of self-governance: "the capacity of social entities to provide the necessary means to develop and maintain their identity, by and large, by themselves - and thus show a relatively high degree of social-political autonomy." Hayek (1991) talks of spontaneous, or grown, order, which stands in contradistinction to organized, or made, order. The state, under this governance mode, can be characterized as the Lockean protective state, which seeks to protect "individual rights, life, liberty and estate" (Locke cited in Held 1987, p. 6).

'Interactive network co-governance' (Kooiman 2001) is where communities–of–interest co-govern, by co-determining, co-protecting and co-promoting the 'public interest' either in conjunction with, or in the absence, but with the approval, tacit or explicit, of government, through a network of co-governing networks.[3] In each co-governing network, individuals or groups of individuals voluntarily cede some autonomy to an association to which they voluntarily belong, in return for agreed common rights and acceptable common obligations, thereby sharing, with other association members, its commitment to a common set of governance values and a presumption that network inter-actions are the basis of network loyalty, trust and reciprocity. Laumann and Knoke (1987) identify the following forms of networks: 'state-directed', 'concertation', 'pressure pluralist', 'clientela pluralism', 'parantela pluralism', 'industry-dominant pressure plural-ism'. The state, under this governance mode, can be characterized as the Aristotelian deliberative state, which seeks to encourage virtuous behaviour and promote human well-being.

In a world characterised by diversity, inter-dependence, dynamics and complexity and by the risks of governance failure, government is, now, confronted with the challenge of determining the governance mode configuration that best identifies, protects and promotes the 'public interest'.

3   Governance and the Public Interest

The concept of the public interest draws upon three traditions of political thought: 'utilitarianism' (the proposition that the wellbeing of society should be the overriding goal of public policy, thus social action is right if it maximizes social wellbeing by, in Benthamite terms, achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people [Bentham [1789] 1970; Mill [1863] 1968]); 'civic republicanism' (the proposition that the different interests that exist in civil society should be subordinated to the interests of all those in that society); and the 'general will' (the outcome when citizens make political decisions for the good of society as a whole rather than for the good of a particular group, [Rousseau [1762] 1973]). It has two distinct formulations: as the 'common interests' of people as members of the society; and as the 'aggregation of the private interests' of those effected or likely to be effected by a collective action. It stands in contradistinction to 'private interests'. Indeed, Lasswell (1930, p. 264) conceptualized the 'public interest' as displaced 'private interests'.

What constitutes the 'public interest' *is* a matter of politics. Political institutions seek to identify the 'will' of the people through 'aggregative processes' - political campaigns and political bargaining - and 'integrative process' - deliberation between politicians and those they seek to govern. Riker (1982, p. 238), however, has pronounced that governments do not - and cannot - know the 'will' of the people. There are, thus, contending perspectives on the 'public interest', which can be aligned, on the basis of their underlying ontological and epistemological premises, with each of the three modes of socio-political governance (Dixon 2003; Dixon et al. 2006).

'Hierarchical governance' presumes that the 'public interest' is grounded in the notion of the societal 'common good', as articulated by a society's politico-administrative elite, who can promote and protect it only if they use the coveted power of the state, with a sense of continuity between the past, present and future.

'Market governance' presumes that the 'public interest' is, following Adam Smith ([1776] 1977), linked to individual self-interest, which is only knowable as aggregated 'revealed preferences' expressed in the marketplace. It is demonstrably impossible to rationally determine a collective preference ranking of any set of possible collective actions (Arrow 1954). The 'public interest' can be promoted and protected only if individuals or organizations are subject to a set of enforceable rights and obligations embodied in negotiated contracts executed within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract, with a zero non-compliance tolerance and full restitution as the ultimate sanction.

'Interactive network co-governance' presumes that the 'public interest' is knowable only as an inclusive set of negotiated 'categorical interests' (or 'categorical goods') (Streeck/ Schmitter 1991, p. 236) of a society's diverse array of stakeholders (communities-of-interest). These 'interests' reflect the shared values that have created a social bond within, and a social identity for, each particular community-of-interest, and a social solidarity across diverse communities-of-interest, both determined through constrained, consensus-seeking values discourses. The 'public interest' can be promoted and protected only if there are sophisticated and subtle interactions taking place amongst communities-of-interest and between them and government.

The state, then, has the ability to make people do what they would not otherwise have done, but, as Flathman (1980, p. 6) contends, "power as distinct from episodic uses of raw force and violence - is impossible in the absence of values and beliefs shared between those who wield power and those subject to it." The governed response to the exercising of power by the state depends upon how politicians, and those to whom they delegate that power, can justify the limitations imposed upon the governed in the 'public interest' (Dixon 2003). This crucially depends on the level of trust - confidence - that government has built up with those it seeks to govern.

3.1   Trust and the Public Interest

Trust informs individual expectations about the future behaviour of others. In a socio-political system, it exists in so far as its members act according to, and are secure in, the expected futures constituted by the presence of each other (Lewis/ Weigert 1985). It enhances the likelihood of tolerance, co-operation, and facilitates human agency - even to the extent of personal sacrifices for the collective well-being (Sztompka 1996). Fukuyama (1995, p. 7) expresses this point admirably: "a nation's well-being, as well as its ability to

compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in a society". Trust also reduces systemic complexity, by ensuring that those who seek to govern do so on the basis of shared expectations about future behaviour of all the actors engaged, thereby enabling them to design and implement policy responses to perceived societal problem-solving and opportunity-creating scenarios with more confidence that the 'public interest' will be - and will be seen to be - protected and promoted as a result. The basic governance function of co-ordinating socio-economic interaction is, thus, more achievable, with greater co-operation and compliance being the consequence.

While there is agreement on the importance of trust, there are contending perspectives on how it can best be understood and built up. A useful distinction can be drawn between 'particularist trust' - the particular trust one person has of another person - and 'generalist trust' - the general trust one person has of everyone else, individually as well as collectively in institutions. Stolle (1998, p. 500) argues that the extension of trust from a person's own group to the larger society occurs through "mechanisms not yet clearly understood." And, even more sceptically, Rosenblum (1998, p. 45, p. 48) calls the purported link "an airy 'liberal expectancy'" that remains "unexplained". There are, however, contending perspectives on the trust-building process, which can be aligned, on the basis of their underlying ontological and epistemological premises, with each of the three modes of socio-political governance (Dixon 2003; Dixon et al. 2006).

'Hierarchical governance' presumes that the granting of trust must be preceded by the confirmation that who (or what) is being trusted is fundamentally consistent with common set of innate moral values. Moralistic trust is a feeling, as well as a judgement and a disposition to act (Uslaner 2002). This moral dimension of trust is important because it is a statement about how people 'should' behave. If people are confident that those who seek to govern them share a moral belief that reinforces honest behaviour, then they will trust them and have confidence in what they plan to do.

'Market governance' presumes that the granting of trust must be preceded by an assessment of the consequences of extending trust. Trust is, thus, reducible to a risk probability (Gambetta 1988), with the dynamics of trust being reduced to probability updating based on empirical evidence (Offe 1999). Yamigishi and Yamigishi (1994) call this knowledge-based trust, which makes any decision to trust essentially strategic. If people are certain of their trustworthiness risk probability predictions, then they will trust those who seek to govern them and have confidence in what they plan to do.

'Interactive network co-governance' presumes that the granting of trust must be preceded by the building up of mutual expectations of reciprocity - goodwill (Ring/ van de Ven 1992). And the symbols used to signal trustworthiness must have meaning for all involved. Such a shared meaning can only be attached to trust following participation in the intersubjective communication process that bridges disparate groups and individuals, each with socially constructed societal roles, norms, expectations (Bacharach/ Gambetta 2000). If people are confident that they have understood the signals of trustworthiness given by those who seek to govern them, then they will trust them and, thus, what they plan to do.

When determining what is in the 'public interest', governments inevitably make judgements on whether those it seeks to govern will trustingly accept the imposition of any constraints upon them in the 'public interest'. The nature of these judgements will vary according to the trust-building premises adopted. Those that seek to govern a society, in accepting their responsibility as the trustees of the 'public interest', must grapple with the ambiguities of trust building when deciding how best to determine, protect and promote the 'public interest'. In doing so they need to be mindful of Dasgupta's (1988, p. 53) observation: "The problem of trust would … not arise if we were all hopelessly moral [giving rise to moralistic trust], always doing what we said we would do [giving rise to knowledge-based trust] in the circumstances in which we said we would do it [giving rise to goodwill]".

3.2   Ethics and the Public Interest

Standards of behaviour govern people's lives, fashion their self-image and represent their actuality (Hegel [1820] 1991, p. 190). They draw upon diverse ethic premises to justify what to them constitutes acceptable standards of behaviour in terms of what human actions are 'right or wrong' - deontological ethics (Fried 1978); 'good or bad' - consequential ethics (Gouinlock 1972), or 'virtuous or shameful' - virtue ethics (Crisp/ Slote 1997). These contending ethical principles can guide the behaviour and decisions of those who seek to govern a society, and can be aligned, on the basis of their underlying ontological and epistemological premises, with each of the three modes of socio-political governance (Dixon 2003; Dixon et al. 2006).

'Hierarchical governance' presumes that social activities can be morally judged to be intrinsically 'right' or 'wrong'. This emphasises duty and obligation - made 'de rigueur' in

their specifics by trusted authority figures - as justifiable reasons for social actions that demand conformity with the norms settled on by those trusted authority figures.

'Market governance' presumes that human activities can be morally judged to be intrinsically 'good' or 'bad' depending on their material consequences. This is premised on the proposition that it is possible to predict the net beneficial material consequences of any action.

'Interactive network co-governance' presumes that human activities are intrinsically 'virtuous' or 'shameful', depending on their virtuousness. This is premised on a moral act being one voluntarily conducted in accordance with a set of jointly affirmed social norms and accompanied by good intentions and the right emotions and feelings.

When determining what is in the 'public interest', government inevitably makes ethical judgements on the appropriate balance it should strike between furthering 'self-interested individual autonomy' - by promoting 'positive' freedom and upholding 'public-interested collective control' - by constraining 'negative' freedom (Berlin 1969). The nature of these judgements will vary according to the ethical criteria adopted. Those that seek to govern a society must grapple with the ambiguities of ethics when deciding how best to determine, protect and promote the 'public interest', as part of their acceptance of responsibility as trustees of the 'public interest'.

3.3   Government as the Trustee of the Public Interest

Contention over the knowability of the 'public interest', gives rise to contending perspectives on the role of the state, which can be aligned, on the basis of their underlying ontological and epistemological premises, with each of the three modes of societal governance (Dixon et al. 2006; Dixon 2003).

'Hierarchical governance' presumes that the public sphere can be clearly demarcated from the private sphere, with the public sphere being the proper domain of government, on whose behalf the societal politico-administrative elite have the right to rule. They expect, however, to accept responsibility for the well-being of those who give them loyalty and obedience. A strong state, a weak civil society and weak markets is the expected governance mode configuration, for government is considered to be benign in intent and benevolent in outcome, albeit also elitist, strong, even coercive if necessary. To protect

and promote the 'common good', government, under this governance mode, is expected to exercises legitimate, knowledge, expert or threat, power. To do so, it prefers tax-financed policy instruments that enhance the collective's superiority over the individual. The governance challenge is to establish societal governance mechanisms that the politico-administrative elite can dominate. The salient governance risk is that the politico-administrative elite may be unable to sustain the loyalty of those they seek to govern because they cannot adequately protect and promote the 'common good', because they, perpetually, cannot understand the causes or design and implement effective solutions to problems that adversely impact on the 'common good' (Dixon et al. 2006).

'Market governance' presumes that the public sphere is a threat to the private sphere, and should be made smaller wherever and whenever possible, for it can take no intentionally instrumental actions to enhance people's well-being. Strong markets, a weak civil society and a weak state is the preferred governance mode configuration, for the state is seen to be intrusive in intent and malevolent in outcome always seeking to shift the balance between autonomy and control in favour of the collective over the individual. To protect and promote the 'individual good', government, under this governance mode, is expected to exercise exchange, resource, reward or economic power. To do so, it prefers tax-financed policy instruments that promote self-interest. The governance challenge facing govern-ment is to be willing to leave the market free to govern itself, within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract, with only minimalist government intervention, to ensure society's security and safety, to act as a Rawlsian agency of justice (Rawls 1971), and to provide a judicial-legal framework that defines and enforces property rights, so permitting private ends to be peacefully pursued (Hobbes [1651] 1962; Oakeshott 1975). The salient governance risk is that the marketplace may be unable to maximise the well-being of society because of market failure, thereby threatening corrective government intervention.

'Interactive network co-governance' presumes that the public sphere has a blurred boundary with the private sphere, which should be expanded if it conceals any unequal power relations in the private sphere. The preference is for the public and private spheres to work together to promote negotiated 'categorical interests' of society's stakeholder (communities-of-interest) in the 'public interest', although both spheres are considered always to be at risk of being amoral, if not actually immoral and corrupt. A strong civil society, a weak state and weak markets is the preferred governance mode configuration, for both the state and markets need to be treated with constant vigilance. To protect and promote the 'categorical good', government, under this governance mode, is expected to

exercise integrative, personal or referent normative power. To do so, it prefers policy instruments that acceptably promote the 'categorical interests' of those involved.

Once a government has determined the appropriate balance between 'self-interested individual autonomy' and 'public-interested collective control' that is in the 'public interest', it can choose to use - or not to use - its coercive power to protect and promote it. The outcome of this choice decision has profound implications for the ethicality and trustworthiness of the public sector reforms decided upon.

4   Public Sector Reform, Ethical Antagonism and Distrust

The diversity of perspectives on societal governance creates tensions with societies as supporters of particular governance modes seek to establish and enhance their credibility by drawing upon specific ethical principles to determine what should constitutes an acceptable societal response to a perceived societal problem-solving or an opportunity-creating scenario.

4.1   Commercialised Provision of Public Policy Outcomes

Enhancing the performance of government by the adoption of commercialisation reforms aimed at reducing the public cost of providing public policy outcomes without reducing its hierarchical governance remit (by, for example, imposing external user charges or reimbursement regimes or permitting contracting-in), brings to the forefront the ethicality of commodified publicly provided services being determined in the 'goodness' of its material consequences, albeit constrained by reference to its intrinsic moral 'rightness', determined in accordance with the social norms settled on by the societal politico-administrative elite. Trusting commercialised public provision would be anathema to those adopting a deontological, consequential, virtue or sceptical ethical position.

Suspicion of commercialised public provision would be the response solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is grounded in the deontological notions of 'right' and 'wrong', for, to them, judging of the desirability of collective action on the basis of the 'goodness' of its material consequences is simply ethically 'wrong'. Their deontological ethical need is to hold onto clear and firm duty and obligation imperatives, so that they

can conduct their affairs in a stable social order in which government has the legitimate power to judge what is in their best interest. They would distrust those responsible for commercialised public provision who do not share their deontological moral values, which, they consider, reinforces honest behaviour. They would have little confidence in what they plan to do with respect to that provision. They would, therefore, demand that government, in name of protecting the 'common good' and in the 'public interest', should wind-back cost-cutting commercialised public provision, and concentrating, instead, on making the public sector fit for purpose (more performance oriented, more accountable, more efficient, and more effective) as the trustee of the 'common good', thereby building loyalty and obedience amongst those whose well-being they are advancing, so as to strengthen the Platonic guardian state.

Distrust of the commercialised public provision would be the response solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is a belief in the need to build a moral commitment to social norms they jointly affirm with like-minded others within a community-of-interest, which they empower to judge what is in their best interest. Their ethical need is to engage with members of a community-of-interest to advance a set of social norms, which they would consider to be in their best interest. They would mistrust those responsible for commercialised public provision from whom they have received none of the signals of trustworthiness that would follow participation in intersubjective discourse. They would, thus, have no confidence in what they plan to do with regard to that provision. They would, therefore, demand that government, in name of the 'categorical good' and in the 'public interest', imposes upon all commercialised public providers an interactive network co-governance arrangement that engages all the relevant stakeholders in their supervision, so as to equalise power relations with respect to stakeholders, thereby strengthening the Aristotelian deliberative state.

Unease would be the response to commercialised public provision solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is the notion that no one can know with any certainty how collective action should be judged. Their ethically sceptical need is to develop their own ethical values in the light of their own intentions and their interpretations of their own social interactions. They would be distrusting of those responsible for commercialised public provision with whom they have had no personal experience to justify the extension of trust. They would, thus, have no confidence in what they plan to do with regard to that provision. This would justify, to them, their unwillingness to engage unnecessarily with the commercialised public sector, which they consider to be unknowing and disinterested in what is in their best interest. They would prefer to address

their unease by means of 'exit' rather than 'voice', as the politico-administrative elite never listens.

Serious misgivings about the commercialised public sector would be the response solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is the belief that collective action can be judged to be intrinsically 'good' or 'bad', depending on the identification and quantification of the material costs and benefits achieved by self-governing individuals undertaking market transactions that they judge to be in their best interests. This enables them to ascertain whether those personally favourable market actions produce outcomes that are, at least, not detrimental to others. They would be mistrustful of any interaction with those responsible for commercialised public provision for whom there is insufficient material evidence to justify extending trust. They would, thus, have no confidence in what they plan to do with regard to that provision. They would, therefore, demand that government, in name of protecting the 'individual good' and in the 'public interest', move on from commercialisation reform, particularly if it creates more competition in the marketplace, to reforms that enlarge the role of the private sector in the provision of public policy outcomes, thereby creating exploitable business opportunities, so as to promote the Lockean protective state.

4.2   Privatised Provision of Public Policy Outcomes

Enhancing the performance of government by enlarging the role of the private sector in the provision of public policy outcomes (by permitting, enabling even requiring buyers and sellers to negotiate enforceable contracts, within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract, for the provision of services that give rise to public policy outcomes) brings to the forefront the ethicality of public policy outcome provision being determined on the basis of the 'goodness' of its material consequences: thereby permitting ends to justify means. Trusting privatised provision would be anathema to those who choose to apply alternative ethical principles.

Suspicion of privatised provision would be the response solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is that notions of loyalty and duty should be consistently observed throughout a society, for if this imperative is ignored, then anarchy would certainly follow. Their deontological ethical need is to hold onto clear and firm duty and obligation imperatives that acknowledge the state's role as "protector, guardian, promoter of morality … guarantor of moral standards" (Hennis, cited in Messner 1997, p. 80). They

would distrust those responsible for privatised provision who, they perceive, are motivated by a desire to advance their own material well-being, because they are, at best, without any absolute moral values that might reinforce honest behaviour. This means they would have little or no confidence in what they plan to do with respect to that provision. They would, therefore, demand that government, in name of protecting the 'common good' in the 'public interest', regulates the privatised providers, preferably using command-and-control regulatory instruments that defy non-compliance (by making violation easily detectable, by ensuring sanctions are inevitably imposed on violators, and by imposing sanctions of a magnitude that makes non-compliance uneconomic), thereby ensuring the loyalty and obedience of those whose well-being they are protecting and advancing, which strengthens the Platonic guardian state.

Distrust of privatised provision would be the response solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is a belief in the efficacy of people's altruistic and virtuous actions, within a pattern of mutually dependent, but unconditional, obligations to like-minded others. Their ethical need is to engage with like-minded others, as members of a community-of-interest, to establish, through discourse, a set of social norms that they can jointly affirm and advance, which they would consider to be in their best interest. They would distrust those responsible for privatised provision, who they would see as self-interested and suffering from a lack of clear social aims, values and beliefs, because, to them, trust is the product of the mutual expectations of reciprocity that follows participation in a discourse that bridges disparate groups and individuals. They would, therefore, demand that government, in name of their 'categorical good' in the 'public interest', imposes upon the privatised providers an interactive network co-governance arrangement that engages all the relevant stakeholders in their regulation, so as to equalise power relations, thereby strengthening the Aristotelian deliberative state.

Trepidation would be the response to privatised provision solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is the notion that any pre-defined ethical framework is nonsense, because no one can know with any certainty how social action should be judged. Their own ethical scepticism would justify their concern that privatised providers are unknowing of, and disinterested in, what is in their best interest. They would be distrusting of those responsible for privatised provision with whom they have had no personal experience to justify the extension of trust. They would, thus, have no confidence in what they plan to do with regard to that provision. This, to them, justifies an unwillingness to engage unnecessarily with privatised providers, which they consider to be unknowing and disinterested in what is in their best interest. They would prefer to

address their trepidations by means of 'exit' rather than 'voice', as meaningful communications with others which is extremely problematic.

4.3   Stakeholder-led Provision of Public Policy Outcomes

Enhancing the performance of government by enlarging the role of stakeholder communities-of-interest in the provision of public policy outcomes (by, for example, giving them regulatory, supervisory or management responsibilities) brings to the forefront the ethicality of public policy outcome provision being determined by the application of a set of social norms jointly affirmed by providers and all the relevant stakeholders.

Distrust of stakeholder-led provision would be the response solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is grounded in the deontological notions of 'right' and 'wrong', for, to them, judging of the desirability of collective action on the basis of the 'vituousness' of its providers is simply ethically 'wrong'. Their deontological ethical need is to have precise and stable guidelines that can inform citizens on how to understand their interpersonal duties and loyalties, and their obligations and responsibilities to the powers that be. They would distrust stakeholders who do not share their deontological, honest-reinforcing moral values. They would have little confidence in what they plan to do with respect to stakeholder-led provision. They would, therefore, demand that government, in name of protecting the 'common good' and in the 'public interest', resume robust regulatory responsibility applying command and control instruments, so as to ensure the loyalty and obedience of those whose well-being they are protecting and advancing, thereby strengthening the Platonic guardian state.

Apprehension would be the response to stakeholder-led provision solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is ethical scepticism and whose ethical need is to develop their own ethical values. They would be distrusting of those responsible for stakeholder provision with whom they have had no personal experience to justify the extension of trust. They would, thus, have no confidence in what they plan to do with regard to that provision. This justifies, to them, their unwillingness to engage unnecessarily with stakeholder-led providers, whom they consider to be unknowing and disinterested in what is in their best interest. They would prefer to address their unease by means of 'exit' rather than 'voice', as the politico-administrative elite never listens.

Trepidation about the stakeholder-led provision would be the response solicited from those whose fundamental moral exigency is the ethical precept that actions of self-interested individuals that they judge to be in their best material interests are 'good', unless others are materially harmed as a consequence. This grounds their concern about stakeholder provision in the distinct possibility that the stakeholders 'categorical interests', inevitably premised on the amorality, but not immorality, of the marketplace, comes into conflict with their 'individual interests', which is to maximise economic rent by reducing market competition and creating new exploitable business opportunities. They would be mistrustful of any interaction with those responsible for stakeholder provision for whom there is insufficient material evidence to justify extending trust. They would, thus, have no confidence in what they plan to do with regard to that provision. They would, therefore, demand that government, in name of protecting the 'individual good' and in the 'public interest', resume minimalist regulatory responsibility applying economic instruments, thereby ensuring that business opportunities are exploitable, whilst maintaining people's confidence in the marketplace, thereby promoting the Lockean protective state.

How well governments can and are willing to - perhaps more importantly, are popularly perceived to be willing to listen to, acknowledge and reconcile a societal governance discourse, and thus can build up trust with the adherents to the contending governance perspectives - will determine the governed's response - compliance or antagonism - to any new governance processes.

5   Implications for Public Sector Leadership

Each governance mode gives rise to a particular public agency orientation and preferred leadership style, in turn embracing a different theoretical leadership model.

The hierarchical governance mode encourages public agencies to engage in a top-down bonding of individuals, through the fostering of an appropriate espirit de corp, with an insistence on hierarchical obedience and organizational loyalty (Burns/ Stalker 1961; Burns 1966; Radner 1992; Taylor [1911] 1947). The basis of leadership in this command and control leadership model is through power and/ or authority flowing though the organisational structure and hierarchy (Burns 1978; Bass/ Avolio 1990; Heifetz, 1994). There is hence a focus on the organisational structure, culture and processes with follower

commitment reinforced through formal and informal rules, regulations, procedures and reliance on tacit belief in precedence and planning.

Good public-sector leadership would thus be perceived as managing for process, with a focus on employee compliance. Thus, organisational policies and practices would be implemented that give minimal discretion to employees, as administrative processes would be strictly controlled by rules and regulations that define who should complete a task, how and when it should be done, with control exercised ex ante (Feldman/ Khademain 2000, p. 150). Since tasks are highly standardised, routines highly formalised and decision making centralised, a more task oriented leadership was to be preferred (Bass 1990). The preferred leadership style would be parental (Nichols 1986), within a benevolent-authoritarian or consultative type of management system (Likert 1961, 1967). This style is characterized by Hersey and Blanchard's (1969, 1993) high relationship and high task behavior pattern, which broadly corresponds with Blake and Mouton's (1982, 1984) team leadership style. In terms of Tannenbaum and Schmidt's (1973) leadership behavior continuum, it involves leaders making decisions and announcing them. The focus of leadership is thus on explaining decisions, providing opportunities for clari-fication, and monitoring performance, thereby ensuring leadership control.

The market self-governance mode encourages public agencies to have entrepreneurial orientation (Bass 1985; Mintzberg 1989; Bass/ Avolio 1997), with a primary concern with outputs and outcomes. The basis of leadership in this market driven transactional model is interpersonal influences and negotiated material rewards, agreements and expectations (Burns 1978; Bass/ Avolio 1990). Actions are embedded in a major way though an elaborate system of rewards and trade-offs which support the leveraging of the market determined outputs. There is a shift to the context of the environment which influences the transactions between leaders and followers.

Good public-sector leadership would be perceived as managing for results, with a focus on performance. Thus, leaders improve results by relying on a decentralized authority distribution, so as to expand the ways in which work is conducted, with individuals expected to use their devolved authority to achieve management-established targets, and with control being exercised ex post (Feldman/ Khademain 2000, p. 150). Since tasks would be results focused, much scrutines and decision making would be purposeful and performance focussed, a more enterprising and risk taking leadership would be preferred. Such notions of leadership are grounded in the reinventing government efforts with a preference for market driven reforms. The preferred leadership style would be that of a

developer (Nichols 1986), within a consultative management system (Likert 1961, 1967). This style is characterized by Hersey and Blanchard's (1969, 1993) low relationship and low task behavior pattern, broadly corresponding with Blake and Mouton's (1982, 1984) impoverished leadership style. In terms of Tannenbaum and Schmidt's (1973) leadership behavior continuum, it involves managers defining limits and followers making decisions. This facilitates individual autonomy by appropriately delegating decision-making and implementation responsibility.

The interactive network co-governance mode encourages public agencies to have a missionary orientation, with a primary concern with process as much as goals and end-states. The basis of leadership in this visionary model is inspirational – the sharing of vision which may be as a result of the charisma of the leader.

Good public-sector leadership would thus be perceived as managing for inclusion, with a focus on building capacity to achieve results not only today but also in the future. Thus, leaders would encourage employees, as well as members of the general public and other relevant organizations, to work together towards results over which they may have little direct influence, achieved by decentralizing authority, and emphasizing empowerment, teamwork, and continuous improvement to increase participation, with management control determined by how they implement participation (Feldman/ Khademain 2000, p. 150). This leadership would extend beyond the boundaries of organisation to the community and might be relying on a mixture of influence, persuasion, partnership working, networking, and coalition building (Weick 1976, 1995; Manz/ Sims 1991; Sims/ Lorenzi 1992; Kouzes/ Posner 1993; Hosking 1988, 1991; Bennington 1997; Hartley/ Allison 2000) with the funding organisation exercising greater leadership. This dispersed leadership should involve "leading others to lead themselves" (Sims/ Lorenzi 1992, p. 295) and requires a balance between influencing and persuading, negotiating and empowering, not only within the organisation but also at the cross roads of different cultures and organisations (Hartley/ Allison 2000). The preferred leadership style is that of a coach (Nichols 1986), within a participative-group type of management system (Likert 1961, 1967). This style is characterized by Hersey and Blanchard's (1969, 1993) high relationship and low task behavior pattern, which broadly corresponds with Blake and Mouton's (1982, 1984) country club leadership style. Under this leadership style the production of outcomes is incidental to the lack of conflict and good fellowship. In terms of Tannenbaum and Schmidt's (1973) leadership behavior continuum, it involves managers permitting followers to function within the limits they define. The leadership

focus is thus on sharing ideas and facilitating group decision-making, thereby empowering individuals.

6   Conclusion

The diversity of perspectives on societal governance creates tensions with a society as supporters of particular governance modes seek to establish and enhance their credibility by drawing upon specific ethical principles to determine what should constitute an acceptable societal response to a perceived societal problem-solving or an opportunity-creating scenario. Mistrust, even distrust, can be built up in the face of emerging ethical antagonisms over how the desirability of collective action should be judged. This depends, crucially, on how well government can manage discordant governance discourses. Good governance must be seen as an iterative process, one that involves learning-by-doing and learning-from-experience about what is the right thing to do and how to do things right. It must accept that the best governance outcome that can be expected will be from constructive governance discourses that seek achievable governance aspirations, implementable strategies, and a tolerable level of governance conflict. Good public–sector leaders need, therefore, not only to give leadership to the efficient and effective management of resource in a politic-administrative environment that can be characterised as being ambiguous, complex and indeterminate, but also give leadership to multi-sectoral partnerships in a governance environment that can be characterised as having incongruent, even incompatible, public, private and diverse stakeholder interests or motivations. At stake is the governability of a society.

Endnotes

[1]   The hierarchical mode of governance is premised on structuralist ontology (social action derives from social structures) and naturalist epistemology (social knowledge is grounded in objective, material phenomena), and, thus, on the social world being knowable as an objective reality, which can be characterised as a hierarchical social order based on positional authority, expressed through orderly differentiation (Dixon 1993; Dixon et al. 2006).

[2]   The market self-governance mode of governance is premised on agency ontology (social action derives from individual intention) and naturalist epistemology (social knowledge is objective, grounded in material phenomena), and, thus, on the social world being knowable as an objective reality, which can be characterised as an aggregation of pre-endowed and self-determining individuals, each of whom voluntarily interact by exercising their freedom of choice to establish relationships (Dixon 1993; Dixon et al. 2006).

3   The interactive network co-governance mode of governance is premised on structuralist ontology (social action derives from social structures) and naturalist epistemology (social knowledge is subjective, rests on subjective interpretations derived from practice, discourse and language), and, thus, on the social world being knowable as a subjective reality, which can be characterised as a negotiated social order to which everyone belongs and is committed (Dixon 1993; Dixon et al. 2006).

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Modernes Regieren und Public Leadership

1   Einleitung

Angesichts der "Paradoxes of Public Sector Reform" (Halligan 2003, p. 97) thematisiert die OECD 2003 in einem Policy Brief das Problem, "that the constitutional, legal, cultural and leadership factors which together create what is important and distinctive about public services and the people who work in them, are (…) dismissed as the bureaucratic problem which must be 'reformed'" (OECD 2003, p. 5). Spätestens seit der Implementierung von Komponenten des so genannten New Public Management-Designs in die legalistische Verwaltungskultur Kontinentaleuropas (König 2006, S. 23-34) sind bestimmte Defizite dieser managerial-betriebswirtschaftlich bestimmten Modernisierungsbewegung nicht mehr zu übersehen. Inzwischen zeichnet sich ab, dass für eine ‚nachhaltige' Modernisierung des Staatssektors die Steuerungs- und Handlungsbeziehungen zu dessen sozialer, ökonomischer und politischer Umwelt mit in die Konzeptionalisierung und Implementierung von Reformprogrammen einzubeziehen sind. In diesem Kontext offerieren Governance-Konzepte komplexe institutionelle Steuerungsdesigns, die als „interactive arrangements" zu verstehen sind, "in which public as well as private actors participate aimed at solving societal problems, or creating societal opportunities, attending to the institutions within these governance activities take place (…)" (Kooiman 2002, S. 73).

Governance bezeichnet somit den Regelungsaspekt in komplexen Strukturen, der externe Steuerung wie Selbststeuerung einschließt. Die Regelung kann in unterschiedlichen Formen sozialer Koordinierung, durch einseitige Anordnung in Hierarchien, durch wechselseitige Anpassung im Markt oder in interdependenten Handlungen, durch Einigung in Verhandlungen oder durch Konsensfindung in Vergemeinschaftungsprozessen erfolgen (Lange/ Schimank 2004, S. 9-44). Mit Governance-Konzepten wird darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass Steuern und Koordinieren, Regieren und Verwalten, inzwischen vornehmlich in horizontalen, netzwerkartigen Beziehungen zwischen öffentlichen und privaten Akteuren stattfinden, wenngleich im ‚Schatten der Hierarchie'. Governance verweist dementsprechend auf Strukturen und Verfahren der Steuerung und Koordination mittels einer komplexen Kombination aus Hierarchie, Verhandlungen, Netzwerken und Vereinbarungen im Zusammenwirken von staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Akteuren. Dabei kann sich Governance sowohl auf eine Handeln regelnde Struktur als auch den Prozess der Regelung beziehen (Mayntz 2006, S. 15).

Wenn Governance als eine veränderte Sichtweise des Regierens, der Strukturen und Prozesse des ‚policy making', der Politikformulierung und –umsetzung zu verstehen ist, kann Governance als ein neuartiges Konzept des Regierens angesehen werden. Insbesondere die Governance-Aspekte: Management des institutionellen Wandels, Steuerung und Koordination im Kontext institutioneller Regelsysteme und kommunikative Verständigung in Netzwerken verweisen dann zugleich auf das Leadership in liberalen Demokratien: "Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes" (Rost 1991, S. 102). Zwar ist Leadership seit Jahren in der Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft des anglo-amerikanischen Sprachraumes ein gängiges Thema; dennoch ist festzustellen: "there is no well developed theory of political leadership, perhaps not even a universally accepted definition" (Stone 1995, S. 96).

In Anlehnung an Hinterhuber/ Krauthammer werden nachstehend Leadership und Management als Aspekte von Führung verstanden: „‚Leadership' heißt, neue Möglichkeiten entdecken und umsetzen oder umsetzen lassen sowie (…) Veränderungsprozesse (…) gestalten (…). ‚Management' heißt, Probleme auf eine kreative Weise lösen. (…) Leadership schafft neue Paradigmen, Management arbeitet innerhalb bestehender Paradigmen". In Zeiten des Umbruchs soll der Leadership-Aspekt von Führung wichtiger sein als der Managementaspekt, da Leadership die Fähigkeit bedeute, Mitarbeiter anzuregen, zu inspirieren und sie in die Lage zu versetzen, „neue Möglichkeiten zu entdecken und umzusetzen sowie sich freiwillig und begeistert für die Verwirklichung gemeinsamer Ziele einzusetzen" (Hinterhuber/ Krauthammer 1999, S. 14-15).

Der Beitrag skizziert, ausgehend von den Defiziten des gegenwärtigen managerial-betriebswirtschaftlichen Modernisierungsdesigns, die Merkmale und Leistungspotentiale des Public Governance–Konzepts im Kontext einer Neuen Staatlichkeit. In diesem Zusammenhang wird entwickelt, dass eine langfristige, nachhaltige Performanzoptimierung des öffentlichen Sektors nur erwartbar ist, wenn die genutzten NPM-Modernisierungsansätze vernetzt werden mit einem "adaptive and innovation-focused leadership"-Paradigma (Milner/ Joyce 2005, S. 82). Wird Leadership im Sinne interaktionistischer bzw. neo-institutionalistischer Ansätze verstanden, dann setzt Leadership spezifische institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen voraus (Blondel 1987) und kann im Sinne von Public Leadership als ein Element von (Good) Public Governance angesehen werden. Durchaus in diesem Sinne deutet die OECD-Studie ‚Public Sector Leadership' das Bemühen um Leadership im öffentlichen Sektor als eine Reaktion der Mitgliedsländer auf

"something missing between existing public service cultures and the public interest" (OECD 2001, S. 7).

2   Public Governance und Neue Staatlichkeit

Die Commission on Global Governance definiert Governance als „die Gesamtheit der zahlreichen Wege, auf denen Individuen sowie öffentliche und private Institutionen ihre gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten regeln". Es handele sich um einen kontinuierlichen Prozess, durch den kontroverse oder unterschiedliche Interessen ausgeglichen und kooperatives Handeln initiiert werden können. Der Begriff umfasse „sowohl formelle Institutionen und mit Durchsetzungsmacht versehene Herrschaftssysteme als auch informelle Regelungen, die von Menschen und Institutionen vereinbart oder als im eigenen Interesse liegend angesehen werden" (Commission on Global Governance 1996).

Allgemein verweist Governance „auf eine veränderte Sichtweise des Regierens, der Strukturen und Prozesse des ‚Politikmachens' (policy making), der Politikformulierung und –umsetzung" (Jann/ Wegrich 2004, S. 194). Denn wenn der Staat nicht mehr als das Handlungszentrum, sondern eher als ein „multizentrales Handlungssystem" agiert, sind organisatorische wie personalstrukturelle Anpassungen des öffentlichen Sektors geboten. Modernisierungsanforderungen, welche vom NPM ausgehen, reflektieren insoweit stattfindende Veränderungen des Staatshandelns und skizzieren darüber hinaus „einen Weg vom hoheitlichen zum kooperativen, von der zentralstaatlichen Weisung zur dezentralen Koordination, von der regulativen Steuerung zur partnerschaftlichen Über-einkunft, von der Normsetzung zur Überzeugung" (Hesse 1990, S. 165). Da in diesem Prozess die territoriale und funktionale Differenzierung des öffentlichen Sektors kontinuierlich voranschreite, werde eine einheitliche öffentliche Verwaltung zur Fiktion. Das Bild von der öffentlichen Verwaltung als hierarchischer, einfach zu steuernder Pyramide entspricht somit nicht mehr der Realität. Die managerialen Reforminitiativen bewirken u.a., dass öffentliche Verwaltung sich zunehmend spezialisiert, ausdifferenziert und fragmentiert. Inzwischen bestehen „vertikal und horizontal differenzierte Strukturen, die in unterschiedlichen Aufgabenfeldern in sehr verschiedener Weise funktionieren" (Benz 2004, S. 11-28). Mit den Funktionsverschiebungen in der strategischen Rolle des Staates von der Produzentenrolle zur Gewährleistungsrolle einerseits, der systematischen Entkoppelung und Neuzusammensetzung von Programmierung, Realisierung und

Finanzierung der Dienstleistungsproduktion andererseits, eröffnen sich staatliche Gestaltungsoptionen jenseits der traditionellen bürokratischen Aufgabenerledigung.

Innovatorische Ausdifferenzierungen und Restrukturierungen der Staatsadministration werden aber nur durchsetzbar sein, wenn der politische Gestaltungswille und die politische Durchsetzungsfähigkeit gegeben sind. Flexibles und kooperatives Staatshandeln, das die Ordnungs- und Verfahrensregelungen durch kommunikative, mediale oder auch reflexive Formen des Handelns und der Steuerung zu ergänzen sucht, erweitert die technisch-instrumentelle Dimension staatlichen Handelns durch prozedurale Aspekte wie inhaltliche Verteilungsentscheidungen (Hesse 1990, S. 164). Die diesen Wandlungen von Staatlichkeit korrespondierende Bewegung von der Hierarchie zum Markt findet ihre Komplementierung in einer Bewegung von der Hierarchie zum Netzwerk, welche sich manifestiert in kooperativen Formen des Regierens, komplexen Verhandlungssystemen und sektoralen Politiknetzwerken. Mit der Entwicklung zur immer stärker horizontal differenzierten Gesellschaft, in der große Funktionssysteme ohne feste Rangordnung nebeneinander bestehen, wird das politisch-administrative System nur noch zu einem Funktionssystem unter anderen. Insoweit spiegelt die interne Differenzierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung die gesellschaftliche Differenzierung wider.

Unter den Bedingungen einer funktionell differenzierten Gesellschaft wird es zur „vornehmste(n) Aufgabe der Politik, die widerstreitenden Teilsysteme zu koordinieren und sicherzustellen, dass jedes seine Kernfunktion erfüllen kann, ohne schädliche Nebenwirkungen - negative Externalitäten - in angrenzenden Bereichen zu verursachen" (Mayntz 1997, S. 69). Eine funktionell ausdifferenzierte Staatsadministration erfordert entsprechend differenzierte Modernisierungskonzepte und Modernisierungsstrategien, da öffentliche Einrichtungen sich hinsichtlich ihrer Managementstrukturen immer un-ähnlicher werden und somit nach spezifizierten politischen Führungskonzepten verlangen. Anders als das Leitbild einer traditionellen bürokratischen Verwaltung versprechen die Akteurs- und Interaktionsstrukturen eines verhandlungs- und netzwerkorientierten Modells effizientere und effektivere Problemlösungen. Denn die Komplementierung der hierarchischen Elemente durch symmetrische Akteurskonstellationen und entsprechende Entscheidungsmodi lässt die Verwaltung nicht nur regelgesteuert-hoheitlich, sondern auch als Akteur unter Akteuren mit Anreizen und Überzeugung agieren. Dieses Interaktions-konzept gilt nicht nur für die Beziehung zwischen Verwaltung und Klientel, also primär bei der Dienstleistungsverwaltung, sondern in besonderer Weise auch für das Verhältnis zwischen unterschiedlichen Verwaltungstypen und zwischen den Organisationseinheiten

einer Verwaltung, wo Strategien der Kooperation und Kommunikation Blockadepotentiale entschärfen und konsensuelles Handeln fördern sollen.

Im Kern geht es bei diesen strukturellen Anpassungen - darin ähnlich privaten Organisationen - um die Ausbildung flexibler, die Grenzen zwischen Innen und Außen durchlässig haltender Strukturen und um die Konstituierung offener Formen „einer heterarchischen, prozeduralen, auf Selbstrevision und experimentierendes Abtasten von Koordinationsmöglichkeiten in Beziehungsnetzwerken angelegten Selbststeuerung (…)" (Ladeur 1993, S. 158). Wenn die neuen Verwaltungskonzepte die Trias formaler, ökonomischer und politischer Rationalität als Handlungskriterien für öffentliche Verwaltungen in den Mittelpunkt stellen, heben sie hervor, dass es sich nicht um ein einfaches Umsteigen vom (öffentlichen) Politikmodell auf ein privatwirtschaftliches Modell handelt, sondern um eine neue, möglichst wirkungsvollere Vernetzung der bisher separierten Modelle. Nur ein Innovationsdesign, das ‚simultan' organisationelle, strukturelle, manageriale und kontextsignifikante Komponenten berücksichtigt, wird nachhaltige Effektivitäts- und Qualitätsoptimierungen im öffentlichen Sektor bewirken können.

Dementsprechend dürften die Struktur-, Rollen- und Funktionsverschiebungen im ‚Civil Service' Australiens, Großbritanniens und Neuseelands auch nur im Kontext eines sich wandelnden Staatsbegriffs und modifizierter Staatsfunktionen adäquat zu analysieren, zu verstehen und zu reflektieren sein (Boston et al. 1997). Unter Effektivitäts- wie Nachhaltigkeitsaspekten sind Verwaltungs- und Staatsreform aufeinander zu beziehen, da eine sektorale Binnendifferenzierung des Regierungsapparates die Kolonialisierung einer Behörde durch die eigene Klientel begünstigt und eine Implementierung von NPM-Instrumenten ohne Vernetzung mit den administrativ-gesellschaftlichen Kontexten Transparenz, politische Verantwortlichkeit und Responsivität prekär werden läßt. Auf diese Probleme hat beispielsweise Neuseeland reagiert, indem "with the growing interest on public service accountability and co-operation, the current New Zealand government stresses the importance of leadership to foster the ideals" (OECD/ PUMA 2000, S. 3). Dementsprechend müsste die geforderte „neue Architektur von Staatlichkeit" (Grande 1993, S. 51) die Rahmenbedingungen für eine Gleichzeitigkeit von effektivem Regieren, kundenorientierter "service delivery" und "political accountablity" vorhalten (Lane 1995, S. 200; Peters 2000).

Das Public Governance-Konzept offeriert Koordinations- und Kooperationsoptionen, welche sich auf ein erweitertes Spektrum an organisatorischer Modalität beziehen: Von hierarchischen hin zu heterarchischen Organisationen, von Netzwerkstrukturen hin zu

hybriden Strukturen. "Governance was and largely remains a 'political' process. (…) Governance nowadays is a phenomenon of managing and networking issues, interests, and actors to produce actions that are transparent in process and effective in achieving those goals which regimes are created as in purpose with." (Agraval 2003, S. 1). Governance wird zu einer Managementleistung, die komplementär steuert, also das vollendet, was die Agenten der Organisation nicht mehr alleine bewältigen können oder wo es ihnen an Koordinations- wie Kooperationserfahrungen fehlt. Governance kann dann als eine Form des Steuerns des Lernens der Organisation, d.h. als ein Prozess verstanden werden, „dessen indirekte Steuerung in processu sich aufhebt bzw. transformiert in eine self-enforcing organization" (Priddat 2006, S. 136).

Dieses Public Governance-Konzept ist normativ aufgeladen, da es Wege beinhaltet, "in which the underlying values of a nation (usually articulated in some way in its constitution) are 'institutionalised'. This has formal aspects such as separated powers, checks and balances, means of transferring power, transparency and accountability. However for these values to be actualised they must guide the actions of public officials throughout the system – they must be embedded in culture. In this regard 'leadership' we have defined is the flesh on the bones of the Constitution. It is at the heart of good governance" (OECD 2001, S. 12). ‚Institutional change' ist nunmehr als Ergebnis von Bedeutungsverschiebungen in einem Kommunikationsprozess anzusehen, welche das alte „shared mental model" in eine „new diversification of multiple other mental models" (Priddat 2006, S. 175) auflösen. Dann aber stellt sich Ordnung nicht mehr durch Institutionalisierung her; vielmehr muss sie „ständig rekonstruiert werden, durch eine kommunikationsorientierte institutional governance" (Priddat 2006, S. 175). Wenn Hinterhuber/ Rothenberger (2004) diese Entwicklungsperspektive organisationstheoretisch im Unternehmensbereich als ‚leadership company' bezeichnen, kann – hier abweichend von Birger Priddat - (Priddat 2006, S. 136) – Leadership durchaus als ein Element von Public Governance verstanden werden: Denn der Governance-Begriff möchte eine Verschiebung von Koordination hin zu Kooperation verdeutlichen, Organisationen als Kooperationsarenen verstehbar machen, Supervisions- und Monitoring-Prozesse thematisieren und auf eine Kommunikationskompetenz, mit eingelagerten Führungs- und Entscheidungsstrukturen, verweisen. Damit aber wird – in Anlehnung an Karl Jaspers (Jaspers 1960, S. 54) - Führung durch Ideen zu einer zentralen Herausforderung des Regierens im 21. Jahrhundert: Die Managementlehre postuliert für den Unternehmenssektor einen notwendigen qualitativen Sprung von einem traditionellen, einseitig managerial-rationalen Führungskonzept hin zu einem Leadership-Konzept, nach welchem sich das Führungspersonal im Entscheidenden, in den letzten Zielen und Wertvorstellun-

gen, gerade nicht mehr von kurzfristigen Zweckrationalitätserwägungen einer so genannten Sachlogik leiten und bestimmen lässt (Peters 1992; White/ Hodgson/ Crainer 1997).

3 Politikmanagement und Public Leadership

Die in Modernisierungsdiskursen geforderte Deregulierungspolitik, Umorientierung der Politik von der Detail- zur Global- und Kontextsteuerung sowie die Delegation von Kompetenzen von der Politik hin zu (teil-)autonomen Verwaltungseinheiten werden nur dann nachhaltige Ergebnisse zeitigen, wenn diese Initiativen eingebettet sind in ein Konzept von 'Effective Governance'. Als wichtige Elemente von 'Effective Governance' definierte der australische Rechnungshof: eine klare, stringente Gesetzgebung, Leadership, Einbeziehung der Managementumgebung, Risk Management, Monitoring und Review sowie Accountability. (Australian National Audit Office 1999) Die in der Reformpraxis deutlich gewordenen Defizite des NPM-Konzepts (Bovaird/ Löffler 2006, S. 11) bewirken neue Akzentsetzungen in den Modernisierungsdiskursen: Zum einen sollen die Modernisierungspolitiken für Organisation, Personal, Verfahren und Finanzen intensiver als bislang mit den Verfahren, Strukturen und Akteuren einer pluralistisch-parlamentarischen „Verhandlungsdemokratie" abgestimmt werden: "(…) the 'internal' steering relationship (...) evidently relates to the 'external' steering relationships between the department and its surrounding policy sector, (...) changes in sectoral policy styles, or call it sectoral governance styles, will affect the internal management and organisation of a ministry" (Kickert 1996, S. 345). Zum zweiten ist die Beziehung „between the political leadership and managerial leadership of public services" neu zu justieren, jedoch nicht im Sinne von "clear boundaries between politicians and managers"; vielmehr ist es "about both elected politicians and managerial leaders learning to combine for effective political management and leadership of services" (Milner/ Joyce 2005, S. 65).

3.1 Modernes Regieren als Interdependenzmanagement

Die Wandlungen von Staatlichkeit in modernen liberalen Demokratien hin zu einem "more decentralized, nonbureaucratic, 'post-Fordist' state in which government's role is one of steering, not rowing" (Kirkpatrick/ Lucio 1996, S. 3), forcieren Prozesse der Deregulierung, Dezentralisierung, Fluidizierung und Diversifizierung und lassen Koordinations- und Komplexitätsmanagement zur zentralen Herausforderung modernen

Regierens werden: Die 'core executive' (Rhodes/ Dunleavy 1995) wird nicht mehr institutionell oder personell definiert, sondern funktional: "The core functions (…) are to pull together and integrate central government policies and to act as final arbiters of conflicts between different elements of the government machine" (Rhodes 2003, S. 63). Eine solche funktionale Definition bleibt offen für politische wie administrative Koordinationsmechanismen und erlaubt es, institutionelle und personenorientierte Koordinationsmuster begrifflich einzufangen (Goetz 2004, S. 86).

Regieren wird im ,Verhandlungsstaat' zu einem sehr komplexen Prozess, in welchem der Staat einerseits zwar Autorität bleibt, andererseits aber zugleich Effektivität, Effizienz und bürgerzentrierte, partnerschaftliche Lösungen öffentlicher Aufgaben anstreben muss. Regieren ist auf die Herbeiführung und die Durchsetzung gesellschaftlich verbindlicher Entscheidungen ausgerichtet und verweist sowohl auf das institutionelle Arrangement der demokratischen Herrschaft (politische Institutionen und Verfahren) als auch auf die akteursbezogenen und kommunikativen Konstellationen (Korte/ Fröhlich 2006, S. 15). Dementsprechend erfordert Regieren eine Mischung aus Koordination und Steuerung, Leitung und Entscheidung sowie die Fähigkeit, politische Konzepte auch durchsetzen zu können (König 2002). Indem in komplexen, ausdifferenzierten modernen Gesellschaften Steuerung sich vornehmlich als Netzwerksteuerung und prozessförmige Steuerung ereignet, wird die Rolle staatlichen Handelns auf ein „Interdependenzmanagement" (Mayntz 1996, S. 156) fokussiert. Modernes Regieren im ,Verhandlungsstaat' ist adäquat als permanentes Interdependenzmanagement (Korte/ Fröhlich 2006, S. 181) zu verstehen, welches wegen der Komplexität der Steuerungssettings einen Mix von Steuerungsinstrumenten nutzt: Neben Recht, Geld, Macht und Kompetenz treten nun auch Information und Kommunikation als Steuerungsressourcen (Walkenhaus 2006, S. 324). Justiert man die Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten von Regierungshandeln „zwischen Allmacht und Ohnmacht", dann heißt politische Steuerung nicht (mehr) Steuerung der gesamten Gesellschaft, sondern lediglich Steuerung in Teilbereichen einer funktional differenzierten Gesellschaft, und das mit wechselnden Steuerungsinstrumentarien.

Wenn die Steuerbarkeit der politischen Teilsysteme und die Steuerungsfähigkeit der politischen Akteure im Begriff des Politikmanagements miteinander verknüpft sind, lassen sich sechs Dimensionen des Politikmanagements analytisch unterschieden (nach Korte/ Fröhlich 2006, S. 173 ff.):

– Regierungssteuerung und Strategie: Öffentliches Handeln ist darauf gerichtet, in Prozessen der Entscheidungsfindung und Konfliktlösung mit öffentlich legitimierten Mitteln zur Verwirklichung allgemeiner Interessen beizutragen.

– Information und Entscheidung: Ein Informationsmanagement ist wichtig, weil Information zu den zentralen Machtressourcen der Regierenden gehört und Sachfragen immer mit Machtfragen verbunden sind.

– Akteursstrategien und politischen Rationalität: Problemlösungen setzen Sachrationalität und Durchsetzungs- und Vermittlungsrationalität voraus. Diese zusammen kennzeichnen politische Rationalität.

– Drei Arenen des Politikmanagements: Die parlamentarische (Parteiendemokratie), die administrative (Verhandlungsdemokratie) und die öffentliche Arena (Mediendemokratie).

– Acht Handlungskorridore des Regierens und Instrumente des Regierungshandelns: Gespielte Kohärenz, Machtzentralisierung, Stilles Regieren, Netzwerkpflege, Chefsachenmythos, Telepolitik, Policy - Orientierung und Ideenmanagement.

– Politische Führung und politischer Stil, wobei im Sinne des oben erwähnten neoinstitutionalistischen Ansatzes die drei Faktoren personality, institutions und environment zu beachten sind.

Innovatives Politikmanagement (Lorig 2001, S. 284ff.) intendiert die Neustrukturierung der politischen Leitungsebene (Innovationsbündnisse der Entscheidungsträger, Qualitätszirkel für Politik, intensivierte externe Entscheidungsberatung), die Erweiterung und optimierte Nutzung von Entscheidungshilfsmitteln (Koordinations-, Abstimmungs- und Vorentscheidungsgremien, Kommunikationssysteme, EDV-Systeme, Budgetierung, Globalhaushalte, Programmhaushalte etc.), neue Konfliktbewältigungsverfahren (langfristige und vernetzte Strategiekonzepte, Übernahme von Katalysator-/ Vermittlerrollen etc.) und schließlich ein Leadership-Paradigma, welches Führungskompetenzen und institutionell-prozessuales Wissen für das politische und administrative Führungspersonal beinhaltet (Milner/ Joyce 2005, S. 82).

3.2   Politisch-administrative Führungskonzepte und -stile

Wenn Public Leadership als eine Komponente effektiven Regierens verstanden werden kann, verweist der Begriff auf eine Führungskultur und -struktur im öffentlichen Sektor, welche "clearly includes the heads of government agencies as well as political leaders" (OECD/ PUMA 2000, S. 3). Dabei soll der Begriff „Führung" - in Anlehnung an Hinterhuber/ Krauthammer (1999, S. 15) - „Leadership und Management" umfassen. Dementsprechend tangiert Public Leadership zum einen das Verhältnis von Politik und Verwaltung, d.h. die Führung der Verwaltung durch die Politik, und zum anderen die Führung in der Verwaltung durch (leitende) Führungskräfte sowie deren Führungsorganisation[1]: "Whatever the case, 'leadership' is an essentially contested concept. (…). They (public leaders, W.H.L.) operate within the confines of a system where their freedom of action is bounded by other factors. In this sense at least, the concept of 'leadership' is indefinable and closely resembles other related social science concepts, such as 'power', 'influence', 'authority' and 'control'" (Elgie 1995, S. 3, S. 5).

Spricht man Leadership die Schlüsselfunktionen des Definierens, Artikulierens, Verteidigens sowie der effizienten und effektiven Umsetzung politisch-administrativer Ziele zu, bieten sich zwei begrifflich-theoretische Zugänge an: zum einen eine "Trait Definition of Leadership" und zum anderen eine "Process Definition of Leadership" (Northouse 1997, S. 5).

Abbildung 1: Zwei Konzepte von Leadership

Trait Definition of Leadership	Process Definition of Leadership
Leader :	Leader:
Height, Intelligence,	
Extroversion, Fluency,	**(Interaction)**
Other Traits	

| FOLLOWERS | FOLLOWERS |

Quelle: Northouse 1997, S. 5

Das erste Konzept schränkt Leadership auf (charismatische) Persönlichkeiten bzw. Persönlichkeitsstrukturen ein, "who are believed to have special, usually inborn, talents". Dagegen akzentuiert das zweite Konzept Leadership als ein Phänomen "that resides in the context and makes leadership available to everyone". Aufgrund dieses prozedural-institutionellen Verständnisses kann Leadership "be observed in leader behaviours and it is something that can be learned" (Northouse 1997, S. 5). Ausgehend von diesem prozedural-interaktionischen Verständnis von Leadership kann dann – mit Luke (1998, S. 24) und Löffler (2003, S. 245) - ein traditionelles Leadership – Verständnis von einem modernen unterschieden werden.

Abbildung 2: Wandel des Verständnisses von Leadership

Leadership: traditionell	Leadership: modern
Hierarchisch	Nicht hierarchisch, sondern organizations-übergreifend
Intendiert Gefolgschaft	Intendiert Kooperation und koordiniertes Handeln
Kontrolliert die Organisation	Wirkt als Katalysator
Übernimmt Verantwortung, die Organisationsmitglieder in die richtige Richtung zu lenken	Übernimmt Verantwortung, die richtigen Akteure zu aktivieren und deren kooperatives Handeln zu fördern
Heroisch, charismatisch	Kompetent, motiviert und motivierend, innovativ
Hat Anteil an einem bestimmten Lösungskonzept	präferiert experimentelle Lösungen, um eine spezifische Wirkung zu erzielen

Quelle: nach Löffler 2004, S. 245

Die oben gelisteten Merkmale von "modern Leadership" begründen die Einbettung in Public Governance: "In public leadership there tend to be defined modes of operation for the exercise of governance and control which restrict the behaviour of public leaders, whereas in private management the outcomes are underlined more than procedures. Thus, we find in public management an intricate system of superordination and subordination, a mixture of rules combining autonomy with heteronomy, and an intricate system of directives through which higher leadership relates to lower leadership" (Lane 1987, S. 57). Da Politik – und damit politische Führung - in modernen liberalen Demokratien „immer verflochtener, anspruchsvoller, kommunikationsabhängiger, zeitaufwendiger, unkalkulierbarer und komplizierter geworden" (Korte/ Fröhlich 2006, S. 194) sein soll, werden von Führungskräften situationsspezifische Verknüpfungsleistungen von Sach-, Vermittlungs- und Durchsetzungsrationalität erwartet, aber auch "the ability to set or select a desirable destination for the organization (…) through strategic decision making and through culture management (and culture change)" (Milner/ Joyce 2005, S. 32-33). Diese Leadership-Leistungen konkretisieren sich in ‚Führungsstilen' als der personalen Komponente von Regieren: Eine Führungsstilanalyse erarbeitet ein dauerhaftes, auf exponierte Führungspersönlichkeiten bezogenes Handlungsmuster, welches den persönlichen Stil der Führungsebene relativ unverwechselbar macht, also die ‚persönliche

Handschrift' der politischen und/ oder exekutiven Entscheider in gegebenen strukturell-prozessualen Rahmungen deutlich werden lässt (Helms 2005; Baldwin 2006).

Die aktuelle Diskussion über Führungs- und Politikstile stellt darauf ab, ob Führung stärker auf Hierarchie und machtbasierte hierarchische Interventionen oder aber auf interaktives Regieren und die Generierung von Folgebereitschaft abzielt. Zudem wird differenziert, ob Führungsakteure stärker aktiv Ziele verfolgen und sich für neue Reformagenden einsetzen oder reaktiv mit politischen Herausforderungen umgehen. In detaillierteren Klassifikationsversuchen werden u.a. folgende Elemente betrachtet: der dominante Interessenfokus der 'political leader', der Stellenwert von Policy- und Politics-Aspekten innerhalb der jeweiligen Leadership-Konzeption, die Spezifika des Konflikt-managements, der Grad, in dem Entscheidungen an andere Akteure des politisch-administrativen Systems delegiert werden, die dominierende Art und Weise der Infor-mationsgewinnung innerhalb der politischen Exekutive sowie die vorherrschende Strategie politischer Parteien (Kaarbo 1997, S. 570).

Idealtypisch lassen sich dann vier Führungsstile bestimmen, die sich in der Praxis dauerhaft oder phasenbezogen überschneiden können:

−   der 'visionary'- Führungsstil, welcher aktiv Ziele generiert und für die Gefolgschaft mobilisiert;

−   der 'consenus facilitator', für den die Herbeiführung von Folgebereitschaft für gemeinsam definierte Ziele Vorrang hat, und zwar auch gegenüber gegebenenfalls vorhandenen eigenen Zielen;

−   der 'boss', der machtbewusst die Möglichkeiten hierarchischer Interventionen nutzt und dabei die eigenen Vorstellungen umzusetzen sucht,

−   der 'caretaker', der am status quo orientiert ist und dafür die ihm zur Verfügung stehenden Möglichkeiten hierarchischen Handelns einsetzt (Getimis/ Grigoriadou 2005).

Die für konkrete Amtsinhaber (Politiker wie 'chief executives') spezifische Kombination von Leadership-Komponenten kennzeichnet den jeweiligen Regierungs- bzw. Führungs-stil. Allerdings müssen Führungsstil und –verhalten einzelner Akteure keineswegs über längere Zeiträume stabil bleiben (Rockman 1984). Im Zeitvergleich wird das konkrete

Führungsverhalten nicht selten modifiziert bzw. angepasst, wenn die institutionell-organisatorischen, die gesellschaftspolitischen oder die biographischen Faktoren für Regieren sich verändern (Rose 2000). Somit können "different types of leadership" wie "distinctive leadership styles" als "contingent upon different organizational contexts and demands" (Halligan 2003, S. 101) verstanden werden.

3.3 Public Leadership und nachhaltige Verwaltungsreform

Dezentrale Ressourcenverantwortung in deregulierten Verantwortungszentren, Instrumente des Kontraktmanagements, fluide Organisationsstrukturen und flexibilisierte Verwendungssysteme bilden inzwischen in zahlreichen OECD-Ländern die Rahmenbedingungen für eine optimierte Ressourcenverwendung im öffentlichen Sektor. In diesem Modernisierungsdesign ist an exponierter Stelle auch Führung mittels Kontraktmanagement – und dies bedeutet ‚auf Abstand' – zu praktizieren. Kontraktmanagement ‚regelt' sowohl die neue Beziehung zwischen Politik und Verwaltung als auch das Verhältnis zwischen Kernverwaltung und ausgegliederten Einheiten (Agenturen) sowie die Beziehungen innerhalb einer verselbständigten Einheit. In der Theorie funktioniert die dezentrale Ressourcen- und Ergebnisverantwortung in autonomen Verwaltungseinheiten nur dann, wenn zugleich die strikte Trennung zwischen Politik (policy making) und öffentlicher Dienstleistung (service delivery) umgesetzt wird (Bogumil 2003, S. 63).

Der Einführung von Elementen des Kontraktmanagements in den öffentlichen Sektor wirft, jenseits des Problems einer postulierten Dichotomie von Politik und Verwaltung im Modell legislatorischer Programmsteuerung (Grauhan 1969), zwei zentrale Fragen auf: Auch wenn es länderspezifische Modernisierungspfade gibt, bleibt zu erörtern, welches neue Modell von Führung die bisherigen Formen hierarchischer Steuerung im öffentlichen Sektor eines hochdifferenzierten, pluralistischen Verhandlungsstaates ablösen soll. Und zweitens bleibt zu klären, welche Koordinierungs- und Steuerungsmechanismen in komplexen Interorganisationsgefügen effizienz- und effektivitätsoptimierend Anwendung finden können. Beide Fragen verweisen – neben Wettbewerb, Macht, Recht, Argumentation und Solidarität (Bogumil 2003, S. 73) – auf adäquate Leadership-Strukturen und -Kulturen als exponierte Koordinierungs-, Steuerungs- und Innovationsinstrumente: "While public leadership clearly includes the heads of government agencies as well as political leaders, the vision of leadership of the future tends to be broader. It includes leaders as change agents dispersed throughout an organisation to further the process of reform" (OECD/ PUMA 2000, S. 3).

Mit den Governance-Konzepten wird deutlich, dass die Optimierung der Steuerungspotentiale im öffentlichen Sektor eine Aktivierung und Sensibilisierung des verwaltungsexternen Umfeldes voraussetzt. Will man im öffentlichen Sektor strategisch, ergebnisbezogen und dezentral steuern, muss dies Konsequenzen für das Verständnis von politischer Steuerung haben. Binnenadministrative Innovationsprozesse sind durch einen begleitenden Reflexionsaufbau im Gesamtsystem zu komplimentieren, denn die Modernisierung des öffentlichen Sektors ist zunächst eine Herausforderung für die Politik. (Naschold 1995, S. 92) Dort, wo die politische Rationalität der Machterhaltung und der Machterweiterung mit der ökonomischen Rationalität in Widerspruch gerät, werden Begrenzungen für Verwaltungsreformen markiert. Veränderungen des öffentlichen Sektors müssen von der Politik initiiert werden und diese gleichzeitig (mit-) verändern. Mit der Frage nach der Weiterentwicklung öffentlicher Organisationen und nach der Bewältigung von Veränderungsprozessen in 'core executive' und ausgegliederten, (teil-) autonomen Verwaltungseinheiten ('agencies') werden der Politik eine neue Rolle und ein neues strategisches Denken zugemutet. Zu den zentralen Erfolgsbedingungen des Modernisierungsprozesses zählt inzwischen die Bewältigung des den politischen Entscheidern zugemuteten Rollenwechsels, der an neue Formen der Kooperation zwischen Politik und Verwaltung gebunden ist, und eine Reorganisation politisch-administrativer Führung anmahnt (Löffler 2003, S. 486f.).

Die Systematik des St. Galler Managementmodells (Bleicher 1996, S. 70ff.) unterscheidet bei Strukturen, Aktivitäten und Verhalten zwischen einer normativen, einer strategischen und einer operativen Ebene. Dynamische Aspekte berücksichtigt dieses Modell, indem es die institutionelle Entwicklung in einem Zusammenhang mit dem Wandel von Strukturen, Aktivitäten und Verhalten betrachtet. Die wechselseitige Beeinflussung zwischen der jeweiligen Institution und ihrer Umwelt verdeutlicht die Interdependenz von deterministischen Prozessen ('outside-in') und voluntaristischen Einflußfaktoren ('inside-out'). (Wagner/ Domnik/ Seisreiner 1995) Politikmanagement hat demnach vier - miteinander verknüpfbare – Problemfelder zu bearbeiten:

– eine Neustrukturierung der politischen Leitungsebene (Innovationsbündnisse der Entscheidungsträger, Qualitätszirkel für Politik, intensivierte externe Entscheidungsberatung),

– die Erweiterung und optimierte Nutzung von Entscheidungshilfsmitteln (Koordinations-, Abstimmungs- und Vorentscheidungsgremien, Kommunikationssysteme, EDV-Systeme, Budgetierung, Globalhaushalte, Programmhaushalte etc.),

– neue Konfliktbewältigungsverfahren (langfristige und vernetzte Strategiekonzepte, Übernahme von Katalysator-/ Moderatorenrollen etc.),

– Führungs- und Managementtrainings für das politische Führungspersonal (Politik-Akademien, Führungskollegs, 'training on the job' für das politisch-administrative Spitzenmanagement, Workshops für Politiker und exponierte Organisationseinheiten wie Ministerbüros).

Eine reflektierte, nachhaltige Modernisierungsstrategie für den öffentlichen Sektor setzt voraus, dass die verantwortlichen politischen Akteure und die professionalisierten administrativen Leitungsebenen die notwendigen Differenzierungen (nicht Trennungen) zwischen politischer und managerialer Rationalität, zwischen normativem, strategischem und operativem Management nachvollziehen, sich der Herausforderungen des Regierens im komplexen Governancesstrukturen bewusst werden und „durch die Schaffung spezieller Rahmenbedingungen der Führung (…) erstens ein(en) Nährboden für die Entwicklung von leadership" bereitstellen und zweitens sich engagieren für „Wissensmanagementsysteme" und organisationsspezifische wertebasierte „Führungsphilosophien" (Bruch/ Vogel/ Krummaker 2006, S. 302). Dabei ist Leadership für die Implementierung und die Nachhaltigkeit von Reformen von erheblicher Bedeutung, weil es zwei wesentliche Aspekte jeder Reformpolitik umfasst: den Prozesscharakter wie die personale Komponente:

"Leadership is manifested in relations between people. Good leaders inspire people. Changing organisations is really about changing people's behaviour, so organisations undergoing reform need leadership. Leaders, spread throughout an organisation, can help to diffuse and maintain the new values that are necessary for successful public sector reform" (OECD/ PUMA 2001, S. 3).

4   Leadership – ein Aspekt innovativer Verwaltungspolitik

Da binnenorganisatorische Reformen und Anpassungen der politisch-adminstrativen Steuerungsinstrumente ohne gleichzeitige Politikreform nicht zu nachhaltigen Veränderungen zu führen scheinen, sind neue, angemessenere Formen der Kommunikation, Information und Kooperation zwischen Politik und Verwaltung, zwischen Parlament und Verwaltung, aber auch Verwaltung und Bürgern sowie zwischen Politikern und Bürgern

zu entwickeln. (Interne) Veränderungen der Regierungs- und Verwaltungsorganisation sind nicht mehr von (externen) Veränderungen der politischen Kontextbedingungen abzutrennen; "changes in the internal management and organisation of government are related to changes in the external 'steering' relations between government and its societal policy sectors, which we prefer to call 'public sector governance' (...)" (Kickert 1996, S. 320f.).

Je ausgeprägter Kontext- und Ergebnissteuerung im Prozess der Staatsmodernisierung und je geringer die Regelgebundenheit der öffentlichen Verwaltung werden, umso systembedeutsamer wird die Entwicklung einer funktionsfähigen politischen Steuerung. In ergebnisgesteuerten Verwaltungen mit dezentralisierter Ressourcen- und Fachverantwortung entstehen zentrifugale Tendenzen, weshalb politische Steuerung zunehmend die dysfunktionalen Nebenwirkungen der einseitig sektoralen Rationalisierungsprozesse auszutarieren hat. Im Kontext der von der neuen Steuerungslogik angestrebten Rollendefinitionen von Politik und Verwaltung bei gleichzeitiger Divisionalisierung der Verwaltung, Ausgliederung öffentlicher Aufgaben und Segmentierung multipler Verantwortungszentren wird ein Ausgleich des Eigengewichts der ergebnisgesteuerten Teilbereiche u.a. von einem neuen Design von Regelsystemen und Leitbildern für die Staats- und Verwaltungsmodernisierung erhofft.

In diesem Zusammenhang kann innovative Verwaltungspolitik als Versuch zu verstanden werden, durch intentionale Modifikationen der Strukturen und Normen des öffentlichen Sektors (Personal, Organisation und Verfahren) Verwaltungshandeln zu verändern und damit im Endergebnis veränderte Politikinhalte und -wirkungen zu erzielen. Nach Tsebelis steht dahinter "the obvious conclusion (…) (that) actors maximize their goals either by changing their strategies or by changing the institutional setting that transforms their strategies into outcomes" (Tsebelis 1990, S. 96). Da Verwaltungspolitik der Versuch einer bewussten Steuerung administrativer Regelsysteme und Leitbilder ist, kann dieses Steuerungskonzept „allgemein als institutionelle Steuerung und damit als ‚governance', genauer als ‚public governance' aufgefasst werden". Zugleich kann aber ‚Public Governance' (verstanden als Leitbild) auch als „eine spezifische Reformstrategie der Verwaltungspolitik oder Staatsmodernisierung aufgefasst werden, bei der es ganz bewusst nicht nur um formelle Strukturen, sondern um inhaltliche Vorstellungen (‚cognitive maps') und nicht nur um Binnenstrukturen, sondern vor allem um die Außenbeziehungen der öffentlichen Verwaltung geht" (Jann 2006, S. 27).

Anders als die traditionelle Verwaltungspolitik, die u.a. mittels Organisationsänderung, top-down-Implementationen, kooperativer Führung und 'job enrichment' zu steuern

versuchte, stellt innovative Verwaltungspolitik die klare Trennung zwischen staatlichen und politischen ‚Inputs' und ‚Outputs', also zwischen Politikformulierung in klassischen politischen Institutionen (z.B. Parlamente, Regierungen) und Politikdurchführung und Leistungserstellung durch Verwaltungen in Frage. Informelle Arrangements als Ergebnisse von Kommunikationsarenen im ‚Verhandlungsstaat' werden nunmehr anerkannt und im Sinne umfassender institutioneller Arrangements genutzt. Damit bedeutet Regieren nicht mehr allein die Beherrschung und Weiterentwicklung des Regierungsapparates und die Verhaltensbeeinflussung durch eine Vielzahl von Steuerungsinstrumenten. Vielmehr kennzeichnet ‚Modern (Public) Governance' die bewusste Organisation und das Management der Netzwerke und Interaktionen zwischen Staat, Wirtschaft, Zivilgesellschaft und Individuen, institutionelle Steuerung und die Integration unterschiedlicher Steuerungsformen, nicht zuletzt den Einsatz von Leitbildern. „Es soll ‚Besseres' durch gezieltes Einwirken gemäß einer regulativen Idee erreicht werden", und über einen Einstellungswandel, geeignete Implementationsstrategien und ein flexibles, koordinierendes Innovationsmanagement konstituiert dann innovative Verwaltungspolitik „ein ‚selbsttragendes' verwaltungspolitisches ‚Netzwerk'" (Böhret 1993, S. 182ff.).

Führung wird zu einem interaktiven Prozess, der auf entsprechende Rahmenbedingungen hinwirkt: u.a. die Delegation von Aufgaben mit Ausführungsverantwortung, eine offene Informationspolitik, die Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme für das Personal, humane Arbeitsbedingungen mit flexiblen Arbeitszeitregelungen u.a.m. (Ridder/ Schirmer 1998, S. 199ff.) Die Pluralisierung und Segmentierung der Verwaltung und deren interne Rationalisierungsprozesse, die eine Dienstleistungsorientierung öffentlichen Verwaltens forcieren, bedeuten Herausforderungen für Führungsorganisation und -stil nach den Prinzipien eines humanressourcenorientierten Personalmanagements: Führungskräfte sehen sich gemeinsam mit dem Personal in einen übergreifenden Lernprozess eingefügt, in welchem sich das Führungspersonal zum ‚Mentor' der Mitarbeiter/ innen entwickelt und die Fähigkeit „zur ‚gleichzeitigen Innovation und Bewahrung' im Prozess der Verwaltungsmodernisierung" (Pitschas 1998, S. 58) ausbildet.

Wenn die mangelhafte Anpassung der politischen Steuerungskapazität an die manageriale Modernisierung administrativer Binnenstrukturen immer wieder als zentrales Defizit bisheriger Verwaltungsreformpolitik beklagt wird, sind die Kontextbedingungen von demokratischer Politik in pluralistischen Demokratien umfassender als bislang in die Modernisierungsdiskurse einzubringen: "Not only the ‚nuts and bolts of the machinery of government' should be improved, but also issues of state, politics and governance" (Kickert 2006, S. 150). Eine akademisch-politische Debatte wäre zu führen über die

Zusammenfassung fragmentierter Ausschussorganisationen, die Bildung von bereichs-übergreifender und langfristig orientierter Strategiekomitees, gemeinsame Strategiekom-missionen von Verwaltungsmanagement, politischer Führung und Parlament, Strategie-arenen von politischer Führung und dem exekutiven Topmanagement, zu Leitbildern, Zielen, Ressourcenzuweisungen, zur Einführung von ‚politischem' Controlling und strategischer ‚Politikevaluation'. Angesichts der verbreiteten Zweifel, ob mit den gege-benen politischen Instrumenten, Verfahren und Gremien eine kompetente, vertrauenswür-dige und „visionäre" politische Führung - im Sinne von „Innovative Leadership" (Moon 1993, S. 135) - möglich ist, dürfte eine, wenn auch vorläufige Perspektive im Leadership-Paradigma enthalten sein: Denn das Verständnis von Führen, politischer Führung und Führungsstrategien unterliegt einem Wandel, und mit der Thematisierung von einzel- und gesamtsystemischen Veränderungen entsteht immer wieder Bedarf an neuerungsorientier-tem Führungswissen.

Wenn heute Leitbilder „die grundlegenden kausalen und normativen Annahmen" sind, „wie Organisationen und Institutionen, z.B. die öffentliche Verwaltung und der Staat, funktionieren bzw. wie sie funktionieren sollten" (Jann 2006, S. 26), dann stehen inno-vative Verwaltungspolitik und Public Leadership geradezu in einem gegenseitigen Ab-hängigkeitsverhältnis. Indem Sinngebung und Legitimation von Verhalten und Aktionen als notwendige Elemente der Staatsmodernisierung angesehen werden, wird politische Führung zu einer „Frage des Schaffens, Aufrechterhaltens und der Entwicklung von Sinn, Bildern, Doktrinen und Begründungen für Reformprozesse in unsicheren und ambiguösen Situationen" (Jann 2006, S. 39). Der Erfolg von Reformpolitik hängt dann davon ab, ob die Protagonisten des Modernisierungsdesigns fähig sind, ein ‚narrative' (Denning 2005) ihrer Reformen zu produzieren.

5   Fazit

Eine Divisionalisierung der Verwaltung, die Ausgliederung öffentlicher Aufgaben und die Segmentierung multipler Verantwortungszentren beinhalten das Risiko einer Diffusion von politischer Verantwortlichkeit und einer Erodierung des Gemeinwohlbezugs öffentlicher Verwaltung. Auf diese Probleme rekurriert Christoph Reichard, wenn er fragt: "Is the 'managerialistic view' of public management the right perspective or does it need to broaden the perspective towards a concept of 'public governance'?" (Reichard 1996, S. 169-170). In der nachholenden Modernisierung der ‚politischen' Steuerungsstruktur mit

den drei Bereichen strategisches Verwaltungsmanagement, neue Verknüpfungsarchitektur (Schnittstellenmanagement) von Politik und Verwaltung sowie Public Leadership liegt die zentrale Herausforderung für eine nachhaltige Modernisierung des öffentlichen Sektors.

Vor dem Hintergrund zum Teil ausgeprägter Wandlungsprozesse von Staatlichkeit in liberalen Demokratien offeriert Public Governance ein verwaltungspolitisches Reform-konzept, welches nicht mehr auf die „'technisch' perfekte Optimierung von Management-systemen (…), sondern auf netzwerkartige Steuerungsformen als zweite Alternative zu traditioneller hierarchischer Steuerung" (Jann/ Wegrich 2004, S. 205) setzt. Management-instrumente werden nicht abgelehnt; doch Controlling und Evaluation werden ergänzt um informelle Verhaltensformen, Vertrauen und eine Leadership-Kultur, die u.a. "leading through a strategic vision" (Milner/ Joyce 2005, S. 107) intendiert. Die hierbei initiierten Veränderungen des Steuerungsparadigmas setzen die Fähigkeit und Bereitschaft zu intra- und interorganisatorischen Lernprozessen voraus. Wenn die Weiterentwicklung der Organisation und die Bewältigung von Veränderungsprozessen durch die Weiterentwick-lung der Human Ressourcen als Kern einer ‚lernenden Verwaltung' verstanden werden können, dann verweist das Leaderhip-Paradigma zugleich auf die Bedeutung von umfassenden Modernisierungsdesigns: die Relevanz von pragmatisch-dialogischen perso-nalen Handlungskonzepten (im Rahmen eines professionellen Projekt- und Konfliktmana-gements) und einer angemessenen Leadership-Kultur.

Mit der Einbettung von Public Leadership in ein ‚Public Governance'-Konzept wäre - im Sinne Fredmund Maliks – Führung nicht mehr auf Persönlichkeitsfaktoren hin „verabsolutiert", sondern „abhängig von der Situation und nur aus einer solchen heraus verständlich und erklärbar" (Malik 2006, S. 288). Legitimiertes, kompetentes Führungs-personal regiert nicht durch Charisma, sondern durch Expertise, Erfahrung, Verantwort-lichkeit und vermag mittels innovativer Verwaltungspolitik zur Nachhaltigkeit von Modernisierungspolitik beizutragen und einem Verlust demokratisch-repräsentativer Standards entgegenzuwirken. Mit der Akzentuierung von Public Leadership als Steu-erungsmodus im Sinne von 'cognitive maps' wird Politische Führung – adäquat zu den neuen Kontextbedingungen des Regierens in komplexen Regelsystemen – enthierarchi-siert, flexibilisiert und diskursiv, eben im Sinne performativer Kommunikation zu einem Element von „kommunikativer Governance" (Priddat 2006, S. 180).

Abbildungsverzeichnis

Anmerkungen

[1]   Mit Bogumil (2003, S. 73, Anm. 1) wird von leitenden Führungskräften gesprochen, „wenn ihnen erhebliche Personalführungsfunktionen zukommen (mitunter auch als Führungsspitzenkräfte bezeichnet)". Es handelt sich bei diesem Personenkreis primär um sog. Regelbeamte der Besoldungsgruppen A16 (z.B. Schulleiter) bis hin zu B 6 (z.B. Unterabteilungsleiter in Ministerien).

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Blair and Governance

1   Introduction

There is much talk of a 'Blair Presidency'.[1] Although people are not always clear about the meaning of this expression, it commonly refers to the centralisation of power on the prime minister and his office at No. 10 Downing Street. However, even as people tell tales of a centralised Blair presidency, they also tell stories of fragmented British governance; of the unintended consequences and failures of policy making. This chapter explores the paradox between presidential claims and governance failure. It is an exploration of the limits to public leadership.

The first section of the paper establishes that journalists, practitioners and academics talk of a Blair presidency.[2] The second section outlines the governance narrative, introducing the ideas of policy networks, governance with and through networks, core executive, and the hollowing out of the state. The third section applies these ideas to a review of policy making under Blair. I distinguish between policy audits that identify the gap between policy aims and outcomes and policy critique that places such fault-finding in a broader, historical perspective. Finally, I comment on the implications of this analysis for the study of public leadership.

2   The Story About the Blair Presidency

Since his election as Prime Minister in May 1997, journalists have repeatedly described Tony Blair as presidential. For example, on 6 May 1997, The Independent ran an article by Anthony Bevins entitled 'Blair Goes Presidential'. He is Britain's John F. Kennedy. The hyperbole knows no bounds; "at last the United States had 'a leader who is acting presidential' on the international stage" but "unfortunately this leader is Tony Blair" (Wheatcroft 2004, p. 58). The more commonplace phrases vary - centralisation, command and control, governing from the centre. No matter, the image is always one of the centralisation of power on Blair (and for more examples see: Hennessey 2000, chapter 18; Rawnsley 2001, pp. 292-294, p. 379).

Practitioners share these views. At the start, Jonathan Powell (No. 10 chief of staff) had famously warned senior civil servants to expect "a change from a feudal system of barons to a more Napoleonic system" (Daily Telegraph, 8 December 2001, cited in Seldon 2004,

p. 437). Blair's No. 10 aides assert, "Cabinet died years ago", claiming "we want to replace the Department barons with a Bonapartist system" (quoted in Kavanagh/ Seldon 2000, p. 291). Blair's ministerial critics do not demur. Mo Mowlam (2002, p. 356, p. 361), former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, claimed "more and more decisions were being taken at No. 10 without consultation with the relevant Minister or Secretary of State". She criticizes "he centralising tendency and arrogance of No. 10", especially: "their lack of inclusiveness of the cabinet, MPs, party members and the unions leads to bad decisions. Try as I might, I got no indication that their views or behaviour would change" (see also Short 2004, p. 272, p. 278). That was New Labour's stated intention from the start. Mandelson and Liddle (1996, chapter 10) talk of "getting control of the centre of government"; of a "more formalised strengthening of the centre of government" so it can "give much-needed support to the prime minister" and "provide a means for formulating and driving forward strategy for the government as a whole". So, the No. 10 Policy Unit should be 'beefed-up', and the Cabinet Office needs to be more 'pro-active'. Blair agrees: "We will run from the centre and govern from the centre" (cited in Hennessy 2000, p. 476).

Political scientists argue Blair has manipulated his personal resources and expanded his institutional power to achieve a degree of predominance unmatched in British history.[3] Political scientists are more prone to define and categorise than journalists or practitioners. They make three main claims made to support the argument that Blair has transformed his role as prime minister into that of president. There has been a centralisation of coordination on No. 10 and the Cabinet Office, a pluralisation of advice away from the civil service to advisers and special units, and the personalisation of party leadership and elections (and see Bevir/ Rhodes 2006, chapter 5 for a detailed discussion).[4] As one example among many, Poguntke and Webb (2005, p. 5, p. 7) argue presidentialization has three faces: the executive face, the party face, and the electoral face. Presidentialism occurs when there is a shift of "political power resources and autonomy to the benefit of individual leaders" along each face and "a concomitant loss of power and autonomy of collective actors like cabinets". They argue these various shifts "generate a greater potential for, and likelihood of, this 'presidential' working-mode" irrespective of regime (Poguntke/ Webb 2005, p. 347).

The other side of the coin of presidentialism is the decline of cabinet. Blair cut back on collegial decision making, "reducing most meetings of the Cabinet to just forty minutes of approving decisions already taken elsewhere, parish notices and short speeches either delivered by the Prime Minister or vetted by him in advance" (Rentoul 2001, p. 540).

Robin Butler, former Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, reports that "during the late 1940s, cabinet met for an average of 87 times a year, with 340 papers being circulated; in the 1970s, 60 times a year, with 140 papers; and by the late 1990s, no more than 40 times a year, with only 20 papers" (cited in Hennessy 2000a, p. 5). So, both the frequency and content of Cabinet meetings have diminished significantly under Blair. Most decisions take place in "bilaterals" – agreements struck in ad hoc meetings between Blair and ministers directly - a style favoured by both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor (Rawnsley 2001, p. 53). In his first three years of office, Blair held 783 meetings with individual ministers compared with John Major's 272 for the same period (Kavanagh/ Seldon 2000, p. 279). As Blair said, "I think most Prime Ministers who have got a strong programme end up expecting their Secretaries of State to put it through; and you've always got a pretty direct personal relationship". Also, he would not expect ministers to raise matters in Cabinet: "I would be pretty shocked if the first time I knew a Cabinet Minister felt strongly about something was if they raised it at the cabinet table" – "I would expect them to come and knock on my door" (cited in Hennessy 2000b, p. 12).

3 The Second Story - Governance

Even as journalists, practitioners and political scientists tell tales of a Blair presidency and Cabinet decline, so they recognise Blair's inability to get his own way. Riddell (2001, p. 40) commented: "If Mr. Blair has been a Napoleonic figure, he has been a frustrated rather than a commanding one". So, there is a second story that focuses on the problems posed by governance and sees Blair as perpetually involved in negotiations and diplomacy with a host of other people, organisations and governments. This governance narrative provides an alternative to the Westminster model. Britain is seen as a differentiated polity characterised by a hollowed-out state, a core executive fumbling to pull rubber levers of control, and a massive growth of networks. The commonplace version of the governance narrative emphasises a shift in British government from government of a unitary state to governance in and by networks, often understood by practitioners as a shift from hierarchy to markets to networks.[5] In this section, I unpack the core ideas of the governance narrative before discussing the implications for the Blair Presidency.

3.1 Policy Networks

The term policy network refers to sets of formal and informal institutional linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared interests in public policymaking and implementation. These institutions are interdependent. Policies emerge from the bargaining between the networks' members (and for a comprehensive review see Rhodes 2006a). The other actors commonly include the professions, trade unions and big business. Central departments need their co-operation because British government rarely delivers services itself. It uses other bodies. Also, there are too many groups to consult so government must aggregate interests. It needs the 'legitimated' spokespeople for that policy area. The groups need the money and legislative authority that only government can provide.

Networks are the defining characteristic of governance and they differ markedly from markets and bureaucracies. If contracts are characterised by prices and competition and bureaucracies by authority and rules, then networks are characterised by trust and diplomacy. Shared values and norms are the glue which holds the complex set of relationships together; trust is essential for co-operative behaviour and, therefore, the existence of the network. As a working axiom, networks are high on trust, while contracts are low on trust. With the spread of networks there has been a recurrent tension between contracts on the one hand, with their stress on competition to get the best price, and networks on the other, with their stress on co-operative behaviour.

The government of Margaret Thatcher was also widely seen as presidential, although she did not favour institution building at the centre (see Bevir/ Rhodes 2006, chapter 6 for review and citations). Also, she did not favour working with and through networks. Rather, she sought to curtail them by using markets to deliver public services, bypassing existing networks and curtailing the 'privileges' of professions, commonly by subjecting them to rigorous financial and management controls. But these corporate management and marketization reforms had unintended consequences. They fragmented the systems for delivering public services and created pressures for organizations to co-operate with one another to deliver services. Welfare state services are now delivered by packages of organizations. Fragmentation not only created new networks, but also increased the membership of existing networks, incorporating both the private and voluntary sectors. It is a striking irony that the government of the 'iron lady' who had little or no time for consensus should swap direct for indirect controls. Her reforms also created conditions in

which central departments were no longer the fulcrum of a network and had to negotiate with many other actors. The government can set the limits to network actions. It still largely funds the services. But it has also increased its dependence on multifarious networks.

New Labour further fragmented the British state when it devolved power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It also rejected the bureaucracy associated with, for example, municipal socialism and nationalisation. Like the New Right, it stressed individual choice and customer involvement in the delivery of public services. But it does not share either the New Right's faith in markets or its distrust of networks. New Labour uses networks based on trust to institutionalise its ideals of partnership and an enabling state. Blair stated the aims succinctly: "joined-up problems need joined-up solutions" (The Observer, 31 May 1998). In other words, in theory at least, the Blair government accepted the importance of network governance (see also Bevir 2005; Bevir/ Rhodes 2003, chapter 7). That it also sought to centralise power built contradictions in to its policy masking strategy.

3.2   Governance With and Through Networks

Governance refers to a new process of governing. Of course, nothing in the social sciences is ever that simple. The term has several meanings (see for example Kjær 2004; Rhodes 1997, chapter 3). Wearing my public administration and public policy spectacles, I use governance to refer to the changing boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors. For many policy areas, these actors are interdependent, so decisions are a product of their game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by the participants. Such networks have significant degree of autonomy from the state - they are self-organising - although the state can indirectly and imperfectly steer them (Rhodes 1997a, p. 53). In sum, governance refers to governing with and through networks; to network steering. It is a scalpel or diagnostic tool for exploring the extent to which governments work with and through networks and networks are self-organising.

The term network governance has two faces. First, it describes public sector change whether it is the increased fragmentation caused by the reforms of the 1980s or the joined-up governance of the 1990s, which sought to improve co-ordination between government departments and the multifarious other organizations. Second, it interprets British

government; it says the hierarchic Westminster model of responsible government is no longer adequate. We have to tell a different story of the shift from government with its narrative of the strong executive to governance through networks and a constrained executive. The term always refers to the changing role of the state after the varied public sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. In the UK context, where there is no state tradition comparable to the continental tradition of 'rechtsstaat', the literature on governance explores how the informal authority of networks supplements and supplants the formal authority of government. It explores the limits to state power and seeks to develop a more diverse view of state authority and its exercise. Necessarily, therefore, it also explores the limits to executive power.

3.3   From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive

There is a conventional debate about the British executive that focuses on the relative power of the prime minister and cabinet (for examples see King 1985). Many have pointed to its limited nature (Rhodes 1995) but it continues to this day as commentators talk of Blair's presidentialism (see Bevir/ Rhodes 2006, chapter 6). This mainstream analysis assumes the best way to look at the executive is to look at key positions and their incumbents. Instead of such a positional approach, the executive can be defined in functional terms. So, instead of asking which position is important, we can ask which functions define the innermost part or heart of British government. The core functions of the British executive are to pull together and integrate central government policies and to act as final arbiters of conflicts between different elements of the government machine. These functions can be carried out by institutions other than the prime minister and cabinet; for example, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office. By defining the core executive in functional terms, the key question becomes 'who does what?' (Rhodes 1995).

There is a second strand to the argument for a focus on the core executive rather than prime minister and cabinet. The positional approach assumes that power lies with specific positions and the people who occupy those positions. But power is contingent and relational; that is, it depends on the relative power of other actors. So, ministers depend on the prime minister for support in getting funds from the Treasury. In turn, the prime minister depends on ministers to deliver the party's electoral promises. This power-dependence approach focuses on the distribution of such resources as money and authority in the core executive and explores the shifting patterns of dependence between the several actors (see Rhodes 1995; Smith 1999). Thus, Norton (2000, pp. 116-117) argues,

"Ministers are like medieval barons in that they preside over their own, sometimes vast, policy territory". Crucially, "the ministers fight - or form alliances - with other barons in order to get what they want and they resent interference in their territory by other barons and will fight to defend it". The core executive is segmented into overlapping games in which all players have some resources with which to play the game and no one actor is pre-eminent in all games.

So, the term 'core executive' directs our attention to two key questions: 'Who does what?' and 'Who has what resources?' If the answer for several policy areas and several conflicts is that the prime minister coordinates policy, resolves conflicts and controls the main resources, we will indeed have presidential government. Alternatively, if power-dependence characterises the links between both barons and the barons and prime minister, then cabinet or ministerial government will be a better shorthand description.

3.4   The Hollowing Out of the State

This phrase means simply that the growth of governance reduced the ability of the core executive to act effectively, making it less reliant on a command operating code and more reliant on diplomacy. In what ways has the capacity of the British core executive been eroded? The state has been hollowed out from above (for example, by international interdependence); from below (by marketization and networks); and sideways (by agencies and the several species of parastatal bodies). Baronies, policy networks and intermittent and selective co-ordination are longstanding features of the British core executive. Now it has been further hollowed out by the unintended consequences of the marketization that fragmented service delivery, multiplied networks and diversified the membership of those networks (see Rhodes 1994; Weller et al. 1997). Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland further constrained the centre's command operating code (Rhodes et al. 2003; Wincott 2006). Externally, the state is being hollowed out by membership of the EU, other international commitments and globalisation. In short, even if the presidential thesis were a persuasive story about domestic politics and policy, it would not travel well. The British executive is locked into a multitude of international obligations, which may be a source opportunities as well as constraints but never allow of command and control and place a premium on diplomacy. The task facing the British executive at home and abroad is to manage packages; packages of services, of organizations and of governments. Such skills lie at the heart of steering interorganisational networks (see for example, Ferlie/ Pettigrew 1996; Taylor 1997).

The Westminster model of British government is best understood by exploring such core ideas as a unitary state, parliamentary sovereignty, strong cabinet government, ministerial accountability, majority party control of the executive, and institutionalised opposition (see Rhodes/ Weller 2005). The presidentialization thesis is firmly rooted in the Westminster model. The governance narrative challenges the Westminster model's account of British government with its focus on policy networks, governance, the core executive, and hollowing out. It argues there has been a shift from government by a unitary state to governance through and by networks. Centralisation and control are incomplete and Britain is best viewed as a differentiated polity - a disUnited Kingdom (Rhodes et al. 2003, p. 9).[6] The consequences for understanding prime ministerial power are significant.

4   The Networks Beyond Westminster and Whitehall

The governance narrative suggests that government policy making is all too often confounded by fragmentation and networks.[7] The Blair reforms of the centre may seek to impose the desired degree of coordination. But the simple fact that service delivery is disaggregated to a multiplicity of networks creates the gap between rhetoric and reality. This implementation gap is ubiquitous. Unintended consequences are inevitable. So Blair is just one actor among many interdependent ones in the networks that criss-cross Whitehall, Westminster, and beyond. The governance narrative looks at the Blair government from beyond Westminster and Whitehall.[8]

It is important to distinguish between evaluation understood as a policy audit and the critiques associated with interpretive approaches. An audit looks at the factual strengths and weaknesses of a specific policy and limits criticism to 'fault-finding'. A critic lists one or more faults, big or small, in a set of ideas or policies. He or she arrives at a judgment on the policy's merits based on allegedly given facts; for example, on the extent to which a policy's outcomes match its aims. There are several policy audits of the Blair government, focusing on implementation gaps and unintended consequences.[9] The crucial point about them is their analysis by policy area. New Labour is atomised into a set of discreet promises made in distinct policy areas, and then evaluated by experts who assess its effectiveness in delivering these promises. In other words, the audit is limited to fault-finding. I supplement fault-finding with critique which takes historicism and contingency seriously and puts their fault-finding in a broader historical context.

4.1   The Blair Government – A Brief Policy Audit

At the end Blair's first term, Toynbee and Walker (2001, p. 40) confessed that a 'deep-dyed cynic' would be impressed by Labour's commitment to a fairer society. They conclude Labour has improved the lot of the poor. However, the driving force behind this poverty agenda was, Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, not Tony Blair. In the second term, despite the war in Iraq and its aftermath, ministers just got on with their jobs. The results make "pretty impressive reading" and "by 2005 Britain was a richer and fairer society than in 1997", especially for children and the elderly (Toynbee/ Walker 2005, p. 320, p. 327). Of course, Blair cannot claim credit for every policy success. Brown would also lay claim to the successes in economic management and health service funding.

Seldon (2005) is less sanguine. He concedes the government's success in tackling health and poverty. Devolution to Scotland is another example of a policy success. Seldon also points to the failures in transport, Europe, House of Lords reform, local government, and regionalism. Others would add the cock-ups, such as privatising air traffic control and tax credit payments, and the disasters, such as the millennium dome, invading Iraq, and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction. Seldon (2005, p. 429) concludes the second term "will be remembered as much for its opportunities lost as for its achievements". The opportunities were squandered for several reasons including the Iraq War and the perpetual discord with Brown. Among these reasons is Blair's failure to grasp and effectively grapple with governance issues.

Of course not every policy initiative and failure lies at the door of No. 10 but a significant number do. Blair took a direct, personal interest in several policy sectors. They include specific issues like social exclusion, teenage pregnancy, drugs, and on the spot fines for unruly public behaviour; reforms of major policy areas like education, health and law and order; and general initiatives like improving service delivery.

Commonly when the media was frenzied over some incident or other, Blair would launch a crusade and appoint a Tsar to head it. For example, he started the crusade against drug use, led by his drugs Tsar, Keith Hellawell, former chief constable of West Yorkshire. Hellawell was given scant extra money and no staff to a spectacular lack of effect. Inevitably, he met none of his four targets. The politics of presentation triumphed over the politics of substance. Among the attempts to reform major policy areas the record is

mixed. For example, education was and remained the number one policy priority. However, Smithers (2001, pp. 424-425) concluded at the end of the first parliament that "idea after idea seems to have come tumbling out, often encapsulated in a catchy two- or third--word phrase, without a full appreciation of the education system's capacity to absorb them or their relevance to ordinary pupils". By the end of the second parliament style continued to triumph over substance; there was "a failure to get to grips with the fundamental issues". Nor is it clear the faults lie with others; "his has been the opportunity and his are the failings" (Smithers 2005, p. 282). Among the general issues, Blair signaled that improving service delivery was one of his top priorities, setting ever more demanding targets for measuring and evaluating performance. However, Tony Wright, Labour Chair of the Select Committee on Public Administration, commented perceptively: "It is just not technically feasible, never mind desirable, to have that much centralization. If everything is a target, nothing is a target" (Rawnsley 2001, p. 292). The emphasis on greater choice for users of public services is welcome but, as a former Minister, Clare Short (2004, p. 279), points out, "public sector reform cannot succeed on the basis of headline-grabbing slogans".

The problems the Blair government shares with every other British government, irrespective of their political hue, were compounded by governance problems of his making. Blair's weaknesses included a lack of follow through. He intervenes, persuades, and then forgets. He lacks "policy making and management skills" (Seldon 2004, p. 692). So, although he wants results "he finds it hard to understand why things can't happen immediately" and he is frustrated when "waiting for the pay-off and he doesn't have time" (official cited in Hennessy 2000b, p. 10). Moreover, although "the machinery of government was in a state of permanent revolution at the centre after 1977 … he never succeeded in finding a structure that suited him". In effect, the reforms were a sign of weakness not strength (Seldon 2004, p. 694). In 2001, Riddell (2001, pp. 38-39) talked of a "beleaguered centre" and a prime minister weak on detailed policies. By 2005, he talked of "central flaws" such as "inexperience", "lack of clarity about both means and ends", and "confusion about the role of central government" (Riddell 2005, p. 41).

Such governance failures are obvious in major policy areas like education but the best example is "joined-up government" (see Cm 4310 1999; Cabinet Office 2000). Joined-up government has two dimensions. Horizontal co-ordination covers strengthening the role of central agencies. Vertical co-ordination covers subnational bodies, irrespective of whether they are part of the government, the voluntary or the private sectors. There are a growing number of central-regional-local partnerships, action zones for health, education and

employment, which seek to bring together local actors to deal with, for example, inequalities in health provision. For example, innovative joint policy initiatives, such as Surestart, bring together childcare, primary health care and early educational provision to combat child poverty.

The problem is that the government has an instrumental view of network governance. It assumes a consensus between central government, local government and other agencies. It believes it owns the initiative. However, the many bodies outside central government prize their autonomy and resist the central imposition of objectives, disputing ownership. Local networks stop being local networks when they are centrally manipulated or directed. In effect, when networks are centrally managed, horizontal relationships are transformed into vertical relationships and networks can and do fall apart (see for examples Davis 2005, p. 331). The centre calculates whether the costs of agreement are greater than the costs of imposition, and all too often it opts for the latter. This instrumental view of networks sees them as a tool of greater central control. Also, joining-up aggravates the governance problem. There is an epidemic of partnerships and zones, to the point where the solution to fragmentation has become part of the problem, since the zones add significantly to the many bodies to be co-ordinated (and for more detailed discussion, see Kavanagh/ Richards 2001; Ling 2002; Rhodes 2006b).

All governments fail some of the time. All governments are constrained by world events. All prime ministers intervene. Few control and then only for some policies, some of the time. It is not that the Blair government differs markedly from other governments. For example, Donoughue (1987, p. 124) shows that former Labour prime minister James Callaghan's efforts to promote new policy initiatives in, for example, housing and education had little success. It is not that his 'presidential' style uniquely failed. Blair's failures are no different to those of prime ministers with more collegial styles. But so much more was claimed for governing from the centre. At best, Blair leaves a "bitterly contested legacy" (Riddell 2005, p. 208).

4.2   From Policy Audit to Policy Critique

I have summarised policy audits of the Blair government and identified where governance issues undermined policy. So, there is a paradox. On the one hand, journalists, political scientists, and practitioners are telling tales of a Blair presidency characterised by centralisation, personalisation and pluralisation. On the other, the same people recount

governance stories in which British politics consists of fragmented policy making and policy implementation networks over which a core executive maintains a fragile – and increasingly fraught – influence. How do we understand this paradox? To do so, we must move beyond audit to critique.

All too often political events are presented as based on given or neutral truths whether these are facts or values. Critique consists less of an evaluation of the specific event, than in unmasking its as contingent, partial, or both. So, we might unmask the contingency of presidentialism by showing it to be just one among several possible narratives. We might unmask the partiality of the presidentialization thesis by showing how it arises in a specific tradition (and for a more detailed discussion see Bevir/ Rhodes 2006).

All the chatter about a Blair presidency is a counter in the court politics of the core executive and in wider party politics (and on the analysis of such rhetorical games, see: Bevir/ Rhodes 2005, pp. 178-180). For Blair's supporters, it is a way of promoting his standing in the party and in the country. For opponents inside and outside the Labour Party, it is a way expressing hostility to Blair in particular and the Labour government in general. Foley (2004) argues the epithet can refer to Blair's personal characteristics, to claims that he is too powerful, to the consequences of Blair's command and control style of government, to his international adventures and attendant disregard of domestic politics, to his flouting of constitutional conventions, to the influence of the USA on British politics, and to the failure to understand the shift from government to governance. The critics may have several targets but what they have in common is using presidential-ism as a smokescreen. In other words, our understanding of the debate about the Blair presidency is contingent on the beliefs and actions of political and bureaucratic elites. It matters not that the presidential analogy is misleading because the game is not about empirical accuracy. It is about the contest for power. Political power is not concentrated in either prime minister or cabinet but contested. So the standing of any individual, prime minister or chancellor is contingent. A key characteristic of the period of the Blair prime ministership is this shifting of fortunes, the contingency of the court politics of the core executive. I do not need to accept, for example, every detail of the "oestrogen-fuelled", "Girl's Own, comic book" view of life at the No. 10 court in Beckett and Hencke (2004, chapter 14) to observe that court politics are an important feature of the British executive. The debate about presidentialism is a counter in that game.

Second, the paradox arises because of the bewitching effect of the Westminster tradition in British politics. In the need to preserve the Westminster fictions, the tales of

presidentialism are a smokescreen hiding the impact of the governance narrative. If a commentator accepts any version of the governance narrative, with its stress on interdependence, then any tale of a Blair presidency will be undermined. Command and control mix with interdependence and cooperation like oil and water. So, commentators focus on Westminster and Whitehall, where the prime minister can appear pre-eminent. Once the focus shifts beyond Westminster and Whitehall, to the rest of the UK and beyond, then any 'presidential' pretensions must be tempered by recognition of dependence. The inescapable fact is that Blair has to work in, with and through a complex web of organisations, governments and networks with his power constrained by ever more pervasive and complex patterns of dependence. When we compare and contrast the story of the Westminster tradition with the governance narrative, we find that centralisation, pluralisation and personalisation represent not a concentration of power, but an endless search for effective levers of control by a core executive less powerful than many commentators and insiders claim. And while the notion of a core executive can encompass a duumvirate, and even baronial government, the ideas of prime ministerial power or presidentialism can not. I can think of no clearer example of how the language of Westminster obscures our understanding of trends in British governance.

Similarly, when critics bemoan the decline of Cabinet government, what exactly has been lost? Weller (2003, pp. 74-78) distinguishes between the Cabinet as the constitutional theory of ministerial and collective responsibility, as a set of rules and routines, as the forum for policy making and coordination, as a political bargaining arena between central actors, and as a component of the core executive. Blair's critics single out cabinet's policy-making and coordination functions, yet it has been clear for over a quarter of a century that these functions have been carried out by several central agencies including but not limited to the cabinet. To suggest that Blair has abandoned the doctrine of collective responsibility is nonsense. Unity is essential to electoral success, so dissenters go. To suggest that any prime minister in the post-war period has adhered to anything but a pragmatic view of individual ministerial responsibility is equally foolish. Ministerial responsibility is alive and well, although not in its conventional formulation. It is no longer the prime minister and the political standing of the minister alone that decide a resignation – but the media maelstrom. It may also come as a surprise to learn that cabinet and its infrastructure of committees continues. As Rentoul (2001, p. 544) observes: "A lot of the business of government continued to be done in cabinet committees". So, during the second term of government, there were some 66 cabinet committees and Tony Blair chaired 10 of them. Cabinet "stocktakes" are now in vogue and the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, is "keen" on cabinet committees (Hennessey 2005, p. 10, p. 12).

If the decline of cabinet government refers to the meetings of full cabinet, then that specific meeting is no longer the forum for policy making, if indeed it ever was. If cabinet government refers to the cabinet system, then it is still active, even thriving. Claims of Cabinet desuetude are a narrative about the state of, and fears about, the Westminster tradition. To understand the presidentialism debate in Britain, it has to be located in the Westminster tradition and to understand the Westminster tradition it has to be compared with other narratives of British government

5   Conclusions

Britain is a land where barons vie for favour in the court of a would-be president as dependent on them for support as they are on him for favours. Britain is a land where the Westminster and governance stories provide markedly different accounts of executive power, and of policy and its consequences. The focus shifts from the unitary state, parliamentary sovereignty, strong cabinet government, ministerial accountability, and majority party control of the executive to policy networks, governance, the core executive, and hollowing out. What are the implications of this analysis for the study of prime ministerial leadership in particular and public leadership in general? I see two lessons – contingency and history.

Prime ministerial leadership is contingent not only on the court politics of the core executive but also on the arenas within which the leader seeks to exercise leadership. It helps to distinguish between the electoral, policy making and implementation arenas. First, personalisation is a prominent feature of media management, party management and electioneering in Britain. If we must use presidential language, it is here in the electoral arena that it is most apt. Blair is the figurehead.[10] In the policy making arena, there is some truth to the claim that Blair centralised policy making on No. 10 and the Cabinet Office and eschewed cabinet government. However, this claim applies to selected policy areas only, with the equally important proviso that the Prime Minister's attention was also selective. The continuous reform of the centre speaks of the failure of coordination, not its success. The Prime Minister's influence is most constrained in the policy implementation arena, so it is conspicuous for its absence in most accounts of presidentialism. Here, other senior government figures, ministers and their departments, and other agencies are key actors. Similarly, although personalisation can affect implementation, that effect is intermittent. Too often, the presidential thesis treats intervention as control. There is much

that goes on in British government about which the Prime Minister knows little and affects even less. And all these arenas are embedded in dependence on domestic and international agencies and governments, making command and control strategies counter-productive. A former prime minister, Harold Macmillan, suggested that public leadership confronted, "events, dear boy, events". I prefer 'contingencies, dear boy, contingencies'.

To further compound the difficulties of analysing public leadership, the notions of executive government, prime ministerial leadership, presidentialism are variously constructed within several traditions. They have no given meaning. I have shown that the Westminster and governance narratives tell markedly different stories about executive power. But there are other stories told from within different traditions. For example, Peter Hennessy (2000) is a Whig: "History is a discipline that sobers up its practitioners". He rejects the command and control model of the prime minister as chief executive for two reasons. First, "command models sit ill with open societies". Second, "British political culture reflects the compost in which it is grown". It is a parliamentary not a presidential compost. So, he defends the "deep continuities" of the constitutional side of the job – relations with the monarchy, accountability to parliament, collective government, and a career civil service (Hennessy 2000a, p. 535, p. 539). His account of the British executive is markedly different from, for example, Miliband's (1969) account constructed from within the Marxist tradition. I offer no criticisms of any of these traditions and their associated narratives. I observe only that there are several such traditions. To understand public leadership we must identify these several traditions and their historical roots. As Helms (2005, p. 261) argues convincingly a historical and comparative perspective is the best way to explore core executives and the variety of political practice within and between regime types: that is the analysis of traditions by another name.

In sum, the analysis of the contingencies of public leadership, and the traditions in which the several narratives of executive power are embedded, undermines not only claims there are law-like trends to presidentialism but also command and control leadership strategies.

Endnotes

[1] This chapter rehearses the arguments in Bevir/ Rhodes 2006. My thanks to Mark Bevir (Berkeley), Jenny Fleming (Tasmania) and Paul 't Hart (ANU) for advice and comments.

[2] For reviews of the academic literature in the UK see Rhodes 1995; Smith 1999; and Heffernan 2005. For useful collections of articles see King 1969 and 1985; and Rhodes/ Dunleavy 1995.

[3] Foley 1993, 2000 and 2004 is the most prolific academic contributor. Others who discuss a trend to presidentialism include: Heffernan 2003; Hennessy 2005 and citations to earlier work in his note 3; Kavanagh/ Seldon 2000; Mughan 2000; Pryce 1997; and Rose 2001. For a cross-national comparison of the presidentialization trend see Helms 2005; and Poguntky/ Webb 2005.

[4] On the several definitions of the presidentialization thesis see: Foley 1993, chapter 1; Pryce 1967, p. 37, p. 67; Mughan 2000, pp. 9-10; and Poguntke/ Webb 2005, p. 5, pp. 8-11.

[5] For the original accounts of the governance narrative and the differentiated polity see Rhodes 1988, 1997, and 2000. For criticisms see Holliday 2000; Marsh et al. 2003; Heffernan 2005; and Marinetto 2003. For replies see Rhodes 2003 and 2007.

[6] More recent versions of the governance narrative decentre networks by analyzing them as the products of situated agency, explaining shifts in government by reference to contingent contests over meanings, and suggesting that power has always been more dispersed than many political scientists allow – the state is never monolithic and it always negotiates with others (see Bevir/ Rhodes 2003, 2006).

[7] I note in passing that horizontal networks at the heart of government are riven by the courts of Brown and Blair, demonstrating that the core executive is not a single decision centre focused on Blair but a set of overlapping, competing networks. For an account of the rivalry between Blair and Brown see: Beckett/ Hencke 2004; Naughtie 2002; Peston 2005; Rawnsley 2001; and Seldon 2004.

[8] Again, I can only note in passing the impact of the rest of the world on domestic politics and the power of the prime minister. Events such as 9/11, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, the Afghan war, and Iraq divert prime ministerial attention from domestic policy. See for example, Kampfner 2003.

[9] See for example, Coates/ Lawler 2000; Toynbee/ Walker 2001 and 2005; Seldon 2001; Seldon/ Kavanagh 2005; and Savage/ Atkinson 2001.

[10] This statement must be qualified immediately because, even at election time, the court politics of the core executive fit uncomfortably with the notion of monocratic leadership. Thus, Brown played an always prominent and often pre-eminent role in the 2001 and 2005 elections (see for example Seldon 2004, chapter 31).

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Navigating the Fragments: Political Dimensions of Managing Networked Public Service Delivery

1   Introduction

Our knowledge of networked governance is first acquired through empirical research. Like other empirically derived concepts – Robert Dahl's 'democratic pluralism' or Robert Putman's 'social capital' – its cogence comes from being built on observable facts. Networks occur in government and in governance, they can be described and how they work can be 'mapped'. What is missing from our lexicon to discuss and, more importantly, evaluate networks is the normative dimension. How ought networks to work? Can we develop an argument that says networked government, or networked service delivery, is in any sense 'better' than other organisational forms? To answer these questions and to answer the questions posed more broadly here about the politics of new forms of public governance and leadership, we need to look to more traditional political theory: to evaluate the use of networks in terms of democracy rather than just in terms of empirical description. By bringing our empirical knowledge of the existence of networks into conjunction with the normative values of democracy it is hoped to provide some insights on how public sector managers in regimes who aspire to deliver democratic outcomes might 'lead' through the use of 'networks'. Of course, such a discussion presents something of a methodological nightmare as, rather than supplanting the meta narrative of representative government with a post modern narrative of 'governance' and 'networks', it brings them together. Any incommensurability, however, can only serve to exemplify and highlight the complexity of 'leadership' in the contemporary public sector.

2   Shifts towards Networks

That government is carried out through networks is clearly an established fact. The differentiated polity is created by and creates, in a reflexive manner, networks. In Rod Rhodes nineteen-ninety-seven study this development is juxtaposed to the 'Westminster' model which now provides 'only a partial understanding' of how government works. He also makes the point that that model's value does not rest so much on any particular factual accuracy ascribed to it but rather on the 'organising perspective' it brings to the study of government (1997, p. 6). For Rhodes "the differentiated polity both describes the new institutional setting of British government and identifies the constraints on executive power which undermine policy" (1997, p. 4). In brief a "'differentiated polity' is

characterized by functional and institutional specialization and the fragmentation of policies and politics" (1997, p. 7).

This discussion about how forms of leadership impact networked service delivery picks up two themes of the Rhodes study. Both the existence of "policy networks of resource dependant organizations" and the "shift from a strong executive (and the tradition that 'leaders know best') to the segmented executive, characterized by bargaining games within and between networks", are taken as givens (Rhodes 1997, p. 4). Rhodes is also right that post modern discourse analysis adds methodological and conceptual richness to our understanding of new modes of government and administration (Rhodes 1997; Fox/ Miller 1995). The problem for the service delivery practitioner, however, is that progress reporting and 'accountability' is still perceived through the now flawed optic of the West-minster model. Understandings, not so much of 'work', but of 'accountability' and 'leadership' in the public sector are still often locked into constructs of the meta-narrative of representative and responsible government. And it is these factors that still have significant bearing on the careers of public officials charged with delivering public services. Mark Considine warns: "As service delivery systems move to more complex forms of agency, we must expect accountability to undergo a dynamic process of evolution, adaptation and – in some cases – crisis" (2002, p. 37).

While the Rhodes' study relies on observations of British experience, features of the network society and the differentiated polity can be found across the OECD world (Pollitt/ Bouckaert 2000; Bishop/ Connors 2003). Much of what is said here about the particular leadership characteristics, capacities, and capabilities of public managers can, therefore, be transferred across governments of differing political make up and structures. Features of this international reform movement, the emergence of efficiency as the measure of success and the adoption of market techniques to achieve that success, make it easy to lose sight of the fact that public sector service delivery is carried out by, or at the behest of, the state and that the state retains its historic monopoly on the use of coercive power. That that power is used legitimately remains the concern of those charged with the delivery of public services and of citizens.

3   Quest for Legitimacy

The problem of legitimacy takes on two dimensions. First, legitimacy in terms of current institutional forms, (parliament, responsible government etc.) and secondly legitimacy derived from broader normative claims of democracy (equality, open access, transparency, common good). While more open notions of 'governance' observe a fragmented and differentiated polity, creating a less bureaucratic environment, the public servant is still constrained by the norms and procedures laid out under 'Westminster', or responsible government, protocols.

This quest for legitimacy in the differentiated polity is further complicated by its explanation through a post modern discourse that is sceptical about the value of the overarching narratives that, in the past, provided legitimacy for government action. It is not, of course, the fault of post modern discourse that legitimacy is now problematic. It is as much a result of the failure of governments, elected and unelected officials to perform in accord with the legitimating narratives of responsible government and to make manifest a truly ethical public service. Whether there ever was a gold age of 'responsible democratic government' is not the point, governmental performance is now clearly at a disjunction with its historic 'Weberian' legitimating narrative.

What has emerged as we seek to describe governance practice is the differentiated polity, the fragmented and dispersed operation of government creating a multi-centred or poly-centric environment of political skirmishes and engagements. Public sector 'actors' are now diverse. Whether an unelected public official, community group member, public servant, bureaucratic manager or, in some cases, contracted private employee, they all exercise leadership at the point where the poly-centric meets the state-centric, where governance meets government. While the trend towards 'whole of' or 'joined up government' (Shergold 2004) attempts to break down hierarchical and 'silo' structures – mimicking the poly-centric – direct accountability to Ministers still predominates. While in, what Rhodes accurately describes as a 'differentiated polity' governments consult more, engage with the polycentrism of post modern political life and discourse; where, one may hope, concerned public managers are reflexive in the efforts to 'create public value', in terms of representative democratic legitimacy, relationships with the minister remain crucial. Particularly in times of 'political heat' – at an election or at other political crisis points, such as tussles over political leadership, what constitutes legitimate action

has acquired new dimensions rather than simply old forms of legitimacy being replaced by new forms.

4   Diversified Forms of Legitimacy

To attempt to bring some clarity to the emerging complex environment and to relate it to democratic outcomes, Chris Skelcher, following work by Hooge and Marks, makes the following distinction between two types of governance.

Table 1: Typololgy of Governance Systems

Type I	Type II
Multi-purpose policy domains	Single-purpose policy domains
Mutually exclusive spatial domains	Territorially overlapping spatial domains
Limited number of jurisdictional tiers	Many jurisdictional tiers
Relatively permanent jurisdictional system	Flexible and changing jurisdictional system

Source: Skelcher 2005, p. 94

Type I, or 'traditional' governance is still the predominant mode within national polities. Type II or 'emergent', is 'likely to flourish specifically where there is a need for a tailored governmental body to address an issue that is not susceptible to policy action by a Type I organization, in the international arena and where there are particular functional policy problems.' Further, Type II governance bodies have been developed in new cross-cutting policy area such as: "Sustainability, community safety, and neighbourhood revitalization" (2005, p. 94). Increasingly governments are attempting to deliver services in a way that reflects these broader cross-cutting policy agendas. Thus Main Roads departments no longer just build roads, but 'connect citizens' and do so in a manner that considers a much broader range of social and environmental consequences. These new policy formulations have also let to the emergence of 'whole of government' strategy, on the governmental side (Shergold 2004) and extensive consultation with communities, (Bishop/ Davis 2002) both drivers for further network building.

As Skelcher says: "The emergent governance of the public realm presents challenging yet exciting possibilities for institutional design. The challenge is to enable subtle but

effective processes for collective action that also recognize the integrity of jurisdictions and maintain the principle of segmental authority (subsidiarity) whether this is expressed in terms of spatial or policy boundary conditions, or both. The challenge is accentuated by the changes in societies that reflect the emergence of polities around established beliefs and locales" (2005, p. 106).

It is significant to reflect on why 'emergent' governance comes into being and the consequent need for institutional redesign. It emerges because traditional modes are no longer adequate, because policy problems that governments are now choosing to address and that citizens are now demanding governments address, are framed in ways that do not neatly fit into traditional spatial and institutional considerations. Traditional understandings of 'legitimacy' and 'accountability' – developed along with notions of responsible government; of cabinet; of the functional separation of departments – are more readily understood and implemented in their traditional forms but now need considerable reinterpretation and reformulation in the light of emerging areas of policy interest and governance modes. It is also important to see that the challenge emergent (Type II) governance poses for institutional design also represents a challenge for those who inhabit these institutions and are charged with making them work. In fact leadership techniques within the new institutions need to be just as subtle if they are to be effective.

5   New Forms of Designing Leadership

On a traditional account leadership is a quality expected of the head of an organization. The expectation is that the singular 'leader' has a group who they lead and, in a hierarchical system, they acquire that power through their perceived capacities and retain it in terms of the quality of their leadership. Like the classical military leader, they 'lead from the front'. In the traditional legitimating accounts of responsible government and bureaucracy the public official sits within a fixed a hierarchy, may be very powerful and influential but is never the titular leader. Even the CEO is subject to ministerial authority. Therefore, the expressions of leadership by the public officials have to gain authority through something other than the mere fact of being 'in charge.' The public official also has a very complex relationship with those they lead. As already noted, not only can they not lead from the head, but those who are to be led are always in some sense their superior – ministers through departmental hierarchy and citizens who can be said to ultimately hold them to account through the notion of responsible government. While the term

'public manager' is now more frequently applied in many ways 'public servant' remains apt.

It is only in the differentiated polity, or network society, (Rhodes 1997) that the notion of public sector leadership can gain any real purchase, outside of any immediate organisational hierarchy that the public official might find them selves the nominal 'head'. The diffusion created in the differentiated polity means that leadership relationships are not tied to status or hierarchy but to relevance, knowledge coherence, but also power, politics and even popularity. While the subsequent policy discourse can, as Torgerson, says inaugurate new forms of democratic practice (2003, p. 138) it can also lead to more malign outcomes.

If, as Ian Shapiro argues, our allegiance to democracy relies on it being 'the best available system for managing power relations among people who disagree about the nature of the common good, among many other things, but who nonetheless are bound to live together' (2003, p. 146). We also arrive at a suitably 'thin' theory of the common good that allows for both democratic interplay and an assessment of the democratic merits of networked government and service delivery, not by a simple numerical calculus – how many belong to a network – but by how effectively that diffuse power.

Shapiro claims that it is the possibility of diminishing – if not eradicating – domination that is often what draws people to democracy (2003, p. 146). For the public manager it becomes crucial that they both realise their position vis a vis the power of the state and the power present in civil society and continue to negotiate that interface in a manner that ensures the bridging between the two. There is a crucial insight here. The breadth of the network alone is not a measure of its democratic quality – small networks that work efficiently in the community's interest and that do not reproduce dominant power relationships may be far more democratic than large populist movements in support of policies and practices that oppress or marginalise some community members.

Robert Putnam's seminal study of social capital in the United States maps the decline of informal social networks, (2000) a social form that Putnam argues, based on this and previous studies (1993), is essential to the health of democracy. Leaving aside the many criticisms that Putnam's claims about the relationship between group membership and democracy have attracted, (Goldberg 1996; Sabetti 1996) his thinking has been very influential on governments. Indeed on his speaking tour of Australia in 2001 he was billed as 'the most influential academic in the world today'. His influence can now be seen, for

example, in that the Australian Bureau of Statistics now reports a social capital index (www.abs.gov.au). Thus part of the role of the public management leader in building governance networks, could be seen as replacing or revivifying the more organic and spontaneous networks shown to be in decline, or rather freefall, in civil society. Paradoxically, almost by definition governments cannot directly build social capital. In fact government activity often has negative impacts on social capital. The urban decay and subsequent loss of communities in large cities in the US, and elsewhere, in the 1960s, for example, was the direct result of ill considered freeway development. In the same way that development applications are now subject to environmental impact statements, so should impacts on social capital be considered. As the Putnam study makes clear, it is important that social capital is developed by 'social' networks, not bureaucratic impost. The solution to the decline in the number of picnics can not be government initiated picnics! However, just as the concept 'governance' blurs this distinction between state and civil society so do 'networks'.

Some government initiated networks have the appearance of building or creating social capital it is significant that many are a function of funding arrangements. If, for example, a portion of the public housing budget is distributed to community-based housing co-operatives, such organisations will emerge. If funding to improve land care in rural communities is distributed to 'the community', again community bodies will be created to meet that requirement. In effect you have government created, non-government organi-sations. These will be, following Putnam, more effective if they are built on already existing social capital rich networks but they can also emerge, like mushrooms after rain, in response to the funding stimulus, only to wither once fiscal capital dries up.

One aspect of these networks that is consistent with Robert Putman's typology of social capital creation is the distinction he makes between bridging and bonding social capital. Where "some forms of social capital are … inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities, and homogenous groups… Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages" (2000, p. 22).

This distinction can have significant social and democratic effects. Bonding social capital, according to Putnam, is: "Good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity" (2000, p. 22). If, however, the solidarity generated is not 'mobilized' the 'capital' developed in bonding group does not develop social (as in society wide) capital at all. The 'capital' remains in its 'enclave' and is only beneficial to the social subset of group membership. This is not necessarily malevolent; it may as Putnam says: "Provide

crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community" (2000, p. 22). It also has the potential to be malevolent and Putnam (2000, pp. 350-366) and others have written on this problem of social capital. The 'Hell's Angels problem' (Rothstein 2004) can be applied to groups as diverse as the Mafia and exclusive religious charities where church membership or adherence to certain moral codes are prerequisites to receiving benefits. In such examples, the problem is that strong bonding links between group members work against the broader society. Such networks always run the risk of generating as much social enmity as social capital.

On the other hand bridging social capital networks are "outward looking and encompass people across the diverse social cleavages". As such they "generate broader identities and reciprocity" (Putnam 2000, pp. 22-23) and it is this feature of social capital formation also provides insights for how and in what directions networks should be led by public managers. In some instances, as seen above, a network might ensure the dominance of a particular view and become a closed system creating a very strong bonding network. Far from reaching out in democratic 'inclusion', they exclude and keep tight dominant positions. A bridging network on the other hand can be a vehicle for bringing in the excluded, diversify the policy mix, enhancing policy learning and so on. Putnam, in his more popular Bowling Alone, uses two household products as analogies: Superglue for bonding and WD40 for bridging (2000, p. 23). Of course all networks require some level of glue to hold them together but for networks charged with the delivery of public goods, and for those who provide government leadership in them, the lubricant is crucial for the outcome to be democratic, in the sense of diffusing power and managing domination.

6   Consequences

For public managers it becomes important to look to the normative dimension of networked governance. Networks may be highly effective in terms of getting the job done but not necessarily be democratic in character. Clandestine networks, for example, may work very well in resistance to authority but will fail to meet the democratic requirements of openness and transparency. A network that becomes a cartel takes on an exclusionary character that only initiates understand or can benefit from. So, what shape should networked service delivery take?

As Considine points out (2002) the driving force behind this shift has been the push for real performance from the public sector. To the extent that networks have become a 'fad' any test of their success has to be based on its capacity to deliver and perform, not only on its mere existence. Its effectiveness, however, can not rest only on whether it 'gets the job done'. It has to do so in a manner that allows the expression of democratic public values. To achieve this, its effectiveness has to be balanced against its capacity to include all relevant players. If networks become the site of policy capture and result in the systematic exclusion of significant actors – either of 'stakeholders' or broader community interest – they work against rather than contribute to democratic governance. As a locus of diffused power in a differentiated polity a network should work in the interests of the community it serves rather than only the sectional interests of its membership. While bonding relationships offer a bed rock of solidarity, especially among oppressed or minority groups, in a democratic polity the wider aim of networks should be to develop connections across society not to solidify in a manner that disconnects them from society.

The kind of leadership capacities required of the contemporary public service manager can be brought together under the term 'nodal leadership'. Here leadership (or 'leading from where you are') is expressed across the horizontal rather than up and down the hierarchical plane. The network itself, built around either common interests or functions, can be seen as a flat plane where people, with different levels of formal and informal authority, operate across the network at the same level. Leading within the network becomes a collective exercise. While the public manager operates across that plane and at that level they need to always be aware of the other dimensions, in particular 'public' and 'service', of their role. The particular 'node' they inhabit intersects with hierarchical leadership structures. While in terms of accountability, this hierarchical structure has the higher formal status this does not mean that they are not also accountable to their network.

Putnam's earlier Italian study distinguishes between vertical and horizontal networks and sees that the horizontal networks, those "involving the organization of individuals of equal status and resources as generating the kind of social capital for institutional success" (Putnam 1993, pp. 173-175). While in public service delivery networks formal authority may differ, the functioning dynamic of the network attempts the same kind of equality, not through equal power, but shared interest. Network accountability then is expressed as a function of keeping the network meaningfully and democratically connected. It is here that the successful public manager's 'navigation' becomes crucial to both the network and their own careers. To further complicate the process some actors, such as ministers, appear on both the horizontal and vertical planes. The relationships into and out of the

public servant's 'node' then may be best expressed as two functions of 'responsiveness'. Responsive to ministerial formal authority, through which traditional democratic account-ability is established, but also responsive to the network to ensure the transfer of knowledge and power across the network to achieve desired policy goals. A further distinction to keep in mind is that there is not a direct conduit between the two kinds of accountability because their organisational structures are ultimately incompatible. Ideally they 'lead' through becoming capacitors.

The politics of service delivery, therefore, is multi dimensional. The delivery of public services has always been political in the Laswellian sense of 'who gets what when and how?' While Harold Laswell's definition pointed to an elite theory of politics, networks can, while still being political in this sense, offer quite a different answer, when they devolve diffuse or fragment power. In some instances, political power rests with the government or the service deliverer, in others, for example in community based and administered housing co-operatives, power is devolved back to the community itself.

It is also highly political in the sense of negotiating interests and conflict. The dimensions of this sense of the political are not fully covered here, but they include, negotiation between new and old accountability structures, between government and community relationships, distinguishing between bridging and bonding social capital, negotiating intra- and intergovernmental relations in response to a 'whole of government' agendas and also, as I have argued here, between competing, legitimating narratives. This multi-dimensional political terrain requires skilled performance, not only in delivering services but in negotiating its politics. Mark Considine calls this: "The appropriate exercise of a navigational competence: That is, the proper use of authority to range freely across a multi relationship terrain in search of the most advantageous path to success" (2002, p. 22). The nautical metaphor is apt but the task is made even harder by there being fewer fixed points to navigate by. 'Proper authority', for example, can differ politically depending on the whether that authority is derived from horizontal networks or vertical governmental hierarchies; or whether they derive from the functional and political fragments of the changed and changing policy terrain.

List of Tables

12

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The Problem of Politics: Public Governance and Leadership

1   Introduction

Contemporary talk about public governance – as distinct from 'government' – emerged at roughly the same time as the introduction of the so-called managerialist reforms into the public sector. This coincidence was significant. The terms governance and managerialism each signalled an intention to break decisively with allegedly outmoded forms of administration. If governance meant something other than government (both are defined in dictionaries as the practice of continuous authority in a political system), it seemed to be in the lesser emphasis that the former placed on hierarchical organisation. Governance suggested a benign structure of mutually supportive, independently active parts rather than the hierarchical, authoritarian mode of rule traditionally associated with government. It also indicated a blurring of the boundary between government agencies and non-government actors, who had now become partners in responsibility for the provision of services and the maintenance of regulatory regimes. It implied, according to Rhodes (1996), a change in the very meaning of societal government. The concept was not without its sceptics (Marinetto 2003) and there was no particular consensus on exactly what set of phenomena it was supposed to cover (Kooiman 2003). Yet it was clear enough that the vogue for 'governance' was stimulated by a sense that a new way must be found of governing complex societies in a globalising environment, a way better suited to a dynamic, more thoroughly egalitarian and less deferential age.

Managerialism, promulgated as the antithesis of traditional bureaucratic administration, carried similar implications. Indeed Stoker (1998) asserted that 'governance' formed a reference point for challenging the central assumptions of traditional administration. The old bureaucracy had aimed to achieve regular and predictable outcomes through a system of strict command and control. It had worked by dividing operations into discrete competencies attached to interlocking offices manned by individuals habituated to following clear rules and authoritative instructions. A public functionary could survive, even thrive, within this structure by scrupulously adhering to prescriptive rules and processes while paying scant regard to actual results achieved. A typical bureaucrat not only lacked the freedom to vary authoritative prescriptions but − at least according to popular caricature − frequently gloried in the fact. Rigidities and absurdities undoubtedly resulted from thus caging human decisions in formal rules and arbitrary authority.

For a variety of reasons, many governments in the late twentieth century decided such inefficiency could no longer be tolerated. They embarked on a series of managerialist

reforms under the slogan 'managing for outcomes'. The pragmatic aims of the managerialist program – efficiency, economy and effectiveness – could be achieved, so it was argued, only if managers exhibited qualities of creativity, flexibility, and entrepreneurialism. The aim of the reform movement was therefore to create a cadre of managers with both the skills and freedom needed to run well-planned public programs in a way that optimally achieved clearly defined objectives. A necessary precondition for this was that authority, formerly hierarchically ordered, be devolved and more widely dispersed. Managers, unlike old-fashioned administrators, would not work under careful and continuous supervision but must be left free to manage. They must be granted discretionary power over the sourcing and deployment of budgets, over the implementation of policies and programs, and over the recruitment and rewarding of personnel. In an era of commercialisation and outsourcing, they must also have the freedom and capacity to procure services according to their own best judgement, and be able to negotiate and supervise contracts involving considerable sums of public money. They must learn to work in partnership with private and non-governmental organisations, and they must display initiative and be prepared to take calculated risks for the sake of better social outcomes. They must in fact be more than managers, they must be leaders – dynamic, visionary, innovative, exemplary.

The demand that public servants demonstrate leadership at every level of the service was almost if not quite unprecedented (van Wart 2003). It was not clear, however, what exact style of leadership was most appropriate to the public sector, even a reformed one. The models of leadership applied were, like so many of the reform initiatives, drawn from the private sector. Training programs tended to draw on an existing inspirational literature largely geared to corporate executives of the 'boldly-going' type (Robbins et al. 2001). Typical admonitions were that leaders never command followers but always persuade (Gardner 1990); they teach, inspire, show consideration, offer emotional support, set high standards, give frequent feedback, provide assurance in the midst of uncertainty, and bring clarity amidst confusion (DuBrin 2001); they are path makers and guides who establish values and directions, who lead by example, who question and innovate, who create visions of the future, and who energise people to develop their full potential (Parry 1996). All of this was highly idealistic rather than realistic, and almost certainly not accurately reflective of actual leadership practised amid the cut and thrust of private business. But even if public sector leaders proved able to acquire and demonstrate some of these qualities and attributes, the question remained whether there was anything distinctive about the leadership they could and should exhibit in the public sector.

Earlier in the reform process there had been a somewhat inconclusive debate on whether management techniques were readily transferable across sectors, in other words on whether management was a 'neutral' skill. The parallel debate on leadership has been either muted or absent, yet the central issue was the same. It related to the explicitly political character of the public sector. What special constraints, if any, did this highly political environment place on any form of leadership practised within it?

I want to address this question here in order to argue the reality and profound significance of such constraints. I suggest that the issue might be best approached by considering and contrasting the kind of leadership found in old bureaucratic administrations, and also the consequences of the destruction of that leadership at the hands of reformers. I begin, then, with the demise of the administrative class that the British referred to as 'mandarins'.

2   Destroying the Leadership of the Mandarins

Old-fashioned bureaucracy certainly did not lack leadership although it did not necessarily label it as such. Indeed, the professionalised, 'rational' bureaucracies of the nineteenth century posited a clear division between political leadership and an administrative apparatus meant faithfully to serve it; bureaucracies, at least in intention, were neutral and subservient instruments of an authoritative political will, whether that will was democratic or autocratic. Yet despite this instrumentality − and in fact in order to make it effective − there existed significant space for genuine leadership within the bureaucracy, most specifically at its peak.

Nineteenth century reforms abolished amateurism and cronyism in Western administrations and created a fully professionalised service that ostensibly recognised and rewarded merit, established life-time career structures, and awarded significant honour to career bureaucrats. In this new environment, the heads of the service became important and influential (though seldom publicly known) figures. They formed a new elite corps recruited from the brightest and best, often educated in prestigious schools specifically geared to bureaucratic training. This training was often described (as it still is today in France or Singapore) as 'technocratic', implying an apolitical, problem-solving approach to administration. Such a characterisation was always disingenuous, but the hypocrisy served a necessary political end.

Once at the top of the administrative hierarchy, career bureaucrats found themselves strategically located at the critical boundary between politics and administration, a boundary they were careful to preserve and police. Public service mandarins possessed an intimate knowledge of all formal and informal aspects of the bureaucracy and commanded the strategic heights of a pyramidal organisation that was their effective fiefdom. Their leadership in this sense was unchallenged. Yet the mandarins were also familiar with the needs, habits and aims of elected policy-makers at the highest level. Given their advisory functions and their security of tenure, these permanent chieftains of the civil service were in a unique, and uniquely secure, position to influence the shape and direction of almost all public policy. It was a role that required the deepest experience, the most sensitive alertness to political currents, the utmost discretion, and the most delicate judgment – in other words the highest political prudence. It was little wonder that the best examples of this non-partisan (but hardly apolitical) breed were often credited with being the real authors and guardians of good long-term governance (Dale 1941; O'Halpin 1989; Fry 2000; and compare Theakston 2000 with Rhodes/ Weller 2001).

The mandarins were highly conscious of their power, disguise it though they may. Their ability to guide and lead while playing the faithful servant (famously satirised in the old 'Yes Minister' and 'Yes Prime Minister' television series) was generally crucial to their effectiveness. Their discreet leadership was strengthened by their public invisibility, which protected them from a populace that might become suspicious of appointed officials capable of usurping democratic power.

Yet their power and prestige could not, in the end, thwart the overt political will of elected leaders if the latter ever got fed up with playing Bertie Wooster to their Permanent Secretaries' Jeeves – as in the 1970s they did. A relationship that had once been intimate and valued (however occasionally strained) now became intolerable. A shifting ideological climate coincided with increasing fiscal constraints and increased demands on government to alter perceptions of the whole machinery of public bureaucracy. Western governments now believed themselves to be confronted by two interrelated imperatives: The need to limit public expenditure and the need to gain control of the bureaucracy. Indeed the latter appeared to be a prerequisite for the former. A vast, permanent bureaucracy with a monopoly on technical knowledge represented an alternative repository of power that could be used to defeat governmental purposes rather than fulfil them, either through hostility to those purposes, through sheer inertia, or simply to preserve entrenched bureaucratic interests. Strong and secure civil service heads, far from being loyal servants of government who reliably tendered frank and fearless advice, might

instead be a fifth column subverting at every turn the legitimate aims of elected governments.

As electoral pressure increased on politicians, the huge expenditure of taxpayers' money on an allegedly self-serving and errant bureaucracy was argued to be unjustifiable. Governments drew on a conveniently existing critical literature that characterised bureaucracies as bloated, unbalanced and oppressive of the public they were meant to serve. The administrative apparatus was driven, so it was alleged, not by public interest but by the self-interest of empire-building bureaucrats in competition with other bureaucrats for scarce resources (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1973). Governments argued the need to regain control of their bureaucracies in order to ensure more reliable and more efficient outcomes. All the waves of reform that followed had (at least) those aims in view.

The old mandarinate thus succumbed to the imperatives of so-called New Public Management. These imperatives included: a shift from inputs and processes to outputs and outcomes; more measurement and quantification; a preference for specialized, 'flat' and autonomous organizational structures; substitution of contractual for hierarchical relationships; market type mechanisms for delivery of public goods; and a consumer and individual orientation (Pollitt 2003, pp. 27-28). The old sites of leadership (and some would say of real practical wisdom) in the higher reaches of the service were dismantled by the removal of tenure and the introduction of fixed-term, performance-based contracts for senior public servants. The independence of the latter was purposely destroyed and their policy role often usurped by hired political advisers who were not part of the bureaucratic apparatus (Tiernan 2007). Rather than high policy their business became management, and their task to make the bureaucracy more consistently obedient to the will of elected ministers. A study of the 'mandarin cadre' of Whitehall after the advent of Margaret Thatcher's conservative government in 1979 (when the modern reform process was initiated in Britain), showed that senior bureaucrats had become more 'politically passive' as they moved from policy formulation and advice to focus on efficiency and costs of service delivery, in other words, to efficient management (Richards 1997, pp. 235-237, 2000, p. 115).

There was considerable irony in the fact that the process of making senior servants more dependent on partisan politicians should be widely characterised as 'politicising' the upper levels of the bureaucracy. By this was meant that senior servants were now dependent on the politicians who employed them and liable to share their fate if the

government fell. Their loyalty was (at least structurally) no longer to higher, 'apolitical' ideals of professional public service but to representatives of a particular political party. If this made them more political in a partisan sense, it was calculated to make them much less political in the wider sense of being politically sensitive sources capable of swaying policy through an informed and independent judgement.

Yet, the politicisation of the bureaucracy was a far wider, and more structurally significant, phenomenon than this blurring of the old boundary between political and administrative spheres. The apparent sharpness of that boundary was, after all, largely an illusion sustained by the concealed leadership of the discreetly political mandarins. Rather, the old way of conceptualizing the boundary no longer made sense once capacities and qualities appropriate to the political sphere (including the mandarinate) came to be expected at all levels of the service.

The managerialist agenda required that governments deliberately attempt to refashion the average public servant into a radically different kind of being, one more intelligently responsive to public demands and better able to achieve more effective outcomes for tax monies spent. Blind rule-following was out, flexibility, innovation and entrepreneurialism were in (Osborne/ Gaebler 1992). What was demanded was a capacity for independent and discretionary judgment, ethical competence, and the ability to manage and lead rather than merely administer. Even as the freedom of the mandarins was curtailed, greater freedom of decision and action was to be granted to managers at lower levels of the service. Public servants at every level were to be multi-skilled and multi-tasked and given discretionary responsibilities for program design, implementation and evaluation. They were required, under a corporatist model, to understand their place in the grand scheme of things and to appreciate their role in faithfully translating policies into action, or in feeding information back into the policy process so as to enable improvement. They thus became more closely and consciously concerned with policy than ever before, from analysis, consultation and advice through to implementation and evaluation. They became, in other words, players in the policy game rather than mere functionaries.

Since policy is inherently and irreducibly political, politicisation of a certain kind now went all the way down. Public servants were obliged to become political, not in the partisan sense but in their conscious involvement in, and influence on, policy decisions and actions impinging directly on public outcomes. But having once assumed real political responsibilities, they now also became more exposed to public scrutiny and the awkward political and personal consequences of missteps. The general diffusion of

responsibility allowed politicians, whenever it proved politically expedient, to rend the old curtain of bureaucratic invisibility in order to point the finger of blame downward.

3   The Hidden Problem of Politics

The project of taking political control of the bureaucracy by destroying the power of the mandarins was thus accompanied by a project to create a better system of overall governance. The loss of independence at the top was arguably compensated, or balanced, by a larger grant of discretion and responsibility throughout the service. The intention was to transform the administration from a lumbering, process-obsessed beast into a genuinely intelligent organisation peopled by intelligently active and responsive public servants.

This was a laudable goal, but it presented certain problems that were perhaps not clearly understood. The central problem, one which had helped kick off the reforms in the first place, was the ancient one of balancing freedom with political control. Maintaining too tight a control on individuals seemed to produce ignorance and stupidity, leading to poor political consequences in the long run; discretionary responsibility was therefore granted to enable intelligent actions and sensible outcomes. But responsibility may always be abused or poorly fulfilled, and in a highly political environment such failures can easily present the kind of problems or dangers that Ministers habitually seek to avoid. The same conundrum that had bedevilled the issue of mandarin power – how good, independent decision-making can be combined with effective political control – now pervaded the entire bureaucracy.

One governmental response to this dilemma was to supplement greater discretion with new and different forms of discipline intended to direct freedom into virtuous channels. These included: the discipline of the market, real or simulated; the requirement that proper technical procedures, such as cost-benefit analysis, be applied in project management; the demand that policy options be exposed to multivariate interests and opinions via broad and extensive internal and external consultations; the imposition of strict reporting requirements to ensure that discretionary budgetary spending was justified by adequate or superior outcomes (sanctions for incompetence or failure being of course implied); the general use of Key Performance Indicators to monitor both program and individual performances. Taken together these represented, in effect, an attempt to constrain public servants toward the kind of prudential judgment and political discretion that had once been the pride and hallmark of the mandarin cadre.

The trouble with these disciplines was that they tended to present fundamentally political questions − the very kind requiring sophisticated prudential judgment − as ones that could be solved either by the rationality of the market, rational technique, or otherwise through adequate consultation (for further analysis see Kane/ Patapan 2006; on the confusions of consultation see Kane/ Bishop 2002). What was really being asked of ordinary public servants, if only implicitly, was that they display and employ the acute political knowledge and instincts that had once been expected only of mandarins, even as they were admonished to remain strictly apolitical. The moral and legal demand that public servants be apolitical is meant, of course, to preclude partisanship that might affect service to the elected government of the day, but the distinction between this and a more general conception of the political was never clearly formulated. The result, not surprisingly, was confusion. Moreover, since public servants found that they could manipulate or effectively circumvent all the new disciplines in order, quite understandably, to preserve their own reputations and positions, confusion often turned into creeping cynicism. Fine and apparently rational managerialist prescriptions began to seem a mere gloss concealing darker political realities that actually guided governmental activity.

The new generation of public servants soon learnt by experience the deeply political nature of their enterprise, but few of the extensive training programs they undertook made note of it or gave them the means, understanding or even permission to cope with it. Even managers who succeeded in operating effectively by virtue of a developed political intelligence were liable to feel afflicted by a hovering sense of illegitimacy. Such feelings were more likely to be exacerbated than soothed by the new emphasis on ethics in public service that accompanied managerial reform.

The ethical nature of public administration had formerly been taken for granted, seemingly embedded in the very idea of a 'neutral', instrumental public sector serving a constitutional democracy. The ethical demands placed on the average public servant were, however, hardly onerous, amounting to little more than the need to perform one's designated function and keep one's nose clean. But managerialism's broadening of individual responsibility, bringing with it the risk of greater discretionary irresponsibility, changed everything. The regime of rules and authority, which had demanded only compliance and obedience, had been replaced by an order of values that demanded ethical understanding and intelligent responsiveness. Certainly, the reforms introduced greater opportunities for straightforward criminal conduct. The involvement of public servants in processes of 'contracting out' and tendering, for example, enlarged the potential for corruption, fraud and waste. But whether the main risk was seen to be recklessness, fraud

or folly, it seemed that discretion had to be made safer by encouraging a more sophisticated appreciation among public sector workers of the ethical dimensions and consequences of their acts or omissions. Legislated ethical principles, codes of conduct, ethics units and ethics training programs were instituted everywhere (Kernaghan 2003). An 'applied ethics industry' arose to serve the needs of the new public sector, and the volume of work on public sector ethics grew (Cooper 1991, 2001; Gortner 1991; Chapman 1993; Frederickson 1993; Berman/ West/ Bonczek 1998; Gawthrop 1998; van Wart 1998; Rohr 1998).

Yet this emphasis on ethics, laudable in itself, once again served to obscure rather than clarify the essentially political nature of public service action. Indeed political-ethical tensions were compounded by the fact that some aspects of the managerialist ethos − for example the emphasis on risk-taking for the sake of results − could be seen as promoting an 'entrepreneurial ethic' whose values were at odds with those of constitutional democracy (Terry 1993). Such a possibility pointed to the problematic nature of the demand that public sector managers show ethical as well as practical leadership in the new public service. In addition to displaying initiative and enterprise in the design and delivery of public services, they were expected to play a major role in establishing a genuinely ethical culture. Such a culture could hardly be expected to emerge unless consistently fostered from above, for leaders were not only initiators and mobilisers but also moral exemplars who set the standards of conduct and decision-making expected of their followers. The leader-manager's task was, in effect, to create anew throughout the whole service the ethos of responsible governance that had once characterised the old mandarinate at its best.

The word 'ethos' is of special significance here, for its meaning in the original Greek is 'character'. It had been precisely on the character, both collective and individual, of the mandarins that the hope of continuously good government had once rested. This character had been fostered through social class, elite education, the winnowing of talent, long experience, and the careful cultivation of an exclusivist ésprit de corps among a privileged few into whose keeping the deep secrets of government were entrusted. These few were expected to perpetuate the traditions of discretion and inner knowledge that enabled them to balance the potentially conflicting demands of good governance and democratic legitimacy.

Even such a brief description should give some idea of the heroic dimensions of the task that the managerialist transformation implied as it sought to inculcate a spirit of genuine

leadership in the new bureaucracy. The values, perspectives and political talents of a highly-trained elite had now to be inculcated throughout the service − with the additional demand that secretiveness be replaced by openness and transparency. This inevitably meant a greater focus than hitherto on the personal character of a mass of individual employees. It was no accident that training courses in ethics were as concerned with the 'good character' of public servants as with their overt behaviours. The inner character of a public servant had once been a purely private matter, of no interest to supervisors provided external actions were in conformity with rules and instructions. Once discretion had been granted, however, and the risk of indiscretion correspondingly courted, character became paramount. Gawthrop (1998, p. 139) criticised mere adherence to procedural correctness as denoting a hollow, quasi-ethical life that produced a "government of persons without fault, operating in a society without judgment, through the administration of a constitution without purpose". Behn (1998, p. 3) argued similarly that the source of pernicious bureaucratic power lay precisely in the ability to refuse to exercise initiative by hiding behind rules and legality. To escape this inertial weight, a renovated ethics regime emphasised individual character and demanded the 'internalising' of ethical principles. It required not just public conformity, but personal engagement and even transformation, and a developed capacity to judge ethically in complex situations.

Yet ethical character was, for the most part, narrowly construed as being principally concerned with recognizing and preventing wrong-doing and injustice, whether intentional or inadvertent. It scarcely comprehended a wider ethic that addressed the difficulty of taking properly prudent decisions and acting wisely in a deeply political world, not to mention a world that Max Weber (1991) once described as ethically irrational. The public sector had been reformed to make it simultaneously more responsive to the legitimate demands of elected governments and more creatively responsive to a public whose needs and demands were ultimately the reason for its existence. This inevitably exposed the service to a storm of conflicting and competing demands that could not possibly all be met even if available resources had been more abundant than they ever are. Solutions to policy problems could thus never be purely rational or technical, but must necessarily be political.

4   Leadership and Public Governance

Effective leadership in the public sector certainly requires ethical integrity and technical competency, but it also demands more; it requires a particular sensitivity to the constraints

imposed by a unique political environment and an ability to act prudently within it. The general avoidance or overlooking of the political dimension of administration that I have described here defines the essence of the problem facing administrators as they attempt to graft the idea of leadership onto public governance. It is a problem that has been exacerbated by the often uncritical acceptance of the validity of many of the central ideas informing managerialism. Back in 2000, Pollitt and Bouckaert examined the achievements of managerialist reform across ten countries and gave it a very poor report card. They argued that the rhetoric of reform far outweighed the reality in terms of incontestable evidence of improvement, while the gap between the view from the top and experience at the grassroots was so wide as to provoke scepticism or cynicism. They criticised the faddishness of the reform agenda and the extreme flimsiness of many of the contemporary 'principles' of good public management (Pollitt/ Bouckaert 2000, p. 190).

It is not at all obvious that sounder principles have emerged over the succeeding years. This may be because, as the authors noted (p. 154), many of the expressed aims of managerial reform were potentially contradictory − for example: increasing political control over bureaucracy while freeing managers to manage (and simultaneously empowering service consumers); promoting flexibility and innovation while increasing citizen trust and governmental legitimacy; prioritising savings while improving per-formance. The authors argued that these might be made non-contradictory under certain circumstances, but in fact seldom were. There may, for instance, be no necessary contradiction between innovation and maintaining the stability and continuity required for public legitimacy − indeed successful innovation may sometimes promote legitimacy. In many contexts, however, managers will face a trade-off between innovation and public values like stability, continuity, predictability, trust, and equity. "Such contexts confront public service managers with difficult problems of balancing divergent desiderata, and possibly disadvantaging certain sections of the community, even if an improved service is supplied to other sections of the community" (Pollitt/ Bouckaert 2000, p. 159).

What Pollitt and Bouckaert were implicitly adverting to here was the essentially political nature of public sector leadership, which must make its choices stick even when they do not please everyone (as they never can), and sometimes when they please very few indeed. The number of desiderata that a private sector CEO must confront and fulfil is much more limited, and at the end of the day all will be forgiven if the bottom line shows a significant profit and shareholders receive satisfactory dividends. Public sector 'shareholders' − that is, members of the public − are much less tolerant. This is not just because the public sector is entrusted with and wholly dependent on public monies. It is

because governments have been granted coercive authority to command (among many other things) that the public render to it a portion of its wealth in order to provide broad public benefits. No private corporation, however economically powerful, has this authority (though some may use their wealth to corruptly suborn public authority), nor this responsibility. The public sector can therefore never be assimilated to the private, and it is folly to try.

Because democratic forms of government are founded on values of representation, transparency, accountability and the toleration (indeed encouragement) of dissent, governmental choices, however sensible and necessary they may appear from some 'rational' angle, are inevitably contested and therefore intrinsically difficult. They can seldom be simply authoritatively imposed; they must be politically defended and politically won. Every democratic politician knows, or quickly learns, the political danger of taking an unpopular action, promoting a controversial policy, or uttering a single careless word. The mandarins understood this too, and understood the delicacy of their role in protecting elected ministers from the cold winds of politics while pursuing policies they believed, on mature judgment, to be for the greater public good.

The dismantlement of the mandarins' discreet form of leadership and the transfer of some of their responsibilities to lower levels of the service did not dissolve the essential, political question that their role was intended to answer: how to navigate and accommodate the conflicting and contradictory forces of democracy while fulfilling the overarching objective of continuously good government. The combination of democratically elected representatives, elite mandarinate, and obediently subservient bureaucracy comprised an integrated system of governance that, for a long time and at least in some places, met and satisfied many of the complex political demands of a modern state. No doubt it had reached the limits of its usefulness in a fast-changing world, and certainly the sins of the old bureaucracy were by no means merely popular fictions. Nor is the idea of a more generally nimble and responsive organisation, in which intelligence is distributed throughout rather than concentrated at the peak, merely a fond hope. Even modern armies, in which command and control remains a sine qua non, provide training that encourages flexibility and initiative down to ground level, so that engaged troops facing unforeseen and in principle unforeseeable circumstances may respond resourcefully, even unexpectedly, in order to reach designated objectives. And such a radically revised system of governance undoubtedly requires leadership of a high order if it is to become an operative reality. But then the important question for the modern public service becomes, 'What kind of leadership?'.

It is pointless and even dangerous simply to admonish public sector leaders to be boldly innovative without sensitising them to the peculiarities of the context in which they are being asked to make things new. Certainly one sees, from time to time, political leadership that scorns existing constraints, contemptuously dismissing what the George W. Bush administration called the 'reality-based' approach to politics in favour of creating its own realities through vigorous action. This is traditionally described as hubris, and generally receives its comeuppance sooner rather than later if existing realities prove either extremely recalcitrant to, or even impossible of, change. The constraining realities of democratic government will exist just so long as it remains constitutionally democratic, however many reforms it may undergo. The central task for the public servant remains what it was for the mandarins − to provide and deliver good policy to a sensitive and demanding public while remaining conspicuously obedient to the government elected by that public and while preserving respect for the legal and constitutional order that contains and constrains them all.

This is, needless to say, easier said than done and, indeed, is a task fraught with constant peril. The room for manoeuvre enjoyed by public sector leaders is generally much narrower than that of a CEO in private industry, and their practical choices are always more closely circumscribed than those of private agents. Their entrepreneurialism is bound to be restrained by the fact that they inhabit and must act within a complex political and legal environment where failures or missteps, even slight ones, can be immensely consequential in political terms. This is not to say that boldness is always out of the question − certainly some of the legendary British mandarins could be very bold in pulling into line ignorant or recalcitrant ministers with an inadequate grasp of their job. But the public sector leader must have a deep and thorough appreciation of the political conditions and constraints within which he or she may successfully essay boldness.

Norma Riccucci provides the example of Eileen Clausen, who served in the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under President Reagan (Riccucci 2000, pp. 20-21). Clausen had a central role in negotiating and renegotiating the Montreal Protocol on curbing the production of Chloro-Fluoro-Carbons (CFCs), and later took very large initiatives to preserve the effect of this agreement when the Reagan administration became intent on watering it down, eventually gaining Reagan's formal backing for an official signing-off on the agreement. Though in effective political contest with an executive to which she was theoretically subservient, Clausen defended the legitimacy of her actions by leaning on the established mission of the EPA and on the fact that the US had (along with 23 other nations) agreed to the Protocol. This was bold indeed, and

Riccucci describes it as an instance of excellence in administrative leadership. Yet it is the kind of action that may only have been possible in an extremely fragmented political system like the American (on which see Behn 1998). Similar action in Westminster systems may easily appear (or be made to appear) a usurpation of the democratic prerogative and an exercise in 'administrative tyranny'.

In general the good public sector leader is less likely to be the zealous visionary type that stalks so much of the current literature than the clear-headed, cautiously pragmatic kind. 'Over-the top' bravado will seldom seem appropriate. The public sector remains, and will remain, far more rule-bound and legalised than the private; if public sector leaders are to safely navigate the web of rules they will need to be acutely sensitive to this fact. And because their work is in the nature of a public trust and their position defined within a structure of democratic political authority, the legitimacy of any actions they take is always far more open to challenge than those of their private sector counterparts. Prudent managers will be those who are capable of acting and leading effectively without endangering this legitimacy.

5   Conclusion

The burden of this chapter not been to argue that the new system of public governance sought by so many contemporary governments is a pipe dream. And of course it would be a mistake to indulge in nostalgia for old bureaucracies whose sins were not wholly a figment of the imagination of public choice theorists. The fostering of blind obedience, aggressive passivity and bureaucratic inflexibility do not make for intelligent ad-ministration. The creation of a genuinely and broadly intelligent public service organi-sation capable of acting more responsively, creatively and flexibly is therefore highly desirable and undoubtedly possible, if difficult. Moreover, good and effective leadership will be absolutely crucial to making the hope a reality.

The enthusiasm of early reformers for change was thus not misplaced, but their enthusiasm was founded on ideas about leadership and innovation that were too far divorced from the very particular public context in which they were applied. I have returned to the leadership of the old mandarins here only to point out that the political logic of their reign has not been superseded by time and events even if their practical usefulness or political acceptability has. The aim of balancing good governmental policy with democratic legitimacy remains a central task of administrators, and this means,

nowadays, administrators at all levels. This is a fundamentally political task, and it infects all public service work with an unavoidably political dimension. No amount of training in technical analysis, project management, budgetary reporting or applied ethics can substitute for the development of an acutely sensitive political instinct that has thoroughly absorbed this fact.

It is undoubtedly true that prudent political judgment and action already occurs in many public sectors, otherwise it would be hard to imagine that bureaucracies would continue to work even as well as they do. People often sensibly learn to do what they find needs to be done to achieve a given task (Pollitt/ Bouckaert 2000, p. 190). Yet it is usually difficult to acknowledge or justify such action in purely managerialist language. Conscientious public servants often operate effectively and achieve results in spite of, rather than because of, the latest reforming prescriptions. The essential leadership task is to give such people permission to act as the best of them are inclined to act anyway, which can only be done by acknowledging and accommodating the inherently political nature of their task. They must be taught to distinguish between the politics of partisanship (which when illegitimately pursued by public servants amounts to disloyalty to the democratic principle) and the ineradicable politics of public administration (which they must learn to practise and negotiate with a skill approaching that of the best of the old mandarins). Only thus will the dangers of hubris be obviated by the rigours of realism, confusion be replaced by clarity, and cynicism give way to healthy appreciation of what it truly means to be a dedicated and effective public servant.

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Governance - Wandel als Lernprozess

1   Zusammenfassung und Überblick

Ziel des Beitrages ist es, den Wandel von Governance-Formen als Lernprozess zu thematisieren. Dazu wird zunächst der Lerntypus ermittelt (transformatives Lernen), der bei einem solchen Wandel im Vordergrund steht. Mit Blick auf das Konzept der Public Governance als Lernmodell wird anschließend ein differenziertes Bild der politischen und managementbezogenen Implikationen für den Lernbedarf aufgezeigt. Die anschließend analysierten Lernerfahrungen im Zuge von Verwaltungsreformen weisen einerseits auf Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung und die Tendenz zu ‚gemischten Lernformen' hin, andererseits lassen sie jedoch auch erkennen, dass der öffentliche Sektor im Zuge dieser Entwicklung seine Lernkompetenz deutlich ausgebaut hat.

2   Management im Governance-Kontext

In der politik- und verwaltungswissenschaftlichen Literatur ist ‚Public Governance' in den letzten Jahren verstärkt in den Blickpunkt getreten. Im Rahmen der Diskussion um Modernisierungen des politisch-administrativen Systems wird dieses Konzept, programmatisch gefasst als ein neues, auf dem Weg befindliches Reformleitbild, zunehmend in den Vordergrund gerückt (Jann 2002a; Voigt/ Walkenhaus 2006; Klenk/ Nullmeier 2004). Dabei wird ‚Public Governance' einerseits als Leitbild und Reformstrategie begriffen, also spezifisch adressiert und von anderen Leitbildern und Reformstrategien abgegrenzt. Dies geschieht z.B. durch eine Gegenüberstellung von ‚Governance' und ‚Management' als alternative Leitbilder. Dabei wird Public Governance als ein Leitbild entwickelt, das als weitere ‚Brennstufe' der Verwaltungsreform das zuvor dominierende ‚Managementleitbild' mindestens partiell überholen und in einen größeren (politikwissen-schaftlichen) Zusammenhang stellen soll (Jann 2002a). Andererseits wird der Begriff auch allgemeiner und eher als analytische Kategorie gefasst. So sehen etwa Klenk/ Nullmeier (2004, S. 44) die ‚Governance-Reform' als „nichts Originäres oder Neues". Vielmehr betonen sie, dass mit der Einführung des Governance-Begriffes eine „... klarere und vergleichende Betrachtung von scheinbar höchst divergenten Organisationsformen ..." möglich sei.

Wenn es darum geht, den Wandel von Governance-Formen als Lernprozess zu thema-tisieren, dann müssen zunächst die Begriffe Leitbild, Governance und Management in

eine sinnvolle ‚Auslegeordnung' gebracht werden. In welcher Beziehung stehen Governance und Management, inwiefern kommt ihnen Leitbildcharakter zu und welche Rolle spielen dabei kollektive Lernprozesse? Konkret: Bedeutet Governance-Wandel den Wechsel vom Management- auf das Governance-Leitbild, wie er etwa von Jann (2002a) beschrieben wird? Steht also am Anfang des Lernprozesses eine Ökonomisierung des politisch-administrativen Systems und der Managerialismus und an dessen Ende eine „politikwissenschaftliche Läuterung" des politisch-administrativen Selbstverständnisses in Form eines „neo-weberianischen Staates" (Bouckaert 2004, S. 34ff.)? Steht der Managementbegriff also ‚gegen' den Governance-Begriff? Oder findet in der aktuellen Diskussion nicht vielleicht – partiell und insbesondere im deutschen Sprachraum – eine Konkurrenzierung von eigentlich zusammengehörenden Konzepten statt? Dafür spricht, dass im politik- und verwaltungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs der Managementbegriff vorwiegend auf das reduziert wird, was in der Vergangenheit unter dem Begriff ‚New Public Management' oder ‚Neue Steuerungsmodelle' diskutiert wurde. Dagegen spricht, dass in der aktuellen ‚Governance-Diskussion' Management als ein spezifischer politisch-administrativer Steuerungsstil aufgefasst wird, der die ‚Steuerung' komplexer Netzwerke vor dem Hintergrund eines Gewährleistungsstaates zu bewältigen hat. Das wiederum ist nur möglich, wenn man Management als einen integralen Bestandteil von Governance versteht.[1]

Im Folgenden wird deshalb ‚Governance' als ein übergeordneter Ordnungsrahmen für die normative Ausrichtung des politisch-administrativen Systems verstanden. Dem normativen Kern einer Governance-Form kommt Leitbildcharakter zu (z.B. das Leitbild des Gewährleistungsstaates). Solche Formen beinhalten Steuerungsmodi, die in formal-rechtlicher sowie faktischer Weise (von Werder 2004, S. 160ff.) einen ordnungspolitischen Rahmen für das Zusammenspiel der im politisch-administrativen System verflochtenen Akteure vorgeben. Adressiert werden dabei Führungsstrukturen, Kooperationsformen, Koordinationsinstrumente und Evaluations- sowie Kontrollmechanismen, mit denen „... komplementäre Steuerungsformen zwischen Staat, Markt und Netzwerken" geregelt werden. Damit entsteht zugleich „... eine Leitlinie für die Analyse komplexer Strukturen kollektiven Handelns" (Voigt/ Walkenhaus 2006, S. 162ff.).

In diesem Sinne lassen sich die in der aktuellen Diskussion unterschiedenen Leitbilder der Verwaltungsreform als Skizzen unterschiedlicher Governance-Formen betrachten, die Vorstellungen darüber enthalten, mit welcher Steuerungslogik gearbeitet werden soll. Folgt man den üblicherweise unterschiedenen Phasen des Verwaltungswandels und den damit jeweils verbundenen Reformleitbildern, wird die Entwicklung in Deutschland seit

Kriegsende üblicherweise mit den Schlagworten ‚demokratischer Staat', ‚aktiver Staat', ‚schlanker Staat' und ‚aktivierender Staat' beschrieben.[2] In diesen Leitbegriffen kommen – grob unterschieden – mindestens drei Steuerungsmodi (oder Governance-Formen) zum Ausdruck: Präferenz für hierarchische Steuerung – Annäherung an marktliche und wettbewerbsbezogene Steuerungsformen – Steuerung durch und mit Netzwerkstrukturen.

Governance-Wandel soll deshalb im Folgenden als strukturell maßgebliche Veränderung eines solchen Ordnungsrahmens verstanden werden. Damit ist gleichbedeutend, dass davon nur gesprochen werden kann, wenn sich die jeweils präferierten Steuerungsmodi substanziell ändern, wenn also eine neue Logik zugrunde gelegt werden soll.

Mit Blick auf die oben unterschiedenen Reformleitbilder lässt sich festhalten, dass die bisherige Entwicklung des politisch-administrativen Systems und die damit verbundene Verwaltungsreform durch mindestens zwei Arten des Governance-Wandels gekennzeichnet waren: a) von der Hierarchie zum Markt und b) vom Markt zum Netzwerk, wobei die letztgenannte Form der Netzwerksteuerung gegenwärtig noch als Zukunftsmodell gehandelt wird. Jede dieser Governance-Formen impliziert zugleich auch ein unterschiedliches Managementverständnis. Deshalb ist es nicht weiter verwunderlich, dass der primär managementorientierte Forscher oder Praktiker beim Studium der politik- und verwaltungswissenschaftlichen Governance-Debatte eine Vielzahl von Themen auffindet, die ihn seit Jahren beschäftigen. Das Anwendungsfeld der Managementlehre ist aber nach wie vor dominierend die Wirtschaft mit ihren entsprechend privatwirtschaftlich verfassten Organisationen. Das zuvor genannte Reformleitbild ‚Management' lässt nun offenkundig werden, dass dieses eher privatwirtschaftlich ausgerichtete Managementwissen im Zuge der Verwaltungsentwicklung auch auf öffentliche Organisationen/ Verwaltungen übertragen wurde. Damit verbunden war zwangsläufig eine Annäherung an die eher marktlich und wettbewerbsbezogen ausgerichteten Steuerungsvorstellungen, in deren ‚Feuer' die im Rahmen der Neuen Steuerung importierten Managementkonzepte gehärtet wurden. Dabei zeigt sich, – und dies überrascht kaum – dass je marktnäher und wettbewerbsbezogener das jeweilige Managementkonzept ist, desto größer fallen die Umsetzungsprobleme in der Praxis öffentlicher Verwaltungen aus. Das Thema Strategisches Management ist hierfür besonders kennzeichnend.[3]

Wenn aber sowohl unter dem politikwissenschaftlichen Governance- als auch unter dem Management-Begriff ähnliche Steuerungsformen und -logiken unterschieden werden, und Dezentralisierung, Entbürokratisierung, Selbststeuerung, (teil-) autonome Akteure usw. von keiner Seite als Monopol angesehen werden können, wenn Netzwerke als ‚hybride'

Strukturen zwischen Hierarchie und Markt oder – wie ebenfalls unterstellt – als eigenständige dritte Steuerungslogik sowohl in der Governance- als auch in der Managementdiskussion der letzten Jahre eine erhebliche Rolle spielen, so scheint auf der Hand zu liegen, dass sich diese beiden Diskurse in nutzbringender Weise verbinden lassen.

Dies wird von Koch (2006, S. 6) wie folgt auf den Punkt gebracht: „... (wir) gehen hier davon aus, dass es ... zu ersten, recht grundlegenden Umbauten des Managements von Staat und Verwaltung (von ‚Public Governance' als strategisch funktionaler Positionierung im Rahmen des gesamtgesellschaftlichen Handlungsgefüges/ Management als entsprechend typmäßig auszurichtende bzw. zu variierende Form der Planung und Entscheidungsfindung) gekommen ist...".

Damit bezieht sich Governance (als ‚Ordnungsrahmen') auf das gesamtgesellschaftliche Handlungsgefüge und Management auf eine möglichst kongeniale ‚Konfiguration' von (auf den jeweiligen Governance-Typ ausgerichteten) Funktionen und Prozessen (der Führung, Entscheidung, Koordination, Kontrolle usw.) zur Umsetzung des (im Governance-Typ) zugrunde gelegten ‚gesamtgesellschaftlichen Handlungsgefüges'.

Pointiert kommt Management damit die Aufgabe zu, das Steuerungswissen bereitzustellen, welches für die Umsetzung der im jeweiligen Governance-Typ enthaltenen Ordnungslogik benötigt wird. Dies geschieht über Visionen/ Leitbilder und Strategien sowie Strukturen und Programme, die sich auf die vorgenannten Aufgabenstellungen beziehen (Klimecki/ Laßleben/ Thomae 2000). Da es sich hier zunächst um eine idealtypische Betrachtung handelt, dürfte klar sein, dass Management durch die Governance-Form zwar prädisponiert aber nicht determiniert wird. Realiter besteht somit ein erheblicher Gestaltungsspielraum. So bedeutet z.B. das von einer ‚Public Governance' prädisponierte Netzwerkmanagement lediglich, dass es sich hierbei um eine primäre Orientierung handelt.

3   Governance-Wandel als Lernimpuls

Es ist offensichtlich, dass jeder Wandel einer Governance-Form Lernbedarf erzeugt, ohne den seine Umsetzung nicht funktionieren würde. Das ‚Management' dieses Lernbedarfs[4] besteht also ganz wesentlich darin, die für solche Veränderungen notwendigen Lerninhalte zu bestimmen und die zu ihrem Erwerb notwendigen Lernprozesse zu fördern.[5] Die Lerninhalte ergeben sich dabei notwendigerweise aus den Zielsetzungen des

jeweiligen Governance-Typs. Im Vordergrund stehen nachfolgend insbesondere die (kollektiven) Lernprozesse, die mit einem Governance-Wandel zwangsläufig verbunden sind, wenn dieser als eine substanzielle Veränderung der Steuerungslogik verstanden wird. Es ist deshalb nahe liegend, einen solchen Wandel mit Hilfe von Konzepten und Begriffen des Organisationalen Lernens zu interpretieren:[6]

– Vision und Leitbild als Lernauslöser: Governance-Formen können beschrieben werden als ein dynamisches Konstrukt, als eine Momentaufnahme in einem fortlaufenden und komplexen 'gesamtgesellschaftlichen Lernprozess'. Als Leitbilder sind sie allerdings 'strategisch fixiert' und liefern einen visionären Lernauftrag. Mit Blick auf die zuvor unterschiedenen vier Reformphasen kommt einer solchen Momentaufnahme durchschnittlich eine Zykluszeit von etwa 15 Jahren mit einem entsprechend langen Lernprozess zu.[7] Aufgrund dieses dynamischen Charakters lassen sich in jeder Governance-Form neben den genannten visionären (transformativen) auch adaptive (erfahrungsbasierte) Lernaktivitäten finden, mit denen der eingeschlagene Veränderungspfad angepasst und optimiert werden soll.[8] Ein Governance-Wandel kristallisiert sich dabei sowohl durch die erfahrungsbasierte Abgrenzung von einem früheren Governance-System als auch durch den Entwurf einer neuen, andersartigen Steuerungslogik heraus. In dieser visionären Zuspitzung kommt der Leitbildcharakter von Governance-Formen zum Ausdruck. Insofern ist der primäre Lernauslöser die Differenz von Vision vs. Wirklichkeit, und adaptive Lernprozesse (Erwartung vs. Ergebnis) sind zunächst sekundär.[9]

– Von der Bekenntnis- zur Handlungstheorie: Neue Governance-Typen sind zunächst als eine 'Bekenntnistheorie' (espoused theory of action) einzuschätzen (Argyris/ Schoen 1978). Jeder Governance-Wandel beginnt sowohl mit einer Erkenntnis (Wandel ist notwendig) als auch mit einem Bekenntnis (zu einer neuen Steuerungsform). Dieses Delta zu überbrücken, und aus der Bekenntnistheorie eine Handlungstheorie (theory-in-use) zu formen, ist demzufolge eine wesentliche Managementaufgabe. Dies kann als schwierig und aufwendig angesehen werden: Da sich die neue Bekenntnistheorie – mindestens in ihrem Kern – im Widerstreit mit der bislang praktizierten Handlungstheorie befindet und ihre Problemlösungsfähigkeit noch nicht unter Beweis stellen konnte, sind Umsetzungswiderstände und Akzeptanzprobleme zu erwarten. Wenn man im Einklang mit weiten Teilen der Literatur davon ausgeht, dass sich 'Public Governance' als neue Governance-Form abzeichnet, dann kann man daraus schließen, dass die darin zum Ausdruck kommende Bekenntnistheorie mittlerweile eine gewisse Akzeptanz und auch Stabilität erreicht hat. Ob es dafür empirische Indikatoren gibt,

d.h. ob das politisch-administrative System sich bereits erkennbar in diese Richtung bewegt, kann durch eine entsprechend 'lernorientierte' Analyse näher bestimmt werden (vgl. hierzu Abschnitt 4).

– Kulturwandel und Neustrukturierung der Wissensbasis: Jeder Governance-Wandel fordert eine Veränderung normativer Leitvorstellungen und somit eine neue politische Kultur.[10] Damit einher geht zugleich der Bedarf, die organisationale (hier: politisch-administrative) 'Wissensbasis' in grundsätzlicher Weise umzubauen.[11] Aufgrund des Abgrenzungsbedarfs gegenüber bisherigen Leitvorstellungen beinhaltet dies auch die deutliche Aufforderung zum ‚Verlernen' von bisher praktizierten Handlungstheorien (Hedberg 1981). Konkret bedeutet dies eine Aufforderung zur kritischen Auseinandersetzung und bewussten Distanzierung von bisher praktizierten und jetzt nicht mehr für brauchbar erachteten Problemlösungen. Dabei ist zu unterstellen, dass ohne diesen Vorgang das Erreichen der jetzt angestrebten Lernziele blockiert oder sogar unmöglich wird.

– Die Qualität des Lernprozesses: Wenn, wie angesprochen, jeder Governance-Wandel eine maßgebliche qualitative Veränderung der Steuerungsmodalitäten darstellt, folgen daraus auch besondere Anforderungen an Art und Qualität der mit einem solchen Wandel verbundenen Lernprozesse. Es kann unterstellt werden, dass sich ein derart tief greifender Wandel nur über Veränderungslernen (double-loop-learning, Argyris/ Schoen 1978) erreichen lässt. Gegenüber einem Verbesserungslernen (single-loop-learning) ist dessen besondere Qualität darin zu sehen, dass die normative Dimension einer (organisationalen) Wissensbasis dabei in grundsätzlicher Weise 'umgebaut' wird. Pointiert kann dieser Lerntyp auch als 'Kulturentwicklung' bezeichnet werden. Solche Lernprozesse, die an die 'Tiefenstruktur' und das Selbstverständnis des politisch-administrativen Systems gehen, sind schwer zu bewältigen und fordern einen hohen Aufwand an (intellektuellen, motivationalen und finanziellen) Ressourcen. Die bekannten Probleme bei der Umsetzung neuer Steuerungsformen des öffentlichen Sektors sind deshalb aus einer lernorientierten Perspektive wenig überraschend.

– Die neue Wissensstruktur: Betrachtet man den Lernprozess von seiner inhaltlichen Seite, so lassen sich – im Einklang mit der modernen Wissensmanagementdebatte – verschiedene Wissensformen unterscheiden. Dies geschieht in teilweise sehr differenzierter Form (Sackmann 1992). Für die hier verfolgten Darstellungszwecke reicht eine Unterteilung in drei Wissensarten: Know-why- (kulturelles/ normatives Wissen), Know-what- (strategisches Wissen) und Know-how-Wissen (aktionales

Wissen): Wenn ein Governance-Wandel als fundamental (Wechsel des Paradigmas) anzusehen ist, dann bedeutet dies, dass insbesondere auf der Know-why- und Know-what-Ebene gelernt werden muss, wobei Know-why gleichgesetzt werden kann mit dem bereits angesprochenen normativen Wissen, während Know-what-Wissen sich als strategisches Wissen verstehen lässt, welches darin besteht, aus dem normativen Grundgerüst die dazu passenden strategischen Wahlentscheidungen für Handlungsprogramme abzuleiten. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass die Know-how-Komponente des Wissens, das operative oder aktionale Wissen, bei einem solchen Governance-Wandel keine Rolle spielen würde. Vielmehr geht es um eine Prioritätensetzung: Ohne Lernprozesse in Bezug auf die beiden erstgenannten Wissensarten kann ein solcher Wandel nicht stattfinden. Insbesondere das normative aber auch das strategische Wissen sind dabei in der Kultur einer jeden Organisation besonders stark verankert (bzw. repräsentieren diese) und deshalb schwer zu verändern.

– Quellen des Wissenserwerbs: Bei tief greifenden Veränderungsprozessen ist nicht davon auszugehen, dass die dazu benötigten oben angesprochenen Wissensgrundlagen im bestehenden System bereits vollständig enthalten sind. Es geht also nicht nur um Erschließung bereits vorhandenen, sondern auch um Gewinnung neuen Wissens (March 1991). Dieser Aspekt greift tief in die Managementrealität des politisch-administrativen Systems ein: so müssen damit z.B. bestehende Rekrutierungsmuster in Frage gestellt werden, und die Sicherung des (über Berater teuer erworbenen) Wissens und die Effektivität neuer personalpolitischer Maßnahmen (Führungskraft auf Zeit, leistungsabhängige Entlohnung und Karriere, etc.) werden zu vordringlichen Aufgaben bei der nachhaltigen Umsetzung und Sicherung der neuen Steuerungsformen.

– Das Lernen des Lernens: Dass derart fundamentale Umbauten der Steuerungslogik Rückwirkungen auf das ihnen innewohnende Lernmodell haben, also darauf, welche Lernformen und -qualitäten für ein neues Governance-Modell als adäquat anzusehen sind, ist offensichtlich. Für die 'learning agents' und 'agencies' bedeutet dies, bisherige Lernmodelle zu hinterfragen und gegebenenfalls weiterzuentwickeln. Das Lernen selbst wird somit selbst zum Gegenstand des Lernens (deutero-learning).[12] Neben dem Lernen auf 'Objektebene' der jeweiligen Governance-Form wird damit das Lernen eines adäquaten neuen Lernmodells zur eigenständigen Aufgabe. So ist etwa zu unterstellen, dass der aktivierende 'Gewährleistungsstaat' im Gegensatz etwa zum 'aktiven Staat' ein sehr unterschiedliches Lernmodell beinhaltet (vom 'Macher' zum 'Ermöglicher').

Zusammenfassend zeigt diese lernbezogene Interpretation des Wandels von Governance-Formen Bedarf an komplexen und aufwendig zu praktizierenden sowie ausdifferenzierten Lernformen auf: ‚Visionsgetriebenes' (kulturelles/ normatives) und ‚strategisches' Lernen steht im Vordergrund, ‚strukturelles' und ‚programmspezifisches' (aktionales) Lernen bleibt zunächst im Hintergrund und hängt stark davon ab, ob und wie die grundsätzlicheren Lernprozesse gelingen. Nachfolgend werden die bisherigen Ausführungen zu zwei unterschiedlichen Lerntypen zusammengefasst und pointiert: transformatives und adaptives Lernen. Governance-Wandel als Lernprozess fordert dabei einen transformativen Lerntypus und stellt deshalb außerordentlich hohe Anforderungen an das Management des Veränderungsprozesses. Erst bei weiter gehender Verfestigung der neuen Governance-Form in entsprechenden und sich als erfolgreich erweisenden Handlungstheorien dürften sich zunehmend adaptive Lernformen als hinreichend erweisen. Diese Darstellung bleibt dabei notwendigerweise typisierend. Empirisch lässt sich vielfach beobachten, dass Transformationen durch misslungene adaptive Lernprozesse und die damit verbundenen Krisenerfahrungen angestoßen werden.[13]

Abbildung 1: Transformatives und adaptives Lernen

	Transformatives Lernen	**Adaptives Lernen**
Lernbedarf		
Lernprozess	double-loop und deutero-learning	single-loop-learning
Lerninhalt	fundamentaler Umbau der Wissensbasis, insbesondere des normativen/ kulturellen und des strategischen Wissens (know why und know what)	inkrementeller Ausbau der Wissensbasis, insbesondere Ausdifferenzierung des aktionalen Wissens (know how)
Managementkomponenten		
Visionen/ Leitbilder	Visionen (neue Leitbilder) wirken als Lernauslöser, vorh. Strategien, Strukturen und Programme werden grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt	vorh. Leitbilder bleiben erhalten, wahrgenommener Anpassungsbedarf von Strukturen und Programmen als Lernauslöser
Strategien	fundamentaler Strategie-wandel	eingeschlagene Strategien werden weiter verfolgt
Strukturen	Strukturen werden strategisch angepasst	Strukturen werden reformiert und optimiert
Programme	Programme werden strategisch ausgerichtet und neu strukturiert	Programme werden neu justiert
Nachhaltige Umsetzung	aufwendig und anspruchs-voll, da zunächst nur als ‚espoused-theory' verfügbar, die mit vorh. ‚theories-in-use' konfligieren	moderat, da auf bestehenden ‚theories-in-use' aufbauend

Quelle: Eigene Darstellung

4   Public Governance als Lernmodell

Bislang stand der Lernprozess bei einem Wandel von Governance-Formen im Vorder-
grund. Der Schwerpunkt lag deshalb auf ‚Wandel'. In einem weiteren Schritt soll
nachfolgend ‚Governance' betont werden. Zu fragen ist, ob für das Reformleitbild des
‚aktivierenden Staates' (des Gewährleistungsstaates) lernspezifische Besonderheiten
festzustellen sind. Der diesem Leitbild zugewiesene Ordnungsrahmen wird – wie auf-
gezeigt – als ‚Public Governance' bezeichnet. Dieser umfasst insbesondere Elemente der
Governance-Typen ‚Netzwerk' und ‚Gemeinschaft' und schließt darüber hinaus auch
Teile des ‚Markttyps' nicht aus, grenzt sich aber zugleich auch deutlich von diesem ab.
Public Governance wird dabei als eine Weiterentwicklung des Leitbildes ‚schlanker Staat'
angesehen, der – so die Vorstellung – zu einseitig auf marktliche und wettbewerbsbezo-
gene Steuerungsformen gesetzt hat. Um Public Governance als Lernmodell inhaltlich
näher zu bestimmen, wird dabei kontrastierend auf das Reformleitbild des schlanken
Staates mit seiner dominierend marktbezogenen Ordnungsvorstellung zurückgegriffen.

Abbildung 2: Schlanker und aktivierender Staat als Lernmodelle

	Schlanker Staat	Aktivierender Staat
Governance-Form	Markt	Netzwerk, Gemeinschaft (Public Governance)
Aufgaben	Dienstleistung, Outsourcing, Privatisierung	Gewährleistung, Beteiligung
Ziel	Rückzug des Staates, Outputoptimierung staatlichen Handelns	‚neo-weberianische' Rückkehr des Staates, Regulierung von Kooperationsbeziehungen
Managementkomponenten		
Vision/ Leitbild	Rationalisierung	Kooperation
Strategien	Wettbewerb und Kontrolle	Vertrauen und Verantwortungsteilung durch ‚Netzwerkmanagement'
Strukturen	Dezentralisierung, Entkopplung	neue (lockere) Kopplung, interorganisationale Strukturformen
Programme	marktnahe Steuerungsinstrumente (z.B. Budgetierung)	entwicklungsbezogene und integrative Steuerungsinstrumente (z.B. Organisationsentwicklung, Prozessmoderation)
Lernbedarf	‚politisch': umfassend, da neue Rolle des Staates, neues Selbstverständnis. ‚managerial': radikal, da Übernahme-‚Zwang' privatwirtschaftlicher Konzepte	‚politisch': moderat, da partielle Rückkehr des bekannten Selbstverständnisses. ‚managerial': umfassend, da hoher Bedarf an Steuerung komplexer Netzwerke zwischen Markt, Staat und Gemeinschaft

Quelle: eigene Darstellung, zu Governance-Form vgl. Jann 2002

Wie in Abb. 2 deutlich wird, kommen in den beiden Reformleitbildern sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen darüber zum Ausdruck, welche Aufgaben Management als ‚Umsetzungsstrategie' einer Governance-Form zu leisten hat. Dem ‚schlanken Staat' geht es primär um ökonomisch-rationales Handeln, effiziente Prozesse und Produktqualität. Das Managementleitbild für eine solche Umsetzungsstrategie ist ‚Rationalisierung'. Im Leitbild des aktivierenden Staates verändert sich der Auftrag an das Management. Die partiell nach wie vor aufrecht erhaltenen Rationalisierungsziele werden überlagert und dominiert von einer Umsetzungsvorstellung, die dem Leitbild der ‚Kooperation'

entspricht und eine strategische Schwerpunktsetzung auf ‚Vertrauensbildung' und ‚Netzwerkmanagement' erfordert. Durch Förderung von Kooperation soll dabei eine Gemeinschaft teilautonomer Akteure, die in einem jeweils ziel- und problemorientiert abzugrenzenden Geflecht von Wechselbeziehungen stehen, an einem partnerschaftlichen Problemlösungsprozess beteiligt werden. Idealtypisch zugespitzt geht es also um Rationalisierungsmanagement vs. Kooperationsmanagement. In der gleichen Über-spitzung bedeutet dies auch einen Übergang vom Nachtwächter- zum Gewährleistungs-staat. Auch wenn die Rolle von Staat und Verwaltung deutlich anders ausgedeutet wird, als dies z.B. beim Leitbild des ‚demokratischen Staates' geschieht, kann festgehalten werden, dass die Vorstellung eines solchen aktivierenden Staates mit einer Rückbesin-nung auf mindestens jene Institutionen verbunden ist, mit denen die im Leitbild in Anspruch genommene Gewährleistung sichergestellt werden kann. Dies führt in Folge auch zu sehr unterschiedlichen Anforderungen an die Managementkomponenten Strukturen und Programme. Statt Dezentralisierung von Strukturen und Entkopplung durch Privatisierung treten übergreifende, lose gekoppelte Netzwerkstrukturen in den Vordergrund. Neben einer Kontroll- und Leistungsausrichtung treten Programme zur Organisationsentwicklung und zur Steuerung organisationsübergreifender Prozesse stärker in den Blickpunkt.

Für das Lernmodell bedeutet dies, dass der durch diesen Governance-Wandel erzeugte fundamentale Lernbedarf auf der politischen Ebene wahrscheinlich weniger stark ausfällt, als es beim Übergang vom z.B. aktiven zum schlanken Staat der Fall gewesen sein mag. Mindestens Teile älterer Handlungstheorien können übernommen werden. Anders scheint es auf der Ebene des Managements (als Umsetzungsstrategie) auszusehen: Rationalisie-rungs- und Kooperationsmanagement unterscheiden sich auf normativer und strategischer Ebene in sehr grundsätzlicher Weise, so dass der hiermit verbundene Lernbedarf wohl als transformativ bezeichnet werden kann. Denn dieser Managementtyp ist dominierend auf die Erstellung und Sicherung von Vertrauen zwischen den beteiligten Akteuren aus Staat, Verwaltung, Wirtschaft und Zivilgesellschaft bezogen. Ziel ist es, problembezogen variierende komplexe Netzwerke zwischen diesen Akteuren zu steuern und deren Ergebnisse zu evaluieren und zu optimieren.[14] Rationalisierungsmanagement wird dabei sicher weiter erhalten bleiben, tritt aber eher als adaptiver Lernbedarf auf und zeigt sich in der Ausdifferenzierung bereits bestehender Problemlösungen.

Als Fazit zeigt das Reformmodell Public Governance einen hohen Lernbedarf in Bezug auf seine Managementkomponenten. Etwas überraschend, mit Blick auf eine neo-weberianische Wende des Staates aber nachvollziehbar, ist das Fazit, dass der politische

Lernaufwand vermutlich geringer ausfällt als der manageriale. Und zwar deshalb, weil sich die Vorstellung darüber, wofür Staat und Verwaltung stehen, mindestens vom Grundsatz her weniger stark ändern als die Vorstellung darüber, wofür Management steht.

5   Verwaltungsreformen als Lernerfahrung

Ging es bislang um die Abschätzung des Lernbedarfs infolge eines Wandels in Richtung Public Governance, sollen nachfolgend und abschließend die Lernerfahrungen im Zusammenhang mit Verwaltungsreformen betrachtet werden. Damit lässt sich eine erste Einschätzung treffen, welche Umsetzungschancen dem zuvor ermittelten transformativen Lernbedarf zugesprochen werden können. Es fragt sich also, welche Lerntypen in den bisherigen Verwaltungsreformen zu beobachten waren und welche Varianten davon – gegebenenfalls mit welchen Ergebnissen oder Lernerfolgen – aufgetreten sind. Da es hier nicht um einen detaillierten Überblick, sondern um das Aufzeigen von Entwicklungstendenzen geht, soll dies beispielhaft an empirisch nachvollziehbaren Reformstrategien verdeutlicht werden:

In ihrer vergleichenden Analyse kommen Pollitt/ Bouckaert (2000) für die OECD-Länder zu vier idealtypisch verdichteten Reformstrategien:

–   Modernisierer: Bei diesem Reformtyp stehen Leistungsorientierung und Flexibilisierung im Vordergrund. Dies soll erreicht werden durch Dezentralisierung und Erhöhung des Autonomiegrades bei gleichzeitig erhöhter Kontrolltransparenz und Wirkungsüberprüfung. Das hier verwendete Managementmodell orientiert sich an der Privatwirtschaft und kombiniert dieses mit politischen Reformen.

–   Marketizer: Wie im Namen bereits anklingt, geht die Modernisierung hier noch weiter in Richtung markt- und wettbewerbsorientierter Steuerungsmechanismen. Öffentliche Organisationen werden einem direkten Wettbewerb zu privaten Alternativanbietern ausgesetzt oder mindestens doch durch die Einführung von marktäquivalenten Elementen einem stärkeren Leistungsvergleich unterzogen (Benchmarking).

–   Minimierer: Mit diesem Reformtypus wird Privatisierung in den Vordergrund der Reform gestellt. Es findet ein Contracting Out öffentlicher Dienstleistungen statt. Der Staat wird nicht nur schlank, er zieht sich vielmehr aus einigen Arbeitsbereichen

weitgehend oder sogar vollständig zurück. Der Managementfokus bleibt hier ähnlich markt- und wettbewerbsorientiert, jedoch mit noch stärkerer Ausprägung als in der vorgenannten Reformstrategie, wobei zusätzlich die Managementaktivitäten des Staates/ der Verwaltung durch diesen Rückzug weiter beschränkt werden.

– Bewahrer: Die bestehenden Systeme eines klassischen bürokratischen Managements werden im Kern erhalten, aber optimiert. Dies gilt insbesondere für den finanz- und personalwirtschaftlichen Bereich. Haushaltskürzungen, Einstellungsstops, Aufgaben-kritik und Ähnliches sind die hier hauptsächlich zu beobachtenden Managementaktivi-täten.

Diese hier genannten Reformansätze sind insofern idealtypisch, als sie in den ver-schiedenen untersuchten Ländern durchaus in Mischformen angewandt werden. So war beispielsweise die Verwaltungsreform in Großbritannien und den USA eher durch den Typus des Marketizers und des Minimierer gekennzeichnet, während in Deutschland und auch Frankreich das New Public Management vergleichsweise distanzierter betrachtet und entsprechend zurückhaltend praktiziert wurde. Im letzteren Fall kann man deshalb von einem Mischtyp aus Bewahren und Modernisieren ausgehen. Ein Vergleich der Reformergebnisse zeigt zudem, dass nicht alle angestrebten Reformprojekte auch wirklich umgesetzt wurden und dass darüber hinaus radikale Reformkonzepte im weiteren Verlauf wieder zurück genommen wurden (z.B. Großbritannien). So wird für den Reformprozess in Deutschland gelegentlich sogar von einem Scheitern gesprochen, mindestens jedoch einem weiten Zurückbleiben hinter den Reformzielen, gleichzeitig jedoch attestiert, dass die deutsche Verwaltung sich unter dem Einfluss dieser Reformen durchaus eigendyna-misch entwickelt hat.[15]

Vergleicht man diese Reformtypen mit dem zuvor entwickelten Lernmodell, so lässt sich feststellen, dass wohl nur der ‚Minimierer' eindeutig auf transformatives Lernen ausgerichtet ist, jedenfalls wenn man das darin zum Ausdruck kommende Staatsver-ständnis betrachtet. Für das Management-Konzept darin gilt dies – wenn auch mit Ein-schränkungen – vermutlich ebenfalls. Zwar werden durch Privatisierung und Contracting-Out Aktivitätsfelder frei gegeben, was zu einer Entlastung von vormals politisch-administrativ wahrgenommenen Managementaufgaben führt. Doch ist zu vermuten, dass die verbleibenden Aufgaben weiterhin marktnah und wettbewerbsbezogen zu erfüllen sind. Nur für den Fall, dass durch eine zunehmende Privatisierung der Druck auf den öffentlichen Sektor abnimmt, wäre von einem weniger intensiven managementbezogenen Lernbedarf auszugehen. Für beide Entwicklungen lassen sich in der Untersuchung von

Pollitt/ Bouckaert (2000) empirische Hinweise finden. In letztgenannten Fall wäre dann das politische Lernen eher transformativ, das Managementlernen aber eher adaptiv.

Beim ‚Modernisierer' und ‚Marketizer' hingegen lässt sich das Verhältnis anders einschätzen: Das politische Lernen, das ‚Neudenken' des Staates scheint hier weniger stark ausgeprägt zu sein. Zwar gibt es auch hier Veränderungen in den wichtigsten Funktionen und Rollen, die dem politisch-administrativen System zugesprochen werden, aber in jedem Fall bleibt der Staat ‚aktiv'. Bezüglich des intendierten Managementverständnisses ist die Verwaltung in diesen beiden Formen jedoch in stärkerem Maße einem transformativ ausgerichteten Managementlernen ausgesetzt. Dies deshalb, weil der öffentliche Sektor in diesen beiden Typen einem stärkeren Druck zur Übernahme privatwirtschaftlich ausgerichteter Managementkonzepte unterliegt. Dies gilt für den Modernisierer sogar noch stärker als für den Marketizer. Denn in dieser Form werden markt- und wettbewerborientierte Governance-Vorstellungen stärker in das politisch-administrative System hinein getragen (und nicht in den privaten Bereich hinein delegiert), als dies beim Marketizer der Fall ist. Ähnliche Entwicklungen werden wahrscheinlich auch für den ‚Bewahrer' gelten, da das bloße ‚Schärfen' des bestehenden finanz- und personalwirtschaftlichen Instrumentariums im Zuge fortschreitender und lang anhaltender Haushaltskrisen eine Eigendynamik in Richtung Modernisierung entfaltet, die nicht durch Reformvorgaben von oben, sondern durch zunehmend unsichere und ungünstige Rahmenbedingungen, denen sich Verwaltungshandeln ausgesetzt sieht, forciert wird.

Betrachtet man diese Ergebnisse, so lässt sich festhalten, dass eine einseitig transformative Lernausrichtung – wie zu erwarten – nicht festgestellt werden kann. Insofern sind eher ‚gemischte Lernerfahrungen' anzunehmen. Mit Blick auf die Umsetzungschancen transformativer Lernformen scheint eine differenzierte Sichtweise angebracht. Dies ist beachtenswert, denn mindestens implizit geht die entsprechende Literatur dominant von eben diesem Lernverständnis aus. Doch trifft dies bei näherer Betrachtung nicht zu, und zwar weder, wenn man auf die Implikationen der jeweils verfolgten Governance-Form (hier: Public Governance, s. Abschnitt 3) schaut, und schon gar nicht, wenn man das empirische Lernverhalten im öffentlichen Sektor fokussiert. Transformatives und adaptives Lernen sind typisierte analytische Konstrukte, d.h. empirisch würden sie immer nur als Mischtypen nachzuweisen sein. Dennoch kann man aber unterstellen, dass die Reformen politischer Leitbilder mindestens der Tendenz nach eine deutliche Aufforderung in sich tragen, adaptive Lernwege zu verlassen und sich auf den ‚Transformationspfad' zu begeben. Da differenzierte Lernwege einzuschlagen sind, gilt es

dabei, die Fähigkeit zu fördern, zwischen den jeweils als adäquat anzusehenden Lernpfaden und ihrem konkreten Mischverhältnis unterscheiden zu können. Dies weist darauf hin, dass die Fähigkeit zum ‚Meta-Lernen', die Fähigkeit zur Reflexion und nachhaltigen Weiterentwicklung beim Aufbau einer solchen Lernkompetenz eine besondere Rolle spielen muss. Die zuvor dargelegten Ergebnisse belegen, dass hier noch Nachholbedarf besteht. Dass der öffentliche Sektor in unsicheren Zeiten und unter dem zunehmenden Einfluss der Leitidee des Gewährleistungsstaates nicht ohne erhebliche Erhöhung seiner Lernkompetenz auskommen kann, ist offensichtlich. Welche Lernprozesse und -inhalte dabei von Bedeutung sind, sollte hier konturiert werden. Auf zwei Auffälligkeiten sei abschließend hingewiesen: Auf der konzeptuellen Ebene besteht der dringende Bedarf, die Lernproblematik in die Governance-Debatte wesentlich stärker einzubeziehen und das Thema ‚Governance Learning' zu etablieren. Auf der empirischen Ebene wird deutlich, dass der öffentliche Sektor im Zuge der Verwaltungsreformen intensive Erfahrungen mit transformativen Lernformen sammeln konnte und musste. Dass dies nicht ohne Einfluss auf die Lernkompetenz bleibt, zeigen Einzelbeispiele gelungener Transformationsprozesse immer wieder auf. Kein Grund zur Skepsis also.

Abbildungsverzeichnis

Anmerkungen

[1] Vgl. Bovaird/ Löffler 2003.

[2] Vgl. hierzu insbes. Jann 2002a.

[3] Vgl. z.B. Jann et al. 2004 und zur Übersicht über Studien zum Strategischen Management im öffentlichen Sektor: Kang 2005; vgl. auch Koch 2004.

[4] Zum Management der Lerninhalte (Wissensmanagement) aus anwendungsorientierter Sicht vgl. u.a. Probst et al. 1999 und Nonaka/ Takeuchi 1999. Zu den Lernprozessen vgl. die Literatur zur Lernenden Organisation, z.B. Senge 1999.

[5] In der Governance-Diskussion spielen Probleme des institutionellen oder organisationalen Lernens bislang allerdings keine Rolle. Das Thema ist bisher weitgehend ein ‚weißer Fleck' geblieben. Darüber hinaus sind

auch empirische Untersuchungen, etwa zu organisationalen Lernprozessen in der öffentlichen Verwaltung vergleichsweise spärlich und beruhen meist auf Einzelfallanalysen (vgl. z.B. Barrados 2003; Bate 2000; Stolzenberg 2000; Vince 2000; Scott 2003; Little/ Cayer 1996; Martin 1999, Finger/ Bürgin 1999; Klimecki/ Laßleben/ Thomae 2000).

[6] Zu einer solchen Vorgehensweise vgl. auch Klimecki/ Laßleben/ Thomae 2000.

[7] Jann (2002, S. 286) sieht den demokratischen Staat ab Beginn der 50er Jahre, den aktiven ab Mitte der 60er, den schlanken ab Ende der 70er und den aktivierenden (Gewährleistungs-)Staat ab Mitte der 90er Jahre.

[8] Vgl. Senge 1999; Klimecki/ Laßleben 1998.

[9] Vgl. Klimecki/ Laßleben/ Thomae 2000.

[10] Argyris/ Schoen (1978) beschreiben organisationales Lernen als eine Veränderung kollektiver Handlungstheorien, was man – vereinfacht gesprochen – als Kulturwandel bezeichnen kann. Zu den Begriffen Kultur und Governance vgl. auch Jann 2002b.

[11] Duncan/ Weiss (1979) definieren organisationales Lernen als Veränderung der ‚organisationalen Wissens-basis'.

[12] Die Unterscheidung zwischen proto- oder objektbezogenem Lernen – dazu gehören die Formen des double- und des single-loop-learnings und des Deutero- oder Meta-Lernens – geht auf Bateson (1983) zurück.

[13] Vgl. hierzu etwa Levy/ Merry 1986.

[14] Damit soll nicht bezweifelt werden, dass es – empirisch gesehen – natürlich auch im ‚alten' Managementleit-bild Netzwerke zu steuern gab (public private partnerships). An dieser Stelle geht es aber um die analytische Schwerpunktsetzung.

[15] Vgl. hierzu im Überblick Jann et al. 2004.

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4 Changes in Politico-administrative Leadership

Matthew Flinders/ Felicity Matthews

Rebuilding Strategic Capacity? Multi-Level Governance, Leadership and Public Service Agreements in Britain

1   Introduction

The spread of new-public management inspired initiatives across advanced liberal democracies in the 1980s and 1990s were driven by a desire to increase the economic efficiency of state systems – to get 'more bang for each buck' to use Osborne and Gaebler's well known phrase (Osborne/ Gaebler 1992). The disaggregation or decon-struction of large multi-purpose bureaucratic structures into quasi-autonomous single purpose bodies combined with where possible the introduction of market principles would, so the theory suggested, lead to greater specialisation, customer focus and transparency. As the work of the OECD (OECD 2002) has demonstrated in detail, this far-reaching wave of administrative reform led to the rapid 'unbundling' (Pollitt/ Talbot 2003) or 'unravelling' (Hooghe/ Marks 2003, p. 233-243) of the state with a concomitant growth in what has become known as 'distributed' or 'delegated' public governance (Flinders 2004a, 2004b; Flinders/ Thiel/ Greve 1999) – the location of key state responsibilities beyond the direct control of elected politicians and their officials. The creation of a dense and administratively complex tier of delegated governance within the topography of most state systems has created both political and leadership challenges. From the political perspective the key challenge lies in designing and implementing new mechanisms of democratic accountability through which this 'fugitive power' (Morison 1998) can be scrutinised and 'blame games' between organisational leaders and politicians avoided (Hood 2002; see also Flinders 2004c). The central challenge in terms of leadership focuses on how to balance the relationship between independence and control. Put another way, how can public sector leaders, both politicians and officials, steer complex networks in which many organisations in the policy-chain enjoy a significant level of day-to-day autonomy (i.e. numerous veto points exist) and where delegation may have reduced the amount of specialist knowledge at the centre. Despite the attempts of numerous scholars to emphasise the potential drawbacks and consequences of large-scale agencification these warnings went largely unheeded which led to a groundswell of literature on the 'hollowing out' of the state in the 1990s – a term used to indicate both the delegation of public responsibilities away from traditional state structures and also the evisceration of central state capacity to steer or manage the vast flotilla of semi-state bodies that now existed (see for example Rhodes 1994, 1997). Indeed, during a valedictory speech in 1999 the outgoing Head of the British Civil Service, Sir Richard Wilson, lamented, "I would not claim that the manner in which we implemented all these reforms over the years was a model to emulate. There was not

enough overall vision or strategic planning. Too often it was uncoordinated, with different parts of the centre of government launching similar initiatives simultaneously or at a pace which long-suffering managers in departments found difficult to handle" (Wilson 1999).

The outcome of this process raises two issues: one theoretical and the other empirical. First, how have scholars sought to understand and conceptualise the challenges faced by public sector leaders (both politicians and senior public servants)? Second, in what ways have public sector leaders sought to rebuild their strategic capacity in the face of widespread fragmentation? This chapter examines both these questions through an examination of the British Labour Government's attempts to create 'joined-up' or 'holistic' governance, specifically through the creation of Public Service Agreements (PSAs). The central argument we present is that in Britain the 'hollowing out' of the state thesis has overstated the demise of central state capacity. The state has not lost power but it must exert its powers and resources in different ways and through different tools of governance, of which the PSA is a prime example. This is not to say that the PSA infrastructure is unproblematic but it is to say that the empirical manifestation of state development in Britain would appear to suggest that the Crown is not hollow (see for example Weller/ Bakvis/ Rhodes 1997). In order to make this argument this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part - Governance and Leadership in Theory - examines the concept of governance and seeks to provide greater analytical clarity through an exposition of its core components. This part also seeks to demonstrate the utility of governance at both the theoretical and empirical level in order to provide a firm foundation for part two – Governance and Leadership in Practice. On May 1st 1997 a 'New' Labour government was elected in Britain after eighteen years of Conservative rule. The second part of this chapter focuses on how Tony Blair's government has attempted to institute new measures and reforms that would increase the strategic capacity of the centre while at the same time providing public sector leaders with the operational freedom to manage combined with incentives to emphasise delivery. The final concluding part – Governance, Leadership and Strategic Capacity - locates the British experience within a number of broader trends concerning public leadership, politics and the evolution of the state.

2   Governance and Leadership in Theory

The focus of this section is largely theoretical and it is based on the assumption that concepts are not only elements of a wider theoretical system but they are also tools that shape not just how we understand the world but also how we synthesise, collect and interpret information. The concept of governance is notoriously difficult to define: indeed, it was recently described in a British broadsheet newspaper as "as slippery as an eel swathed in Swarfega"[1]. It therefore provides an example of an 'essentially contested' concept in which scholars could debate 'ad infinitum' without ever coming to any agreed conclusion (Gaille 1956). Few scholars have sought to challenge the apparent ubiquity of governance; let alone apply Sartori's (Sartori 1970) classic distinction between 'conceptual travelling' – the effective application of a concept to new cases - and 'conceptual stretching' – the distortion of a concept in order to make it fit new cases.[2] The danger of 'conceptual stretching' according to Sartori was that "gains in extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision … we can cover more only by saying less, and by saying less in a far less precise manner" (Sartori 1970, pp. 1034-1035). Pierre and Peters suggestion at the beginning of the twenty-first century that governance therefore refers to a 'proto-theory' (Pierre/ Peters 2000, p. 7) – a preliminary theory awaiting future refinement through theoretical and empirical research – appears to have been proved correct and it is clear that what might be termed the 'second wave' governance literature since this point has matured in two ways. First, although Rhodes' (Rhodes 1997) ground-breaking work on governance was explicit about the existence of different forms and definitions of the term more recent scholarship has sought to further unravel and tease apart the various distinctions that exist (Stoker 1998). Secondly, as mentioned above, the work of scholars like Bache (Bache/ Bristow 2003), Flinders (Flinders 2002), Holliday (2000, pp. 175-176), Taylor (2000) and Weller (Weller/ Bakvis 1997) have attempted to relocate the power and role of the state within governance debates in a way that suggests the transformation rather than the evisceration of the power of the state. At the theoretical level this has been most cogently expressed in Marsh, Richards and Smith's 'asymmetrical power model' (Marsh/ Richards/ Smith 2003). In terms of the numerous approaches to governance that have been identified (and in response to Sartori's plea for conceptual clarity) this chapter adopts what Kjaer (2004) interprets as the mainstream 'Public Administration and Public Policy' approach which emphasises the role and capacity of public sector leaders vis-à-vis the management and delivery of public goods across and between complex networks.[3] In essence the utility of

this approach to the concept derives from the questions it posits about the interaction and linkages between the state, the market and civil society. Moreover it questions the epistemological and ontological foundations on which traditional research has been conducted. Critically, however, 'governance is not a synonym for government'. As Rosenau and Czempiel stress, "Governance is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby persons and organisations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs and fulfil their wants" (Rosenau/ Czempiel 1992, p. 19).

The concept therefore reflects that the relationship between state and society, and particularly the successful implementation of public policy, is increasingly dependant upon a much wider array of public, private and semi-independent organisations – the outcome of the 'unbundling' process highlighted above – than would traditionally be included within the 'governmental' framework. Having narrowed down the specific governance-approach adopted here it is possible to extract three primary distinctions or approaches from the wider literature. The first distinction distinguishes between governance as 'structure' and governance as 'process'. Governance as structure emphasises the historical dominance of hierarchies, markets and networks as the main state forms mediating state-society relations. There is no perfect state form. Nevertheless as mentioned previously the perceived failure and inadequacies of hierarchies and markets coupled with the bureaucratic fragmentation occasioned by the centrifugal thrust of new public management has focused attention on governance as the management of complex networks (Kickert/ Klijn/ Koppenjan 1977; Goldsmith/ Eggers 2004). Governance as process, by contrast, emphasises that governance is about more than institutional design. It considers the interactions both between institutions 'and' between the public and institutions. Governance as process is therefore dynamic and concentrates on issues such as control and accountability.

A second distinction underlines both the 'horizontal' (across governance networks) and 'vertical' (between different governance levels) dimensions to governing modern states. Horizontal governance is predominantly interested with the level of the nation state. While this frequently involves co-ordinating actors at the sub-regional level it is essentially concerned with the policy process within states. Attempts to foster greater inter-organisational co-operation across and between 'para-statal' or semi-state actors at the national level and their parent departments would therefore fall within the remit of horizontal governance (Hayward/ Wright 2000). Vertical governance emphasises the increasing inter-dependence between different geographic levels or tiers of govern*ment*

and gover*nance*. Not only does this involve the creation of overlapping spheres of responsibility but also the existence of dual networks and complex game-playing in which actors may seek to build alliances across and between levels – multi-level governance (Hooghe/ Marks 2001). This broader approach to governance also includes and appreciation of the increasingly inter-twined global economy and the development of a trans-national civil society (Rosenau 1995; Strange 1996; Weiss 1998). In reality the management of complex networks often involves the governance of both vertical and horizontal structures. Hence governance, in most policy fields, can be seen as a complex matrix involving over-lapping and inter-dependent organisational relationships.

The demarcation between horizontal and vertical governance provides a neat illustration of possibly the most significant (and third) distinction to be found within the wider literature: state-centric versus society-centric approaches. While accepting that theories of governance challenge traditional understandings of state power and capacity, the state-centric approach asserts that the nation state remains the key political actor in society and the predominant expression of collective interests (Pierre/ Peters 2000). The state-centric approach does not accept that the nation state is losing power or being 'hollowed out' but that the role of the nation state and its levers of control are evolving in light of changing domestic and international circumstances (Evans 1997). Much of the literature on national level horizontal governance adopts an implicit if not explicit state-centric approach. Conversely, much of the literature on vertical multi-level governance approaches the challenges of governance from the opposite perspective via a society-centric approach. As Gamble notes, "It starts with the global economy and trans-national civil society and understands the policy process in the UK as part of the system of trans-national governance" (Gamble 2000, p. 219). The society-centric approach therefore posits more fundamental questions about the power, capacity and future of national governments. Central to this approach is the movement of policy competencies upward to supra-national bodies, outward to quasi-autonomous organisations and downward to regional governmental levels. Society-centric approaches culminate in an exposition of the tensions between an increasingly inter-connected global political-economy and the frag-mented structure of political authority within states. The result, at its most extreme, is a 'centreless society' in which the nation state is influenced by global trends but has little capacity to steer the ship of state (Luhmann 1986). Governance therefore has a dual meaning which explains the variety of approaches to the terms and the confusion regarding the precise scope of the word. "On the one hand it refers to the empirical manifestations of state adaptation to its external environment. On the other hand, governance also denotes a conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of

social systems and the role of the state in that process" (Pierre 2000, p. 3). The former being a state-centric approach, the latter emphasising a society-centric approach.

Drawing on the above distinctions it is possible for us to refine and define 'our' understanding of governance as: the study of the structural manifestation of state adaptation to its external social, political and economic environment with particular reference to the evolving processes and mechanisms of control, leadership and the location of power within complex networks. And yet this definition raises the question of the (inter)relationship between the concept of governance and the notion of leadership. Put simply, the two are bound together through their shared focus on control, co-ordination and management. Indeed, Stoker identifies three potential types of partnership and leadership pursued through governance arrangements:

– agent-purchaser provider relations through the use of managerial tools such as contracts;

– interorganisational relations, typified through negotiation and coordination of parties through the blending of capacities, which may result in bureaucratic partnership; and

– systematic coordination, wherein mutual understanding is established as organizations develop a shared vision and joint working, which can lead to the creation of self-governing networks (Stoker 1998, p. 23).

Stoker's work reminds us that there are different forms of leadership and it is important to understand that a key driver behind the hiving-off and agencification which formed a central component of new public management in Britain was a desire on the part of politicians to enact 'shift in both leadership styles and responsibilities' in relation to both government ministers and senior civil servants. The problems encountered by the Labour governments in the 1970s had convinced many politicians and scholars that the British state was overloaded (King 1975; Rose 1976). Not only had the state taken on too many responsibilities in this interpretation but it also lacked the leadership and management skills to effectively fulfill these roles. This body of work complemented a broader and increasingly influential school of thought – the New Right. This painted a picture of inefficient, over-protected, empire-building, self-interested bureaucrats that were in (see for example Niskanen 1971, 1982). The managerialism of the 1980s was a response to these beliefs but crucially it also contained a shift in relation to understandings and expectations in relation to leadership. Conservative ministers did not want to become

'overloaded' with the minutiae of state administration (as they felt their Labour predecessors had become) and instead wanted to delegate day-to-day leadership responsibilities to named and accountable officials who would work with a high degree of managerial autonomy but within a broad policy framework set by ministers. The nature of leadership for ministers was therefore intended to shift from administratively focused leadership to strategic leadership, while at the same time reforms were introduced to reduce the number of rules and regulations within the public sector in order to 'free-up' managers to manage in an increasingly flexible and where possible entrepreneurial leadership style.

This transition in terms of leadership demonstrates three critical issues that underpin any debates concerning public governance and leadership. First, there are different forms of leadership that frequently co-exist and can either be complementary or conflictual. For example the basis of 'political leadership' is derived through the electoral process and a popular mandate; whereas the rationale for 'organizational leadership' is likely to based on esoteric knowledge or prior experience. Different forms of leadership underpin the second issue – leadership is not necessarily a zero-sum game. If leadership responsibilities are delegated away from x by y, it does not necessarily mean that y has necessarily 'lost' their leadership capacity. Just as the first point states that there are different forms of leadership then y may well have increased their strategic and/ or long-term leadership capacity while also improving their operational leadership capacity by delegating those specific responsibilities to someone with the necessary skills and experience. Finally and once again related to the two previous issues, leadership in all contexts is based on a mix of incentives and sanctions (i.e. carrots and sticks). The managerial 'revolution' of the 1980s attempted to increase both leadership-performance incentives and the leadership-failure sanctions. The deconstruction of British government into numerous agencies and other forms of delegated governance was accompanied by an increase in the public visibility of those made responsible for the day-to-day running of large (delegated) parts of the state. Leadership-performance incentives were established through not only the introduction of markedly higher rates of pay (often far in excess of those paid to government ministers) but also through performance-related pay schemes (see Lewis 1997). At the same time the traditional anonymity of public servants was down-graded as a result of agencification due to the fact that ministers wanted officials to take personal responsibility for their performance rather than sheltering behind the convention of ministerial responsibility. The leadership-failure sanctions therefore included an increased public visibility for performance, an expectation of a closer relationship between public sector leaders and the legislature (i.e. between the chief executives of the numerous

delegated public bodies and the respective legislative scrutiny committee), and dismissal where there is widespread concern that the necessary leadership qualities are not in place. At the heart of this new incentives and sanctions structure lay the introduction of quasi-contractual relationships containing explicit performance targets, usually in the form of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which formed the leadership-bond between ministers and their senior public managers. The leadership responsibility of ministers involved setting the strategic objectives and KPIs while chief executives were responsible for the successful delivery of these objectives and the attainment of their KPIs (see Flinders 2001; James 2003).

The link between governance and leadership is therefore that the increased organizational fragmentation or 'balkanisation' that governance (as opposed to government) denotes involved a change of emphasis between different forms of leadership at the national level in Britain. In the 1980s Conservative ministers were unconvinced that the senior civil service possessed the necessary leadership and management competencies to not only improve public services but achieve this without extra public spending. However, the reforms that were put in place created a number of anomalies and tensions which remain central aspects of public sector governance and leadership debates today. As the research of Hood and James has shown in detail, the creation of numerous single-purpose organizations with their own organizational targets created two negative externalities (see for example Hood 2006; James 2004). First, targets encouraged 'tunnel vision' in which organizations focused on the attainment of 'their' targets to the detriment of external relationships. Second, organizations would sometimes focus on achieving their prescribed targets at all costs even where this might involve perverse decisions or a reduction in service standards in those areas that were not subject to a KPI. Politically maintaining the policy-operations divide between the respective leadership responsibilities of ministers and officials has also been problematic especially in politically salient areas of public policy. Not only have ministers attempted to informally micro-manage some agencies, but have also later sought to deny such actions and the problems they may have caused (Barker 1997). Finally, leadership styles, or at least expectations regarding leadership styles, (particularly in large or long-standing organizations) are often path-dependant – they form an element of organizational culture and yet these are notoriously difficult to change. The New Right-inspired reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were at the deepest level attempting to change the organizational culture of public bureaucracies in a way that inverted the way in which senior public sector leaders interpreted their management responsibilities. Conservative ministers in Britain (and subsequent Labour ministers since 1997) sought to shift the leadership focus of senior civil servants from an upwards-focus

on policy advice to ministers to a downward-emphasis on management and service delivery to customers.[4] However this change in leadership style and direction grated against the traditional culture of the British civil service which saw the role of senior officials as policy-based and highly elitist; administration and management roles were interpreted as second-class and something to be avoided (This was reflected in recruitment patterns where fast-track officials tended to have non-vocational 'academic' degrees and rarely had management experience and middle-management grades were reluctant to accept 'operational' leaderships posts beyond the environs of central London).

Overall, the challenges and issues encapsulated in the concept of 'governance' help us understand and deconstruct many of the central questions for public sector leadership in the twenty-first century. Through what processes and mechanisms is it possible to manage and co-ordinate complex networks? Is it possible to balance organizational independence and political control? How do different forms of leadership co-exist? Are private sector leadership styles and methods transferable to the public sector? What role does organizational culture play in relation to new management practices or organizational reforms? These are exactly the questions faced by the Labour Government when it was elected into office on 1 May 1997 after eighteen years in opposition. How they have attempted to answer these questions forms the focus of the next section.

3   Governance and Leadership in Practice

As a result of the managerial reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (discussed above) the state-structure inherited by the Labour Government in 1997 was markedly different from the one they left behind in 1979. In particular the changes to the state were widely perceived to have undermined the strategic capacity of the core executive (i.e. the 'hollowing out' thesis). The 'tunnel vision' effect of agencification was interpreted as being particularly problematic in relation to a great number of 'wicked issues' that transcended organisational and departmental boundaries and could therefore only be addressed through 'joined-up' or 'holistic' government. These issues included homelessness, drug prevention, criminal justice, migration control, teenage pregnancy, social exclusion, anti-social behaviour, organised crime, and the control of sexually transmitted diseases (see Bogdanor 2005; Kavanagh/ Richards 2001; Ling 2002). Indeed, the historic failure to address these issues was perceived as endemic to the institutional structures and political culture the government had inherited, creating the acute concern to avoid the 'besetting

sin of past governments'[5]. Numerous institutional forms, tools and mechanisms were adopted to promote both vertical and horizontal coordination and thereby promote the leadership capacity of both ministers and officials. This included creating a large number of advisory units and taskforces, establishing a number of specialist cross-departmental units at the centre of government (Cabinet Office) to co-ordinate and drive forward change across a network of departments and organisations (e.g. Rough Sleepers Unit, Women's Unit, Social Exclusion Unit, Anti-Drugs Coordination Unit). Other tools adopted included joint-budgets, the appointment of (usually junior) ministers with cross-cutting portfolios, the creation of budgets to incentivise joint working (such as the Invest to Save Budget) and the appointment of a Minister without Portfolio within the Cabinet Office charged with overseeing and delivering joined-up policies.

However, the approach of the Labour Government was not entirely consistent and it is possible to identify an element of 'fragmegration' – the desire to increase integration while at the same time increasing organisational fragmentation that makes this harder to achieve. Flinders suggests a tension between the 'devolutionary thrust' of the government's public management reforms and the 'centralizing efforts by ministers to steer increasingly complex networks', as despite measures of central coordination, the delegation of operational functions to quasi-autonomous and non-governmental actors has meant that fragmentation and the number of potential veto points has continued to increase (Flinders 2004a, p. 893). Under Labour the sphere of delegated governance has increased; there has been no 'bonfire on quangos' (HC 209 1999; HC 367 2001). Moreover, the development of the 'hybrid state' moved into a new stage after the 2001 General Election when the Prime Minister announced that the next phase of public sector reform would focus on improving delivery (as opposed to the first term's focus on JUG) (Richards/ Smith 2004). This would be based on two core principles. First, 'earned autonomy' would involve the introduction of greater managerial flexibilities and autonomy where there was clear evidence that an organisation was delivering high-quality services to prescribed levels – the leadership-incentive being that excellent results are rewarded with less audit, inspection and central oversight.[6] The leadership-sanction however was underpinned by the second principle – that of 'contestability': the option of using alternative service providers from the private or voluntary sectors where service levels fall below certain standards. The former principle reflects an attempt to balance independence and control and is predicated on the fact that successful organisational performance presents a low-risk for ministers. Earned autonomy also illustrates that while good performance will bring extra benefits bad performance will no longer be tolerated. In a number of speeches Tony Blair made clear that leadership was central to public service

delivery and where successful leadership could not be found in the public sector then the government would look to the private or voluntary sectors irrespective of the policy area in question – there should be 'no barriers, no dogma, no vested interests that stand in the way of delivering the best services' (Blair 2001). In this context there was an emphasis on 'what matters is what works' (see Shaw 2004) and a renewed willingness to experiment with new or expanded forms of public-private partnerships (Flinders 2005).

Although the Labour government has not attempted to reverse any of the previous Conservative governments' managerialist reforms (and has even extended them in some areas) it has in many different ways recognised the implications that increased fragmentation and institutional hybridity has for public sector leadership. The challenge has been in developing new tools of governance that can promote and support leadership and executive control in a changed (and constantly changing) environment. Arguably the central mechanism used to achieve this and balance-out all the competing pressures has been the PSA regime that has been in place since 1998. It represents an important channel of strategic governance, aiming to increase the strategic and leadership capacity of the core executive in accordance with its two broad pillars of reform, delivering joined-up public services within a national framework of priority setting and accountability, by establishing explicit aims and targets for all departments which then trickle down to the various arm's-length bodies that operate under the auspices of each department. Whilst the PSA framework has been modified and reformulated over four successive Spending Reviews, several core principles have remained constant. Each Spending Review, from which targets are derived, identifies broad, overarching objectives - macro-level goals which represent the 'starting point' for the allocation of resources across government for the following three years, bringing all elements of government together under a set of common objectives. Fixing the public expenditure envelope for a three-year period is intended to allow departments to manage their resources more effectively, enabling them to plan ahead and think more strategically. Longer-term planning also sharpens the focus upon tangible policy outcomes, something which previous governments were criticised for failing to do, thus coupling spending with the achievement of policy outcomes, rather than individual departmental processes and outputs (Cm. 4181 1998, pp. 1-5). Departments are also encouraged, where appropriate, to work together to achieve policy goals that transcended traditional Whitehall boundaries, as each Spending Review has established a number of cross-departmental reviews and inter-departmental targets 'to ensure effective coordination and joint working between departments with related responsibilities', in a number of areas, including the Criminal Justice System, illegal drugs and provision for young children (Cm. 4011 1998, para. 4.9). Finally, a greater degree of

autonomy for front-line service providers has been envisaged in accordance with the principle of 'earned autonomy', wherein flexibilities granted to local authorities and service providers are driven and monitored by the centre, within a national framework of priority setting and accountability. Indeed, new lines of accountability were established within Whitehall, as the centre sought to adopt an increasingly active and interventionist role in ensuring progress against targets, engaging with departments in a 'continuous process of scrutiny and audit' (Cm. 4011 1998, para. 4.9-4.11). The monitoring arrangements in place to oversee progress towards the PSA targets reinforced the role of the centre as the driver of the new regime, its system of incentives and disincentives ensuring that the focus across government remained upon the centre's core objectives. The government acknowledged that progress towards targets would vary particularly as the targets were intended to be 'stretching', however if progress were to slip beyond acceptable levels the centre would intervene, providing support and advice for departments rather than simply deducting money from their budget. Through the Ministerial Committee on Public Services and Public Expenditure, to which departments are required to submit regular reports, the centre is involved 'monitoring closely' each department's PSA framework. Departments are also required to make performance information publicly available by publishing their progress twice a year in annual departmental reports and autumn performance reports, as well as being encouraged to make the information available on their websites (Cm. 4181 1998, p. 2). Thus, the PSA regime 'in theory' offers a matrix solution to (multi-level) governance and leadership challenges in Britain, covering 'horizontal relationships' between actors at the same level (e.g. between the core executive and delivery departments) and 'vertical relationships' between actors at the national and sub-national level (e.g. between individual local authorities and the national government). The remained of this section will now examine the utility of the PSA regime 'in practice'.

Overall, the success of the PSA regime as a tool of governance is predicated upon the effectiveness of political leadership, and it has sought to unify the core in order to operationalize its strategic objectives. The role of HM Treasury in the domestic policy-making process has been revitalised, as it has assumed responsibility for negotiating with departments their aims objectives which feed into PSA targets, and for monitoring their performance against their targets, providing supporting and guidance as necessary. The Cabinet Office and Prime Minister's Office are also involved in the regime's administration. The Cabinet Office works alongside the Treasury in preparing and delivering PSA targets, and through the Civil Service Reform programme has also worked with departments across government to improve their capacity to achieve their targets

(National Audit Office 2001, p. 18). The Cabinet Office has also complemented the work of the Treasury in shadowing and monitoring the policy and expenditure of departments, exercising a similar function over a select number of areas. The Prime Minister has also informed the PSA framework, being heavily involved in determining top-level priorities and objectives. His influence was institutionalised through the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit which works in close collaboration with the Treasury to 'strengthen the capacity of departments to deliver effectively on particularly challenging targets' in certain key areas (Cm. 5571 2002, p. 3).

The appearance of an orderly framework, however, belies evidence of tension at the heart of government. There are concerns that, through its stewardship of the PSA framework, the Treasury has been disproportionately empowered vis-à-vis the rest of the centre, leading to 'a rivalry for control of domestic policy' within the core executive (Lee/ Woodward 2002, p. 51). In particular, the Treasury has been charged with encroaching upon the traditional territory of the Cabinet Office, which had held responsibility for efficient service delivery since the Thatcher premiership (Lee/ Woodward 2002, pp. 50-51; Burch/ Holliday 2004, pp. 5-7). Whilst there has always been an element of tension between the two regarding to the management of centrally driven initiatives, the situation has been exacerbated by the PSA framework, particularly as the Treasury now negotiates policy objectives for departments, deciding through the spending process what is worthy of funding (Talbot 2000, p. 65). Compounding this uncertainty is the lack of clarity in the government's reform agenda, particularly between the various initiatives contained within Modernising Government White Paper and the PSA regime. In evidence to the House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee Richard Parry drew attention to the 'enhanced capacity' of the Cabinet Office in coordinating and delivering government objectives in the 'Modernising Government' white paper, and the absence of the Treasury in its vision of the centre, suggesting that 'Modernising Government' represents an attempt by the Prime Minister to create an alternative policy system outside of the Treasury-driven PSA framework. In contrast, however, Sir Peter Kemp suggested the PSA regime significantly empowered the Treasury vis-à-vis the Cabinet Office, its departmental objectives affording the Treasury massive leverage at the heart of government, and in comparison 'Modernising Government' appeared weak and lacking in rigour (HC 378 1999, PST 01-02). Whilst it is suggested that tension at the heart of government is an enduring feature of the British political system, representing the manifestation of the dynamics in the relationship between the Prime Minister and Chancellor (Thain 2004, pp. 124-125), tensions may have been exacerbated by the particular dynamics of the Blair-Brown relationship. Thus attempts at administrative

change driven by 'prime ministerial whim' have been offset by the increasing power afforded to the Chancellor over domestic policy, potentially creating a struggle for ascendancy at the heart of government which could undermine the effectiveness of the PSA regime, the success of which is predicated upon coherent political and stratgeic leadership from a unified core (Burch/ Holliday 2004, pp. 18-20; see also Lee/ Woodward 2002, pp. 50-53).

Yet despite tensions within the core executive, the PSA regime has undoubtedly enhanced the centre's position vis-à-vis the spending departments, ensuring the link between resource allocation and the delivery of key priorities. The steady evolution of the performance framework over successive Spending Reviews has strengthened this focus, as departments have increasingly been required to explicate how various aspects of their objectives will be achieved and particularly how the governance of partner organisations has been tied to this overarching framework. Following the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review all departments were required to publish a Departmental Investment Strategy detailing how resources allocated would be managed 'to deliver the Government's objectives, provide the best value for money and ensure positive social returns' (Cm. 3978 1998, para. 4.2.2). Accompanying the 2000 Spending Review were three further elements to the performance framework. PSA targets were accompanied by Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs), which set out in greater detail how targets would be delivered, providing specific milestones and KPIs. Technical Notes sought to clarify the terms and data definitions used in PSA targets, and detailed the sources and use of performance information. Finally, all departments were required to include at least one target relating to improved value for money and efficiency (Cm. 4808 2000, paras. 2.26-2.28). This process was formalised following the 2004 Spending Review, as all departments were required to publish transparent Efficiency Technical Notes, setting out the precise measures and methodologies used to assess efficiency gains, in accordance with recommendations made in the Gerhson Review on public sector efficiency (Gershon 2004, p. 32). The increased rigourousness of the framework has been accompanied by a simultaneous reduction of PSA targets over successive Reviews, from a maximum of 600 in 1999-2002 to 110 by for 2005-08, to ensure that departments focus fully on the centre's key priorities. Similarly, the abolition of SDAs in 2004, which had previously comprised over 500 subsidiary targets, represented another explicit attempt to afford departments with 'more scope … to devolve decision-making and maximise local flexibility to deliver' (Cm. 6238 2004, pp. 5-7). As the rigourousness of the PSA framework has increased there have been concerns regarding the extent to which the Treasury has dominated the policy-making process, indeed the Treasury Select Committee concluded that moving

increasingly into areas outside its traditional remit of macro-economic concerns has, "…inevitably caused the Treasury to step on the toes of other departments … and has given the impression that the strategic direction of the Government in many areas is being set by the Treasury" (HC 73-I 2001, para. 40, p. 11).

Those within the Treasury, however, have emphasised the collaborative spirit of the regime. Former Chief Secretary to the Treasury Alan Milburn denied that PSA targets represented a Treasury-led top-down imposition, which was later reiterated by then Chief Secretary, Paul Boateng, who highlighted the reciprocal process of negotiation between departments and the Treasury regarding target-setting based in mutual understanding. Indeed, then Cabinet Secretary, Andrew Turnbull, stated that PSAs represented a contract with the government as a whole, outlining 'what they commit themselves to deliver collectively' through a process overseen, rather than dictated, by the Treasury (HC 849 1999; HC 331-I 2005, Q. 6; HC 73-II 2001, Q. 12). Indeed, despite concerns regarding the micro-management of departments, the use of centrally determined targets represents an attempt to develop a stronger corporate centre in government, forging a sense of collective identity around which departments can rally and cohere (Social Market Foundation 2005, pp. 25-26).

An important factor in the success of aligning departments towards the centre's key objectives is the sanctions regime underpinning the PSA framework. In accordance with the explicit principle of linking resources to reform and results, the Prime Minister emphasised 'that the extra investment was conditional on clear objectives, higher standards, improved productivity, and the reforms needed to deliver the modern and efficient services the public needs' (Cm. 4181 1998, p. i). Elsewhere, however, the Treasury denied the imposition of 'direct sanctions' for failing ministers and departments (HM Treasury 2003, p. 10). The rhetoric surrounding incentives and sanctions appears confused, and the PSA regime can therefore be criticised for failing to establish a meaningful sanctions regime. Indeed there are few examples of punitive action being taken against departments unable to meet their targets. The lack of penalty was deplored by the Public Administration Select Committee, stating that contrary to 'Chancellor's intentions as expressed in 1998', the failure to enforce the regime meant that 'the PSA exercise has no teeth whatsoever' (HC 62-I 2003, paras. 3.3-3.4). Similarly, the Treasury Select Committee, warned that without a stringent sanctions regime, the risk of perverse behaviour within departments would be exacerbated, thus recommending the 'publication of a set of principles establishing the ground rules' (HC 378 1999, paras. 56, 61). However, change has not been forthcoming. Without a coherent and overt statement

regarding the incentives and sanctions that can be inflicted upon departments, the extent to which the strategic priorities of the centre can be realised through the PSA regime is likely to be impeded, affecting the regime's utility as a tool of strategic governance and leadership.

Forging holistic government has been a core aim of the PSA framework, its importance illustrated by a steady increase in the proportion of shared targets and a corresponding decrease in departments without any joint targets. Many joint PSA frameworks and targets have focused on 'wicked issues', bringing several departments under a shared set of goals to address problems that had fallen between the cracks in Whitehall, including criminal justice and early years provision. Undoubtedly, 'wicked issues' are without easy answers and attempts to solve such seemingly intractable problems will always be tough. However, progress towards cross-cutting PSA frameworks and joint targets has also been beset by operational challenges including ensuring clear political leadership; affording equal attention to joint and departmental targets; identifying relevant partners and establishing accountability; and implementing appropriate working arrangements and reporting performance (National Audit Office 2005a, pp. 1-6). Regarding political leadership, it is crucial to identify a lead department to ensure the focus of all partners upon the achievement of their shared goal, and to promote the importance of joint working, particularly where the working cultures of partner departments are often different (National Audit Office 2005a, p. 27). The role of political leadership in a target's success is evidenced through the joint targets regarding child obesity and teenage pregnancy. The limited progress towards the child obesity target, for example, has been linked to the failure of the Department of Health (DH) to provide effective leadership, as numerous programmes feeding into the PSA target are located within the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS). Both departments are outside the DH's sphere of control, and without any formal governance mechanisms in place, the DH has been unable to assume control over the necessary levers, both within Whitehall and further down the delivery chain, where service providers are still uncertain about their respective role (Audit Commission/ Healthcare Commission/ National Audit Office 2006, pp. 14-20). The success of the teenage conception target, however, illustrates the positive impact of constructive political leadership, as its achievement was directly attributed to the creation of a dedicated implementation unit within the DH to oversee the wider Teenage Pregnancy Strategy and to ensure the continuing, coordinated focus on achieving the necessary reduction (Teenage Pregnancy Unit 2005, p. 2, p. 16).

Evidence suggests that progress towards shared outcomes has also been hindered by a lack of priority afforded to joint targets compared to departmental targets, as the pervading culture of Whitehall has reinforced the silo mentality, rendering departments unwilling to operate outside their formal structures. Indeed, the departmental focus of sanctions and incentives has led to the suggestion that 'there is little or no reward – either in financial terms or in terms of enhanced status or career prospects – for helping someone else to achieve their objectives (Performance and Innovation Unit 2000a, p. 13). Again the importance of effective political leadership is highlighted as without it, departments 'might be pressured to different directions as circumstances change' (National Audit Office 2005a, pp. 9-10, p. 18). Wider attitudinal change across Whitehall has been called for, to ensure that joint working is 'valued as much as traditional "vertical" departmental approaches' (Unit 2000a, pp. 28-29, see also p. 1). Although in principle all partners should attach equal importance to joint targets, this is unlikely in practice. For example, whilst the health of prisoners is a high priority for the Crown Prosecution Service and the Home Office, it is likely to be significantly less important for the DH, with whom the target is jointly held. Similarly, the priority afforded to school sport by the DCMS and the DfES is likely to differ in relation to the wider aims and objectives of each department (Social Market Foundation 2005, p. 24). Indeed joint targets often contribute to different departmental objectives, and may sometimes be just one of a basket of performance indicators, which affect the emphasis given to the target within each department. Stronger leadership driven by the centre is crucial to overcome such difficulties; to coordinate joint activities, to determine the right strategic framework, and to support departments and promote joint working, intervening directly only as necessary. Certainly, the core executive already exercises such functions in ensuring the delivery joint targets, by supporting cross-cutting reviews, identifying opportunities for joint working and agreeing joint targets as part of the Spending Review process. However there remains scope for the centre in promoting best practice across Whitehall, specifically regarding the value of joint delivery and planning, providing support as necessary (National Audit Office 2005a, p. 3). Furthermore, it has suggested that centre's capacity to forge holistic government is compromised by the lack of clarity in core executive relations, which remain obscure to staff in departments and outside Whitehall (Performance and Innovation Unit 2000a, pp. 61-65).

The PSA framework has also sought to engage those responsible for delivering public services on the ground; ensuring joint working along a vertical axis and uniting the core and periphery around a set of leadership priorities. From the outset, the PSA framework sought to afford service providers with flexibility in deciding appropriate delivery

mechanisms. Since the government's second term, this aspect of the regime has become more pronounced, as the narratives of improved service delivery and enhanced local leadership have moved to the fore. A devolved approach has become intimately 'coupled with national standards and accountability to ensure that an acceptable standard of services is maintained throughout the country.' Delivery organisations have flexibility in prescribing the means necessary to achieve the government's objectives on the ground, in accordance with the demarcation between centrally-determined policy design and locally-driven policy implementation. As mentioned above, enhanced freedoms and flexibilities are predicated upon the principle of 'earned autonomy', which operates as a 'central component in the rewards strategy.' The concept of earned autonomy was formalised in Local Public Service Agreement (LPSA) targets in 2000, which represent partnership agreements between individual local authorities and the Government, to 'allow increased freedom locally and in the regions to set targets in areas that matter most to citizens and ensure local government and other organisations have the flexibilities needed to deliver them.' Underpinning the LPSAs are a number of incentives, including further administrative flexibilities, pump-priming grants and performance reward grants (HM Treasury and Cabinet Office 2004, p. 1, p. 43).

The compatibility of autonomy and national standards, and the willingness of central government to devolve meaningful freedoms have been disputed. Whilst the Prime Minister rejects this 'false dichotomy' (Blair 2004), others maintain that the PSA regime, with its emphasis on performance indicators and targets, has strengthened central sovereignty and hierarchy, rather than enhancing local autonomy and flexibility. Targets have been criticised for being top-down in imposition, which undermines the credibility of the regime and inhibits a sense of 'ownership' amongst service providers, risking perverse behavior (HC 378 1999, para. 14). It has also been suggested that local service providers have been overloaded with a raft of central initiatives and without sufficient coordination, the confused and fragmented performance framework has impeded local autonomy and service delivery (Performance and Innovation Unit 2000b, p. 8, p. 40). Indeed, the Public Administration Select Committee indicated that a 'lack of proper integration' between the simultaneous development of front-line organisational capacity and a centrally-driven measurement culture had created 'tension between those charged with centralised responsibility and those who are responsible for dispersed delivery of public services', undermining the centre's ability to realise its strategic leadership priorities (HC 62-I 2003, p. i). Ensuring effective leverage is likely to require a fundamental reappraisal of core-periphery relations and improved mutual understanding, which was conceded by the core executive in the 'Devolving Decision Making review' (HM Treasury and Cabinet Office

2004, p. 33). However, despite the government's commitment to revitalising central-local relations, there remains scope for improvement. The 2004 Spending Review, for example, illustrated the continuing difficulty of 'squar[ing] greater managerial devolution with the barrage of central initiatives', as the incorporation of recommendations from the Lyons Review (2004) on public employment relocation and Gershon Review (2004) on efficiency savings remain distinctly at odds with measures to ensure further freedoms and flexibilities (HC 960-II 1998, Q. 6).

In determining the impact that the PSA regime has had on leadership and performance, procedural aspects of the regime have at times hindered assessment. In particular, a lack of common monitoring and reporting standards across departments has inhibited meaningful judgement of individual and government-wide performance, a problem highlighted by the PASC, who called for the Treasury to set common reporting standards (HC 62-I 2003, p. 39). Although the government pledged to issue departments with further guidance in the 2004 Spending Review, some inconsistency still remains. Further-more, performance information has not always been readily available, preventing the timely assessment of progress. The prevalence of targets that are 'not yet assessed' has been significant throughout successive rounds of PSA targets. Moreover the existence of 'data lags' has exacerbated the problem that many of the targets focus on long-term societal outcomes (as opposed to simple outputs) and as such fall outside the relatively short timeframe of the PSA regime. Without rigorous interim targets to concentrate the efforts of departments there is the risk that progress towards these long-term goals will diminish over time; an issue compounded by political factors, most notably the electoral cycle and politicians' frequent demands for immediate results.

The weaknesses in departmental data systems have been acknowledged by the centre and in 2002, the NAO assumed responsibility for the external validation of departmental data systems underlying the PSA targets (National Audit Office 2005b, pp. 5-7). However, the continuance of numerous anomalies in departmental data systems, including different standards of data collection and measurement, suggest that a consistent approach across government has yet to be adopted. The Treasury's continued responsibility for the validation of performance information risks conflict between the dual responsibilities of setting targets and monitoring progress against them. It has been suggested that the opacity of performance data may allow the Treasury to 'fudge' unfavourable results, and that it can simply drop unmet targets that are politically sensitive (HC 62-II 2003, PST 28). Whilst both charges are speculative, and have been vehemently denied by the Chancellor (HC 1092-II 2002, Qs. 270-285) they do indicate the lack of transparency in

the Treasury's use of performance data in subsequent reviews. The limitations of data published compounds issues of transparency, as although the government initially committed to producing an annual report (Cm. 4181 1998, p. 2), publishing the 'Modernising Government Annual Report' in 2000 (Cabinet Office 2000), its publication has since ceased and whilst all departments are required to publish performance information twice a year the Treasury no longer produces an overall report detailing the progress of the government as a whole.

Nonetheless, the PSA framework illustrates the importance of effective political leadership in steering the policy process within an increasingly fragmented delivery landscape, directly feeding into the government's overarching fiscal framework which recognises 'a shift from the state only as owner, manager and employer to the state also as facilitator and partner' (Cm. 3978 1998, para. 1.2). The PSA framework has allowed the core executive to delineate its broad policy preferences and exercising strategic political leadership vis-à-vis spending departments and services providers, within a framework of operational flexibility driven and monitored by the centre. Furthermore new lines of accountability have been established across Whitehall, as the centre has actively sought an interventionist role in ensuring progress against targets, engaging with departments in a 'continuous process of scrutiny and audit', whilst freeing them up to determine the detail of delivery (Cm. 4011 1998, para. 4.11). The PSA system is therefore an important example of the state seeking to increase its strategic leadership capacity, coordinating the multitude of bodies involved in policy implementation and service delivery, rather directly providing services itself, in many respects challenging the 'hollowing-out' thesis. The PSA regime also fits within the statement made in the first section about different forms of leadership and leadership potentially being a positive-sum game – British ministers have stepped back from attempting to provide operational leadership and in so doing have (or more precisely specific actors within the core executive have) arguably enhanced their strategic leadership capacity. Although tensions exist within the PSA regime, not only is the framework maturing and evolving, many of these pressures are not directly related to the PSA regime as such but are a reflection of the highly political context in which many of the key actors are operating. The organic evolution of the PSA framework over the past ten years indicates that a certain degree of responsiveness and reflexivity, as it has sought to adapt too many of the consequences, unintended or otherwise, that it has encountered. The government anticipates further 'evolution in the relationship between central government, local government, regional organisations and the front line', to allow central government to 'maintain a strategic role, ensuring national standards are met and maintained, but allowing greater scope locally to determine other priorities and to decide

how best to deliver national outcomes' (HM Treasury and Cabinet Office 2004, p. 1). The next round of PSA targets are due to be announced April 2007, which will provide a further opportunity for refinement. However, the role and existence of the PSA framework can be located within two broader issues that are central to governance, leadership and strategic capacity – meta-governance and governance failure. These form the focus of the next and concluding section.

4   Governance, Leadership and Strategic Capacity

The above account of the PSA framework allows it to be described (in metaphorical terms) as being analogous to a net that can be cast over a vast flotilla of organizations, with different roles and levels of autonomy, and drawn towards broad goals. As such it fits with the central argument of this chapter, which has sought to counter the 'hollowing out' thesis and instead emphasize new forms of central strategic capacity. To continue with the metaphor, although the net might be too small, the mesh to broad and may even have holes in places, it does at the very least, represent an attempt to devise modern tools of governance that impose new incentive and sanction frameworks which recognise that different forms of leadership will be required in different organisational contexts. The PSA regime therefore provides an example of what Jessop has termed 'meta-governance' – the exercise of political leadership wherein traditional political actors have become charged with the management of 'complexity and plurality' (Jessop 1998, 2004). Thus rather than its marginalization, meta-governance highlights a revitalized role for the state in providing the context for the design of self-organisation, ensuring the relative coherency of diverse aims and objectives, and setting the parameters within which governance transactions take place.

There are both institutional and strategic dimensions to this political leadership. Institutionally, it relates to the provision of mechanisms for 'collective learning about the functional linkages and the material interdependence amongst different sites and spheres of action'; and strategically, it promotes the development of shared visions and objectives. Along both dimensions, therefore, political leadership seeks to shape 'the context within which heterarchies can be forged rather than developing specific strategies and initiatives for them.' The state, in this analysis, adopts a major role as the 'primary organizer of the dialogue among policy communities, as an institutional ensemble charged with ensuring some coherency among all subsystems, as a source of regulatory order in and through

which they can pursue their aims, and as the sovereign power of responsibility.' Rejecting both the rigid hierarchical ordering of governance arrangements on one hand, and the unstructured exercise of fluid and dynamic power on the other, Jessop therefore envisages the imposition of centrally-determined frameworks of order wherein the state 'provides the ground rules for governance', which is then largely exercised within self-organised networks. Thus, as suggested previously by Scharpf, governance transactions increasingly take place 'in the shadow of hierarchy' (Scharpf 1994, pp. 38-41) as the numerous coordination mechanisms exercised by the central authority, including markets, hierarchies, networks and solidarities, inform and direct the different forms of self-organisation adopted by further down the delivery chain (Jessop 1998, pp. 40-44).

If meta-governance redefines the role of political leadership as one of defining, setting and policing the ground-rules within which other actors operate then the next logical question asks – what would the implications of (meta-) governance failure be for leadership within the public sector? In an increasingly diffused landscape of policy-making and service delivery the risk of governance failure is significant, as is the dilemma posed by the blurring of responsibilities (Bovens 1998). But at a broader level the notion of governance failure poses as yet under-developed questions about the nature of leadership within the public sector, the role of public expectations as a possibly irrational driver of reform projects and the increasing disjuncture between the structure of state systems and established frameworks of representative democracy. It is in this context that Stoker suggests 'the need to think beyond the retooling of government to a broader concern with the institutions and social and economic fabric beyond government' (Stoker 1998, pp. 24-26). And to this we would add a broader concern with the issue of leadership because it is through coherent political leadership at the strategic level and professional public sector management at the operational level, combined with a mutual understanding and respect for each actors respective sphere of authority, that the inevitable difficulties and challenges of network co-ordination and delivery can be overcome.

Endnotes

[1]   Swarfega is an incredibly slippery gel used by mechanics and engineers to remove engine oil from their hands.

[2]   Exceptions being: Bache/ Flinders 2004 and Stubbs 2005.

[3]   As opposed to the approached emanating from the spheres of comparative politics, international relations, political economy or social anthropology and encapsulated in the approach of the contributions in Hodges 2005.

[4]   Classic texts such as Hayek 1944 and Friedman 1962; were influential in New Right schools of thought, including the Chicago school and the Virginia school.

[5]   Evidence from Cabinet Secretary Jack Cunningham (HC 82 1998, para. 1).

[6]   For evidence of the rhetoric of earned autonomy, see HM Treasury and Cabinet Office (2004) and Milburn, A. (2003).

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Coordination and Leadership at the Centre of the Australian Public Service

1   Introduction

In an era of sustained reform that began in the mid-1970s, the internal structures, systems and culture in Australian federal government have moved away from direct central controls of administration exercised by strong public service institutions and towards a reliance on flexible coordination processes under strong political control. This chapter suggests reasons for the shift and for the form it has taken, outlines the network of coordinating mechanisms now existing and notes the limited institutional base for designing and supporting future significant reform to the public service. It indicates broad directions in which it might be prudent to consider further changes.

2   The Development of a New Australian System

2.1   Control and Coordination

Early in 2007 the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) moved after 20 years in an attractive but small building on the edge of the parliamentary triangle in Canberra to new premises next door. The history of PM&C's former building points to a significant change in style in the Australian Public Service (APS). Built in the mid-1970s and named McLachlan Offices after the first Australian Public Service Commissioner, the building was first occupied by the Public Service Board, a powerful central agency which controlled staffing levels and entitlements across the APS. In July 1987 Prime Minister Hawke abolished the Board and most of its control apparatus. Its successor, a small Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) with residual functions in senior appointments, human resource policy and training moved to a wing of the building otherwise occupied by the Agriculture Department. The Board's former accommodation was taken over by PM&C, a new-style central agency with coordination rather than control functions, and the former public service commissioner's name disappeared from the building in favour of the neutral address, 3-5 National Circuit[1].Thriving in the subsequent 20 years, PM&C outgrew the building that once housed a control apparatus which gave the APS much of its ethos. There could be no better indicator of the consolidation of a new ethos of coordination than PM&C's move to larger, purpose-built headquarters and the demolition of the former McLachlan Offices.

At the beginning of the Australian era of administrative reform in the 1970s, the Coombs Commission had pointed to the need for such a change. The Coombs Report (1976) gave extensive attention to the coordination and control problem within government, which it presented as inevitable when the executive power of government is exercised by more than one entity. In the Coombs analysis, because the executive power in Australian national government is exercised by departments of state administered by ministers, multiple minister/ department units are the basic executive entities, and "… occasions will arise on which individual ministers and their departments will seek to exercise their powers to a degree or in ways which ignore, or seek to ignore, constraints necessary for the success of the government as a whole and the welfare of the community. Essential, therefore, to any form of government in which authority is entrusted to a number of ministers will be the means by which the discipline of such constraints is made effective" (Coombs 1976, p. 355).

At the time of the Coombs Report, control was preferred over coordination as a means of maintaining discipline and coherence in government. The Public Service Board, along with a single finance agency called the Treasury, administered direct controls of resources and aspects of operations of agencies in the APS. In addition, each minister/ department unit included a departmental secretary, also called a 'permanent head', with significant statutory power to exercise management control within departments, strong tenure relative to the minister and a defined relationship with the central agencies.

The Coombs Commission advocated a shift from these direct controls, deeply embedded in public service institutions, towards coordination. The direct central controls, the Commission argued, distorted responsibility and accountability and were increasingly difficult to apply effectively. Their centrality in public service thinking contributed to a neglect of the mechanisms for coordination of policy development and a lack of concern for the most effective way of delivering services. The Commission considered that it would be preferable to foster "a widespread acceptance of responsibility, an understanding of the nature, significance and force of the constraints which make discipline necessary, and a willingness to see and accept their relevance even to strongly favoured objectives and programs" (Coombs 1976, p. 356).

The Coombs Commission's recommendations were timid, in contrast to the boldness of its analysis and made little immediate impact on the entrenched institutions of public service control. However, societal and economic trends central to its advocacy were making the control structure unsustainable and events developed in line with the

Commission's world view, if not with its proposals. As summarised by Halligan and Horrigan (2005) "Australia moved from a strong centre with a locus in central institutions and high capacity for certain types of coordination to a smaller centre with a corresponding reduction in capacity, coherence, and control of coordination. At this stage it reached a point on the devolved end of the spectrum that was comparable in some respects with New Zealand. Both countries have subsequently engaged in a rebalancing process" (Halligan/ Horrigan 2005, p. 1).

The rebalancing in Australia has resulted in a network of central coordinating mechanisms in place of the direct central controls and institutionally based central agencies of the McLachlan Offices era. The system is now one in which political control of administration is coordinated by a Prime Minister whose head-of-government role exists within a strong culture of collective involvement of other ministers through the Cabinet. It focuses very strongly on the management of change, whether planned new initiatives or responses to unplanned disruptions of ongoing activity. In the absence of disruptions, ongoing activity is the responsibility of each minister/ agency unit and these are expected to operate with a high degree of independence, the centre having progressively reduced its access to and knowledge of the detail of continuing operations while strengthening its involvement at the points of change (although recent trends in budgeting indicates some increased interest at the centre in program detail). Fundamentally, the system relies on strong processes under direct political authority rather than strong public service institutions.

In recent years at least, the shift from control to coordination has developed more through pragmatic responses to external forces than as a result of philosophically or ideologically based planning by reformers. It has reached what seems to be a state of maturity that is well adapted to the style of recent Australian governments but with little in the way of an institutional base for administrative reform. A statutory and structural basis for reform leadership has been established within the APS and is discussed in section 3.4 below but it has yet to be strongly applied or even fully tested.

2.2   Social and Technological Underpinnings

Flexible, process-based rather than institution-based public service leadership is consistent with the societal changes strongly emphasised in the Coombs Report. These in turn have strong underpinnings in technological changes that have been revolutionary in scale since

the 1970s and are continuing. The Coombs Commission focused on the social aspects of the transition then occurring from an era of industrial mass-production and mass-mobilisation industrial warfare to one where individual differences and preferences were increasingly able to be accommodated, and therefore increasingly had to be. Community expectations of service providers and of discipline in workplaces, whether in the public or private sectors, had changed from those of a generation conditioned by economic austerity and military discipline.

Technological and organisational innovation, less emphasised in the Coombs Report, has provided the capacity to meet these community expectations even while it has driven their further growth. In choice of motor vehicles, for example, the Model T Ford famously came in any colour so long as it was black. Modern automobiles roll off production lines as and when needed to fill particular orders with colour and structural options almost as varied as those available from local coach builders before Henry Ford. This is made possible by instant communications down a long supply chain to a manufacturing facility that can cope with immensely complex orders while retaining the cheapness and reliability of mass production. As well as new information and communications technologies, this style of production depends on fundamentally different structures of organisation and work. The capacity to manage complex organisation has vastly increased and continues to improve. Just-in-time manufacturing, networks of suppliers around the world, and highly diverse and complex ways of organising skilled and often independent workers are now the norm.

The scale of change since the Coombs Commission reported can be illustrated by Australian social security and taxation law. In 1976 these could be numbered in the hundreds of pages and delivered relatively simple and standardised results from large, government clerical factories. Today, Australia's taxation law is over 10,000 pages and growing, takes account of a mind-boggling range of circumstances and involves the highly decentralised interaction of public sector regulators and private sector advisers. Social security in Australia is provided through a complex of many hundreds of public sector bodies across jurisdictions and non-government organisations under contract producing results that are increasingly tailored to the circumstances of individuals.

This complexity affects the dynamics of policy development as well as delivery. Many more players than in 1976 have the capacity and the standing for involvement in the policy debate while the technological and organisational capacity for the top of government to reach deep into hierarchies has grown enormously.

The monolithic departments of the Coombs era received their instructions from government in a structured and formal way and through a hierarchy. Their input to policy was often close to monopolistic because often only they had sufficient access to operational information to give worthwhile policy advice. Today, changes to the welfare system, for example, require consideration of impacts and interrelationships between dozens of programs administered by as many as six or seven federal agencies and hundreds of other entities in the non-government sector or in sub-national levels of government. In this and many other cases, the number of players necessarily involved and the complexity of the relationships have moved far beyond the capacity of a department to monopolise the policy relationship with its minister.

The constraints of hierarchy within government have changed as fundamentally as the access to policy of players outside government. Top-level policy makers now can have simple, even routine, access to the middle and lower levels at which services are delivered. Military technology, for example, can connect the commander of the smallest unit, directly and securely, to a national capital, potentially half a world away. The term 'strategic corporal' has become shorthand for the extent to which a junior commander can call on and deploy striking power. The term can be applied equally to the extent to which the top levels of government can interact with that individual in making decisions with strategic implications. The Chief of the Australian Defence Force, the Minister for Defence, and the Prime Minister, can now discuss with a junior commander in the field, in real time, a decision on whether to fire a shot that might be heard round the world.

Additional to the changes flowing from the interaction of new social norms and technological and organisational innovation has been the increasing involvement of the Australian federal government in issues that cross boundaries of many kinds; boundaries within the APS structure, between the public and private sector and between jurisdictions within and beyond Australia. Partly this is the result of more complex policy making and delivery structures. Much of it is driven by issues facing governments that cannot be contained within a single organisational, sectoral or jurisdictional boundary, issues such as: global warming; demographic change (population ageing in the west and the opposite in the developing world); and the globalisation of production of goods and increasingly of services. In Australia, the trend towards cross-boundary problems has been exacerbated by a long-term trend to wider and more extensive federal government involvement in issues once the responsibility of lower levels of government.

3   Political Control and the Shift to Coordination

A shift from a 'command economy' of direct controls by strong central agencies to the general use of market-like and non-market coordination mechanisms was inevitable. The trends outlined above meant that the importance of the area once controlled by strong, relatively autonomous institutions like the Public Service Board, the old Treasury and the 'permanent heads' of departments, the contestably bounded area of activity called 'administration', was declining as the complexity of managing controls within it was increasing. In the large and growing domain beyond the scope of old-style controls, imperatives for leadership were growing. That leadership needed to be political in a democracy and this necessitated a shift in the balance of power and responsibility both within and across the minister/ department units that make up the government. The technological drivers of the changes, by allowing the political leadership to reach deeper into APS agencies, strengthened this aspect of the shift.

But, although a shift away from controls towards coordination and in favour of political supervision rather than autonomous public service institutions was inevitable, the specific form it took was open. One notable feature of the form actually taken is that it is strongly based on processes rather than institutions, perhaps because of the continuing strength in the Australian political system of cabinet processes as the arrangements for managing collective action by ministers.

3.1   Cabinet Processes and Central Agencies

A trend towards a more presidential style of prime ministership in Australia, at least in terms of the support structure available to the office, is often seen to have gathered strength in the 1960s only marginally earlier than the beginning of the public service reform era (Walter 1992; note that Weller 1992 emphasises that prime ministers before the 1960s were able to dominate their government through personality and political influence, even in the absence of extensive formal support structures). In any case, prime ministerial power in Australia continues to be qualified by a strong cabinet system. The Prime Minister's authority stems from the role of chair of cabinet and is constrained by the internal dynamics of each cabinet. Australia has been unusual among Westminster

systems in the strength and reach it has retained for its cabinet system (Weller 2003, p. 702; Kelly 2006, p. 10) and this has shaped the overall coordination system.

Cabinet rules do more than govern the relationship between the senior political members of the government in the areas open to collective decision by them as opposed to actions that ministers may take unilaterally. Crucially, the rules also shape public service activity in the development stage of policy and in post-decision implementation. They force extensive staff work in advance of cabinet decision making and give the APS roles in gate-keeping, agenda-shaping and fact-settling in the lead-up to cabinet decisions or decisions made bilaterally between the Prime Minister and other ministers. These roles are managed by the new central agencies: PM&C; Treasury; and the Department of Finance and Administration.

The Cabinet can thus be seen as extending beyond its defined ministerial membership to what Weller (2003, p. 720) has called "a working set of arrangements". In this sense, the Cabinet includes the set of collective decision-making processes at the top of government for which meetings of ministers provide an occasion and which, in Australia, are heavily supported by the central agencies. These processes rather than any sense of corporate or institutional identity beyond the life of a particular cabinet are the central feature of the Australian cabinet system. The processes that help define cabinet in this sense in Australia are flexible and change over time. There are no firm rules about how an Australian Prime Minister carries out the chairing role and the infinite variability of interpersonal relations in politics changes the dynamics of each cabinet. Cabinet rules are issued, and can be waived in any case, by the Prime Minister. But, beneath the flexibility and variability, core continuities in the Australian cabinet processes have given a distinctive shape to the coordination system.

The central continuity that has given the Australian cabinet processes their strength has been that the great majority of significant decisions, particularly on changes of policy direction, come to the Cabinet for decision or endorsement. There has also been considerable continuity for at least 30 years in the processes for screening and checking that are triggered in the public service when a matter is listed for cabinet consideration. These include standard formats for cabinet papers with provision for short 'coordination comments' on cabinet submissions by three central agencies plus any other agency that may be affected by or have a role in implementing a proposal. Financial impacts must be agreed in advance by the Department of Finance and Administration (or Treasury in the case of revenue). Consultation in developing proposals is emphasised and a cabinet or

prime ministerial decision authorising a matter to come to the Cabinet may establish an interdepartmental committee to work on a proposal or direct that it be developed in consultation between particular ministers. Expenditure proposals are mostly forced through the priority-setting funnel of a cabinet Expenditure Review Committee each year with additional checks by the public service (PM&C 2004).

These forms of the cabinet system, administered to a significant degree by the APS, influence the substance of decision making. The standard format for papers submitted to the Cabinet structures the content, arguments and checking processes for new policy proposals. The papers must be lodged through a computer system in which circulation to ministers and departments is centrally controlled by the Cabinet Secretariat in PM&C under the direction of a senior member of the Prime Minister's staff appointed as Secretary to Cabinet. This retains prime ministerial control of the agenda but authorises a role for the APS. The knowledge that established consultative processes must occur at the cabinet decision stage tends to encourage those developing proposals to consult other interested entities earlier in the policy development process than might otherwise occur. Even if such early consultation does not happen, the collective stage of the process forces those proposing policy to at least consider, and perhaps seek to pre-empt, the likely views of other players, especially the three central agencies.

The role of the central agencies in the cabinet processes goes beyond that of disinterested, potentially sceptical commentators. It also involves early warning by the central agencies to the Prime Minister and other senior ministers of issues arising in policy development and gives the agencies standing and opportunities to put views on policy at the development stage, informed by their perspective across government and lack of vested interest in most programs. The authority of the central agencies within cabinet processes and their mandated involvement at defined points has a pervasive effect and inserts professional, bureaucratic rigour into a process that remains unmistakably under political control. Frequently the Prime Minister or the Cabinet will direct that PM&C and/ or one or both of the other central agencies be involved in the preparation of policy proposals or, even more commonly, in refining them after they are first considered by the Cabinet. Compared to the former Public Service Board and the old Treasury, the new central agencies have lost institutional standing and hard power in the narrow field of administration but gained a defined process role and a measure of soft power across the full range of policy and administration.

A key element of the system is PM&C's role of advising the Prime Minister on gate-keeping decisions across the full range of government activity. These decisions are about what comes forward to Cabinet and in what form and what gets turned back at the cabinet 'gate', possibly for additional public service staff work. Equally significant is the extent to which PM&C officials become involved at key points in policy development by line agencies, either through committee processes or an informal advisory involvement. The changing structure of PM&C reflects these elements, as does the extent to which its officials are required to have both policy process skills and subject matter knowledge in the area of policy with which they are involved. The department draws many of its expert staff from other agencies and a high level of staff turnover in PM&C reflects the attractiveness to high quality, expert public servants of a period of employment in a central agency. PM&C's sub-units also grow and decline to reflect leading concerns in government. In the last few years, for example, the Office of the Status of Women has left PM&C while a new, large National Security Division has been created in the Department.

The modern role of the central agencies has been little documented (Weller 2005, p. 35) and institutional histories of the agencies have tended not to distinguish the central agency role from the normal departmental roles also undertaken by each of the central agencies in support of their own ministers. In their normal departmental capacity, the central agencies provide policy advice and portfolio coordination for their ministers and Treasury and Finance also administer significant programs. Treasury, for example, has responsibility for macroeconomic policy and policy on business law and manages the Royal Australian Mint while Finance manages government property, asset sales and the employment and entitlements of ministerial staff.

As distinct from the normal departmental roles of the central agencies, their central agency role proper has four components: advising the political centre on the merits of policy proposals, working with other agencies in a dispersed policy development system to ensure consistency and compliance with general government approaches and rigorous development of selected key proposals, managing the coordination system for collective decision making; and conducting specific checks on policy proposals, especially their financial aspects. PM&C has the greatest responsibility for process management and the Department of Finance and Administration (Finance) for scrutiny of the financial aspects of proposals. All three agencies, but especially PM&C, are involved in the work undertaken with line agencies on the detailed development of policy and in debates on policy merits.

It is worth noting that an emphasis in the central agency role on responsiveness to government direction owes something to failures on the part of the Coombs-era Treasury at the time that the need for new central role began to emerge. Possibly carried away by the power it exercised in expenditure controls or shaken by instances of imprudent economic policy on the part of the Whitlam Government (1972 to 1975), Treasury so passionately and actively opposed specific economic policies of successive governments as to destroy the patience of the political centre and prompt steps that, among other things, eventually facilitated the removal of the direct controls. The extent of Treasury's policy activism at the time irritated both sides of politics. John Menadue, the mid-1970s Secretary of PM&C, who had acknowledged links to the Labor Party, listed "Treasury disloyalty" to the Whitlam Labor Government along with external shocks and ministerial inexperience as the key factors in failures by that government to execute its program (Menadue 1999, p. 124). David Kemp, chief of staff to the Coalition (conservative) Prime Minister Fraser (1975 to 1983) and later a Howard Government minister, has described Treasury's refusal in 1976 to carry out support work for a Fraser Government decision on currency devaluation as "essentially a strike" (Kemp 2006, p. 10).

The situation was resolved by Prime Minister Fraser who moved Treasury's expenditure control function into a new Department of Finance and began a process that gave the Reserve Bank of Australia an independent advisory role on monetary policy. The establishment in this way of what is now the Department of Finance and Administration was a salutary lesson to the APS on responsiveness to government. It also provided unexpected benefits through a three-agency division of the central agency role that is generally seen to be robust and effective.

A coordinating system has similarly developed in support of the federal government's relationship with lower levels of government, although it is less formalised and entrenched than the cabinet system and the extent to which it is used has fluctuated with political cycles and the ebb and flow of topical issues. Federal-State coordination is undertaken through the Council of Australian Governments, comprising the Prime Minister, his counterparts from the states and territories and a local government representative which, with its supporting ministerial councils in specific policy areas, resolves cross-boundary issues between the federal and lower levels of government. Preparatory work to ministerial consideration is undertaken by public servants across agency and jurisdictional boundaries, again with a strong coordination role for central agencies, especially PM&C and Treasury (COAG 2007).

3.2   Structures for Collective Ministerial Control

Structural innovations have strengthened the collective, cross-portfolio aspects of coordination. Notably, the 'task force' has been semi-formalised as a device to develop new policy or to deal with significant, urgent issues (Management Advisory Committee 2004, pp. 29-32). As long ago as the Coombs inquiry, the term 'task force' was in use to denote a high profile interdepartmental committee (Coombs 1976, pp. 384-385; Painter/ Carey 1979, pp. 87-90). The recent innovation has been to distinguish a task force from other cross-agency structures, informally but now consistently, by entrenching the understanding that a task force is a discrete, time-and-purpose limited unit responsible for producing a result in its own right. Other structures are used to bring together delegates or representatives of longer-term agencies to develop input to positions to be taken forward by those agencies.

Task forces are established by either the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. Their high profile and the high level of authorisation along with the way in which they are reserved for issues of significant interest to the centre of government allows them to establish an organisational identity independent from any of the multiple agencies operating on a long-term basis in their area of activity. Although staff may come from the relevant expert agencies, they owe their loyalty for the duration of the task force's life to the new cross-portfolio body and not to their home agency. If being used to develop new policy, a task force may include as ranking members senior non-government personalities. In this role, the structure may be used for kite-flying and co-option of interest groups as well as policy development. New national welfare and infrastructure policies were developed by task forces of these types. Membership of a task force will usually be restricted to officials if it is used to manage an issue, for example, the Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor in 1999 (Management Advisory Committee 2004, pp. 29-32).

The capacity for task forces to operate independently from continuing agencies within the relevant policy field is enhanced by the frequent practice of assigning the administrative responsibility for them to PM&C, even though staff members usually continue to be paid by their home agencies during the period of their attachment to the task force. More than 70 task forces were serviced by PM&C in the seven years to June 2006 (PM&C 2007) with much smaller numbers being based in other organisations in the same period. The consolidation of the task force as a structural innovation received its most tangible recognition in the design of PM&C's new building, where extensive space has been

allocated specifically for the hosting of task forces (A separate indicator of the salience of PM&C's coordination role is the large allocation of space in the building to meeting rooms to accommodate the constant interaction now required between PM&C and other agencies).

A more recent structural innovation has been the establishment at the end of 2003 of a Cabinet Implementation Unit within PM&C (PM&C 2005; Wanna 2005). The functions of the Unit may have been best summarised in an unscripted comment by Prime Minister Howard in August 2005: "The introduction of a Cabinet implementation unit which is designed in a systematic way to ensure that decisions once taken with great fanfare are not then forgotten and lose their lustre through lack of vigorous detailed implementation, so far has proved to be a valuable addition to my understanding of progress, and also that of Ministers" (Howard 2005, p. 6).

The Unit has designed new forms and processes requiring implementation information to be put before Cabinet at the point of decision and detailed implementation plans to be provided afterwards to PM&C. Selection of proposals for this sort of treatment and the extent of the treatment is risk-based and focuses on issues most likely to concern the government. The Unit monitors the implementation of selected initiatives and every three months presents agency reports on progress to the Prime Minister in a 'traffic light' report with amber and red lights to indicate slippage against milestones or likely shortfalls on expected outcomes and green lights that provide assurance that problems are not expected. The Prime Minister takes these quarterly reports to a cabinet meeting. The system encourages progressive adjustment of expectations on the part of both the government and the public service implementers in the regular exchanges occasioned by the traffic light reports (PM&C 2005).

There have been other procedural refinements in recent years along the same broad lines as the Cabinet Implementation Unit. In defence procurement, an inquiry chaired by another prominent business identity, Malcolm Kinnaird, and reporting in 2003, led to what is called the 'two-pass' system of approval of major acquisition projects (Kinnaird 2003). Decision-making information is required to be brought forward twice to the National Security Committee of Cabinet (serviced by PM&C), once for broad policy approval of acquisition of a defence capability and a second time for decision on the particular equipment or system to be purchased. There is strict definition of the types of information and the prior checks to be undertaken at each stage (PM&C 2004, pp. 36-39). In 2005 the Gateway system of periodic peer review of major capital projects as they are

implemented (a system trademarked by the UK Office of Government Commerce) was adopted. Gateway is managed by a new unit in the Department of Finance and Administration (Department of Finance and Administration 2006). Both the two-pass system and Gateway aim in part to inculcate a stronger delivery focus in the relevant areas of the APS and do so through requirements to follow processes managed by central agencies.

3.3   Structures under the Control of Individual Ministers

As well as the collective, cross-portfolio coordination required by the cabinet system, the Australian coordination system requires structures for control by individual ministers within the minister/ agency unit that the Coombs Report identified as the basic entity within the executive and coordination between the multiple units within each minister's portfolio.

At the beginning of 2007, the basic minister/ agency units in the government were organised within portfolios headed by the 17 senior ministers who make up the Cabinet. The portfolios also included 25 junior ministers in two tiers, non-cabinet minister and parliamentary secretary, each responsible for specified ministerial functions within the portfolio to which she or he was assigned, often including control of one or more agencies. At the centre of each portfolio was a department with policy and implementation responsibilities principally responsible to the cabinet minister in the portfolio. Again, as at the beginning of 2007, a total of 195 agencies, including 18 Departments[2], existed under one or the other of the two financial management acts that regulate the core APS (Department of Finance and Administration 2007).

The assignment of ministers to portfolios and the functional allocation of responsibilities across agencies remain entirely in the hands of the Prime Minister. Administrative Arrangements Orders initiated by the Prime Minister assign the responsibility for functions and agencies to portfolios and departmental functions and activities are often reshuffled within and across portfolios for political or administrative convenience. Responsibilities of individual ministers within portfolios are settled between the senior minister in each portfolio and the Prime Minister through a system of 'charter letters'.

Coordination within each minister/ agency unit has come to be mediated to a significant degree by 'personal' or political staff of ministers. Holland (2002, pp. 6-8; see also Maley 2000) identified just over 150 such staff with a policy advisory or coordination role in

the 42 ministerial offices (in addition to these, ministers have more than that many staff again employed in media, administrative and secretarial roles). A typical allocation of policy advisers to ministers would be one to a parliamentary secretary, three to a minister not in the Cabinet and five to a cabinet minister but with considerable flexibility in allocation to account for the differing workload of ministers. In recent years there have been more than 15 advisers of this type in the Prime Minister's office. Employed outside the APS, frequently without a public service background, these staff have no tenure. They extend the capacity of ministers by providing additional, personally and politically loyal, eyes and ears on portfolio issues, and by functioning as additional sources of political and policy advice, as gatekeepers, agenda setters and process managers in the flow of work between ministers and agencies. Some aspects of the relationship between ministerial personal staff and the apolitical career APS are still to be resolved, as is the place of personal staff in relation to the concept of ministerial responsibility in the democratic system. These issues have arisen in notable recent political scandals (Weller 2002; Holland 2002; Keating 2003). However, the personal staff system is firmly established and has become essential to the type of political control and coordination sought by Australian governments.

Chief executives, including secretaries of departments, are responsible for managing their agencies 'under the minister', as the Public Service Act puts it, and secretaries ceased to be called 'permanent heads' in 1984. Chief executive appointments are centrally controlled and normally made for specified terms. The Prime Minister appoints secretaries of departments and the Cabinet appoints other chief executives, although the Prime Minister retains a plenary power of exception that may occasionally produce an appointment outside the collective cabinet process. There is an informal expectation of rotation after five years for secretaries of departments.

The essence of these top-level personnel arrangements is that, save for specific offices or agencies given statutory independence for a reason, such as the Auditor-General, the Taxation Commissioner and the national broadcasting authority, the APS is required to be responsive to ministers within politically controlled government structures. The arrangements have a statutory basis in personnel and financial management legislation[3] introduced in the late 1990s to replace legislation that dated back to the early years of Australian federation. They are a further indication that the policy influence of the APS depends on the quality of the its advice and not on any independent standing of departments or agencies as institutions. APS involvement in any area of administration as well as in policy is contestable.

Further clarification and rationalisation of the structural underpinnings of ministerial control is being given effect in the implementation of recommendations by the Uhrig Inquiry, which reported in 2003 (Uhrig 2003). John Uhrig, a prominent businessman, with support from the Department of Finance and Administration, reviewed the corporate governance of statutory authorities and office-holders and recommended a systematic rationalisation based on the application to every statutory authorities of two templates built around questions on the degree of direct ministerial control. All structural changes following the application of the templates are expected to be implemented by 2007.

The Uhrig report was in its own terms "practical rather than theoretical" (Uhrig 2003, p. 2) although it soon generated a considerable literature on the unstated theories that lie beneath it and on the extent to which its authors understood these. Critics have also claimed that the Uhrig team understood little of the diversity and functions of the sector they reviewed (Halligan/ Horrigan 2005, pp. 10-11). For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to note that the Uhrig rationalisation will have the effects of strengthening ministerial control of some government bodies by removing boards of directors in some cases and by amalgamating other separate agencies into their central portfolio department. There will be rather more clarity in the direct relationship between minister and agency head where agencies continue to exist. Secretaries of departments will have a more specific coordinating function for agencies within their minister's portfolio. There will be formal, public statements of expectations by ministers and statements of intent from surviving agencies to facilitate understanding of results. Whatever the underlying theory, these refinements clearly fit with the emphasis in the Australian coordination model of ministerial control.

While the Uhrig process is expected to somewhat reduce the number of agencies, the overall total has been fairly stable over time and there is no sign that implementation of the Uhrig report will materially change this. A comparison of changes in Australian federal government agencies between 1982 and 1992 identified 139 agencies at the beginning of the period and 165 at the end, but with considerable churning during the period (Dollery/ Hamburger 1996, pp. 499-505). The Department of Finance and Administration (2007), using a wider definition of agency, listed 195 at the beginning of 2007. The initial results of the application of the Uhrig templates suggest that any reduction in agency numbers as a result of the exercise will be within the normal level of change of time indicated by these figures and that the total will remain in the range of 175 to 200.

An earlier manifestation of the emphasis on ministerial control appeared in a so far little used and little noted feature of the 1999 Public Service Act (section 67) that permits the establishment and abolition of 'executive agencies' at the discretion of the Prime Minister. This provision allows, in effect, a form of generic statutory authority able to be initiated and ended by the executive rather than parliament.

3.4   Leadership and the Cultural Dimension

While presented as structural and process innovations, the changes outlined above have implications for the culture of the APS. This is explicit in the case of the Cabinet Implementation Unit. The Secretary of PM&C has emphasised the potential for the Unit's processes to encourage public servants to consider and plan for the actual results of policy and to encourage those formulating high level policy proposals with significant delivery implications to consult those who will be implementing the resulting policy at the development stage (Shergold 2004, p. 4). Beyond the expectation that the structural and procedural changes embodied in the Unit will affect organisational culture and the way public servants choose to operate, the Unit has taken opportunities to actively promote cultural change. It facilitates regular meetings of what it calls 'communities of practice' among staff of APS agencies, seeks to engage major delivery agencies in a reference group to guide its own activities and has worked with the Australian National Audit Office to prepare and publish a better practice guide to implementation of program and policy initiatives (PM&C/ ANAO 2006).

However, compared to the early years of the Australian reform period, relatively little is now being done to overtly encourage cultural change. There has been no demand from the political level of government in recent years for an APS reform program, as opposed to specific reforms, but the comparatively low level of specific attention given to cultural change may also reflect the absence of a central structure for managing change in the APS. Although a leadership structure for management in the APS has developed that includes a statutory basis for what could be seen as a 'head of the public service' role for the Secretary of PM&C, supported in important ways by the Australian Public Service Commissioner (APSC), it has a limited institutional base. To the extent that the new leadership structure is being used to promote cultural change, the focus has been on ways of operating collectively and across boundaries rather than on developing or promoting reform initiatives.

The significance of the potential leadership role of the Secretary of PM&C in the APS is evident in requirements in the Public Service Act for the Prime Minister to consult the Secretary on the appointment of secretaries of other departments and the APSC on the appointment of a secretary of PM&C. The Act also creates a Management Advisory Committee of agency heads to be chaired by the Secretary of PM&C, the secretariat for which is supplied by the APSC. Under pay arrangements for secretaries of departments settled by the Prime Minister pursuant to the Public Service Act, the Secretary of PM&C and the APSC jointly advise the Prime Minister on the payment of substantial per-formance bonus to departmental secretaries.

Leadership potential with a less formal base also exists in a now well established forum called the portfolio secretaries meeting which is convened monthly by the Secretary of PM&C. The Secretary of PM&C is also well placed to advise the secretaries of other departments, both in this forum and bilaterally, of the views and dispositions of the collective ministerial decision making body as well as those of the Prime Minister because, despite the 1996 innovation of a political appointee as Secretary to Cabinet, he continues to attend all cabinet meetings. Officials of agencies other than PM&C are rarely called to the meetings.

In the last few years, some tangible signs of conscious leadership of the APS through these mechanisms have been apparent. An empirical basis is for thinking about leadership across the APS is available from periodic surveys of APS staff conducted by the APSC and published with other information in annual State of the Service reports. But, not surprisingly in the current climate of thinking, much of the recent formal effort in top level management leadership has been directed at the issue of coordination across portfolio boundaries. Three of the six published reports of the Management Advisory Committee have been directed at aspects of cross agency operations, including a publication 'Working Together', that was distributed across the APS and set out guidance and protocols for cross agency work (Management Advisory Committee 2005). Each of the 2004-05 and 2005-06 State of the Service Reports (APSC 2005, 2006) contains a full chapter on whole of government and the 2004-05 report includes whole-of-government capacity among five 'critical challenges' facing the APS (the other four were: embedding the statutory values and code of conduct in APS culture; relationships between the APS and the Government; building and sustaining the capability of the APS; and ensuring proper diversity in employment).

4   Reform without Doctrine?

In 1901 Albert Metin, a French radical, described Australia as practising socialism without doctrine (Metin 1977 [1901]). This chapter might be said to present the recent developments in Australian public service reform as reform without doctrine; that is, without reference to schools of thought on public service reform. This has not been done in any Uhrig-like attempt to be 'practical rather than theoretical' nor with any wish to disparage the efforts of reformers. Rather, it acknowledges that in recent years, and in marked contrast to the earlier phases of the reform era, there has not been in Australian federal government a public service reform movement with a stated doctrine or any discernible, self-conscious leadership within the APS. It acknowledges also that, in the absence of doctrine and active leadership, the influence of local institutions and history on the direction of change may be greater.

But the absence of theory and overt leadership in recent reforms in the APS does not mean that change has not followed a broadly coherent and consistent path. Although it may be unstated, a doctrine is discernible in the present Australian model. The model is clear in its emphasis on the primacy of responsiveness of the APS to the collective decisions of ministers as a cabinet on the one hand and to individual ministers within each minister/ agency unit on the other. From these basic premises flow the key features of the model. Processes supporting ministers when they are acting collectively necessarily focus on matters that require collective decision, which in the Australian system are those matters that are approaching a point at which change will be contemplated or is being made necessary by events. These are the matters that now receive most of the central attention in Australian government. At the same time, a significant reduction of capacity for central monitoring of ongoing activities not subject to any evident disruption reflects an assumption that the centre can safely be less involved in the continuing management of their portfolios by individual ministers. Further, the need to give effect to responsiveness to ministers collectively within a generally devolved system has created a role for the three central agencies as coordinators rather than controllers or leaders. It also accounts for the increasingly important set of structures and systems for working across organisational, jurisdictional and sectoral boundaries and for an emphasis on transparency to the centre of government that can be seen in many of the specific reforms of recent years.

The more recent reforms may not have been as overtly linked to theory as was common in the earlier years of the reform era but much of the doctrine of that era has arguably been absorbed and become commonplace. This may account for a degree of coherence and consistency of approach that is evident in reform initiatives in diverse areas of policy. The reform emphasis has in fact shifted from the machinery of government to reform of specific programs and policy areas with machinery reforms now increasingly emerging in responses to program or policy problems rather than from generalised thinking about public service reform.

It is arguable that the absence of a stated doctrine for public service reform in Australian federal government has been compensated for by what was described, about 60 years after Metin, as "a talent for bureaucracy" in Australia (Colebatch 2005, pp. 32-33). This has operated to produce structures, systems and, increasingly, a culture that delivers rigorous support processes for government decision-making of a kind that recent Australian governments have favoured. However, reliance on the talent for bureaucracy has a disadvantage in that the APS, operating ostensibly without doctrine, may find it hard to maintain a common understanding across the service of the purpose and functions of the coordination system or to fit ad hoc reforms within it. There is no doubt that the cultural value of responsiveness to the political level of government has been hammered home in the APS but the structures and systems that provide coordination under political control may not be as well understood. The Coombs Report (Coombs 1976, p. 356) had raised as an ideal a system in which the necessary constraints and disciplines in government would be so widely understood and accepted as to minimise the need for direct controls. The report offered little guidance as to how that understanding could be established or what coordinating system should mediate the interaction of units in the executive that would necessarily occur even with a shared understanding. A coordinating system has developed but its continued effectiveness depends on the extent to which the APS can properly apply it in the absence of stated doctrine.

In the circumstances that have prevailed during a long period of sustained economic growth, robust public finances and a highly disciplined government the present tacit understandings and unstated doctrine have been sufficient, and may well have been as much as could be done. When these circumstances change, the debate on theory may become overt and the implicit doctrine underlying reform may be tested, along with the extent of real understanding and commitment to the processes within Australian government and the capacity for leadership of public service reform.

Any such testing will also highlight the greatest risk in the Australian system: the extent to which the coordination structure depends on the approaches and capacities of each prime minister and the dynamics of his or her cabinet (Kelly 2006, p. 10). The key processes in the system hang off the political authority of the top level of the government in a way that exposes them to the possibility of sudden, radical change if the political approach changes. This could happen not only through changes of personnel at the top of government but also through external shocks, for example, pressures arising from the inevitable end of the long economic boom or adverse developments in national security or international relations. The institutional buffer against administrative turbulence that once existed has largely been dismantled while the processes that replaced it have so far only been tested under political leadership that understands and is attuned to it.

A further risk is that the shift away from central monitoring of ongoing activities may have degraded capacity in a way that will require prolonged and difficult reconstruction if circumstances require greater central management of ongoing activity as well as policy change. In particular, outcome/ output budgeting, perhaps the most significant recent reform to have been largely conceived of by the APS rather than ministers, and one of the few to have been put forward with an explicit doctrinal base, has greatly reduced the availability of detailed information on a consistent basis about the operations of government programs. If a government were to require changes in policy direction or a fiscal consolidation as large as those implemented by the incoming Howard government in 1996 the central agencies might find it difficult or impossible to establish a strong evidential basis for proposed changes.

These risks suggest that a prudent approach to immediate further reforms would focus on the central agencies. It should be possible to clarify and strengthen their functions and structures, to be clearer and more explicit on the roles and the purposes of their various activities, and to promulgate an understanding of these more widely in the APS. The question of leadership of the APS could be more explicitly addressed and a stronger and more clearly defined support structure for the leadership of public service reform ought to be achievable within the decentralised structures now favoured. This would require clearer definition of the location of the elements of the leadership role, most of them presumably with the Secretary of PM&C, as well as establishment of a secretariat support structure with greater strength and continuity than now exists. The knowledge and capacity at the centre to report and advise on continuing activities in ordinary portfolios could be improved.

The role that has evolved for the central agencies means that the continued health of the process-based Australian coordinating system will depend significantly on their performance and capacity, especially that of the agency that supports the Prime Minister as chair of cabinet, PM&C. If the history of the former McLachlan Offices highlighted one sea change in the Australian system, perhaps the future of the extensive space provided in PM&C's new building for task forces and inter-agency meetings might be an indicator to watch for the next one. If PM&C's flexible space is ever sublet for use by conventional organisations, it may be a sign that the era of flexible, cross-boundary coordination has ended. At time of writing, however, this prospect seems remote and the more likely response to the challenges to the system that will inevitably emerge will be mechanisms for better rather than less coordination.

Endnotes

[1] It is possible that a disapproving mid-1980s re-reading of McLachlan's early twentieth century attitude to women working in the public service was thought inappropriate to a building housing the Office of the Status of Women, an element of PM&C, and this more than any wish to sow salt in the soil formerly cultivated by the Public Service Board may have influenced the dropping of the name.

[2] The number of departments varies slightly from the number of portfolios. One of the 17 portfolios, Foreign Affairs and Trade, has two cabinet ministers but only one department. Two portfolios, Defence and Finance and Administration each include two departments, a service delivery department (Veterans' Affairs and Human Services respectively) as well as the core policy department.

[3] The Public Service Act 1999, the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997.

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Das Konzept des aktivierenden Staates als deutsches Muster von Governance? - Zur Stabilität und zum Wandel von öffentlichen Institutionen

1   Politische Phasen in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Schaut man auf Staat und öffentliche Verwaltung über die Zeit seit der Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949) bis heute, dann findet man in der Literatur und Publizistik häufig die Einteilung in klar voneinander abgrenzbaren Phasen. Und dem jeweiligen vorherrschenden Politikverständnis wird dann ein politisches Leitbild zugeordnet, für das es in den Wissenschaften auch eine theoretische Fundierung gibt (Jann 2003, 2002).

Folgende Phasen werden in der Regel eingeteilt:

Tabelle 1: Phasen, Leitbilder und theoretische Konzepte in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Zeit	Hauptkennzeichen	Leitbild und theoretisches Konzept
1949 bis Anfang der 1960-er Jahre	Aufbau und Konsolidierung; Beseitigung der Kriegsfolgen	Demokratischer Staat
Mitte der 1960-er bis Mitte der 1970-er Jahre	Planung, Ausbau der leistenden Verwaltung	Der aktive Staat/ Aktive Politik
Ende der 1970-er bis Mitte der 1990-er Jahre	Entbürokratisierung, Reduzierung der öff. Aufgaben, Privatisierung	Schlanker Staat
Seit Mitte der 1990-er Jahre	Zivilgesellschaft, Regulierung	Der aktivierende Staat

Quelle: Eigene Zusammenstellung in Anlehnung an Jann u.a.

Diese Einteilungen haben durchaus ihren didaktischen und heuristischen Wert, sind aber stark vergröbernd und unterstellen einen Dreiklang zwischen tatsächlicher Entwicklung, politischem Leitbild und Theorie auch dort, wo dieser nur mühsam konstruiert werden kann. So liegt die Staatsquote, die als belastbarer Indikator für das Aktivitätsniveau des öffentlichen Sektors herangezogen werden kann, Mitte der 1970-er Jahre und Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts fast gleich hoch, obwohl in diesen zweieinhalb Jahrzehnten die Zurückdrängung des öffentlichen Sektors lange Zeit Programm war. Dieses Bild wird auch nicht dadurch grundlegend korrigiert, dass in die Staatsquote die Ausgaben und

Transfers der deutschen Einheit eingeflossen sind (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2006, S. 165ff.; Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung 2005, S. 192).

Eine Parallele kann durchaus zu einem früheren Bild des Staates gezogen werden, das sich auch verselbständigt hat und empirisch schwer zu halten ist: den sogen. Nachtwächterstaat des 19. Jhd. hat es in der Reinform auch nicht gegeben. Der Staat ist etwa als aktiver Förderer des Gewerbes aufgetreten und hat die Entwicklungen von Gesellschaft und privatem Sektor durchaus unterstützt.

Eine andere Frage ist, wie die drei Dimensionen der tatsächliche Entwicklung, des politischen Leitbilds und der theoretischen Konzepte sich zusammenfügen. Dabei ist keineswegs eindeutig zu bestimmen, welche Dimension die anderen beeinflußt und geprägt hat bzw. umgekehrt durch sie eine Prägung fand. Ist die Ankündigung in der Regierungserklärung der Bundesregierung im Herbst 2005, die ‚Entbürokratisierung' voranzutreiben und dazu eine Stabsstelle im Bundeskanzleramt einzurichten von einem politischen Leitbild des Staates und der Verwaltung der Zukunft geprägt? Das niederländische Standard-Kosten-Modell und seine deutschen Protagonisten liefern allerdings nicht das theoretische Fundament, dafür ist dieser Ansatz zu praxeologisch und zugleich axiomatisch geprägt (Bertelsmann-Stiftung 2006).

Die Problematik der Phasen mit der Dominanz eines Ansatzes wird durch folgende Gegenüberstellung deutlich. Ende der 1960-er Jahre war politisches Thema, den Reformstau durch eine neue Politik (Bildungspolitik, Rechtspolitik usw.) und ein neues Politikverständnis (‚Demokratie wagen') aufzulösen. Die Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten wurden durch die überkommenen Strukturen behindert, so dass in den Ländern kommunale Gebietsreformen und Funktionalreformen durchgeführt, Gesetze mit lenkenden Instrumenten erlassen und Planungssysteme entwickelt und eingeführt wurden (Thieme/ Prillwitz 1981; Mayntz/ Scharpf 1973). Das theoretische Fundament lieferte das Konzept des aktiven Staates (Mayntz/ Scharpf 1973, S. 115ff.). – Aber war nicht auch der Staat in den 1950-er Jahren ein aktiver? Mindestens die Grundlagen und der Ausbau des Sozialstaates haben ihren Ausgang in den späten 1950-er Jahren genommen, vor allem mit der Rentenreform 1957 und dem Bundessozialhilfegesetz von 1961 (1962).

Hier wird ein vermittelnder Standpunkt vertreten. Sicherlich gab es Unterschiede in Politikverständnis und Leitbildern, so dass Phasen oder Zyklen zur Strukturierung herangezogen werden können. Eine jeweils passende Theorie für die einzelne Phase ist dann schon schwerer zuzuordnen. Über alle diese Phasen hinweg gibt es aber auch stabile

Grundmuster und Faktoren, die über längere Zeiträume wirken. Das soll allerdings nicht heißen, dass Flexibilität und Wandel nicht möglich sind und nicht stattfindet. Das gilt es jeweils im Detail herauszufinden und zu interpretieren.

2   Grundmuster des politisch-administrativen Systems: zwischen Stabilität und Anpassung

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist als föderaler Staat konzipiert, der eine Reihe von besonderen Ausprägungen aufweist (König 2002). Die Gesetzgebung ist zum ganz überwiegenden Teil Bundesrecht, während die Umsetzung der Gesetze und Programme grundsätzlich den Länderverwaltungen übertragen ist. Diese wiederum weisen einen Verwaltungsaufbau in 2 bis 4 Ebenen auf, auf dessen unteren Ebenen (Kreise und Gemeinden) der Vollzug im Einzelfall der Bundes- und Landesgesetze und der sonstigen Programme erfolgt. Kreise und Gemeinden nehmen darüber hinaus Aufgaben der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung wahr, die in derselben Verwaltung vollzogen werden wie die staatlichen Aufgaben der Bundes- oder Landesangelegenheiten. Die Länder wirken über den Bundesrat an der Bundesgesetzgebung mit. Die Kommunen haben keine direkte Mitwirkung an der Bundes- oder Landesgesetzgebung.

Diese Prinzipien der Makrostruktur des politisch-administrativen Systems sind seit der Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 nicht verändert worden, auch nicht durch die Föderalismusreform im Jahr 2006, die als die größte Verfassungsänderung seit Bestehen der Bundesrepublik angesehen wird (Holtenschneider/ Schön 2006). Im Gegenteil war es ein wesentliches Ziel der Föderalismusreform, die Grundprinzipien wieder stärker zu betonen, indem die im Grundgesetz angelegte politische Verantwortung der jeweiligen Verfassungsorgane und Ebenen des politisch-administrativen Systems durch Entflechtung von Aufgaben und Verfahren wieder eindeutiger erkennbar wird. Es ging also um eine Inventur und Bereinigung und nicht um eine Systemveränderung.

Die Verteilung von Aufgaben, Finanzen, Macht und politischem Gewicht ist in den fast sechs Jahrzehnten allerdings einem teilweise erheblichen Änderungsprozeß ausgesetzt gewesen. Die erheblichen Unterschiede in Größe und Leistungskraft zwischen den Ländern und die besondere Strukturschwäche in einzelnen Regionen führte in den 1950-er und 1960-er Jahren zu einem zunehmenden Engagement des Bundes in Aufgabenberei- chen der Länder, das 1969 durch eine Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes auch verfassungs-

rechtlich legitimiert wurde (‚Gemeinschaftsaufgaben'). Die Verhaltens- und Ent-scheidungsmuster sind unter dem Stichwort ‚Politikverflechtung' hinreichend empirisch erforscht, und ihre hohen Kosten an politischer und administrativer Koordination mit klaren Grenzen an Innovation und Veränderung als ‚Politikverflechtungsfalle' auch in die Alltagdiskussion eingegangen (Scharpf/ Reissert/ Schnabel 1976; Scharpf 1985). Die Erfahrungen aus dem deutschen Mehrebenensystem werden auch bemüht, um auf vergleichbare Situationen mit der nächsten Ebene, nämlich der EU-Ebene, mit anderen Strukturen zu begegnen (Benz 2004). Eine Entflechtung der sich schleichend entwickelnden Politikverflechtung, die ein wesentliches Ziel der Föderalismusreform im Jahr 2006 war, führt also zur Verfassung von 1949 zurück und korrigiert u.a. die Verfassungsreform von 1969.

Die Ausgangsprinzipien sind auch durch den Prozess der deutschen Einheit bestärkt worden. Es gab keine ernsten Zweifel im Einigungsprozess, dass Ostdeutschland Länder errichtet und zwar in dem Zuschnitt, wie sie 1952 in der DDR aufgelöst und in 14 Bezirke übergeführt worden waren. Und ebenso wurden das Verwaltungssystem und die kommunale Selbstverwaltung nach westdeutschen Muster und mit tatkräftiger Unterstützung von Partnerländern und -kommunen (‚Verwaltungshilfe') errichtet (Derlien 2001; Wollmann et al. 1997; Kaase et al. 1996). Und die Frage wurde nicht ernsthaft diskutiert, ein alternatives oder reformiertes Modell zu entwickeln oder einzuführen. Selbst die in den 1970-er Jahren in Westdeutschland durchgeführte kommunale Gebietsreform wurde – zunächst – außer Acht gelassen.

Die deutsche Einheit hat allerdings die Unterschiede in der Finanzkraft zwischen den Ländern drastisch erhöht. Hatte zunächst der Bund durch Sonderprogramme dies ausgeglichen, so sind ab 1995 die ostdeutschen Länder Teilnehmer an den verschiedenen Budgets des vertikalen und horizontalen Finanzausgleichs (Solidarpakt I und II). Die zusätzlichen Leistungen an die ostdeutschen Länder sind degressiv angelegt und sollen bis zum Jahr 2019 auslaufen (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2006, S. 165ff.). Sie sind Ausdruck des Verfassungsprinzips des ‚kooperativen Föderalismus', an dessen Stelle allerdings der politische Begriff des ‚Wettbewerbsförderalismus' von bestimmten politischen Akteuren in den finanzstarken Ländern gesetzt wird. (Das Bild des Wettbewerbs passt insofern für Verfassungsinstitutionen nicht, als Wettbewerb auch Verdrängung vom Markt bedeutet – es sei denn, man stellt andere Länder grundsätzlich in Frage).

Im Binnenverhältnis der Länder lässt sich über die Jahrzehnte eine ähnliche Entwicklung in den vertikalen und horizontalen Beziehungen feststellen. Die Systeme des kommunalen Finanzausgleichs (horizontal zwischen den Kommunen mit unterschiedlicher Finanzkraft und Sonderausgleichssystemen wegen besonderer Aufgaben und Funktionen; vertikal aus dem jeweiligen Landeshaushalt nach einem komplexen System von Indikatoren) und die Auseinandersetzung um ‚gerechte' Modelle sind plastisches Anschauungsmaterial für die Spannungslagen (Zimmermann 1999). Eine deutliche Stärkung erfuhren die Kommunen durch die kommunalen Gebietsreformen in den 1970-er Jahre. Durch die Einführung von Mindestgrößen, durch Zusammenschlüsse von Gemeinden, Städten und Kreisen und durch neue Organisationsformen der kommunalen Zusammenarbeit (Verbandsgemeinden, Verwaltungsgemeinschaften etc.) wurde die Leistungsfähigkeit der Kommunalverwaltungen gestärkt (u.a. durch Hauptamtlichkeit und Professionalität auch unterhalb der Kreisebene in der gesamten Fläche). Dem wurde auch dadurch Rechnung getragen, dass auf die Kommunalverwaltungen große Aufgabenbereiche der staatlichen Behörden im Zuge der sogen. Funktionalreform übertragen wurden.

Seit den 1990-er Jahren ist eine zweite Welle der Funktional- und Verwaltungsreform auszumachen, die sich in der Begründung von den 1970-er Jahren unterscheidet. Einmal geht es um eine politische Präferenz für ‚Kommunalisierung', um Entfremdungstendenzen bei den Bürgern bezüglich des politischen Systems entgegenzuwirken. In Landesgesetzen wird der Grundsatz festgelegt, dass grundsätzlich alle Aufgaben durch Kommunalbehörden ausgeführt werden können. Für das Gegenteil sei die Landesregierung im jeweiligen Einzelfall beweispflichtig. Zum anderen gab es bei der Landespolitik durchaus eine Bereitschaft, Aufgaben und damit Personal abzugeben, um der sich verstärkenden Haushaltskrise entgegenzuwirken. Letztere war auch ein wesentliches Kriterium bei der Reorganisation der Landesverwaltungen. Ging es in den 1970-er Jahren vorrangig um Leistungssteigerung der Verwaltung, ging und geht es seit den später 1990-er Jahren um Effizienz und Ausgabenreduzierung. Die Reduzierung von einer 3-Ebenen auf eine 2-Ebenen-Landesverwaltung, die Eingliederung der Sonderbehörden in die allgemeine Verwaltung (im Fall Baden-Württemberg in die Regierungspräsidien, im Fall Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in die Verwaltung von Großkreisen) oder die Auflösung der allgemeinen Verwaltung auf der mittleren Ebene (im Fall Niedersachsen Abschaffung der Regierungspräsidien) sind von diesen Gründen getragen (Brenski/ Liebig 2007).

3   Parteien als Entscheidungsträger in dem institutionellen Gefüge der Verfassung

Das institutionelle System der Verfassung wird überlagert durch das Parteiensystem. Das Grundgesetz hat als erste deutsche Verfassung die Parteien als wichtige Institutionen der politischen Entscheidungen anerkannt (Art. 21 GG) und ihnen eine wichtige Rolle im Entscheidungsprozeß zugewiesen. Parteien orientieren sich dabei nur bedingt an den strukturellen und prozessualen Festlegungen der Verfassung. Sie sind auf Legitimation durch Wahlen, auf Machtgewinn und -erhalt und positive öffentliche Wirkung und entsprechende Wahrnehmung durch den Bürger angewiesen und orientiert. Macht und Legitimation spielt auch eine Rolle im innerparteilichen Wettbewerb. Deshalb sind Regierungshandeln, das Verhalten in Koalitionsregierungen, das Verhalten im Parlament und in der Öffentlichkeit immer mehrdimensional geprägt: von dem konkreten Politikfeld und dem zu lösenden Problem und von der Parteienkonstellation und der individuellen und kollektiven Machtsituation. Nur so lässt sich erklären, dass es trotz eines offensichtlich breiten Konsenses über den Umbau des Sozialstaates hin zu einer Problemlagenorientierung, einer stärkeren Konzentration auf Problem- bzw. Zielgruppen, einer Aktivierung des Entwicklungspotentials des Einzelnen der politische Entscheidungsprozeß kontrovers und unter Ausschöpfung aller Möglichkeiten, die das durch die Verfassung geregelte Verfahren bietet, abläuft. Das Beispiel um das Thema Arbeitslosenhilfe und Sozialhilfe mag dies verdeutlichen, das eine gesetzgeberische Neuregelung im Sozialgesetzbuch II gefunden hat (2004)[1]. Beide Sozialprogramme hatten benachteiligte Menschen als Zielgruppe. Bei der Arbeitslosenhilfe ging es um Menschen, die in einem sozialversicherungspflichtigen Beschäftigungsverhältnis gewesen und nunmehr arbeitslos waren. Bei der Sozialhilfe (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt) ging es um Personen, die ihren eigenen Lebensunterhalt nicht bestreiten konnten. Der Grund der Bedürftigkeit konnte vielschichtig sein; eine Konstellation bestand darin, arbeitsfähig zu sein, aber keine Arbeit zu finden, ohne einen Anspruch auf Arbeitslosenhilfe zu haben. Zuständig für die Sozialhilfe waren (und sind) die Kommunen und damit auch verantwortlich, für die arbeitsfähigen Sozialhilfeempfänger sogen. Hilfe zur Arbeit zu gewähren. Zuständig für die Arbeitslosenhilfe war die Bundesanstalt (Bundesagentur) für Arbeit. Es hätte nahe gelegen, systemkonforme Vorschläge von Fachkundigen (Wissenschaft oder Ministerialverwaltung) aufzunehmen, z.B. sich an dem System der Grundsicherung zu orientieren oder entweder die Kommunen oder die Bundesagentur für Arbeit mit der Verantwortung für die gesamte Personengruppe (d.h. alle arbeitsfähigen Personen,

unabhängig ob sie Sozial- oder Arbeitslosenhilfeempfänger sind) zu betrauen. Stattdessen wurde ein politisches Machtspiel inszeniert, in dem einige Ministerpräsidenten aus den Ländern eine maßgebliche Rolle spielten und das bis den Vermittlungsausschuss hineingetragen wurde. Das Ergebnis war ein sogen. Kompromiss mit einer Hybridlösung: sowohl die Kommunen als auch die Bundesagentur blieben im Spiel und sollen in sogen. Arbeitsgemeinschaften institutionell zusammenwirken. Dieses Ergebnis, das mehr als einen Hauch des Verfassungsverstoßes in sich trägt, lässt sich nur aus der parteipoliti-schen Machtkonstellation heraus verstehen.

4   Organisierte Interessen als relevante Spieler im Entscheidungssystem

Wenn in der Bundesrepublik Klage über die Blockaden in der Politik geführt wird, d.h. notwendige Entscheidungen angesichts der Problemlagen zu lange dauern oder nicht weit reichend genug sind, werden häufig das föderative System und seine konkrete Verfasstheit angeführt. Oben ist auf dieses Thema ausführlicher eingegangen worden, indem die politischen Kosten der Politikverflechtung aufgezeigt wurden. Es muss aber auch auf die positiven Seiten des Föderalismus hingewiesen werden: höhere Problem- und Konfliktlösung durch Dezentralisierung, Entlastung der Zentralebene und Differenzierung bei den Handlungsprogrammen entsprechend den unterschiedlichen regionalen Erfordernissen etc. Nicht von ungefähr bemühen sich zentralistisch verfasste Staaten um eine Dezentralisierung bzw. Föderalisierung.

Wenn es um Blockaden bei politischen Entscheidungen geht, ist auf andere Spieler im politischen Prozess zu verweisen: die organisierten Interessen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein Verbändestaat, in dem die einzelnen Interessen gut organisiert, allerdings mit erheblichen Ungleichgewichten, sind (Zimmer 2001). Die organisierten Interessen sind mit dem politischen System ‚vernetzt', wenn sie nicht sogar über Personenidentitäten und Verfahrensregelungen (Anhörungen) bereits Teil des politischen Entscheidungssystems sind. Die Konstellationen können dabei sehr unterschiedlich sein. Eine negative Koalition von Arbeitgeberverbänden und Gewerkschaften hat stetig verhindert, dass das individuelle Arbeitsrecht kodifiziert wird (die Arbeitgeber, weil sie mit dem unübersichtlichen Richterrecht – vor allem in den gewerkschaftlich schwach organisierten Bereichen - gut leben können; die Gewerkschaften, weil sie hoffen, über Tarifverträge bessere Regelungen zu erzielen als ein schwer zu kalkulierender Gesetzgeber regeln wird)[2]. Komplexer ist die Situation im Gesundheitswesen, weil es hier

um eine mehrdimensionale Verflechtung zwischen Leistungsanbietern, Finanzträgern, Produzenten und staatlicher Verantwortung geht (Rosenbrock/ Gerlinger 2004). Die einzelnen Interessen sind – mit Ausnahme der Patienten bzw. Bürger – gut organisiert, wirken tief in die Parteien, Fraktionen und Regierungen hinein und haben jeweils strategische Entscheidungen, die das System nicht nur punktuell verändern und damit allerdings auch Verlierer schaffen würde, im Endergebnis verhindert. Eine Ausnahme bildet die Strukturreform aus dem Jahr 1992, als sich CDU und SPD in einer 4-Tage-Klausur auf ein Konzept verständigten, das die später antretende Lobby nicht mehr aufbrechen konnte.

Bilder des mündigen und eigenverantwortlichen Bürgers und Patienten werden in dieser Situation eher funktional aus der eigenen Interessenlage heraus benutzt (z.B. um die finanzielle Eigenbeteiligung des Patienten zu begründen), als dass sie ein wesentlicher Baustein eines gesundheitspolitischen Konzeptes wären.

5   Das empirische Phänomen: Der Umbau des Staates bzw. das Verschwinden von 1 Millionen Beamten

Vergleicht man die Zahlen der Beschäftigten in der öffentlichen Verwaltung von Anfang der 1990-er Jahre mit denen 15 Jahre später, so stellt man einen Rückgang von rund 1 Millionen oder 20% für die unmittelbare öffentliche Verwaltung fest. Die Erklärung dieses Phänomens liegt nicht in dem Personalabbau, von dem die ostdeutschen Länder überproportional und die übrigen Verwaltungen teilweise über einen längeren Zeitraum stetig betroffen waren (mit Formeln wie: ,1 % Stellenabbau je Jahr' oder eine vergleichbare Ziffer für den Haushaltsansatz). Vielmehr gesellte sich zu der klassischen mittelbaren öffentlichen Verwaltung (Träger der Sozialversicherung wie Renten- und Arbeitslosenversicherung) ein neuer Typus von Organisationen, in die ehemals als Teil der öffentlichen Verwaltung angesehene Einrichtungen überführt wurden. Es sind Agenturen (,Agencies'), verselbständigte öffentliche Unternehmen (Bahn, Post, Telekommunikation) mit unterschiedlichen Rechtsformen und (teil-)privatisierte Unternehmen, denen bisher unstreitig öffentliche Aufgaben übertragen wurden und werden. Ein jüngstes Beispiel ist die geplante Überführung des Arzneimittelinstituts (bis in die 1990-er Jahre Teil des Bundesgesundheitsamts) in eine selbständige Agentur (Arzneimittel- und Medizinprodukteagentur), die sich weitgehend selbst zu finanzieren

hat, und zwar aus den Gebühren der an einer schnellen und positiven Entscheidung interessierten Antragsteller[3].

Diese Veränderungsprozesse werden durch die Interventionen der EU-Kommission - vor allem über den Weg, Hindernisse für einen EU-weiten Wettbewerb abzubauen, - forciert. Ehemals traditionelle Bereiche der Daseinsvorsorge als öffentliche Aufgabe werden auf diese Weise in Formen der Marktwirtschaft überführt. Da diese Bereiche in Deutschland traditionell kommunale Angelegenheiten sind (Versorgung mit Energie und Wasser, Entsorgung), ist nicht nur die Bundesebene betroffen. Und die EU-Wettbewerbspolitik verstärkt die sich national zunehmend stärker artikulierenden Positionen, den Sonderstatus der Wohlfahrtsverbände in Frage zu stellen. Diese Verbände haben über Jahrzehnte im Sozial- und Gesundheitsbereich Versorgungsaufgaben wahrgenommen, die sonst von der unmittelbaren öffentlichen Verwaltung zu leisten gewesen wären, und waren – und sind teilweise - über eine spezifische Ausformung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips privilegiert.

Der Entwicklungsprozeß zu Agenturen und ähnlichen Handlungsformen hat dementsprechend auch die Kommunal- und die Landesebene erfasst. Und die großen Sozialversicherungen, despektierlich als die letzten Dinosaurier einer vergangenen Zeit von öffentlicher Verwaltung bezeichnet, sind einem entsprechenden Veränderungsprozess unterzogen worden. Für die Krankenversicherungen gilt dies seit der Gesetzgebung von 1992, für die Arbeitslosenversicherung seit den Gesetzen von 2003 und 2004, die nicht nur den Namen der Arbeitsverwaltung (jetzt: Bundesagentur), sondern Inhalte und Strukturen veränderten, und für die Rentenversicherung seit dem Organisationsgesetz von 2005.

Die Übertragung in neue Organisationsformen mit anderer Trägerschaft und eigener geschäftspolitischen Orientierung verlief und verläuft in der Regel konflikthaft. Bei diesen Konflikten geht es nicht nur um den Status der Beschäftigten und ihrer beruflichen Zukunft. Hierfür sind unterschiedliche Lösungen gefunden worden (Übernahme des Personals zu mit den Gewerkschaften ausgehandelten Bedingungen, Beschäftigungsgarantien auch außerhalb des unmittelbaren öffentlichen Dienstes, Auffangorganisationen wie bei der Bahn und Telekommunikation usw.). Es geht im Kern darum, welche Aufgaben und Funktionen Staat und öffentliche Verwaltungen auch in Zukunft wahrzunehmen haben, von welchen sie sich nicht entledigen dürfen. Die kontroverse Debatte um diese Grenzlinien wurde besonders plastisch bei der Frage, ob und inwieweit eine Privatisierung von Gefängnissen oder der Flugsicherung (Schoch 2006) verfassungsrechtlich zulässig ist. Die Verfassung hat dem Staat Funktionen zugewiesen und vorbehalten, so dass er einen

Kernbestand an Aufgaben selbst zu erfüllen oder die Aufgabenerfüllung zu gewährleisten hat (Benz 2001; Bull 2005; König 2002).

Nun ist die oben dargestellte Entwicklung zur Agentur-Bildung zwar politisch kontrovers verlaufen, sie ist aber grundsätzlich nicht an Vorgaben der Verfassung gescheitert. Auch spektakuläre Fälle wie die Börsennotierung der Bahn oder der Verkauf des gesamten kommunalen Wohnungsbestandes (Dresden) sind weniger Rechtsprobleme als dass sie deutlich machen, dass solche Schritte unumkehrbar sind; d.h. für eine kommunale Wohnungspolitik fehlt auf Generationen hinaus die substantielle Basis.

Für diese Handlungsformen bleiben aber eine politische Verantwortung der staatlichen Institutionen und eine Steuerungs- und Kontrollfunktion der öffentlichen Verwaltung, um Leistungen, allgemeinen Zugang und faire Bedingungen für andere Anbieter usw. zu gewährleisten. Diese Steuerungs- und Kontrollfunktion erfordert ein anderes Regelwerk (wie z.B. das Telekommunikationsgesetz), andere institutionelle Arrangements (z.B. Regulierungsbehörde) und neue Instrumente für die Aufsicht (Voßkuhle 2006; Masing 2006).

6   Neue Handlungsansätze und -instrumente

Das dominante Steuerungsmedium von Politik und Verwaltung waren in der Vergangenheit das Gesetz und das Recht. Rechtsstaat bedeutet rechtmäßiges Handeln nach außen, d.h. durch Gesetz geprägtes, gesteuertes und zugleich begrenztes Entscheiden. Auch innerhalb des politisch-administrativen Systems ist Recht eine maßgebliche Steuerungsgröße; Geschäftsordnungen, Verwaltungsrichtlinien, Erlasse u.a.m. sind in Recht gekleidete Formen der Binnenkommunikation und -steuerung. Der im Außenverhältnis dominante ‚Verwaltungsakt' erwies sich jedoch als untauglich, wenn es um Verhandlungen in komplexen Problemlagen ging. Der Verwaltungsvertrag kam zu den rechtlichen Handlungsformen hinzu. Allerdings konnten solche Erweiterungen nicht Fragen nach den Ergebnissen, Fragen nach Effizienz und Effektivität des Verwaltungshandelns oder Fragen nach der Legitimation von Entscheidungen oder der Einbindung der Betroffenen beantworten. So haben das Handeln und die Entscheidungen der Arbeitsverwaltung lange darunter gelitten, an klassische Ansätze des Verwaltungsrechts orientiert und an das öffentliche Haushaltsrecht gebunden zu sein. Eine Vereinbarung, z.B. mit einem Arbeitsuchenden, mit Rechten und Pflichten für beide Seiten passte nicht

in dieses System. Erst nachdem der Programmsatz von ‚Fördern und Fordern' eine starke politische Unterstützung erhielt, war es möglich, das Instrument des Vertrages in das Handlungsrepertoire der Arbeitsverwaltung aufzunehmen. Und nicht nur in der Arbeitsverwaltung führte die Betonung der Eigenverantwortung des betroffenen Bürgers dazu, ihm die Leistung in Form von Gutscheinen zu gewähren, mit denen er selbst entscheiden kann, bei welchem Anbieter er die Leistung in Anspruch nehmen möchte (z.B. einen Fortbildungskurs). In der praktischen Umsetzung zeigt sich allerdings, dass nicht nur die Verwaltung den Umgang mit solchen Instrumenten lernen muss, sondern auch der betroffene Bürger, um die notwendige Information zu sammeln und für seine Entscheidungen auszuwerten. Diese neue Form des Verwaltungskontaktes, diese ‚Aktivierung' des Bürgers verändert den Charakter der Beziehungen Verwaltung-Bürger konzeptionell von einer fürsorgenden hin zu einer zum eigenständigen Handeln ermutigenden Orientierung. Erfahrungen mit Gutscheinen in anderen sozialpolitischen Bereichen, z.B. bei den Kindertagesstätten, zeigen allerdings, dass die Fähigkeit zur Ausschöpfung der Handlungsmöglichkeiten von Bildungsstand und sozialen Einbindung abhängt. Parallelen zu einem Mittelstands-Bias bei Bürgerinitiativen und unmittelbaren Bürgerbeteiligungen tun sich deutlich auf. Damit besteht die Gefahr, dass bildungsfernere und in der Gesellschaft weniger integrierte Personen Gefahr laufen, nicht aktiviert sondern noch stärker ausgegrenzt zu werden. Mithin ist es notwendig, die Instrumente der Aktivierung situativ flexibel einzusetzen. Die einzelnen Zielgruppen sind – salopp formuliert – dort abzuholen, wo sie sich befinden. Das kann auch in der Form der aufsuchenden Sozialarbeit geschehen und entspricht damit kaum dem Bild der aktivierenden Verwaltung.

Ist das rechtlich orientierte Verwaltungshandeln auf die Anwendung von Recht und auf Rechtmäßigkeit konzentriert und hat damit nicht die tatsächlichen Wirkungen eines Verwaltungsaktes im Visier, so stehen Politik und Verwaltung zunehmend unter dem Zwang zu begründen, was sie mit bestimmten Programmen und dem Einsatz von Ressourcen erreicht haben. Die punktgenaue Verausgabung eines Haushaltsansatzes und die gerichtsfeste Anwendung eines Leistungsgesetzes sind nicht mehr hinreichend. Bei den Beratungsstellen (für Drogensucht, für Schwangerschaftsunterbrechung, für Schuldnerberatung), bei den Maßnahmen der Jugendhilfe, bei den Instrumenten der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik (Beschäftigung und Qualifizierung), bei der Eingliederungshilfe für Behinderte, bei den Programmen der Gesundheitsaufklärung, bei der regionalen Wirtschaftsförderung, bei den Integrationskursen für Aussiedler und vergleichbaren Programmen wird gefragt, inwieweit die Ziele und die Zielgruppen erreicht und nachhaltig Verbesserung erreicht worden sind. Ergebnis- und wirkungsorientierte Ansätze

haben Einzug in die politischen Programme und das Verwaltungshandeln gefunden. Ganze Programmteile sind auf den Prüfstand gestellt, stark modifiziert oder reduziert worden (z.B. Qualifikationsmaßnahmen in der Arbeitsförderung). Methodisch unterstützt wird diese Orientierung durch eine veränderte Sichtweise, die mit der Verbreitung des Neuen Steuerungsmodells vor allem in der Kommunalverwaltung Einzug gehalten hat. Es müssen Ziele und Zielsysteme entwickelt werden (Leistungsziele, Finanzziele, Wirkungsziele), die nur mittels Indikatoren, die ergebnisorientiert sind, gesteuert werden können. Es kann an dieser Stelle nicht diskutiert werden, inwieweit durch ein solches System sich das Verwaltungssystem von dem Bürokratiemodell hin zu einem Modell des öffentlichen strategischen Managements entwickelt hat, wie es in Papieren der KGSt zu lesen ist (Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für Verwaltungsmanagement 2007; Bogumil et al. 2007). Es geht vielmehr darum, dass in den politischen Programmen und im Verwaltungshandeln eine Tendenz zu einer stärkeren Wirkungsorientierung unverkennbar ist (Kevenhörster 2006; Stockmann 2006).

7   Zur Ausgangsfrage nach dem aktivierenden Staat und Governance

Das institutionelle Grundmuster des politisch-administrativen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat sich als äußerst stabil erwiesen und ist zuletzt mit der Föderalismusreform 2006 einer – stabilisierenden – Inventur unterzogen worden. Es hat aber seit den 1990-er Jahren eine intensive Auslagerung in Agenturen (Agencies) und andere Formen gegeben, die das Gesamtfeld der öffentlichen oder mit öffentlichen Organisationen verbundenen Institutionen stark differenziert und unübersichtlich macht. Dies gilt für alle Ebenen (Bund, Länder, Kommunen). Bezüglich dieser Ausdifferenzierung stehen die politischen Institutionen und die Kernverwaltungen vor der Aufgabe, ihre Legitimations-, Steuerungs- und Kontrollfunktionen neu zu definieren und effektiv auszugestalten.

Mit der Tendenz, Aufgaben nicht mehr selbst durchzuführen, sondern dafür zu sorgen, dass andere sie in der Qualität angemessen, zu vertretbaren Tarifen und für alle Bürger zugänglich anbieten, sind neue Akteurskonstellationen entstanden, bei denen sich die traditionellen Grenzlinien zwischen öffentlichen Institutionen, Gesellschaft und Privaten verwischen. Plastisch wird dies an einem privaten Krankenhausträger deutlich, der durch Übernahmevertrag und gesetzliche Regelungen zu bestimmten Leistungen durch Kommune und Land verpflichtet wird.

Der ‚aktivierende Staat' ist ein Produkt der Literatur. Er hat Eingang in politische Programme wie schlanker Staat, Entbürokratisierung usw. gefunden. In den einzelnen Politikfeldern hat er eher pragmatisch Einzug gehalten, je nachdem wie hoch der Handlungs- und Veränderungsdruck war. In einem Fall war es die Finanzkrise, die den Bürger mehr in Verantwortung nehmen ließ (Eigenbeteiligung im Gesundheitswesen – bei gleichzeitiger Reduzierung der Leistungen für Prävention!), im anderen Fall der Blick ins Ausland (‚Fördern und Fordern' als Prinzip des Programms zur Bekämpfung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Dänemark), im anderen Fall das Scheitern der bisherigen Fachpolitik (Eingliederung von Behinderten, berufliche Qualifizierung) – ohne dass es zu einem ausgearbeiteten Gesamtkonzept gereicht hätte. Und ein bundesweit angelegtes Programm der Aktivierung vermag auch sich selbst ad absurdum zu führen, wenn die Voraussetzungen nicht gegeben sind (‚Fördern und Fordern' funktionierte in Dänemark und in Teilen Westdeutschlands, weil es aufnahmefähige Arbeitsmärkte gab, nicht jedoch in Ostdeutschland mit einer strukturellen Arbeitslosigkeit von 25-30 %).

Die Antwort auf die Ausgangsfrage geht dahin, dass der aktivierende Staat als deutsches Muster von Governance seinen heuristischen Wert hat, aber nicht überschätzt werden darf. Die Debatte um Staat und Gesellschaft wird vielmehr weiterzuführen sein.

Anmerkungen

[1]   Das Thema wurde über einen längeren Zeitraum von der Arbeits- und Sozialministerkonferenz behandelt und fand – in verkürzter Form – Eingang in das Gutachten der sogen. ‚Hartz-Kommission' (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit 2002. Deren Empfehlungen wurde jedoch nur z.T. gefolgt in den vier Gesetzen für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt (die Zusammenführung von Arbeitslosenhilfe und Sozialhilfe ist im 4. Gesetz vom 24.12.2003, BGBl. I S. 2954, geregelt).

[2]   So z.B. das Verhalten der Verbandsvertreter auf dem Deutschen Juristentag 1992 in Hannover, der sich mit dem Thema der Kodifizierung des individuellen Arbeitsrechts befaßte, vgl. Verhandlungen zum 59. Deutschen Juistentag Hannover 1992, München 1992.

[3]   Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung zur Errichtung einer Deutschen Arzneimittel- und Medizinprodukteagentur vom 23.2.2007, Bundestagsdrucksache 16/4374.

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Reforming the Machinery of Government: The Case of the German Federal Bureaucracy

1   The German Federal Government: A Leader or Laggard in Public Sector Reform?

This chapter revolves around the role of the German federal government in public sector reform. Before reviewing the reform history of the past ten years and shed some light on the changes in the machinery of government at the federal level (for more general overviews see Derlien 1996; Klages/ Löffler 1996; Schröter/ Wollmann 1997 as well as Benz/ Goetz 1996 and Wollmann/ Schröter 2000; König/ Füchtner 2000; Jann 2004), it appears appropriate to pave the way for further analysis by putting the federal government's track record in perspective: What measure of reform activity can we reasonably expect? What are the levers of change at the federal government's disposal and what are the major constraints for proactive and comprehensive reform policies?

One should be quick to point to the potential institutional and political limits that stand in the way of sweeping changes in the German public sector at large and in the federal government bureaucracy in particular. Conventional wisdom has it that a number of key principles of public management (such as the constitutive elements of the civil service status or 'Beamtenstatus', the tradition of local self-administration) are constitutionally enshrined, culturally embedded (such as the notion of the 'Rechtsstaat') or both. The form of executive government (as coalition government with a strong sense of departmental egoism) and the peculiar variant of German federalism foster a compromise-seeking policy-making style (horizontally between coalition partners and government departments; vertically between policy-makers at the federal and the 'Länder' levels) that further limits the prospects of swift and far-reaching reform measures. On top of that the characteristic division of labor in the Germany's federal system reserves a predominantly law-making function for the federal level and trusts the task of policy implementation with the 'Länder' and local governments. It flows from this that the German federal bureaucracy accounts only for a small share of the total public sector and – with few exceptions – stands aloof from the nitty-gritty of delivering mass public services. While high hopes for a more zealous role in public sector reform for the federal government have surely been dampened by now, the final blow seems to come our way if we briefly look at the political and administrative agenda of 1990s. Apparently, the reform capacity of all cabinet's during that period of time had been absorbed by the mammoth task of German unification and the subsequent move of seat of parliament and government from Bonn to Berlin – tasks that followed a logic quite different from the prevailing 'new

public management' hype of the time and that could also be effectively used to deflect most pressure for change in a more managerial fashion.

The overall picture, however, would be grossly misleading if we presented the case of the German federal bureaucracy as one of splendid isolation. For one, the degree of splendor leaves a lot to be desired as generations of academic observers as well as practitioners have directed their critical fire at a series of potential shortcomings and reform deficits that may place a heavy burden on the effeceiveness and efficiency of day-to-day operations in the federal bureaucracy: the highly fragmented nature of its (policy-making) organizational units, the orthodoxy of the 'lawyer's monopoly' in its human resource policies and the profound lack of interest in more managerial types of steering concepts to name but a few cases in point. Second, the potentially reactive, if not 'isolationist' position as depicted above is hardly dictated by structural or political circumstances; rather it is primarily a self-chosen fate. Had it not been the federal government level that provided – by means of establishing reform commissions and initiating research programs – a forum for intellectual leadership in the reform discourse of the 1970s (see, for example, the 'Projektbericht Regierungs- und Verwaltungsreform' as a functional equivalent to the British Fulton Report)? Does the constitutional role of being the prime law-maker in the country not place the Federation – as opposed to the 'Länder' or local government level – in a pivotal position to use its leverage in favor of far-reaching changes in public sector management (with regard to civil service regulations, budget laws or procedures to redress maladministration)? Clearly, the federal government has a number of effective instruments at its disposal to shape the reform discourse and the direction of change in the German public sector. The subsequent seek to shed some light on the extent to which successive federal cabinets – spanning roughly the past 15 years so as to capture governments of various political complexions – have made use of those instruments. Starting with a review of major privatization projects at the national level, the will then turn to changes in the structural lay-out of the federal bureaucracy, before discussion the internal management and steering concepts, and, finally, the efforts in reforming the regulatory framework for public sector employment.

2   Selling the "Family Silver"? Privatization of Federal Assets

During the 1980s and 1990s federal government had placed particular emphasis on selling off the remainder of its industrial assets. In doing so, the Kohl governments also finished

the business started in the 1960s when large industrial firms and holdings such as Volkswagen AG or VEBA – in an early attempt to bring about 'popular capitalism' – were partly privatized. (One should bear in mind, however, that German federal governments had not been enthusiastic 'nationalizers' in the first place, so that the overall privatization profile appears in comparative perspective to be only of moderate scale.) More importantly, the 1990s also witnessed the corporatisation of railway and postal services on the one hand, and the privatisation of telecommunication services on the other hand. After taking office in 1998, the Red-Green government (SPD and Greens), by and large, followed the well-trodden path of moderately pursued privatization policies under Helmut Kohl's chancellorship (see for the following Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2001a, 2001b). The cabinet under Chancellor Schröder repeatedly reiterated its commitment to reducing public ownership as an important policy goal of the federal government's 'activating state' agenda, without, however, showing any enthusiasm in pursuing proactive privatization or deregulation strategies. In particular, the government refers mainly to fiscal considerations as a guiding policy objective. As a consequence, the proceeds from selling off state-owned assets are principally earmarked for federal debt relief. During the first four years in office, a number of significant transactions involving the federal government's direct and indirect holdings were undertaken. The largest transactions include the partial privatization of the postal services and a reduction of state holdings in 'Deutsche Telekom'. Other privatization measures go largely unnoticed, although they amount to a systematic disengagement of the federal government from (oftentimes minority) holdings in major infrastructure projects such as the Hamburg or Frankfurt Airports (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2001b, 2003).

2.1   Transportation Sector

As a rule, the German story line has been more one of corporatization rather than outright privatization. The denationalization of 'Lufthansa' was part of the privatization program initiated by the first Kohl cabinet in 1985 (and much fuelled by the more pro-market inclined junior partner of his coalition government, the Free Democratic Party). In 1987, this disengagement of the federal government was phased in by a mild form of 'passive privatization' as the company was allowed to raise badly needed new capital on the financial markets, thus effectively reducing the public stake to 65 per cent. This exercise was repeated three more times until the remaining federal stake of 37 per cent was eventually sold in 1997 (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2001b, 2003). Indicative of a

typical conflict between federal and state governments, this prolonged and cautious process of divestment was in part due to the fierce opposition from the (conservative) state of Bavaria which feared for its own regional base of the aircraft and aerospace industry (Esser 1994).

While 'Lufthansa', though publicly owned, had always operated as a business corporation, the reform of the German Federal Railroad ('Deutsche Bundesbahn') posed a much more challenging problem, both in terms of political and legal obstacles (see for the following Lehmkuhl 1996; Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2001b, 2001c). As it was constitutionally enshrined that the federal railway system has to be organized as a public authority run by the federal government (Art. 87, 1, of the Basic Law), it took a broad political consensus – encompassing not only the major political parties represented in the 'Bundestag', but also the state governments as members of the Federal Council ('Bundesrat') – to push through a constitutional amendment giving greater entrepreneurial freedom to a remodeled railroad corporation, which is now known as 'Deutsche Bahn' (German Railroads). Approaching this 'critical juncture' in the early 1990s, external and internal pressures had already built up to an extent that made it possible to forge such an unlikely broad coalition for railway reform. Not surprisingly, pressure for change was mounting up from the business sector demanding more liberalization and deregulation which resonated well with the swing to a more neo-liberal economic climate after the shift in political power. It also became apparent that restrictive regulations were causing competitive disadvantages for the German transport industry in a progressively integrated Europe. More importantly, EU legislation and court rulings necessitated domestic responses geared to open up transport markets. Finally, the continuously declining financial performance of the Federal Railroads called for more and more subsidies from the public purse – a situation which after unification and the incorporation of the East German State Railroad ('Deutsche Reichsbahn') became intolerable.

In 1994, this reform process resulted in the merger of the East and West German railroad systems and, after full relief of their accumulated debts by a special fund of the federal government, the launch of a new, fully publicly-owned joint-stock company, the 'Deutsche Bahn AG'. As a corollary of this corporatization (as opposed to a full-swing privatization), a new regulatory agency ('Eisenbahn-Bundesamt' or Federal Railway Agency) was established which aptly illustrates the nature of change of government intervention in this sector rather than the retreat of the state. This new agency's portfolio also includes oversight over free and anti-discriminatory access to the railroad network (which remained in the hands of 'Deutsche Bahn') as stipulated by EU and national

legislation. Despite this liberalizing trend, 'Deutsche Bahn AG', in practice, still controls the vast majority of all passenger and freight traffic, although competition has been picking up in regard to local and regional passenger transport. In fact, regionalization has been the third major component of the railroad reform package. Since 1996, 'Länder' governments – which assumed responsibility for local passenger rail transport as part of the reform package – have been inviting tenders for the provision of commuter transport services, which opened the market to other commercial providers. So as to sweeten the major reform deal for the state governments and win over their political support, the federal government agreed to pay hefty subsidies for the operation of regional and commuter rail services and also accommodated the demand for a greater say in all future rail-related legislation by the 'Länder'. Against this background, the seemingly straightforward reform story of transforming a state-run railroad agency into a publicly-owned joint stock company, can also be read as a highly politicized tale of additional chances of government intervention at the federal and – increasingly so - state levels, continued financial responsibilities by the public purse, at least in part, for operational costs (at the regional level) and infrastructure investment (system-wide). After all, the ownership relations have remained unchanged, and while the federal government (being hard pressed by the senior management of German Railroad) has been flirting with the idea of 'going public' for some time, recent developments have cast serious doubts as to whether those plans will come to fruition any time soon.

2.2   Telecommunication and Postal Services

Transforming the German Federal Postal and Telecommunication Services ('Deutsche Bundespost') – a state-run, bureaucratic dinosaur surviving on its monopoly position in the postal and telecom markets and its consumer banking branch – into a private business-like, competitive global player appeared to be a mammoth task by the mid-1980s. As for the telecommunication services (known today as 'Deutsche Telekom') policy-makers and management have already come a long way. And yet, almost 20 years after the federal reform commission presented its road map for change, the privatization process is far from being completed. Shortly after taking office in 1982, the incoming Christian Democratic-Liberal government felt the need to make the necessary adjustments to far-reaching technological changes as well as international business developments in the telecommunication sector (Schmidt 1996). Other than the governing parties, the advocates for more deregulated markets and greater entrepreneurial freedom of what used to be the

Federal Postal Office included a broad church of consumer representatives, corporate interests, and the senior management of the Postal Office. On top of that domestic pressure for change, policy-makers were also propelled into action by market-oriented European legislation (1987) aiming at the liberalization and eventually integration of national telecom markets in the then EEC.

As with the railroad reform project, entry barriers for institutional change were set high and veto points were plentiful. Since the 1920s, postal and telecommunication services had been organized as a special government office, and the Basic Law of 1949 (Art. 87) ruled out any steps towards corporatization or privatization. Also, union membership in the industry had traditionally been at the highest levels (75 per cent at the time). Despite this daunting outlook, the reform protagonists succeeded in navigating the first reform package of 1989 (1. 'Poststrukturgesetz') through the legislative process. It paved the way, however modestly, for more market provision of products and services, established a new regulatory agency, and split the operations of the old 'Bundespost' into three separate branches for postal ('Postdienst'), banking ('Postbank'), and telecommunications services ('Telekom'). In the immediate years after unification and following the re-launch of European integration in 1992 (Treaty of European Union), the limitations of the timid reform approach became only too apparent and pressure for more ambitious measures accumulated. Clearly, there was a widespread fear that Telekom could be marginalized in international markets. In 1993, the EU also stepped up its quest for market liberalization (with a view of liberalizing voice telephone systems by 1998). Besides, the complete overhaul of the technical infrastructure in eastern Germany called for massive investment, while at the same time the Ministry of Finance was quick to siphon off most of the operational profits to help fill the soaring federal budget deficits in the wake of unification. In a nutshell, the long-term viability of the federal postal and telecommunica-tion services was at stake and even former opponents of privatization got increasingly concerned. With effect of January 1st, 1995, 'Deutsche Telekom AG' was incorporated as a joint-stock company (and so were the postal and banking services, 'Deutsche Post AG' and 'Postbank') and one year later shares of 'Deutsche Telekom' were floated at the stock market, sparking off a lot of interest in the wider public and giving rise to a short-lived 'equity culture' in Germany. Since the initial public offering, the public stake has been consecutively reduced until the federal government lost its position as majority shareholder in 2001. However, the Ministry of Finance still controls a substantial minority of the shares.

3 Streamlining the Federal Bureaucracy and Cutting Back its Workforce

While successive federal cabinets concerned themselves with privatization programs, there were systematic or comprehensive plans to overhaul the machinery of government as such. And yet, during the 1990s, the organizational structure of the federal bureaucracy, and the ministerial departments in particular, came under review again. However, it would be grossly misleading to assume that this revitalized debate on reorganizing the executive apparatus at the federal level of government was initially driven and dominated by the new public management creed. While the international and national reform discourses in both academic and political circles did their important share to bring the issue of administrative reform back on the federal agenda, the final impetus for most structural changes was mainly provided by the decision to move the seat of parliament and government from Bonn to Berlin. Also, in view of the rising budget deficits in the wake of German unification federal purse strings had to be tightened again – resulting in a modest „downsizing" and „streamlining" of the federal administration. Against this background it does not come as a surprise that traditional recipes for organisational redesign prevailed, although the recommendations of the Lean State Advisory Committee added some managerial flavor to it.

It is one of the bitter truths for advocates of administrative modernization that the 'window of opportunity' which had been opened by the 'Bundestag' resolution (June 20, 1991) to move the seat of parliament and government from Bonn to Berlin was closed again without any significant positive impact on ministerial reorganization. Quite to the contrary, the lengthy bargaining process between powerful vested interests resulted what most observers consider the worst of all possible worlds: a division of the ministerial bureaucracy between the cities of Bonn and Berlin with each government department having official representations in both places. In the run-up to the move of government increasing emphasis had been laid on 'slimming down' the federal ministries. Indeed, some authors identified a considerable potential for a further shifting of functions from ministerial departments to subordinated federal authorities. By rule of thumb they argued that no less than 60 or even 70 per cent of all activities performed by the federal ministries fall into the category of non-ministerial functions and should be hived-off to executive agencies, if not the private sector (Sachverständigenrat 1997; Jann 1994, Eichhorn/ Hegelau 1993). Even though the quickly calculated percentages are contestable – as they

are apparently based on research conducted in 'Länder' ministries which are burdened with a much greater workload of purely administrative and executive functions (Derlien 1988) – the need for further downsizing of federal ministries is widely acknowledged and goes far beyond the reform steps which have been taken by federal government. In fact, the latest reform measures to devolve tasks to public agencies outside the realm of the ministerial bureaucracies affected less 5 per cent of all ministerial staff (i.e. 950 officials) and were mainly limited to four departments (Peters 1999).

The traditional structural lay-out of the ministerial bureaucracy, however, has not been seriously called into question. Although there is no shortage of critical accounts of the organizational features of the federal executive (Eichhorn/ Hegelau 1993; Jann 1994; Clasen et al. 1995) – typified by comparatively steep hierarchies (with departments being organized into divisions, subdivision and sections) and a high degree of internal fragmentation owed to the large number of smallish sections as basic operating units -, ministerial reorganization projects have confined themselves to mere bureaucratic 'fine-tuning'. Driven by the overall mission to save on administrative costs and to prune back parts of the organizational branches which were added to the existing departmental structure in the immediate aftermath of German unification, in the period from 1991 to 1998 the number of subdivisions (from 288 to 243) and sections (from 1958 to 1662) was reduced by some 15 per cent (Peters 1999). This trend has continued well into the first decade of the new millennium, though at a slower pace. More recently, the number of subdivisions stood at 217 (BMI 2002).

The German federal bureaucracy has never resembled a monolithic bloc made of large bureaucratic building stones. Rather, it has traditionally been structurally most differentiated (Mayntz/ Scharpf 1975; Johnson 1983), with a great number of government agencies populating the administrative universe at the federal level. Currently, the federal ministerial departments are surrounded by a cluster of some 100 'higher' federal administrative authorities and public law institutions which are considered part of the 'direct' federal administration and have no independent legal status. The wide spectrum of functions assigned to this set of hived-off administrative units ranges from technical and statistical support services, research and training activities to quasi-judicial decision-making and policy-relevant advisory and regulatory functions. Rather being the exception than the rule, few federal ministries also have their own administrative infrastructure, e.g. the subordinated agencies of the Ministry of Defence or the field services of the Ministry of Finance (i.e. customs administration). Counting all those government agencies, including their regional and local offices, the grand total in 1998 came to no less than 645

agencies. Recent official 'progress reports' have made claims to substantial changes in this institutional fabric resulting in a more streamlined federal bureaucracy: in 2002, a total of 562 agencies were listed and in 2005, the government report catalogued no more than 445 federal authorities. Judging by the numbers, in less than ten years after the launch of the 'streamlining' program, a reduction of almost 30 per cent has been achieved. A different picture opens up, however, if we disaggregate the numbers and find that the bulk of the changes were limited to the consolidation of field offices of the Ministry of Finance (such as Customs Offices or agencies managing real estate owned by the Federation).

3.1 Cutbacks in the Federal Workforce

Although German politicians are markedly less inclined to engage in 'bureaucrat bashing' of the Anglo-American type, increasing fiscal austerity has put immense pressure on public sector employers and has eventually resulted in considerable downsizing the workforce (see also Derlien/ Heinemann/ Lock 1998; Bogumil/ Jann 2005). In addition, the severe budgetary strains – particularly during the post-2001 recession years – made public employees (and civil servants) swallow a couple of bitter pills such as stagnation, if not reduction in compensation, less generous pension and benefit plans. This cutback strategy, however, was neither ideologically committed to any kind of 'de-privileging' the civil service, nor was it part of an overall and stringent contractionist approach at the federal level. Rather, it can be interpreted as a conventional response to soaring federal budget deficits. As the accession of the five East German 'Länder' and what used to be East Berlin to the Federation brought in its wake a massive increase of public sector employment, the cutback strategy initially aimed at nothing less and nothing more than returning to pre-1990 employment levels. In order to accommodate further budget crunches, an annual reduction in federal government posts at a rate of 1.5 per cent has been established since 1996. After unification, total employment numbers at the federal level (including ministries, subordinated agencies and field services, but excluding military personnel and railway employees) jumped from 301.000 in 1989 to 381.000 in 1992 (Jann/ Wewer 1999; König/ Füchtner 1999). A similar development, though slightly less pronounced, could be observed in the ministerial bureaucracy, with the total number of ministerial officials (i.e. 27.000, including the Foreign Service) reaching an all-time high in 1992 (Peters 1999). Fiscal austerity put a drastic end to this shortlived expansionist period, so that the following years saw a considerable decrease of the federal

workforce. Between 1993 and 1998, federal civil service numbers dropped to some 310.000 (or 19 per cent in five years), while a further reduction to 276.000 federal government posts has followed since then, though at a slower rate (9.5 per cent over a period of six years) (BMI Fortschrittsbericht 2005). However, these reductions have been very unevenly distributed among the horizontal and vertical structures of the federal bureaucracy. In fact, it was the civilian administration of the Federal Armed Forces – accounting for more than 55 per cent of all civil servants, public empoyees and labourers on the federal government's pay role – which had to shoulder the lion´s share (e.g. 57.000 posts or 85 per cent of all reductions) of the personnel cuts. Also, the field services and subordinated agencies have been hit harder, as a rule, by the decrease in personnel budgets than ministerial departments. Nevertheless, the number of budgeted posts in the ministerial bureaucracy had been reduced by some 12 per cent within a five-year period from 1993 to 1998 (24.000), with the top ranks of the departmental hierarchy taking their fair share (subdivision heads and section heads: 15 per cent) (Peters 1999). Since then, the changes have been marginal with total employment numbers in the ministerial bureaucracy now set at some 23.000 (BMI 2002; BMI Fortschrittsbericht 2005). To be sure, these quantitative changes should not be belittled. At the same time, however, one has to realize that they are not the result of systematic and effective task reviews, but a mere reflex to growing pressure on the public purse. As a consequence, no more than one tenth of the federal budget is spent on the federal pay role (as compared to 12 per cent in 1993 and more than 16 per cent in 1980; see Jann 2004). Overall, this conventional cutback-strategy has resulted in a drop in federal government employment way below the pre-unification level of 1989/ 90.

3.2   Introducing New Steering Models in the Federal Bureaucracy

Looking at recent changes as regards budgeting and internal management, it is by now part of the common wisdom that the federal bureaucracy lags considerably behind much earlier and more far-fetched (and by now well-entrenched) reform initiatives at 'Länder', and in particular, at local government level. Since the late 1990s, successive federal governments have stepped up their efforts – at least on the rhetorical level and judged by the amount of government papers and reports produced – to convey a more proactive and reform-oriented image. In reality, however, financial management and accounting in the federal bureaucracy is still – in line with traditional bureaucratic regulations and far away from commercial bookkeeping and accrual-based accounting – governed by a rigid and

excessively detailed grid of rules and norms based on federal framework legislation. In fact, the federal policy-makers seem to have devoted a sizeable part of their political energy to uphold the orthodoxy of traditional input-oriented steering modes in an attempt to stem the tide rising from local and 'Länder'-based reform initiatives. Given its focus on formal, hierarchical oversight and input control, this system has attracted a growing chorus of critical voices. „The worst enemy of cost awareness in the administrative apparatus is budgetary law as it stands", said the Lean State Advisory Committee in 1997 (Sachverständigenrat 1997, p. 147). This emphasis on saving administrative costs – as compared to improving service quality or making political steering more effective – could easily serve as a mission statement for the reform of budgeting laws and financial management procedures at the federal government level. In view of the harsh critique cited above, the response from the Ministry of Finance and the parliamentary majority who adopted the newly-drafted reform law on budgeting principles ('Haushaltsrechts-Fortentwicklungsgesetz', which came into effect on January 1, 1998) appears exceptionally mild and status-quo-oriented (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 1998). While the overall structure of the traditional budgetary regulations remained virtually untouched, the newly enacted procedures give some more room for maneuver as far the 'running costs' of government departments and administrative agencies are concerned. For example, appropriations can now – within limits, however – be shifted between major expenditure categories (such as 'personnel costs' and 'building schemes'). Also, unspent monies earmarked for administrative costs may be transferred into the following financial year. One should be quick to mention, however, that more than 90 per cent the bulk of all expenditure commitments are not at all affected by this – in comparative perspective – marginal, if not minute, change.

To some extent this modest adjustment of budgetary rules forms the basis for the establishment of a set of managerial instruments. In stark contrast to the local government level, where many new managerialist doctrines have taken firm root in the guise of the so-called 'New Steering Model' (Reichard 1997), the federal bureaucracy has only timidly experimented with the New Public Management tool-kit. Judging from the available empirical data, the hesitant introduction of new management systems has made only little progress (Peters 1999; BMF 1998, 2002; BMI Fortschrittsbericht 2005). The emerging pattern shows that ministerial departments have only reluctantly implemented some limited forms of New Public Management, whereas most fruitful reform efforts – including moves towards decentralized budgeting and performance agreements – have been concentrated on the larger field services and subordinated authorities. While the Ministry of Finance has developed a standardized and product-centred cost-accounting

system (focused on operational costs and internal administrative functions only), three ministries have been designated as pilots for testing the system. Also, individual departments have started to experiment with written goal agreements, which are, however, not yet sufficiently linked to the budgetary process.

As for 'soft' instruments of output-oriented control measures, it has even been consider a success that one in two federal agencies have introduced mission statements. The lateral relations between government offices as well as the hierarchical relations between agencies and their parent departments are primarily governed in traditional ways of political control and legal oversight, but to some – very limited – extent more or less institutionalized performance agreements are slowly making their inroads into the management practices at the federal level: in 2002, roughly every third government agency made use of performance agreements in one way or another, whereas three years later, almost every other federal agency had an established agreement about goals with other federal institutions. Within government agencies, performance agreements are much less frequently utilized: only 37 per cent of federal agencies reported in both 2002 and 2005 of any use of this management technique (BMI Fortschrittsbericht 2005). The majority of federal employees (56 per cent) work for agencies that have – at least partially – introduced cost-benefit accounting systems, but the general trend towards a growing proliferation of cost-benefit accounting seems to have lost its momentum – in some cases the trend has even been reversed as the official 'progress report' has it (BMI Fortschrittsbericht 2005). A still fairly rare occasion is the established linkage between cost-benefit accounting and budgetary decisions. Currently (based on the 2005 data), only half a dozen federal agencies operate on the basis of program or 'product budgets', including the Federal Press and Information Office, a regional office of the Inland Revenue Service, the Federal Department for Motor Vehicles, Federal Railroad Office, Federal Statistical Office, and the Federal Civil Service College. As a rule, ministerial departments are conspicuously absent if it comes to most 'new steering' models, although the Ministry of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection as well as the Foreign Office are utilizing selected management tools such as formal performance agreements and cost-benefit accounting. While the officially reported use certain management techniques tells us very little about the reality of managerial practices in federal agencies, the fact that the federal government has only recently embraced benchmarking circles (2004) conveys an interesting message. In a similar vein, it was only in 2004 that the Ministry of Finance joined an intergovernmental working group with state governments to prepare the ground for a transition to accrual accounting (as is planned for 2008 in the city states of Hamburg and Bremen as well as in Hessen).

4   Adjusting the Regulatory Framework for Public Sector Employment

Civil service reform as one of the classical and potentially most influential levers for public sector modernization did not receive wide currency and, if at all, was understood only as a cost-cutting exercise for most of the 1980s and 1990s. The federal, 'Länder' and local government services are governed by a close-knit fabric of federal and state regulations, however, and until very recently (September 1, 2006) it was the Federal Civil Service Framework Law that gave the German civil service its uniform character. It flows from this situation that the main responsibility for deregulating the civil service lies with the federal legislature and the federal government. By the mid-1990s, federal government had to bow to pressure from 'Länder' and local governments which felt hindered in their own reform activities by restrictive federal civil service regulation. As a consequence, the then conservative-liberal coalition government put forward a list of modest reform measures which eventually reached the statute book as the Civil Service Reform Law of 1997.

After fruitless attempts in the early 1970s (Studienkommission zur Reform des öffentlichen Dienstes 1973) to thoroughly revamp Germany's civil service laws, most innovative reform proposals lay dormant and public personnel policy at the federal level was degraded to the lower ranks of the political agenda (for a broader treatment of changes in human resource management see Röber 1996; Röber/ Löffler 2000). This passive stance taken by Helmut Kohl´s cabinet produced particular problems for 'Länder' governments, which sought to introduce greater pay flexibility and career mobility for officials serving in 'Länder' administrations or local authorities. When it became clear that – in view of the increasing political pressure from the 'Bundesrat' (including some CDU-CSU-led 'Länder' governments) – this issue could no longer be neglected, by the end of 1995 the Federal government drafted new legislation to amend the existing body of civil service regulation. After cumbersome and time-consuming negotiations between the Federation and 'Länder' representatives, final approval from the 'Bundesrat' could be assured and the Civil Service Reform Law came into effect on July 1, 1997 ('Gesetz zur Reform des öffentlichen Dienstrechts').

A key element of the 1997 reform law, which has given rise to heated debates between civil service traditionalists and reform protagonists, was the introduction of temporary executive duties (Böhm 1996; Ziemske 1997; Siedentopf 2000; Röber/ Löffler 2000). Traditionally, the institution of the 'political civil servant', which applies to the two top ranks of the bureaucratic hierarchy and allows ministers to send their top advisers into

temporary retirement without any justification needed, was the only significant exception to the constitutionally enshrined principles of the professional civil service. The new federal regulations (see also Derlien 1999; Goetz 1999) – based on the Civil Service Reform Law – allow for greater flexibility in top positions by making a two-year probationary period for senior positions the rule. After this period unsuccessful candidates will have to return to their previous rank. At the federal level, this rule applies to newly-appointed section and subdivision heads of the ministerial departments as well as heads of non-ministerial authorities of equivalent rank. It is part of the compromise reached by the federal and 'Länder' governments that the 1997 reform package makes room for the 'Länder' to go beyond the restrictive federal rules. So, they are allowed to introduce more far-reaching models of fixed-term contracts for top officials. In these instances, temporary executive duties are limited to two periods of office of no more than 10 years in total.

A second contentious reform issue inspired by new public management thinking was the introduction of elements of performance-related pay systems (Röber/ Löffler 2000). While the new 'framework law' provides several options for forging a closer link between a civil servant's remuneration and individual performance (e.g. the introduction of single bonuses for exceptional results or an extra pay increase for a limited period of one year), the Federation as well as the 'Länder' show – worried about invalid appraisal systems and possible drawbacks of extrensic rewards – no enthusiasm in putting these moderate elements of performance-related pay into administrative practice. Particularly for senior bureaucrats in ministerial departments this reform measure has not yet shown any significant impact. In essence, the 1997 reform package was meant to reinforce the traditional civil service structures by allowing for some marginal adjustments to a changing environment. In any case, the federal government turned a blind eye to more radical proposals which would have put the constitutionally enshrined principles of the civil service seriously into question.

In the wake of the initial reform law, a broader movement advocating further regulatory changes in managing the public sector workforce at the federal level (and beyond) gained slowly, but steadily critical momentum. This reform-minded coalition included protagonists of a more flexible regulatory framework for the German civil service allowing for greater regional variation among the states or tailor-made solutions for specific functional groups or professions in the public service. Another concern was the perceived need to go further down the road of performance-based pay incentives, while still others were primarily sought to control public personnel expenditure. The phalanx of reform advocates - however modest their goals were set by international and particularly

Anglo-Saxon standards – even transcended the deeply entrenched lines of demarcation between salaried public employees and civil servants proper. While the almost obsessive focus on reforming only the legal norms regulating the civil service (as 'Beamte') had traditionally stood in the way of a more comprehensive HRM reform (i.e. practically excluding 60 per cent of the federal workforce), the new reform impetus also addressed the working conditions of employees and workers on the federal government's payroll. The combined effects of the above mentioned reform drivers eventually resulted in a series of changes that provided for further pay-for-performance incentives and open the doors for an increased regional and sectoral differentiation of employment conditions in the public sector: New legislation in 2002, for example, made further allowances for bonus payments for federal civil servants, while legal changes in 2003 gave greater to 'Länder' governments to differ from federal compensation schemes (in view of their precarious financial situation). In September 2005, after three years of intensive collective bargaining, employers' and workers' representatives from the federal and local governments reached a new agreement on compensation schemes and working conditions for salaried employees in the public sector ('Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen Dienst') that made provision for performance-related pay (which came into effect for federal employees on January 1, 2007), leadership positions on a fixed-term and more specific and tailor-made agreements for individual sectors of the public service (such as hospitals, public utilities or general administration). A more radical and comprehensive bill for civil service reform (based on the Eckpunkte Papier 2004) never came to fruition as the Red-Green cabinet was voted out of office in the 2005 general elections, but the Grand Coalition was prepared to carry the ball further and has just announced (January 8, 2007) a new launch to revamp the federal civil service law by placing higher emphasis on performance and merit at the expense of social status and seniority. The new law, however, will only have binding effect for civil servants of the Federation as the wings of federal policy-makers have been clipped by the major 2006 constitutional reform law (enacted on June 30, 2006) which substantially shifted policy competencies downwards to the state government level (including competencies to regulate civil service pay, promotions, and pensions).

5 Concluding Thoughts

If it is true that in Germany support for market-driven and managerialist reform pro-grammes has by and large been only lukewarm, at the federal government level the preachers of the new public management gospel have been received in an even frostier atmosphere. Although successive government coalitions led by Christian Democrats or Social Democrats and eventually the Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats *and* Social Democrats have paid lip service to the need for more efficient management in the federal bureaucracy, political leaders have not seriously subscribed to a comprehensive 'reinvention' programme aiming at a paradigmatic shift in public management. In fact, it appears that every effort has been taken to keep any organisational change as compatible as possible with the existing machinery of government. Rather than being governed by a grand design for public sector modernization, most reform steps have been taken as a response to various external pressures (such as fiscal austerity or the Bonn-Berlin decision) or as a reflex to a policy spill-over from 'Länder' or local government initiatives. As a consequence, administrative reform mainly occured in a pragmatic and incremental way to keep the established politico-administrative system in place while allowing for some modest adaptation to a changing environment. While one could point to bureaucratic inertia (backed by strong pressure groups) and a deeply-rooted legalistic and state-oriented culture as influential factors in explaining this resistance to fundamental reform, it is argued here that this continuity also serves a functional purpose and is in accord with the incentive structures of federal political leaders and senior bureaucrats.

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Leadership in Regional Cooperation

1   Introduction

Regional Cooperation is an ongoing process. Its more recent developments have altered the very fabric of cooperation. This is described in the first part of this essay. The second part deals with the consequences of regional cooperation and new forms of governance for leadership. Different features and problems of leadership are discussed. This discussion is summarized in a short conclusion.

2   The Venue for Leadership: Regional Cooperation and Regional Governance

2.1   "Classical" Regional Cooperation

Regional[1] cooperation is not new, as not all public services can be delivered by one local government. Many forms of regional cooperation have been developed: mergers of local governments as extreme form on the one side, different forms of cooperation on the other side with a specific contract between two local governments as mildest form. In between one will find consortia or regional authorities for specific policy sectors, but also transfers of specific competences to another community. Many of these cooperations were found to be necessary by the municipalities themselves and were negotiated and agreed upon, whereas others were mandated by higher levels. These two aspects, agreement and mandate, can also be regarded as ends on a continuum. Then carrots in form of extra money from higher levels of government after contractual cooperation or sticks in form of deadlines for cooperation (later they will be mandated) would be located in between. In case no basis for regional cooperation exists at all, higher levels may take away the competences from the local level and provide the services themselves or create new authorities, be it a metropolitan transport authority or a regional water or sewerage board or a regional school district. Actually the presence of counties or provinces in many countries is an expression of this competence-transfer to a higher level.

Since any regional cooperation requires 'joint actions' by different actors, and negotiation plus (contractual) agreement is not always adequate for cooperation, at least some kind of

common basis must exist or - if not existing yet - has to be established. The "istituzionale-fiduciario" model (Longo 2005, p. 139) is helpful to understand the situation: a basic trust allows you to commit yourself to a positive 'tit for tat' arrangement: I give something, if I get something back, then I will give again.[2] Joint actions have meanings that all involved can understand, values are imbued into cooperation and thus become institutionalised with the "emergence of an organisational identity" (Stacey 2004, p. 319).

There are distinct governance problems attached to these 'classical' types of cooperation. The democracy-deficit is probably the most severe problem. Whereas the local democracy can be and is vibrant most of the times, a county democracy is (at least psychologically) further away from the citizens, it may even have been delegated to local politicians who at the same time serve in councils or on boards of regional authorities. At the voting booths citizens forget that they may also be selecting their representatives in regional authorities, and the local/ regional politicians will give priority to their local constituencies and forget about regional cooperation.

In the classical form of regional cooperation the boundary is clear – this is around the combined territories of municipalities. This poses problems, however. They result from the different territorial needs of different services: water supply has a different territorial basis as the disposal of sewerage water. School districts vary for elementary schools and vocational schools. The idea of "functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions" of the Swiss economists Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (Frey/ Eichenberger 1999) is supposed to allow different territorial layers fitting the exigencies of specific policy sectors and at the same time solve the democracy problem with direct connections between citizens and these jurisdictions. The ongoing discussion especially in Switzerland has led to a few approximations to this idea.

2.2   New Types of Cooperation

Up to now, we still have regarded regional cooperation as a purely public affair - cooperation of public entities. Most of the legal solutions have promoted cooperations between public institutions only. More recently other types of regional cooperation have appeared - with more and diverse actors: the private sector is involved, NGOs or even individuals are involved, higher levels of government may be involved outside of their supervising and controlling functions in relation to the local world. These developments are even crossing borders, as Euregios and other kinds of cooperation are spreading.

Sometimes these developments are accelerated by the regional policy of the European Union especially in countries that have just recently become members. In 2005 and 2006 a research project funded by the German Hans Böckler Stiftung had a closer look at these new forms of regional cooperation.[3]

The developments with regard to their purposes are manifold:

Economic purposes abound.[4] In case local governments do not see any chance to play in the world league of economic clusters, they could try to play in the world league and acquire its critical attributes, magnets and glue, in cooperation with other municipalities, businesses, institutions of higher education and possibly higher levels of government (Plamper 1996, p. 332). "Magnets are the key institutions that attract potential members of the world class to a particular place" - "Social glue includes the quality of industry inter-action and quality of life that hold them there" (Moss Kanter 1995, p. 357). Despite the globalisation trend, despite the prevalence of a national economy "the United States is overlaid with 'Local Economic Regions'" (Barnes/ Ledebur 1994, p. iii). There is every reason to assume that these local economic regions exist not only in the United States, but form the spatial basis of European economies as well.

In the European-Union context another purpose has gained importance: grants/ subsidies by the European Union possibly combined with matching grants by national governments are restricted to cooperative arrangements on the inter-local or regional level (Lehner 2006; Petzold 2006; Pieper 2006; Tömmel 2006). Cooperation is engendered, but despite their clear objective of sustainability the stability of these arrangements may be fragile and cooperation may stop once funding has ended.[5]

Other purposes may relate to the development of social capital and civic society or to spatial planning.

Different from the classical form of regional cooperation, the boundary is more diffuse. This is due to those actors who follow a functional instead of a territorial path with regard to regional cooperation. Politicians like to discuss themes more from a territorial perspective, whereas enterprises usually discuss without territorial considerations. (Fürst 2006, p. 53)

Regional cooperation today is a lot more than just cooperation of municipalities to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in a better way. In addition, the cooperation comprises

enterprises, NGOs and also individuals and above that other government agencies and also different levels of government. Diverse actors at home in different communities are cooperating. Instead of negotiating, reaching an agreement and even signing a contract, they rather follow the 'istituzionale-fiduciario' model, an easier to-get-going but more fragile mode of cooperation. The amount of cooperation, its structure, its stability (life-cycle), its legal binding, its democratic legitimation and its achieved (compared to imagined) results may vary tremendously, however.

2.3   Varying Governance Requirements

After these descriptions of regional cooperation in classical and recent forms we have arrived at regional governance, because the structure and the procedure among actors and within actors' organisations becomes of pivotal importance for success and for durability. Regional cooperation has to be managed and requires a kind of governance fitting to its respective needs.

Some of the findings from the research in regional governance are the following: The list of cases show that there are many different governances in regional cooperation depending on the mix of actors, on the purposes as well as the glue holding regional cooperation together. It has also become clear that organisations have to adapt their own structures and procedures to the exigencies of regional cooperation. In the case of the Rhein-Neckar Triangle[6], one of the economically powerful German metropolitan areas around Heidelberg, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen, this holds true for the participating cities, but also for companies like BASF (giant in the chemical industry) and SAP (giant in IT-applications). It also holds true for the local chambers of commerce or for institutions of higher education in the area. New ways of working externally require adaptations in the internal worlds of the actors.

The tools applied in regional cooperation are changing as well. Direct services by government bureaucrats are supplemented by "a dizzying array" (Salamon 2002, p. 2) of services supplied by different actors, possibly with "the exercise of discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public funds" (Salamon 2002, p. 2). As tool choices are essentially political and not technical choices (Salamon 2002, p. 601), they pose challenges in proper management, in accountability, and in democratic legitimation, and they direct the view towards knowledge gaps about the availability of tools, the proper design and the proper operation (Salamon 2002, pp. 603–608). „Bargaining and

incentive systems replace command and control. The basic administrative problem … thus is developing effective management mechanisms to replace command and control" (Kettl 2002, p. 491). Government is „using its hierarchical bureaucracy to manage nonhierarchical tools", is „dealing with multiple actors who often have widely different incentives and motivations", is „reconciling government`s bottom line – political accountability – with the diverse, sometimes conflicting, financial bottom lines of its partners" (Kettl 2002, p. 492).

Regional governance therefore has become more diverse and more complex with repercussions on management. In addition to 'direct management' of one's own institution (we like to confine management to this category), 'political management' is necessary for securing resources (this 'meddling' with politics is meanwhile also accepted, though less understood) and on top of that 'meta-management' is necessary to create and develop structures and processes of regional governance. "Managing … government is a messy process at best. Managing indirect government is messier yet, precisely because indirect government incorporates more varied and complex social values into the process. Managing this system requires a three part balance among process, people and performance, and it requires building the capacity to do so" (Kettl 2002, p. 494). This statement can be generalized and applied to the management of regional cooperation.

The following graph should explain the complexity of managing regional governance:

Table 1: Managerial Complexity of Regional Governance

	Implementation Operations	Authorization Ressources	Creation/ Molding of Governance (Structures + Processes)	
External	Integrating Co-Producers	Political Management	Civil Society	Metamanagement
			Creation/ Molding of Regional Cooperation	
Internal	Direct Management	Maintaining support of own troops	Direction of one's Organization towards Exigencies of Regional Governance	

Increasing complexity of management

Source: Plamper 2006

We have learned up to now that there are different actors cooperating on the regional scene:

A. Local Governments

Core Governments

Public Enterprises (e.g. utilities)

B. Higher Levels of Government

with offices in the region

without those offices

C. NGOs, Clubs, Parties, Foundations, Syndicates (private organizations with public purposes)

D. Private Enterprises

Type according to Size

        big

        medium

        small

Type according to Location

        with headquarters in region

        with outlets (factory, office) in region

        not located, but active in region

E. Individuals (usually with some prominence, some clout etc.)

These actors are active in two realms of action: One's own organisation plus its corporate governance (public or private), and the system of regional cooperation plus its regional governance. Actions may influence both realms, may lead to frictions or to enhancing conditions in both.

Finally we must not forget that most of these organisations have hierarchies and do not cooperate through their chief executives only. Sometimes cooperation starts on lower levels of the hierarchy with open or tacit or even without knowledge of the superiors.

This graph gives a short summary of the features of a typical public or private organisation (left) and regional cooperation in its recent emanation (right):

Table 2: Two Realms of Action

Own Organisation	Regional Cooperation
Internal Compactness	Regional fragility, in need of stability
Hierarchy	Open forms of interaction
Resources available	Resources unclear
Contractual obligations	No clear commitments (promised today, forgotten tomorrow)
For leaders: priority in organisation	For leaders: priority to one's organisation

Source: Own depiction

3 Leadership or Leaderships?

"Leadership is a kind of work done to meet the needs of a social institution. …To know the nature of the work done by leaders, we must know something about the social situations they are called upon to handle" (Selznick 1957, p. 22). According to this classic quote on leadership we are called to look closer at the work and the social situations or types of situations in regional cooperation and governance. Leadership is ever more important, the higher environmental uncertainty and the higher managerial discretion are. Both are significantly higher in the more recent regional cooperations than in their classical manifestations.

In this part I will try to shed light on some aspects of leadership that are more or less special for regional cooperation.

3.1 Joint Action: Communication – Relation to Power

In regional cooperation there has to be 'joint action' – not in the sense that more persons are holding one shovel, but that one action is depending on other actions. Each single action is dependent on and receives its meaning from other actions. "Interaction is always

communication and communication always takes place in the medium of symbols[7] …
Secondly, interaction is always power relating because in relating to each other people are
always simultaneously constraining and enabling each other's actions" (Stacey 2004,
p. 399).

In the more recent cooperations power may surface in disguises, because much of the
cooperation cannot be enforced. On the one hand veto players – "actors whose agreement
is required for a change of the status quo" (Tsebelis 2002, p. 17) - seem to abound, posing
additional difficulties, as the basic initiative has to be directed to gaining and keeping up
momentum. On the other hand the power of veto players may not be as decisive as
expected, as most regional cooperations do not rely on all actors who could possibly be
involved to take part in regional cooperation. Usually they rely on a critical (in quality
and/ or in quantity) mass of actors. The initial leaders have to be able to create this critical
mass or at least to convey to the joining actors that they represent it.

3.2   Leaders' Diverse Habitats

Leaders in regional cooperation are at home or reside in many different habitats. The
chemical giant BASF is the home of the initiator of the Rhein-Neckar Triangle comprising
adjacent parts of three German Länder. There he is one of the CEOs. Mayors reside in city
halls. Office buildings or manufacturing halls are homes of the presidents of the chambers
of commerce. A laboratory, a PC or a laptop may be the 'home' of individuals active in
the Rhein-Neckar Triangle. Mobile phones and SMS-messages may be the 'homes' of
NGOs or pressure groups. Since the combination of actors and thus of habitats is different
from regional cooperation to regional cooperation, the governance of these cooperations is
different as well and this is influencing the necessities of leadership.

As we must know something about the social situations, they (leaders) are called upon to
handle, referring to Selznick again, any leader has to accept the other leaders and all
people involved in their habitats, in their beliefs, their habits, attitudes, interests, and in
their individual goals. A great deal of openness and of tolerance[8] is a prerequisite for
leadership in these settings.

Furthermore leaders in regional cooperation are not always the top people in their
organisations. Normal 'front office' workers may have found their niches as well, because
in their work they have discovered a regional focus that the top may not even be

recognising or lacking interest in.[9] For these leaders in the lower ranks of their organisations it may not be necessary to receive outright support from their superiors (as helpful as it may be), but it certainly impedes their activities and most of all questions the stability of any desired regional cooperation. Support from superiors and the amount of stability go hand in hand.

We are dealing with diversity and, as we have to get hold of a paradox, we should look for the 'quality of diversity'. "The paradox is this: if members of an organisation have nothing in common at all, then obviously any kind of joint action will be impossible. However, if they conform too much then the emergence of new forms of behaviour is blocked" (Stacey 2004, p. 419). This statement is an outflow of "a complex responsive process theory of organisations" (Stacey 2004, p. 389). The theory seems to be especially adequate to regional cooperation, and may join or even replace systems theory and its basic tool called intervention. In responsive process theory leaders are joining and thus influencing narratives of regional development. This is done through symbolic communication – verbally or by concrete deeds. Within this flow of communication systemic interventions may be useful as well: For the cooperation in the Rhein-Neckar Triangle a new treaty between the German Länder Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz and Hessen was signed. Trigger for this treaty was an intervention of the initiator from BASF. Through his intervention the legal foundation for all aspects of cooperation was renewed (an insufficient treaty existed already), and the narrative could go on.

3.3 Transformational and Transactional Leadership – Heroic Leaders or Leaders as Servants and Partners?

Even though we are aware of the division between transformational (creating something new, changing) and transactional (making the organisation run smoothly) leadership and that both types are necessary for regional cooperation, we like to turn a blind eye towards transactional leadership.[10] In regional cooperation especially in the more recent patterns this would be a grave mistake. Cooperation may run across organisations, be of a network nature, involve not only employees of organisations but also volunteers. These persons have mixed competences, diverse priorities, have the opportunity to opt out at any time. Orders and directives may be ineffective devices for achieving adherence to the common goals. Hence transactional leadership is more difficult in regional cooperation. It has to be nearby leadership close to the people doing the actual work. They rather have to promote

more with their procedural or professional competences, and cannot act as power promoters[11], since power is missing and cannot be established easily.

Transformational leaders appear in two versions: the American "heroic" leader[12] and the leader as "servant and partner" (Alimo-Metcalfe/ Alban-Metcalfe 2005, p. 64) in the British (and I am willing to assert in the European) tradition. The first one is more distanced whereas the latter is a nearby leader close to his followers and their needs and expectations. The heroic leader may play his role especially in the beginning while igniting the fire and initiating regional cooperation. The leader as servant and partner is necessary throughout regional cooperation – with its fragility especially in the more recent coinage discussed here. When a system is in constant need of infusion of values and motivation, it needs constant attention by transformational leaders. Paradoxically here stability in itself is created by change, not just requiring change management but also (transformational) leadership. Leaders of the kind 'servant and partner' can play this role probably more effectively than heroic leaders as they are very close to the people in joint action on the regional level.[13]

3.4   More Female Leaders?

Recent studies "reveal gender differences in leadership style, with women in general, being rated significantly more likely than men to adopt a transformational approach to leadership" (Alimo-Metcalfe/ Alban Metcalfe 2006 based on Alimo-Metcalfe/ Alban-Metcalfe 2003). These women are following the nearby 'servant and partner' instead of the heroic leadership pattern, are open, sociable and considerate and show genuine concern for their followers.

This has repercussions on leaders in regional cooperation. The assumption is well founded that women are suited for leadership in regional settings, getting people to work, keeping up the momentum, fostering change. People can get a hold on women leaders, sense that they are trusted and at the same time are challenged and receive reassurance. Our own research on regional governance did not focus too much on management and certainly not on leadership, so there are no data collected on this issue.[14] Especially in the second phase of transformational leadership women seem to be indispensable.

3.5   Location of Leaders in the Hierarchy

Regional Cooperation is no affair of top people only. Middle managers, officers on the shop floor are generally as important and may have taken the initiative in cooperation. The local police and its regional area of activities, cultural attractions or sports events shining into the region, universities engendering and spreading high-quality jobs for the region, the growing network-structure of medical services with general practitioners, ambulatory services, specialists and hospitals in cooperation, the financial problems of religious congregations in combination with a shortage of priests or ministers - all these circumstances and many more can lead to regional cooperation. When a middle manager or a person on the shop floor realizes that one cannot work successfully without outside cooperation, this person will look around, put its professional, ideological, economic, political, charitable 'tentacles' out and see whether 'tentacles' fitting to one's own can be found. Thus regional cooperation may start.

Therefore the question arises whether persons from the lower ranks can serve as leaders at all. Fortunately leaders can be found everywhere and especially in all ranks (Alimo-Metcalfe/ Alban-Metcalfe 2005, 2006[15]). So the opportunities for regional cooperation, as outlined above, can also be seized by leaders from the middle or lower ranks.

3.6   New Challenges and Pervasive Leadership Deficits

In many settings leaders do show major deficits in their tasks. This was also analyzed twenty years ago in the German setting of local governments (Klages 1989). We have to assume that not too much has changed. According to this study the majority of superiors does not show any leadership or just exhibits inadequate leadership (inadequate = not respecting the specific needs and expectations of employees) and therefore is not motivating or is rather demotivating employees (Klages 1989, p. 88).

These findings from internal leadership settings should have repercussions on external leadership settings such as regional cooperations. Usually there is no coercive power available and not-following cannot be sanctioned. In these situations carrots are by far more important for compliance than sticks. Leaders adhering to 'Theory X' in McGregor's theory of motivation, be they autocratic or merely task-oriented, have to be

sorted out in regional cooperation right from the beginning. They would be at the wrong place. In regional cooperation leaders invite others to take part in the narrative of regional cooperation, its present and more so its future advantages, "participating creatively in the formation of transient meaning … to continue living with the anxiety generated by change" (Stacey 2004, p. 394 citing Streatfield), the interesting work to be done, the evolving regional community to be a member of, the importance for the region, the values of individual inputs to the overall success, in short the 'joys' of cooperating.

This has tough consequences: Organisations with a prevalence of in this sense 'incompetent' leaders will not be able to take part in regional cooperation. They may try to join, but cannot fulfil the criteria of adequate leadership.

3.7   "Loosely Coupled Systems" and Leadership

The more recent types of regional cooperation follow the pattern of "loosely coupled systems", a term used for educational organizations "as case in point", but applicable for other organizations as well (Weick 1976, p. 1) with discretion and the necessity of constant sense-making. Loosely coupled systems rarely bear detailed directives. The different pieces do not fit together like a puzzle, they rather form a bunch of flowers that can be arranged in many different ways. The technical and especially the authority-based couplings are weak and can easily break. There are buffers, organizational slack, redundancies as lubricants for ongoing regional cooperation. Though loosely coupled systems[16] have weaknesses in efficiency, they have advantages in certain circumstances. A breakdown in one part of the system may leave the rest intact, the lack of information from other parts must not stop the process, because this part can act on its own. These systems can adapt themselves to new circumstances. This is also the case in personal relations. People will manage themselves in an open space that may be influenced by the activities of their leaders: leaders are shaping the contexts their followers are working in, but do not 'directly' direct them.[17] Their impulses are directed instead towards correcting dysfunctional developments in their followers' self-management (Müller-Stewens/ Lechner 2005, p. 568).

This has repercussions on leadership: Making sense through communication, through working on the narrative of regional cooperation, taking away anxiety or better dealing with anxiety despite not being in control, are main tasks of leadership. Again:

Transformational leadership of the British/ European type of 'leader as servant and partner' is needed.

3.8   Stability of Regional Cooperation: The Exit Option and Leadership

Despite the reforms along New Public Management with their focus on competition, still few public organisations are forced to woo their citizens and to regard them as customers: Citizens have to take their services, even if not content with their quality, or at least cannot get services from other organisations be they public or private. In Hirschman's terms they are lacking the exit option and instead are forced to rely on the voice option (Hirschman 1970, p. 4). This may also hold true of the old forms of regional cooperation, when consortia of public organisations or regional authorities render services that otherwise would have been rendered by local governments. Both, local government and regional authority, are monopolistic manifestations. Citizens may not have a choice, no exit option and must rely on the voice option as a means for getting satisfaction.

The new forms of regional cooperation are less stable and more ephemeral, are voluntary associations, may rely on the interaction of many in order to achieve results etc. Anybody can refrain from regional cooperation or cooperate with others (sometimes even without moving to another place). As monopolies do not exist, all actors involved have the exit option.[18] Consequently hierarchies fail with their objectives of integration and unification. Though differences between actors in economic strength, factual power, public influence etc. may be huge, in regional cooperation all actors act on the same level.

The exit option has consequences for leadership: Rather growing into leadership than being formally installed as leader, transformational instead of transactional leadership, less in control (with greater anxiety)![19]

3.9   Pervasive Requisite for any Leadership: Trust

Openness, fairness, transparency, tolerance, patient listening, reflexiveness, willingness to learn, ability to moderate, all those soft skills (Kleinfeld 2006, p. 411) are attributes for leaders in regional cooperation. The more tangible tools of leadership in form of sticks or carrots (money, law, power) are obviously insufficient or at least less efficient. This is

also the reason for giving the nearby leader as servant and master better grades than the heroic leader.

These requirements with regard to the characteristics of leaders allow to arrive at an almost trivial truth: trust as requisite pervading all leadership at least in regional cooperation.[20] "Being endowed with trust provides a temporary suspension of normal social constraints … This leaves wide margin for non-conformity, innovation, originality, or to put it brief – for more freedom of action" (Sztompka 1997, p. 10). Trust may be easily misused (through collusion for example) and in consequence democracy would be put into question. The need then arises to have institutionalized distrust, on which trust can thrive. "The culture of trust is due precisely to the institutionalization of distrust … the paradox of democracy" (Sztompka 1997, p. 16). "In brief: the more there is institutionalized distrust, the more there will be spontaneous trust." (Sztompka 1999, p. 140) Democracy is not or only indirectly institutionalised in regional cooperation of the more recent type. So the paradoxical connection between trust and distrust cannot function. In my opinion more thinking is still necessary, if this problem is to be solved. One trajectory to pursue is the exit option, because settings of regional cooperation, as discussed here, allow every actor to opt out.

4   Conclusion

Leadership in regional cooperation is as diverse and complex as regional cooperation is nowadays. Neither can one find one pattern of leadership nor can one design a pattern unique to regional cooperation. A few propositions have to suffice:

− Transformational and transactional leadership are necessary in regional cooperation.

− The (American) heroic leader may be helpful for initiating regional cooperation, the British/ European leader as nearby servant and partner is necessary for keeping regional cooperation intact.

− Transactional and transformational leadership have to allow self-management by all actors involved in regional cooperation.

− Leadership is less intervention and more narratives.

− Leadership is not reserved for the top, but pervades all walks of organisations and the broader society.

These propositions should be tested in further research.

Endnotes

[1] For the purposes of this essay 'regional' means inter-local, more than one municipality involved. This has to be distinguished from the Italian 'regionale' relating to the territorial entity 'regione'. Italy has 20 regions.

[2] According to Longo this is one of the reasons why cooperation in Italy is thriving (Longo 2005, p. 139). He is obviously, though not explicitly, following Putnam's seminal work on civic traditions in modern Italy (Putnam 1993).

[3] The project culminated in a workshop in September 2005 at the Universität Osnabrück and in the publication of 2 volumes of articles on this subject one year later (Kleinfeld/ Plamper/ Huber 2006).

[4] Most of the examples in the two volumes relate to the economic aspect, be it Hamburg, Stuttgart, Hannover, Karlsruhe, the Rhein-Neckar Triangle, Köln/ Bonn in Germany, Lugano in Switzerland, Antwerp and Gent in Belgium, London in the UK, Emilia-Romagna and its municipalities in Italy or Twente in the Netherlands.

[5] The German Land Nordrhein-Westfalen is funding long-term projects in regional cooperation, at present 'Regionale 2010' comprising the area around Cologne and Bonn. The previous regional projects did not display their sustainability. Therefore sustainability through regional identification receives special attention in Regionale 2010 (Hoebel 2006, p. 355). In rural areas of Poland and Hungary the sustainability of regional cooperation is also questioned (Pieper 2006, p. 363).

[6] I take this as reference for different aspects of regional governance and of leadership. In our research this is one of the cases we have followed closely (Mandel 2006).

[7] "Man kann nicht nicht symbolisch führen!" (Thom/ Ritz 2006, p. 414) is the German (Swiss) equivalent to "One cannot lead without symbols!".

[8] Toleranz… "ist eine Zumutung: Sie anerkennt nicht eine andere Überzeugung als prinzipiell gleichwertig; sondern sie erträgt mit Mühe eine Überzeugung, die sie nicht versteht, ja ablehnt." (Tolerance is a heavy burden: It does not just accept another person's conviction as of principally equal value, but it painfully endures a conviction not just understood but rejected). This quote is from Thomas Maissen. I took it from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung some time in 2006.

[9] The local police may have to fight criminality introduced from outside (sex tourism or drug dealing as examples). Prevention may lead them to regional cooperation.

[10] Often this is called management in distinction to leadership (Seiler 2000). I prefer to talk about leadership, when one influences people, whereas management is getting things done – with material and human resources.

[11] The three types of promoters, power (Macht-), procedural (Prozess-), professional (Fach-Promotoren) promoters are taken from Thom/ Ritz 2006, pp. 103–107.

[12] The literature is abundant. A good example is Borins 1998.

[13] Some "social characters", a term coined by Fromm and Maccoby (Fromm/ Maccoby 1970, pp. 16-23) seem to be less suited for leadership in regional cooperation than other social characters. In Maccoby's terms Jungle Fighters and Gamesmen (in the 1970s the more and more prevalent social character in business and politics) would not fit, whereas Craftsmen, Company Men and Creative Gamesmen (those combining head and heart) should better suit the requirements for leadership in regional cooperation (Maccoby 1976).

[14] I do have women keeping regional cooperation alive in my mind. The person in the centre of regional cooperation among local governments in dealing with the Deutsche Bahn (German Railway) on railway-property is a leader of this kind (Holtel 2006).

[15] This concurs with my personal experience. I have met leaders on all levels of the organizations I have been working in. They did not make a fuss about their leadership (were not heroic leaders), were servants and partners and were able to inspire change.

[16] Loosely coupled systems require some tight couplings. "…it may not be the existence or nonexistence of loose coupling that is a crucial determinant of organizational functioning over time but rather the patterning of loose and tight couplings" (Weick 1976, p. 12).

[17] In German "Kontextgesteuertes Selbstmanagement" (Plamper 2004).

[18] "Some customers stop buying the firm's products or some members leave the organization: this is the exit option. As a result revenues drop, membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and means to correct whatever faults have led to exit" (Hirschman 1970, p. 4).

[19] "The distinguishing feature of management is not control but courage to carry on creatively despite not knowing and not being in control, with all the anxiety that this brings" (Stacey 2004, p. 393).

[20] Even though trust is rated highly in 'normal' leader-follower relationships, especially by followers, it is not a prerequisite for achieving the wanted results. Shere power may suffice. In regional governance trust is a prerequisite, especially as these arrangements can be regarded as loosely coupled systems (Fürst 2006, p. 50).

List of Tables

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Finding a Focus for Local Political Leadership: Performance, Party, Public or Partners?

1   Introduction

This chapter will examine how the pressure to encourage efficiency and improve performance in local government is altering the traditional focus and activities of local political leaders. Initially it will examine the pressures for management and governance reform at the local level across local government in Europe before setting out a framework for understanding the role of local political leaders. This suggests that political leaders at the local level have to balance a variety of tasks both internally and externally focussed in order to create and manage coalitions of support for their leadership at the same time as ensuring the strategic development and delivery of services.

Next the chapter will explore a case study of political management reform in English local government to examine the impact of reform on leadership roles. It will highlight the local government modernisation agenda (LGMA) in the UK and associated leadership reforms introduced through the Local Government Act 2000. This Act aimed to enhance leadership power through the introduction of a separation of powers and executive decision making in English local government. Then empirical data from a five year evaluation of the Local Government Act 2000 will be used to explore how the pressure for efficiency, transparency and accountability at the local level is changing the way leaders operate and the way they balance their leadership focus and tasks.[1] In conclusion it will be argued that in the context of a focus on performance, leaders are looking more to partners and less to party or public in decision making at the local level.

2   Comparative Local Political Management Reform

As with other parts of the public sector, in mature democracies in Western Europe, the US and the antipodean countries, the local government sector has faced the adoption of practices associated with the New Public Management (NPM) such as privatization, contracting out, the use of performance management frameworks of national and local targets, and partnership working (Denters/ Rose 2005, introductory chapter of this volume). An added feature at the local level is experimentation with new forms of citizen engagement in part a response to concern about a loss of democratic legitimacy indicated by falling electoral turnout at the local level (Borraz/ John 2004; Denters/ Rose 2005). In sum these lead to requirements for great efficiency, transparency and accountability of

local government. In a survey of local government across Western Europe, the US and the antipodean countries, whilst a diffuse pattern of reform with different emphases and initiatives can be identified, overall Denters and Rose confirmed a trend of a move from local government towards the idea of local governance with local authorities working with other statutory and non statutory providers in multi-agency partnerships to achieve policy delivery (John 2000, 2001).

As Haus and Sweeting (2006) set out, these developments, and dilemmas they raise in local governance, are linked with different understandings of the concept of local democracy and have consequent different implications for the leadership role in a locality. In the tradition of 'representative democracy', a concern for professionalisation requires more efficient leadership (Wollman 2004). The weak engagement between electors and representatives argues for a more visible and accountable leadership. In the logic of 'user democracy' the strictures of 'NPM' require strategic leadership to set the overall direction of quasi market based provision. In more 'participatory' understandings, an activist leadership is required reaching out to citizens and bypassing entrenched interests such as parties. In 'network democracy' an understanding of the complexities of the contemporary urban environment suggests the role of leaders is to manage the interface between the different sectors required to work together (Haus/ Sweeting 2006). Local leaders are required to be more professional, strategic, responsive and networked.

A comparative examination shows that across Europe reforms in political management structures reflect a concern to improve the efficiency, transparency, visibility and accountability of local executives. The aim has been to make constitutional arrangements which might support the exercise of stronger, strategic leadership to deal with cross cutting issues such as economic development, regeneration, transport, crime and the environment which are beyond the scope of one single body (John 2001; Denters/ Rose 2005; Borraz/ John 2004; John/ Gains 2006). In Germany there has been the adoption of a directly elected mayoral model (Wollmann 2004). Italy has likewise allowed for the direct election of mayors. Holland has introduced a stronger political executive and in England, both a strengthened executive and directly elected mayors are permitted (Denters/ Rose 2005). There is a pattern across Europe of strong city leadership, with Barcelona, Lille, Rotterdam and London demonstrating how high profile, entrepreneurial leaders can compete on the world stage for economic and cultural development for the benefit of their localities (Pimlott/ Rao 2002; Borraz/ John 2004; John/ Gains 2006). Haus and Sweeting argue the dilemmas of contemporary local governance combining requirements for

efficiency, transparency and accountability imply a return to a charismatic basis for the exercise of local leadership albeit one tempered by reflexivity (2006, p. 283).

Although there is no agreed theory of political leadership (Haus/ Sweeting 2006, p. 270), alongside the move to local governance, increasing attention has been given in the academic and practitioner literature both to the way in which local political leaders act, interact and steer the places they represent and what institutional frameworks can facilitate the exercise of leadership. This has led to a growing literature on the role, attributes and tasks of local political leadership and the institutional design of local political management which is explored below.

3   Understanding the Exercise of Local Political Leadership

As Lowdnes and Leach (2004) point out, an understanding of local political leadership requires an appreciation of the context in which they work, the constitutional setting and their capabilities. Clearly the opportunities and constraints which are available to individual leaders will vary according to the wider political and economic context and the constitutional arrangements in the authority. The wider political and economic context creates varying windows of opportunity for action. The availability of political and administrative resources to leaders such as electoral and party strength, length of tenure, the powers granted by the constitution and the availability of organizational and informational resources will create varying power dependency relationships between leaders and their parties, bureaucrats and partners (Rhodes 1997; Gains 2004).

However as Joseph Rowntree Foundation research on leadership found there is an 'interpretative space' in any given context where a leader's skills and capabilities can creatively impact upon the possibilities for action (Leach et al. 2005). Leaders will vary in their capacity to be creative and to forge effective coalitions, both within their local authorities and outside them to the wider world of local governance (Lowdnes/ Leach 2004). This places an emphasis on understanding the agency of local political leadership with recent work examining the leadership capabilities and the task focus of leaders.

Capabilities

The research on political leadership skills and 'capabilities' is summarized in recent Joseph Rowntree research on political leadership which adapts work developed for

managers in the private sector for elected members (Leach et al. 2005). This examines the personal characteristics which are linked with successful leadership. Using a self reporting questionnaire – the Warwick Political Leadership Questionnaire (WPLQ) – this research showed that leading members rated themselves higher than other councillors in terms of the following:

– Personal effectiveness – working with others and managing relationships,

– Strategic direction and taking an overview,

– Political intelligence - understanding and working in a political arena,

– Organizational mobilization – effecting organizational and cultural change.

This literature stresses that a range of abilities and skills might be necessary to demonstrate good leadership in any given context rather than a blueprint for action. It is suggested that leaders can learn and develop capabilities like managing relationships, strategic direction setting, political intelligence and mobilization through experience.

Tasks

There is also research interest in examining the role of political leaders and 'tasks' required of a leadership role and these tasks are closely linked with the capabilities listed above. Leach and Wilson (2002) have summarized the task focus of leaders as being fourfold:

– to maintain political cohesiveness (to build a coalition in a multi-party controlled council or to maintain intra party commitments in a majority authority),

– to give strategic direction and develop policy,

– to represent the authority to the wider world,

– to ensure that things get done through effective implementation.

Here then the focus of leaders is on managing performance through the creation and maintenance of coalitions of support, internally through the party arrangements and externally through partnership arrangements. Adding in the need to reach out directly to

citizens to promote democratic engagement and it seems that leaders need to maintain both internally and externally facing coalitions and find a balance in their focus between performance (both strategic and implementation issues), partnership, party and the public.

Institutional facilitation

For other researchers the interest lies in what institutional arrangements are necessary to facilitate the 'enactment' of the leadership role. Whilst Lowdnes/ Leach (2004) make a normative case for an emphasis on institution building in the informal sense; Greasley/ Stoker (2005) draw on empirical data to argue that there are differences in the exercise of leadership between different formal (constitutional) models of executive governance. This chapter wants to explore how changed institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, which were adopted to respond to the requirements of local governance, are altering the focus and tasks of local political leaders. It examines local government modernization and particularly political management reform in English local government introduced by the Local Government Act 2000 drawing on empirical data gathered for an official evaluation of the Act. Initially a brief background of the context of English local government will be provided before an introduction of the reform.

4   The Local Government Modernisation Agenda in the UK

There are 388 separate principal local authorities in England responsible for a range of activities including setting the strategic direction, managing, delivering and commissioning public services across a wide range of functions such as education, social care, housing, the collection and removal of waste, libraries, roads and street lighting. In rural areas there is a two tier system with large 'county' authorities with responsibility for education and social services sitting over smaller 'district' authorities who provide more local services like housing and waste management. In the rest of England, there is a single tier or unitary system with 'metropolitan' and 'London authorities' in the large urban areas and 'unitary' authorities centered around large market towns (Wilson/ Game 2002; www.communities.gov.uk). There are 22,000 locally elected councillors and local authorities are major employers with local government spending accounting for 25 % of public spending overall (www.communities.gov.uk). Each local authority is headed by a Head of Paid Service (or Chief Executive) assisted by a financial and legal specialists who have specific statutory powers and a large number of employees with responsibilities in functional areas for ensuring the provision of key public services. Yet, despite the size of

most local authorities and their vast sphere of competence, comparatively speaking English local government has far less autonomy than its continental or American counterpart and is both subject to the jurisdiction of the central government and reliant on central government for three quarters of its finance (Denters/ Rose 2005).

Since the election of the New Labour Government in 1997, the local government sector has undergone many changes following on from the managerialism and marketisation, of the Thatcher era (Stoker 2003). Collectively New Labour's reforms are known as the Local Government Modernisation Agenda (LGMA) and comprise over 20 separate initiatives and legislative changes including political management reform introduced through the Local Government Act 2000 (see www.communities.gov.uk for more details). Taken together the reforms move the emphasis away from privatization to partnership, hugely strengthen the performance regime in local government and seek to address the issue of democratic renewal. Some of the most significant are listed below:

Partnership and community leadership

As well as the introduction of political executives through the Local Government Act 2000, councils are also expected to establish local strategic partnerships (LSPs) with other key statutory, private, community and voluntary organisations in the locality and to produce a shared community strategy plan covering policy aspirations and plans in key areas for example community safety.

Finance

Following on from initiatives in central government to establish public service agreements between departments and the Treasury, some local authorities piloted local public service agreements (LPSAs) whereby a part of central government financing was linked to meeting agreed goals. Now the initiative is to be extended with all authorities, with local area agreements (LAAs) where priorities and funding streams are agreed between central government the local authority and the LSP. Authorities have been permitted greater freedom and flexibility to introduce and charge for non statutory services and have been permitted to spend the receipts of council house sales.

Democratic Renewal

Authorities are being encouraged to experiment with e-governance and new methods of organising elections including permitting voting in non traditional ways. Part of the aim of the Local Government Act 2000 was to encourage better public engagement.

Service delivery and performance management

The 1999 Local Government Act introduced a 'best value' regime of performance review replacing compulsory competitive tendering arrangements. Under best value each service is examined every four years and subject to challenge, consultation with users, comparison with other comparable provision and competition if appropriate. To assist in making comparisons best value performance indicators are uniformly collected and published across local government and improvements in these indicators form the basis of LSPA and LAA targets. In 2002 a new comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) was introduced for all authorities which ranked them as poor, fair, good or excellent according to audits of service provision and a corporate management assessment.

5   Political Management Reform in England

As part of the LGMA, the Local Government Act 2000 introduced political management reform aimed at strengthening the efficiency, transparency and accountability of decision making in English local government. Until the enactment of the Act decision making had been formally through a committee system and in principle, decision making was open to all councillors although decisions about specific services were delegated to functional committees and sub committees which then put forward recommendations to be approved at full council. In practice the committee system was underpinned by party organization. Leadership of the council fell to the leadership of the largest party group or the group who could broker a coalition. Committees including powerful central policy and resources committees, were politically proportionate with the majority party holding the committee chairs. In practice then in the two thirds of councils where one party had an overall majority, decision making took place along party lines. Increasingly the committee system came under criticism for the inefficiency, duplication and lack of transparency (Stoker 2003).

The rationale for change to political management arrangements and move away from a committee based decision making structure was set out in two Government white papers after the election of the New Labour Government in 1997 (DETR 1998, 1999). These argued local government required a stronger, more visible and accountable decision making and leadership. The proposal was for the introduction of a separation of powers between a small group of executive councillors and a larger group of non executive councillors. A small number of executive councillors were to hold decision making

responsibilities either collectively as a cabinet or delegated individually to leaders and individual portfolio holders. The remaining larger group of non executive councillors freed up from committee decision making were expected to spend more time in their local communities acting as 'community champions' and to adopt a new scrutiny role holding the executive to account for decision making in the authority.

As with any legislation the Act was addressing a bundle of aspirations. Firstly to create more strategic, flexible and speedier decision making. The hope was also for a more responsive and outward facing leadership which "translates the wishes of the community into action, taking hard choices about resources and priorities, building coalitions and working in partnership across all sectors" (DETR 1998, p. 25). The aim was to create "a clearly identified executive to give strong leadership to communities and clarity to decision taking; and powerful roles for all councillors to ensure transparency and local accountability" (DETR 1999, p. 19).

The resulting legislation, the Local Government Act 2000 permitted four options for change:

− a directly elected mayor with a cabinet - where a directly elected mayor serves as the political leader for that community, supported by a cabinet drawn from among the council members chosen and directed by the mayor. Depending on local political circumstances and choices, the cabinet may be formed from a single party or from a coalition of parties. Cabinet members, endowed with their own portfolios, could be empowered to take executive decisions.

− a directly elected mayor and council manager - with the mayor's role being primarily one of influence, guidance and leadership, defining strategic policy and delegating day-to-day decision-making to the council manager.

− a cabinet with a leader - the model closest to the pre-existing practice in partisan authorities. Under this form the leader is decided by the council (read majority party), while the cabinet is made up of councillors, either appointed by the leader, or elected by the council. As with a directly elected mayor form, the cabinet could be drawn from a single party or a coalition. The leader might define the portfolios of the cabinet. The cabinet can take decisions collectively but decision-making power could also be given to individual cabinet members or the leader.

– a streamlined committee system - in a late amendment to the Act, in response to
pressures from opposition parties, the Government allowed smaller authorities a wider
set of choices. The key argument was that these authorities would have perhaps neither
the political or administrative resources to implement one of the three main models
under the Act. Therefore a further fourth option was offered, of adopting 'alternative
arrangements' based on adaptations of the existing committee system. This is available
only to authorities with a population under 85,000 and as a fall back in the case of a
'no' vote in a mayoral referendum.

As well as changes in the nature of political executive decision making all authorities
were expected to introduce a new scrutiny function and all four types of arrangement
allowed considerable scope, as under the previous system, for decisions to be delegated to
officers. The reforms instigated by the Local Government Act 2000 represent a
fundamental change in the organization of local government in England and a new focus
on local leadership (Gains 2006a). The following section will examine how the new
leadership roles have been enacted drawing on survey and case study data gathered for the
Evaluating Local Governance (ELG) research evaluating the Act.

5.1   Changing Institutional Frameworks for Leadership

All 388 principal local authorities had to have new council constitutions in place by 2002
and a census of how these new constitutions had been implemented confirmed that 316
authorities (81 %) adopted the leader cabinet executive form whereby the leader of the
majority group or of a coalition is supported by a cabinet of up to ten other executive
members who may or may not hold a portfolio responsibility (Stoker et al. 2003). The
mayoral options represented the most radical change as a mayor is elected on a separate
mandate however only eleven authorities (3 %) chose this route and only one authority
operates the mayor and council manager form.[2] The remaining 15 % (59) of the smallest
authorities chose to maintain a streamlined committee system. The remaining discussion
in this chapter is therefore predominantly a discussion about how executive councillors
and leaders operate in the 85 % of authorities which adopted a leader cabinet or mayoral
system. Where statistical differences between leader cabinet and mayoral authorities are
found this will be noted but low numbers mean results should be treated with some
caution (see www.elgnce.org.uk for a wide range of research reports and issue papers).

It is clear that the political management reforms introduced by the 2000 Act have changed the roles, relationships and resource allocations in English local government greatly enhancing executive leadership in most authorities. In a survey of councillors, officers and stakeholders in 40 representative authorities there was overwhelming agreement that the Act supported visible and effective leadership (Stoker et al. 2006). Respondents were asked their level of agreement to a number of propositions about the impact of constitutional change (Table 1). A majority of respondents in all authorities agreed that the role of the leader was stronger and had a higher profile with, as Table 1, shows a level of agreement slightly higher in the mayoral authorities.

Within the leader cabinet authorities too there is a picture of patterned difference. Although eight out of ten authorities have adopted the leader cabinet form there are wide variations in how the constitutions are drawn up and operated and so various options for the distribution of power and responsibility are possible (Stoker et al. 2003). For example the extent of leadership powers varies, four in ten leaders can take decisions alone (38 %). A third permit the leader (as opposed to the party group) to select their cabinet members (34 %). Over a half (54 %) permit the leader to award portfolios to cabinet members. Taking these three as indicators of concentrated or strong leadership one in five (16 %) of leader cabinet authorities permitted their leader all three powers . At the other end of the spectrum three out of ten (28 %) of authorities permitted leaders none of these powers. There was some party patterning to this picture with conservative leaders more likely to have greater freedom and Labour cabinets more likely to maintain collective decision making in the cabinet (Stoker et al. 2003).

Table 1: Views on the Current Constitutional Arrangements Compared with the Old System

Agree/ strongly agree that…	Non-Mayor %	Mayor %	All (Base)
Decision-making is quicker	46	61	(1712)
The role of leader has become stronger	69	79	(1722)
The leader of the council has a higher public profile	59	82	(1727)
It is easy to find out who has made specific decisions	40	48	(1724)
The public is more involved in decision-making	16	30	(1731)
The council's relations with partners has improved	46	57	(1699)
Backbench members are more engaged	11	12	(1755)
Political parties dominate decision-making	47	29	(1750)

Source: Stoker et al. 2006

These variations in constitutional organization led to differences in how the leader and the cabinet interacted which was observable on case study visits. Some cabinets being very 'leader dominated' with all decision making being routed through the leader. 'Multi-actor' executives had more bi-lateral working between leader and individual portfolio holders. 'Team executives' operated with far more collective decision making in cabinets and this type of working was more associated with Labour authorities. Finally some authorities struggled to manage the new executive role and were 'disengaged' from decision making altogether (Stoker et al. 2004).

5.2   Changing Leadership Roles

Despite this picture of patterned constitutional and institutional change it is clear that across the leader cabinet and mayoral authorities overall, there are big differences emerging between the roles of executive and non-executive councillors. Further that this picture of strengthened leadership and a distinct executive councillor role is consolidating as the new political management arrangements embed in the standard operating procedures of the leader cabinet and mayoral authorities. This is apparent in the time they spend which for all councillors averages 81 hours per month but for executive councillors is 112 and leaders 150 hours per month (Stoker et al. 2006, p.10). Table 2 shows the reported average hours per month spent on various activities by executive councillors.

Although all councillors undertake constituency work, attend party meetings and the meetings of full council the remaining forums councillors attend and types of role they play are very different. Non executive councillors sit on scrutiny and regulatory committees, executive councillors attend the formal and informal meetings of cabinet. Executive councillors can take decisions alone and half report doing so (47 %) (Stoker et al. 2006). Executive councillors and chief officers are spending more time together in informal meetings and there is some blurring of roles (Gains 2006b, p. 12).

Table 2: Average Hours per Month on Various Activities by Executive Councillors

Activity	Mean hours 2005
Reading reports	14
Representing constituents	14
Liaising with partners	6
Informal cabinet meetings	6
Meeting with non executive members	6
Preparing for cabinet meetings	5
Meeting with the party group	5
Formal cabinet meetings	5
Writing reports	4
Liaising with overview and scrutiny committees	4
Dealing with the media	3
Area committees	3
Other (including full council)	28

Source: Stoker et al. 2006

Executive councillors are writing and presenting their own reports although to some extent this does depend upon personal capability (Gains 2006b, p. 12; Stoker et al. 2006). Table 2 shows executive councillors also more time working with partners as with the party group. These data – on the time allocation of executive councillors together with interviews with leaders and executive councillors in case study authorities suggest that the demand for stronger leadership to deliver improved performance has created a changing balance in the focus of local political leaders.

5.3 The Focus of the New Executive Leadership

Performance – Strategic management and ensuring delivery

Taking the focus of strategic management and ensuring delivery together it is clear that improving performance is the primary focus of the new executive role. As Table 2 shows the time spent preparing for and in meetings to take strategic decisions and oversee the implementation of those decisions is the most time consuming part of the leadership role. It is apparent from interviews with leaders and executive councillors that the drive to improve performance is a primary concern in all authorities. The introduction of the CPA and LPSA targets provide a strong driver for the focus on performance with this focus facilitated by the introduction of executive arrangements. As one chief executive explained "the leader is assertive and effective and the cabinet a smaller group of people who trust each other – the Act makes it easier to get things done rather than get lost in committees" (Gains 2006b, p. 9). Table 3 shows the level of agreement from councillor and officer respondents about the effectiveness of the executive towards a range of tasks. As Table 3 shows the survey indicated that there was majority agreement that the executive system has been effective in performance related tasks like leading the drive to service improvement, setting the policy direction, ensuring the delivery of council policy and dealing with the budget.

Most of the new roles which executive councillors are undertaking such as writing and talking to reports relate to this focus although there are differences noted during case study visits to do with the capability of the executive councillor. There were also differences related to the constitutional arrangements of an authority, for example in the ELG case study authorities monitoring of performance was undertaken by the executive in the stronger leadership authorities such as the mayoral and majority controlled leader cabinet authorities (Gains 2006b, p. 11). In particular the ability to redirect resources to support strategic aims were most easily facilitated in authorities with stronger leadership forms (Gains 2006b, p. 9).

Table 3: Councillors' and Officers' Views on the Effectiveness of the Executive (or Equivalent)

Agree executive has been effective in…	Councillors %	Officers %
Articulating a vision for the area	52	72
Leading the drive to service performance	53	62
Setting policy direction	51	76
Ensuring the delivery of council policy	54	62
Dealing with the budget process	58	67
Leading partnership bodies	46	45
Working with stakeholders in the community	48	52
Promoting good external relations	49	57
Responding to concerns of non-executives	28	24
Managing relations in the party groups	29	24
Lobbying for resources in the area	51	55
(base)	(879)	(456)

Source: Stoker et al. 2006

Partnership Work

It is clear under the LGMA that with the establishment of local strategic partnerships and a closer linkage between financial rewards and the achievement of shared performance targets, the importance of partnership work has increased. Half of the stakeholders responding to the 2005 ELG survey reported contributing to a policy plan (Stoker et al. 2006, p. 50). There were differences reported in whether stakeholders primarily dealt with portfolio holders or officers and in whether the local authority sought to lead local partnership activity or be participants (Stoker et al. 2004, pp. 83-84). A 2006 census of all authorities showed a third of council leaders chaired the Local Strategic Partnership (Gains 2006c).

Table 2 shows that partnership work is one of the most time consuming activities which executive councillors and officers undertake. Executive councillors report spending on average 6 hours per month liaising with partners (officers report a monthly average of 14 hours (Stoker et al. 2006). Table 1 shows that half the respondents agreed that their

authorities' relations with partners had improved. Table 3 similarly shows approximately half of respondents thought that executives had been effective in providing an externally facing focus through leading partnership bodies, working with stakeholders and promoting good external relations although there is less strong agreement that executives were effective at providing a partnership focus than at their performance roles. Respondents from the mayoral authorities were more likely to agree that their council's relations with partners had improved (Table 3). Although leaders in all types of authorities referred to the political legitimacy and authority in their dealings with partners arising from their elected status, the way this authority is channeled through elected mayors is more marked. This was summed up by one mayor who commented in relation to partnerships "I have no power just influence, they take the calls because I have the mandate" (Gains 2006b, p. 11).

Party Management

Party institutions and loyalties are still very important in the informal organization of local authorities, for example nearly all authorities where one party is in the majority (approximately two thirds of authorities) have single party cabinets, very few councillors agree that leaders should make decisions alone and majority party non executives are reluctant to use their powers to publicly scrutinise executive decision making (Stoker 2004). However, there are signs that the attention which is given to party considerations by executive councillors is growing less. Executive councillors report spending less time in party meetings than liaising with partners (Table 2) and in interviews express a concern about how to maintain a dialogue with non executives (Gains 2006b, p. 15). As Table 1 shows only one in ten respondents thought the new constitutions had led to more backbench engagement and Table 3 shows respondents felt that the least effective parts of executive activity was dealing with party groups and responding to the concerns of non executives.

However there are clear institutional differences here in the importance leaders give to maintaining internal cohesiveness (Gains 2006b). Party considerations are much more prominent in the weaker leadership authorities such as authorities where there is no overall party in control. The leader in one such authority was described as 'beholden' to the party group by the chief executive (Gains 2006b). This is most clearly seen in the budget debates which take place annually in the spring where the full council has to approve a budget. In hung and balanced authorities this is the one opportunity for extensive party politicking and these authorities report lengthy and often unpredictable meetings (Stoker et al. 2004). Conversely Table 1 shows that survey respondents in the

mayoral authorities were less likely to see that parties dominated decision making. As one chief executive in a mayoral authority explained "it is clear here the mayor is the single person running the show" (Gains 2006b).

Public

There is widespread agreement that the creation of executives had increased the visibility of local leaders. This is true in all authorities but again the level of agreement appears to be higher in mayoral authorities (Randle 2004). All authorities have been employing more sophisticated and professional methods of public consultation. Nearly all councils run citizen's panels on both general and specific council policies, councils have strategies on how to address hard to reach groups of citizens such as young people and people with disabilities, and many councils are experimenting with initiatives to utilize e-communication (Pratchett/ Krimmer 2005). Moving on from consultation, increasing public involvement in the decision making of the council was a key aim of the 2000 Act seen to be linked to democratic renewal. The mechanism for this was through increased public representation in scrutiny committees and public involvement in area committees and full council both feeding through to executive decision making. Here too there are developments stemming from the new constitutional arrangements. For example institutional innovations in full council found in the second round of ELG case studies include: allocating time for public petitions, state of the borough debates, public question time, one off policy debates, and executive members reporting and answering questions on their portfolios (Stoker et al. 2004).

However the ELG case studies also revealed widespread disillusionment with the role of full council with councils reporting difficulty in attracting members of the public to full council meetings, lack of clarity over routing of issues in legislation and in council's constitution; lengthy agendas; overtly political behaviour; councillor misunderstanding of the role of full council; lack of public involvement and press interest; seen as symbolic rather than of real importance in the constitution (Stoker et al. 2004; Gains 2006b, p. 16). The survey evidence in Table 1 suggests that survey respondents were far less positive about the extent to which the public had become involved in decision making although there was less despondency in the mayoral authorities, as one officer explained "the public perceive a change, people believe the mayor will sort things out" (Gains 2006b, p. 22). There is other evidence that mayors and mayoral authorities are providing a better scope for public involvement. Mayors have developed better name recognition and an ability to act as a focal point for local political debate (Randle 2004).

6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the case study of English local government to explore how the focus of local leadership is altering in response to the drive to improve performance in contemporary governance settings. In common with many other European countries, English local government has seen a strengthening of executive decision making through the creation of higher visibility leaders (indirectly elected as head of the majority party), and a mayors (who are directly elected), in both cases supported by executive councillors in a cabinet who can take decisions either collectively or individually. The driving logic behind these institutional changes is to find forms of local leadership that allow leaders to be more managerial, strategic, responsive and networked.

Although there is a variable picture of reform due to the differing power dependencies of leaders in different contexts and their different capabilities, it is argued here that overall these formal and informal institutional reforms have contributed to a more managerial and strategic leadership which is certainly more visible particularly in the mayoral form. It also appears to be the case that leadership is more networked than previously with partnership work more important. There has, in short, been an increasing focus on 'performance' and 'partners' in all authorities.

At the same time there has been a shift away from a focus on 'party' and the management of internal coalitions of support although this is more marked in the stronger leadership forms especially the mayoral form where a separate mandate creates its own legitimacy. A further cost has been the focus on direct political engagement with the 'public'. Here too there is some evidence to suggest that the separate electoral mandate of a mayor assists in creating responsiveness, or a perception of responsiveness, to the public.

The argument here then is that the performance agenda and associated strengthened leadership forms in England have led to a focus on performance and partners at the expense of party and public. There are some indications that mayoral forms of leadership may be slightly better at maintaining the balance. At the time of writing further reform for English local government is planned with legislation going through the UK Parliament aimed at strengthening leadership 'and' non executive engagement with local communities. Ruth Kelly, the Minister responsible, appears to acknowledge both the gains and losses for public leadership at the local level arguing that local government has

succeeded in driving up performance and the time is right now to change the focus again this time with reforms aimed at strengthening the responsiveness and accountability of local leadership (Kelly 2006).

List of Tables

Endnotes

[1] This chapter draws on the collective endeavors of the Evaluating Local Governance (ELG) research team, for more details about the evaluation and all official reports please visit www.elgnce.org.uk. ELG reports are published on this website and also on the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) website (www.communities.gov.uk) which contains archived official publications from when DCLG was named the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). The interpretations in this chapter reflect those of the author only.

[2] In 2005 a twelfth authority subsequently moved through the required local referendum process and changed its constitution to permit the election of a mayor who is supported by a cabinet.

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5 Changes in Organisational Leadership

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Leadership in a Managerial Context

1   Introduction

The twenty years from the mid-1980s saw a transformation in the management of public organizations in many countries. As argued by those following the trajectory of what has been variously termed 'managerialism' (Pollitt 1993), 'the new public management' (Hood 1991), or simply 'public management', the old traditional model of public administration has been largely overtaken and replaced (see Hughes 2003). The public management reforms have been controversial and not fully accepted (see Pollitt/ Bouckaert 2004) and reforms have not progressed as far in some countries, notably those from the statist tradition in continental Europe (Kickert 2000). There is, however, sub-stantial agreement that one of the key features of the newer models of public management in countries that have followed this model is the personal responsibility for results ascribed to public managers themselves.

Older, strictly bureaucratic models rely on the notion that politicians are responsible and that public servants simply carry out their wishes. In such a system, the only real leadership is that exercised by the politicians; the public servants are merely followers, no matter what their level. Once the system changes, as occurred with the adoption of managerialism, a manager is required to achieve results. And, once an individual public manager is responsible, his or her personal qualities – their leadership – necessarily become important in how results are achieved. This is in complete contrast to Weberian bureaucracy which set out a machine model of administration, aimed expressly at being as completely impersonal as possible. There is obviously little role for leadership in a strict bureaucratic system, indeed, there is little role for any individual, other than to impersonally follow the rules. But, once managers themselves become responsible for results, the machine model of bureaucracy breaks down, if not immediately then over time.

The emergence of concepts of leadership in the public sector should be seen as a reassertion of individual and personal attributes in management and, as a corollary, a reduction in the emphasis on management by formal rules. Giving a manager real responsibility to achieve results means that he or she must then deliver and their part of the organization must also deliver. The staff involved need to achieve and the manager needs to lead them. A good manager must not only deliver results, but somehow get

subordinates to agree with the general parameters of the vision and to be inspired to achieve themselves, for the overall benefit of the organization.

Leadership is a term used much more in a private sector context than in the public sector, other than in reference to political leaders. Leadership in the public service part of the sector has become important only in recent years; the delay due to the previously held view that leadership has little role in a formal bureaucratic system (Javidan/ Waldman 2003). The emergence of leadership brings more realism into what actually happens in the workplace, once managers are required to organize their people to deliver results. Managerial reform has meant a transition from administration to management to leadership within public sector management in many countries.

The three words of the title – administration, management and leadership – are clearly related and obviously overlap in terms of their scope. Perhaps there is a simple linear history in which administration has led to management and, in turn, management has led to leadership. While tempting to take this view, it is too simplistic. It could be argued equally that management can include notions of leadership as well as ordinary administration. The precise ways in which administration, management and leadership are utilized is a matter of some debate and need not be mutually exclusive. Public managers do operate in some ways as administrators, in some ways as managers and in some ways as leaders. It can be argued further that, even within the same organization, the higher a manager goes the more that leadership takes over from more administration and management. At the highest levels, political behaviour in the broadest sense and interpersonal relationships become more important in the achievement of results than technical administrative or management skills.

The increased attention to leadership in the public sector is an enhancement, and a positive one, of the change from administration to management that has occurred with the adoption of managerial models. It is argued here that the sharpest dividing line, the greatest degree of discontinuity, is that between administration and management. There may well be some differences between management and leadership, but the line between them is not so sharply drawn as that between administration and management. The difference between management and leadership is a difference of emphasis; the difference between administration and management is a difference of kind.

2   What is Leadership?

There is no single agreed view about what leadership involves, particularly in its public sector context. Sometimes it refers "to the possession of personal properties such as courage, stamina, or charisma" and at other times, it means "a property of a position which dispenses power, authority, and responsibility" (OECD 2001, p. 11). There are two somewhat contrasting ideas about leadership in this view. The first refers to some personal qualities a leader may possess that enables him or her to stand above others; the second idea is that the leadership is attached to a position. The two views lead to quite different conceptions of what might be involved with leadership in the public sector context. Here they will be used as the two over-arching views of leadership in the public sector; the first we can call the 'personal' view of leadership, and the second, the 'positional' view.

Both of these views will be looked at in more detail. In the public sector environment, it is most likely that a combination of personality and position will be most effective in terms of management achievement. There may well be a significant difference here with the private sector where the personal kind of leader can have greater freedom of action. Positional leadership is clearly important in the public sector in what remains a hierarchical system, but the best leaders are likely to be those who bring personal attributes to their positional context.

2.1   Leadership as a Personal Attribute

The first view posits that leadership is some kind of personal attribute where some individuals are 'leaders' and others are 'followers', with both qualities almost innate. What Bennis terms "basic ingredients of leadership" include: a guiding vision; passion; integrity; trust; curiosity and daring (1989, pp. 40-41). All these characteristics have something to do with personality, with individual thoughts or behaviours. They are 'personal' attributes, as opposed to attributes that come with position in a hierarchy. It follows that leadership in this sense is not a common attribute, almost by definition, that can be held by many people, just those lucky few possessing innate qualities that makes them leaders as opposed to the mass of followers.

The view of the leader as a person possessing extraordinary authority through personal charisma is most associated with the work of Max Weber (Gerth/ Mills 1970). He argued there were three types of authority: the charismatic - the appeal of an extraordinary leader; the traditional - such as the authority of a tribal chief; and rational/ legal authority. The latter was both rational and legal, naturally, as opposed to the other forms of authority that were essentially irrational and extra-legal. It was, therefore, the most efficient of the three forms of authority and formed the basis for his theory of bureaucracy. The modern world would be one where rationality would rule and the other two forms of organization would fade away.

Charismatic authority involves the personal qualities of an individual who then is able to lead others by the exercise of these attributes. As Weber described it:

"There is the authority of the extraordinary and personal 'gift of grace' (charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership. This is 'charismatic' domination, as exercised by the prophet or – in the field of politics – by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 79).

The charismatic leader leads and the followers merely follow anywhere the leader takes them, whatever the destination might be. As Weber notes, "Charisma knows only inner determination and inner restraint. The holder of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 246). If success is not found, the authority of the charismatic leader presumably falls away. In any case, charismatic authority is temporary and less effective than the rationality to be found in bureaucracy, as Weber argues:

"In contrast to any kind of bureaucratic organization of offices, the charismatic structure knows nothing of a form or of an ordered procedure of appointment or dismissal. It knows no regulated 'career,' 'advancement', 'salary,' or regulated and expert training of the holder of charisma or of his aids. It knows no agency of control or appeal, no local bailiwicks or exclusive functional jurisdictions; nor does it embrace permanent institutions like our bureaucratic 'departments,' which are independent of persons and of purely personal charisma" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 246).

Weber recognizes that charismatic authority can exist and leadership can be based on charisma. But it is seen as obsolete, as belonging to an earlier, pre-modern age. Even more than tradition – the traditional authority of a tribal chief – charismatic authority is essentially non-rational. As Weber argues, "It is the fate of charisma, whenever it comes into the permanent institutions of a community, to give way to powers of tradition or of rational socialization" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 253). In other words, rational legal authority – bureaucracy – inevitably takes over from non-rational authority.

There is some misunderstanding of the views of Weber in the leadership literature. According to Goffee and Jones, Weber thought that:

"The most destructive force operating in institutions was something he called technical rationality – that is rationality without morality. For Weber, technical rationality was embodies in one particular organizational form – the bureaucracy. Bureaucracies, he said, were frightening not for their inefficiencies and their capacity to dehumanize people. . . Weber believed that the only power that could resist bureaucratization was charismatic leadership" (Goffee/ Jones 2000, p. 64).

This is not altogether accurate. Weber did not propose charisma or charismatic authority as a counter to bureaucratization; his argument is the other way around. It is true that there were aspects of bureaucracy that worried Weber, but charismatic and traditional authority were regarded by him as obsolete, patrimonial and inefficient compared to bureaucracy based on rational-legal authority.

Charismatic authority was little regarded in public services for much of the twentieth century. The bureaucratic system was set up precisely to avoid charismatic authority, to replace any kind of personal authority with impersonal rules. As noted earlier, a formal, rule-based system does not allow much room for charisma or any other kind of individual attribute. In the wider political system, for much of the past century, charismatic leadership has been associated with disorder rather than order. We have had the charismatic demagogue, the dictator who governs through force of personality. Despite some reinvention of the great man theory of history for some leaders in the private sector, this kind of charisma has been usually seen as something for organizations to avoid, particularly those in the public sector.

More recently within the private sector management literature, arguments have been made to reinstate some ideas of charisma. Conger and Kanungo (1987, p. 639) argue that

charisma can be observed in management "as an attribution made by followers who observe certain behaviors on the part of the leaders within organizational contexts" and this is "not an attribution made about an individual because of his or her rank in the organization, but rather it is an attribution made because of the behavior he or she exhibits". Leadership in some contexts, then, is observed as occurring as a personal attribute - charisma - rather than through position alone. Conger and Kanungo argue for further study, for measurement:

"Although all leadership roles involve charting a clear path for group members to achieve a common goal, attribution of charisma to leaders is believed to depend on four variables: (a) the degree of discrepancy between the status quo and the future goal or vision advocated by the leader, (b) the use of innovative and unconventional means for achieving the desired change, (c) a realistic assessment of environmental resources and constraints for bringing about such change, and (d) the nature of articulation and impression management employed to inspire subordinates in the pursuit of the vision" (Conger/ Kanungo 1987, p. 640).

Within government, leadership of this kind may be harder to measure, but clearly it does occur. There are public managers who gain results through force of personality and the possibility that this is a significant reason for their success does need to be allowed.

In trying to achieve a result a manager should be able to use whatever means are available, including that of leadership based on personal characteristics. It follows that personal interaction and personal political behaviours come back into play. With hindsight it was unrealistic for the strict bureaucratic model to be so rigid about lack of personal involvement. Organizations are not inhabited by unthinking robotic beings and how they relate to each other has an inevitable effect on achievement of results.

The personal attribute perspective of leadership does have a role within government. It may not be as useful as in the private sector, but is certainly a possibility to be followed further.

2.2   Leadership as Position

The second view of leadership is that it is based on position within an organization. Achievement can be found within organizations without the obvious exercise of personal

qualities, especially if it is assumed, as in the personal view of leadership, that leadership is a quality that is only rarely found. A leader in this second sense may be someone who is in a leadership 'position' rather than a person who is innately suited, through force of personality, to be a position of leader. In other words, he or she is a leader, not by an innate possession of charisma, but simply because leadership of others is required by the nature of the job. This kind of leadership is not to be disparaged; indeed, a leader in this sense may well be as effective as the glowing charismatic leader.

Heifetz and Laurie argue that the prevailing notion that "leadership consists of having a vision and aligning people with that vision is bankrupt because it continues to treat adaptive situations as if they were technical: the authority figure is supposed to divine where the company is going, and people are supposed to follow". They add that leadership "has to take place every day" that it "cannot be the responsibility of a few, a rare event, or a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity" (Heifetz/ Laurie 1997, p. 134). The leader is not necessarily an extraordinarily talented person. Perhaps leadership has become a largely informal process rather than one relying on simple authority.

Personal attributes may be insufficient explanations of behavior in organizations. A leader may not be innately charismatic but still work well with others. He or she may have high levels of emotional intelligence and may also have skills and passions that can influence subordinates, but not necessarily be a leader possessing innate charismatic qualities. A leader may also have technical skills that are able to be learned; in particular, framing a vision or a strategy for the organization to follow.

Changes in management practice have democratized the workplace and these point to a flaw in the charismatic view of leadership. It is less acceptable now for authoritarianism to prevail. The view of the leader as a person who is the sole thinker and motivator for the group assumes a hierarchical leader and follower model. This could be seen as rather archaic in an era where staff at all levels are able to participate in decision-making, as an OECD paper argues.

"Under the old autocratic model, leaders could expect to solve the problem, announce the decision, and get compliance, based on their authority. But public sector leaders today must gain commitment, not just compliance, and therefore a collaborative style is needed. Leaders now succeed only if they can influence others, and quite often those whose support they need do not report to them" (OECD 2001, p. 43).

Leadership should be able to occur without formal authority; indeed that kind of leadership is much more in tune with an organizational culture that is participative. The idea of the leader who has all the wisdom for a group and everyone is defers to the leader does seem somewhat obsolete.

Leadership is certainly in demand with the transition to managerialism in government. Managers are now involved in matters of policy; they are also involved in matters of strict politics; they are more often personally responsible for results and will pay by losing their jobs if something goes wrong. Many of these points could be seen as involving leadership, but not necessarily of a personal kind. An identified manager must achieve results, but could conceivably do so without any kind of charismatic authority, more as a result of being placed in charge and that leadership is involved as part of being in charge.

There does seem little doubt that using both these views of leadership emphasizes the need for leadership in government. Indeed, leadership is "the process by which individuals' effectiveness is increased, while at the same time maintaining, if not increasing, motivation, job-related satisfaction and other forms of psychological well-being" and it is "the only way in which the government's multifaceted objectives for the public sector can be achieved" (Alimo-Metcalfe/ Alban-Metcalfe 2004, p. 174). Someone in a leadership position may be able to gain the commitment of others based on their authority level, but they are also more likely to be effective if they bring some aspects of personality to that process. In other words, the two views of leadership may be able to co-exist.

3   Leadership in the Strictly Administrative System

Looking at leadership in the strictly bureaucratic model must mean further examination of the work of the great Max Weber. In doing this, it is clear that the traditional administrative system allows for no real role for leadership, as, above all other considerations, the system is quite impersonal. It is about authority and rule compliance rather than leadership.

The Weberian administrative system required the replacement of personal administration, based on traditional or charismatic authority, with an impersonal system based on rules. An organization and its rules are more important than any individual within it. Weber set

out six principles for modern systems of bureaucracy, deriving from rational/ legal authority:

– The principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is by laws or administrative regulations.

– The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and sub-ordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.

– The management of the modern office is based upon written documents ('the files') which are preserved. The body of officials actively engaged in 'public' office, along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files, make up a 'bureau' . . . In general, bureaucracy segregates official activity as something distinct from the sphere of private life . . . Public monies and equipment are divorced from the private property of the official . . .

– Office management, at least all specialised office management - and such management is distinctly modern - usually presupposes thorough and expert training. . .

– When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official . . . Formerly, in all cases, the normal state of affairs was reversed: official business was discharged as a secondary activity.

– The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical learning which the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, or administrative or business management (Gerth/ Mills 1970, pp. 196-198).

The key point that is being argued here is that government should be about rules, about interpreting them in a completely impersonal way. The office is far more important that any individuals within it, who in actuality have very little scope, other than following the rules set down. Weber's principles of bureaucracy say very little about individual public servants at all or how they are to operate and, unsurprisingly, there is no mention of leadership.

Even the principles Weber sets out for officials are essentially about terms of employment, rather than how to operate or to achieve results. Office holding is considered a vocation, following examinations and a rigorous course of training, but again is all about impersonality. For Weber, office holding does not "establish a relationship to a person" as "modern loyalty is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes" in which "entrance into an office is considered an acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management in return for a secure existence". He specified the position of the official in the following way (Gerth/ Mills 1970, pp. 199-203):

–   The modern official always strives for and usually enjoys a distinct social esteem as compared with the governed . . .

–   The pure type of bureaucratic official is appointed by a superior authority. An official elected by the governed is not a purely bureaucratic figure . . .

–   Normally, the position of the official is held for life, at least in public bureaucracies. . .

–   Where legal guarantees against arbitrary dismissal or transfer are developed, they merely serve to guarantee a strictly objective discharge of specific office duties free from all personal considerations.

–   The official receives the regular pecuniary compensation of a normally fixed salary and the old age security provided by a pension. The salary is not measured like a wage in terms of work done, but according to 'status', that is, according to the function (the 'rank') and, in addition, possibly, according to the length of service.

–   The official is set for a 'career' within the hierarchical order of the public service. He moves from the lower, less important, and lower paid to the higher positions.

These points follow logically from the six principles of bureaucracy. The official is to be part of an elite with status higher than that of ordinary citizens even if, paradoxically, individual public servants have little real power or scope.

The two principles - the model of bureaucracy and position of the official - had specific purposes. A formal, impersonal system offers to Weber "the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specialising functions according to purely objective considerations". Decisions would and should be made according to "calculable rules" and

"without regard for persons" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 215). The general aims were certainty, impersonality and efficiency. Decisions are not made arbitrarily. The idea was to create a system that was at the highest possible level of technical efficiency.

Weber argued that the decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organisation "has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization" and, further, the "fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organisations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 214). By comparison with what he calls "patrimonial systems" – those based on charisma or tradition – bureaucracy would always be more efficient. But Weber goes further than this, arguing that "precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and personal costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic organization" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 214). In other words, not only is bureaucracy more efficient that patrimonial systems, it is more efficient than any conceivable system.

3.1   The Importance of Impersonality

The key point for present purposes is the quite deliberate impersonality of the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic system must be impersonal in its own operations and in how it acts to its clients. As Weber argued (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 198):

"The reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in its very nature. The theory of modern public administration . . . assumes that the authority to order certain matters by decree - which has been legally granted to public authorities - does not entitle the bureau to regulate the matter by commands given for each case, but only to regulate the matter abstractly. This stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationships through individual privileges and bestowals of favour, which is absolutely dominant in patrimonialism, at least in so far as such relationships are not fixed by sacred tradition".

This is a very important point. Earlier administration was based on personal relationships - the loyalty to a relative or a patron, to the leader or the party - and not to the system itself. An impersonal system based on Weber's principles removes arbitrariness completely - at least it does in the ideal case. The existence of the files, the belief in precedent and the basis in law mean that the same decision is always made in the same circumstances. Not

only is this more efficient, but citizens, and those in the bureaucratic hierarchy, know where they stand. Other differences follow. A rigid system of hierarchy follows naturally from the basis in rules and impersonality. The system and its rules persist when particular individuals have left the organization.

Quite clearly, then, if any semblance of personality is to be driven from the bureaucratic system, there is no real role for leadership. Indeed, this was a deliberate part of the design. Occupants of offices must operate according to the rules set down for their dealings, not only with the public, but with each other. The system is one of administration – following instructions – rather than even management, let alone leadership.

What we have in the traditional model of administration, as set out by its greatest theorist, is formal, technical bureaucracy, a system in which personality of any kind is to be disregarded and in which public servants follow the rules in an administrative sense. There are many reasons for the eventual demise of the strictly bureaucratic system. One of these is that it is simply impractical to completely discard personal interactions and motivations in organizations that are constructed by humans and serve human purposes. As Behn argues, "if organizations could function as machines, leadership by individuals would not be necessary" and because organizations are not machines and individuals do not behave as part of a machine, "public managers have to lead" (1998, p. 212) and then adds:

"If human organizations are machines, they don't need motivation, and they don't need inspiration, and they don't need leadership. But if human organizations are composed of real humans- not a cloned collection of 'normal' interchangeable people but diverse individuals with different competencies – then getting such people within these organizations to actually do their jobs requires motivation and inspiration. It requires leadership" (Behn 1998, p. 212).

Leadership becomes necessary, then, as the machine model of bureaucracy breaks down, to be replaced by a more realistic view of how organizations actually work. A machine model is not possible in organizations composed of people. In the real world of organizations there are all kinds of personal political games, jealousies, varying levels of competence, personal foibles and personality conflicts. A Weberian view would be that such matters of personality are innately inefficient and should be sublimated for the greater good or removed altogether.

Weber argued that civil servants do not exercise leadership, but politicians should and it is only at the political level that there is personal responsibility. As he argues:

"To take a stand, to be passionate . . . is the politician's element, and above all the element of the political 'leader'. His conduct is subject to quite a different, indeed, exactly the opposite, principle of responsibility from that of the civil servant. The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. This holds even if the order appears wrong to him and if, despite the civil servant's remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces. The honor of the political leader, of the leading statesman, however, lies precisely in an exclusive 'personal' responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he cannot and must not reject or transfer" (Gerth/ Mills 1970, p. 95).

Here Weber sets out a politics/ administration dichotomy that could well derive from Woodrow Wilson. Not only is leadership reserved for the politician, it is explicitly ruled out for the administrator.

One obvious problem with the strictly administrative model is that organizations are made up of people and people inevitably interact with each other. Of course, some traditional public administrators were leaders and possibly highly effective ones, but leadership was not required by design and, if it did exist, was an informal factor attached to a formalistic system that tried to remove any vestige of personal management. Traditional adminis-tration is really about authority rather than leadership. A high ranking civil servant certainly has authority in being able to make binding decisions backed by the full force of the law. But leadership is not evident in this model at all.

4   Leadership in the Managerial Model

A managerial model requires leadership; indeed, this is one of the key aspects of the change from the traditional administrative model. A managerial model not only recognizes that informal, personal behaviour will exist in reality, but sets out to capture it and use it for organizational benefit. The first of seven main points set out by Hood (1991) to describe what he termed "new public management" is "hands-on professional management in the public sector". This means letting the managers manage, or as Hood puts it "active, visible, discretionary control of organisations from named persons at the

top". The typical justification for this is that "accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action" (1991, pp. 4-5).

What we have in this managerial model is an individual, a 'named person', who is explicitly accountable for the achievement of results. This is quite different from Weber's impersonal machine model where an administrator only follows instructions and operates abstractly and anonymously. An administrator serves and obeys, and follows instructions; a manager takes charge and gets results (see Hughes 2003). It is this point that is the most important about the shift from administration to management in the public sector. Despite the differences in political systems, in the past politicians were accountable for results and administrators were not. Now managers – a significant change of terminology - are themselves accountable.

The difference with the administrative model is well illustrated by Behn who argues:

"The wonderful source of bureaucratic power lies in the bureaucrats' ability to refuse to exercise initiative, to hide cleverly behind some rule while, in fact, subtly exercising initiative by cleverly selecting a rule to achieve their own purposes. In contrast, as a leader, a public manager takes initiatives publicly. There is no hiding behind some law or regulation created by someone else. . . While bureaucrats can exercise initiative by claiming they have no ability to exercise it, leaders exercise initiative by articulating and clarifying purposes; by setting and pursuing performance targets; by educating, persuading, and motivating people; by choosing among alternatives; and by experimenting with strategies and tactics. It is all very public. And it is all very personal" (Behn 1998, p. 211).

It follows that a managerial model of government implicitly, and often explicitly, requires greater leadership. Instead of decisions being made by impersonal application of the rules, decisions are to be made in order to achieve results, to solve problems, and, crucially, a manager is required to do this as a person, as an individual. This is very different from Weber's impersonal machine model where any vestige of personal conduct on the part of a public servant is to be minimized.

4.1   Personal or Positional Leadership?

The managerial reforms have meant that high-profile managers are more often appointed to head departments or agencies. These are often appointed on short-term contracts, have management backgrounds and are employed to get results. They are also public figures in a way not previously considered normal for a public servant. Frequently they seem to prefer working for one political party. Another change in senior management is the move away from specialist heads, such as engineers or scientists in technical areas, or doctors in health departments, to managerial heads of agencies. Management is seen more as a function requiring its own skills rather than something which specialists can simply 'pick up'.

There remains the question as to whether leadership in the public sector is largely personal or positional. An OECD report argues that the leadership profile includes: "focusing on delivery of results, challenging assumptions, being open to learning from the outside, understanding the environment and its impact, thinking and acting strategically, building new patterns and ways of working and developing and communicating a personal vision of change" (OECD 2005, p. 178). Some of these points are personal, others may be more positional. The last point – communicating a personal vision of change – is clearly personal where some of the other points could be regarded as either positional or a combination of the two.

There are clearly pressures for more personal, even charismatic, leadership as Javidan and Waldman argue:

"As is the case in the private sector, there is strong evidence that public sector organizations are facing increasing economic and social pressures to reform managerial and organizational practices. Reduced or stagnant tax base, strong public criticism, and increasingly global competition are forcing public sector leaders to focus more on outputs and performance, longer-term goals, stronger monitoring of results, and greater responsiveness to client needs and expectations. These challenges provide fertile ground for charismatic leadership with the public sector executive ranks" (2003, p. 233).

Charismatic leadership is something beyond leadership on the basis of position. In this, Javidan and Waldman essentially agree with Conger and Kanungo who argue that charismatic leadership is "an additional inferred dimension of leadership behaviour" and,

importantly, it is "not an attribution made about an individual because of his or her rank in the organization, but rather it is an attribution made because of the behaviour he or she exhibits" (1987, pp. 639-640).

Ingraham sets out ways that an excellent leader "drives and supports performance in important ways" including: the leader as communicator, the leader as driver of performance and as shaper and reinforcer of performance. She adds that strong leadership in public organizations "is going to be absolutely fundamental to keeping the future course as steady as possible" and leaders with "vision, resolve, and frankly, pretty tough skins, will be key ingredients to performance success" (Ingraham 2005, p. 395). These points could refer to either leadership as a personal attribute or leadership as a positional attribute, but the underlying view does seem to lean towards personal attributes such as vision and resolve.

Another perspective is that of Denis, Langley and Rouleau (2005) who contrast an 'entrepreneurial' view of leadership with a 'stewardship' view. The entrepreneurial view that "the achievement of more effective public services depends on the creativity of strong leaders who do not feel constrained by the weight of tradition or formal rules" is contrasted with the 'stewardship view' where "innovation is appreciated only as long as it contributes to the maintenance of traditional values of service that legitimate public sector production" (Denis/ Langley/ Rouleau 2005, pp. 450-451). This not quite the same as the contrasting views of leadership as personal attributes or positional attributes, although the entrepreneurial view is closer to managerialism and the stewardship view closer to more traditional models. They also argue that "there are no simple recipes for leadership effectiveness through having appropriate traits, fitting one's style to the context, or 'being charismatic' although all these undoubtedly play a role" (Denis/ Langley/ Rouleau 2005, p. 463). New managerial models within government do seek the more entrepreneurial leader who will take an organization into a completely new direction at the behest of government and as part of their own need to achieve results. Leadership as stewardship really belongs more with the traditional administrative model, in which the safeguarding of processes and procedures is of higher value than that of achieving an outcome.

On the other hand, there is room for leadership in the positional sense in government, and perhaps rather more than in the private sector. A leader in government is constrained in various ways that are there in the private sector. There are limitations on scope. A department or an agency does have a legal mandate and while this might be able to be changed, rarely can it be done immediately. A private sector leader can take an

organization into a completely different industry – an option not open to a public sector leader. There are accountability mechanisms in both sectors, but a public manager has rather more accountability requirements.

It could be argued that a public manager must do more than carry out the requirements laid down in the legal mandate, as no matter how carefully legislation is drafted; there is always room for individual judgment. This is one way in which the administrative model was clearly inadequate as any possibility of individual discretion or scope is removed as completely as possible. As the reforms have progressed, formal rational-legal authority can be argued to inadequately describe what actually happens at the top levels of public sector organizations, in particular, their success and failure.

It is increasingly clear that highly successful managers in the public sector operate in ways that are sometimes outside the formal management structures and procedures. Only by including some aspects of charismatic authority, including ideas of leadership, can this be understood. The personal view of leadership certainly has a place within public management. In addition, there are circumstances where the positional aspect of leadership is required. A leader may well have charismatic qualities that allow he or she to progress to high positions, but someone who is placed in a high position may have to show leadership by virtue of being in a job where leadership is required. Also, with some breaking down of hierarchy often seen as advantageous for an organization, leadership can be exerted merely by being able to get people working together without hierarchy, without authority needing to be exercised. In an environment that does not rely to the same extent on formal hierarchy as the administrative model, leadership can be found, indeed, needs to be found at different levels of an organization and not just at the top. It seems possible that in the public sector leadership by personality and leadership by position blur together. Both may well be needed in order to be an effective leader in government.

5   Is Leadership Separable from Management?

The 1980s and 1990s debate over public management and managerialism included discussion as to whether management was intrinsically different from administration (Hood 2005). More recently there is the beginning of a similar debate over leadership, as to whether leadership is a different, higher level function than management. What is

common in both these debates – from administration to management and from management to leadership -is the general move away from formalism and rigidity towards flexibility. A manager takes responsibility for the achievement of results but can, in theory, be flexible as to how those results are to be achieved. Leadership is similarly flexible, perhaps even more so in the sense that a leader is expected to crash through obstacles, to be novel, and to take the organization into a new direction.

One view of the difference is that while management "puts more emphasis on formal systems, processes and incentives, leadership is more about informal influence – how to mobilize people through values and visions" (OECD 2001, p. 15). This sees the two as distinct. Terry, however, argues that "neo-managerialism fosters the idea that public managers are (and should be) self-interested, opportunistic innovators and risk-takers who exploit information and situations to produce radical change" and in the managerial movement "public managers should assume an entrepreneurial leadership role" (1998, p. 197). Leadership here is seen as part of the managerial movement, as within neo-managerialism and not separate from it.

In the private sector literature, Kotter (1990) argues that leadership and management are two distinctive and complementary systems, each having its own functions and its own characteristic activities, but both are necessary for the management of complex organisations. Management is "about coping with complexity" where leadership is "about coping with change" (Kotter 1990, p. 104). He argues that management involves planning and budgeting, setting a direction, organizing and staffing, aligning people and by controlling and problem solving, but for leadership, "achieving a vision requires motivation and inspiring – keeping people moving in the right direction, despite major obstacles to change, by appealing to basic but often untapped human needs, values, and emotions" (Kotter 1990, p. 104). As Kotter outlines the differences:

"Managerial processes must be as close as possible to fail-safe and risk-free. That means they cannot be dependent on the unusual or hard to obtain. The whole purpose of systems and structures is to help normal people who behave in normal ways to complete routine jobs successfully, day after day. It's not exciting or glamorous. But that's management. Leadership is different. Achieving grand visions always requires an occasional burst of energy. Motivation and inspiration energize people, not by pushing them in the right direction as control mechanisms do but by satisfying basic human needs for achievement, a sense of belonging, recognition, self-esteem, a feeling of control over one's life, and the

ability to live up to one's ideals. Such feelings touch us deeply and elicit a powerful response" (1990, p. 107).

For Kotter, management is about systems and processes where leadership is about vision and coping with change.

In the public sector context, Fairholm agrees with Kotter in seeing management as being about organizational structures, making transactions and "ensuring control and prediction" where leadership is about change and transformation, "setting and aligning organizational vision with group action, and ensuring individuals a voice so that they can grow into productive, proactive, and self-led followers" (Fairholm 2004, p. 588). However, the clear separation between management and leadership argued by Kotter and Fairholm may be less relevant in a public context. There are two aspects to this.

The first is that the tasks Kotter ascribes to management fit, in the historiography of the public sector, the concept of administration far more than management. Much earlier, Gulick and Urwick (1937) set out the acronym 'POSDCORB' that stood for Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting as key administrative functions in government. This is very similar to Kotter's planning and budgeting, setting a direction, organizing and staffing, and the like. In the private sector, all functions from high-level strategy down take place within the organization. There is no equivalent of a political leader in the person of the minister. In the public sector, there has always been a tension between the administrative part of government and the political part. For a long time it was assumed that politicians were the strategists and policy-makers – the leaders – and public servants were mere administrators. In the private sector, it may be possible to find a point in the organization where the management function ends and the leadership function takes over. This may have once been possible in the public sector but between administration and leadership, especially political leadership. With public sector reform, administrative functions have become management functions, but while management functions may include the administrative and procedural ones listed by Kotter, they also include strategy and other high level functions regarded as reserved for leaders in the private sector.

The second point, and mentioned before, is that leadership in the public sector takes place within parameters, within mandates, in a way not usual in the private sector. For example, Behn argues:

"I am advocating active, intelligent, enterprising leadership. I am advocating leadership that takes astute initiatives designed to help the agency not only achieve it purposes today but also to create new capacity to achieve its objectives tomorrow. I am advocating a style of leadership that builds both an agency's and its government's reputation for accomplishment and thus competence. Such leadership requires public managers to exercise initiative within the framework provided by their legal mandate" (Behn 1998, p. 220).

The legal mandate is quite different from that of the private sector. Leadership occurs in government but it is a constrained kind of leadership as the mandate restricts freedom of action compared to the private sector. Leadership is then not so far away from management in the public sector context. One possibility, one postulate, is that leadership and management are closer together in the public sector than they are in the private sector.

In one view, leadership can be seen as a higher order function than management, so that in terms of the development of public management a linear progression can be seen from administration to management and then to leadership. An alternative and equal view is that leadership is a part of the function and functionality of management, so that a manager needs to be a leader too. In the governmental context at least, a manager does need to be a leader. If a manager is to achieve results, a manager needs to exercise leadership.

6   Conclusion

For a practicing public manager, the roles of administration, management and leadership need not be mutually exclusive. Public managers do operate in some ways as administrators, in some ways as managers and in some ways as leaders. The activities of a given day, even, can include aspects of all of these. It can be argued further that the higher a manager goes the more that leadership takes over from more formal authority; political behaviour and inter-personal relationships become far more important in the achievement of results.

If there is a big dividing line between the three concepts, it is between administration and management, or between traditional public administration and public management. Traditional public administration tries, at least in the ideal Weberian case, to take any personal dimension away from what a public servant does in practice. The reasoning was

laudable, in that an impersonal administration based solely on rules and laws will make the same decision every time. But public administrators are people; they are men and women with personalities and with personal relationships of a kind with each other, the politicians and the public that they serve. The relative utilities of the personal view of leadership and the positional view of leadership are hard to separate in the public sector context. Personal attributes are required in order to inspire others to achieve, but similarly positional attributes can allow leadership to be exercised in that leaders with positional authority are more likely to be able to use their personal skills.

Since managerial reform, a public manager has as one of his or her required attributes the ability to work with others in order to achieve results and takes personal responsibility for doing so. This is leadership in action; through both personality and position. It may or may not be charismatic leadership, but leadership it is, and its absence makes it that much harder for the organization to achieve its goals.

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Politics-Management Relations in an Agency Context: The Case of Centrelink

1   Introduction

Australia's primary case of a new style 'agency' (Pollitt et al. 2004) was created as a multi-purpose delivery agency to provide services to several purchasing departments mainly in the areas of social security and unemployment. Centrelink provides a case of the dynamics of political and management relations when the traditional conditions under which agencies operate are relaxed and redefined. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issues in this experiment with an agency's relationships by examining its origins and why the original model was terminated after seven years.

Centrelink significance has derived from it prominence – accounting for 30 per cent of the Commonwealth budget[1] – and its delivery role and relationships. It was also distinctive as a hybrid organisation combining some autonomy through corporate governance arrangements and operations involving relationships with several departments, but with features facilitating conformity with government policy and preferences in politically sensitive fields. In this latter respect it might operate like a department of state, although technically a statutory agency that was seeking to be entrepreneurial and benchmarked against private delivery systems.

The case of a complex agency, which is political salient and highly budget-significant, raises questions about levels of autonomy and the ability to sustain it in practice. This is particularly so where the agency was seen to be operating in an 'ambiguous environment' (Rosalky 2002; Rowlands 1999), which derived from how the functions were originally divided up, the scope for interpreting relationships between agency and departments, and the multiple models that entered into the calculations for the new agency. In essence a horizontal question (inter-agency failures in collaboration) was converted into a vertical question (defining the relationship in terms of purchaser and provider).

Two types of explanation are considered. The fall-out from the original design features of the agency provides one level of explanation about long-term organisational durability. Design issues emerged from the incorporation of several models in the arrangement and from the difficulties with operationalising central concepts such as purchaser-provider. The complex political/ bureaucratic environment involved different relationships with agencies with divergent positions, producing a problem with alignment between different organisational actors.

The second explanation addresses environmental questions. Centrelink emerged during one reform phase, only to loss its special status in a second phase. At the heart were issues about autonomy and control. One phase favoured disaggregation and flexible government with different forms of service provision within and beyond the public sector. The succeeding era favoured integration and more direct political and management control. This pattern also reflects a broader movement against the new style agencies of the 1990s, particularly in Anglophone countries, as disaggregation falls out of favour and agencies are reabsorbed (see e.g. Talbot/ Johnson 2007).

2   Political and Management Models

The design issues involved in forming and maintaining different types of 'autonomous agency' have often been overlooked in the mainstream drive for reform of public sectors (OECD 2001). There are varying degrees of autonomy (Verhoest et al. 2004) and the types most relevance are not necessarily those most removed from the core of government. Some measure of autonomy is sought through differentiation in order to acquire organisational advantages, but the location is not the outer public sector but the margins of the public service at the intersection between the minister and the department on the one hand and the customer and private sector on the other.

Two principal types of autonomy arise in relations between government agency and the political executive and between agency and ministerial department, which are termed respectively political and managerial autonomy. Both have a long tradition but are best dated from the period when ministerial departments were evolving in the nineteenth century.

Views about political autonomy were shaped by both the articulation of the dichotomy between politics and administration (notably by Wilson in the United States), and experience with the defects of capricious political intervention including patronage. In the case of Australia, the emergence of the public corporation as a mechanism for undertaking a range of functions of a business nature appeared in the nineteenth century as a solution to the colonial problems with political interference and was then applied to other functions laying the foundation for the non-departmental sector (Wettenhall 2003).

The preference for managerial autonomy derives from the constraints of the public service model identified with the department of state, which traditionally was associated with

bureaucratic features. The traditional rationale was also commercial in seeking to incorporate business features in public organisations. This spawned a range of organisational forms ranging from the long-standing statutory corporations and authorities through to the late twentieth century 'agencies'. However, a new element emerged under new public management increasingly defined relationships through the use of formal performance agreements and purchaser-provider arrangements.

There are then two principal models that are present to a greater or lesser extent in government organisations that display some degree of autonomy. The political model advocates separating political from administration to prevent interventions that do not accord with an organisational mission serving the public purpose. The weakness of this model lies with the power and imperatives of the political executive particularly where the stakes are high. Much may depend on the willingness of politicians to accept the boundaries as demarcating zones of influence. Attempts to specify respective roles, such as strategy and operations, are common. The use of a board of management is a standard way of locating an organisation at arms length (although many agencies lack boards: OECD 2001).

The weakness with this management model is the difficult with retaining separation in practice. Separation may either go too far or be insufficiently applied. In practice, decoupling can be counterproductive and increase overhead and transaction costs, with organisational linkages having to be re-established to provide policy feedback. Separation does not necessarily follow decoupling because service delivery agencies tend to acquire policy capacity (Schick 1996).

At the same time there is an argument in favour of policy activity. The explicit separation of policy from implementation had been significant in countries such as New Zealand and UK, but elsewhere agencies often retain a role in policy monitoring and development. Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, have had a long experience of agencies, which may be active in policy advice and evaluation in addition to providing service delivery (Shand 1996).

There is a need therefore to balance the advantages of separate organisations for policy and operations while ensuring that there are effective communication mechanisms and dialogue between them on policy directions and implementation. As with other debates about separation of levels of government, is it necessarily optimal or realistic to strive for

separational purity? The department may intervene in implementation as indicated by the blurring of responsibilities between departments and UK's agencies (Trosa 1994).

3   Reform Environment

The conception of a new type of service delivery agency was a product of a confluence of trends, ideas and agenda. The conditions for major change occur infrequently, but a window of opportunity occurred in the mid-1990s in Australia. There had been large public organisations before and the forerunner of Centrelink, the Department of Social Security, was large in the departmental pantheon. In Centrelink's case, the concept that emerged was for a new type of Australian organisation – a generalised delivery agency that could handle several major functions. But in moving towards the combination of elements a number of considerations were involved.

A study that has integrated a set of elements for handling complexity is Kingdon's (1997) depiction of three distinctive streams (problems, policies and politics) in agenda setting. These streams operate independently: the recognition of problems that requires attention, the policy ideas that eventually produce alternatives, and the political arena covering inter alia changes in government. The confluence of the streams through the coupling of politics, problems and solutions provide the window of opportunity for an item to be promoted to the decision agenda.

The second consideration was the process of deriving a set of decisions – the design choices for a delivery agency – that articulated and evolved the concept that was launched in September 1996. The issues covered structural questions about decoupling of policy and delivery, integration of delivery roles, and the choice of agency features. The practical options involved the division of responsibilities between departments and agency, governance arrangements and the definition of relationships under purchaser-provider arrangements.

In examining the operations of these relationships, the impact of organisational environment needs to be factored in. In particular, there is the impact of changing agendas.[2] The creation of Centrelink reflected the mood of the mid-1990s, and it continued to be a beacon of new agendas.

The last two decades have been remarkable for the level of public sector change in Australia, a foremost international exponent of the new public management in the 1990s as part of the reform era that emerged in the 1980s. The wave of reform was characterised by its magnitude, experimentation with new organisational forms and attention to system design. Reform was rapid and systemic with reforms applied across the public sector and a comprehensive range of measures implemented.

The reforms can be seen through the changing agendas that cover political control, management, markets and reorganisation. The Labor government (1983-96) favoured the public sector while pushing it heavily towards the private sector; the Coalition government (1996-) favoured the private sector but recognised the need to maintain a strong core public service. The directions that emerged in the 1990s were fundamentally different from the initial decade of reform in important respects, in particular the shift from the emphasis on management reform to market-based change. The election of the conservative Coalition government accelerated the emerging trends, initially focusing on cutting the size of the budget deficit and the level of public sector staffing, and then on other fundamental changes (Halligan 2002).

The terms of the Howard government can now be viewed as coinciding with different reform phases. The first term produced a neo-liberal agenda from the first conservative government of the reform era. The second and third terms provided opportunities for the reform program to be tested through implementation and then refined. In the process, the hard-edged focus of the 1990s was less appropriate in the 2000s. New agendas emerged such as corporate governance review, whole of government and strengthened central processes (Halligan 2007).

What was significant here was that the reform environment surrounding the formative years of Centrelink was characterised by devolution, privatisation, contracting, consumer choice and an intensification of cutbacks and promotion of the private sector over the public sector. There were major implications for Centrelink from these agenda associated with the overall momentum of environmental change.

4   Centrelink's Origins

4.1   Problems and Policy Options in the New Reform Environment

A long-standing issue was the existence of separate networks of regional offices of the departments of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) and Social Security (DSS).[3] Apart from the duplication, there was a history of competition over 'turf' between the two. There was also growing consciousness of the connections between the social policy departments that were developing policy that impacted on the same group of people.

A second question was that of delivery mode. The monopoly of the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) on the provision of services to unemployed people had been challenged by an experiment begun under the Labor government involving contracting out of case management to community and private organizations. There was a preference for introducing greater competition and freedom of choice through extending the non-government market share of the work.

The concept of the one-stop shop, and specifically the one-stop welfare shop, had been discussed since the mid-1970s. The notion of a one-stop shop had already been picked by politicians and emerged from Liberal Party election policy on public sector reform (Rowlands 2003; Wettenhall/ Kimber 1996).

Australia had been active in public management reform from the 1980s (Halligan 2002). By the mid-1990s market principles were assuming centrality with competition and contestability becoming the currency of reform; and there was acceptance of more flexible approaches to delivery systems for public services including the need to move beyond the traditional monolithic department. New factors that influenced the direction for the organisation that would eventually emerge: entrepreneurial government; purchaser-provider; and specialised agencies, pioneered in New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

A pivotal influence was the experience of New Zealand's system of decoupled policy (ministry) and implementation (agency) and its approach to service delivery and the 'customer'. With the confluence of these ideas it was possible to envisage some

combination of service delivery, purchaser-provider and integrated services. The other experiment with separating policy formulation from implementation, the creation of new executive agencies (Rowlands 2003; James 2003), was being diffused internationally. Australia's doctrinaire approach towards the superiority of integrated policy and implementation was questioned, and the option of seamless integration of service delivery was being raised.

The emerging consensus on new and possibly more integrated solutions for delivery needed an impetus. This was provided by a new government, the Howard Coalition, whose reform agenda for the public sector included a commitment to make the provision of government services open to competition (Vardon 2000). The Coalition's appointed a National Commission of Audit to undertake a major review of the management and financial activities of government, including what additional efficiencies might be achieved through, inter alia, rationalisation of client contact networks between and within agencies. The agenda derived from both the political sphere and central agencies, particularly the Department of Finance.

The second factor was anticipating and influencing the new government's agenda. The specific idea of creating Centrelink and the associated arrangements came from the two departmental secretaries most involved, Tony Blunn (Department of Social Security) and Sandy Hollway (Department of Employment, Education and Youth Affairs). The duplication of the DSS and DEETYA networks was an obvious target for the Department of Finance. The considerations that were influential included the need for better integration of service delivery and program design in view of the budget deficit and the need to find savings in expenditure. If the two departments could not formulate an approach to achieving substantial running costs savings, they could expect a less palatable option. The secretaries moved quickly to formulate an agency concept, drawing on available ideas (e.g. purchaser–provider).

The eventual decision to create a Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency in 1996 was consistent with the findings of the National Commission of Audit, which recommended rationalising the delivery of income and employment services and raised the possibility of opening the service provision to the private sector. While the government's commitment to competition policy was one reason for establishing the agency, another was the need to improve service delivery, and specifically to create a single network to improve access for customers (Halligan 2004).

4.2   Choices of Agency Form and Underlying Models

At this stage there were two government agenda: developing options for a one-stop shop for beneficiaries; and examining the scope for further privatisation of employment placement services. The outcomes were shaped by the general brief from the two key secretaries (Blunn and Hollway), and the government expectation of a 10 per cent saving from the merger of the employment side of CES and the payment side of DSS. The preferred option was for a service delivery agency with two major clients but with the potential to serve others. A second process, paying heed to bureaucratic politics, was the question of pinning down the concept in a meaningful way for final approval by the government, and laying the basis for the implementation of a viable organisation. This required recognition of the constraints on choices and the need to balance political expectations and the interests of departments.

The original concept envisaged a policy-delivery split that would produce a large agency with several small high-level policy departments. There were second thoughts about a department confined to policy, and the interface between the two new organisations was reformulation to add a middle area between policy formation and delivery that essentially represented program management or operational policy. Under this revised concept, the department would retain product design of delivery and control of the program, and the department and agency would compete in the middle ground, with the challenge being to achieve the effective working of the interface. The use of purchaser-provider was to be a core element of this process.

The concept then was eventually shaped by a reality check and a compromise with long-term consequences for operations and relationships between client departments and Centrelink. The choices made in 1996 produced the structural features of Centrelink and the basis for later debates about the relative responsibilities of purchasing department and provider agency.

Several models underpinned the new Centrelink. First, Centrelink was a public service organisation and subject to public service legislation as a statutory authority. In many respects it was not much different from a department of state because of the centrality of public service principles and its adherence to whole of government and political dicta. The political model, which derived from the environment of an organisation that although subject to special governance arrangements is still directly or indirectly subject to political

direction. Centrelink had to recognise the top-down authority relationship and government agendas. Centrelink was also an agent and service provider in a purchaser-provider relationship and was expected to behave in specified quasi-contractual ways. Its existence was defined in terms of relationships with client departments, the purchasers of its services.[4]

Each model captured a major organisational imperative that drove Centrelink. They were all externally grounded and several had a basis in the agency's empowering legislation. Moreover, they pulled or pushed the organisation in different ways. The fundamental question for Centrelink under these circumstances was how it handled the multiple demands on it in practice, particularly where they were in conflict.

5   Political Relationships

Centrelink represented a radical departure from the standard departmental model because of the combination of elements in the scope of its design and operations, in particular the unusual governance arrangements. It provides a case of an organisation that combines autonomy through corporate governance arrangements (an independently appointed CEO and board) and operational relationships with several departments, with informal features that facilitated conformity with government policy and preferences in politically sensitive fields. Did a board make a difference and how did the political dimension relate to the managerial?

Centrelink was a statutory authority within the core public service and subject to the Financial Management Act like departments of state. How its position and relationships operate depend on both its statutory basis and practice as it evolved. In so far as the organisation's functions have been separated out from a department and it was expected to display undepartment-like features (entrepreneurial, business-like etc.) differences might result. In so far as it derived from a department of state and remained in the core, some features would endure.

The agency was located within the Family and Community Services portfolio and responsible to the Minister for Community Services through an appointed Board of Directors. However, it was a separate entity to the FaCS Department and had its own accounting and reporting requirements. The standard departmental model consists of a direct relationship between a minister and a departmental secretary who under the Public

Service Act 1999 has direct responsibilities in relation to the minister. In contrast, Centrelink reported to the minister through the Centrelink Board on administrative issues relating to the portfolio. The client departments were the purchasers of services detailed in negotiated agreements with the agency, which required effective working relationships to ensure policy was implemented to the agreed standards and quantities.

The Board of Directors set the overall objectives, gave strategic direction and set broad business rules for the organisation (CSDA Act 1997). It was responsible for Centrelink's goals, practices and priorities and focused on balancing the needs for accountability, risk management and auditing with expectations about best practice in service delivery and reduced costs to meet the government's efficiency demands and remain competitive.

The Board was appointed by the Minister for Family and Community Services and consisted of a chairman, the Centrelink CEO, and at least four other members, of whom at least two could not be principal officers of Commonwealth authorities. While not a requirement of the Act, it was a practice until 2002 for the secretaries of the two principal purchasing agencies, FaCS and Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), to be appointed to the Board as non-voting members. There was widespread critique of the practice of appointing board members from the purchasing agencies on the grounds that you could not be on the board if you were also representing a purchasing agency with an independent relationship.

Centrelink was subject to the legislative requirement to perform any function directed by the minister in writing to the chairman of the board (with details to be provided in the agency's annual report), and providing that there was consultation with the board prior to the issuing of directions (CSDA Act, Sections 8-9).

There was evidence from both the original design and subsequent practice that ministerial accountability might continue to operate as under the former Department of Social Security. Ministers routinely accepted public responsibility for Centrelink's activities: the agency's performance was defended, and new services were announced by the minister. There were expectations and pressures to respond to government agenda and public crisis (e.g. drought relief). Ministerial correspondence in relation to Centrelink was handled as if staff were dealing with a department. However, less politically attractive decisions such as retrenchments were matters for Centrelink management (Mulgan 2002, pp. 52-54). A judgement about ministerial responsibility was that there were "slight changes of emphasis but no major breaks with convention". Ministerial responsibility for administrative

decisions still applied in Parliament, and apart from employment conditions, public delineation of ministerial and managerial responsibilities had not occurred (Mulgan 2002, pp. 54-55).

The former secretary of FaCS for much of Centrelink's existence provided insights into the relationship between the minister and the department responsible for purchasing services from Centrelink. Ministerial intervention occurred with politically sensitive management strategies and decisions and "directly with Centrelink regularly in a direct one-to-one link with the CEO, overriding the roles of the secretary and the board" (Rosalky 2002, p. 10).

Given that Centrelink had responsibilities for one of the largest components of the budget with programs that could be highly sensitive, this outcome was not unexpected. However, a difficulty arose in relation to other imperatives that drove Centrelink. Since Centrelink was part of the FaCS portfolio, the responsible ministers had regarded it as a department of state rather than a delivery agency that was operating at arms length. Hence the claim that "when the minister wants a call centre to be set up quickly to do something, he just calls on Centrelink to do it" (Central agency official).

6   Managerial Relationship

The new agency's relationships with its client departments were to be through purchaser-provider arrangements, governed by a form of contractual agreement with each agency. These agreements, evolved from Service Agreements into more comprehensive documents with entitled Business Partnership Agreements (BPAs). The BPAs established the scope and provide the detail of a formal purchaser-provider relationship between two organisations. They took the form of a memorandum of understanding as the Commonwealth was unable to enter a contract with itself where both purchaser and the provider organisations are Commonwealth agencies. BPAs were used to manage and review the operating and performance relationships between them.

Centrelink's revenue came overwhelmingly from client departments, with a small percentage coming as a direct appropriation from the government. Each client (usually a policy department) negotiated a purchase price for specified services that Centrelink agreed to undertake. The BPAs detailed the services, the funding arrangements, agreed performance outcomes and related reporting mechanisms. The overwhelming majority

(92 per cent in 2002–03) of Centrelink's business was undertaken for FaCS, with the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations a distant second (5 per cent). The remaining 14 purchasers accounted for about three per cent of Centrelink's revenue.

From the point of view of the primary purchaser, FaCS, the only direct relationship with Centrelink was that established by the BPA. For an agreed price, FaCS exercised the power to purchase specified services from Centrelink, and the relationship might require the provision of performance information. Centrelink was responsible to FaCS for service delivery in accordance with the agreement.

The position of the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) was different. About one billion dollars worth of services were bought in the market based on service delivery arrangements that were almost entirely outsourced. Employment services were delivered through 200 providers in the Job Network and services were also bought from a network of community work coordinators and providers for the delivery of other projects and programs. In each case, they were a product of a competitive tender. In contrast with this highly competitive market, where organisations might lose or gain business according to their performance against standards, with Centrelink the department was negotiating with a government monopoly, without generally having an alternative (Senior departmental official).

The interface – the intermediate zone between policy formation and service delivery covering program management or operational policy – continued to be a source of debate and at times acute disagreement. As one senior Centrelink official observed, there was "a fine line between micro-policy and implementation". This grey area was where agencies needed to work through issues together. The Centrelink position was that departments continued to micro-manage what it does. It was argued that the Department of Social Security should have been purely a policy department, comparable to those in other countries. The constant problem in the relationship since had been that most of what FaCS did was micro- policy or management because it could not decide where the boundary was (Senior Centrelink official).

From a purchaser point of view there was a need to have Centrelink involvement in providing advice on the implementation challenges involved in specific policy. This was regarded as a secondary role and one that Centrelink had in the development of the government report 'Australians Working Together'. However, there was strong opposition to a role in taking the initiative or driving policy agenda. Centrelink should be confined to

consultation and forcible arguments regarding the implementation of the policy agenda (Senior departmental official).

Looking across the life of Centrelink, the tensions in the relationships were significant in the initial years. The rhetoric from an early stage was couched in terms of partnership, but the basis was defined and operated in formal purchaser-provider terms. The official view in 1999 was that the relationship was purchaser-provider, which organisations operationalised through a partnership (Rowlands 1999). There were however continuing problems arising from the competition for the middle ground and the mutual concern that both organisations were either insufficiently engaged in each other's primary responsibilities or too involved in their respective roles.

The tension could be perceived as "tolerable and creative", but also "destructive". "So the model shifted then, from pure purchaser-provider, to partnership underpinned by the elements of purchaser-provider" (Senior departmental official). The key factor was whether purchaser and provider were located within the same portfolio.

The official attempt at characterising the complexities in the FaCS–Centrelink relationship in a strategic partnership statement, was that it had evolved over several years into "a dynamic, mutually-beneficial association" regarded as a unique arrangement blending elements of purchaser/ provider with partnership and alliance (DFaCS 2001). This was not the case with the other significant relationship (DEWR) where there had been some movement in the direction of 'a more mature partnership', but this progress was retarded because of constant argument about funding of service delivery (Senior departmental official).

7   Explanations

By 2005, the governance of Centrelink was transformed. The two types of explanation address concerns at the level of design that received reinforcement from the changing reform paradigm in the 2000s as it moved on from principles salient in the 1990s.

7.1   Models in Contention

The incorporation of conflicting models in complex approaches to institutional design produces complications (Aucoin 1990). In the case of Centrelink several models have had to be reconciled and in that process there has been some attempt to clarify the sharper conflicts, while other tension remain as structural elements to be worked through.

There has been consensus among the purchasers and the provider about the limitations of one of the models. The commercial approach underling the purchaser-provider model requires an arm's length relationship between the two with regard to financial results, and is designed to provide clearer accountability for performance. However, because of Centrelink's character and the shortage of financial data, the model was seen to be "artificial and inimical to the primary portfolio purpose. The government's fiscal interests are tied more closely to effective joint management of program funds than to a competitive model aimed at reducing administrative costs" (Rosalky 2002, p. 14).

Finance not unexpectedly continued until recently to perceive the relationship in formal terms. Centrelink had an issue with regard to its location within the FaCS portfolio as to whether it was a separate service agency model or a traditional departmental model. Ministers like "a big mushy-looking bucket of money and there's lots of cross subsidies", because that gave them more flexibility, but this was not a purchaser-provider relationship (Senior finance official). According to the former secretary of FaCS, the priorities of portfolio ministers produced "frequent changes in Centrelink outputs which could not reasonably be captured in a purchaser-provider relationship and which undermined the terms of business agreements between the two organizations" (Rosalky 2002, p. 10). The 1990s fervour for purchaser-provider waned with the struggle for maintaining productive relationships sustaining he, at least within a ministerial portfolio.

7.2   Rise of Integrated Governance and Agency Flexibility

Centrelink was able to adapt its approach to reflect trends as they applied at the interagency level, but it was not in a position to handle the broader reform agenda and the overall functioning of the public sector as new public management was both subsumed and supplanted by an integrated governance approach (Halligan 2007).

Integrated governance became apparent in the 2000s defined by four dimensions: resurrection of the central agency as a major actor with more direct influence over departments; whole of government as the new expression of a range of forms of co-ordination; central monitoring of agency implementation and delivery; and departmentali-sation through absorbing statutory authorities and rationalising the non-departmental sector. In combination these dimensions address performance improvement and provide the basis for integrated governance (Halligan 2006, 2007).[5]

These trends shifted the focus to some extent from vertical to horizontal by emphasising cross-agency programs and collaborative relationships as well as the individual agency – a trend anticipated by Centrelink. At the same time, vertical relationships were extended and reinforced. The whole-of-government agenda had a centralising element in as far as central agencies were driving policy directions systemically and across several agencies. As a result devolution was the tempered by central strategic steering and management and a rebalancing of the positions of centre and line agencies. Underlying the model was political control: strategic coordination under cabinet; controlling major policy agendas; organisational integration through abolishing bodies; and monitoring implementation of policy down to the delivery level. The overall result was greater potential for policy and program control and integration using the conventional machinery of cabinet, central agencies and departments.

An agenda for resurrecting a more comprehensive ministerial department through absorbing bodies or extending controls was given formal recognition in Australia through the Uhrig review into the corporate governance of statutory authorities and office holders. The focus was on nominated agencies with relationships with an impact on business, but also included the delivery agencies of the Health Insurance Commission and Centrelink. The recommendations of the Uhrig report (2004) were grounded in private sector thinking and focused on two alternatives – a Board template with full powers delegated by government and an Executive Management Template. Many public bodies, including Centrelink, did not readily fit either (Halligan 2006; Halligan/ Horrigan 2006).

The post-Uhrig agenda has been for ministerial departments to have tighter and more direct control over public agencies. This was partly represented as a move against the "dangers imposed by bureaucratic proliferation" (Shergold 2004) with most public servants working for agencies; whereas departments of state employed less than one-quarter of federal officials. The head of the public service registered concern about opaque governance and that driving implementation needed "clarity of purpose, powers and

relationships between Ministers, public servants and boards. Good governance depends upon transparency of authority, accountability and disclosure. There should be no doubts, no ambiguities" (Shergold 2004). Departmentalisation was encouraged through absorbing statutory authorities and reclaiming control of agencies with hybrid boards that did not accord with corporate governance prescriptions. The most significant was the creation of a Department of Human Service as a small agency for strategically directing, coordinating and brokering improvements to the delivery of services and incorporating six agencies, including Centerlink, under its umbrella.[6]

The impact of integrated governance on Centrelink was comprehensive for all dimensions: the relationship to ministerial direction, stronger ministerial departments in relation to policy leadership and control over agencies, enhanced central agency capacity for monitoring service delivery and implementation, and the clarification of what constituted appropriate corporate governance (thereby striking out Centrelink's advisory board). The whole of government agenda implied that Centrelink was no longer the distinguished innovator in horizontal initiatives for now all agencies were expected to participate actively in collaboration.

Two agendas then were operating: one addressed agency governance and ministerial accountability and the need to rebalance the public service by tempering the high levels of devolution, including the number of non-departmental organisations. There were also Centrelink specific matters that addressed issues arising from conflicts identified earlier, such as the operation of a purchaser-provider relationship within the same portfolio; governance by board and minister; and inter-departmental tensions.

The position of Centrelink changed between late 2004 when Centrelink was subsumed within a new parent department and within a new portfolio under a central agency, and October 2005, when its board was disbanded. The Department of Human Services was created within the Finance portfolio with responsibility for six delivery agencies operating under direct ministerial control and one advisory board. The rationale was to improve the delivery of services within a whole of government approach that involved better collaboration and performance.

The CEO of Centrelink, and five other agencies, "retain responsibility for day-to-day operations in their agencies, the department provide assurance to the Minister on cross-agency issues, the quality of outcomes, and the achievements of the government's objectives". The Minister of Human Services now had responsibility for day-to-day

operations. According to the departmental secretary, the department had "the job of supplying the service delivery 'zing'. We work directly with policy departments and our six agencies to improve policy design by focusing on better service delivery" (Department of Human Resources 2005, p. 13). Whereas Centrelink had previously taken the lead or co-lead on such matters, now a generic ministerial department was in the chair.

The integrating governance model has parallels in other Anglophone systems that were once exemplars of new public management with broadly similar movements reflecting a desire to review and tighten oversight through restructuring and rationalisation of public bodies. New Zealand displays similar dimensions to Australia including rationalising governance of non-departmental organisations (Gregory 2006). In Britain, coordination and integration have been apparent under Blair for a decade (e.g. joined-up government) and now 're-aggregation' is prevalent as the reversal of agencification reaches an advanced stage (Richards/ Smith 2006; Talbot/ Johnson 2007).

8   Conclusion

Centrelink emerged in the mid-1990s from a combination of personalities, agendas and opportunities. Out of the convergence came an organisation that was different from other international experiments with new style agencies at the time (Pollitt et al. 2004). In formulating a concept that was politically acceptable and organisationally relevant, choice was constrained by government agenda and reformer preferences that reflected existing institutions. Centrelink's fusion of separate networks and specialisation in delivery for a range of client agencies provided the conditions for innovative synergies within one organisation. Despite depictions of Centrelink as essentially a department of state, its operating style was distinctive as befitted an organisation responding also to customer and entrepreneurial imperatives. That experience offered a distinctive approach for system designers examining the subtleties of autonomy (Halligan 2006; Vardon 2000).

The tensions between models provided opportunities for advocacy of a distinctive agenda and employing smart practices in pursuit of public management innovation and interagency collaboration. The cases of interagency relationships indicated significant changes in scope and style from purchaser-provider to the alliance; competing for policy roles to value chain; and competing to expanding business through partnering agreements. Centrelink developed a new service delivery model and reformulated external

relationships despite obstacles and the need to balance the several imperatives of customers, clients, competitors and politicians. It was able to transcend relying on its own capacity within a competitive environment to develop interagency collaborative capacity.

However, the basis for subsequent debates about the roles of purchasing department and provider agency was laid by conflicts between models underlying Centrelink's constitution. There were different interpretations of the relative importance of different policy and managerial roles as mediated through purchaser-provider principles, partnerships and political direction. There were attempts to reduce environmental ambiguity, and the emphasis on partnerships facilitated more productive external relationships, but the structural features of the original design meant that tensions remained as did issues about the separation of policy formation and implementation and how best to constitute a multi-purpose delivery agency.

The original reform environment turned out to be transient. The relaxed market phase that allowed flexibility and opportunities contracted. The interaction between factors stimulating organisational creativity and inhibiting features ultimately worked against sustaining the original form of Centrelink. The resurrection of the traditional machinery of bureaucracy – central agencies and departments – meant that challenges to their policy authority, direction and the delivery agency's scope for manoeuvring were no longer viable. Centrelink has however survived as an organisation that continues to operate as a delivery agency for departments but within a more tightly integrated governance framework (Centrelink 2006).

Endnotes

[1] Centrelink was launched in September 1996 as the Commonwealth Service Delivery Agency and formally established in July 1997 as an independent statutory authority with responsibility for delivering services to 7.8 million recipients of social welfare benefits and services (approximately \$40 billion or 30 per cent of total Commonwealth expenditure). Centrelink employs 27,000 staff spread across 1000 service delivery points. The agency was located in the Social Security (later Family and Community Services) portfolio because most responsibilities involved social security entitlements. Centrelink operates under formal agreements with more than fifteen client agencies, several at state level. In conducting the research, I wish to record my appreciation of the support of Centrelink and Chief Executive Officer, Sue Vardon, who played a pivotal role in the organisation's development.

[2] There were also the routine policymaking, political preferences, and the difficulties that agencies have, particularly in the sphere of social security, in adjusting to changing requirements over time.

[3] The summary draws on Halligan 2004. See also Rowlands 2003.

[4] Of the other models, one conceives of Centrelink as a customer-driven organisation, another as an entrepreneurial organisation (Halligan 2006).

[5] The reasons for the shift from new public management involve both internal (e.g. shortcomings of reform initiatives) and external (e.g. environmental threat from terrorism) factors (Halligan 2007).

[6] Six agencies deliver services and payments that account for over $90 billion and also include the Child Support Agency, Health Services Australia and Medicare Australia.

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Management Changes and Adapting Leadership Practices: The Case of the Shared Services Initiative of the Queensland State Government

1   Introduction: Problems and Questions

From a more general design-oriented perspective nearly all OECD member states are presently held to give their ongoing attempts to modernise management of the state and administration the now needed stronger strategic shape. In this regard, it is true that in these countries also strongly concept-driven approaches of modernising management of the state and administration have been pursued from the very beginning for bringing the various highly demanding economic as well as social challenges of an ongoing process of globalisation under control. In the course of these processes not only a re-positioning of the state as an 'enabling authority', but also moves towards a stronger competition-or even market -based type of management (so called NPM-approaches) have been made used off for driving public service delivery to the now needed higher levels of efficiency or effectiveness. Given this heavy reliance on either competition or market-based concepts there at least in principle should be ample prescriptions available for giving also the whole process of readjusting inherited management practices a fairly strong conceptual guidance.

However, coming from a design-oriented perspective it still can be questioned as to whether the given conceptual heart of current modernisation activities have already been exploited fully for adapting the whole set of sub-functions of a fully developed or staged management cycle in a systematic fashion. Coming from a design-oriented perspective rather the stand is taken that in designing and implementing further steps in modernising the inherited bureaucratic system of management far higher levels of an internal consi-stancy are to be achieved for becoming able to capitalize fully on the efficacy-enhancing effects of deliberately driven large scale management changes. In this context, it is not denied that already some basic progress has been made in opening up the inherited highly vertically integrated bureaucratic state apparatus in favour of at least some moderate competition-driven approaches of producing and delivering public services at the interface to the citizenry. None the less, following the arguments of a design-oriented management science the issue seems to be at stake as to whether (along with the moves towards an 'enabling authority' concept of governance) such a nucleus of a stronger competition- or even market driven type of management has already adequately been made starting point for adjusting all the other sub-functions of a fully developed management cycle – ranging from financial management through approaches of organisational structuring to all the

diverse functions of a fully fledges human resource management system itself. In this context, specifically with regard to a further adjustment of HRM functions the question is raised as to whether the design and implementation of innovative or new concepts of leadership have already proven successful to deliver the necessary means for making the 'steering logic' of a competition-based contract management the now also binding or mandatory 'logic' for producing and delivering services at the workplace level. Thus, it is getting an issue here as to whether modernisation activities of that sort have already been successful in putting in place some sort of an entrepreneurial type of performance behaviour at the workplace level of decentred service units.

Accordingly, in terms of a strategic benchmarking the following inquiry is aiming at finding out 'better' or 'best practices' to complement current management changes with suitable leadership concepts in an efficiency enhancing way. In line with current developments this enquiry is aiming at finding out the extent to which progress has already been made in generating leadership concepts powerful enough to support ongoing changes to a New Public Management regime - and thereby towards to a more contract-based or even competition- and/ or market-driven type of management in the public sector. More specifically, the question to work on is as how notably approaches of a more entrepreneurial type of leadership (or at least stronger performance management approaches) have already been proven suitable for supporting changes towards a more output-oriented or cost-effective delivery of public services. Lastly, one of the currently highly popular attempts to outsource corporate management functions (the Queensland State Shared Services Initiative) is taken to demonstrate as how changes in managing public services are to be complemented by a re-design of leadership practices in a systematic way in order to achieve desired impacts to the full[1]). In terms of a more substantive proposition this inquiry is aiming at finding out the extent to which designing and implementing more thorough individual performance planning approaches or so some entrepreneurial-like concepts of 'self-management' are proving suitable to improve overall efficacy of establishing NPM-regimes as core concept of service delivery in the public sector.

Consequently, as result of this enquiry this study is putting together – in terms of 'best or better practices' – all the conceptual as well as social challenges single units or jurisdictions have to overcome in order to generate efficiency enhancing leadership practices.

2   The Methodological Concept of Benchmarking for Identifying Best Practices

From a methodological point of view benchmarking is used as a pragmatic or partly constructivist approach for identifying factors of success in designing and implementing management practices. From a methodological point benchmarking analysis has become famous as a methodology to use systematically collected knowledge about highly outstanding performances ('best of class-solutions') in resolving most topical manage-ment problems for deliberately generating design recommendations being both of highly practical relevance and of rather general validity. In terms of a typical research design, benchmarking analysis is targeted at carrying through very carefully set-up comparisons between some 'cutting edge developments' and some 'lagging behind cases' for getting the necessary insight into the practicalities or conditions (into the 'better or best practices') of driving management changes at levels of highest efficacy. Consequently, in line with such a concept then the most challenging demand is to make practical experiences subject of analysis which already upfront seem most favourably suited to draw 'better' or 'best practices' for adapting leadership practices. Therefore, for becoming able to deal with truly most advanced or progressive approaches of complementing NPM regimes with suitable leadership concepts the Shared Services Initiative (SSI) of the Queensland State Government is selected as a 'cutting edge unit' (as benchmark) for our analysis.

As to be elaborated yet in more detail, the SSI is basically an attempt to improve efficiency/ effectiveness of corporate management service delivery at the whole of government level. More specifically, the SSI is one of the most prominent examples to use improving 'economies of scope' and/ or 'economies of scale' as a lever to strengthen efficiency/ effectiveness of corporate management function delivery. Therefore, in sharp contrast to former approaches (especially to the approach to centralize respective functions on a department by department basis) now the attempt is made to improve delivery of corporate management services (ranging from Financial Management to the whole set of generic HRM Functions) by gradually outsourcing those units und in turn exposing them to competition or even market forces. Since those units have to learn to survive in an increasingly competitive environment there then is clearly the assumption that those units are being held to adjust the full spectrum of their internal performance management functions. This drive to make those units competitive in terms of higher

efficiency rates is then clearly holding these units to take on measures not only to adjust internal organisational arrangements or inherited budgeting and accounting practices, but to update given leadership practices as well. One of the big challenges to put whole the SSI into place smoothly then is to generate leadership practices proving suitable for translating raising efficiency demands into the day-to-day performance behaviour of the general workforce. Consequently, by putting the focus of our inquiry right on given attempts to implement the SSI this inquiry will already in general have best possible chances to deal exactly with circumstances/ contingencies from which innovative leadership practices in terms of better or even best practices are most likely to spring.

The other requirement a benchmarking analysis is to meet is to introduce some adequate conceptual premises (an adequate 'context of discovery') for guiding the search for better or best practices in substantive terms. Therefore, by way of introducing some conceptual assumptions upfront also this analysis is to be provided with a general idea as how respective restructurings have to be looking like at least in principle. Accordingly, for becoming able to identify practices relevant in this regard this enquiry is mainly following propositions from the Principal-Agent concept or from the concept of Decentred Organisations or Firms (such as the M-Form of a Corporation). More specifically, in line with those concepts also for our own inquiry the question will become crucial as to whether an adequate degree of delegating property rights (and in turn a progressing opening in favour of market-type like purchaser-provider relations) has been achieved for enabling managers to adapt service delivery to changing situational demands most effectively each time. Accordingly, in line with the concept of 'Intrapreneurs' the focus then will be on figuring out the extent to which single units or managers have already given enough scope for flexible re-arranging the input of all relevant production factors at levels of highest efficiency each time. As well known, in this regard not only measures to hand down (undiluted) property rights are at issue, but also safeguards as how to ensure that the extended scope is truly made use off in full support of upper-level (political) objectives. Lastly, since design-oriented management science concepts are coming into play at this point, it does not come as a surprise that also in this enquiry some very basic design-criteria - such as the demand to meet some 'system-environment fits' or to achieve presumed "ideal-type consistency" - are followed in the attempt to use empirical evidence for drawing recommendations.

Finally, like with the benchmarking methodology in general also this enquiry is supposed to produce best practices or practically relevant recommendations with a rather general validity or truth. To meet those standards it firstly has to be assumed that this enquiry is

really dealing with problems which have already turned out to be of a more general nature to nearly all public sectors. In this regard, it is becoming of crucial importance that issues as how to complement general management changes with suitable leadership concepts have already been made heart of ongoing modernisation activities with nearly all the OECD member states for quite long. By way of relying on management change issues of a more general importance this way this enquiry is already from a logical point of view getting the chance to draw recommendations or conclusions applicable for a larger universe of cases. However, looking for 'best practices' does not only require to deal with problems being of a more general character, but also necessitates an enquiry being in a position to embark upon an analysis of outstanding, if not best possible solutions at all. Consequently, to meet this criterion this enquiry is rather applying some sort of a strategic sampling than using random survey techniques for selecting its subject of analysis. As already referred to above, this enquiry is relying on given expert knowledge to consider the SSI one of the most ambitious approaches for the time being to adapt inherited internal management structures to changing environmental conditions – especially to a henceforth more strongly competition driven environment. More than that, in this context the SSI is also assessed most famous for its drive to bring its leadership practices in a newly more fitting shape.

In conclusion, this inquiry is not only in a position to draw conclusions with a more general validity or transferability for the public sector in large, but is also likely to produce most effective or knowledgeable (cutting edge) recommendations for resolving those problems due to its use of strategic sampling techniques.

3   Complementing Management Change with Leadership Concepts

3.1   Normative Criteria from the Shared Services Initiative Model of Management Change

As outlined, this enquiry is making the (in 2001 launched) SSI its central object of analysis for indicating 'best practices' to adapt internal performance management systems (or internal leadership practices) to changing environmental conditions of service delivery – for getting leadership concepts adapted to a more competition – or even market-driven task environment. From a wider benchmarking methodology point of view the SSI model

to enhance efficiency of delivering corporate management function services (in particular by using gradually advancing levels of outsourcing) is being made 'best-of-class-development' for demonstrating as how internal management structures/ leadership practices have to be adjusted to an ongoing change of whole the management systems. Since the SSI is to be considered a 'best-of-class-case' it does not come as a surprise that this model is firstly also spelling out by itself some normative or prescriptive criteria as how to complement overall management changes by adjusting leadership concepts.

From a model point of view the main objective of the SSI is to aim at enhancing quality as well as cost-effectiveness in delivering corporate management services through increasing 'economies of scale and scope' (in their on terms also of 'skills'). Mostly in adopting Principal-Agent assumptions the SSI is envisaging measures of both outsourcing and amalgamating for achieving savings through improving 'economies of scale' and 'skill' in delivering corporate management services. In terms of its own organisational philosophy, notably a new mix of centralising and decentralising service delivery (of applying business process re-engineering methods on the one hand and of granting scope for customer-tailored services on the other hand) shall serve as main lever to produce the desired efficiency enhancing effects. Following this track a number of seven (semi-detached) Shared Services Providers (each of them serving a broader cluster of client-departments) are being established to operate as main instruments of the Shared Services Initiative. Lastly, the central object of whole the SSI is to be seen in a variety of measures to get the whole range of corporate management functions outsourced first and then conversely consolidated or bundled with those Shared Services Providers.

As far as the more detailed organisational prescriptions are concerned to put those SSP units in place, it becomes apparent that the model is basically making use of some classic core recommendations of the Principal-Agent approach to structure service delivery processes. Therefore, the focus of all those regulations is clearly on breaking down the traditional highly vertically integrated departmental structures into series of single contract-based (and partly competition-driven) purchaser-provider relations to make sure that single SSP units will be able to benefit from a decentralized production and delivery of corporate management services at highest levels of cost-effectiveness. Following such a Principal-Agent approach all further regulations (at least from a model point of view) once are aiming at providing a range of freedom (in operational matters) to these decentralized SSP units each time large enough to give them the chance to choose most efficient courses of service production even under highly varying conditions. In this regard, especially the finally envisaged transition to a system of full cost recovery/ fee-

for-service system (to a system of quasi commercial revenue generation plus the right to retain surpluses) shall require single SSP units to go for the most cost-efficient alternative (or best cost-to-performance relation) of service production in each single case. However, from a model point of view such an approach to provide single units with all the necessary competences ('property rights') to act on their own is clearly going together with introducing a variety of organisational measures to make sure that this extended scope is going to be used in full support of the performance standards of the client-departments each time. In this regard, not only the set up of a multi-tiered governance structure but also a highly sophisticated system of writing service level agreements (in conjunction with establishing standardized end-to-end customer service processes) is supposed to operate as safeguard that all the single SSP units are going to employ negotiated financial resources in the best interest to meet performance standards of their client departments.

However, when it comes to the rather micro-organisational details the model clearly is not yet presenting some kind of a fully detailed master plan or template (a 'fully-fledged model') as how internal performance management structures (including leadership practices) are to be adapted in accord with the macro-organisational changes (with the gradual 'hiving-off' of single SSPs) at the whole of government level. Nonetheless, by following again core concepts of the Principal Agent approach it is becoming more than apparent that the SSI is clearly favouring switches from 'scientific management' as well as from 'human resource management' (especially from the so-called soft-model variant) to a some more 'entrepreneurial type of leadership' (with a strong focus on 'self-management') for restructuring internal performance delivery processes in organisational terms. Accordingly, at least in terms of some general regulations the SSI model is making contract-based (and lastly even market-like) 'purchaser-provider relations' also the core concept for designing internal service delivery processes right across down the various levels or tiers of single SSPs. To establish such relations the model then firstly is requiring (notably as part of one of its 'implementation work stream' – of its 'performance and service management work stream') that overall values and missions are to be cascaded (down) into objectives of teams and individuals. In this regard – like with the demand side of a market-based type of exchange processes – the cascading principle (in conjunction with applying individual performance agreements) shall make sure that performance contributions from all the various lower levels are delivered in line with the demands of the top management (or the Principal respectively). Yet, to make this arrangement work the overall concept then is also demanding to set up recognition and reward systems powerful enough to enforce adequate levels of motivation and performance in each single case. More specifically, in line with its basically neo-classic (and in turn behaviouristic)

origins the concept then is following the idea to ensure adequate levels of achievement motivation by directly rewarding employees according to the amount of contributions or outputs accomplished.

In general, it is true that this model does not yet present any sort of a fully fledged 'one-size-fits-all' model for getting internal structures (and in turn concepts of leadership) adjusted to changing environmental conditions. Yet, as far as Principal-Agent concepts are followed for reshaping the overall management context it is nothing but consequent that at least in principle also rather some 'utility' or 'output-maximization' approaches have to come into play for adapting internal management practices and leadership concepts. Therefore, as far as the approach of strongly decentred 'purchaser- provider-relations' (or even a shift towards 'Internal markets') is applied for restructuring purposes there is the clear assumption that such an approach will only display its full range of efficiency enhancing effects, if it is supplemented by some more service or output-oriented concepts of personnel leadership at the same time. More specifically, from a design-oriented management science perspective (or in line with its basic 'consistency' argument) there are some good reasons to speculate that only turns to some more entrepreneurial concepts with their stress on 'economic self-regulated performance behaviour' will be able to unleash the necessary motivation that all the handed down 'property rights' will be used in full support of efficiency enhancing measures. Following such a track then all may come down to the question as to whether systems of reward and recognition can be implemented in a way according to which individual successes in using scarce resources will become dominant criterion for granting/ dispersing rewards of diverse quality. Though no fully detailed models may be presented here, there can be no doubt that options in favour of Principal-Agent concepts are offering a range of sound prescriptions for a further systematic extension of management changes.

3.2 Practices for Setting up an Overall Management Structure for Shared Services Providers

From our benchmark perspective the first step to take is to figure out the extent to which a thorough implementation of the SSI model is really leading to the set up of quite a new overall management structure. More specifically, the question is as to whether in the course of those changes a genuine transition towards a purchase-provider regime of service delivery is being carried through for achieving efficiency enhancing effects at the

government level at large. The most crucial question in this regard is then as to whether enough scope or competences (property rights across all the various fields of management) are being delegated to the decentred or outsourced SSP units to give them the chance (but also to hold them responsible) to get their service delivery adapted to demands and opportunities of a fluctuating environment. Thus, the way in which the new management framework is going to be implemented will also raise the pressure on those units to get their internal management structures and in turn leadership concepts adapted from an optimizing perspective.

3.2.1   Practices to Specify the Overall Governance Structure

In this regard, it may be true that the SSI at least in terms of its own model has been favouring a rather balanced whole of Government approach – an approach trying to unify the benefits from both decentralisation and centralisation right from the beginning. However, as far as practice is concerned arrangement are becoming apparent according to which the final say in nearly all the major management issues (for both the more strategic ones and the specific departmental ones is clearly left to the governing bodies of the upper departmental tiers – in other words with the 'father administrative units' each time). Due to this, given practices of breaking down the hitherto given highly vertically integrated departmental structure into series of single purchaser-provider-relations have definitely resulted in a rather top-down type of a governance structure.

From this, it may be true that the overall SSI approach has at least once aimed at establishing a more co-operative type of institutional arrangement (or even a competition-based type of purchaser-provider relationship) for strengthening efficiency of exchange relations between (hived off) Shared Service Provider units and their set of client-departments. Yet, for the time being notably the so-called C.E.O. governance committee (staffed with the C.E.O.s from the client departments and with some representatives from the Treasury) has attained all the necessary rights or competences to give binding directions on all issues to establish as well as to manage single Shared Services Provider units. From a more systematic view of allocating single fields of competences, this in line with common regulations has first of all led to the practice to assign all the competences to take the more strategic decisions to the C.E.O. governance committee at the apex of the overall governance structure. Moreover, even when it comes to the more operational aspects of establishing as well as running single SSP (in particular to fields such as funding, scoping and continuous performance improvement) those competences have not been handed down to the single SSP either (let alone in an undiluted way). On the contrary, to give the departments from the various client-department clusters the chance to

get their own corporate management service delivery expectations served in the way wanted those competences have become assigned to a further intermediate body – to the so called Governing Bodies or Boards of Directors (therefore typically staffed with top management people from the client-departments each time). In addition to that, some further supporting or advisory bodies have been put in place at the upper level (especially the SS Implementation Office with all its own Implementation Committees) for monitoring as well as reviewing the whole management build-up of single SSP on the basis of a raising number of implementation projects (by the way by also running a highly sophisticated Balanced Scorecard approach).

Taking all those regulations together, there certainly can be no debate that such a complex process of restructuring corporate management functions needs definitely some sort of central guidance. From this, it is more than consequent e.g. to give the cabinet the right to intervene (or more practical the 'final say'), if changes with a significant impact on the public sector workforce at large are becoming an issue. Still, on the other hand it does not come as a surprise that under those circumstances single SSP (notably their Executive Directors) are developing the feeling of not only being exposed to a rather highly regulated environment, but also of being locked in into a rather top-down type of a governance structure. Consequently, it may not be surprising either that those units are also about to develop the feeling of being a bit deprived of necessary rights or competences to operate as partners (or on a level playing field) in such a relationship.

3.2.2   Practices to Specify the (Initial) Scope of Services

According to this distribution of property rights (according to this rather top down type of a governance structure) it is first of all highly questionable as to whether single SSP will attain enough freedom for defining its own range of tasks ('defining the initial scope of services') in an adequate competitive manner.

Since those units are going to be exposed to an increasingly competitive environment at least in a long-term perspective, the question to raise is clearly as to whether they will be able to position themselves (also in relation to their potential private competitors) according to their own strengths and weaknesses each time. For setting up genuine purchaser-provider relationships it is definitely getting of crucial importance the extent to which single SSP units will be in a position to concentrate negotiations on the scope of their activities (specifying their performance contracts) primarily on the production of services from which they know to achieve best possible profit margins. In this regard, it is true that there are discussions to give these SSP units the freedom to make moves to so-

called 'fee-for-services' a bit later down the track – and in turn to let them specialize on services from which they can achieve net-benefits. However, according to the current rather top-down type of a governance structure the initial scope of services to be delivered is more or less strictly defined (and framed) according to the given demands of the client-departments each time. In this regard, it may be true that in this context these services are going to vary to some extent with reference to specific task requirements of single client-departments (e.g. with regard to their specific employment conditions etc.) Yet, following a rather classic corporate management service provision approach a more or less identical (or standardized) set of 'shared services' (covering typically Finance, Human Resources as well as Procurement) is being declared 'core services' of the service delivery processes of the SSP units.

Therefore, at least for the moment the scope of services provided is clearly not yet evolving from business planning activities (strategic planning) single SSP have to go for becoming able to survive in a growingly contested environment. At least for the time being the spectrum of services does not result from a carefully planned portfolio of services the single SSP are willing to produce for achieving highest possible per unit profit margin (or at least highest per unit cost recoveries). On the contrary, the spectrum of services to be provided is not yet determined by such 'market- forces' (by the interplay of 'supply and demand') but rather by hierarchical decisions single departments are going to take in the light of the support they feel needed for discharging their specific policy duties.

3.2.3   Practices to Specify Modes of Resource Utilization

However, the situation is aggravating insofar as under those conditions also only some very limited scope is given to the SSP to decide upon best possible courses in utilising (financial) resources.

Therefore, also in this regard it is highly questionable as to whether these units will be in a position to identify as well as to rely on most efficient input-mixes in generating service outputs according to the client-departments quality standards each time. Apart from further hampering conditions (such as the terms and conditions to employ personnel according to the Public Service Law) it is already becoming an issue in this regard that the SSP have not yet received the right to determine the set up of their own service delivery processes – in other words have not yet become 'process owners' (have not yet achieved 'process ownership'). As already outlined above, according to the stipulations of the overall SSI model there is rather the philosophy to get all the service delivery processes

organized in terms of highly standardized end-to-end customer business processes. The scope given to single SSP to decide upon the necessary inputs in a flexible way may then already be restricted as far as business process re-engineering methods (to write 'model business cases') are going to be applied for sorting out/ tying down standard cost-effective business solutions (for delivering human resource management services etc.) across the board.

In addition, their scope to organise optimal input-mixes are going to be restricted in that the way and extent to fund single services is not left to the single SSP unit either. Since those units have not yet achieved the status of self-funding units/ or cost-recovery units (status of 'resource ownership') all the expenses of single services are being covered by so-called quarantined payments paid by client-departments up front. From the view of client-departments the method to fund expenses by guaranteeing fixed amounts of 'quarantined payments' is surely providing a proven technique to keep resource consumption on the part of single SSP (and thereby also per unit costs to produce and to deliver corporate management services) under control. However, since this method can also result in a detailed assignment of budgets to single elements or stages of the overall 'supply chain' (to a detailed funding of factor inputs) this method then can clearly deprive all the single units of the opportunity to capitalize on the flexibilities of genuine decentred structures of budgeting to the full.

Lastly, to aggravate this there are restrictions also insofar as these units – as with the administration at large – are still lacking an accounting and pricing regime allowing for calculating 'pay offs' (the 'profitability') of alternative courses of actions (in monetary terms) on a comparative basis. In this respect, these units are still struggling hard to introduce some sort of an Activity Based Costing system with the help of which then (besides calculating 'full costs') the profitability of single activities can be specified in terms of superior cost-to-performance ratio. Since the SSP are still lacking an adequate control over the way how input-mixes can be organized in best possible economic terms, it is nothing but surprising that there are only very limited capacities available to get even the given initial scope of shared services produced and delivered in accordance with fluctuating opportunities of their environments (more precisely: with the fluctuating price-to- quantity ratios of their resource markets).

3.2.4 Practices to Specify Organisational Models

From all those regulations it is becoming apparent that the SSP are embedded into a highly regulated top-down type of a governance structure. Already from the given

distribution of property rights it is becoming obvious that all these regulations are still not aiming at introducing a genuine market or at least competition-driven type of purchaser-provider relations. On the contrary, for the time being (for this period of transition) rather a highly regulated non-competitive approach of outsourcing (in classic terms: of de-centralising) is followed for improving efficiency/ efficacy of corporate management service delivery processes. In accordance with this, a similar restricted delegation (more specifically: a limited bundling) of property rights is becoming apparent when it finally comes to the rights or competences to dispose of organisational means as crucial production factors – in other words to make use of varying decision-making or communication patterns as an extra 'input factor' for finding out best possible courses of action from a variety of different opportunities.

In this regard, it is true that all those different items to set up lively and in turn productive organisational units have been addressed a couple of times throughout the ongoing process of change. Thus, in line with modern organisation theory thinking especially the claim to create a some how commonly shared organisational culture has been made (at least in terms of an official 'rhetoric') central point of reference for design and implementation of single SSP. However, when it comes to questions of allocating respective rights or competences those rights to make use of organisational means in terms of an extra production factor are far from being delegated in an undiluted way – of being bundled up with the office of Executive Directors. In this regard, it is true that the Executive Directors (equivalents to C.E.O.s) have been given full responsibility for all the day-to-day routines in producing and delivering 'high excellent' corporate management services (by the way by also being nominated Chief Accounting Officer). However, taking the overall picture there can be no doubt that competences to decide upon organisational structures and processes have rather become dispersed across a larger number of groups or stakeholders. In this context, needless to say that in line with current organisational philosophies the attempt is made to apply some sort of a 'participatory approach' (holding that all 'the people concerned' (the workforce) are to be engaged into the design and implementation of organisational structures) for giving the whole process of organi-sational restructuring the nowadays needed legitimate outlook. However, when it comes to the practical regulations it is becoming more than evident that the final say in organisational matters is still clearly left to the representatives of the single client-departments in each single case. At the end of the day, decisions upon structures and processes can only be taken in close co-operation with the senior management of the single cluster of client-departments each time.

Nonetheless, even this kind of arrangement has already resulted into the set up of organisational patterns obviously fitting quite well into overall management changes carried through so far. In this regard, being held to operate under the regulations of a rather limited type of a contract-based purchaser-provider relationship no universal transfer of the market-mechanism for the purpose of structuring internal decision-making procedures and communication patterns can be expected. At least for the given period of transition no decision-making or communication pattern seems to be adequate primarily organising resource-utilization processes from the view of optimizing profit-to-loss relations. Under the given hybrid circumstances of service delivery rather models seem suited aiming at organising service delivery processes at levels of outputs or cost-to-performance relations as predefined by the client departments. Therefore, to meet those service delivery standards rather some approaches of the type of a 'learning organisation' are coming into play in the attempt to optimize organisational structures. Accordingly, restructurings are directed at setting up organisational structures in terms of an overall feedback loop – thereby constituting frames that service delivery can be monitored as well as adapted according to output standards of client-departments in continuous circles.

In this way, the given practices to set up a general management structure for Shared Services Providers are clearly not yet holding single units to adopt market type models for an internal structuring. As to be outlined, this overall change consequently is not holding single managers or employees either to position themselves as genuine intrapreneurs. Nonetheless, already the transfer to some sort of a learning- or output-type of an organisational model is going to place new challenges to optimize leadership practices.

3.3 Practices to Adjust the Internal Management Structure

Therefore, from a benchmarking perspective there is the other step to be taken to figure out as to whether given changes in the overall management framework are raising demands to get also components of the internal management structure adapted. In this regard, it is true that given changes are only aiming at setting up a rather limited version of a purchaser-provider regime of service delivery (primarily forwarding a non-competitive approach of outsourcing so far) for the time being. Yet, already this change of the management framework from a highly vertically-integrated departmental system towards a more customer-focused system is clearly placing inescapable needs or demands to develop as well as to establish better fitting internal management structures or leadership patterns. Thus, from a benchmarking perspective the ongoing moves to

implement the SSI are staying to be an epistemologically lucrative object for finding out as to whether overall management changes are followed by the design and implementation of some innovative as well as hopefully efficiency enhancing leadership practices.

3.3.1 Practices to Establish a Learning - or Output-Type of Organisation

Embarking upon an analysis of such practices there first of all may be no doubt that the large scale change of the overall management framework is raising the need for adapting organisational models and internal management structure or leadership concepts as well.

However, looking at those drivers in some more detail it is becoming apparent that all the single SSP feel themselves exposed to a situation with quite ambiguous or even conflicting demands and expectations. Accordingly, to get their internal structures right it has already become the most crucial issue in this regard as to whether those units will have to operate as decentred but non-contested entities within the wider public sector or whether they will become fully privatized at the end of the day. Moreover, SSP units are not only seeking for some stable objectives or clear cut orientations of this sort, but also feel themselves restricted in their freedom at least in principle in making their own choices in adapting their structures properly. As outlined, being embedded into a highly diversified rather top-down governance structure there is also the strong feeling on the part of single SSP that there is only left too little scope for making use of a more coherent or consistent approach of organisational renewal.

Though those units have to operate in an ambiguous situation like this, the given changes of the overall management structure are nonetheless pressing single SSP to adapt their inherited organisational structures. In this regard, it is becoming apparent that these SSP units at least feel themselves urged to take first steps in transferring their inherited classic bureaucratic structure (notably the approach to run corporate management service delivery in terms of divisions or branches in their father departments) into some sort of a learning or at least output- or customer focused organisation. It is true that given moves towards a rather contract-based purchaser-provider pattern of service provision clearly does not yet hold single SSP to fall back on genuine market-based concepts for adapting internal management structures – thereby applying market-type-like exchange or coordination modes (notably the price-mechanism) for structuring internal processes of resource utilization. Nonetheless, in line with the broader family of learning- or output-focused concepts attempts or practices are becoming apparent on the part of single SSP to turn the inherited classic hierarchical set up of decision-making and communication patterns into a more matrix-structure-like (if not loosely coupled) system of project groups and teams.

Accordingly, a rather flexible grouping of function-specific activities (the corporate management functions) along the given client-departments clusters is becoming core organizing principle of setting up the internal organisational structure. In this respect, it still remains to be seen as to whether ongoing projects to put down highly standardized end-to-end customer process solutions will have an impact on this organisation reshuffle as well. Never the less, from a more systematic point of view given practices to differentiate as well as to integrate activities on the basis of a highly flexible as well as decentralized matrix-type of organisation is clearly reflecting the attempt to bring internal resource utilization in line with desired outputs and quality standards of the client departments.

However, for becoming able to reap the full benefit from these changes also some adaptations or refinements of leadership concepts will become necessary. Consequently, in addition to the overall change of management structures these changes have to be complemented with some more fitting approaches as how to get individual performance capacities more purposively aligned with the requirements of a more learning- or output-type of organisation. In this respect, it is true that also some more complex approaches – such as a resource-based view of managing human resources or even social capital building approaches – have been made subject of broader discussions. Likewise, there is growing rhetoric around about the need to turn public servants into entrepreneurs – making a market-like 'self-management' on the part of public servants the root cause (the central lever) for an overall productivity improvement in the public sector. Nonetheless, the specifics of given changes do not seem to hold single SSP to follow genuine entrepreneurial concepts for restructuring leadership so far. Under given circumstances it rather seems suffice for single SSP to get leadership practices – in terms of an individual performance management – more closely integrated into the overriding -already given- cycles of an output-focused monitoring of performance at the organisational level. In accordance with the given mainstream (or the given policies at the Australian Commonwealth level) these practices are aiming at leveraging all the given skills and efforts of public servants by embedding their performance behaviour (via the use of individual performance agreements) into systems of cascaded performance planning on the one hand and a result-oriented rewards and recognition system on the other hand.

Though this might be controversial to some extent, at least in terms of practical developments 'leadership' is then not anymore so much dealing with leadership behaviour, personal growth or long-term development. From a rather narrow utility maximizing or resource management perspective 'leadership' is becoming turned into

approaches of 'Individual Performance Management' and eventually into approaches to strive for a best possible use of personnel as human resources.

3.3.2   Practices to Adjust Leadership in Terms of Performance Management

From a model point of view the SSI is aiming at achieving savings through increasing economies of scale as well as of scope and skill. Accordingly, all the SSP units are expected to deliver efficiency dividends of a mounting percentage already during the still ongoing process of transition. The main measure to secure such an efficiency enhancing effect is clearly seen in a turn to a service delivery model according to which single SSP are progressively held to produce and to deliver their services contract-based or even competition-driven within wider purchaser-provider relationships. For reaping all the benefit from this change such a change in the overall management structure then is clearly putting all the single SSP under pressure to adapt all their internal management systems in a consistent or fitting way as well. Therefore, being put under pressure to deliver efficiency enhancing effects these units are clearly on the move not only to turn their inherited rather bureaucratic and rule-driven type of internal organisation into a more output-focused model, but also to use concepts of 'Individual Performance Management' to get its leadership practices adapted in a hopefully suitable way.

From our own benchmarking perspective it is becoming apparent that all the SSP are being put into a situation according to which they feel themselves urged to explore some new or even innovative leadership practices for making better use of human resources – and in turn for producing services at higher levels of efficiency. Yet, from our benchmark perspective it equally becomes an issue that all those units do not feel themselves pressed yet to resort to market-concepts or genuine entrepreneurial approaches for responding to the overall changes in their management environment. On the contrary, at least for the time being raising challenges to become more efficient or cost-effective in terms of their clients` expectations are rather holding them to fall back on business-like and more strongly output-focused concepts or concepts of individual performance management. Nonetheless, coming at least basically from a 'utility maximizing perspective' these adjustments are going to result in attempts to use also both 'goal-setting procedures' and some more strongly 'result-based rewards' for directing individual performance behaviour towards levels of desired efficiency. In any case, to meet these new challenges the SSI is following the traditional management philosophy (or planning philosophy) that better monitoring (or the use of better instruments) is always going together with achieving better results.

Therefore, from a benchmark perspective the issue at stake is the way in which single SSP are succeeding in making approaches or practices of individual performance management a proven mean for a more effective use of human resources – and in turn a management instrument for leveraging efficiency or effectiveness of service delivery. More specifically, being under pressure to adapt its internal management structure it is becoming an issue whether those units are really succeeding in making sure that this sort of redirecting performance behaviour is not only ending up in higher levels of control (to levels of intensified control) but is leading also and foremost to higher levels of outputs or efficiency.

Practices to Monitor Performance Behaviour

From its own philosophy a very first step of those performance management concepts is clearly to make sure that individual performance behaviour can become aligned more rigorously with the pursuit of customer objectives.

Accordingly, some very crucial parts of the implementation activities of all the SSP are deliberately aiming at developing ways and means to get individual performance contributions more targeted at the accomplishment of overall customer objectives. More or less in line with some classic approaches (such as the PPBS, the various Financial Management Initiatives and the more recent Australian Commonwealth approach of an Output-Outcome Management Framework) the attempt is made on the part of single SSP to get all the higher level objectives (starting with the more strategic ones at the top management level) cascaded into performance targets of the next lower levels of operating units or even single managers or employees. In making use of this cascading approach (either in terms of the well known top-down or bottom-up techniques) single units have already succeeded in also aligning individual performance efforts more strongly with the pursuit of higher level programme priorities. In addition to that, to achieve an adequate monitoring capacity in this respect those SSP are already about to use cascaded objectives of that sort as central criteria for producing individual performance planning as well as performance appraisals - though this is only happening in terms of some rather process-oriented indicators - such as timeliness etc. - for the moment. However, for the time being this approach seems already proving sufficient for directing performance contributions in a purposively staged way across all the levels down (down to the level of single teams or project groups) at the implementation of the now necessary corporate management service processes (for the time being as put down with the various 'Implementation work streams' such as Business Processes, Information and Communication Technology etc.).

Following this performance management approach it is true that there are already some attempts under way for monitoring as well as adapting performance behaviour on the basis of some clear-cut as well as informative criteria. As being hold to re-position its own service delivery in the context of purchaser-provider relations in particular attempts are being made on the part of single SSP to lay the ground for developing clearly defined cost-to-performance measures for monitoring purposes (albeit always in collaboration with the SS Implementation Office). In this regard, it is true that there are also projects under way to fully implement the Queensland government-wide approach of an Output-Outcome Financial Management Framework - thereby aiming at making lower level operational units - such as teams and project groups - more fully responsible for deploying and utilizing resources in the course of service provision. What is counting more in this respect is that there are currently projects under way to further introduce (accrual) cost accounting and pricing systems – in particular in terms of an Activity Based Costing System giving thereby the opportunity to calculate as well as to assign 'full costs' (including depreciations) along all the single activities of fully structured end-to-end customer service provision processes (value chains). Lastly, being under pressure to become more client-focused also attempts are made to introduce some manageable (micro-economic) indicators or yardsticks for appraising as well as adapting service delivery results according to the given or changing expectations of the various stakeholders of SSP units. Though, some more refinements will still become necessary in this regard it is worth noting that some SSP are about to explore as how measures of 'operating expenses by function per employee' can be applied for monitoring purposes in this respect.

Taking stock of all these activities there can be no denying that already some very important measures have been taken for giving single SSP the capacity to deliver services in terms of gradually optimized cost-to-performance ratios. In applying a rather rigorous performance management it is becoming apparent that also a somewhat changing approach of leadership is clearly operating as success factor in bringing about per-formance contributions at improving cost-to-performance levels. However, having a closer look at all this there is the question as to whether all those changes/ practices have also given enough scope or flexibility to single SSP for adapting their service delivery to the requirements of a still possible more pronounced change to a market- or competition-driven environment. In this regard it is still a crucial issue the extent to which budgetary competences are going to be handed down to single SSP – to give them genuine 'ownership' in financial matters for letting them organise their own optimal input-output-relations in service provision. More specifically, it is still an issue to give SSP scope

allowing for organising their input-output-relations of service delivery at levels of continuously increasing revenues or an increasing surplus. In this regard, it especially has to be worked out the extent to which teams or single managers ('case managers') shall be made responsible for singling out alternatives with best possible 'pay offs' in serving client departments expectations even under changing conditions. Most crucially in this regard is the question as to whether lower levels (including single managers) will have to become authorized to negotiate on their own for the details of its service level agreements with their purchaser- departments.

Therefore, dependent on the rather final shape the overall management structure of the SSI (the purchaser-provider -relations) will find it cannot be ruled out that further capacities have to be developed for delivering service programmes also in a somewhat more market-or at least competition-driven environment. For not putting both efficiency and quality of its own service provision at risk the extent to which further adjustments will fall due has to be regarded the most crucial issue for all restructurings still to come.

Practices to Monitor Performance/ Achievement Motivation

Though this is all still in a transitory period – from an efficiency enhancing point of view there is not only the need to enable single SSP to get the performance behaviour of their workforces more effectively aligned with the pursuit of outputs and quality standards of their client departments. On the contrary, to reap the benefits from all the envisaged changes to a more fully outsourced unit there clearly is the need to adjust all the further generic HRM practices as well – in particular its motivation function. Therefore, a second step in getting especially leadership practices adjusted is not only anymore to redirect performance behaviour (notably the underlying cognitive capabilities) at the pursuit of overall objectives, but also to generate adequate levels of achievement motivation on the part of the workforce to produce such a behaviour. Consequently, from a concept point of view also in this case then the whole spectrum of either intrinsic or extrinsic motivational means is becoming a subject of debate in setting up proven HRM practices in this regard. However, following a rather rigorous performance management track under the given circumstances it does not come as a surprise that questions of pay or compensation – notably of merit pay – are going to play a prominent role in all attempts to use HRM functions as means to foster a more cost-effective delivery of corporate management services.

As being exposed to a rather risky large scale organisational change (in particular being put at risk of becoming 'privatized' and thereby abolished or obsolete at the end of the

day) there is already the challenge as how to keep the workforce of single SSP motivated to follow that at large. Accordingly, from a planned organisation change perspective there are already quite a few projects underway for getting the workforce as a whole adequately involved in the ongoing process of implementing the SSI. From this perspective there is already the policy to grant a maximum of employment security (to all permanent, temporary as well as casual positions) for giving employees also the necessary psychological freedom to take part into or even support such an enterprise like this. In line with this, lots of training as well as development measures have been put in place explicitly in order to let the workforce acquire the necessary skills and knowledge to deal with the new requirements of corporate service provision in the desired more professional manner (or to increase their system-wide employability). Further, there are some projects underway to offer all these employees some solid/ long-term professional perspectives on a wider scale by restructuring as well as reconsolidating corporate management service delivery in terms of some genuine career tracks. Lastly, as already mentioned above even some classic organisational development approaches have come into use again for generating some sort of a commonly shared organisational culture or vision. By way of setting up a variety of networks, forums as well as reference groups also in this case the approach has been taken to let employees participate into all crucial design activities for getting them committed more closely to the overall mission – and eventually to make them deliver at least at satisfactory levels of outputs and quality.

Whereas SSP seem to be quite successful in making the workforce follow the changes at a whole of system level, there are still some very severe deficiencies to overcome in getting leadership practices adjusted adequately on the individual or inter-active level. From a philosophical stand performance management approaches of that sort clearly requiring single SSP to offer monetary rewards (merit pay) in a staged (piece-rated but progressive) way to make employees to strive for best possible performance results from the view of their own utility maximizing interests. In this regard, it is true that visible progress has already been made in incorporating process-focused, if not result-based performance indicators into the monitoring as well as appraising of individual performance processes. However, on the other hand no extra monetary awards are available for the management to address those individual utility maximizing tendencies for improving their motivation to perform – for shifting performance to higher levels of efficiency and quality. Due to a quite restrictive whole-of-government approach in this regard none of those SSP units is in a position to apply any sort of a merit pay (let alone boni) for triggering higher levels of achievement motivation – and eventually higher rates of cost-effectiveness in service delivery. Though, merit pay in all its aspects is still quite a controversial issue among the

top level management, the management of single SSP is- from their own view – suffering from a big lack in instruments to give their own employees` performance behaviour a stronger output-orientation. For the time being, the only mean left in this regard is to use job (re-) evaluation (especially below the S.O. level) for both attracting and retaining talented people (in particular for the level of project manager). Due to this lack (or shortage) the management of these units is rather resorting to the other category of non-monetary rewards or intrinsic rewards. Since the management of these units has also been officially requested to put in place extra non-monetary reward systems, an increasing variety of different measures has become applied in the meantime - ranging sometime from granting days-off to letting employees take part in some social events or functions. The most innovative way to deal with those problems seems to be to earn extra revenue by selling a growing amount of special non-core activities (e.g. some additional IT services) – from which then extra training measures can be funded to increase employability (and consequently transferability) of its own staff.

Though there has been made some progress in speeding up the overall process of implementing the SSI at the system level, there is still the challenge to overcome some severe constraints in activating performance behaviour on an individual level. In this regard, it is true that given measures are already falling short of handing down adequate scope of action (e.g. resource autonomy) in order to give the performance behaviour of employees or managers a genuine entrepreneurial looking shape – and in this way to get it adapted to a more competition- or even market-driven environment. However, what is mattering more for the moment is that there is even a severe lack in adequate HRM instruments (a lack if adequate incentives) to get individual performance at least a bit more strongly directed at the pursuit of higher scales of outputs and quality.

4   Provisional Assessment

In a last step benchmarking analysis is aiming at using produced evidence for drawing 'better' or 'best practices' to adapt structure and processes of management.

Being at the 'frontline' (vanguard) to adapt structure and processes of management to changing service conditions the SSI can definitely be considered a 'best-of class' case (a very lucrative subject of enquiry) from which 'best practices' in developing innovative patterns of leadership can be drawn. More specifically, indicating this approach as one of

the most advanced approaches to revamp structure and processes of management (notably by re-organizing hierarchically shaped service delivery structures in terms of purchaser-provider-relations) such restructurings can also be applied for shedding some light on requisites to get leadership practices adapted in an optimized way. Consequently, making respective restructurings the main subject of our enquiry the foregoing analysis has already been in a position to reveal as how individual performance management approaches are becoming crucial levers to adapt leadership practices to changing service delivery conditions. At least in terms of a tendency also in this case there is evidence that (apart from all official 'rhetoric') notably economic concepts of 'self-management/ self-regulation' (thereby a stronger reliance on goal-setting procedures as well as on result-based rewards) seem to be best suited to support transitions towards a stronger market-like type of service delivery system (towards a competition-driven type of contract management).

However, following the methodology of benchmark analysis the ranking of the SSI as a 'best-of-class' case does not mean that all the given findings have necessarily to be evaluated as 'best practices' or 'success factors' in adapting leadership practices. On the contrary, as outlined with the introductory remarks also in this case given evidence has first been assessed against some conceptual premises before being used for drawing respective conclusions. Consequently, in line with our own conceptual considerations given evidence has to be assessed against some very basic assumptions or prescriptions of mainstream design-oriented management sciences- against the well known 'fit' and/ or 'consistency' requirements in designing and implementing effective management change processes. More specifically, at this point the crucial criterion is coming into play that an adequate range of consistency has to be reached among the diverse reform or design activities for becoming able to drive management change processes at levels of highest possible efficacy. In more operational terms then, from this perspective 'fits' or functionally supporting relationships have to be created between the various components for making the overall (the then fully fledged) management change work at higher levels of efficiency or cost-effectiveness.

However, grabbing such a simple criterion it already becomes apparent that the current process of implementing the SSI is in fact suffering from some remarkable shortages or mis-matches of that kind.

1) Therefore, in bringing about such an assessment there is first of all (from a whole-of-government perspective) to be taken into consideration:

- that there can be no doubt that the SSI – in terms of the purchaser-provider management model – is definitely presenting a fairly clear cut model (a set of precisely defined instructions) for the restructuring of all the corporate management services provision on the whole of government level!

- but that for whatever reason the extent to which single Shared Services Provider are going to become outsourced at the end of the day remains fairly vague (whether this is going to stay a rather non-competitive (solely contract-based) form of outsourcing or whether the whole initiative is going to result in a genuine competition- or even market-driven form)!

- so that as a consequence there is the raising feeling on the part of single SSP of being exposed to some sort of a hybrid situation – and eventually hampered in taking unambiguous decisions with regard to their own internal restructuring (what sometimes can even mean to be hold to turn back to already past developments)!

2) To carry through such an assessment is then also bringing to light (at the system level of single SSP):

- that under those circumstances there is no doubt that all the single SSP (partly by following upper level reform concepts) are being required to get their all their service delivery models re-positioned within the frame of an overall ongoing turn to a purchaser-provider type of management at the whole of government level!

- but that according to the vagueness or ambiguities of the overall management policies given practices to hand down 'property rights' have not yet gone far enough (across the fields of scoping, funding as well as human resources) to enable single SSP to adapt their own internal management structures in a consistent way to their new role of a service provider – or to give them the chance to capitalize on the benefits of a fully decentralized service provider!

- that this may have led to the perception or feeling on the part of single SSP of being embedded into an overregulated as well as at least partly contradictory environmental setting – at any rate of being embedded into a governance structure hampering them to take best possible (innovative) decisions with regard to their own overall re-positioning (let alone the problem as how to motivate a workforce exactly knowing the risk to become obsolete in case of further turns to a full privatization)!

3) Lastly, as far as the level of internal adjustments is concerned there is to note:

–   that by making use of the given scope all those single SSP are struggling hard to adapt their internal management structures to the changing challenges of a new management environment!

–   though this has not yet resulted into another fully fledged model – there are indications that those units use some turns to a learning-and/ or output-focused type of organisational model for responding to the raising demand to become more efficient and cost-effective!

–   that in this context then especially practices from the classic performance management approach have been applied to bring also inherited leadership practices (the most crucial lever to translate changing requirements into performance behaviour) more strongly in line with the functional requirements of a more output-focused internal management structure!

–   but that given restrictions from various levels does not allow single SSP to adapt both of the basic leadership functions – the goal-setting function and the motivating function – in an internally consistent way – und thereby in an genuine efficiency enhancing way!

From all this then it becomes apparent that there are lots of innovative approaches underway to implement a new service delivery model for providing corporate management services. In addition, it also becomes evident that already current overall changes towards an at least contract-based type of a purchaser-provider model are urging SSP to embark on exploring new or innovative concepts or practices in leadership – at least in terms of a more thorough individual performance management. Yet, since all those changes have not yet reached an adequate level of consistency (neither vertically in relation to the overall management structure nor horizontally amongst the different components itself) there seem to be some very good reasons at least to speculate that under given circumstances the potentials of a management reform – and in particular leadership reform are only be underutilized. Therefore, it should not seem to be too farfetched to expect that those inconsistencies or mis-matches will come down to raising efficiency losses – in the short run most likely to raising rates of overall turn-over or in decreasing chances to attract or to retain talented people. Since, from our point of view inconsistencies or mis-matches are being hold responsible for those deficiencies, the way

out should definitely be in bringing about more co-ordinated designs in both the vertical and horizontal structuring of the overall management change.

One way to reach this would be clearly to get those units more fully exposed to market-conditions and in turn to let them compete with a range of private providers.

Endnotes

[1] All data becoming relevant in this contribution were collected during a research visit the author had the chance to carry through (with the kind support of the Queensland Public Service Commission) at the SSI Office and some Shared Service Provider Units in the months from January to April 20005 (for further details and proof please see the web: www.sharedservices.qld.gov.au).

List of Tables

Table 1: Best Practices in Complementing Management Changes with suitable Leadership Concepts

1) Optimizing decentralized service delivery

Strategic Management

Balanced Scorecard Approach Change

5) Making managers to design their desired career advancements depending on their willingness to generate surplus

Base pay

Merit increments

Boni

2) Managers as self-responsible Entrepreneurs

Concepts/ Skills/ Behaviours of Self-management

Delegating Property Rights

Goal-Setting/

3) Self-operating semi-autonomous Workplace Units

Teams

4) Making managers to negotiate on their cost-to-performance agreements

Outputs and Quality

Pricing/ per unit costs

Target setting

Source: Own depiction

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Udo Rienaß

Ansätze einer geänderten Verwaltungssteuerung in der Praxis

1   Vorbemerkung

Obwohl sich gerade in den letzten Jahren insbesondere in der Wissenschaft die kritischen Stimmen mehren, die nur eine in Ansätzen gelungene Verwaltungsmodernisierung in Deutschland erkennen (vgl. Wollmann 1999; Klages 2003), oder gar ein Versagen des ‚Neuen Steuerungsmodells' beschreiben (vgl. Kuhlmann 2006), lassen sich doch auch konkrete und praktische Umsetzungsergebnisse aufzeigen (vgl. Rienaß 2004a).

Sicher handelt es sich bei diesen Ergebnissen nicht immer um den großen Wurf und in großen Verwaltungseinheiten schon gar nicht um in sich konsistente und durchgängige Veränderungen. Aber vielleicht liegt hierin auch das Problem der Reformmüdigkeit bzw. des Reformunwillens (vgl. Röber 2000), weil immer nur fundamentale Veränderungen gefordert und öffentlich wahrgenommen werden wollen. Wer diese dann aber nicht oder nicht sofort erzielt, wird auch schnell mutlos und verharrt beim Bestehenden, dem bisher Bekannten. Andererseits zeigen die praktischen Beispiele (vgl. Rienaß 2004a), dass Verwaltungsmodernisierung immer dann erfolgreich verläuft, wenn „die Führungskräfte diesen Prozess unterstützen" und „selbst zu Agenten des Wandels (…) werden" (Hill 2006a, S. 9). Dazu ist es aber auch erforderlich, die Modernisierungsaktivitäten nicht isoliert zu gestalten, sondern in die originäre Verwaltungsarbeit zu integrieren (vgl. Rienaß 2002).

Dies erfordert klare Konzepte, Gestaltungswillen der Führungskräfte und Beschäftigten aller Ebenen, aber auch den Mut zum Experimentieren und zugleich auch den ‚Mut zur Lücke'. Hierzu ist es erforderlich, dass das Organisationsklima stimmt und sich der Schwerpunkt der Veränderungen nicht allein auf Strukturveränderungen mit Ressourcen-einsparungen beschränkt, sondern sich insbesondere auch auf Kulturveränderungen richtet (vgl. Reichard 2006; Rienaß 2004b). Dabei spielen nicht nur die großen kulturellen Kontexte eine Rolle, vielmehr kommt es auch auf die jeweilige organisationsspezifische Kultur an (vgl. Hill 2006b). Behörden, Ämter, Abteilungen, ja sogar Referate und Sachgebiete haben ihre jeweils eigene Kultur, die gerade bei Veränderungsaktivitäten zu berücksichtigen ist.

Der folgende Beitrag beleuchtet erste praktische Ansätze einer geänderten Verwaltungs-steuerung im Geschäftsbereich der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres Berlin.[1] Hierbei beschränkt er sich auf praktische Erfahrungen in den Organisationseinheiten im Politik-

feld ‚Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten' sowie in den Querschnittsfeldern ‚Organisationsmanagement' und ‚Personalmanagement'.[2] Es werden schwerpunktmäßig das Steuerungsverhältnis und –verständnis zwischen der zuständigen Ministerialverwaltung zu den ihr nachgeordneten Sonderbehörden, aber auch ein ganzheitliches Steuerungsverständnis, das auf eine wirkungsorientierte Betrachtung zielt, dargestellt. Der Beitrag zeigt daneben auf, dass es in der Umsetzung und insbesondere in der Fläche noch große Lücken gibt, dennoch soll mit ihm verdeutlicht werden, dass eine veränderte Verwaltungssteuerung möglich und erfolgreich ist; sie muss nur konsequent gewollt und umgesetzt werden.

2 Verwaltungssteuerung in der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres Berlin

2.1 Struktur

Zur Senatsverwaltung für Inneres gehören aktuell vier Ministerialabteilungen[3], sechs Sonderbehörden[4] und zwei Anstalten öffentlichen Rechts[5].

Das Politikfeld ‚Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten' wird im Wesentlichen von der Abteilung Zentraler Service (ZS) sowie dem Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten und die Querschnittsfelder ‚Organisationsmanagement' sowie ‚Personalmanagement' werden im Wesentlichen ebenfalls von der Abteilung ZS und dem Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin bearbeitet.

Der ‚Abteilung Zentraler Service' obliegen insgesamt landes- und ressortweite sowie hausinterne Querschnittsaufgaben (Personal, Haushalt, Organisation, Informationstechnik). Das ‚Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten'[6] erledigt die zentralen Aufgaben des Einwohnerwesens und ist Entschädigungs-, Kraftfahrzeugzulassungs-, Fahrerlaubnis- und Ausländerbehörde. Das ‚Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin' ist Dienstleister für Personalverwaltung (Personalstelle, Berechnung und Zahlbarmachung der Bezüge, Beihilfe, Versorgung) sowie Logistik (Beschaffungen, Post, Fuhrpark).

2.2   Grundzüge der Steuerung

Sonderbehörden und nichtrechtsfähige Anstalten der Hauptverwaltung unterliegen der Fachaufsicht der zuständigen Senatsverwaltung. Dabei erstreckt sich „die Fachaufsicht (…) auf die recht- und ordnungsmäßige Erledigung der Aufgaben und auf die zweckentsprechende Handhabung des Verwaltungsermessens. In Ausübung der Fachaufsicht kann der Aufsichtsführende erforderlichenfalls a) Auskünfte, Berichte, die Vorlage von Akten und sonstigen Unterlagen fordern und Prüfungen anordnen (Informationsrecht), b) Einzelweisungen erteilen (Weisungsrecht) und c) eine Angelegenheit an sich ziehen, wenn eine erteilte Einzelweisung nicht befolgt wird (Eintrittsrecht)" (§ 8 Gesetz über die Zuständigkeiten in der Allgemeinen Berliner Verwaltung (Allgemeines Zuständigkeitsgesetz – AZG) i.d.F. vom 22. Juli 1996, GVBl. Berlin 1996, S. 302).

Obwohl in dieser traditionellen Form gesteuert,[7] hat das Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten bereits im Jahre 1999 damit begonnen, eine wirkungsorientierte Steuerung über Ziele, Kennzahlen und Leistungsvergleiche zu entwickeln (vgl. Rienaß 2004a). Dabei hat sich das Amt in die Diskussionen zur Entwicklung eines Zielsystems eingebracht und eine über die bisherige traditionelle und aufbauorganisatorische Betrachtung hinausgehende leistungsstrangbezogene Steuerung über Zielvereinbarungen über verschiedene Ebenen eingefordert, musste sich jedoch mit den Widerständen des dienst- und fachaufsichtsführenden Ministeriums auseinandersetzen, die nur durch das aktive Einschreiten der jeweiligen Staatssekretäre überwunden werden konnten (vgl. Rienaß 2004b, S. 250).

Nunmehr haben sich seit dem Jahr 2004 das Zielvereinbarungsmanagement und das Berichtswesen zwischen der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und dem Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten sowie dem Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin etabliert. Hierbei orientieren sich alle beteiligten Verwaltungseinheiten und -ebenen an aufeinander abgestimmten Zielen. Die Ziele werden zentral vorgegeben und in dezentraler Fach- und Ressourcenverantwortung operationalisiert. Die Zielerreichung je Verantwortungsbereich und -ebene wird vierteljährlich und systematisch überprüft. Damit können fundierte Entscheidungen auf Basis der entwickelten Kennzahlen getroffen werden.

Die bisherigen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die abgeschlossenen Zielvereinbarungen mit den Sonderbehörden und das ihnen folgende Berichtswesen keineswegs die Fachaufsicht

ersetzen, sondern vielmehr nützliche Instrumente der Fachaufsicht sind (vgl. Hansmann 2006).

2.3 Bisherige Zielerreichung

Während dieses Steuerungssystem in den Senatsverwaltungen des Landes Berlin - so auch im unmittelbaren ministeriellen Bereich der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres selbst - weitgehend noch nicht etabliert werden konnte,[8] lassen sich gerade in der veränderten Steuerung der Sonderbehörden Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten und Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin positive Ergebnisse verzeichnen.

Auf der Grundlage der jährlich abgeschlossenen Zielvereinbarungen zwischen den Behördenleitern und dem Staatssekretär der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres (vgl. Rienaß 2004a) werden Quartalsberichte erstellt, deren Kennzahlen in aggregierter Form der Aufsichtsbehörde vorgelegt und von dieser ausgewertet werden. Signifikante Auffälligkeiten sind sodann Inhalt der regelmäßigen Gespräche zwischen dem Staatssekretär und den Behördenleitern. Dieses Vorgehen ermöglicht frühzeitiges planvolles und kompetentes ‚Gegensteuern' und trägt somit unmittelbar zur Zielerreichung bei.

Obwohl über diese neue Steuerung trotz drastischer Ressourcenverknappung[9] sichtbare Verbesserungen in der Ergebnissen erzielt werden konnten und sich dieses System damit zwischenzeitlich nicht nur in der Steuerung des Landesamtes für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten bewährt hat (vgl. Rienaß 2004a, 2004b), sondern auch erfolgreich auf das Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin übertragen werden konnte und auch die aufsichtsführende Abteilung des Ministeriums einbezieht, wird aber immer wieder der Aufwand und Umfang der Berichterstattung thematisiert. Dabei ist unstreitig, dass über diese Art der Steuerung und somit auch des Controllings verschiedene Informationen zu den jeweiligen strategischen und operativen Zielen gebündelt werden können (vgl. Frerichs/ Hildebrand 2001), allerdings muss auch immer wieder verdeutlicht werden, dass das Steuern mit eindimensionalen Kennzahlen nicht ausreicht (vgl. Schäfer/ Burger/ Sieg 2006).

Eine Konzentration auch trotz knapper Kassen allein auf Haushalts- und Kostenrechnungsdaten ist zu kurz gegriffen und führt nicht zu den gewünschten Ergebnissen (Wirkungen). Deshalb legt das in der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres eingeführte Berichtswesen auch einen besonderen Wert auf Leistungsdaten zu den Wirkungsebenen Auftrags-

erfüllung, Kundenzufriedenheit, Mitarbeiterzufriedenheit, Wirtschaftlichkeit und auf deren Wechselwirkungen (vgl. Rienaß 2004a, 2004b).

Allerdings ist auch Brüggemeier (2004, S. 387f.) zuzustimmen, der beim Verwaltungs-controlling vor „Einheitsmodellen" und „geschlossenen Ansätzen in der Verwaltungssteu-erung warnt und stattdessen fordert, dort eine ziel- und wirkungsorientierte Steuerung zu etablieren, wo „eine Erhöhung der Effektivität ,zugleich'[10] Effizienzverbesserungen (…) bewirkt". Andersherum heißt dies, die ziel- und wirkungsorientierte Steuerung muss zugleich beide Ergebnistypen ,im Auge' haben und zumindest eine Gleichrangigkeit an-streben. Diese Herangehensweise führt nicht nur zu Erfolgen in den jeweiligen Verwaltungsorganisationen, sondern schafft zugleich Transparenz und somit auch Akzeptanz einerseits bei den Beschäftigten und andererseits bei den politisch Verantwortlichen.

Gerade in den beiden in der Vergangenheit wegen langer Bearbeitungs- und Wartezeiten – auch öffentlich – kritisierten Behörden Landesverwaltungsamt und Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten hat diese Art der Steuerung mit der dahinter liegenden Steuerungsphilosophie zu signifikanten Verbesserungen für die Kunden der jeweiligen Verwaltungsleistungen geführt. So konnten beispielsweise die Bearbeitungszeit von Beihilfeanträgen von 6 bis 8 Wochen auf durchschnittlich 14 Arbeitstage und die Warte-zeiten in der Kfz-Zulassungsstelle von über 4 Stunden auf durchschnittlich 20 Minuten reduziert werden.

Diese Daten aus den regelmäßigen Berichten an das aufsichtsführende Ministerium fließen auch in die Berichterstattungen des Senats an das Parlament ein und haben zu einem deutlichen Imagewandel der beteiligten Sonderbehörden sowohl im Parlament als auch in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung beigetragen. Das Verfahren vereinfacht auch das Berichtswesen insgesamt, da für die Parlamentsberichterstattung nicht regelmäßig neue Daten oftmals sehr arbeitsintensiv generiert werden müssen.

2.4   Erfolgreiche Entwicklung der Berliner Bürgerämter durch ganzheitliche Steuerung

Die vorstehenden Ergebnisse verdeutlichen, dass unmittelbare positive Wirkungen einer veränderten Verwaltungssteuerung nicht nur in der Binnenmodernisierung, sondern gerade in der Kundenorientierung zu erzielen sind. Besonders deutlich wird dies bei den

Bürgerämtern, die in der Bearbeitung dem Prinzip ‚Alles aus einer Hand' folgen und bei denen es in der Organisation zu einer Trennung von ‚Backoffice' und ‚Frontoffice' kommt (Klages 2006a).

Wie in vielen anderen Bundesländern und Kommunen wurden daher bereits 1998 auch in Berlin für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger erste Dienstleistungszentren - Bürgerämter - errichtet. Als Stadtstaat hat Berlin einen zweistufigen Verwaltungsaufbau.[11] Die Einrichtung und Entwicklung der Berliner Bürgerämter liegt in der Verantwortung der Bezirke. Da aber für alle Bürgerinnen und Bürger Berlins ein einheitliches und hochwertiges Dienstleistungsspektrum zur Verfügung stehen soll, bedarf es einer zielgerichteten Steuerung oberhalb der bezirklichen Verantwortung, die dieses sichern soll. Darauf soll im Folgenden speziell eingegangen werden.

Das Land Berlin verfolgt die Strategie, gesamtstädtische einheitliche Rahmenbedingungen für Bürgerdienste zu entwickeln. Als Orientierung wurden vom Abgeordnetenhaus[12] Eckwerte vorgegeben, wie:

– das Bürgeramt als zentrale Anlaufstelle,

– Erweiterung der Öffnungszeiten,

– landesweite Zuständigkeit,

– Mobile Bürgerämter,[13]

– Allzuständigkeitsprinzip,

– Erhöhung der Servicequalität (u.a. einmaliges Vorsprechen).

Derzeit arbeiten mehr als 700 Bürgerberaterinnen und Bürgerberater in 61 Bürgerämtern in Berlin. Sie bieten den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern zu mehr als 50 Dienstleistungen (in einigen Bezirken optional zu weiteren 20) Beratung und Bearbeitung aus einer Hand an. Das Leistungsangebot und die Servicequalität der Dienstleistungen in den Bürgerämtern wurden in einem landesweiten Monitoring im Jahr 2005 untersucht, an dem sich alle 12 Bezirke beteiligten.[14] In der Gesamtbewertung der Monitoringergebnisse sind folgende zusammenfassende Aussagen getroffen worden:

– Im Kundenmonitor werden die Berliner Bürgerämter insgesamt zu 77 % positiv bewertet;

– die Servicemerkmale werden auf einer Skala von 1 = „sehr zufrieden" bis 5 = „sehr unzufrieden" folgendermaßen bewertet: Bearbeitungszeit = 1,67; Leistungsangebot = 2,06; Erreichbarkeit = 2,29; Öffnungszeiten = 2,09 und Wartezeiten = 2,22;

– die Öffnungszeiten der Bürgerämter bewerten die Bürgerinnen und Bürger zu 33,28 % mit „sehr gut" und zu 34,64 % mit gut;

– immerhin 10,8 % der Befragten geben eine Wartezeit von zwei Stunden und länger an;

– nur ca. 6 % der Befragten haben die Möglichkeit der Terminvereinbarung genutzt, obwohl ca. 47 % der Befragten angaben, diesen Service zu kennen und

– die Freude an ihrer Arbeit im Bürgeramt bewerten die Beschäftigten mit 2,07.

Die Ergebnisse zeigen einerseits eine hohe Zufriedenheit der Bürgerinnen und Bürger, aber auch noch bestehende Qualitätsunterschiede zwischen den bezirklichen Bürgerämtern.

Zwischen der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, dem Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten sowie den Bezirken wurde eine zweite Stufe des Monitorings eingeleitet, die eine kritische Überprüfung der bisherigen umfangreichen Kennzahlen (Ziel: Reduzierung des Berichts), auch hinsichtlich ihrer Steuerungsrelevanz ebenso wie eine berlinweite Auswertung der bisherigen Ergebnisse (Ziel: Best-Practice-Beispiele) unter Berücksichtigung der bezirksbezogenen Auswertung vorsieht.

Mit dem Ziel, diesen erfolgreichen landesweiten Kennzahlenvergleich permanent fortzuführen, wird von der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres gemeinsam mit den Bezirken und dem Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten ein kontinuierlicher Steuerungskreislauf eingeführt, der die Grundzüge ‚Ziele planen und vereinbaren' und ‚Zielerreichung messen und bewerten' berücksichtigt.

Die weitere Entwicklung der Bürgerämter zu modernen Dienstleistern wird mit folgendem strategischen Ziel zusammengefasst: Bürgerfreundliche und dienstleistende Stadt, d.h. allgemeine Dienstleistungen und Informationen sind aktuell, vollständig, schnell, ver-

ständlich, lebenslagenbezogen, barrierefrei, auf verschiedenen Vertriebswegen, zu sachgerechten Gebühren, einheitlich und mit landesweiter Zuständigkeit anzubieten.

An dieser Zielstellung sind alle Aktivitäten der beteiligten Verwaltungseinheiten auf den verschiedenen Hierarchie- bzw. Steuerungsebenen (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten, Bezirkliche Bürgerämter) auszurichten. Dabei stehen alle Ebenen vor der Herausforderung, verschiedene Formen der Arbeitsteilung miteinander zu kombinieren, um den unterschiedlichen Anliegen gerecht zu werden (vgl. Brüggemeier/ Röber 2002, S. 141). Das praktizierte Steuerungssystem mit Zielsystem, Zielvereinbarungen, Berichtswesen übernimmt dabei die koordinierende Funktion. Allen Akteuren werden dabei bestimmte Rollen zugewiesen, die nur bei ‚richtigem Zusammenspiel' zum Gesamterfolg führen.

Die ‚Senatsverwaltung für Inneres' übernimmt mit der Festlegung und Auslegung der strategischen Ziele eine Führungsrolle für alle beteiligten Verwaltungseinheiten. Sie leitet aus der politischen Schwerpunktsetzung die Maßstäbe (Mindeststandards) für den bürgernahen Service ab und verankert diese in der Rahmen-Zielvereinbarung. Dementsprechend initiiert sie die Rahmenbedingungen für die Entwicklung der Bürgerämter zu modernen Dienstleistern. Neben den rechtlichen Voraussetzungen gehört dazu auch die Förderung von Innovationen.

Das ‚Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten' moderiert die Abstimmungsprozesse der Bürgerämter zur weiteren Entwicklung. In der Rolle als zentraler Ansprechpartner koordiniert das Amt die Ziele und Aktivitäten und sorgt für die einheitliche Umsetzung der Dienstleistungen in den bezirklichen Bürgerämtern. Voraussetzung dafür ist die kontinuierliche Erhebung der erreichten Standards und der Abgleich mit den festgelegten Mindeststandards (regelmäßiges Berichtswesen).

Die ‚bezirklichen Bürgerämter' erstellen in ihrer Verantwortung selbständig die Verwaltungsleistungen. Neben der leistungsgerechten Erfüllung des Standardaufgabenkatalogs werden bedarfsorientierte Angebote realisiert. Dabei steht zunehmend die Verbesserung der Servicequalität der Dienstleistungsangebote im Vordergrund.

Zur erfolgreichen Wahrnehmung der jeweiligen Rollen wird auf allen Ebenen der Steuerungskreislauf umgesetzt. Die einzelnen Steuerungskreisläufe der drei Akteure sind über die Zielvereinbarungen und das Berichtswesen miteinander verbunden. Die Zielvereinbarungen werden zwischen den einzelnen Ebenen abgeschlossen. In einer

Rahmenzielvereinbarung zwischen dem Staatssekretär für Inneres und den bezirklichen Stadträten für Bürgerdienste werden Kennzahlen (Mindeststandards) festgelegt,[15] die die aktuelle strategische Ausrichtung der Berliner Bürgerämter landeseinheitlich steuern sollen. Dies ist z.B. die Umsetzung mobiler Dienstleistungsangebote. Dieser Mindeststandard hätte Auswirkungen auf die operativen Aktivitäten und somit auf die Zielvereinbarungen zwischen Stadtrat und Leiter/ in des Bürgeramtes.

Zur Messung der Zielerreichung werden die entsprechenden Ist-Werte zu den vereinbarten Erfolgsindikatoren im Berichtswesen erfasst. Je nach Steuerungsinteresse sollen ministerielle, zentrale und dezentrale Berichte[16] erstellt werden. Der Stand der Entwicklung auf dem Weg zu modernen Dienstleistern muss darin erkennbar werden, um ggf. gegensteuern zu können. So ist z.B. der Einsatz von eGovernment-Aktivitäten kontinuierlich unter den Gesichtspunkten Auftragserfüllung, Kundenzufriedenheit, Mitarbeiterzufriedenheit und Wirtschaftlickeit (Balanced Scorecard) zu analysieren, um einen zielgerichteten und effizienten Einsatz zu erzielen.

Das Steuerungssystem ist im Politikfeld Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten von allen Beteiligten akzeptiert. Nur durch das konsequente, zielgerichtete und aufeinander abgestimmte Vorgehen wird die Entwicklung der Bürgerämter zu modernen Dienstleistern gesichert. Die sehr guten partnerschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den Akteuren sowie die Transparenz und Offenheit hinsichtlich des Erreichten sind erste Erfolge der ganzheitlichen Steuerung.

2.5   Steuerung interner Serviceleistungen

Während die Steuerung der zum Bürger gerichteten Handlungsfelder idealtypisch in verwaltungsübergreifenden Leistungssträngen vorgenommen wird, erfordert die Steuerung der verwaltungsinternen Querschnittsaufgaben (Serviceleistungen) neben den einheitlichen Zielvorgaben zu den wichtigsten Ressourcen auf der Durchführungsebene Servicevereinbarungen zwischen ‚Herstellern' externer Produkte und Serviceanbietern - ‚Auftraggeber und Auftragnehmer' - (vgl. Rienaß 2004b, S. 242). Diese Servicevereinbarungen enthalten neben den Preisen auch Vereinbarungen zu Leistungen und Qualitäten.

In vielen Verwaltungen Deutschlands werden interne Serviceleistungen durch eigenständige Organisationseinheiten angeboten (vgl. Dick/ Bergmann 2003). Die praktischen Erfahrungen in Berlin und so auch in der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres haben

jedoch gezeigt, dass es weniger auf die organisatorische Trennung bzw. Eigenständigkeit, sondern vielmehr auf die klare Beschreibung und Trennung der jeweiligen Rollen ankommt. Was nützen Serviceeinheiten, wenn sie doch im Sinne einer traditionellen Verwaltungserledigung weiterhin keine vereinbarte Serviceleistung erbringen?

Berlin ist im Verwaltungsreform-Grundsätze-Gesetz[17] zunächst auch von dieser strikten Trennung ausgegangen, hat dieses zwischenzeitlich jedoch aufgegeben.[18] So steuert die Abteilung ZS der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres externe Politikfelder und Querschnittsfelder, und diese sowohl landes- sowie ressortweit über Zielvereinbarungen als auch im unmittelbaren Ministeriumsbereich, dann jedoch über Servicevereinbarungen.

Eine andere Frage stellt sich, welche Organisationseinheit die Serviceleistungen tatsächlich durchführt. Zunehmend setzt sich in der öffentlichen Verwaltung – so auch in Berlin - die Tendenz durch, die Erledigung von Durchführungsaufgaben bei gleichzeitiger Stärkung der dezentralen Entscheidungskompetenz durch verwaltungsinterne Dienstleister erledigen zu lassen (Shared-Service-Center).[19]

Für die Steuerung und das Berichtswesen gelten die gleichen bereits beschriebenen Prinzipien. Zusätzlich ist ein Querschnittsvergleich zwischen Behörden der Berliner Verwaltung möglich (vgl. Rienaß 2004a), der zur Zeit für das Ministerium sowie für das Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten und das Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin erprobt wird.

2.6 Zwischenfazit

Die ganzheitliche Steuerung in einem bestehenden Zielsystem mit Ziel- und Servicevereinbarungen und einem institutionalisierten Berichtswesen ermöglicht die uneingeschränkte Wahrnehmung der Führungsfunktionen auf den Ebenen Senat (Regierung), Senator/ in, Abteilungsleiter/ in, Leiter/ in der Sonderbehörden. Dabei kann das Parlament in besonderem Maße durch das Berichtswesen qualifiziert informiert werden. Gute und konsistente Kennzahlen stärken darüber hinaus das Selbstbewusstsein der Beschäftigten und fördern deren Motivation.

Insgesamt hat sich in der beschriebenen Praxis die Parallelität von konzeptioneller Entwicklung und praktischer Erprobung bewährt. Allerdings hat sich auch deutlich gezeigt, ‚auf die Kultur kommt es an!'

3   Auf die Kultur kommt es an

Das Praxisbeispiel beschreibt einen Veränderungsprozess, der quasi durch ein „Lernen in Tippelschritten" (Koch 2003, S. 18) „viele kleine Schritte" beschreitet und bewusst prozesshaft gestaltet ist (Koch 2003, S. 20). Dieser Prozess ist auch noch lange nicht abgeschlossen.

Die bisherigen Erfahrungen zeigen, dass auch auf diesem Weg wirkungsvolle Veränderungen nur zu erzielen sind, wenn es einen grundsätzlichen Kulturwandel in der Organisation und bei den in ihr beschäftigten Menschen gibt (vgl. Reichard 2006) und ein Veränderungsklima geschaffen werden kann, in dem die Defizite der öffentlichen Bürokratie nicht allein durch veränderte Steuerungsmechanismen überwunden werden sollen (vgl. Brüggemeier/ Röber 2002). Vielmehr kommt es darauf an, dass Führungskräfte gestaltend steuern können und auch wollen (vgl. Furch 2001; Rienaß 2004a, S. 189) und Teamstrukturen statt hierarchischer Strukturen geschaffen werden (vgl. Adamaschek 2001; Löffler 2003). Spannend ist dies, wenn es – wie hier beschrieben – über mehrere Steuerungsebenen geht.

Während das Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten bereits seit einigen Jahren erfolgreich – wenn auch manchmal mit Hindernissen und Widerständen – den amtsinternen Veränderungsprozess mit einer zwischenzeitlich auch als nachhaltig zu bezeichnenden Kulturveränderung gestaltet hat (vgl. Rienaß 2004a, 2004b) gleiches auch für viele Bürgerämter gilt[20], musste dieser Prozess für die Senatsverwaltung für Inneres erst initiiert werden. Dies war – wie zuvor im Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten – nur durch die Gewinnung anderer Führungskräfte möglich; Führungskräfte, die bereits an anderen Stellen in der Berliner Verwaltung aktiv in Organisations- und Personalentwicklungsprozessen praktische Erfahrungen sammeln konnten (vgl. Rienaß 2004b, S. 249) bzw. sich aktiv den Veränderungsnotwendigkeiten stellten. Die Entwicklung eines Veränderungsklimas in der betroffenen Ministerialabteilung stellte dennoch alle beteiligten Akteure vor große Herausforderungen.

Obwohl die Senatsverwaltung für Inneres gemeinsam mit der Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen seit 1994 Trägerin des Verwaltungsreformprozesses in Berlin war (vgl. Meyer-Piton/ Rienaß 1997) und für das Verwaltungsreform-Grundsätze-Gesetz[21] verantwortlich zeichnete, sind wesentliche Reformansätze weder verinnerlicht noch angegangen worden.

Zwar sind in einzelnen Bereichen erste Ansätze eines veränderten Führungsverständnisses zu erkennen gewesen, dieses Verständnis hat sich jedoch sehr stark auf einen institutionalisierten und instrumentellen Einsatz beschränkt. Gerade in den rechtlich geprägten Aufgabenfeldern mit ihrem hohen Grad an institutionalisierten und standardisierten Regeln gibt es ein ausgeprägtes Beharrungsvermögen. Diese Beständigkeit basiert auf der Verinnerlichung von Regeln vor dem Hintergrund eines bestehenden Realitätsverständnisses (vgl. Ridder/ Hoon 2003).

Die Auseinandersetzungen mit diesem Realitätsverständnis und der über Jahrzehnte gewachsenen Organisationskultur mit starkem hierarchischen Denken sowohl innerhalb der Abteilung selbst, aber auch im Verhältnis zu den Sonderbehörden bestimmten den Beginn des Veränderungsprozesses im Ministerium.

Bis die Erkenntnis reifte, dass Zielvereinbarungen Steuerungsinstrumente sind, die nicht gerichtsfest sein müssen (vgl. Rienaß 2002), verging eine Zeit. Ehe Kennzahlen entwickelt und gar akzeptiert wurden, war eine intensive Überzeugungsarbeit erforderlich. Dabei haben wir uns von dem Gedanken leiten lassen, dass „das Führen mit Zielen (…) sehr wichtig (ist) – allerdings nur mit der Implementierung dieses Führungsstils" (Klages 2004, S. 25). Zielvereinbarungen haben sich demzufolge an der Philosophie der jeweiligen Organisationseinheit zu orientieren. Geschieht dies nicht, besteht die Gefahr, dass sie „zum bloßen Ritual (…) degenerieren" (Klages 2004, S. 25). Andererseits können gerade über Zielvereinbarungen die Beschäftigten motiviert werden (vgl. Ceylangoglu 2004; Rienaß 2004b), allerdings nur dann, wenn Führungskräfte gewillt sind, ihre Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter zu motivieren und zum gewünschten Ziel hinzuführen (d.h. zu steuern).

Deshalb sind neben der notwendigen Vermittlung von Managementwissen und -fähigkeiten längerfristige Lern- und Veränderungsprozesse angelegt worden, die „Werte, Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen", zunächst der Führungskräfte (Reichard 2006, S. 14), dann aber auch der übrigen Beschäftigten der Abteilung beeinflussen. Galt es erst, die Vielseitigkeit von Führungskräften durch eine zielgerichtete Führungskräftequalifizierung zu fördern (vgl. Drescher 2004; Rienaß 2000), folgte dann ein breit angelegter Teamentwicklungsprozess, der noch längst nicht abgeschlossen ist.

Neben regelmäßigen systematischen und strukturierten Informationen für alle Beschäftigten der Abteilung und der betroffenen Sonderbehörden durch die Leitungskräfte, hat ein Teamcoachingprozess, an dem der Abteilungsleiter und die Referatsleiter seit

einem Jahr teilnehmen, zu einer deutlichen Kulturveränderung bei den Führungskräften, aber auch in der Abteilung insgesamt geführt. Gemeinsames Verständnis für die wechselseitigen Problemstellungen, Akzeptanz der unterschiedlichen Arbeitsweisen und Kennen der jeweiligen Aufgabenkontexte sind wesentliche Ergebnisse dieses Prozesses, der zudem insgesamt zu einer verbesserten Kommunikation führt.

Ziel dieser Bemühungen ist es, einen „Kulturwandel zu bewerkstelligen (…), der Innovationen und Kreativität auf allen Ebenen fördert" (Löffler 2003, S. 254) und nicht nur aus instrumenteller Sicht zu einem veränderten Steuerungsverständnis zu gelangen, sondern die öffentliche Verwaltung nachhaltig zu verändern und die u.a. von Hill (2006a, S. 28ff) beschriebenen Kriterien für nachhaltige Verwaltungsmodernisierung zu erfüllen.

Aber nicht nur in den beteiligten Sonderbehörden und der aufsichtsführenden Ministerialabteilung sind diese Kulturveränderungen eingeleitet worden. Auch wenn es im Geschäftsbereich der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres nicht durchgängig Zielvereinbarungen gibt, wird dessen Notwendigkeit und Sinnhaftigkeit nicht mehr bestritten. Erste Ansätze eines veränderten nicht nur instrumentell betrachteten Personalmanagements tragen sichtbare Früchte. Rotationen auf der Ebene des mittleren Managements[22] haben zunächst zur Verwirrung, sodann zur Akzeptanz geführt und tragen letztlich dazu bei, dass bei abteilungs- und behördenübegreifenden Rotationen auch die jeweiligen organisationsspezifischen Kulturen kennen gelernt und verstanden werden. Ein hausinternes Mentoringprogramm[23] schafft die Voraussetzungen dafür, „dass durch ‚Alltagsexperten' (…) den Fachexperten neue Sichtweisen von Problemen und Lösungen" vermittelt werden können (Löffler 2003, S. 259).

Eingebettet sind diese Maßnahmen in ein umfassendes Personalentwicklungskonzept, das zielgerichtete Personalentwicklungsmaßnahmen sowohl für Führungskräfte, als auch für Führungskräftenachwuchs und für die übrigen Beschäftigten vorsieht. Hierbei besteht die Absicht, diese Maßnahmen für die Führungskräfte und den Führungskräftenachwuchs in der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres verpflichtend zu machen, denn nur dann besteht die Gewähr dafür, dass sich mittel- und langfristig etwas ändern wird (vgl. auch Löffler 2003, S. 254).

Zur Vorbereitung dieser Maßnahmen, aber auch für mögliche Einstellungs- und Beurteilungsverfahren sind standardisierte Anforderungsprofile entwickelt worden, die in den außerfachlichen Kompetenzen schwerpunktmäßig auf Methoden-, Sozial- und

Persönlichkeitskompetenzen setzen und bei Führungskräften aller Ebenen die gleichen Anforderungen, wenn auch unterschiedlich gewichtet, stellen.

Bei den wegen der drastischen Haushaltsrestriktionen in Berlin erstmals seit drei Jahren wieder vorgenommenen Einstellungen von Nachwuchskräften für den höheren Verwaltungsdienst (potenzielle Führungskräfte) und für den gehobenen Verwaltungs-dienst (Sachbearbeiter, aber auch potenzielle Führungskräfte der mittleren Ebene) standen daher im Auswahlverfahren die Sozial- und Persönlichkeitskompetenzen im Vordergrund.

4 Forderungen an die Zukunft

Die beschriebenen Ansätze einer veränderten Verwaltungssteuerung sind durchaus positiv zu betrachten, setzen sie doch auf Verwaltungsmodernisierung und ein somit weiter entwickeltes Verwaltungsmanagement. Dabei steht neben dem Einsatz ziel- und wir-kungsorientierter Steuerungsinstrumente richtigerweise der Kulturwandel, insbesondere durch Personal- und Führungskräfteentwicklung, im Vordergrund. Doch dies reicht letztlich nicht aus, sofern keine Transformation der Entwicklungen gesichert ist (vgl. Hill 2006b) und regelmäßige Evaluierungen durchgeführt werden (vgl. Löffler 2003).

So fordert das Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin[24] die Wirksamkeit von Fortbildungen auf geeignete Weise (z.B. Benchmarking über Mitarbeiterzufriedenheit, Krankenstände, Kundenbeschwerden) zu überprüfen[25]. Ergänzend wird dazu auch die Einführung eines konsequenten Fortbildungscontrollings vor allem für Führungskräfte gefordert.[26]

Letztlich wird es bei diesen Modernisierungsansätzen und Steuerungsmodellen nicht bleiben können, zumal in der theoretischen Diskussion eine Weiterentwicklung der Reformanstrengungen zum Good Governance und Public Leadership gefordert wird (vgl. Hill 2006c). Dabei geht es nicht nur um „Leadership at the top", sondern auf allen Ebenen einer Organisation, wenn es um das Zusammenwirken verschiedener Akteure geht. (Löffler 2003, S. 244).

Auch wenn in der beschriebenen veränderten Steuerung ganzheitlich-strategische An-sätze, wie etwa der Einsatz der Balanced-Scorecard durchaus vorhanden sind, fehlt jedoch bisher die Verknüpfung mit einer strategisch-visionären Komponente (vgl. Hill 2006c, S. 82). Hier steht die Verwaltung in Deutschland insgesamt, aber auch die Senatsverwal-tung für Inneres mit ihren Sonderbehörden vor einer großen Herausforderung, die es in

einem nächsten Schritt zu meistern gilt, und zwar nicht nur für Führungskräfte (vgl. Löffler 2003). Nur wenn alle Facetten der Verwaltungsmodernisierung gleichrangig eingeleitet und umgesetzt werden und dieses mit dem notwendigen Kultur- , d.h. aber auch Mentalitätswandel, verbunden wird, wird der notwendige Umbau der öffentlichen Verwaltung – auch im Interesse einer Konsolidierung des Haushalts – gelingen. Dabei scheinen aus meiner Sicht „kleine Schritte" unter Berücksichtigung des Gesamtziels erfolgreich zu sein.

Zusammenfassend heißt dies für die Zukunft: Erfolgreiche Verwaltungssteuerung funktioniert nur, wenn Prozess- und Ergebnisverantwortliche ihre Führungsrolle erkennen und wahrnehmen. Gleichzeitig müssen alle Beteiligten im Prozess eine Vertrauensbasis entwickeln. Wichtige Voraussetzungen für diese neue Vertrauenskultur sind die beschriebenen Steuerungsinstrumente. Zielvereinbarungen und Berichtswesen schaffen Transparenz, einvernehmliche Lösungen und gemeinsame Erfolge.

Anmerkungen

[1] Nach Artikel 67 Abs.1 der Verfassung von Berlin (VvB) nimmt der Senat durch die Hauptverwaltung die Aufgaben von gesamtstädtischer Bedeutung wahr.

[2] Zielsysteme im Land Berlin beinhalten Politikfelder (zu Bürgern, Institutionen und Wirtschaftsunternehmen gerichtete externe Handlungsfelder) und Querschnittsfelder (verwaltungsinterne Querschnittsaufgaben). Diesen Politik- und Querschnittsfeldern ordnen sich strategische und operative Ziele sowie Kostenträger unter.

[3] Abt I (Recht), Abt. II (Verfassungsschutz), Abt. III (Öffentliche Sicherheit) und Abt. ZS (Zentraler Service).

[4] Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin, Berliner Feuerwehr, Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten, Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin, Standesamt I (diese Behörde soll im Jahre 2007 in das Landesamt für Bürger- und Ordnungsangelegenheiten integriert werden), Statistisches Landesamt Berlin (diese Behörde fusioniert am 1. Januar 2007 mit der Brandenburger Behörde zu einer Zweiländeranstalt öffentlichen Rechts ‚Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg').

[5] IT-Dienstleistungszentrum Berlin, Verwaltungsakademie Berlin.

[6] Durch das Gesetz zur Neuordnung von Zuständigkeiten im Geschäftsbereich der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und im Verkehrsbereich (Zuständigkeitsneuordnungsgesetz – ZNOG) vom 18. Dezember 2004, GVBl. Berlin, S. 516 ist mit leicht veränderter Zuständigkeit dieses Amt aus dem Landeseinwohneramt Berlin hervorgegangen.

[7] Neben der Fachaufsicht gibt es noch die Dienstaufsicht, die aus der Organisationsgewalt des jeweiligen Senatsmitgliedes abgeleitet ist und im Wesentlichen Fragen der allgemeinen Geschäftsführung sowie allgemeine personelle Angelegenheiten berührt.

[8] Vgl. u.a. Bericht des Rechnungshofes von Berlin vom 19. Mai 2006 (unveröffentlicht).

[9] Allein in den Jahren 2001 bis 2006 mussten in allen Dienststellen des Landes Berlin 20 % des Personals eingespart werden. Weitere Einsparungen sind angekündigt.

[10] Hervorhebung durch den Autor.

[11] § 2 AZG aaO.

[12] Beschluss vom 31. Oktober 2002 (Drucksachen 15/777 und 15/883).

[13] Nach einem Pilotversuch in zwei Bezirken wird seit dem Jahr 2006 die Möglichkeit geboten, mobile Bürgerämter in allen Berliner Bezirken einzurichten (vgl. Rienaß/ Wagnitz 2005).

[14] Das Gesamtergebnis ist im Abschlussbericht des Projektes dargestellt (Klages 2006b).

[15] Dieses System wurde bereits 2004 erfolgreich mit der Zielvereinbarung über den Bestandsabbau, die Verkürzung der Bearbeitungsdauer und die Verfahrensoptimierung in Einbürgerungsverfahren eingeführt.

[16] Dezentrale Berichte sind in diesem Beispiel Berichte je Bürgeramt, zentrale Berichte sind zusammenfassende Berichte über alle Bürgerämter, ministerielle Berichte umfassen die wichtigsten Kennzahlen für die politische bzw. ministerielle Steuerung.

[17] Drittes Gesetz zur Reform der Berliner Verwaltung (Verwaltungsreform-Grundsätze-Gesetz – VGG) vom 17. Mai 1999, GVBl. Berlin 1999, S. 171.

[18] Viertes Gesetz zur Reform der Berliner Verwaltung (4.Verwaltungsreformgesetz – 4.VerwRefG) vom 3. November 2005, GVBl. Berlin 2005, S. 686.

[19] Das IT-Dienstleistungszentrum ist nach dem Gesetz über die Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts IT-Dienstleistungszentrum Berlin vom 19. November 2004, GVBl. Berlin 2004, S. 459 der zentrale IT-Dienstleister des Landes Berlin , das Landesverwaltungsamt Berlin soll zentraler Dienstleister für Personalverwaltung und Logistik werden.

[20] siehe hierzu Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission „Eine Zukunft für Berlin" vom 9. Mai 2005, Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, 15. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 15/4000, S. 33f.

[21] siehe Anmerkung 18.

[22] Seit 2004 sind im Geschäftsbereich der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres – ohne Polizei und Feuerwehr - insgesamt 24 Rotationen vorgenommen worden, und zwar 11 Rotationen innerhalb des Ministeriums, 5 Rotationen vom Ministerium in eine Sonderbehörde, 4 Rotationen von einer Sonderbehörde in das Ministerium, 1 temporäre Rotation in das Land Brandenburg, 2 temporäre Rotationen in eine Sonderbehörde und eine temporäre Rotation von einer Sonderbehörde in das Ministerium.

23 Neben dem landesweiten Mentoringprogramm 'Mit Mentoring in Führung' gehen, hat die Senatsverwaltung für Inneres ein eigenes Programm aufgelegt, in dem zunächst vier weibliche Führungsnachwuchskräfte durch erfahrene Führungskräfte begleitet werden.

24 Nach Art. 38 VvB ist das Abgeordnetenhaus die gewählte Volksvertretung des Landes Berlin.

25 Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission , aaO, S. 37.

26 Forderung des Autors vor der Enquete-Kommission am 14. Mai 2004 (vgl. Wortprotokoll der 6. Sitzung) und Minderheitenvotum des Sachverständigen Kromphardt, aaO, S. 44.

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Wirkungsorientiertes Management in öffentlichen Dienstleistungseinheiten – Neue Anforderungen an die Führung

1   Einleitung

Strategisches wirkungsorientiertes Management und Leadership sind wesentliche Säulen von Good Public Governance und stehen auch in engem Zusammenhang zueinander. Strategisches Management bedeutet langfristiges Planen, Definieren von Wirkungszielen, das Abgeben operativer Verantwortung an dezentrale Einheiten und die begleitende Koordination und Kontrolle auf strategischer Ebene. Im Gegensatz zur operativen Detailsteuerung setzt das strategische Management daher auf das Einhalten der ‚großen' Linie und fokussiert bei der Zielsetzung weniger auf die konkreten Leistungen sondern auf Wirkungen wie etwa bessere Lebensqualität, höhere Kundenzufriedenheit etc. Die Steuerung über Wirkungsindikatoren stellt sich als sehr anspruchsvoll dar. Nicht nur sind sinnvolle Zählgrößen für Wirkungen oft schwer zu finden, auch hat die Mehrdimensionalität des Ursachen- Wirkungszusammenhangs den Effekt, dass Wirkungen oft nicht eindeutig dem Verantwortungsbereich einer einzigen Stelle oder Person zuzuordnen sind. Ist eine bessere Gesundheit der Bevölkerung als Wirkung angestrebt, so wird diese durch bessere Medikamente, ein gesteigertes Gesundheitsbewusstsein der Bevölkerung, das Ess- und Rauchverhalten der Menschen oder auch soziale Aspekte beeinflusst. Auch die Messgröße für bessere Gesundheit lässt sich nicht so einfach festlegen: ist dies das subjektive Gesundheitsempfinden jedes einzelnen, sind es Krankenstandstage oder die Säuglingssterblichkeitsrate.[1]

Bei Leadership geht es sowohl um persönliche Eigenschaften eines herausragenden ‚Leaders' als auch um Rollen, Strukturen und das Selbstverständnis eines Systems (Hill 2006) Wenn Hill unterscheidet: „Leadership shapes the future, management delivers it" (Hill 2006, S. 81) so wird deutlich, dass strategisches Management gleichermaßen visionäres Denken und wirksames Verändern voraussetzt. Während die Verwaltungsführung noch bis in die neunziger Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts vom inputorientierten Steuern geprägt war und auf die Frage: „Was sind die Ziele der Organisation?" geantwortet wurde: „Wir brauchen keine, wir vollziehen das Gesetz", so ist erkennbar, wie fundamental sich mit neuen Steuerungsmodellen und mit Public Governance auch das Führungsverständnis und die Anforderungen an Führungskräfte geändert haben. Im Folgenden werden einige innovative Ansätze aus österreichischen Verwaltungen beschrieben und die damit verbundenen neuen Anforderungen an die Führungskräfte erläutert.

2 Die Flexibilisierungsklausel

Die Flexibilisierungsklausel im §17a BHG sieht für ausgewählte öffentliche Dienstleistungseinheiten der Bundesverwaltung größere Selbständigkeit und Flexibilität bei der Leistungs- und Budgetsteuerung vor. Hier wird die dezentrale Fach- und Ressourcenverantwortung Realität.

In Mehrjahresprogrammen werden geplante Einnahmen und Ausgaben ebenso festgelegt wie Arbeitsprogramme mit Leistungs- und teilweise auch Wirkungszielen. So sollte etwa im Bundesamt für Wasserwirtschaft der Anteil an Leistungszeiten (für Publikationen, Beratung, Kurstätigkeit) bis 2006 um 3% jährlich gesteigert werden oder die Produktivität der Fischproduktion durch gesteigerte Einnahmen pro Mitarbeiterin im Jahr 2006 um 7% erhöht werden. Derzeit sind 14 Organisationen Teil dieses Projektes, u.a. vier Strafvollzugsanstalten, das zentrale Melderegister, das Bundesamt für Wasserwirtschaft, die Sicherheitsakademie etc. Bis dato konnte bei durchwegs allen ‚Flexi-Organisationen' ein – im Vergleich zum veranschlagten Budget im Projektprogramm – positiver Budgetsaldo erreicht werden. So hat etwa die Strafvollzugsanstalt Leoben ihre Kosten pro Hafttag von 2002 bis 2006 von 50 € auf 38 € reduzieren, die Einnahmen seit 2002 von 715.000 € auf knapp über 1 Mio. € steigern können. Der ‚erwirtschaftete' Überschuss wurde zum Großteil wieder in die Organisation und Ihre MitarbeiterInnen investiert (Weiterbildungsprogramme, Belohnungen, dringende Anschaffungen in kleinerem Ausmaß).

Die Vergrößerung der Entscheidungsspielräume und Verkürzung der Entscheidungswege stellt einerseits die Führungskräfte vor neue Herausforderungen, andererseits führt dies innerhalb der gesamten Organisation zu erhöhter Mitarbeitermotivation und Leistungs- bzw. Ergebnisorientierung. In umfangreichen Diskussionsprozessen wird über die Mission der Organisation (Was ist unsere Existenzberechtigung? Wofür sind wir da?) diskutiert, über die Kernleistungen und Messgrößen, erreichbar Ziele und letztlich das Selbstverständnis der Organisation. Eine weitere Erkenntnis war, dass privatwirtschaftliches Denken und Handeln auch bei der Erfüllung hoheitlicher Aufgaben möglich und zielführend ist.[2] Für die Führungskräfte dieser Einheiten bedeutet dies: Kundenorientierte Visionen und Mehrjahresprogramme entwickeln, Denken in Zielen und Zahlen, aktiv Steuern und Verantwortung für Entscheidungen übernehmen sowie einen ständigen Weiterentwicklungsprozess in Gang halten. Dies erfordert einerseits entsprechendes Fach-

Knowhow etwa auch in betriebswirtschaftlichen Bereichen sowie hohe soziale Kompetenz beim glaubwürdigen Vorleben der neuen Philosophie und Begleiten des Prozesses.

3   Die geplante Haushaltsrechtsreform des Bundes

In Österreich ist derzeit eine Haushaltsrechtsreform in Diskussion, die nachhaltig geordnete öffentliche Finanzen, ein gesamtwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht und die tatsächliche Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern anstrebt.

Diese Ziele können selbst schon als Wirkungsziele angesehen werden. Ein vierjähriger Finanzrahmen legt per Gesetz den Ausgabenrahmen für die einzelnen Rubriken fest. Diese Rubriken sollen mehrere Ministerien zusammenfassen wie z.B. in der Rubrik ,Sicherheit' das Innere und die Landesverteidigung. Vier Grundprinzipien prägen das neue Haushaltsrecht: Wirkungsorientierung, Effizienz, Transparenz und die möglichst getreue Darstellung der finanziellen Lage. Erstmals soll also die Wirkungsorientierung ein Kernelement des neuen Haushaltsrechts werden. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, welche Wirkungen erzielt werden sollen. Mittels Globalbudgets erfolgt eine konsequente Verknüpfung von Ergebnis- und Ressourcenverantwortung. Auch erhält die Verwaltung Gelegenheit zu zeigen, was sie leistet (Steger/ Mungenast 2005).

Nun trifft dieses neue Bundeshaushaltsgesetz im Falle der Beschließung durch den Nationalrat auf eine Verwaltungsorganisation, die nicht für diese neuen Anforderungen gerüstet ist. Strukturen, Prozesse und das Führungsverständnis entsprechen dem inputorientierten Denken, Erfolg ist gegeben, wenn die Ausgaben plangemäß getätigt wurden. Nicht geschaut wird auf die ,produzierten' Leistungen, die erzielten Wirkungen und ob Ziele definiert und dann auch erreicht wurden. Durch dieses neue Haushaltsrecht wird sich die Verwaltungsorganisation dahingehend anpassen müssen, dass Aufgaben- und Ressourcenverantwortung zusammengeführt und in einer Organisation klar ersichtlich ist, wer die Verantwortung für die Zielerreichung trägt. Weiters wird das bestehende Budgetcontrollingsystem um ein Leistungs- und Wirkungscontrolling zu erweitern sein.

Im Rahmen dessen wird man dann die Leistungen und Wirkungen anhand von Kennzahlen messen, um den Zielerreichungsgrad festzustellen und allenfalls Gegensteuerungsmaßnahmen setzen. Jedenfalls wird ein begleitendes Personalentwicklungs- und -qualifizierungsprogramm dafür Sorge tragen müssen, dass ausreichend fachlich qualifizierte MitarbeiterInnen für das Leistungs- und Wirkungscontrolling zur Verfügung

stehen. Führungskräfte werden in diesem neuen wirkungsorientierten Budgetierungssystem zusätzliches Fach-Knowhow erwerben, ein hohes Maß an Eigenverantwortung übernehmen, ergebnisorientiertes Handeln vorleben und für eine gezielte Personalentwicklung und Qualifizierung in ihrem Bereich Sorge tragen müssen. Während das Budget das finanzwirtschaftliche Steuerungsinstrument darstellt, wird die Kostenrechnung betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerungsinformationen liefern müssen. Für eine optimal ausgewogene Steuerung sollten Struktur und System von Budget und Kostenrechnung bestmöglich miteinander verknüpft werden.

4 Das neue Führungsmodell im Bundeskanzleramt

Jede Neuwahl bringt Veränderungen in den Zuständigkeiten der Bundesministerien mit sich. Das Bundeskanzleramt war stets in besonderem Ausmaß betroffen. Agenden wie Kunst, Sport, Frauen, Gesundheit, öffentlicher Dienst und Verwaltungsreform waren im Bundeskanzleramt (BKA), wechselten in andere Ressorts und kamen wieder zurück. Dies führte zu einer wenig einheitlichen Führungsstruktur innerhalb des BKA, oft wenig klaren Aufgaben und Anforderungen an die Führungskräfte. In der Folge kam es 2006 zu einem stark partizipativ aufgebauten Projekt mit dem Ziel, gemeinsame Vorstellungen von Führung, stabile Prozesse und ein klares und einheitliches Bild der Aufgaben und Anforderungen zu entwickeln. Die Rahmenbedingung für dieses Vorhaben waren günstig, da gerade flächendeckend moderne Arbeitsplatzbeschreibungen erarbeitet waren, jede Abteilung einen Leistungskatalog mit Kostenschätzungen (Verteilung der Personalkapazitäten auf die Leistungen) besitzt und das Management by Objectives im Rahmen der Mitarbeitergespräche eingeführt war. Dieses integrierte Set an Instrumenten erleichtert den Führungskräften die Steuerung und bedeutet für die MitarbeiterInnen eine klare Ausrichtung und ein motivierendes Umfeld. Wesentliche Elemente dieses Führungsmodells betreffen die Kooperation zwischen Politik und Verwaltung und eine möglichst weit reichende Dezentralisierung der Verantwortung. Dieses ehrgeizige Projekt befindet sich derzeit in der Umsetzungsphase, für 2007 ist erstmals ein strukturierter Planungs-, Steuerungs- und Controllingdialog in jeder Abteilung vorgesehen. Jede Abteilung hat sich wenige Ziele zu setzen, die möglichst auch ein Wirkungsziel enthalten soll. Gerade in einem Ministerium, dessen Tätigkeit hauptsächlich in strategischer Planung, Politikberatung, Logistik und Koordination besteht, ist das Festlegen konkreter Leistungen schon schwierig, Wirkungen zu definieren noch anspruchsvoller. Im BKA wird dieses Projekt als ‚Work in Progress' gesehen, das sukzessive das Bewusstsein der

MitarbeiterInnen und Führungskräfte schärfen soll für die Bedeutung von ergebnisorientierter und wirksamer Aufgabenerfüllung.

5 Selbstevaluation mit dem Common Assessment Framework - CAF in einer Sektion des Bundeskanzleramtes (BKA)

Die Sektion ‚Öffentlicher Dienst und Verwaltungsreform' im BKA umfasst 8 Abteilungen und beschäftigt knapp 100 MitarbeiterInnen. Hauptaufgaben sind die Dienstrechtslegistik (Beamtendienstrecht, Besoldungsrecht etc.), Personalplanung und -controlling, Verwaltungsreform und Personalentwicklung im Bundesdienst. Im Juni 2006 führte die Sektion im Auftrag des Sektionsleiters eine Selbstevaluation anhand des Common Assessment Frameworks durch. Der CAF ist ein EU-weit entwickeltes Selbstbewertungsinstrument, das rasch die Stärken und Verbesserungspotentiale einer Organisation zu Tage bringt. In den neun Themenfeldern z.B. Führung, Strategische Planung, Personalmanagement, bürgerbezogene oder mitarbeiterbezogene Ergebnisse befassten sich die beiden Selbstbewertungsgruppen mit zentralen Fragen der Organisation wie etwa: Gibt es eine Mission und wurde sie kommuniziert? Werden die BürgerInnen und Stakeholder in die Leistungserstellungsprozesse involviert? Wird die Qualität der Leistungen gemessen? Gibt es Wirkungsziele, deren Erreichen mit Wirkungsindikatoren gemessen wird? Dieser sehr intensive Diskussionsprozess innerhalb der Organisation hat viel Klarheit über Aufgaben und Selbstverständnis aber auch über moderne Instrumente einer wirksamen Führung und von Qualitätsmanagement gebracht. Eine Liste an Verbesserungsvorschlägen (sie reichen von einer gemeinsamen elektronischen Verteiler-Adressverwaltung bis zu einer Mitarbeiterbefragung) wurde erstellt und sukzessive umgesetzt. Diese Art der kritischen Befassung mit der eigenen Leistung ist in Ministerien noch nicht weit verbreitet, da die Fremdbestimmung durch die Politik groß scheint und die Art der Leistungen schwer zu greifen. Selbst am Prozess beteiligt, sehe ich diese Übung als höchst wertvollen Schritt in Richtung einer ergebnis- und wirkungsorientierten Führung.

6 Drei Bezirkshauptmannschaften lernen voneinander

Von 2003 bis 2005 wurde von drei österreichischen Bezirkshauptmannschaften (Eisenstadt Umgebung, Rohrbach und Zell am See) auf Eigeninitiative ein Projekt durchgeführt mit dem Ziel, durch Informations- und Erfahrungsaustausch, durch Vergleiche

von Ergebnissen und Prozessen auf verschiedenen Akteursebenen Lernprozesse in den drei Organisationen auszulösen. Bezirkshauptmannschaften agieren auf der Bezirksverwaltungsebene und sind die zentrale Ansprech- und Dienstleistungsstelle für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Die Leistungspalette reicht von Gewerbeberechtigungen, Betriebsanlagengenehmigungen über soziale Dienste und Elternberatung bis zur Vergabe von Jagdberechtigungen.

Themen des interbehördlichen Vergleichs waren die Ergebnisse der CAF-Selbstbewertung, der Vergleich zweier Produkte (Führerscheinerteilung und Betriebs-anlagengenehmigung) sowie die Führungsarbeit. Beim CAF wurden die Leistungsprofile und Punktewerte verglichen, bei den Produkten u.a. die Bürgerorientierung, die Prozessqualität (z.B. Verfahrensdauer) und im Bereich Führung wurde anhand von Kriterien verglichen, wie etwa Vernetzungsintensität, Ermöglichung einer Work-Life Balance durch flexible Arbeitszeit, gleichwertiges Forcieren der Weiterbildung aller Personalgruppen und Vielfalt der Projektarbeit. Durch die breite Einbindung der Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter hat dieses Projekt zu einer Kulturänderung in den Organisationen geführt. Die Eigeninitiative der MitarbeiterInnen wurde nachweislich gestärkt: diese haben selbst eine Internetseite gestaltet, die dieses Projekt und seine Ergebnisse darstellt (www.euroze.at). Wenn die Führungskräfte geeignete Rahmenbedingungen schaffen, entwickeln die MitarbeiterInnen selbst schlankere Prozesse, beginnen in Kennzahlen zu denken und zu messen und tragen mit neuen Ideen zu mehr Bürgernähe und Effizienz bei (Bauer/ Drexler/ Maimer 2005). Dieses Projekt ist einzigartig in Österreich, da diese drei Bezirkshauptmannschaften in drei unterschiedlichen Bundesländern liegen und bisher die bundesländerübergreifende Zusammenarbeit kaum stattfand. Außerdem werden die drei beteiligten Organisationen ausschließlich von Frauen geleitet, was zusätzlich eine Besonderheit auf der sonst extrem männlich dominierten Bezirksverwaltungsebene darstellt. Von den 85 österreichischen Bezirkshauptmannschaften sind derzeit nur sieben unter weiblicher Führung.

7 Kontraktmanagement in der Stadtverwaltung Wien

In der Stadtverwaltung Wiens sind rund 66.000 Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter für 1,5 Mio. EinwohnerInnen zuständig. Die Magistratsdirektion fungiert auf der Ebene der Verwaltung als strategische Steuerungszentrale für den Gesamtkonzern Stadt. In Abstimmung mit der Politik gibt sie für die gesamte Organisation Verwaltungsziele vor

und konzentriert sich auf die Aufgabe der strategischen Planung und Steuerung, auf Konzerncontrolling und Koordination. Die Magistratsdirektion zieht sich weitgehend aus den operativen Tätigkeiten zurück. Für die Abteilungen bedeutet dies größere Freiheiten, mehr Kompetenzen und größere Selbständigkeit bei der Aufgabenerfüllung. Zentrales Steuerungsinstrument ist dabei das Kontraktmanagement. Die einzelnen Leistungskontrakte werden von den amtsführenden StadträtInnen und dem Magistratsdirektor mit den Dienststellen abgeschlossen. Der Leistungskontrakt umfasst in strukturierter Form die strategischen Ziele, Projekte, Grundsatzvereinbarungen sowie die Schwerpunkte und Veränderung im Hinblick auf die Ressourcen und angestrebten Ergebnisse. Flächendeckend wurde ein Katalog von Produkten, Leistungen und Vorhaben entwickelt, der derzeit 19 Produktgruppen, sechs Leistungsgruppen und acht Vorhabensgruppen enthält. Bis 2006 wurden für alle Dienststellen strategische Ziele vereinbart.[3] Eine besondere Herausforderung bestand darin, die politische Ebene für den Dialog mit der Verwaltung zu gewinnen und für die Notwendigkeit von Zielvereinbarungen, Steuerung und Kontrolle. Wenn auch nicht in allen Bereichen das Kontraktmanagement im Alltag gelebt wird, so steigt doch die Anzahl jener Bereiche, in denen die zuständigen PolitikerInnen mit den FachbereichsleiterInnen regelmäßig Dialoge führen, gemeinsam Ziele für das nächste Jahr vereinbart werden und die Zielerreichung in der Folge evaluiert wird. Meist wird auch eine AnsprechpartnerIn im politischen Büro nominiert, die während des Jahres für Fragen zur Verfügung steht und als Schnittstelle zwischen Politik und Verwaltung fungiert. Die Offenheit der Politik für diese neue Form des strategischen Managements steigt.

8 Neue Anforderungen an die Führungskräfte

Aufgrund sich wandelnder Steuerungssysteme entstehen auch ein neues Führungsverständnis und neue Anforderungen an die Führungskräfte:

8.1 Visionäres Denken zulassen und Missionen klären

Um Visionen zu entwickeln und Missionen festzumachen muss ein Prozess geplant und durchgeführt werden, der die MitarbeiterInnen breit einbindet und möglichst ein einheitliches Bewusstsein in der Belegschaft bildet. Die Führungskraft muss vorgeben,

motivieren, nachfragen, begleiten, unterstützen und nach außen mit Engagement positives Vorbild sein.

8.2 Zielfindungsprozesse sind anspruchsvoll

Ziele zu definieren führt an den Kern der Organisation und erfordert gleichermaßen hohes Fach-Knowhow wie soziale Kompetenz. Zum Fach-Knowhow gehört ein klares Bild über die Aufgabenstellungen der Organisation und eine Vorstellungsgabe wie mögliche Ziele aussehen könnten. Dazu muss die Führungskraft einschätzen, ob die Ziele realistisch sind, gemessen werden können und als Führungsgröße geeignet sind. Mit sozialer Kompetenz werden MitarbeiterInnen zur Mitwirkung am Zielfindungsprozess gewonnen, Widerstände bearbeitet, auf ein gute Ergebnis des Diskussionsprozesses geachtet und abschließend evaluiert und die notwendigen Anerkennungen ausgesprochen. All das sind Handlungen, die in den öffentlichen Verwaltungen noch nicht selbstverständlich sind. Viel zu oft hat man nicht den Mut, sich dem Neuen oder kritischen Sichtweisen der eigenen MitarbeiterInnen zu stellen, verliert das angestrebte Ergebnis im Alltagsgeschäft aus den Augen oder vergisst am Ende, die richtigen MitarbeiterInnen lobend hervorzuheben.

8.3 Richtiges und gutes Delegieren will gelernt sein

Führungskräfte müssen verstärkt delegieren, weil sie einerseits mehr Zeit und Energie für das Strategische benötigen und weil auf der anderen Seite die MitarbeiterInnen ausreichend Möglichkeit zur Eigeninitiative und zum Tragen von Verantwortung brauchen. Der Rückzug aus dem operativen Geschäft und der Fokus auf die strategische Steuerung wie ihn die Stadt Wien im Kontraktmanagement praktiziert, verbessert die Steuerungsqualität und gibt den MitarbeiterInnen den nötigen Freiraum. Beides trägt zu mehr Ergebnisorientierung und zu einer Verbesserung der Leistungsqualität bei.

8.4 Offenheit für Neues, für Anderes und Interesse an einer kontinuierlichen Ergebnisverbesserung

Gerade die öffentliche Verwaltung ist geprägt vom Streben nach Kontinuität, dem Vertrauen auf das Bisherige und einer Grundskepsis gegenüber Veränderungen. Durch die

betonte Außenorientierung von Public Governance, durch die Einbindung der BürgerInnen und sonstigen Stakeholder in die Leistungsgestaltung wird es notwendig, dass sich die Verwaltungsstuben öffnen, dass die MitarbeiterInnen auf ihre KundInnen zugehen und dass Führungskräfte diese Offenheit leben. Ob die so genannten weibliche ‚Stärken' diese Anforderungen besser erfüllten, mögen die LeserInnen selbst beurteilen. Vielleicht ist es auch nicht verwunderlich, dass gerade diese drei Organisationen die als explizite One Stop Shops auf Bezirksverwaltungsebene einen großen Teil öffentlicher Dienstleistungen erbringen, das Projekt ‚Lernen voneinander' durchgeführt haben.

8.5   Ganzheitliches Führungsverständnis ist gefragt

Ganzheitliche Steuerung bedeutet die Einbindung der Stakeholder (Anspruchsgruppen), die Abstimmung von mittel- und langfristigen Perspektiven mit kurzfristigen Erfordernissen, ein einheitliches Steuerungssystem für die gesamte Organisation sowie eine mehrdimensionale Messung der Ergebnisse (Effizienz, Effektivität) (Biwald 2005). Wenn Führungskräfte nach wie vor überwiegend FachexpertInnen sind, so werden sie für diese neuen Steuerungsanforderungen zusätzliches Knowhow erwerben (Betriebswirtschaft, Qualitätsmanagement, Führen mit Zahlen etc.) und insbesondere das vernetzte Denken und Arbeiten praktizieren müssen.

8.6   Regelmäßige Selbstevaluation ist schwer aber notwendig

Sowohl die Leistung der Organisation als auch die Führungsarbeit des Managements sollten regelmäßig einer Evaluation unterzogen werden. Nur wenn man erkennt, wo man Ziele erreicht hat und wo nicht und aus welchen Gründen sie nicht erreicht wurden, kann man Verbesserungsmaßnahmen setzen und eine Leistungsverbesserung erreichen. Wie die Organisation sollten auch die Führungskräfte selbst ein hohes Interesse an einer Bewertung der eigenen Leistung haben. Instrumente wie 360°-Analysen oder Führungskräftebeurteilungen sind vorhanden. Jedenfalls sind diese Instrumente aber in ein Organisations- und Personalentwicklungsprogramm einzubetten. Trotzdem erfordert es Mut und die Fähigkeit zur Selbstkritik, sich solch einer Bewertung zu stellen und die Ergebnisse anzunehmen und umzusetzen.

9 Schlussbemerkungen

In der Ministeriumslandschaft Österreichs kann das Bundeskanzleramt neben dem Finanzministerium durchaus als Vorreiterressort bezeichnet werden. Nicht mehr nur Gesetze zu vollziehen, sondern die Aufgaben wirksam erfüllen und stets dabei das Ziel im Auge behalten, ist die Devise. Dies erreicht man nur mit einem breit angelegten Kulturwandel der durch Strukturveränderungen, Weiterbildungsprogramme und konkrete Projekte langfristig entwickelt werden kann. Wenn es auch jetzt noch nicht in größerem Ausmaß Wirkungsziele gibt und eine wirkungsorientierte Steuerung noch nicht breit etabliert ist, so kann doch gesagt werden, dass der Boden dafür schon aufbereitet ist. Die geplante Haushaltsreform bildet den rechtlichen Rahmen, in der Flexibilisierungsklausel wurde die Dezentralisierung der Verantwortung erfolgreich geprobt, die Selbstevaluation mit dem CAF stellt die richtigen Fragen und zeigt Lösungen auf und das Kontraktmanagement ist das passende Instrument dazu.

Abschließend muss jedoch zugestanden werden, dass in Österreich aber auch im Ausland weder eine echte ‚Wirkungssteuerung' noch eine wirkungsorientierte Ressourcensteuerung bisher befriedigend umgesetzt werden konnte. Wenn derzeit schon nicht die Wirkungen selbst gesteuert werden, so geht es doch mit eine ‚wirkungsorientierten' Steuerung um eine Philosophie, eine Kultur und eine Betrachtungsweise, die, anders als früher, die richtigen Punkte (die Ergebnisse) in den Mittelpunkt rückt und sich streng nach den Bedürfnissen der Menschen und der Gesellschaft ausrichtet. Daher lohnt es sich, diesen Weg weiterzugehen.

Anmerkungen

[1] Zur Abgrenzung zwischen Leistungs- und Wirkungsindikatoren siehe Dearing 2005.

[2] Näheres dazu siehe http://sektioniii.bka.gv.at/verwaltungsreform/flexiklausel/index.htm.

[3] Newsletter des EFD, Jänner 2004 unter www.flag.admin.ch.

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6 Changes in Individual Leadership

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Turning Leadership into Performance Management

1   Introduction

This chapter builds on some of the issues explored earlier in this book and has three aims. The first is to examine and review the nature of leadership and performance management. Second, it considers how individual leadership can contribute to improved performance in the delivery of public services, in conditions of change and in the context of public governance. The third aim is to illustrate, through a case study, how leadership and performance management are linked in the British civil service.

In the last decade, leadership within organisations, defined broadly as the ability to mobilise effort towards the attainment of shared goals and objectives, has come to the fore in the public sector in all OECD countries (OECD 2001). Although leadership has long been recognised as an essential element of management practice in the private sector (Drucker 1955), it was not identified as a requirement of civil servants and public officials until recently. The public service logic, which dominated public bureaucracies until the 1980s, did not perceive top public officials as managers or leaders but as administrators advising and implementing policy determined by politicians or through applying the law. The transformation of the state, the emergence of Public Governance and the introduction of New Public Management since the 1980s have seen the gradual displacement of the old public service logic with a new managerialist one.

The transformation of public services and the continuous and rapid rate of change and demands for their modernisation have focused attention on the need for leadership among not only politicians but also public officials responsible for implementing public management reforms and for creating a culture consistent with the new managerialism. The introduction of performance management, defined broadly as structured systems helping organisations plan, delegate and assess their operations effectively (Bevan/ Thompson 1991), requires that public officials have the managerial skills and competencies needed to operate such systems and to achieve organisational outputs efficiently and effectively.

More recently, the movement towards new systems of governance, defined broadly as "the formal and informal arrangements that determine how public decisions are carried out, from the perspective of maintaining a country's constitutional values in the face of the changing problems, actors and environments" (OECD 2005, p. 16). It also requires

specific skills in leading and managing partnerships and multi-agency cooperation and networks. One of the lessons learned from the private sector is that in order to achieve the continual change required of public organisations and 'public businesses' today, and to motivate and gain the commitment of staff to the change process, there is a need for effective organisational leadership. Leadership skills, in short, are deemed to be an essential requirement for all those involved in the change process and the striving for continually improving individual and organisational performance. Leadership is now recognised as the key 'enabler' in the European Foundation for Quality Management Business Excellence Model (EFQM 2000) and a critical component of good public governance (OECD 2001). Leadership, it seems, is increasingly being seen as the panacea in the twenty-first century for facilitating organisational success in both the private and the public sectors.

2 Governance and Current Concepts of Leadership

The world of governance today is very different from the world of government 30 years ago and public servants have had to adjust to these changes. Whether a public official is leading a government department or agency, a local authority, a voluntary body or a public/ private partnership, s/he requires different skills, knowledge, capabilities and competencies from those in the past. The OECD publication on leadership (2001, p. 1) asserts that leadership is a "critical component of good governance" because its role is to promote institutional adaptation, enhance managerial capacity and organisational performance in the public interest. The report argues that good leadership in the public sector is not value neutral but "public spirited". Effective leaders are expected to convey a strategic vision of their organisations, their core values and social purpose and inspire, motivate and mobilise those whose efforts seek to achieve the aims and objectives and substantive outputs of public organisations.

Public management now involves a mixed economy of provision of public services and the interface between the public, private and voluntary sectors is becoming increasingly blurred as public-private partnerships are set up to meet public needs. Leading and managing the performance of the public sector makes great demands on those officials responsible for undertaking that role. In addition to traditional leadership abilities such as providing vision and strategy and inspiring and mobilising people to perform, there is now a need for new leadership capabilities. Useem (2001) describes these as 'leading out' and

'leading up' or lateral leadership. A great deal of attention now focuses on how to develop the skills and competencies required of those filling twenty-first century managerial and leadership roles in the public sector.

This is particularly difficult within systems of governance and networks of organisations and community groups that have to tackle problems crossing organisational and increasingly national boundaries. Leading such complex patterns of relationships with different time-frames, interests, resources, constraints and cultures requires reticulist skills, political acumen and ability to operate within ambiguity. These tasks defy simple job descriptions or competency profiles.

Public sector management today, is all about performance and achieving the objectives set by politicians and their advisers in the most efficient and effective way. It is about striving to continually improve the services provided to and for the public and to demonstrate that public money is being used wisely in meeting the needs and expectations of the public as customers, clients and service users. Managers are expected to plan, direct, control and coordinate the use of resources in organisations to achieve their stated ends. Leaders are expected to move individuals, groups and organisations forward by challenging; inspiring, developing and motivating staff to achieve stated aims and objectives and accept the cultural changes taking place to do this. Leaders require different skills from managers, although effective managers need to be leaders too.

A generally-accepted definition of leadership is "a process that includes influencing the tasks, objectives and strategies of a group or organization, influencing people in the organization to implement the strategies and achieve the objectives, influencing group maintenance and identification and influencing the culture of the organization" (Yukl/ Van Fleet 1991, p. 149). In this context, leadership is perceived as a process and not as stereotypical individuals.

Several issues permeate the literature on leadership and they explain the lack of consensus on the subject. These include whether leadership is a group or an individual phenomenon, whether leadership is about influence or includes coercion and manipulation, and whether leadership is different from management (Yukl 1989; Crainer 1995; Grint 1997, 2004; Northouse 2004). Zaleznik (1977) began the trend of contrasting leadership and management by describing the leader as an artist using creativity and intuition in contrast to the manager who uses reason and control to problem solve. Bennis and Nanus (1985, p. 21) wrote that "managers are people who do things right and leaders are people who do the

right thing". Kotter (1990) saw management as a process focusing on complexity, while leadership focuses on change. In practice there is a close relationship between the two and it is not easy to separate them as distinct activities. In the public sector today, senior officials are expected to do both and most competency frameworks include both leadership and management skills and the attributes within them (Page 2005).

3   Discussing Leadership Approaches

Ideas about leadership reflect many historical and contemporary theories. Leaders have existed throughout recorded history and have been depicted as powerful, dynamic (usually) men who command armies, direct economic corporations, inspire political followers and mobilise nations. Initially, leaders were seen as men born with a natural aptitude to 'lead' and leadership was an art that could not be reduced to a science. A brief survey of the literature on leadership reveals that there are a number of approaches and schools of thought including trait, functional, behavioural, power-influence, and situational and contingency theories. The most recent sets of ideas are transformational and charismatic leadership, and servant and distributional leadership. Each of these approaches is summarised below.

3.1   The Trait Approach

The trait approach emphasises the personal attributes or qualities of individual leaders. Early trait research focused on the study of the physical characteristics and personalities of acknowledged leaders (Stogdill 1948). Later studies focused on the connection between specific traits and successful management (Stogdill 1974). Today the emphasis is more on traits such as empathy and tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty (Noordegraaf 2000; Simpson/ Barnard 2000). It is now accepted that there is no definitive set of leadership traits and that traits in themselves are an insufficient basis for the identification or development of superior leaders.

Recent research on leadership traits and skills has taken a pseudo-scientific form and has had a great impact on the selection and development of managers and administrators in large private and public organisations. Assessment centres use various techniques to identify leadership traits, motivation and skills. The same tests are used in succession

planning and in identifying training and development needs. Trait research is also used to match people to jobs and in some situational engineering by matching jobs to people.

3.2   The Functional Approach

This focuses on the job of leaders and the content of leadership and it assumes that leaders can be trained and developed to do their jobs well. The work of Adair (1979, 1984) and his action-centred approach to leadership has had a significant influence in English-speaking countries. He has argued that the effectiveness of leadership depends on meeting task, team maintenance and individual needs. These are overlapping and action by the leader in any one area has an effect on the other two. The 'three-circle' approach of Adair also illustrates the close relationship between leadership and management.

3.3   Behavioural Approaches

Behavioural approaches emphasise what leaders and managers actually do on the job but seek to identify what behaviours differentiate effective from ineffective leaders (Stewart 1976, 1982; Mintzberg 1973; Hales 1986). The earliest studies at Ohio State University (Fleishman 1953; Halpin/ Winer 1957) and the University of Michigan (Katz/ Kahn 1978; Likert 1967) identified three types of leadership behaviour: task-oriented behaviour, relationship-oriented behaviour, and leadership styles. All three behaviours can overlap in practice (Yukl 1971). Varieties of behaviour can be demonstrated using a continuum ranging from autocratic, through consultative to joint decision-making and ultimately delegation (Tannenbaum/ Schmidt 1973). Early research proposed 'universal' theories of effective leadership behaviour (Blake/ Mouton 1964; McGregor 1960; Argyris 1964; Likert 1967) but attempts to apply the theories led to a realisation that leadership is situational and that leadership is a relationship between leader and led.

Effective leadership is about getting the right balance between direction and participation. Hersey and Blanchard (1977) highlighted the maturity or readiness of the group being led as a critical determining situational factor. Other researchers (Vroom/ Yetton 1973) indicated that the more participative the decision process the more committed and motivated subordinates would be.

The work of Stewart (1976, 1988), Mintzberg (1973), Kotter (1982), Kanter (1983) and Peters and Waterman (1982) threw more light on leadership and the many roles that top executives perform. Their work demonstrated that roles have descriptive, prescriptive and perceptual elements and are circumscribed by constraints as well as presented with opportunities. Different jobs require different personalities, skills, competencies and leadership styles. It is now widely accepted that constraints vary from one organisation to another and from one sector of the economy to the other. Although there are still some who consider that managing and leading public organisations are no different from managing and leading private ones, there are far more who accept that the differences are substantive and significant (Allison 1979; Eliassen/ Kooiman 1993; Massey 1993; Farnham/ Horton 1999).

3.4   Power-influence Approach

The power-influence approach explores the bases of the power of leaders and how they exercise that power (Hollander/ Offermann 1990). Most observers accept that the essence of leadership is the influence that leaders have over followers. But followers also have some influence over leaders. Leaders can only lead as long as there are followers to be led. The literature demonstrates that leaders use different types of power including reward, coercive, expert, referent and legitimate power to get the desired behaviour from their subordinates, peers or sometimes superiors. They establish exchange relationships with different people within the group or the organisation and use the resources of their power to influence their behaviour.

3.5   Situational and Contingency Theories

The situational approach emphasises contextual factors, such as type of organisation, skills of the work group, leader authority and discretion, as all impacting on the style and effectiveness of the leader and the leadership relationship. Although there are many situational theories (Yukl/ Van Fleet 1991), they do not translate easily into specific guidelines for organisational leaders. One, however, which has particular relevance to this chapter on leadership and performance is path-goal theory (House/ Dessler 1974). This suggests that the performance of subordinates is affected by the extent to which leadership behaviour motivates them and satisfies their expectations. Given that people are different

and their needs vary, different types of leadership behaviour are required. House (1971) identified directive leadership, supportive leadership, participative leadership and achievement-oriented leadership, which can be practised by the same person in different situations. The two main situational factors - nature of the job and personal characteristics of subordinates - are the two main contingent factors.

3.6   Transformational and Charismatic Leadership

Recent leadership studies have focused on transformational rather than transactional leadership and on charismatic rather than legitimate leadership. Transforming leadership is the process of influencing major changes in organisational structures and cultures and motivating staff to commit to related strategies and objectives (Burns 1978). It involves creating and projecting a vision, which empowers subordinates to become leaders and change agents in the transformational process. Transformational leadership is a shared process involving different levels of leadership throughout the organisation (Schein 1992).

Many writers see transformational and charismatic leadership as the same. Indicators of charismatic leadership are the follower's trust in the correctness of the leader's beliefs, unquestioning acceptance of the leader's decisions, and obedience and affection for the leader. It is the leader rather than the process that is the focus of modern charismatic theories (House 1977). Some research on charismatic and transformational leadership (Peters/ Austin 1985; Tichy/ Devanne 1986) has identified the traits, behaviours and influence processes associated with it, while many biographies of acknowledged inspirational leaders identify their special qualities (Iacocca 1986; Roddick 2005; Harvey-Jones 2003). Much writing on transformational leadership echoes what has been written in the past but what is new is recognition of the importance of emotional reactions by followers to leaders, the role of the management of meaning and symbolism in transforming organisations, and the importance of culture in both shaping and constraining leadership processes. Inspirational leadership connects with the led, has the capacity to recognise the capabilities of others and can empower them to want to excel.

3.7 Servant and Distributional Leadership

The notion of servant leadership is different from other theories in that the servant leader does not want to lead but to serve a purpose greater than the organisation or the group he/she is leading (Greenleaf 1970). Emphasis is on the moral and ethical dimensions of leadership. Informal, emergent, dispersed or distributional leadership disassociate leadership from organisational hierarchies and suggests that all individuals at all levels and in all roles within an organisation can exert leadership influence over their colleagues and influence the overall direction of the organisation.

Central to this approach is the distinction between leader and leadership. Leadership is perceived as the process of sense making and direction-giving within an organisation or a group and the leader is identified by his her relationships within the social group who act as followers. This approach has an output rather than input orientation. It moves away from what are the traits, behaviours or precursors of leaders to the outcomes of effective leadership. It also concentrates on developing and promoting leadership skills amongst all people within the organisation rather than those at the top. "The aim is to encourage a culture which is inclusive, encourages creativity, imagination, care and a collective ambition for excellence at all levels of the organisation." This view also draws attention to the emergent nature of leadership. "It is not a fixed entity but rather a flowing and evolving process whereby different leaders may become revealed overtime as a result of group interaction" (Bolden 2004, p. 13).

4 Managing and Improving Performance

It is clear from studies of leadership theories outlined above that they have no predictive powers but throw light on the skills and competencies required of leaders, the processes involved in managing and leading the change process, and in achieving the performance required and expected of public organisations today. These theories are being used and applied throughout the public sector, although there is still no absolute agreement on what managers and leaders do and what they need to do to be effective. There never can be since such definitions arise not from the organisational or technical requirements "but from the shifting ways in which over time these functions are variously conceptualized" (Salaman 2004, p. 58).

Today, leadership is seen as the key to inspiring people to work towards and achieve group and individual goals, not through coercion and force but through personal motivation. The link between effective leadership and performance is widely assumed, although there is very little evidence supporting that assumption. The impact of leadership or any other organisational process on performance is very difficult to assess. This is because many other factors interact with leadership to shape both individual and organisational performance.

Performance management can be viewed from a number of different levels, individual, group and organisational (Williams 1998) and measurement of performance at any one level is problematic. At individual level, performance can be revealed using hard measures such as productivity, numbers of complaints, and projects completed on time but softer measures, such as improved self-awareness, strategic thinking or staff development, are difficult to measure. Similarly, the effect of leadership and management at group level may be seen in productivity improvements, retention, and good attendance at work. But group morale, cooperation and commitment are less easy to measure. Finally, at organisational level, a critical mass of effective leadership may be revealed in cost savings, returns on investment, achievements of targets but softer measures such as customer satisfaction, innovation, and changes in organisational culture are difficult to link directly back to leadership. In complex systems of governance, which characterise societies today, management and leadership transcend and traverse organisational boundaries and this is the most difficult level to measure their impact.

Research undertaken by the British Management and Leadership Development Research Network (Burgoyne et al. 2004) sought to show the link between management and leadership development, management and leadership capability and performance. The empirical evidence is weak and although both leadership and management are seen to have an effect on a range of outcomes at individual, group and organisational level, they are only part of a general set of human resource management (HRM) practices. Two factors do seem, however, to increase both capability and performance. These are feedback to individuals and the amount of support and reinforcement given to staff generally. Line managers play a key role in ensuring that both these things happen.

4.1   Performance Management

Two leading authorities on performance management define it as a "strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success to organisations by improving the performance of people who work in them and by developing the capabilities of teams and contributors" (Armstrong/ Baron 1998, p. 7). The aims of performance management are to:

–   help achieve sustainable improvements in organisational performance,

–   act as a lever for change in developing a more performance-oriented culture,

–   increase the motivation and commitment of staff,

–   enable individuals develop their abilities, increase their job satisfaction and achieve their full potential to their benefit and that of the organisation employing them,

–   enhance the development of team cohesion and performance,

–   develop constructive and open relationships between individuals and their managers in a process of continuing dialogue, linked to work being done throughout the year,

–   provide opportunities for individuals to express their aspirations and expectations about their work (Armstrong/ Baron 1998, p. 52).

According to Cave and Thomas (1998), the performance management cycle in outline comprises seven main phases. It starts, first, with the organisation's corporate mission statement and strategic goals. These ensure that each of the activities in the cycle contributes to their achievement. Second, business and departmental plans and goals flow out of corporate goals, although some iteration may take place so that departmental views about what can be achieved are taken into account before business goals are finalised. Third, the performance and development agreement, sometimes called the 'performance contract', is the agreement on objectives and accountabilities reached by individuals with their managers. Agreement is normally reached at a formal review meeting and recorded on a performance review form. Many organisations ask both managers and individuals to

complete a pre-meeting questionnaire/ form that provides an agenda for the performance review. A performance agreement defines the work to be done, the results to be attained, the performance standards to be achieved and the competence levels required. For individuals, the work to be done is agreed in terms of key results areas or principal accountabilities. Basically, the same process can be followed for teams i.e. agreeing what work should be done, how it should be done, what should be achieved and what team skills are required. Discussion of individual or team goals may lead to reconsideration of departmental or even corporate goals.

The fourth phase is the performance and development plan. This is primarily a joint exploration of what individuals need to do and know to improve their performance and develop their skills and competencies and how managers can provide the support and guidance they need to do this. For individuals, this stage includes the preparation and agreement of a personal development plan. This provides an action plan for individuals with the support of their managers and the organisation. It may include formal training and, more importantly, self-managed learning, coaching, project work, job enlargement and enrichment, and an element of self-assessment by the individual.

The fifth phase – action: work, development and support – focuses on what has to be done, how it is to be done and what is to be achieved. It is also concerned with developing people, helping them to learn what they need to do well – immediately and in the future. The emphasis is often on managing performance throughout the year. It is necessary to enhance what Mumford (1989) has called deliberate learning from experience. Support can be provided through counselling and coaching and by providing facilities and resources to meet staff expectations.

The sixth phase is continuous monitoring and feedback. Realistically, managing performance is a continuous process in which managers, individuals and teams work together on a continuing basis, so as to achieve the purposes of the organisation. It is a process that seeks to respect the different needs of all stakeholders of the organisation and recognises their mutual interests. In this way, an effective performance management system can provide intrinsic motivation by giving individuals autonomy and the means to control their work.

The seventh and last phase in the performance management cycle is formal review, performance appraisal and feedback between managers and individuals or team leaders and their teams. These are held annually or more frequently as is necessary within the

system. Such reviews provide occasions for structured feedback and reflection. The review and appraisal meeting draws conclusions about what has been achieved, based on events and observations, and it provides individuals with opportunity to comment on the leadership, support and guidance they have received from their managers. Constructive feedback can be given to staff and areas for improvement identified. The main output of the review/ appraisal meeting in the performance management cycle is a revised performance agreement, as well as generating performance ratings for individual staff.

4.2   Some Benefits and Critiques of Performance Management

It is generally recognised that well-run performance management processes provide benefits to individuals, managers and organisations. The benefits to individuals include greater clarity of their roles and job objectives, encouragement and support to perform well (including pay rewards) and provision of guidance and help in developing individual abilities and performance. They provide opportunities to spend quality time with their managers and to contribute to the formulation of objectives and plans to improve the ways in which work is managed and carried out. They also provide an objective and fair basis for assessing performance.

For managers, properly conducted performance management provides the basis for clarifying performance and the behavioural expectations of their subordinates, as well as affording a framework for reviewing performance and competencies. It improves individual and team performance, motivates staff and facilitates teambuilding processes. It also provides a basis for helping under-performers, may be used to develop or coach individuals and offers opportunities to spend structured, productive time with work teams and team members. Performance management can also provide non-financials rewards to staff such as recognition, opportunity for personal growth and personal development.

For organisations, performance management aims to align corporate, individual and team objectives, improve performance, motivate staff, improve commitment and underpin core corporate values. It also has the potential to improve learning and development among staff, enlarge the organisational skill base and provide for continuous improvement. Finally, it provides the basis for career planning, helps retain skilled employees, supports total quality and customer service initiatives, and supports culture change programmes.

There are, however, critiques of performance management, particularly of performance appraisal, by academic commentators. These critiques are rooted in three issues. First, it is argued that the process is problematic because of the complexity and difficulties involved in one person's attempts to sum up the performance of another. Indeed, Bowles and Coates (1993) have argued that performance appraisal of individuals requires subtle psychological and social skills that are not demonstrated by many managers.

Second, some scholars argue that performance appraisal is a means of oppressive or coercive control by managers and organisations over individual staff. These critiques include:

−   Appraisal is a bureaucratic system of management control (Newton/ Findlay 1996), as well as being a process to which many managers are hostile (Carlton/ Sloman 1992).

−   Appraisal enlists compliance (Barlow 1989).

−   Appraisal reinforces authority relations and defines dependency.

−   Appraisal implies that rewards and progress are in the hands of a single "super ordinate" (Grint 1993).

−   Appraisal is a form of control used to police performance (Winstanley/ Stuart-Smith 1996).

Third, other academic critiques of appraisal include the tendency of managements to adopt a unitary frame of reference in organisations, where organisations are more realistically analysed as pluralist systems (Townley 1993, p. 199). Similarly, Engelmann and Roesch (1996) have argued that appraisal ignores the collective aspects of work and that there is conflict between the individualistic approach to appraisal adopted by managers and their emphasis on teamwork. Others such as Deming (1986) have argued that appraisal ignores system factors, while Grint (1993) has suggested that appraisal is an inconsistent and fundamentally subjective process. Finally, researchers such as Stiles et al. (1997) claim that managements indulge in rhetoric about developing staff within performance management systems but often do not put their espoused views into practice.

5   Case Study: Leadership and Performance Management in the British Senior Civil Service

The trends towards utilising skills of leadership by public managers and introducing performance management in the public sector are demonstrated within the UK in the Senior Civil Service (SCS). The SCS was created in 1996 and consists of some 3,800 specialists and general managers filling the top three levels of the service. They head government departments and agencies and are responsible for advising government on policy, implementing policy and managing the performance of all central government organisations involved in the delivery of government services. Managing and leading this complex organisation (some 150 administrative units and 570,000 civil servants) makes great demands on senior civil servants. Since the 1980s they have operated within a system of performance management. This has been designed to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and value for money of public services, ensure their responsiveness to service users and continually improve their quality.

The SCS has been in the vanguard of a transformation of the state as both the agent and focus of change. It assumed responsibility for implementing the modernisation policy of the 'new' Labour government in 1999 (Cabinet Office 1999a) and produced a strategy for reforming itself to create a civil service for the twentieth-first century (Cabinet Office 1999b). The modernisation programme required a strategic leadership role for the SCS and a new competency framework and a pay and performance system were introduced in April 2001. They are highly integrated and continually being reviewed. In 2006 a new skills for government framework was introduced designed to ensure that at every level, including the SCS, civil servants have the skills and competencies required to perform their management and leadership roles effectively.

5.1   The Performance Management System

In the SCS Pay and Performance Management is centrally managed by the Cabinet Office covering all members irrespective of the department or agency in which they work. Great emphasis is placed on the importance of the system in creating a high performance culture. It concentrates on four areas enabling leaders of the service to:

– focus individual performance and development on the delivery of strategic business priorities,

– motivate people,

– support succession planning, career and personal development,

– provide for growth in organisational capability and continuous improvement.

Every year, in April, individuals enter into a performance agreements with their line manager setting up to four personal business objectives or targets which clearly reflect departmental or agency priorities for the year ahead. It also specifies how their job is to be performed by identifying the key competencies, standards and behaviours expected. These reflect the core competencies in the SCS competency framework.[1] In-year reviews evaluate progress and make adjustments if necessary and end of year reviews (the following April) discuss individual performance and lay a foundation for the following year.

Line managers record the achievements of their subordinates and indicate if there is a need for a personal performance improvement plan (PIP). They also make recommenda-tions on pay and bonus payments and provide information on succession planning. Within a month of agreeing new personal business targets individuals and their line manager meet to prepare and discuss a personal development plan (PDP). Where a line manager has recommended a PIP, it sets down specific targets, time scales and the consequences of failing to improve.

Performance and rewards are closely linked in the SCS. Pay is performance related and not based on time served. It is also linked to comparative performance as individuals are rated and placed in one of three pay tranches: tranche 1 (25 per cent of staff), tranche 2 (65-70 per cent) and tranche 3 (bottom 5-10 per cent). This requires a forced distribution by managers on the basis of individual performance. Those in tranche 1 get a base pay increase, an increment plus a bonus. Tranche 2 get a base pay increase but may not get a bonus if they fail to achieve all their performance targets. Tranche 3 do not receive a base pay increase or a bonus.

One of the issues at the beginning was what to do with underperformers. An HR Practitioner Guide to Performance Management and Reward in the SCS (Cabinet Office

2004) identified both causes of underachievement and strategies for dealing with them. The latter depends on the cause of underachievement. Individuals who could perform effectively elsewhere can be moved. Insufficient development can be met by a strong development plan, whilst individual mentoring or coaching could help 'fast track' performance improvement. Inappropriate behaviours, however, are best remedied through improvement plans and working closely with the line manager, who may mentor or counsel the member of staff. This requires skill and ability of line managers to select and deliver appropriate strategies. In 2003, a major programme was commissioned, aimed at strengthening the leadership capacity of the SCS to meet the demanding delivery targets, provide the vision for the future, and manage the performance of staff.

5.2 Leadership in the Senior Civil Service

Emphasis of the present Government is on service delivery and as a consequence there has been a radical shift in the core purpose of the leadership within the civil service. Leadership used to be providing policy advice and managing government business. Although it still does both of these, delivery is now added as a core function. This has called into question the assumptions underlying the civil service structure, careers and the skills that civil servants require.

Top civil servants are now seen as chief executive officers who are required to display leadership skills. Although they are still expected to display traditional characteristics of integrity, impartiality, intellect, dedication, responsiveness to events and effective management of government business, they are also now expected to be innovators, customer oriented, strategists and skilful in rigorous prioritisation, effective performance management and risk management.

The profile is for visible leaders who inspire trust, take personal responsibility for delivering results, work in teams and across traditional boundaries focused on strategic outcomes, matching resources to business priorities, and are also honest, courageous and realistic with staff and ministers. These senior civil servants need to become more visible to staff, partners and customers. As a result, government has put in place a number of initiatives with the aim of developing leaders of the future through a high potential development scheme. But there are also programmes to develop leadership at every level.

A central part of the change agenda for the civil service entitled Professional Skills for Government was launched in September 2005. The programme is intended to enable staff in all areas of the civil service to develop the skills and experience needed to design and deliver twenty-first century services. The key elements are:

− moving towards a service where all staff will be expected to have the professional skills and experience needed to do their job well,

− establishing three career groupings: operational delivery, policy delivery and corporate services delivery, each with parity of esteem and career development opportunities,

− requiring staff to demonstrate skills in four areas at appropriate levels in relation to their job and chosen career path: these are leadership, core skills (people management, financial management, programme and project management, analysis and use of evidence, strategic thinking, communications and marketing), job related and professional skills, and broader experience.

This is a major long-term change programme and a key part of Government's delivery and reform agenda. It represents a major culture shift, which the Head of the Civil Service has described as "The fusion of historical values with 21st Century dynamism" (O'Donnell, 2006). All civil servants are expected to be leaders now and at SCS level, a leadership development programme is now in place. There are three levels in a suite of leadership programmes. The first is a Leadership Foundation Programme that lasts five days and explores leadership models, practices, tools and techniques, provides personal profiling, explores strategic thinking, and begins to explore contemporary dilemmas and challenges. The second is the Advanced Leadership Programme that has four modules taken over12 months. The third level, the Top Management Programme, includes members from private, public and voluntary organisations. Its aims are to deepen personal awareness of their effectiveness as leaders, extend strategic, change and risk capabilities, broaden environmental awareness to assist in planning for the future, build participants' resilience and ability to deal with crises, and enhance strategic communication skills under pressure.

Clearly, the system of performance management in the SCS integrates both individual and organisational performance frameworks. It is also part of an integrated HRM system which links recruitment, training, development and reward using its competency framework to ensure that members of the SCS have the core competencies needed to provide for strategic leadership of the civil service, and ensure the effective delivery of

government policies. Recent changes are placing greater emphasis on managerial skills relevant to the key role of delivery and on inspirational and transformational and distributive leadership.

In addition to the soft skills of communication, interpersonal, decision-making and problem solving, leaders in the SCS are expected to display excellent information processing, project management, customer service and delivery skills along with proven business acumen. They are expected to be able to show drive and enthusiasm, have endless energy, be entrepreneurial, take risks, build partnerships and be visible. In addition they are also expected to demonstrate personal qualities of honesty, integrity, empathy, trust and valuing diversity. The standards approach to competencies (Horton 2002) while still widely used has its limitations. A more useful approach is to start from the type of organisation, its culture and core values and to identify the attributes required of leaders and leadership within that context. This is what the civil service in the UK is now attempting to do.

6   Conclusion

The evidence from recent research into the impact of management and leadership on performance indicates that they have an effect but only as part of an effective set of HRM practices, with leadership which takes a variety of forms being only one of a range factors affecting performance. It is clear that an integrated HRM strategy aligned with the strategic objectives of the organisation are more likely to be effective than any number of stand alone initiatives. It is the leaders' influence on employee motivation and commitment that appears to have the greatest impact rather than any specific characteristics of the leader per se. Also the development of skills and knowledge is not sufficient to improve performance. Constructive feedback, appropriate support and encouragement to take on new responsibilities or accept challenges are keys to improved performance.

The OECD and its member states now recognise the need for leadership in rapidly changing and modernising public organisations. They accept that leaders can be developed and trained and have evolved strategies and policies to raise the profile of leaders and leadership throughout their public services. In the UK centres of excellence in leadership have been established for all parts of the public sector including local and central government, health, defence, education and police. The case study analysed above

has examined and demonstrated how the SCS in the UK has constructed a leadership programme to ensure that it has the men and women needed to lead the civil service into the twenty-first century.

In the UK, however, government is not only promoting management and leadership development in the civil service but also nationally (Department for Education and Skills 2002). Some of the most influential generic and public sector frameworks currently used are the Framework of Management and Leadership Abilities (Council of Educational Management and Leadership), Investors in People Leadership and Management model, EFQM Business Excellence Model, Chartered Institute of Management and the four frameworks developed specifically for the Public Sector. These are the new SCS Competency Framework, Defence Leadership Centre Helix Model, the Employers Organisation for Local Government Compendium of Competencies, and the NHS Leadership Qualities Framework. Bolden's et al. (2003) study of these frameworks indicates that a version of transformational leadership is being promoted, with leadership being conceived as a set of values, qualities and behaviours that encourage the participation, development, performance and commitment of followers. The leader in almost all cases is seen as the source of direction and as the energiser, catalyst and visionary equipped with the abilities that can be applied across a diverse range of situations and contexts.

Despite absence of definitive empirical evidence indicating the critical relationship between leadership and performance and the difficulty in measuring the relationship, it is becoming increasingly accepted that appropriate leadership is a key ingredient in the effective performance of individuals, groups, organisations, regions, and even nation states in the contemporary world (Bolden 2004). The importance of leadership is being promoted and is seen as being the key to building effective organisations. Ideas about leadership and the competencies needed to lead organisations in the twenty-first century are changing. According to (Bolden/ Gosling 2003), the key qualities identified for leaders over the next 10 years are deemed to be:

–   integrity and moral courage,

–   self-awareness and humility,

–   empathy and emotional engagement,

- transparency and openness,

- clarity of vision,

- adaptability and flexibility,

- energy and resilience,

- decisiveness in the face of uncertainty,

- judgement, consistency and fairness,

- ability to inspire, motivate and listen,

- respect and truth,

- knowledge and expertise,

- delivering results.

However, practical dilemmas continue to face public managers and public leaders in the twenty-first century. For example, can performance outcomes justify the means by which they are achieved? When values clash which ones should take priority? What can be done when the interests of organisational stakeholders are in conflict with the interests of society? Can leaders lead when they do not subscribe to the core values of their organisation? How can consensus be achieved without negating minority views? These surely are ongoing dilemmas that have always faced politicians and their senior officials within the political context of government. These dilemmas continue to challenge them within contemporary systems of public governance.

Endnotes

[1] There are six core competencies in the SCS competency framework Leadership for Result. They are: (i) giving purpose and direction (ii) making a personal impact (iii) thinking strategically (iv) getting the best from people (v) learning and improving (vi) focusing on delivery. Each of these competencies has a list of effective and ineffective behaviours, which are the criteria, used to assess performance (Horton 2004).

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Personenbezogene Führung als Context Setting - Knee Deep in the Big Muddy?

1   Problemhintergrund

Will man personenbezogene Führung im Rahmen des Managements und der Gestaltung von Handlungskontexten näher bestimmen, ist man bereits zu Beginn mit mehreren konzeptionellen Fragen belastet. Sie beziehen sich vor allem auf die Art und den Umfang der Phänomene, die jeweils analytisch einbezogen werden. Offensichtlich variieren die Auffassungen darüber ziemlich stark, was unter personenbezogene Führung zu verstehen ist, welche Funktionen es hat, wie es in das gesamte Führungsgeschehen eingebettet sein kann, welche Leistungsbesonderheiten es aufweist und mit welchen anderen Führungsarten es gegebenenfalls verknüpft auftritt bzw. auftreten kann, damit Führungserfolg entsteht. Die verschiedenen Auffassungen über den Gegenstand und die Funktionen von personenbezogener Führung sind selbst konzeptionsabhängig, wobei in den Konzeptionen wesentliche Hintergrundannahmen oft implizit bleiben. Vergleichbares gilt für das context setting wie auch die Verknüpfung beider Konzeptionsbereiche. Dadurch wird die innertheoretische Verständigung ebenso erschwert wie Versuche, auf derart diverser Grundlage angewandte Fragestellungen eindeutig zu beantworten. Sicherlich trifft diese Zustandsbeschreibung auch auf andere sozialwissenschaftliche Konstrukte zu, sodass man es mit einem generellen Problem und weniger mit einem Sonderfall verwaltungswissenschaftlicher Forschung zu tun hat (vgl. z.B. Scherer 2001). Die Vielfalt an Vorstellungen kann man einerseits positiv deuten, etwa als reichhaltige Interpretationsmöglichkeiten und theoretische Kreativität. Sie lässt sich aber auch lesen als bloße Ansammlung von Einzelheiten, die zwar um eine Forschungsfrage gruppiert sind, ohne aber als Mosaik an Interpretationen bereits ein Muster zu offenbaren. Beide Interpretationen bergen ein handicap, weil die wissenschaftlichen Hilfestellungen zugunsten der Anwendung eines bestimmten Managementkonzepts oder die Empfehlungen für ein Führungsverfahren letztlich widersprüchlich bis diffus bleiben müssen.

Betrachtet man beide Konstrukte genauer und arbeitet ihre verschiedenen Bedeutungsgehalte heraus, handelt es sich keineswegs um ein theoretisches Raisonnieren etwa mit dem Ziel, Mehrdeutigkeiten begriffstrategisch zu arrondieren. Die Überlegungen sind vielmehr planungs- und gestaltungserheblich. Sie zeigen erstens die handlungsleitende Funktion managerialer Bezugsrahmen bei der gedanklichen Analyse wie bei der Lösung praktischer Probleme (vgl. grundsätzlich Grochla 1978). Zum zweiten werden so die Kriterien angesprochen, die die Auswahl solcher Bezugsrahmen und Instrumentarien steuern, wenn wissenschaftlich gestützte Konzeptionen praktisch wirksam gemacht werden sollen. Unterschiedliche konzeptionelle Perspektiven, die sich in verschiedenen Auffassungen

widerspiegeln, liefern unterschiedliche gedankliche Ansatzpunkte für Veränderungsmöglichkeiten, an die zum Beispiel ein Kontextsetting als Mittel individueller Führung angekoppelt werden kann. Nicht zuletzt spielen neben den Leistungspotentialen von Managementkonzepten und Instrumenten ihre Einsatzkosten eine Rolle. Damit wiederum verknüpft sind die Führungs- bzw. Koordinationskosten insgesamt sowie die weitergehenden Folgen zu nennen. So gesehen hat die konzeptionelle bzw. theoretische Klärung des Phänomenbereichs nicht nur seiner empirischen Erforschung voranzugehen, sie sollte jedenfalls einer Gestaltung dann vorauslaufen, wenn man den Anspruch erhebt, dies überlegt und zielgerichtet zu tun. Conceptual cleverness und device cleverness gehören zusammen.

Im weiteren wird kein neues Konzept, Modell oder Instrumentarium vorgestellt oder dessen Entwicklung angeregt, um personenbezogene Führung als Kontextgestaltung (context setting) zu etablieren oder den bestehenden Instrumentekasten an Verfahren zur Führung von Mitarbeitern um eine weitere Variante anzureichern. Stattdessen soll gezeigt werden, wie komplex, widersprüchlich und theoretisch unklar der hier behandelte Bereich immer noch ist. Es sind nicht nur die mit den Begrifflichkeiten bezeichneten Gegenstandsbereiche personenbezogene Führung oder context setting, die selbst ihrer Art und ihrem Umfang nach unterschiedlich gefasst werden. Es gilt auch für die theoretischen Mittel, die man zur Analyse heranzieht und auf deren Grundlagen verändert wird. In der Folge dieser Vielfalt laufen natürlich auch die gedanklichen Vorstellungen darüber auseinander, wie sich beide Bereiche instrumentalisieren lassen ('als') und wie sich Nutzen und Lasten für die verschiedenen Akteure des Führungsprozesses verteilen.

Um diesen komplexen Tatbestand besser zu erhellen, werden daher Leistungen und Leistungsgrenzen von managerialen Konzepten und Instrumentarien am Beispiel personenbezogener Führung und context setting näher umrissen. Beide wurden am Standardmodell `Unternehmung` entwickelt. Angesprochen werden auch daher mögliche Nebenwirkungen solcher Konzepte und Verfahrensweisen. Dies wegen der besonderen Randbedingungen, die für die Leistungserzeugung im öffentlichen Bereich vorliegen können. Die Rede ist hier von der Wahrung der Rechtsbindung, Unparteilichkeit, Professionalität, Gleichbehandlung und Kontrollierbarkeit des Verwaltungshandelns, die durch den Einsatz neuer Führungsverfahren tangiert werden.

1.1   Asymmetrien

Bei der Konzept- und Instrumentewahl zur Lösung theoretischer wie angewandter Fragestellungen, die bei der Analyse verwaltungswissenschaftlicher Sachverhalte ebenso eine Rolle spielt wie bei einem wissenschaftlichen gestützten Veränderungshandeln, steht man daher nicht nur vor der Zielproblematik rationalisierten Verwaltungshandelns selbst. Sie wird in der einschlägigen Diskussion breit behandelt und bedarf in diesem Zusammenhang keiner besonderen Darstellung.[1] Man ist auch mit einem Auswahlproblem konfrontiert, das sich auf die Denkvorstellungen und Instrumente bezieht, die eingesetzt werden können bzw. sollen, um die Ziele verwaltungsbetrieblicher Rationalisierung zu erreichen. Untersuchungen zur Wahl geeigneter konzeptioneller Mittel, um die Binnenrationalisierung des Verwaltungsbetriebs zu betreiben, sind bislang nach meinem Eindruck allerdings kaum systematisch entwickelt worden (vgl. aber z.B. Reichard 1998 oder Pfeffer 2006).[2] Argumentiert wird ansonsten mit ökonomischen Begründungen. Augenfällig, aber natürlich auf den ersten Blick wenig überraschend, ist dies bei den Positionen, die generell zugunsten einer stärkeren internen Managementorientierung öffentlicher Verwaltungen argumentieren und anraten, hierzu auf unternehmerische Denkvorstellungen und Instrumente zurück-zugreifen. Hier können aber gravierende Probleme auftreten, deren Konsequenzen nach meinem Eindruck unterausgeleuchtet bleiben. Gleichzeitig mit der Empfehlung macht man darauf aufmerksam, dass der Erfolg einer Übernahme unternehmerischer Ansätze in die Strukturierung und das Management des Verwaltungsbetriebs nicht voraussetzungslos ist. So meint beispielsweise Budäus, dass sich die praktische Umsetzung von Managementtheorien im öffentlichen Bereich nur dann zu den erhofften Rationalisierungsfolgen (Effektivität, Effizienz; Produktivität, Kostenwirtschaftlichkeit) verdichten kann, wenn auch eine wettbewerbsadäquate positive wie negative Sanktionierung von Verwaltungshandeln gewährleistet ist (vgl. Budäus 1998, S. 5).

Interne Produktivitätsorientierung und externe Marktorientierung müssen demnach zusammengedacht und zusammengebracht werden (vgl. Oppen/ Sack/ Wegener 2005) und - wenn das aufgrund des besonderen Gepräges öffentlicher Leistungen ersichtlich nicht geht - auf die Signalfunktion von Wettbewerbsäquivalenten (z.B. benchmarking) zurückgegriffen werden, damit die Konzeptionen und Verfahren der verwaltungsbetrieblichen Binnenrationalisierung ihre erhofften Wirkungen überhaupt entfalten können. Der Erfolg der empfohlenen unternehmerischen Managementkonzepte und Führungsinstru-

mente ergibt sich nicht automatisch, er wird an das Vorhandensein zusätzlicher Kontextbedingungen rückgebunden: Sie sind entweder aber zur Zeit nicht gegeben, ihre zuverlässige Erfassbarkeit ist zweifelhaft oder hängt davon ab, ob notwendige vorgelagerte politische Grundsatzentscheidungen gefällt werden.

Legt man solche Wirkungsvoraussetzungen durch die Verkopplung von Binnenmodernisierung und Marktkonditionierung fest, wird die Zahl der Anwendungsfälle in denen Managementinstrumentarien zur Binnenrationalisierung zur Zeit erfolgreich eingesetzt werden können, scharf begrenzt, ohne dass dies hinreichend klar gestellt wird. Gleichzeitig immunisiert man das Argument zugunsten einer managerialen Binnenrationalisierung gegen sein Scheitern. Misserfolge der Binnenrationalisierung müssen nun weder auf ungeeignete Managementkonzepte noch auf fehlerhaft ausgewählte Verfahren zurückgeführt werden, vielmehr sind nicht vorhandene oder unterausgeprägte Kontextbedingungen verantwortlich. Eine eingehende Betrachtung der Leistungsmöglichkeiten wie Grenzen unternehmerischer Managementansätze selbst kann unterbleiben. Will man so den Erfolg von Maßnahmen zur Binnenrationalisierung sichern, führt diese Logik dazu, dass die Makro- und Mikrostrukturen des öffentlichen Sektors zukünftig denen von Unternehmungen angeglichen werden müssen, bislang vorhandene Unterschiede zwischen dem privaten und dem öffentlichen Sektor werden eingeebnet.

Zweifellos hat dieser Weg der Umgestaltung seit Jahren erhebliche politische, publizistische wie praktische Bedeutung. Jüngst aber mehren sich die skeptischen Stimmen, erwartete Rationalisierungserfolge treten nicht ein. Die Erfolgsmöglichkeiten der zur Umgestaltung empfohlenen Mittel werden stärker relativiert, weil sich zeigt, dass nicht nur althergebrachte bürokratisch-administrative Konzeptionen erhebliche Leistungsgrenzen besitzen und entsprechende Organisationspathologien bedingen, es gilt auch für die neuen Organisationsverfahren (manageriale ebenso wie marktliche). Benannt werden jetzt die Grenzen wettbewerblicher Strukturen, die beschränkte Signalfunktion von Preisen für den Qualitätswettbewerb wird eingeräumt, die Steuerungsprobleme bei stark dezentralisierten Leistungseinheiten aufgelistet, Fehleinschätzungen über das Einsparungspotential beim Wechsel des Organisationsregimes erkannt und die unzureichende Verrechnung von Folgekosten mit den Rationalisierungsgewinnen kritisch angemerkt. Das sind nur einige Beispiele dafür, dass und wie sich vorangegangene positive Einschätzungen und Erwartungen zurückbilden (vgl. Wegener 2005). Noch hinzuzufügen ist die idealisierte Darstellung der Management- und Arbeitswirklichkeit des Institutionentypus Unternehmung, der als Referenzmodell für gelingendes Management dient.[3]

Orientiert man sich an diesen Strukturen und Managementpraktiken in mehr oder weniger großem Umfang, muss man auch deutlich machen, welcher Preis dafür zu zahlen ist. Er besteht zumindest in der sehr schlichten Erkenntnis, dass das Management von Unternehmungen und die Führung von Mitarbeitern auch dann mit einer Fülle von Dysfunktionalitäten, Paradoxien und Ineffizienzen behaftet bleibt, wenn man sich der jeweils neuesten Konzeptionen und Verfahrensweisen bedient, die gerade in Wissenschaft und Beratungspraxis verhandelt werden. Jedes einigermaßen umfassende Lehrbuch über Management[4] behandelt eine Fülle an Gestaltungs- und Führungsproblemen, mit denen Unternehmungen im Rahmen ihrer Leistungserstellung und -verwertung konfrontiert sind. Wenn man sich nur auf die Personalführung und die arbeitsorganisatorische Gestaltung der Leistungserstellung bezieht (z.B. Motivation und Anreizgestaltung; Arbeitszufrieden-heit und Leistung, Identifikation mit betrieblichen Zielen und Handlungskoordination; psychologischen Entfremdung und anomische Arbeitsbedingungen) wird über die vielfältigen theoretischen Beiträge, die hier verhandelt werden, sehr deutlich, dass sich menschliche Leistungspotentiale nicht friktionslos in betriebliches Arbeitshandeln umwandeln. Wäre dies anders, würde die Behandlung der hier nur beispielhaft angeführten Themens keine Berechtigung haben. Es sind theoretische Abbildungen der diversen Versuche, menschliche Leistungspotentiale in betrieblich gewünschtes Arbeitshandeln umzuwandeln, die Transformation zu erleichtern oder zu verbessern. Es sind die gedanklichen Mittel zur sozialen Rationalisierung (vgl. Mayer 1951).

Die Kapazität der für eine Lösung managerialer Fragestellungen praktisch ermittelten wie auf wissenschaftlichem Weg entwickelten Ansätze ist bekanntermaßen also begrenzt. In der einschlägigen betriebswirtschaftlichen Diskussion hat sich hier seit längerem eine gewisse Bescheidenheit breit gemacht, die die Leistungsgrenzen von Denkansätzen und Verfahrensweisen betrifft. Außerdem werden unerwünschten Folgewirkungen mehr beachtet. An dieser Stelle müssen zwei Exempel genügen, um diese Feststellung zu belegen. Nicht nur ist die Existenz organisatorisch erzeugter Pathologien seit langem bekannt (vgl. z.B. Türk 1976), auch Entstehen und Konsequenzen von Marktversagen sind ein intensiv behandeltes Thema innerhalb der organisationstheoretischen Diskussion (vgl. z.B. Schauenberg 2005 sowie in anderem Zusammenhang Conrad 2004).

So gesehen besteht zumindest in der Theoriebildung selbst kein prinzipieller Mangel an kritischer Reflexion über den Erklärungswert und damit den Gestaltungsschranken managerialer Denkvorstellungen und Instrumentarien, unerheblich ob sie binnenorientiert sind oder sich auf die Koordination über Märkte beziehen. Da man sich in weiten Teilen der Reformdiskussion des öffentlichen Sektors neben der Darstellung möglicher positiver

Folgen durch veränderte Management- und Organisationsregime nicht vergleichbar darum bemüht, ihre inhärenten Grenzen systematischer zu bestimmen und sich außerdem noch von der Fiktion ihrer Nebenwirkungsfreiheit leiten lässt, entstehen Zweifel an den offiziellen Zielen der Veränderungsempfehlungen. Wenn die Leistungseigenheiten managerialer Ansätze derart verkürzt werden[5], kann man sich des Eindrucks nicht erwehren, dass es um mehr und anderes geht als darum, manageriale mind sets zu propagieren und sie den Entscheidungsträgern des öffentlichen Sektors anzudienen. Die wissenschaftliche Lauterkeit verlangt meines Erachtens danach, auch solche Fakten sprechen zu lassen, die sich auf die Leistungsgrenzen und negativen Folgewirkungen managerialer Konzepte und Instrumente beziehen. Andernfalls leidet die Glaubwürdigkeit.

1.2 Hollowing Out ?

Die Kombination aus Modernisierungslücke, Leistungslücke und Finanzierungslücke unterwirft den öffentlichen Sektor - so wird festgestellt - einem existentiellen Erneuerungsdruck, der ihm bislang unbekannt war (vgl. Budäus 1998). Neuere Arbeiten zum Public Management als Binnenreform des öffentlichen Sektors empfehlen zur Abhilfe oder Milderung deshalb oft die Übertragung von Organisations- und Führungskonzepten, die in erwerbswirtschaftlichen Betrieben erfolgreich eingesetzt worden sind.[6] Sie sollen jetzt auch dazu dienen, die Institutionen des öffentlichen Sektors ‚besser' zu managen. Begründet wird dies mit ökonomischen Rationalitätsvorsprüngen unternehmerischer und marktlicher Steuerungskonzepte gegenüber den hergebrachten bürokratischen Strukturen und Steuerungsverfahren, die für den Verwaltungsbetrieb typisch sind. Als grundlegende Antwort gelten strukturelle Veränderungen des bisherigen bürokratischen Verwaltungsmodells. Dafür hat sich die Sammelbezeichnung New Public Management (NPM) eingebürgert.

Wenn man New Public Management als verwaltungsbetriebliche Rationalisierungsstrategie sieht, stellen sich für den öffentlichen Sektor allerdings nicht nur die ökonomisch wichtigen Fragen einer dadurch veränderten Produktivität und Kostenwirtschaftlichkeit. Gleichzeitig gerät die klassische soziologische (wie politische) Frage der rationalen Ausübung legaler Herrschaft durch Verwaltungshandeln erneut in das Blickfeld.

Das bürokratische Organisationsmodell sensu Weber beabsichtigte, personengebundene, patriarchalische Herrschaft und subjektive Willkür durch korrekte, personenunabhängige,

nachvollziehbare und sachbezogene Umsetzung vorgegebener Regeln zu ersetzen. Auch mit einem neuen Organisationsregime müssen diese sehr sinnvollen Funktionen bürokratischer Regeln erreichbar bleiben und weder konzeptionell noch instrumentell unterlaufen werden. Rechtsbindung, Unparteilichkeit, Professionalität, Gleichbehandlung und Kontrollierbarkeit des Verwaltungshandelns sind hierfür die tauglichen Mittel. Sie bilden so auch Entscheidungskriterien, um die Tauglichkeit neuer struktureller Arrangements und Managementverfahren selbst und die darüber erzeugten Verfahrensergebnisse zu prüfen. Neben und zusätzlich zu einer ökonomischen Effizienzbetrachtung. Wenn vom ökonomisch vernünftigerweise wünschenswerten Abbau der Dysfunktionen bürokratischer Steuerung die Rede ist, wenn vom innovativen Vorgehen statt starrer Regelbefolgung, von der Bedarfsorientierung und der Erhöhung oder Sicherung der Wirtschaftlichkeit als den neuen Gestaltungszielen modernen Managements von Verwaltungsbetrieben gesprochen wird, müssen die spezifischen Begrenzungen beim Einsatz neuer verwaltungsbetrieblicher Managementkonzepte und Verfahren ausgelotet und berücksichtigt werden. Als Randbedingungen regulieren sie die Spielräume für Veränderungen.

Da die Lösungskapazität herkömmlicher bürokratischer Organisationsstrukturen und verwaltungsbetrieblicher Arbeitsprozesse selbst zum Problem geworden ist, stellt sich bei ihrem Wechsel oder ihrer Modifikation demnach auch die Frage, in welchem Verhältnis neu zum Einsatz kommende Veränderungsinstrumente zu den oben genannten Kriterien des Verwaltungshandelns stehen. Nicht nur müssten die unter dem Label des New Public Management zusammengefassten Konzeptionen und Instrumente ihre produktivitätserhöhende Wirkung im Vergleich zu den bislang eingesetzten, bürokratisch - administrativen Strukturen und Verfahrensweisen belegen. Es müsste wohl auch deutlich werden, dass sie den verwaltungsbetrieblichen Leistungsgrad erhöhen, ohne demokratietheoretisch gerechtfertigte ‚Randbedingungen' im Sinn von Rechtsbindung, Unparteilichkeit, Professionalität, Gleichbehandlung und Kontrollierbarkeit des Verwaltungshandelns auszuhöhlen, zu unterlaufen, auszuhebeln oder zu konterkarieren. Aus einer solchen Perspektive betrachtet reicht der Mitteleinsatz zu einer veränderten Staatstätigkeit in Form von Aufgabenabbau, Privatisierung und die Entwicklung neuer, teilweise innovativer Organisationsformen alleine nicht aus. Die Neubestimmung des Umfangs an Staatsaufgaben und der Umfang der Funktionen, die gegebenenfalls durch ‚Dritte' (privatwirtschaftlich oder gemischtwirtschaftlich verfasste Betriebe) übernommen werden können oder sollen, muss gesellschaftlich legitimiert werden. Verhandelt werden muss zudem die Art der Konzeptionen und Verfahrensweisen, die dabei eingesetzt werden, wie der veränderte Umfang an Aufgaben mit veränderten Tätigkeitsformen auch

führungstechnisch und arbeitsorganisatorisch vollzogen bzw. realisiert werden kann. So gesehen - und dies betrifft die Binnenmodernisierung des öffentlichen Sektors im Kern - muss die Forderung nach einer verstärkten internen Managementorientierung öffentlicher Verwaltungen ergänzt werden. Es ist darüber zu informieren, wie sich ein verändertes Regime des Leitungs- wie des Arbeitsprozesses (vgl. z.B. Brüggemeier/ Röber 2003) auf die oben genannten demokratietheoretisch gerechtfertigten ‚Randbedingungen' auswirkt. Neben den prinzipiell bekannten ökonomischen Analysen bürokratischer Regelwerke müssen sich die Entscheider über den Einsatz neuer Managementkonzepten und Verfahrensweisen deshalb nicht nur mit deren wirtschaftlicher Vorteilhaftigkeit befassen, sondern auch mit den Rechtsfolgen ihrer Verwendung (vgl. dazu im Überblick: Hommelhoff/ Mattheus 2004). Die Beurteilung der Eignung solcher Konzepte und Verfahren speist sich zusätzlich aus ihren Konsequenzen für den rechtlichen Rahmen des Verwaltungshandelns selbst. Idealtypisch denkbar sind jedenfalls konfligierende, positiv verstärkende, supplementäre oder neutrale Wirkungen eines veränderten Organisationsregimes auf die oben genannten ‚Randbedingungen', die als Zielgrößen dienen.

Prüft man bisherige Übertragungsanregungen, fällt auf, dass wesentliche Konditionen unspezifiziert bleiben, wenn Managementvorstellungen und die Anwendung einzelner Führungsverfahren angeraten werden. Eine genaue Analyse ihrer spezifischen Anwendungsbedingungen, der Leistungseigenheiten und Leistungsgrenzen unterbleibt. Entkoppelt man die Verwendung von Managementansätzen und Führungsinstrumenten gedanklich von den spezifischen Bedingungen ihres Einsatzes und blendet zudem weitergehende Folgen einer Anwendung aus, führt dies automatisch zu einem eingeschränkten Set an Beurteilungskriterien mit den entsprechend verkürzten Einsichten. Da die Wahl der Beurteilungskriterien das Ergebnis einer Einschätzung mitsteuert, entstehen so statt sachlich angemessener Bewertungen leicht Fehleinschätzungen und Fehlentscheidungen mit teilweise erheblichen Konsequenzen.[7] Es geht um Prämissenkritik, denn sonst treten ideologische Urteile an die Stelle distanzierter wissenschaftlicher Einschätzungen.

Bislang werden Managementkonzepte und Führungsverfahren in diesem Zusammenhang offensichtlich als grundsätzlich funktionsneutrale Instrumentarien der Problemhandhabung oder -lösung betrachtet, deren Effekte sich im Wesentlichen nebenwirkungsfrei in unterschiedlichen Betriebstypen mit ihren differierenden externen oder internen Kontexten entfalten. Ein solches Verfügbarkeitsdenken ist deswegen problematisch, weil ein komplexes Entscheidungs-, Transfer- und Anwendungsproblem übersimplifiziert wird.[8]

Um nur einige generelle Einwände zu formulieren: erstens stellt man den Erträgen der Anwendung eines Managementkonzepts oder eines Führungsinstruments regelmäßig keinen Aufwand gegenüber. Man saldiert demnach nicht offiziell, sondern höchstens privatissime, was aber in diesem ökonomischen Zusammenhang, egal ob man den Veränderungsdruck aus einer Finanzierungslücke, Leistungslücke oder Modernisierungslücke entspringen sieht, sicher nicht gratis erfolgen kann. Entwicklung, Kauf oder Anwendung eines Veränderungsinstruments verursacht auch Kosten (für Personal, Sachmittel, overheads), die mit den Leistungen zu verrechnen sind, damit man überhaupt zu einer Kalkulation des ‚Ertrags' und damit zu einer Aussage über die Vorteilhaftigkeit der Verwendung kommen kann. Zweitens werden spezifische Anwendungsbedingungen sowohl für die zum Einsatz empfohlenen Managementkonzepte als auch für einzelne Führungsinstrumente ausgeblendet, man denkt und argumentiert quasi ‚entsituiert'. Dekontextualisierte Annahmen über die Leistungsfähigkeit von Managementverfahren konfligieren nun mit grundlegenden Erkenntnissen der modernen Organisationstheorie und empirischen Organisationsforschung. Sie äußert sich im Übrigen bereits zu den messbaren Wirkungen unterschiedlicher organisatorischer Arrangements für Unternehmungen - also einem Teil des Instrumentariums, das zur Veränderung verwaltungsbetrieblichen Handelns empfohlen wird - in bestechender Bescheidenheit. Auch aus Sicht der managerialen Ressourcenforschung lassen sich kritische Einsichten über den Sinn oder Unsinn einer Übernahme von Managementverfahren in das verwaltungsbetriebliche Handeln entwickeln. Während die empirische Organisationsforschung auf die Kontextabhängigkeit des Systemerfolgs hinweist (vgl. für viele z.B.: v. Werder 2004), machen Ressourcenansätze die interne Strukturabhängigkeit des Erfolgs deutlich (vgl. z.B. Ridder et al. 2001; Ridder 2007). Dauerhafte Erfolgsunterschiede entstehen nicht nur durch strategisch richtige Anpassungsentscheidungen im Hinblick auf die Spezifika des jeweiligen Kontextes, sondern auch dadurch, dass man imitatives, bloß nachahmendes Managementverhalten (`Echopraxie`) vermeidet, spezifische Strukturen und Handlungsbedingungen für die Mitarbeiter und Führungskräfte bereitstellt und standardmäßig konstruierte oder ‚flächendeckend' einsetzbare Managementinstrumente gerade nicht verwendet. Standardverfahren bedingen keine ‚Differentialrenten' - oder einfacher gesagt - keine Unterschiede in der Leistungsfähigkeit bzw. im Leistungsergebnis im zwischenbetrieblichen Vergleich. Drittens wird die Typik verwaltungsbetrieblicher Leistungserstellung, die Produktion von Dienstleistungen, in ihren faktoriellen wie managerialen Besonderheiten, kaum berücksichtigt (vgl. Conrad 2003). Stattdessen orientiert man sich an Managementkonzepten und Führungsinstrumentarien, die typischerweise in Unternehmungen eingesetzt werden, die Sachleistungen erzeugen. Deren Produktions- und Vermarktungslogiken sind aber mit denen von Dienstleistungsun-

ternehmungen nur teilidentisch. Hinzu kommen noch allfällige Erfassungs- und Messprobleme, um Voraussetzungen wie Folgen einer Verwendung verwaltungsbetrieblicher Veränderungsansätze mit empirischen Daten, seien sie quantitativer oder qualitativer Art, zu unterfüttern (vgl. Conrad 2001).

2 Personenbezogene Führung

Solange privater und öffentlicher Sektor kontextspezifisch aufgestellt sind, müssen die koordinativen Leistungspotentiale (im arbeits- wie herrschaftsorganisatorischen Sinne) von personenbezogener Führung als context setting gedanklich auf solche unterschiedlichen, ,vorauslaufenden' Randbedingungen rückbezogen bleiben. Dies gilt vor allem, wenn man näher klären möchte, was ein solches Instrumentarium unter welchen Bedingungen, zu welchen Kosten und Nebenfolgen leisten kann. Instrumentell kann man personenbezogene Führung als Teil des betrieblichen Führungshandelns insgesamt sehen. Sie ist inhaltlich und funktional mehrfach von anderen Führungskonzepten und ihren jeweiligen Instrumentarien abzuschichten. Drei Aspekte lassen sich unterscheiden.

2.1 Personenbezogene Führung als Untersuchungsobjekt

Betrachtet man personenbezogene Führung als Untersuchungsgegenstand, Phänomen oder Forschungsfeld, so sind die unterschiedlichen theoretischen Ansätze und Methoden, die eingesetzt werden, um diesen Objektbereich gedanklich bzw. empirisch zu erschließen, der Diskursschwerpunkt. Verhandelt werden zahlreiche theoretische Ansätze, die selbst nochmals vielfältige Verästelungen aufweisen können.[9] Auf der Grundlage dieser theoretischen Konzepte kommt man zu unterschiedlichen Erklärungen oder Deutungen, was unter Führung bzw. Mitarbeiterführung zu verstehen ist und welche Einflussgrößen sich ableiten lassen, um Führungserfolg zu gestalten. Je nach zugrunde gelegtem Konzept variieren die Hauptansatzpunkte, die man zu einer Gestaltung nutzen kann, deutlich.[10]

Die verschiedenen theoretischen Zugänge lassen sich anhand ihrer ,Erklärungslogiken' wenigstens grob typisieren. Unterschieden werden beispielsweise eigenschaftstheoretische Arbeiten, Führungsstil-Ansätze, lerntheoretischen Konzepte, sowie kognitive und situative Denkvorstellungen. Eigenschaftstheoretisch lässt sich personenbezogene Führung als Ausdruck einer Persönlichkeitsdisposition beschreiben, die im Wesentlichen zeitlich wie

situativ invariant bleibt. Nach dieser Auffassung ist es die Persönlichkeit des Führers, die das Führungsverhalten und in dessen Folge den Führungserfolg bedingt. Will man personenbezogene Führung auf dieser Grundlage nutzen, um betrieblich zu koordinieren und erfolgreich führen, muss man zur ‚richtigen' Auswahl- und Platzierungsentscheidungen über die Führungskräfte selbst kommen. Die Annahme ist, dass die Persönlichkeit bzw. bestimmte Eigenschaften des Vorgesetzten die erfolgsrelevanten Handlungsprogramme - vergleichbar einem ‚Container' - bereits enthält. Weniger bis gar nicht relevant sind hier Verhaltensänderungen durch Lernen oder Konditionierungen über Anreizgestaltung. Analytisch anders gehen Stil-Ansätze vor, die den individuellen Verhaltensstil der Führungskraft zum Bezugspunkt der Analyse machen. Hier werden person-typische Verhaltensmuster von Führungskräften zum Ausgangspunkt der Betrachtung. Führungsverhalten gilt als veränderbar, indem entsprechende Trainings oder Verhaltensmodifikationsprogramme eingesetzt werden. Strittig ist ‚lediglich' ihr Grad und ihre Stabilität im Zeitverlauf bzw. in der back-home Situation, wenn das neu Gelernte in der betrieblichen Situation praktiziert werden soll. Beide Ansätze sehen Person und Verhalten der Führungskraft als ausschlaggebend an und interpretieren Führungserfolg als Funktion der Person des Führers oder seiner Fähigkeit, Stilvarianten seines Verhaltens in Abhängigkeit von den wahrgenommen oder antizipierten Reaktionen der Geführten auszubilden und einzusetzen. Lerntheoretische Arbeiten, die auf den Grundannahmen des operanten Konditionierens basieren, untersuchen ebenfalls direkt beobachtbares Führungshandeln. Sie setzen an den Konsequenzen des Verhaltens bei den Geführten an. Wenn Verhalten von den Konsequenzen abhängt, so kann man es über die Gestaltung seiner Folgen ändern bzw. steuern. Entsprechend muss Führung gewünschtes Verhalten über Folgenanreize herbeikonditionieren. Soziale Lerntheorien nehmen intrapersonale Denk- und Einschätzungsprozesse in den Blick. Im Kern machen sie auf die Bedeutung von Erwartungen aufmerksam, die man über das Eintreten der Konsequenzen eigenen Handels, aber auch des Handelns anderer, hegt. Sie beziehen sich auf nicht-direkt beobachtbare, kognitive Strukturen oder Prozesse, die methodisch über geeignete Indikatoren ermittelt werden müssen. Außerdem gehen sie von einer quasi mechanischen Konditionierungsidee ab. Diese kognitive Erweiterung lerntheoretischer Ansätze bezieht Beobachtungs-, Denk- und Abwägungsprozesse mit ein, wenn Führungs- wie Geführtenverhalten untersucht und beeinflusst werden soll. Menschen agieren demnach nicht nur aufgrund von Kontingenzen, sondern auch deswegen, weil sie in der Lage sind, gedanklich ‚Probehandlungen' vorzunehmen, ihre jeweilige Umwelt zu beobachten und Erwartungen über das Zustande kommen von Ereignissen auszubilden. Handlungen werden nach dem Muster attraktiver Rollenvorbilder geplant und umgesetzt. Führung ist also ein komplexes Wechselspiel aus Wahrnehmungen, Situations- und Personinterpreta-

tionen sowie Handlungen aller am Führungsgeschehen Beteiligten. Theoretisch ebnen sich auf diesem Weg auch die sonst häufig implizierten 'strukturellen' Eigenschafts- oder Verhaltensunterschiede zwischen Führungskräften und Geführten ein. Denn beide Akteursgruppen werden so prinzipiell als denkende, planende und handelnde Individuen begriffen.[11] Attributionstheorien sind weitere kognitive Interpretationsansätze, die sich auf subjektintern verlaufende Denk- und Urteilsprozesse beziehen und für das Handeln bedeutsam sind. Attributionen beinhalten subjektive Erklärungen über das Zustandekommen eines Ereignisses, z.B. einer Führungshandlung. Je nachdem, ob man eine Attribution oder ein Attributionsmuster aus Sicht der Führungskraft oder des Geführten analysiert, können sie einer manifesten Führungshandlung gedanklich vorauslaufen, diese begleiten bzw. steuern oder nachträglich subjektiv deutend erschließen. Im Zusammenhang mit personenbezogener Führung interessiert z.B. wie Vorgesetzte das Verhalten ihrer Geführten 'erklären' und wie Untergebene das Verhalten ihrer Vorgesetzten subjektiv interpretieren. Kennt man die eigenen kognitiven Muster und die der Geführten, so lassen sich Führungshandlungen wie 'Reaktionen' der Geführten darauf besser verstehen und gestalten.

Situationstheorien der Führung erweitern bzw. verändern die bereits genannten Vorstellungen, indem sie die 'äußeren' Handlungsbedingungen einbeziehen, in denen sich Führung als Prozess entfaltet. Allerdings ist auch der Situationsbegriff mehrdeutig und opaque, werden darunter doch so unterschiedliche Bedingungen zusammengefasst wie individuelle Merkmale, betriebliche Gegebenheiten, technische und organisatorische Begrenzungen des Handlungsspielraums oder auch allgemeinere, gesellschaftliche Strukturen sowie kulturelle Eigenheiten. Je nach Ausprägung der Situationsbedingungen verändern sich die konkreten Handlungsmöglichkeiten für individuelle Führung. Der in diesem Zusammenhang prominenteste Ansatz ist die Situationstheorie von Fiedler (vgl. z.B. Fiedler/ Chemers/ Mahar 1976; Fiedler/ Mai-Dalton 1995), der Eigenschaftsdenken und Situationskontingenzen verkoppelt. Im Wesentlichen sind es die Merkmale der Situation und nicht die der Person, die effizientes Führungsverhalten erzeugen. Die erfolgreiche Führungskraft muss erstens in der Lage sein, die situative Günstigkeit einer Führungssituation (Führer-Mitarbeiter-Beziehung, Strukturiertheit der Aufgabensituation, Positionsmacht der Führungskraft) analysieren zu können und zweitens fähig sein, den eigenen typischen Führungsstil (eher aufgabenorientiert oder eher personorientiert) zu ermitteln. Da die Stilvariable hier Eigenschaftscharakter hat und dementsprechend schwer kurzfristig zu verändern ist, wird stattdessen empfohlen, die Arbeitssituation für die Führungskraft jeweils so zu modifizieren, dass sie mit seiner Persönlichkeitsdisposition weitgehend harmoniert. Führungserfolg entsteht, wenn es gelingt, die für die dispositiven

Eigenheiten der Führungskraft angemessene Aufgabensituation zu finden bzw. herzustellen (z.B. über arbeitsorganisatorische Gestaltung, über Personalauswahlen, die zu passenden Mitarbeitern führen). Bereits diese sicher sehr kurze Darstellung theoretischer Grundzüge des personenbezogene Führung macht deutlich, dass die jeweils zugrunde gelegte Konzeption die gedanklichen Ansatzpunkte dafür steuert, welche ‚Stellschrauben' anzunehmen sind, um personenbezogene Führung selbst zu gestalten. Dies gilt im Weiteren dann auch für die Verwendung von personenbezogener Führung, um das Verhalten und Handeln anderer zu beeinflussen. Man muss sich im Fall der Gestaltung von Führung bzw. dann, wenn man personale Führung einsetzt, bereits vor einer Maßnahme sehr genau darüber verständigen, über welches Führungskonzept man eigentlich redet, wenn man Veränderungen erreichen will.

2.2   Personenbezogene Führung als Tool

Wenn man Führung als zielorientierte Gestaltung sieht (vgl. Bea/ Friedl/ Schweitzer 2005), wird personenbezogene Führung zu einem unter mehreren Instrumenten, über die das Management insgesamt verfügt, um betriebliche Koordinations- und Herrschaftsziele zu erreichen. Diese Instrumentalthese gestattet es, personenbezogene Führung in eine Mehrebenenbetrachtung einzurücken, die den Gesamtzusammenhang von personenbezogener Führung mit Mitarbeiterführung, Führung und Management deutlich macht. Außerdem kann man so die Verbindung zum context setting klarer bestimmen.

Personenbezogene Führung ist eine Form sozialer Einflussnahme durch persönliche Interaktion zwischen Führungskraft und Geführtem, sie koexistiert im Realfall mit anderen Arten der Koordination und Steuerung der Handlungen von Mitarbeitern. Personenbezogene Führung ist der direkte Teil der Mitarbeiterführung, die daneben noch wesentlich durch indirekte Anteile gekennzeichnet ist, wenn sie sich der Regelsysteme zur Personalführung bedient. Direkte und indirekte Mitarbeiterführung zusammen werden zum Personalmanagement, wenn die Entwicklung von Systemen hinzukommt, die sich auf die Lenkung (Personalplanung, Personalbedarfsdeckung und -freisetzung, Personal- und Organisationsentwicklung) und die Anreizgestaltung beziehen. Führung hingegen ist nicht auf die Aufgaben des Personalmanagement begrenzt, sondern umfasst Koordinations- und Steuerungsaufgaben in allen betrieblichen bzw. unternehmerischen Funktionsbereichen. Damit sind alle auch nicht personenbezogenen Aktivitäten, ihre Planung, Durchführung und Kontrolle in materieller wie zahlenmäßiger Hinsicht gemeint (vgl. z.B. Berthel/ Becker 2003; Weibler 2004). Die Verwendung des Management-

begriffs soll in diesem Zusammenhang deutlich machen, dass in den vorgenannten Bereichen jeweils Entscheidungen darüber zu treffen sind, welche Führungsregime und einzelnen Verfahren eingesetzt werden sollen. Management ist hier die Bezeichnung für die Entscheidungsinstanz bzw. Personengruppe, deren Aufgaben darin besteht, die Strukturen des Führungssystems, die zur Führung und zum Personalmanagement einzusetzenden Konzepte und Verfahrensmittel und die damit Beauftragten festzulegen, zu ʼoptimierenʼ und an den Zielsetzungen des Betriebs bzw. der Unternehmung auszurichten (vgl. z.B. Schirmer 1992). Da die verschiedenen Arten und Einsatzformen von Führung selbst disponibel sind und unterschiedlich ergiebig sein können, kann man von der Notwendigkeit sprechen, Führung zu managen (ʼManagement von Führungʼ).

2.3 Personenbezogene Führung als Strukturelement

Vor allem die Untersuchungen zu Führungssubstituten haben in den letzten Jahren auf Alternativen und Ergänzungen zur personalen Führung aufmerksam gemacht und den Set-Charakter von Führungsinstrumenten betont, wenn das Verhalten von Geführten auf betriebliche Ziele ausgerichtet bzw. stabilisiert werden soll. (vgl. zusammenfassend z.B. Conrad/ Schirmer 1991). Die Möglichkeiten, die Koordinations- und Kontrollleistungen personaler Führung durch andere Instrumente als direkte soziale Einflussnahme zu erreichen, werden als Führungssubstitution, die dafür geeigneten Mittel als Führungs-substitute bezeichnet. Im hier entwickelten Verständnis ist es eine Entscheidungsaufgabe des Managements festzulegen, wie sich das Mix an Instrumenten direkter und indirekter Mitarbeiterführung zusammensetzt und welche Verfahren im Einzelnen verwendet werden sollen.

Wichtige Ersatz- oder Ergänzungsgrößen für personenbezogene Führung liegen in der durch Aus- und Weiterbildung erzeugten professionellen Orientierung von Mitarbeitern. Gemeint sind damit erlernte Handlungsstandards und Regeln, die zu sachgerechten Lösung von betrieblichen Problemen eingesetzt werden (sollen). Auch nicht immer vollständig bewusste Handhabungsregeln, die man im Zuge einschlägiger Arbeitserfah-rung erworben hat, gehören dazu. Orientiert sich ein Mitarbeiter an diesen Standards, reduziert sich im Idealfall der Führungsaufwand. Die Regeln fungieren als person-interne, mentale Handlungsprogramme, wie man etwas ‚richtig' macht. Klar geregelte, schriftliche Anweisungen oder in ihren Ausführungsbedingungen eindeutige Schrittfolgen bei der Erledigung von Aufgaben können des weiteren Ersatzgrößen für personale Führung werden, da sie Handeln über von außen vorgegebene Pläne determinieren. Verrichtungen

werden eindeutig durch schriftliche oder mündliche Vorgaben reguliert und Führungs-
aufwand entsteht weitgehend nur noch in der Einübungsphase. Die informationelle
Rückkopplung des Aufgabenfortschritts kann eine weitere Ersatzgröße sein. Durch die
zeitlich unmittelbare Rückkopplung über den Vollzug einer Arbeitshandlung wird der
Mitarbeiter entweder darin bestärkt, auf dem gewählten Weg fortzufahren oder kurzfristig
in die Lage versetzt, Fehlerkorrekturen und Adjustierungen seines Handels vorzunehmen.
Insofern sind Arbeitsprozesse, in die solche Informationsrückkopplungen eingebaut sind,
ebenfalls als Substitute personaler Führung zu begreifen. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit den
Normen und Handlungsorientierungen von Teams, die bereits so weit entwickelt sind,
dass sie ihre Selbstabstimmung im Rahmen vorgegebener Ziele eigenständig vornehmen
können. Alle diese Substitute sind unter bestimmten Bedingungen in der Lage, den
personalen Führungsaufwand zu verringern. Sie können separat in mehr oder weniger
reiner Form, miteinander kombiniert wie auch mit personaler Führung integriert
eingesetzt werden.

Angesichts einer möglichen Alleinstellung, der Kombination oder Integration personaler
Führung mit anderen Koordinationsinstrumenten sind die Kriterien zu klären, die die
Verwendung funktional äquivalenter Instrumente steuern. Formal betrachtet müssten dazu
die Leistungskapazitäten ebenso wie die direkten und indirekten Kosten und mögliche
Folgewirkungen aller Alternativen bestimmt und miteinander verglichen werden.
Außerdem sind neben den ökonomischen Überlegungen auch andere, organisationspoliti-
sche Momente zu berücksichtigen, etwa der gesamte Bereich der sozialen Integration und
der betrieblichen Herrschaftssicherung, die mit Führung und Management im
Zusammenhang steht (vgl. z.B. Staehle 1992). Faktisch ist das methodisch eigentlich
notwendige Vorgehen aber mit erheblichen Schwierigkeiten belastet, weil eine
trennscharfe und valide Ermittlung der angesprochen Größen bislang kaum erreichbar ist.
Mangels ausreichender Daten müssen solche Entscheidungen mit erheblicher
Ungewissheit belastet sein. Eine andere, ebenfalls empirisch genauer zu lösende Frage ist
die spezifischer Kombinationen von Führungsverfahren in Abhängigkeit von
Einflussfaktoren wie z.B. Führungsphilosophie, Führungsklima, technologisch-
organisatorischen Bedingungen oder auch der Unternehmungsstrategie. Da es bislang an
den empirisch eindeutigen Daten mangelt, muss man sich mit Näherungslösungen und
Plausibilitätsbetrachtungen behelfen. Hier liefert die jüngere Diskussion um mögliche
Erfolgsbeiträge des Human Resources Management zum Gesamterfolg zumindest einige
anregende Einsichten, Sicherheiten liefert sie nicht.

Interpretiert man die Kombination unterschiedlicher Koordinationsmittel im Sinne der hier angesprochenen Substitute als ‚Führungsstruktur' oder ‚Instrumentebündel', werden die Zusammenhänge mit dem Human Resources Management moderner Prägung und dem strategischen Management deutlich (vgl. Ridder 1996; Wright/ Snell 1998; Ridder et al. 2001, sowie zu den Instrumentebündeln vgl. z.B. Guest 1997). Zum einen ist eine vertikale Übereinstimmung zwischen Unternehmungsstrategie und Personalstrategie zu erreichen, zum anderen müssen die Praktiken des Personalmanagement miteinander verträglich (horizontaler Fit) sein. Beide fits müssen aufgrund der Umweltdynamik flexibel ausgelegt sein. Sie sind nicht als starre Strukturen zu konzipieren, sondern als ressourcenflexible und als koordinationsflexible Antworten des Managements bei der Wahl seiner Handhabungsverfahren. Ressourcenflexibilität bedeutet, dass die eingesetzten Instrumente genügend Leistungsbreite oder Variabilitätsspielraum enthalten, um sie auch in unterschiedlichen Situationen erfolgreich einsetzbar zu machen. Bezieht man dies auf die genannten Substitute so sind beispielsweise vorgegebene Arbeitsgangfolgen eher starr und änderungsrestriktiv und eher bei geringer Umweltdynamik einzusetzen. Professionelle Orientierungen hingegen dürften ihre Koordinationseffizienz auch unter diskontinuierlichen Bedingungen erhalten. Koordinationsflexibilität als zweite Anforderung an bzw. Gestaltungskomponente von erfolgreichen Führungssystemen ist dann die Fähigkeit des Managements zwischen verschiedenen Führungssubstituten - abhängig vom Wandel der Bedingungen - wählen zu können.

Personenbezogene Führung ist demnach ein Tool innerhalb eines umfassenderen Satzes von Koordinationsverfahren, über dessen Kombination mit anderen Verfahren und über dessen strukturelle Ausgestaltung das Management entscheidet. In den Arbeiten zum Human Resources Management werden solche Bündel als positive Voraussetzungen von betrieblichen Erfolgsmerkmalen behandelt. Allerdings mangelt es auch hier bislang an tragfähigen empirischen Belegen über die genaueren Ursachen der Erfolgsentstehung und des Erfolgsanteils, der sich auf diese Instrumentebündel zurückführen lässt.

3   Context Setting

In einem weiteren Schritt gilt es nun Zusammenhänge der personenbezogenen Führung mit dem context setting näher zu betrachten. Umgangssprachlich bezieht sich der Begriff des Kontextes auf den umgebenden Text (eines Begriffs, eines Wortes, einer Textpassage), der in Abhängigkeit davon die Bedeutung eines einzelnen Wortes oder den

Sinn einer Aussage spezifisch werden lässt. Die Bedeutung eines Wortes - oder eines größeren Aussagenzusammenhangs - entsteht demnach nicht singulär, sondern wird gerade durch seinen Zusammenhang im Text gesteuert und gegebenenfalls in spezifischer Weise verändert (z.B. im Fall der Ironisierung oder des Witzes besonders augenfällig). In gewisser Weise enthält auch die wissenschaftliche Verwendung des Kontextbegriffs noch Anklänge an diese Ursprünge, insofern man auf die Bedeutung der physikalischen, materiell-gegenständlich oder symbolischen 'Umgebung' für den Erfolg von Handlungen abstellt.

In der Organisationstheorie und in der Managementlehre wird der Kontextbegriff in vielfältiger Weise verwendet. Einmal ist makroorganisatorisch gesehen die Rede vom Kontext, wenn die Zweckmäßigkeit organisatorischer Gestaltungen verhandelt wird (vgl. zusammenfassend für viele z.B.: Schreyögg/ v. Werder 2004). Sie ist eine Funktion der Merkmale der jeweiligen Gestaltungssituation. Entscheidungsträger organisatorischer Gestaltungen sind wegen des Erfolgrisikos gehalten, die wichtigsten Kontextfaktoren zu berücksichtigen. Auf der Makro-Ebene gehören dazu die Strategie, die Technologie, die Rechtsstruktur, das kulturelle Umfeld, der Typus der Organisation selbst (z.B. Dienst- oder Sachleistungserzeugung) und die Branche von erheblicher Bedeutung. Entsprechend unterscheiden sich die organisatorischen Lösungen für unternehmerische Probleme. Auch auf der Mikroebene der Organisation, dem arbeitsorganisatorischen Regime, wird der Kontextbegriff verwendet. Hier dient er zur Analyse bzw. Beschreibung des betrieblichen Arbeitssystems und der Arbeitssituationen, um effiziente und motivational anregende Bedingungen für das individuelle Arbeitshandeln zu untersuchen und einzurichten (vgl. zusammenfassend z.B. Ridder 2004). Kontexte determinieren aber Entscheidungen bzw. Handlungen nicht. Als soziale Konstrukte werden sie erst über den Weg der individuellen Wahrnehmung, des Denkens und Abwägens, handlungswirksam.

3.1   Management des Führungskontextes

Ein Zusammenhang beider Größen (bzw. der Konstrukte) deutete sich schon bei der Aufzählung möglicher Substitute zur personalen Führung an. Hier waren arbeitsorganisa- torische Gestaltungsmittel wie hoch formalisierte und in ihren Verkettungen eindeutig festgelegte Arbeitsschritte, Arbeitsprozesse, die ein automatisches Feedback über den Aufgabenvollzug liefern oder auch teilautonome Teams als grundsätzliche Ersatzgrößen bzw. Alternativen zur personalen Führung angesprochen worden. Managerial betrachtet sind es Gestaltungsmittel, die dazu dienen können, die Bedingungen des Handels von

Geführten in spezifischer Weise zu kanalisieren, indem der Instrumentalmix, die zur Führung zugelassenen Konzepte und Verfahren, definiert wird . Auf diesem Weg werden auch die Handlungskontexte der Führungskräfte formatiert. In die Begrifflichkeit der eingangs skizzierten Führungsansätze (vgl. Abschnitt 2.1) übersetzt, dienen sie dazu, Arbeitssituationen zu gestalten. Entscheidend ist hier ihr materiell-gegenständlicher Charakter, der dem arbeitenden Subjekt äußerlich bleibt. Er tritt ihm als formales Regelwerk (Organisation), technische Vorgabe (Technologie) oder soziale Bedingung (Handlungsorientierungen semi-autonomer Teams) entgegen. Um wirksam werden zu können, müssen sie der Wahrnehmung und Bewertung durch den jeweiligen Mitarbeiter unterzogen, also subjektiv redefiniert, werden. Erst auf dieser Grundlage stehen sie der subjektive Handlungsplanung zur Verfügung. Aus der hier aus konzeptionellen Gründen eingeführten, übergeordneten Managementsicht und der Aufgabe des Managements, das Führungssystem zu strukturieren, wird klar, wie das Management die Handlungsmöglich-keiten der Führungskräfte gestalten kann. Personenbezogene Führung wird mit indirekter Führung, der Gestaltung bzw. Handhabung von Systemen zur Mitarbeiterführung, kombiniert. In diesem mehrstufigen Prozess werden die Handlungsmöglichkeiten für die Führungskräfte reguliert und die einzelne Führungskraft dann auf der Grundlage dieses Kontextes in die Lage versetzt, das Arbeitshandeln ihrer Geführten zu beeinflussen, indem wiederum deren Handlungsspielräume gesteuert werden. Das macht letztlich auch die Bedeutung der Wahl von Führungsstrukturen oder Human Resources Management - Architekturen aus.

3.2   Personenbezogene Führung als Context Setting

Lässt man sich von der systemtheoretischen Grundidee leiten, dass Menschen nicht-triviale Systeme mit hoher organisierter Komplexität sind, so hat dies auch dann entsprechende Bedeutung, wenn man sie (,nur') in ihrer Funktion als Mitarbeiter einer Unternehmung oder eines Betriebs betrachtet. Mitarbeiter bleiben ,Umwelt' für die jeweilige Beschäftigungsinstitution, ihre psychische Eigengesetzlichkeit macht äußere Beeinflussungsversuche nur bedingt möglich. Denn Veränderungen ihrer ,Operationswei-se' verlangen jeweils nach der eigenen Zustimmung (vgl. grundsätzlich Willke 1999). Die spezifischen Operationsweisen finden ihren begrifflichen Niederschlag in verschiedensten theoretischen Zusammenhängen auch außerhalb systemtheoretischer Annahmen, zum Beispiel als personale Eigenart, als Eigensinn, als Identität oder Persönlichkeit jedes Mitarbeiters, gänzlich unabhängig von seiner hierarchischen Stellung oder Funktion in

einem Betrieb. Damit verändert sich auch der Blick auf personenbezogene Führung in ihrer Kombination mit indirekter Führung. Analytisch muss man die Mitarbeiter als Elemente des Kontextes betrachten. Will man versuchen, ihre Operationsweisen als Mitarbeiter (oder Führungskraft) einer Unternehmung oder eines Betriebs zu verändern, so bedarf es entsprechender theoretischer Erkenntnisse, die ‚Einblicke' oder ‚Hypothesen' über ihre systeminterne Funktionsweise zulassen. Soziale Lerntheorien, Attributionstheorien oder andere, an Erwartungen ansetzende theoretische Konzepte, die die Organisation psychischer Prozesse[12] betreffen, versuchen jedenfalls solche symbolischen Strukturen und Prozesse zu rekonstruieren. Beschrieben werden damit mentale Kontexte, die man berücksichtigen muss, wenn man versuchen will, das Denken und Handeln der Geführten zu beeinflussen. Je nach zugrunde liegender Konzeption lassen sich allerdings andere Anregungen für Veränderungs-möglichkeiten ableiten. Sie sagen jeweils etwas darüber aus, ‚wo' man ansetzen könnte und wie man ‚vorgehen' könnte, um über veränderte mind sets zu führen. Trotz (oder wegen?) der prinzipiellen Nichtverfügbarkeit der symbolischen Innenwelt, mangelt es daher nicht an Versuchen, in diese symbolischen Innenwelten auf der Grundlage wissenschaftlicher Konzepte einzudringen. Allerdings gelten Versuche Personen zu verändern, bereits im privaten oder therapeutischen Bereich als heikel, sodass dieser Vorbehalt auch für andere, nämlich betriebliche Handlungsbereiche gelten dürfte.

4   Resume

Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen bildete die Frage nach den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Transferierbarkeit unternehmerisch eingesetzter Führungskonzepte und Führungsverfahren in Betriebe des öffentlichen Sektors. Hier war grundsätzlich argumentiert worden, dass Vorschläge manageriale Denkansätze und Verfahrensweisen auf das verwaltungsbetriebliche Handeln zu übertragen, mit erheblichen Problemen behaftet sind. Es wurde die These aufgestellt, dass die Darstellung von Anwendungsfolgen weitgehend asymmetrisch erfolgt und deutlich zugunsten positiver Rationalisierungseffekte verschoben ist. Ausgeblendet bleiben notwendige Spielräume (Koordinationsflexibilität) zugunsten der Wahl unterschiedlicher Managementkonzepte und Instrumentarien in den verschiedenen Teileinheiten des öffentlichen Sektors. Aus ressourcentheoretischer Sicht wurde des weiteren die geringe Eignung standardisierter Vorgehensweisen notiert, das Ausklammern der Besonderheiten verwaltungsbetrieblicher Produktion sowie die Unterschätzung von Messproblemen, die gelöst werden müssen, wenn ein derartiges Kennzahlen gestütztes Management betrieben werden soll, wurden erwähnt.

Im Rahmen einer Detailanalyse zur personalen Führung und ihren Substituten wurde die Konzeptvielfalt und Heterogenität an Annahmen beispielhaft deutlich, die bei der Untersuchung von Führung eine Rolle spielen können. Übertragen auf die Gestaltung spezifischer Führungsverfahren und -strukturen wurde herausgearbeitet, dass sie wesentlich darüber reguliert wird, welche gedankliche Konzeption die jeweiligen Entscheidungsträger zugrunde legen. Die Mikroanalyse am Beispiel personaler Führung zeigte dabei, dass ein Konzept- und Instrumentetransfers bereits auf der Ebene einer Verständigung über den Inhalt scheinbar einfacher Konzepte scheitern kann. Der angesprochene Reichtum an theoretischen Alternativen wird von faktischer Informations-armut begleitet, wenn relevante Empfehlungen für die Führungspraxis abzugeben sind.[13] Die Vorteilhaftigkeit einzelner Herangehensweisen ist ungeklärt, über die Einflussstärken oder den ‚Wirkungsgrad' einzelner Ansätze sind bislang kaum tragfähige und generalisierbare Ergebnisse vorhanden. Mögliche Inkompatibilitäten, Konflikte, Überschneidungen oder Verstärkungseffekte beim Versuch, sich gleichzeitig mehrerer Ansatzpunkte für eine Veränderung zu bedienen, mit Ausnahme der Untersuchungen zu Führungssubstituten, wurden bislang wenig untersucht.

Insgesamt hat man es daher mit einer mehrfachen Kontextualisierung mit durchaus problematischen Konsequenzen zu tun. Managerial gesehen wird über Führungsstrukturen und damit grundsätzlich verfügbare Führungskonzepte bzw. Instrumentarien entschieden. Sie dienen nachgelagert als Randbedingungen der personenbezogenen Führung, die nun in dreierlei Hinsicht agieren kann. Erstens kann sie Formen der Selbstrationalisierung durchlaufen (etwa als gewollte Veränderung des eigenen Führungsverhaltens), zweitens kann sie auf die materiell - gegenständlichen Handlungskontexte der Geführten Einfluss nehmen und sich dazu indirekter Führung bedienen. Zum dritten kann sie auf dem Weg symbolischer Steuerung mentaler Handlungskontexte versuchen, mentale Orientierungen, die für das Arbeitshandeln relevant sind, im betrieblichen Sinne zu beeinflussen.

Personale Führungstheorien liefern nun ziemlich ungestüm Hinweise, die jedenfalls andeuten, wie ‚tief' man in die Persönlichkeit eindringen muss, um die Umsetzung von psychischem Arbeitsvermögen in manifestes Arbeitshandeln in betrieblich erwünschte Bahnen zu lenken. Der Grat zwischen Mitarbeiterführung und Manipulation wird so zunehmends schmaler. Zum Vorschein kommt eine Interventionslogik, die das Verwertungsinteresse über die Autonomie der Geführten stellt (vgl. grundsätzlich bereits z.B. Kornhauser 1947; Baritz 1960).

Über Leistungsunterschiede verschiedener gedanklicher Bezugsrahmen personaler Führung wie die Erfolgsaussichten, wenn man Führungsinstrumente unterschiedlich strukturiert bzw. bündelt, kann bislang nicht differenziert entschieden werden. Auf den Grad an Ressourcenflexibilität einzelner Instrumente kann nur indirekt geschlossen werden, systematisch untersucht wurde sie unter den spezifischen Anwendungsbedingungen des öffentlichen Sektors bislang nicht. Grundlagentheoretische Argumente des Human Resources Management sprechen zwar dafür, spezifische Lösungen zu entwickeln, empirische Daten sind aber nicht ausreichend vorhanden.

Angesichts des theoretischen wie empirischen Wissenstandes können keine generellen Empfehlungen zur Übernahme von Managementansätzen der untersuchten Art ausgesprochen werden. Verallgemeinert heißt das, dass die bisherigen Übernahmen managerialer und marktlicher Verfahren in das verwaltungsbetriebliche Handeln als Resultat erzwungener oder künstlich erzeugter Isomorphien (vgl. DiMaggio/ Powell 1983) zu interpretieren sind.

Anmerkungen

[1] Die Aufgabenverteilung zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft und die Art der Leistungserzeugung bzw. des Produktions- und Organisationsregimes (bürokratisch administrative Steuerung vs. manageriale und marktliche Instrumentarien) werden zur Disposition gestellt.

[2] Vgl. z.B. Reichard 1998 oder die Hinweise bei Pfeffer 2006 zum Recht auf eine gute Verwaltung in der europäischen Grundrechtscharta.

[3] Auch hier müsste man eigentlich grundsätzlicher argumentieren. Es können wegen der Kürze der Darstellung leider nur einige anregende, weiterführende Lesehinweise gegeben werden, wie: Halpern/ Stern 1998 oder näher am Management liegend: Neuberger 1994.

[4] Lediglich als Beispiele: Bea/ Friedl/ Schweitzer 2005; Berthel/ Becker 2003; Drumm 2000; Steinmann/ Schreyögg 2000; Schanz 2000; Staehle/ Conrad/ Sydow 1999; Scholz 2000.

[5] Zwischenzeitlich kann man sich den kritischen Einwänden nur noch um den Preis der `bewussten` Verdrängung entziehen. Mehrere Arbeiten machen deutlich, wie und auf welchem Interessenhintergrund solche Asymmetrien zustande kommen können. Sie werden auch publizistisch - außerhalb des Wissenschafts-betriebs massenmedial - weiter distribuiert und sickern in das öffentliche Bewusstsein als allein richtige Sichtweise sein. Kritisch ist nicht nur die Modernitätsvorstellung, die im Begriff der ‚Staatsmodernisierung’ enthalten ist (vgl. grundsätzlich: Beck/ Bonß 2001), die verwendeten Begriffstrategien (‚Reform’, ‚Modernisierung’) und die offiziellen Ziele einer Veränderung, sondern auch die wesentlichen Akteure und Akteursgruppen, die die öffentliche Diskussion wie Teile des wissenschaftlichen Diskurses instrumentieren und instrumentalisieren. In der Konsequenz entsteht eine vermeintliche Alternativlosigkeit in Zielen und Vorgehensweisen. Die mind sets der Entscheider über Veränderungsvorhaben uniformieren sich und der Diskurs nimmt die bekannten fatalistischen Tina- Züge an (Tina: There is no alternative). Vgl. dazu im Einzelnen durchaus grundsätzliche und über das hier behandelte Detailthema deutlich hinausgehende

Analysen bei: Diamand 1995; Arnim 2001; Krugman 2003; Halper/ Clarke 2004; Walpen 2004; Nordmann 2005; Müller/ Giegold/ Arhelger 2004; Resch 2005; Meyer 2005.

[6] Der ‚Erfolgsnachweis' ist nicht immer leicht zu erbringen. Vgl. dazu zum Beispiel: Kieser 2002; oder Conrad/ Trummer 2007.

[7] Zur Kritik von ‚first- und second hand dealers' der Ideen und Verfahren eines ‚modernisierten' und in seinen gesellschaftlichen Funktionen zurückgeschnittenen bis ‚abgeschafften' Staates vgl. z.B.: Diamand 1995; Walpen 2004; Nordmann, 2005; Müller 2004; Rügemer 2004; Schöller 2004; Halper/ Clarke 2004.

[8] Der Entschluss, sich einer bestimmten theoretischen Denkvorstellung zu bedienen, um ein praktisches Problem zu analysieren und Lösungen zu entwickeln sowie die Wahl zugunsten eines oder mehrerer hierfür einzusetzender Instrumentarien, sind nur ein kleiner Ausschnitt eines umfassenderen Transfer- und Übernahmeprozesses, mit dem das Management von Veränderungen insgesamt zu tun hat. Nicht näher betrachtet werden im hier behandelten Zusammenhang z.B. die Fragen des Wissenstransfers oder des Managements von Veränderungen. Vgl. für einen ersten Überblick hierzu z. B: Franz/ Howaldt/ Jacobsen/ Kopp 2003.

[9] Einen Überblick über personale Führungstheorien bieten einschlägige Lehrbücher, für viele vgl. z.B.: Staehle/ Conrad/ Sydow 1999; Scholz 2000; Berthel/ Becker 2003.

[10] Hier ist nicht der systematische Ort, um den gesamten Variantenreichtum an Vorstellungen, die hier bislang entwickelt wurden, ansatzweise oder etwa im Detail dazustellen. Einen kleinen Einblick in die facettenreiche Diskussion bietet z.B. der Reader von Syrett/ Hogg 1994. Hier wird nur Bezug genommen auf einige Grundstrukturen. Es geschieht mit dem Ziel, unterschiedliche Ansatzpunkte herauszuarbeiten, die zu beachten sind, wenn man personenbezogene Führung einsetzen will. Entweder geschieht dies, um das Handeln von Geführten direkt zu beeinflussen oder aber wenn man das Handeln von Führungskräften ‚optimiert' (z.B. bei der Wahl unterschiedlicher Führungsstile), um darüber vermittelt auf das Verhalten der Geführten einzuwirken

[11] Insbesondere Groeben und Scheele (1977) haben auf die grundlagentheoretische Bedeutung eines epistemisch aufgeweiteten Subjektmodells hingewiesen. Leider hat sich eine derartige Modellbildung bislang in der Managementforschung nicht breit durchsetzen können, man behilft sich mit Ausnahme systemtheoretischer Vorstellungen stattdessen weitgehend mit sehr vereinfachenden Menschenbildannahmen oder zerlegt das Individuum methodisch elementaristisch in einzelne Dimensionen, die dann separat beforscht und zur Grundlage von Gestaltungsempfehlungen gemacht werden. Der Gesamtzusammenhang einer solchen Dimension oder ‚Variablen' mit dem ‚übrigen' Selbst oder der Persönlichkeit wird nicht hergestellt, die Bedeutung einer einzelnen Variablen (oder eines hypothetischen Konstrukts) für die Handlungsentstehung überzeichnet. Zu neueren Arbeiten im Rahmen der Untersuchung des subjektiven Faktors als Teil der betrieblichen Leistungserzeugung vgl. aber z.B. Moldaschl 2002.

[12] Zu dieser erweiterten Gegenstandsbestimmung von Organisationspsychologie vgl. meines Wissens erstmalig: Franke (1978).

[13] Dies ist eine Frage der subjektiven Bewertung. Studien zur Führungseffizienz erbringen jedenfalls regelmäßig keine sehr starken signifikanten Korrelationen zwischen Führungsaktivitäten und -erfolg. Das spricht weder gegen Führung noch die Notwendigkeit zu führen. Meines Erachtens eher dafür, die Forschungsbemühungen mit anderen als den bisherigen Konzepten und Methoden zu verbreitern und zu intensivieren.

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Managing Motivation: Verhaltensannahmen und Personalsteuerung im New Public Management

1   Die Ökonomisierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung

Ökonomisierung war in der öffentlichen Verwaltung lange Zeit gleichbedeutend mit Privatisierung. Spätestens seit Anfang der 1990er-Jahre zogen zunehmend auch hierzulande marktliche Steuerungselemente in den öffentlichen Sektor ein. Zu beobachten ist ein Bedeutungsgewinn wirtschaftlicher Rationalitäten in ursprünglich 'außerwirtschaftlichen' Bereichen (Reichard 2003). Fokussiert wird hierbei eine Ausrichtung des Handelns an ökonomischen Kategorien, Werten und Prinzipien.

Ihre theoretische Legitimation bezieht diese Ökonomisierung einerseits aus dem Managerialismus. Aus der Privatwirtschaft und der Betriebswirtschaft stammend, fordert diese Strömung den Staat seit den 80er Jahren auf, aus den Entwicklungen in der Privatwirtschaft Lehren zu ziehen (Löffler 2003). Anderseits erfährt die Ökonomisierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung ihre Legitimation durch unterschiedliche Theorien der Volkswirtschaftslehre. Hierbei spielt insbesondere die Public Choice-Theorie eine prominente Rolle (Budäus/ Grüning 1998; Jann 1998; Koch 1999).[1] Als Vertreter der modernen Institutionenökonomie favourisieren die Public Choice-Theoretiker einen institutional choice Ansatz. Unter den Verhaltensannahmen – individuelle Nutzenmaximierung und eingeschränkte Rationalität – entwerfen die ökonomischen Akteure hiernach institutionelle Arrangements, um die 'Schäden' zu beheben, die aus der begrenzten Akteursrationalität resultieren. Nur so ist gemäß ökonomischer Doktrin ein möglichst hohes Niveau an Bedürfnisbefriedigung realisierbar (Picot/ Dietl/ Franck 2002).[2]

Zwar betonen die Institutionenökonomen den Modellcharakter ihrer Verhaltensannahmen. Indem diese jedoch zur Grundlage der Institutionenwahl gemacht werden, lassen sich institutionelle Arrangements letztlich aus exogenen Verhaltensdispositionen ableiten. Diese deterministische Perspektive wird zunehmend von Ökonomen (z.B. Frey 1990; Grandori 2001) und Betriebswirten (z.B. Osterloh/ Frey/ Frost 1999; Frost 2005) kritisiert. Die Kritiker monieren sowohl die reduzierte Motivstruktur als auch deren axiomatischen Charakter. Unter Rekurs auf verhaltenswissenschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse betonen sie die Variabilität und Gestaltbarkeit von Handlungsmotiven. Mit Blick auf die Ökonomisierung der Verwaltung stellt sich hier nun die Frage, welchen Einfluß das gewählte institutionelle Arrangement – hier das New Public Management – auf die Handlungsmotive der Verwaltungsakteure hat. Zunächst wird das ökonomisierte Steuerungsverständnisses des New Public Managements mit seinen motivationalen

Prämissen vorgestellt. Hiernach werden mit intrinsischen und extrinsischen Handlungs-motiven die verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Grundlagen des Verwaltungsmanagements herausgearbeitet. Anhand des Verdrängungs- und Verstärkungseffekts tritt die Dynamik der Motivationen deutlich hervor und lenkt den Blick auf die Notwendigkeit einer Endo-genisierung von Handlungsmotivationen bei der Konzeption von administrativen Steu-erungssystemen. Unter Rekurs auf die verhaltenswissenschaftliche Diskussion werden schließlich Perspektiven eines motivationsorientierten Steuerungskonzepts präsentiert.

2 New Public Management – Facetten eines ökonomisierten Steuerungsverständnisses

Der Prozess der 'Verwaltungsökonomisierung' hat länderspezifisch unterschiedliche Formen angenommen. Die Erscheinungsarten der Ökonomisierung umfassen eine intensivere Kooperation zwischen öffentlichem und privatem Sektor (z.B. Contracting out, Public-Private Partnership) und eine stärkere Orientierung des Verwaltungshandelns an volkswirtschaftlichen und betriebswirtschaftlichen Prinzipien. Zu beobachten ist hierbei der Einsatz ökonomischer Ansätze im Beschaffungswesen, bei der Produktion öffentlicher Dienstleistungen und bei der Finanzierung öffentlicher Infrastruktur (Löffler 2003). Doch in kaum einem Bereich staatlichen Handelns wird die Relevanz ökonomischer Theorie so offenkundig, wie bei der Steuerung von Verwaltungsorganisati-onen (Budäus/ Grüning 1998). Denn wie Jann (1998, S. 167) betont, „überträgt New Public Management neuere theoretische Entwicklungen der Institutionenökonomie, wie etwa Property-Rights-, Transaktionskosten-, Principal-Agent- und Vertragstheorien, auf die Steuerungsprobleme komplexer Organisationen". Die Ursachen der als zu niedrig behaupteten Produktivität im öffentlichen Sektor werden daher folgerichtig primär in der für die öffentlichen Institutionen charakteristischen Struktur der Eigentumsrechte und der damit verbundenen Anreizmechanismen gesehen (Badelt 1987; Picot/ Wolff 1994). Getreu dem (institutionen-) ökonomischen Motto: „at the beginning there were markets" (Williamson 1975, S. 20) vertrauen daher alle Ansätze des New Public Managements – so auch die deutsche Adaption, das Neue Steuerungsmodell (Reichard 2003) – auf die Steuerungskompetenz des Wettbewerbs und auf die Anreizwirkungen, die eine klare Zuordnung von Ergebnisverantwortung auslöst.

Die Bürger vergeben als Prinzipale über ihre gewählten Vertreter politische Aufträge und stellen hierfür materielle Ressourcen bereit. Dokumentiert werden Aufträge wie

Ressourcen im produktorientierten Haushaltsplan, in dem je Produkt dem erwarteten Ressourceneinsatz die angestrebte Wirkung gegenübergestellt wird. Auftragnehmer bzw. Agent ist der Verwaltungsvorstand, der seinerseits Aufträge an spezialisierte Leistungseinheiten vergibt. Ihnen obliegt es im Rahmen eines Globalbudgets (Schedler/ Proeller 2000), die politischen Vorgaben eigenverantwortlich zu erfüllen. Bei Ziel-verfehlung werden sie zur Rechenschaft gezogen. „Die gemeinsame Grundidee der Ansätze besteht darin, die monolithische Staatsorganisation in kleinere Einheiten zu zerlegen und diese, bzw. ihre Manager, für einen konkreten, eindeutig messbaren Output verantwortlich zu machen" (Sander/ Langer 2004, S. 92).[3] Gesteuert werden solche Leistungseinheiten – etwa Ämter, Abteilungen oder Einrichtungen (z.B. Museum, Theater) – gemäß institutionenökonomischer Steuerungslogik über Kontrakte (Osner 2001). Diese konkretisieren den Haushaltsplan und legen als Steuerungsinstrument den Umfang von Entscheidungskompetenzen, Ergebnisverantwortung sowie Anreize und Sanktionen für die Mitarbeiter der Leistungszentren fest (Osner 2001).

Neben vertraglich fixierten Leistungs- und Ressourcenumfängen bedarf es auch einer daran gekoppelten Anreiz- und Belohnungsfunktion. Letztere zielt darauf ab, eine Zielkongruenz zwischen Verwaltungsvorstand und Leistungseinheit herzustellen. Um eine ressourceneffiziente und qualitätsorientierte Leistungserbringung zu incentivieren, können die Leistungseinheiten ihre erzielten Überschüsse einbehalten. Das erzielte wirtschaftliche Ergebnis des Leistungsvollzugs ist damit zentraler Anreizzweck, weil die monetären Konsequenzen des eigenen Handelns unmittelbar erfahrbar werden und beim Leistungsanbieter für eine anreizkompatible Handlungsmotivation sorgen. Die individu-elle Vergütung beinhaltet gemäß dieser Systemlogik 'erfolgsabhängige' Entlohnungs-anteile, die an die Erreichung der produktspezifischen Zielgrößen gekoppelt sind.

Damit die Verantwortlichkeit der Politik bzw. des Verwaltungsvorstands in solchen Vertragsbeziehungen gewährleistet ist, wird auf unterschiedlich gestufte Berichtspflichten abgestellt, die den Zielerreichungsgrad im Handeln der Leistungszentren ermitteln. Überprüft wird die Zielerreichung durch ein Berichtswesen, das laufend und ex-post einen Soll-Ist-Vergleich zu ex-ante definierten Informationen über Umfang, Qualität, Nachfrageentwicklung, Wirkung etc. im Sinne einer Abweichungsanalyse liefert. Indem das Berichtswesen den Handlungsbereich des Agenten transparenter macht (Ebers/ Gotsch 1999), nimmt es eine zentrale Funktion in der institutionenökonomischen Steuerungslogik ein (Picot/ Wolff 1994). Der Leistungsnachweis erfolgt auf der Basis outputorientierter Indikatoren (Beschwerden, Kundenzufriedenheit, Wartezeiten), die an den jeweiligen Produkten angelehnt sind. Die Indikatoren bilden Mindestvorgaben. Bei Unterschreitung

dieses Sollwertes sieht sich das Leistungszentrum Begründungszwängen gegenüber der Verwaltungsleitung/ Politik ausgesetzt. Das Handeln der Leistungszentren und seiner Mitarbeiter ist daher so zu steuern, dass der Sollwert möglichst übertroffen wird. Unterschreiten die Leistungszentren jedoch dauerhaft den Wert, so kann der Verwaltungsvorstand vorbehaltlich gesetzlicher Bestimmungen die übertragenen Aufgaben an den Markt bringen und dort von einem anderen Leistungsanbieter erfüllen lassen (Picot/ Wolff 1994).

Im Kern entsteht ein System sich selbst steuernder Regelkreise: Leistungseinheiten, die eine Kongruenz von Ergebnisverantwortung, Ressourcenverantwortung und Handlungsmöglichkeiten bei ihrer Konstruktion fokussieren, sind integriert in ein Netz von Auftraggeber-Auftragnehmer-Beziehungen. Sofern dies möglich ist, „werden die politisch-demokratisch bestimmte Auftragserteilung und die autonome effizienzorientierte Auftragserledigung getrennt. Koordiniert werden diese Beziehungen nicht länger durch bürokratische Anweisungen, sondern möglichst durch Märkte, Quasi-Märkte oder Kontrakte" (Sander/ Langer 2004, S. 89).

3   ‚Avoiding the negative' – zum motivationalen Verständnis des New Public Managements

Dreh- und Angelpunkt des New Public Managements sind dyadische Tauschbeziehungen zwischen Auftraggebern und Auftragnehmern. Unabhängig davon, ob es sich um Globalbudgets, Berichtswesen oder anreizkompatible Vergütung handelt, sämtliche Steuerungstechnologien zielen im Rahmen eines Verhaltenstauschs auf die kosteneffiziente Sicherstellung der Vertragserfüllung. Indem die Akteure im New Public Management als Nutzenmaximierer konzipiert werden (Osner 2001), reduzieren sich die Tauschbeziehungen auf Kostenkalküle. Gekennzeichnet sind diese gegebenen Präferenzen in institutionenökonomischer Perspektive zusätzlich durch die gleichsam „anthropologisch gegebene" (Pirker 2000, S. 77) Opportunismusneigung der Akteure. Diese exogen definierte Handlungsmotivation wird von Ökonomen insofern als Vorteil gesehen, als dass sich strategisches Verhalten der Akteure bereits vor Implementation bestimmter Steuerungstechnologien erfassen lässt und nicht nur in bereits bestehenden institutionellen Arrangements (Frost 2005).

Was folgt nun aus der Opportunismusannahme für die Motivationsaufgabe organisatorischer Steuerung? Sie restringiert die Lösungsmöglichkeiten für das Anreizproblem. Im Kern setzt das New Public Management auf zwei Lösungen, um die Verwaltungsakteure zur Leistungserstellung zu bewegen. Entweder werden die Handlungsspielräume eingeschränkt oder die Bereitschaft zur Leistungserstellung wird durch Ausgleichzahlungen gefördert.

Der Handlungsspielraum der Verwaltungsmitglieder kann durch Überwachung oder Sanktionen so reduziert werden, dass Leistungszurückhaltung nicht mehr lohnend ist. So werden im New Public Management Weisungsmechanismen und Verhaltenskontrollen in Form von Berichtswesen, Budgets, Outsourcing und Kontrakte eingesetzt, um eine rationale Kontrolle zu gewährleisten (Frost 2005).

Die Lösung des Anreizproblems durch Ausgleichszahlungen fokussiert den Preis-Effekt: Mit steigendem Preis erhöht sich die Arbeitsanstrengung (Eisenberger/ Cameron 1996). Hierauf setzen die leistungsorientierten Vergütungsbestandteile im Rahmen des New Public Managements. Denn werden die Verwaltungsmitglieder entsprechend ihrer Leistungsbeiträge vergütet, so besteht ein Anreiz, zur Leistungserstellung beizutragen. „Demzufolge wird opportunistisches Verhalten durch erzielbare Erlöse in Form von Belohnungen positiv beeinflusst" (Frost 2005, S. 116). Neben der Handlungssteuerung kommt im New Public Management also eine Ergebnissteuerung zum Einsatz.

In ihrem Bemühen, die Interessenkonflikte in den diversen Prinzipal-Agenten-Konstellationen möglichst kosteneffizient zu lösen, offenbart das Konzept des New Public Managements eine Gestaltungsstrategie, die Foss (1997, S. 5) als „Avoiding the Negative" betitelt. Die hierbei verwandten Steuerungstechnologien – Berichtswesen, Budgets, Kontrakte, Leistungsentgelte, Outsourcing – fokussieren nur extrinsische Motivationeffekte. Die Handlungsmotivation, so Frost (2005, S. 116), „erfolgt durch Transaktion, d.h. einen externen Antrieb, sei es durch Sanktion wie im Fall der Handlungssteuerung oder Belohnung im Fall der Ergebnissteuerung". Zwar bestreiten viele Ökonomen die Bedeutung intrinsischer Motivation nicht. Sie werden etwa in Form von „managerial incentives" (Güth 1995, S. 694), Vertrauen (Arrow 1980) oder Gefühle (Akerlof/ Yellen 1986) thematisiert. Da jedoch das ökonomische Gestaltungs- und Steuerungsinteresse auf die Vermeidung eines ‚worst-case'-Szenarios (Milgrom/ Roberts 1992) ausgerichtet ist, bestimmen Nutzenmaximierung und Opportunismus die Definition und Lösungsversuche der Steuerungsprobleme. Insofern reiht sich das New Public Management nahtlos in die

Steuerungsdoktrin der Institutionenökonomik ein. Hier wie dort zielen die einzelnen Elemente auf entsprechende Sanktions- und Belohungswirkungen ab.

4 Seelenmassage oder Sanktionen – Motivationale Grundlagen des Verwaltungsmanagements

Die Frage nach dem, was ‚dahinter steckt', was einen Menschen zu seinem Verhalten bewegt, was seiner Energie eine bestimmte Richtung verleiht, warum er bestimmte Verhaltensmuster an den Tag legt, ist die Frage nach der Motivation menschlichen Handelns (Bosetzky/ Heinrich 1994).[4] Motivation ist somit die Antriebsfeder des Handelns. Unterschieden wird in der Literatur zwischen intrinsischer und extrinsischer Motivation.

4.1 Intrinsische Motivation: Definition und Relevanz

Intrinsisch motiviert ist, wer eine Tätigkeit um ihrer selbst willen ausführt (Frey/ Osterloh 1997). Die Ausführung bringt den Menschen in einen Zustand, den er als belohnend empfindet. Sie erweist sich somit als direkte Bedürfnisbefriedigung. Frommer (1976) folgend spricht man hierbei von Eigenbekräftigung: Die Handlung selbst hat Wert und befriedigt bzw. bereitet Freude. Intrinsische Motivation wirkt sich insofern auf die Leistungsmotivation aus, als diese zu einer höheren Arbeitszufriedenheit führt, die kognitiven Leistungen und die Informationsverarbeitung verbessert bzw. effektiviert sowie Kreativität fördert (Deci/ Koestner/ Ryan 1999).

Laut Osterloh und Frey (1997) ist eine hohe intrinsische Motivation der Organisations-mitglieder aus folgenden Gründen unverzichtbar. Zunächst entziehen sich mitunter Tätigkeiten aufgrund von 'multiple-tasking'-Problemen einer leistungskontingenten Vergütung. Im Zuge von 'fuzzy-tasking'-Probleme läßt sich bei vielen Aufgaben das Ziel einer Tätigkeit nur mangelhaft operationalisieren. Intrinsische Motivation ist schließlich eine zentrale Bedingung für die Durchführung innovativer und kreativer Aufgaben. Die Organisation der Verwaltungsaufgaben ist in Teilen durch solche ‚multiple-tasking'- und ‚fuzzy-tasking'-Probleme gekennzeichnet, erfordert ein hohes Maß an Kreativität und Innovativität und ist deshalb auf intrinsische Motivation der Organisationsmitglieder angewiesen.

Überwindung des ‚multiple-tasking'-Problems

‚Multiple-tasking'-Probleme treten bei Aufgaben mit mehreren Leistungsdimensionen auf, die unterschiedlich gut beobachtbar und damit messbar sind (Holmström/ Milgrom 1991). Bei komplexen Verwaltungsaufgaben, wie sie insbesondere in den Bereichen Jugend und Soziales anfallen, können nur die wenigsten Leistungsdimensionen erfasst werden. So sind etwa in der Kinder- und Jugendhilfe nur 5% des Tagesgeschäftes eindeutig über Kennzahlen quantifizierbar (Göbel 1999; Pitschas 1994). Da die Vergütung sich im Rahmen des NPM primär an den quantifizierbaren Leistungsdimensionen orientiert (Brüggemeier 1997), fokussieren extrinsisch motivierte Verwaltungsmitglieder nur die Erfüllung dieser Arbeitsinhalte. Aus dem Blick geraten hingegen nicht genau spezifizierbare Aufgabenbestandteile mit der Folge, dass sich individuellen Opportunitäts-kosten für die schlecht messbaren Aktivitäten erhöhen (Frost 2005). Leistungsorientierte Anreizsysteme motivieren so nicht nur erhöhten Arbeitseinsatz, sondern beeinflussen auch die Allokation von Arbeitsanstrengung auf die unterschiedlichen Aufgabenbestandteile (Holmström/ Milgrom 1991).

Bewältigung von ‚fuzzy-tasking'-Problemen

Das ‚Fuzzy-tasking'-Problem fokussiert die Situation, dass mit der Einführung von Anreizsystemen das Interesse der Verwaltungsmitglieder sinkt, über ihren eigenen Leistungsbeitrag hinaus sich für die Entwicklung weiterer organisationsrelevanter Ziele zu engagieren (Osterloh/ Frey/ Frost 1999; Frost 2005). Solche übergeordneten Ziele sind normalerweise weniger mess- und zurechenbar als operationalisierte Bereichs- oder Individualziele. Gerade im administrativ-politischen System spielen auf managerieller Ebene allgemeine, schlecht strukturierte Ziele eine zentrale Rolle. So ist das zentrale Ziel der mittleren Führungsebene die Gewährleistung eines reibungslosen Verwaltungsablaufs (Göbel 1999). Eine detaillierte Quantifizierung der Ziele ist nicht nur unmöglich, sie wäre auch angesichts des komplexen und häufig veränderlichen Arbeitszusammenhangs eher kontraproduktiv. Der Verwaltungsvorstand ist geradezu auf die Mitwirkung der mittleren Führungsebene im Zielbildungsprozess angewiesen und muss von deren lokalem Wissen profitieren. Werden die Untergebenen aber anhand von klar quantifizierten Vorgaben entlohnt, dann entfällt der Anreiz, sich Gedanken über die Veränderung von Zielsystemen zu machen.

Bearbeitung von nicht routinisierten Aufgaben

Kreative und innovative Tätigkeiten beruhen primär auf intrinsischer Motivation (Osterloh/ Frey/ Frost 1999). Bei solchen Aufgaben ist es schwierig oder gar unmöglich,

exakte Maßstäbe für noch unbekannte Alternativen zu setzen. Es liegen zahlreiche Interpretationsmöglichkeiten vor. Wie bei der Bekämpfung von Umweltkatastrophen (Hochwasser, Schneechaos, Vogelgrippe) regelmäßig deutlich wird, fordert die umsichtige und effizienter Lösung unvorhersehbarer Probleme den Verwaltungsmitgliedern ein Höchstmaß an Kreativität, Innovativität und Leistungsbereitschaft ab. Damit in solchen Fällen nicht mögliche Leistungsergebnisse zu niedrig veranschlagt werden, also – wie im Falle der Vogelgrippebekämpfung auf Rügen - suboptimale Lösungen gewählt werden, dürfen die Verwaltungsmitglieder ihre Informationssuche nicht zu vorschnell abbrechen. Anreizsysteme erhöhen nun die Gefahr vorschneller Kompetenzabschätzung mit der Folge einer reduzierten Lernintensität. Es findet nur ein Anpassungs- und kein Veränderungslernen statt „Monetäre Anreize bewirken in komplexen und neuartigen Situationen, dass Individuen zu stereotypen Wiederholungen von bereits Bewährtem neigen" (Osterloh/ Frey/ Forst 1999, S. 1254).

Für eine gesamtzielkonforme Steuerung der individuellen Handlungen – so macht die Argumentation deutlich – ist die intrinsische Motivation der Verwaltungsmitglieder von zentraler Relevanz. Intrinsische Motivationen haben jedoch auch Nachteile. Die 'richtige' intrinsische Motivation ist schwierig zu erzeugen und ihre Richtung ist nicht zielgenau beeinflussbar. Außerdem kann intrinsische Motivation auch negative Inhalte haben. Die Nachteile der intrinsischen Motivation sind die Vorteile der extrinsischen Motivation, wie nachstehend deutlich wird.

4.2   Extrinsische Motivation: Definition und Relevanz

Motivation zum Handeln erfolgt aus extrinsischen Gründen, wenn die Handlungsfolgen belohnend sind. „Extrinsische Motivation durch Transaktion beruht auf einem Antrieb durch externe Belohnung, z.B. Geld, Anerkennung und Status, oder Sanktion durch Bestrafung" (Frost 2005, S. 247). Ihre Anreize dienen als Mittel zum Zweck der Bedürfnisbefriedigung. Erfolgt bei der intrinsischen Motivation der Antrieb zum Handeln aus der Tätigkeit selber, ist die Handlung hier nur Instrument für die Befriedigung eines anderen Bedürfnisses (Frommer 1976). Entscheidend ist, dass es sich dabei um einen Austausch bei gegebenen Präferenzen handelt. Vertreter des NPM – wie beispielsweise Osner (2001) – fokussieren auf extrinsische Motivation. Sie unterstellen eine lineare Beziehung zwischen monetärem Anreiz und Arbeitseinsatz. Indem die einzelnen Vertragsbestandteile an spezifische Belohnungskomponenten gekoppelt sind, zielt die Steuerungslogik des NPM auf eine Übereinstimmung von individueller Leistungsabgabe

mit dem organisationalen Gesamtziel, ohne dass jedoch die Verwaltungsmitglieder ihre Präferenzen inhaltlich synchronisieren.

Wichtig ist die extrinsische Motivation in der Verwaltung, weil sie erstens disziplinierend wirkt, zweitens zu einer inhaltlichen Flexibilisierung der Handlungsziele führt und drittens intrinsische Motivation erzeugen kann.

Disziplinierung von Emotionen

Extrinsische Motivation ist nützlich, um die überbordende Emotionalität der Verwaltungsmitglieder zu disziplinieren (Frey/ Osterloh 1998). Hier werden die Schattenseiten intrinsischer Motivation angesprochen. Denn: Neid, Rachsucht und Geltungstrieb sind nicht weniger intrinsisch motiviert als Loyalität, Altruismus, Pflichtbewusstsein oder Liebe. Wie der Verwaltungssoziologe Bosetzky wiederholt festgestellt hat (für eine Übersicht Bosetzky/ Heinrich 1994), sind diese negativen Formen intrinsischer Motivation auch in öffentlichen Verwaltungen beobachtbar und können maßgeblich zur negativen Politisierung des Verwaltungsbetriebs beitragen. Um diesen negativen Folgen überbordender Emotionalität zu begegnen, wird das Verhalten der Verwaltungsmitglieder auf extrinsische Anreize gerichtet. Insbesondere Hirschman (1987) verweist auf die Bedeutung von ökonomischen Interessen für die Einhegung unkontrollierter Leidenschaften. In Verwaltungen können beispielsweise unerwünschte emotionale Konflikte gezügelt werden, wenn ein gemeinsames Interesse an materiellen Entgelten besteht.

Flexibilisierung von Organisationszielen

Extrinsische Motivation führt zu einer inhaltlichen Flexibilisierung der Handlungsziele. Wie Seibel (1992) in seiner Untersuchung über Non-Profit-Organisationen deutlich gemacht hat, ist die Motivierung von Freiwilligen hochsensibel für Differenzen über das Organisationsziel. Die öffentliche Verwaltung braucht sich hingegen beispielsweise bei der Neuausrichtung an ökonomischen Steuerungsstandards im Zuge des New Public Managements nicht um die persönlichen Überzeugungen ihrer Angestellten kümmern, solange sie diese adäquat bezahlt und die Kosten der Überwachung gering hält (Frey/ Osterloh 1998). Wie Luhmann betont, gewinnt eine Organisation sogar an Elastizität, wenn es davon absieht, „seinen Mitgliedern die herrliche Vierfruchtmarmelade nahezubringen, die es produziert" (Luhmann 1973, S. 142). Hier greift das "Gesetz der Verstärkung" (Frey/ Osterloh 1998, S. 315). Monetäre Anreize machen als uninteressant empfundene Arbeitsinhalte nicht attraktiver, insgesamt wird aber eine höhere Arbeitszufriedenheit ausgelöst.

Erzeugung von intrinsischer Motivation durch extrinsische Motivation

Belohnungen können stituationsspezifisch erst intrinsische Motivation erzeugen. Dies ist dann der Fall, wenn zunächst unbekannte und gar als Überforderung empfundene Aufgaben aufgrund von Anreizen überhaupt angegangen werden. Im Zuge der Handlungsausführung kann sich ein Kompetenzerleben einstellen, das die intrinsische Motivation fördert (Frey/ Osterloh 1998). Die Organisationsmitglieder nehmen hier den extrinsischen Anreiz als Herausforderung und Gelegenheit wahr, die eignen Fähigkeiten zu testen und sich selber neue Ziele zu setzen (Locke 1981). Diese Herausforderung kann sich positiv auf ihr Selbstvertrauen auswirken mit der Folge, dass die innere Zielsetzung und somit das eigene Anspruchsniveau steigt (Frost 2005).

Extrinsische Motivation ist insofern für die öffentliche Verwaltung relevant, als Belohnungen Verwaltungsmitglieder zu gesamtzielkonformen Handlungen bewegen. Sie wirken als Disziplinierungs- und Kontrolltechnologie zur effizienten Verhaltenssteuerung. In Folge des möglichen Disziplinierungs-Effekts (Frey 1997) ergeben sich Leistungssteigerungen, da die Opportunitätskosten des nicht-belohnten Verhaltens steigen. Zu beobachten ist die Wirkung des Preis-Effekts.

4.3   Intrinsische und extrinsische Motivation im dynamischen Wechselspiel

Eine gesamtzielkonforme Verhaltenssteuerung der Organisationsmitglieder kann nicht einfach durch eine additive Verknüpfung von Faktoren zur Förderung intrinsischer Motivation um extrinsische Anreize optimiert werden. Angenommen wird in der neueren motivationstheoretischen Diskussion vielmehr ein 'inverser Austauschmodus' zwischen intrinsischer und extrinsischer Motivation (Staehle 1999; Frost 2005). Beide Motivationsformen stehen in einem interdependenten Beziehung, welche die Dynamik der Motivation begründet. Situationsabhängig kann extrinsische intrinsische Motivation unterhöhlen bzw unterminieren. Beobachtbar ist ein sogenannter Verdrängungs-Effekt (Frey 1997).

Die Unterminierung der intrinsischen Motivation: Der Verdrängungs-Effekt

Sozialpsychologische Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Belohnungen situationsabhängig die intrinsische Motivation verdrängen[5]: Jede Belohnung hat sowohl einen kontrollierenden als auch eine informierenden Aspekt (Deci/ Ryan 1975). Dominiert letzterer, wird das Gefühl der Kompetenz und der Selbstkontrolle erhöht. Die intrinsische Motivation nimmt zu. Dominiert jedoch der kontrollierende Aspekt, so rechnet der Handelnde die Verant-

wortung für die Aktivität dem Kontrollierenden zu. Die intrinsische Motivation wird reduziert. Die Vergütung von Aktivitäten kann daher 'hidden costs of rewards' implizieren. Frey (1997, S. 110) verallgemeinerte dies als „Verdrängungseffekt" und führte „hidden costs of rewards" in die Wirtschaftstheorie ein. Für die Unterminierung der intrinsischen Motivation ist entscheidend, ob der Preis- oder der Verdrängungs-Effekt dominiert. Die Beziehung beider Effekte ist in nachstehender Abbildung dargestellt.

Abbildung 1: Der Netto-Effekt zwischen Preis- und Verdrängungseffekt

Quelle: Frey 1997, S. 103

Alle Menschen sind in ihren Handlungen in einem gewissen Ausmaß intrinsisch motiviert. Sie tun etwas, weil es Spaß macht, sie von dessen Richtigkeit überzeugt sind oder die Arbeit an sich Freude macht. In dieser Abbildung wird die Arbeitsfreude (intrinsische Motivation) durch den Abschnitt 0A dargestellt. Bei konstanter intrinsischer Motivation steigert ein Lohn (extrinsischer Anreiz) von W die Arbeitsanstrengung gemäß dem Preis-Effekt entlang der Angebotskurve S von A auf B. Zur gleichen Zeit führt der Verdrängungs-Effekt zu einer Verschiebung der Angebotskurve von S nach S', da die intrinsische Motivation abgenommen hat. In der Abbildung dominiert der Verdrängungs-Effekt den Preis-Effekt, d.h., der Arbeitseinsatz verringert sich von A auf C. Bei einem kleineren Verdrängungs-Effekt, wäre die Kurve S' weniger nach links verschoben. In diesem Falle würde eine Lohnerhöhung einen verstärkten Arbeitseinsatz implizieren. Welcher Netto-Effekt sich tatsächlich ergibt, ist jedoch nicht generell prognostizierbar (Osterloh/ Frey/ Frost 1999).

Zu beobachten ist der Verdrängungseffekt immer dann, wenn über extrinsische Anreize die Selbstbestimmung und Selbsteinschätzung der Akteure reduziert wird. Die externen

Eingriffe werden als kontrollierend und nicht als informierend wahrgenommen. Werden extrinsische Anreize dagegen in Form von Lob als positive Rückmeldung präsentiert, so wird dies von den Akteuren als Ausweis ihrer Handlungskompetenz wahrgenommen. Eine Verdrängung der intrinsischen Motivation ist dann nicht zu erwarten. Im Gegenteil: Dominiert bei extrinsischen Anreizen der informierende Aspekt, so wirkt eine Belohnung als Motivationserhöhung. Sie steigert das Gefühl der Kompetenz und Selbstbestimmung (Lane 1991). Dieser Effekt ist für die Ökonomie nicht neu. Bereits Schumpeter (1936) hat die verstärkende Wirkung des Preissystems auf die intrinsische Motivation betont. Im folgenden Abschnitt wird dieser sogenannte Verstärkungseffekt (Frey 1997) näher beleuchtet.

Die Integration externer Werte und Ziele: Der Verstärkungs-Effekt

Der Verstärkungs-Effekt – also die Steigerung intrinsischer Motivation durch extrinsische Anreize –. ist möglich, sofern extrinsisch motivierte Verhaltensweisen durch Prozesse der Internalisierung und Integration in selbstbestimmtes Handeln transformierbar sind (Deci/ Ryan 1991, 1993). Hierbei müssen die Organisationsmitglieder die mit den extrinsischen Anreizen verbundenen Ziel- und Wertvorstellungen in das individuelle Wertsystem integrieren. Eigene Handlungen werden so als selbstbestimmt erfahrbar. Eine solche Internalisierung erweist sich in verhaltenswissenschaftlicher Perspektive als aktiver Prozess, bei dem die Verwaltungsmitglieder organisationale Ansprüche, Werte und Ziele eigenständig in das individuelle Wertesystem einfügen. In der Verhaltenswissenschaft wird dieser Prozess als extrinsische Verhaltensregulation bezeichnet.

Die Verwaltungsmitglieder können die organisationalen Werte und Ziele in differenter Weise in ihr Wertsystem integrieren. Die unterschiedlichen Integrationsformen bilden Deci und Ryan (2000, S. 230) folgend ein Kontinuum aus, an dessen Endpunkten ein extern wahrgenommer „locus auf causality" und ein intern wahrgenommener „locus of causality" stehen. Empfinden die Verwaltungsmitglieder bei einem externalen „locus of causality" ihre Handlungen als aufgezwungen und reagieren nur auf mögliche Belohnungen bzw. Sanktionen, so fühlen sich sie sich bei einem internalen „locus of causality" als Verursacher der Handlung und „Herren ihres Schicksals" (Frost 2005, S. 274). Deci und Ryan (2000) differenzieren innerhalb des Kontinuums zwischen vier Stufen extrinsischer Verhaltensregulation, die in der nachstehenden Abbildung zusammengefasst sind.[6]

Abbildung 2: Die vier Stufen der extrinsischen Verhaltensregulierung

„Locus of Causality"

internal

eher
internal

eher
external

external

4. Integrierte Regulation
Ziele sind in das Selbst-
konzept integriert.

3. Identifizierte Regulation
Handeln wird als persönlich
wichtig angesehen.

2. Introjizierte Regulation
Handlungen werden ausge-
führt , um inneren Druck zu
folgen.

1. Externale Regulation
Handlungen werden ausge-
führt, um Belohnungen
zu erhalten und Bestrafun-
gen zu vermeiden.

Zunahme des Gefühls,
autonom und selbst-
bestimmt zu handeln

Quelle: Frost 2005, S. 273

− Auf der untersten Stufe – externale Regulation – werden Handlungen vollzogen, um
   eine Belohnung zu bekommen bzw. einer Sanktionierung zu entgehen. Virulent wird
   hier eine ökonomisierte Steuerungslogik, wie sie etwa im New Public Management
   deutlich wird. Das Verhalten orientiert sich zwar an den Organisationszielen. Indem es
   jedoch von externen Anreiz- und Steuerungsfaktoren abhängt, werden keine
   Bedürfnisse nach Autonomie oder Selbstbestimmung adressiert.

− Introjizierte Regulation fokussiert Handlungen, die internen Anstößen und Druck
   folgen. Verwaltungsmitglieder vollziehen Handlungen aus Selbstachtung und
   Konformitätsstreben. Ein Verstoß gegen die 'guten Verwaltungssitten' führt zu einem
   schlechten Gewissen. Da eine Vermeidung solcher Situationen im Verhalten bereits
   antizipiert wird, also keine äußeren Handlungsanstöße mehr nötig sind, ist introjizierte
   Regulation bereits internal. Die Handlung bleibt gleichwohl von der Identität getrennt.
   Obwohl die Handlung innerem Druck entspringt, hat das Organisationsmitglied diese
   in ihrem Vollzug nicht wirklich akzeptiert.

– Im Rahmen der identifizierten Regulation nehmen die Organisationsmitglieder bestimmte Verhaltensweisen als persönlich relevant wahr. Leisten etwa Organisationsmitglieder im Rahmen von Projektarbeit eine erhöhten Arbeitseinsatz, um das Projekt erfolgreich abzuschließen, so geschieht dies häufig, weil sie sich mit Projektzielen identifizieren und diese in ihr Selbstkonzept integrieren. Vollziehen sie ihre Handlungen also weitgehend aus eigenem Antrieb, so wird doch eine extrinsische Handlungsmotivation virulent. Denn es sind die Folgen des Handelns – etwa der Projektarbeit -, die belohnend wirken, weil beispielsweise die Kundenwünsche mit den erarbeiteten Projektergebnissen befriedigt werden.

– Auf Ebene der integrierten Regulation wird der höchste Grad an Selbstbestimmung erreicht. Hierbei bringen die Organisationsmitglieder die externen Systemziele und -werte mit ihren individuellen Ziel- und Wertvorstellungen in Übereinstimmung und integrieren sie in ihr Selbstkonzept. Extrinsisch motivierte Prozesse werden so quasi in die Kernstruktur des individuellen Selbst einverleibt (Deci/ Ryan 1993). Ein systemkonformes Handeln wird zu einem inneren Bedürfnis Im Unterschied zu der als aufoktroiert wahrgenommenen ökonomisierten Verhaltenssteuerung haben die Organisationsmitglieder hier das Gefühl von Freiwilligkeit und Optionalität. In Verbindung mit der intrinsischen Motivation bildet die integrierte Regulation somit die Grundlage für selbstbestimmtes Handeln.[7]

Die Forschung zur extrinsischen Verhaltensregulation zeigt: „Es gibt bei extrinsischer Motivation Unterschiede, warum Organisationsmitglieder Ziele verfolgen und bestimmte Handlungen ausführen" (Frost 2005, S. 274). Je nachdem fühlen sie sich fremdbestimmt oder in normativen Zwängen befindlich (externale und introjizierte Regulation) oder aber sie agieren selbstbestimmt unter der Maßgabe von Freiwilligkeit und Optionalität (identifizierte bzw. integrierte Regulation). Welche Auswirkungen haben nun die unterschiedlichen Formen der extrinisischen Verhaltensregulation auf die Arbeitsleistung und -qualität? Glaubt man der Forschergruppe um Deci und Ryan, so korrelieren autonome Formen der Regulation positiv mit einem gesteigerten Fluss-Erleben, reduzierter Angst, einer erhöhten Akzeptanz für Herausforderungen, eine gesteigerte kognitive Flexibilität, ein tiefergehendes Verständnis für Erlerntes, eine höhere Fehlertoleranz, mehr Arbeitszufriedenheit sowie ausgeprägte Willenskraft (z.B. Kasser/ Ryan 1993; Ryan/ Deci/ Grolnick 1995).

Was bedeuten diese Forschungsergebnisse für die Konzeption organisationaler Steuerung? Zentraler Faktor für einen erfolgreichen Internalisierungsprozess ist der soziale Kontext,

in dem die Organisationsmitglieder handeln. Als förderlich für die Internalisierung von organisationalen Zielen und Werten erweisen sich laut Deci et al. (1994) die Unterstützung der mit den Zielen verbundenen Gründe durch folgende organisatorische Interventionen:

– Die Akteure sollten eine rationale Begründung des gewünschten Verhaltens erhalten und den hieraus resultierenden individuellen Nutzen nachvollziehen können.

– Die Akteure sollten in ihren Beweggründen verstanden, ernst genommen und gewürdigt werden.

– Den Akteuren sollten Handlungsoptionen offeriert werden, da so der äußere Druck und ein allfälliges Kontrollgefühl reduziert und das Gefühl autonomen und kompetenten Handelns unterstützt wird.

Empirische Untersuchungen (Deci et al. 1994) haben einen positiven Einfluß der genannten Interventionen auf die intrinsische Motivation nachgewiesen. In diesen Fällen, so Frost (2005, S. 275), wurde „die intrinsische Motivation der Organisationsmitglieder durch externe Verhaltensregulation sogar gefördert". Es war mithin ein Verstärkungs-Effekt beobachtbar.

5 Die Endogenisierung von Motivationen als Gestaltungs-a priori eines New Public Managements

Organisationale Steuerungskonzepte – wie etwa das New Public Management – dienen primär der Beeinflussung des aufgabenbezogenen Verhaltens der Verwaltungsmitglieder. Jedoch weisen organisatorische Steuerungskonzepte immer Lücken auf, die den Organisationsmitgliedern Handlungsspielräume eröffnen. Letztere sollen möglichst organisationszielkonform ausgefüllt werden. Dies ist auch in der öffentlichen Verwaltung der Fall, wie etwa die Diskussion um die Grenzen legislativer Steuerung verdeutlicht (z.B. Dreier 1991). Mag die Rede von bestimmten und unbestimmten Rechtsbegriffen sowie von Konditional- und Zweckprogrammierung die Existenz klar abgrenzbarer Steuerungs-kategorien suggerieren. In realiter sind die Übergänge fließend. Es handelt sich „wegen der niemals vollständigen Determination der Entscheidungen durch die gesetzlichen Vorgaben eher um Posten auf einer Skala von Möglichkeiten zu- bzw. abnehmender

Präzision" (Dreier 1991, S. 185). Die beobachtbaren Verfahren des 'Wählens', des ‚Wägens' und des ‚Wertens' offenbaren individuelle Handlungsspielräume, die bezeichnend für die Verwaltungspraxis in einem modernen Rechtsstaat sind. Bedeutsam für dieses Handeln sind Motivation und Präferenzen der Verwaltungsmitglieder. Bei der Neugestaltung des Steuerungskonzepts sind daher Motivationspotentiale zu entwickeln, die der Genese zielorientierter Motivation dienen. Wie Frost (2005, S. 276) zu Recht betont, „macht es allerdings einen großen Unterschied, ob der organisatorische Steuerungsmechanismus als ‚Folge' spezifischer Motivations- und Präferenzannahmen eingeführt wird oder aus dessen Einsatz erst bestimmte Motivationswirkungen und Verhaltensweisen ‚resultieren'".

Im ersten Fall bestimmt die individuelle Motivation als gegebene Verhaltensannahme die Verwendung bestimmter Steuerungstechnologien. Diese Sichtweise dominiert die gegenwärtige Ausrichtung des New Public Managements. In Einklang mit der herrschenden ökonomischen Lehre fokussiert die Neukonzeption von administrativen Steuerungsmechanismen wie Budgetierungskonzepten, Prämiensystemen oder Kontrakten implizit auf den extrinsisch motivierter Akteur. So betonen etwa Budäus und Grüning (1998, S. 7), dass „die Ansätze zum Personalmanagement bezüglich der individuellen Anreize sowohl auf die Entwicklung der Managementtheorien als auch auf die Public Choice-Theorie zurückgeführt werden". Die Motivation der Verwaltungsmitglieder wird mithin axiomatisch als Verhaltensannahme eingeführt. Das Postulat der Nutzenmaximierung bildet die Basisannahme, auf der das jeweilige theoretische Fundament der einzelnen Steuerungskonzepte fußt und fließt zumeist unhinterfragt als Gestaltungs-a priori in die organisationale Praxis ein.

Setzen also ökonomische Governanceansätze – so auch das NPM – axiomatisch auf gegebene Verhaltensannahmen auf, so bildet die Dynamik der Motivation das empirische Fundament für ein Plädoyer zugunsten einer Endogenisierung der Motivation. Endogenisierung heißt hier: Die individuelle Motivation nicht als gegebenen Ausgangstatbestand zu behandeln, sondern zum erklärenden Verhalten und zum gestaltbaren Faktor zu machen (Osterloh/ Frost/ Frey 2002; Frost 2005). Denn wie die verhaltenswissenschaftliche Forschung um den Verdrängungs- bzw. Verstärkungseffekt deutlich herausgearbeitet hat, ist die Handlungsmotivation keine prädeterminierte Verhaltensdisposition. Sie wird vielmehr situations- und kontextspezifisch erst erzeugt. „Damit ist der Einsatz eines Repertoires organisatorischer Steuerungsmechanismen keine ‚Folge' spezifischer Motivations- und Präferenzannahmen, sondern ‚führt' zu bestimmten Motivationswirkungen" (Frost 2005, S. 277). Organisationale Steuerungstechnologien wie

das NPM wirken niemals direkt, sondern stets via Verhaltensbeeinflussung auf die Realisierung der Gestaltungsziele ein (z.B. Simon 1991). Die individuelle Handlungsmotivation ist mithin immer auch das Ergebnis organisationaler Steuerung. Im Gegensatz zum institutional choice Ansatz setzt die Verwendung einer spezifischen Steuerungstechnologie nicht nur eine bestimmte Motivationsstruktur voraus, sondern erzeugt diese gleichzeitig.

6   Die Dynamik von Motivationen und die Steuerung von Verwaltungs-organisationen – konzeptionelle Überlegungen für ein motivationsbasiertes Verwaltungsmanagement

Was bedeutet nun die Dynamik von Motivationen konkret für die Steuerung von Verwaltungsorganisationen? Im Folgenden sollen nun im Rahmen eines New Public Management erste konzeptionelle Überlegungen für eine motivationsbasierte Verwaltungssteuerung unterbreitet werden.

Relativ unproblematisch gestaltet sich die Sachlage bei einfachen, repetitiven Aufgaben, wie sie etwa bei der Instandhaltung, der Landschaftspflege oder auch in der Registratur anfallen. Hierbei werden Leistungen verlangt, die nahezu ausschließlich aufgrund monetärer Vergütung erbracht werden. Da in diesen Fällen nur materielle Anreizeffekte wirken, steigert Pay for Performance die Leistung der Mitarbeiter. Intrinsische Motivation existiert hingegen nicht, kann daher auch nicht verdrängt werden und die Leistungsbereitschaft schädigen. Die Mitarbeiterleistung wird somit bei einem Prämienlohnsystem steigen (Frey/ Osterloh 2000; Lazear 1999). Die Überführung von Betriebshöfen oder auf Landschaftspflege spezialisierte Ämter in kommunale Eigenbetriebe bzw. das Outscouring solcher Aufgaben an Private erscheint auf der Basis ex ante fixierbarer Jahresbudgets als geeignete Strategie. Da die einzelnen Beiträge der Vertragspartner relativ gut spezifizierbar und monetär bewertbar sind, können die interorganisationalen Transaktionen über Märkte abgewickelt werden (Gaitanides/ Göbel 2005). Neo-klassische Verträge (Picot/ Dietl/ Franck 2002) erscheinen somit als probates Steuerungsmedium.

Auf der anderen Seite gibt es viele Aufgaben in der öffentlichen Verwaltung, die komplexer und politisch brisant sind. Viele Aufgaben im psycho-sozialen, im karitativen aber auch im polizeilichen Tätigkeitsbereichen sind einerseits Gegenstand öffentlicher Diskussion und markieren als solche Handlungsansprüche an den Staat und können aber

anderseits nicht mit den Mitteln des Staates gelöst werden.[8] Zu nennen sind hier etwa die nachhaltige Bekämpfung von Obdachlosigkeit, häuslicher Gewalt oder Drogenmissbrauch sowie die Eingliederung von sozialen Randgruppen in die Arbeitsgesellschaft. Die Bearbeitung dieser Aufgaben verlangt von den dort Beschäftigten ein Höchstmaß an Empathie, Fürsorge, Flexibilität und Einsatzbereitschaft. Hier ist die intrinsische Motivation der zentrale Antrieb zum Handeln. Monetäre Anreize spielen hingegen nur eine marginale Rolle.

Wie Seibel (1992), Hansbauer (1996) und van Maanen/ Barley (1984) am Beispiel von Frauenhäusern, Arbeitsverwaltungen und Polizeien herausgearbeitet haben, sind solche Arbeitszusammenhänge häufig sozio-kulturell hoch integriert und durch eine ausgeprägten Arbeitsideologie und -ethiken[9] gekennzeichnet. Diese bewirkt auf individueller Ebene „die Ersetzung oder Verhinderung modernen, 'offenen' Denkens durch geistige Abschließung ('closed minds')" (Seibel 1992, S. 232). Im Falle der Frauenhäuser interpretiert die dominante Ideologie die Arbeit „nicht als Dienstleistungstätigkeit, sondern als gemeinsamen emanzipatorischen Kampf der misshandelten und der Frauenhaus-Frauen gegen die patriarchalischen Gesellschaftsstrukturen" (Seibel 1991, S. 485).[10] Aus Sicht der Beschäftigten ist diese Auseinandersetzung eine politisch Angelegenheit und daher ökonomischen Kriterien, wie denen der Effizienz oder auch einer angemessenen Vergütung, prinzipiell entzogen. Die feministische Ideologie erzeugt mithin einen ‚Schleier der Unwissenheit', der die Stabilität der individuellen Präferenzordnungen vor zu großen Erschütterungen durch valide Marktsignale schützt.

Würden nun wie im NPM vorgesehen Effizienz und Professionalität zu akzeptierten Maßstäben der Organisationsgestaltung und -steuerung werden, würde die Tätigkeit der Beschäftigten in solchen Arbeitszusammenhängen den Charakter eines 'Wertes an sich' verlieren. Genau das hieraus resultierende hohe Ausmaß an intrinsischer Motivation ist es jedoch, der Frauenhäuser, Obdachlosenasyle, Drogenberatungsstellen, Sozialhilfeeinrichtungen, aber auch Polizeien von ‚normalen' Dienstleistungseinrichtungen unterscheidet. Die stabile Versorgung mit intrinsisch motivierten Arbeitskräften „ist also eher durch Dilettantismus als durch höhere organisatorische Effizienz zu sichern" (Seibel 1991, S. 486). Erscheint dieser organisatorische Dilettantismus auch unter motivationalen Gesichtspunkten als funktional, so ist er jedoch in einer auf Zweckrationalität ausgerichteten Verwaltungsorganisation nicht legitimationsfähig. Die Aufgabenbereiche sollten daher - soweit gesetzlich möglich - an Non Profit Unternehmen ausgelagert und nur lose an die Kernverwaltung gekoppelt werden (Weick 1976). In Anlehnung an Dahl und Lindblom (1953) schlägt Seibel (1992) als Steuerungsmechanismus solcher

„weichen" Verbindungen "Bargaining" vor. Der "bargain" ist ein politischer Handel zwischen selbstständigen Partnern. Seine Kompromissmasse besteht nicht aus partieller Interessenbefriedigung in einer Sachfrage, sondern aus ausbalancierenden Machtanteilen. Rationales Abwägen wird durch das Anstreben von Machtkompromissen überlagert. "Bargaining" – so Seibel (1992, S. 220) – „senkt daher die Tendenz nach das Qualitäts- niveau sachlicher Problemlösungen, aber es stabilisiert der Tendenz nach das politische System, wenn die Folgen unzureichender Problemlösung kalkulierbar bleiben oder neutralisiert werden können".

In der öffentlichen Verwaltung lassen sich schließlich eine Vielzahl von Aufgaben finden, die sich einerseits durch Komplexität, Arbeitsteiligkeit, Kundennähe und politische Relevanz auszeichnen und sich andererseits einer zweckrationalen Organisationsgestaltung und –steuerung nicht entziehen. Diese machen den Kernbestand administrativer Tätigkeiten aus. Zu nennen sind hier Aufgaben im Umweltschutz, Bau- oder Gesundheitswesen. Aber auch in der Ordnungs- und Schulverwaltung oder in den Querschnittsbereichen sind die Aufgaben häufig komplex, arbeitsteilig und kundennah und bedürfen daher einer gleichmäßig hohen Leistungsbereitschaft der Mitarbeiter. Hier werden eindeutig Formen intrinsischer Motivation virulent. Die Renaturierung einer Industriebrache, die erfolgreiche Seuchenbekämpfung oder die kundenorientierte Abwicklung komplexer Bauvorhaben implizieren oftmals eine schon durch die Handlungen selbst stattfindende Bedürfnisbefriedigung. Damit es hier nicht zu einer Verdrängung sondern zu einer Verstärkung der intrinsischen durch die extrinsische Motivation kommt, wird die motivationsadäquate Verwaltungssteuerung zu einer zentralen Anforderung an das New Public Management. Die bisherigen Budgetierungsan- sätze erweisen sich diesbezüglich als wenig erfolgversprechend. Gehen sie doch von dem Mitarbeiter „als ein zu kontrollierender Kostenfaktor, von dem Risiko ausgeht und der daher strengstens und am besten permanent überwacht werden sollte" (Haesler/ Hörmann 2005, S. 151) aus. Schon von ihrer Funktionslogik hierarchisch konzipiert (Horvath/ Möller 2004), werden Budgetierungsansätze häufig überdies „im alten Geist" (Müller 1998, S. 6) angewandt und reproduzieren so die weberianische Verwaltungsbürokratie. In der Folge kommt es zum Verdrängungseffekt und zu einer Fokussierung extrinsisch motivierten Verhaltens, welches sich in mikropolitischen Budgetspielen äußern kann (Brüggemeier 1997).

Eine mögliche Alternative bietet hier die aktuelle Diskussion um das Steuerungskonzept des Beyond Budgeting (vgl. Horvath/ Möller 2004; Becker 2004). Im Unterschied zu

herkömmlichen Budgetierungsansätzen, die stark am Rechnungs- bzw. Berichtswesen orientiert sind, zielt Beyond Budgeting auf den Kern des Organisierens.

Das Konzept (Hope/ Frazer 2003) setzt auf dezentrale Strukturen und die Delegation von Entscheidungen. Diese umfasst die Partizipation der Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter am Strategieprozess und die Übertragung von Verantwortung an dezentrale kundenorientierte Teams. An die Stelle von Leitbildern und misson statements treten als oberste Führungsleitlinien geteilte Werte und Verhaltenskodices. Den handelnden Personen wird einerseits ein Maximum an Entscheidungsspielraum und Selbstkontrolle eingeräumt, andererseits werden ihnen relative und marktorientierte Ziele als Orientierungsgrößen vorgegeben. Gesteuert werden die dezentralen Teams über interne und externe Benchmarks. Die Mehrzahl der Organisationseinheiten ist somit einer direkten Markt-bewertung ausgesetzt. Betrachtet man das skizzierte Organisationskonzept unter moti-vationstheoretischen Vorzeichen, so ergibt sich folgende Bewertung:

– Eine teamorientierte Steuerungsstruktur fördert die zwischenmenschliche Interaktion und Kommunikation. Dadurch werden die persönlichen Beziehungen verstärkt.

– Die Teilautonomie der Teams impliziert ein hohes Maß an Partizipation, wahrgenommener Selbstkontrolle und Interesse an der Ausgabe.

– Marktpreise zerstören die intrinsische Motivation der Teammitglieder dann nicht, wenn ihre informierende Wirkung die der kontrollierenden übersteigt.

– Marktpreise werden als objektiv und fair interpretiert und erhöhen so die intrinsische Motivation.

Dies ist nur eine erste Bewertung eines Steuerungskonzeptes, das derzeit in der Unternehmenspraxis ‚heiß' diskutiert wird. Sie zeigt jedoch deutlich, dass jenseits formal-juristischer Kriterien (Hill 2005) auch motivationstheoretische Erkenntnisse bei der Gestaltung des New Public Managements wichtig sind. Denn wie bei allen betriebswirt-schaftlichen Instrumenten und Verfahren gilt auch hier: Es ist Management und keine Rechentechnik. Management wird von Menschen für Menschen gemacht, oder wie der Begründer der Institutionenökonomie Ronald Coase (1937, S. 404) einmal sagte: „from the man as he is"!

Abbildungsverzeichnis

Anmerkungen

[1] Trotz der Tatsache, dass das New Public Management (NPM) in erster Linie als eine Praktiker-Bewegung angesehen wird, betonen Budäus und Grüning (1998) den Einfluss ökonomischer Theorien auf die konkrete Ausgestaltung des NPM. „Die 'Formel', die in diesem Zusammenhang von einer Vielzahl von Verwaltungs-wissenschaftlern vertreten wird, lautet: NPM geht auf die Public Choice-Theorie und den'Managerialismus' zurück" (Budäus/ Grüning 1998, S. 7).

[2] Koch (1999, S. 11) betont in diesem Zusammenhang, dass „mit der Rückkehr zu den Prinzipien einer selbstverantwortlichen bzw. individuellen Nutzenmaximierung ... die Grundlagen dafür gegeben sind, um nun auch schon – zumindest in grober Art – zu einer theoretischen Fundierung von NPM-Konzepten einer Modernisierung von Staat und Verwaltung zu kommen".

[3] In ähnlicher Weise betont Koch (1999, S. 19), dass „entsprechend den hier einschlägigen Leitbildern der Principal-Agent Ansätze" die erkennbaren Änderungen des Verwaltungsmanagements grundsätzlich darauf hinaus laufen, „das bisherige monopolitisch-hierarchische System einer staatlichen Leistungserstellung ... zugunsten einer Vielzahl von Auftraggeber-Auftragnehmer Beziehungen und insoweit auch für zumindest marktähnliche Wettbewerbs-, Vergleichs- und Tauschprozesse zu öffnen".

[4] Laut Staehle (1999) handelt es sich bei Motivation um ein hypothetisches Konstrukt, das sich einer direkten Messbarkeit entzieht. Nur der Input und der Output des Verhaltens sind beobachtbar und damit messbar.

[5] Der Verdrängungseffekt ist in vielen Untersuchungen untersucht und nachgewiesen worden (Deci 1971; Deci/ Cascio/ Krussel 1975; Amabile 1979). Neuerdings haben jedoch Vertreter der behaviouristischen Psychologie (Cameron/ Pierce 1994; Eisenberger/ Cameron 1996) die Existenz des Verdrängungseffekts aufgrund einer eigenen Meta-Analyse in Frage gestellt und als ‚Mythos' bezeichnet. Deci/ Koestner/ Ryan (1999) zeigen jedoch in einer umfassenden Arbeit, dass die dort gemachten Folgerungen unberechtigt sind. In ihrer neuesten Meta-Analyse berücksichtigen sie sämtliche Studien, welche die Kritiker betrachtet haben und darüber hinaus Studien, die seither erschienen sind. Sie bestätigten anhand der Analyse von 128 Experimenten noch einmal deutlich den Verdrängungs-Effekt.

[6] Vgl. im folgenden Frost (2005, S. 272-274).

[7] Bei aller Ähnlichkeit von integrierter Regulation und intrinsischer Motivation gibt es auch deutliche Unterschiede. Während die integrierte extrinsische Motivation letztlich seinen funktionalen Charakter behält, sind intrinsisch motivierte Handlungen ‚autotelischer Natur' (Deci/ Ryan 1993).

[8] In diesem Sinne macht Brunsson (1989, S. 206) deutlich, dass „many problems handled by public organizations are essentially insoluble, or have defied solution for thousands of years".

9   Mit Blick auf die occupational communities in Polizeien betonen van Mannen und Barley (1984, S. 341), dass
    im Zuge von Sozialisationsprozessen, „an occupation's value system comes to shape a person's work
    perspectives and self concepts – work perspectives and self-concepts that are supported over time in a
    person's daily interactions".

10 Die im Falle der Arbeitsverwaltung identifizierte Arbeitsideologie bedingt laut Hansbauer (1996, S. 81), dass
    die Meldung eines Sozialhilfeempfängers für das Programm „Arbeit statt Sozialhilfe" nach „ideologischen
    Kriterien strikt durchgehalten wird, auch dann, wenn wenig Chancen bestehen, dass der gemeldete
    Hilfempfänger tatsächlich in ein Beschäftigungsverhältnis vermittelt werden kann. Ideologische Entscheider
    in dieser Variante sind also weitgehend resistent gegenüber möglichen Erwartungsenttäuschungen und halten
    – gegen alle Wahrscheinlichkeit! – an einer normativ orientierten Entscheidungslogik fest".

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Do Extrinsic Rewards Enhance Organizational Citizenship Behavior? A Study of Public Sector Organizations

1   Introduction

When Organ (1977) digged up the early notions of Barnard (1938) and Katz (1964) on extra-role behaviors in organizations this became the resurgence of an almost forgotten concept in organizational research. Organ's (1988) organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) is probably the most popular concept in research on extra-role behaviors and an important topic in the field of Organizational Behavior (Organ/ Paine 1999; Podsakoff et al. 2000; Van Dyne et al. 1995). It is widely accepted that OCB fosters organizational effectiveness – indeed, it may be a key factor in stabilizing and ensuring organizational survival in times of uncertainty and rapid environmental change.

Following theoretical lines of reason OCB is independent of formal reward systems. It is usually defined as behavior, which is "discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization" (Organ 1988, p. 4). Therefore, taking a utilitarian point of view, formal rewards should not enhance OCB. If in- and extra-role behaviors are distinct types of behavior which individuals allocate according to their relative prices, formal incentives should motivate individuals to engage in in-role behavior rather than extra-role behavior. In terms of expectancy-value theories (Feather 1982): Rewards and OCB should either be uncorrelated or negatively linked to each other depending on the total amount of work effort allocated to in- and extra-role behaviors. If the total amount of work effort remained stable, extrinsic rewards should have a crowding-out effect on OCB as net expected gains of in-role behaviors were raised relative to those of extra-role behaviors. If extrinsic rewards stimulated some extra-amount of work effort, one could expect a positive effect of rewards on formal performance, whereas the connection between rewards and OCB remained unclear.

Besides theory empirical findings shed some light on the relation. For example, it is well known that managers' performance evaluations of subordinates covary with their ratings of extra-role behaviors of the same persons (MacKenzie et al. 1991, 1993, 1998). People are rated higher in terms of formal performance when they are rated high in OCB. As Schnake and Dumler (1997) have shown, the same effect may also operate vice versa: In their study OCB was positively effected by pay raises. Given a bidirectional effect – OCB influences performance evaluations (and thus rewards) and is again influenced by

extrinsic rewards – the mechanisms which produce these effects must be stated more clearly. It is the aim of this article to contribute to this question. Therefore, we shortly elaborate our theoretical view towards the problem in the next section. We then present empirical evidence from data gathered in public sector organizations in Germany. In the last section we discuss the implications of our findings.

2   (Social) Exchange, Extrinsic Rewards and OCB

Following Blau's (1964) notion of social exchange, in- and extra-role behaviors are produced by different processes. While (formal) in-role behavior is generated via processes of economic exchange, extra-role behavior is brought about by processes of social reciprocity (Konovsky/ Pugh 1994). Economic and social exchange are both reciprocal in nature. They differ according to the media of exchange and in the models of man assigned to the processes.

In economic exchange agreements are specified and explicated ex ante in 'written' (transactional) contracts. Economic exchange is characterized by short-sighted calculations; goods are exchanged immediately and in a 'quid pro quo' manner. Expectations and liabilities are objectively measurable and, thus, contract violations can be easily disclosed. However, economic actors are often conceptualized as 'atomized' and 'undersocialized' (Granovetter 1985). As a consequence, economic analysis abstracts from phenomena like commitment and sunk-costs.

In contrast, social exchange relations are built on mutual respect and trust in compensation – individual action is socially embedded (Granovetter 1985). As social exchange goes along with so-called psychological (relational) contracts (Robinson/ Morrison 1995; Rousseau 1995), expectations and liabilities are much more unspecific in nature. Social exchange is based on generalized reciprocity (Polanyi 1959) instead of direct reciprocation, which is characteristic for economic exchange. This means that social actors give credit to their exchange partners, they grant time for reciprocation. Second, generalized reciprocity is not directly bound to an actual interaction; instead it may be directed at other community or group members or serve the goals and well-being of the organization (Eisenberger et al. 2001). Thus, similar to organizational-level theories, as for example contingency theory (Burns/ Stalker 1961), theories of extra-role behavior explain how organizations manage to adjust to changing environments. Whereas the

former operate on a structural level, social exchange theories (as action theories) point to the individual level.

Following a social exchange view on extra-role behavior, OCB can be defined as some unspecified kind of reciprocation of experienced support in organizational settings. In OCB research several dimensions of the concept have been discussed to specify its character. In summary, it seems agreed upon that OCB includes aspects of personally helping behavior as well as behaviors directed at the organization as a whole (Smith et al. 1983; Organ/ Paine 1999; LePine et al. 2002). However, operationalizations of OCB always include a critical moment as the process of definition remains a subjective task. What is meant to be OCB and what is not may vary interpersonally as well as between different points of time and different cultural and organizational settings (Morrison 1994; Schnake 1991).

How do extrinsic rewards enter the field? In economic theory wages (as factor prices) determine labor supply and demand; wage setting is an evolutionary and spontaneous process which rather unintendedly brings forth labor market equilibrium. In managerial thinking, however, wages fulfill informational, motivational and distributional tasks as well. Wages and extrinsic rewards, e.g. incentive bonuses, are sources of feedback regarding task completion. As work effort is seen as an economic bad, wages are manifestations of respect and compensation for work investments. Rewards serve as extrinsic motivators to enhance individual performance (Akerlof/ Yellen 1986). And, above all, performance orientied pay practices may serve as balancing mechanisms in processes of social comparison. Individuals tend to compare themselves to referent others. Thus, input-output-relations are not only jugded on their own; instead, they are also assessed in the light of corresponding input-output-relations of similar others (Adams/ Rosenbaum 1962; Adams 1965) and are even compared to ocurrences that might have happened (Folger 1986, 1993). Perceptions of organizational justice are therefore results of social processes (Lamertz 2002; Lind et al. 1998).

Here do organizational politics and pay practices come into play. Contingent rewards are always based on some kind of performance appraisal (Rynes et al. 2005). This makes the appraisal procedure the basic source of fairness perceptions regarding pay practices (Folger/ Cropanzano 1998; Folger/ Konovsky 1989; Holbrook 1999; Jones et al. 1999). Fair appraisals and subsequently fair rewards may well be interpreted as organizational benefits (Konovsky/ Pugh 1994). In a social exchange view employees will reciprocate fair treatment with citizenship behaviors. As fairness perceptions are built on processes of

social comparison, fair appraisal practices will contribute to a positive working climate and to the development of group norms of mutual trust and support (LePine/ Van Dyne 2001). In summary, while from a theoretical point of view there is no direct link between extrinsic rewards and OCB, rewards can contribute to organizational fairness, either because the procedures and practices applied are fair and consistent in themselves or because rewards can help balancing existing wage injustices. Rewards may thus indirectly motivate employees to engage in citizenship behaviors. Drawing on these propositions we put forth the following hypotheses:

− There is a positive effect of perceived fairness of pay practices on individual OCB.

− There is a positive effect of group norms of helping behavior on individual OCB.

− There is no effect of extrinsic rewards on individual OCB when fairness perceptions are controlled for.

In the following section we present empirical evidence. The data we used were collected in German public sector organizations. We will shortly present the background setting of the study before we turn to measures and methods.

3 Pay for Performance and OCB in German Public Sector Organizations Empirical Setting, Measures and Data

The German system of public administration is subject to extensive endeavors of modernization these days. Keywords like the German 'Neues Steuerungsmodell' (KGSt, 1993) or 'New Public Management' mark the transition from traditional public authorities to performance oriented local governments (Oppen 2002). The ongoing changes comprise the implementation of corporate management practices in public sector organizations. Among these are performance appraisals and performance based pay systems. Performance orientied pay practices, and in particular incentive schemes, are installed to replace the old remuneration systems, which were mainly seniority and social status oriented, hence rewarding being married and having children, for example. Thus, the public sector constitutes an exemplary field of organizational change for empirical research.

Drawing on a full sample of all administrative districts and municipalities in Germany with a population of 10,000 or more (N=1,960), Matiaske et al. (2005) found that at the end of 2004 only 7.1 % (n=52) of the participants in their representative study (response rate=37.6 %; n=736) applied performance appraisals or performance oriented pay practices. 30 of these public agencies had implemented performance-oriented practices in 1998 or later. Another 144 organizations indicated to be planning the implementation of performance appraisals, 94 of these declared the implementation was to be realized within the next two years. This descriptive evidence underlines the dynamics of the reformation process.

In the course of the implementation of performance appraisals we accompanied three municipalities in Southern Germany. All three municipalities applied the same performance appraisal system (the so-called LBB-SYS; Holtmann et al. 2001). In municipalities 1 and 3 the system was invented at the time we first conducted our research. In municipality 2 the system had been invented some years ago (see the data used in Holtmann et al. 2001). Because of financial problems and ambiguity and vagueness during collective wage negotiations, appraisals had been interrupted for several years and were just taken up again when we started our research. Thus, some employees could draw on experiences with performance appraisals while others could not. It should be mentioned that appraisals are now to be conducted regularly on basis of collective labor contract.

In all cases the performance appraisal follows the same procedure: Two raters judge one employee. Raters are superiors and department managers. The average of the ratings constitutes the final result. If inter-rater variance exceeds a threshold tolerance a corrective evaluation is conducted if staff council and/ or the rated employee intervene. The performance appraisal instrument, the LBB-SYS, had been subject to a validation study some time ago (Holtmann et al. 2001). In its actual version performance is measured in six dimensions. Each dimension is operationalized by six items to be answered on six-point rating scales with range 0 to 50 (using 10-point scale steps). The total score of all dimensions makes the final result. This score is then converted into an incentive bonus (IB) via variable transformation schemes, which may be different in each municipality. For further analyses we draw on incentive bonuses as a comparable measure of extrinsic rewards. Table 1 shows the corresponding frequency distribution.

Table 1: Frequency distribution of incentive bonuses

IB (%)	frequency	percent	cumulated
0	45	30.2	30.2
1	22	14.8	45.0
2	20	13.4	58.4
3	17	11.4	69.8
4	17	11.4	81.2
5	9	6.0	87.2
6	5	3.4	90.6
7	1	0.7	91.3
8	5	3.4	94.7
9	5	3.4	98.1
10	3	2.0	100.0

Notes: N=149; M (Mean)=2.54; s (standard deviation)=2.66

Appraisal results were handed over in a personalized manner after data security had been guaranteed by the research group and staff councils had agreed on the procedure. Thus we were able to match different data sources. Parallel to performance appraisals we administered OCB questionnaires to all raters. We used the questionnaire developed and validated by Staufenbiel and Hartz (2000). The questionnaire is a German adaptation of common English-language instruments. OCB is measured in four dimensions: (1) sportsmanship (SPORT); (2) civic virtue (CIVIC); (3) altruism or interpersonal helping (ALTRU); and (4) conscientousness or generalized compliance (CONSC). The fifth dimension, courtesy, was excluded because it could not be corroborated with empirical data (Staufenbiel/ Hartz 2000, pp. 75-80). Each dimension is measured with five items which are answered on seven-point rating scales. OCB results per employee were calculated by taking the average of the two raters' judgements. Table 2 shows uni- and bivariate statistics of the OCB scales.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics and scale correlations of OCB scales

Scale	Min.	Max.	M	s	SPORT	CIVIC	ALTRU	CONSC	OCB
SPORT	1.50	7.00	4.88	1.36	**.80**				
CIVIC	1.20	7.00	5.00	1.03	.08	**.86**			
ALTRU	1.60	7.00	4.88	1.09	*.22*	*.56*	**.87**		
CONSC	2.60	7.00	5.98	1.00	*.18*	*.38*	*.28*	**.79**	
OCB	2.80	6.85	5.18	.75	*.62*	*.71*	*.74*	*.65*	**.85**

Notes: N=149; Pearson correlations r, $p<.05$ in italics; $p<.01$ if $r\geq.21$; Cronbach α in bold face

In addition to measures of performance and OCB we used process generated data to reconstruct work group membership. On this basis we calculated two indices for each OCB-dimension and for the OCB total score: For each employee we calculated work group specific means of group OCB, thereby excluding the employee's own value. The result indicates the average level of work group sportsmanship, civic virtue etc., independent of one's own evaluation. This index is referred to as GMEAN in the following analysis. Second, for each employee we calculated the work group specific variance in OCB (GVAR). The person's own value is included in this index. These indices serve as proxy-variables for the strength (GMEAN) and existence (GVAR) of group norms, which should be key factors in reciprocal social relationships.

Finally we administered questionnaire measures to blue collar workers. Data were gathered in September 2002 (municipality 1, wave 1), July/ August 2003 (municipality 2 and municipality 1, wave 2) and February 2004 (municipality 3). The workers participating in the study were performing simple manual tasks, as for example garbage collection, wastewater treatment or park cultivation and maintenance. Most subjects were male (95 %). The average labor market experience was about 23 years (s=8.77 years), average tenure was approximately 12 years (s=7.08 years). Most participants had completed elementary or secondary intermediate education (88 %). 73 % had finished some kind of apprenticeship or vocational education, 22 % were unskilled workers.

In the case of municipality 1 data gathering was extended to a second wave (appraisals are usually conducted in a yearly rhythm). However, while we administered all questionnaires to the participants personally at the first time, one year later data collection was completed in absence of the research group. Participation was low, probably due to reservations regarding anonymity. The few questionnaires we received were pooled with the data we collected one year ago and controlled for with a dummy variable.

In all spots (and at both times in municipality 1) data collection took place shortly after the results of the performance appraisal had been fed back. To enable data matching subjects were guaranteed anonymity and asked to put their names on the questionnaires. Fairness perceptions regarding performance appraisals and subsequent reward practices were measured in three dimensions, procedural, interactional, and distributive justice. Each dimension was operationalized with 5 items to be answered on five-point rating scales. Item selection closely followed Colquitt's (2001) suggestions. Exploratory factor analysis and item analysis corroborated the expected factor structure and yielded satisfactory scale statistics. However, because of substantial scale intercorrelations (up to

$r=.63$) and correlations of $r \geq .81$ between the subscales and the total score, we chose to build a 15-item measure of overall fairness (FAIR).

In addition, we controlled for autonomy at the workplace (AUTON), job satisfaction (SATIS), and affective organizational commitment (COMMIT). Autonomy was measured using a German scale developed by Müller-Böling (1978). The five-item measure is to be answered on five-point rating scales. We used an 11-point single-item measure to capture job satisfaction. This format is applied in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP, see http://www.diw.de) and has proved to yield valid results in research on job satisfaction (Matiaske/ Mellewigt 2001). Single-item measures have sometimes been scrutinized in terms of missing reliability. Several studies, however, prove quite satisfactory results (e.g. Nagy 2002; Oshagbemi 1999; Wanous et al. 1997). Affective organizational commitment was operationalized using a two item scale. The items were meant to measure the degree of identification with the organization (Allen/ Meyer 1990) and had to be answered on five-point rating scales.

Table 3 shows scale statistics and correlations of the presented measures. FORE, MUN1 to MUN3 and WAVE2 are additional dummy variables. FORE takes the value 1 for assistant foremen or foremen and 0 for workers. MUN1 to MUN3 are dummy variables for the municipalities. WAVE2 is a dummy variable for the few cases ($n=9$) of the second wave in municipality 1. In addition, AGE is subject age in years. As MUN1 to MUN3 are conditional on each other and WAVE2 fully consists of subjetcs of municipality 1, we do not show the intercorrelations of these variables.

Table 3: Univariate statistics and scale correlations

Skala	Items	Min.	Max.	M	s	α	01	02	03	04	05	06
(01) FAIR	15	1.00	5.00	3.01	.89	.92	–					
(02) AUTON	5	1.00	5.00	3.35	.93	.77	*.26*	–				
(03) SATIS	1	1.00	11.00	7.34	2.90	–	*.30*	*.29*	–			
(04) COMMIT	2	1.00	5.00	3.58	1.02	.73	*.37*	*.37*	*.27*	–		
(05) AGE	–	20	62	40.48	8.39	–	.07	.05	*.25*	*.28*	–	
(06) FORE	–	0	1	.22	.42	–	.14	*.34*	.05	*.21*	.13	–
(07) MUN1	–	0	1	.46	.50	–	.01	.01	.08	*-.22*	-.13	-.08
(08) MUN2	–	0	1	.22	.41	–	-.04	-.15	-.09	*-.26*	-.08	-.04
(09) MUN3	–	0	1	.32	.47	–	.03	.13	-.00	*.46*	*.21*	.12
(10) WAVE2	–	0	1	.06	.24	–	*.31*	.14	*.18*	.08	.01	.07

Notes: N=149; Pearson correlations r, $p<.05$ in italics; $p<.01$ if $r \geq .21$

Fairness perceptions are positively correlated with job satisfaction, commitment and autonomy; foremen or assistant foremen dispose of more autonomy at the workplace. While these results are no surprise, the significant correlation between fairness perceptions and the few cases of the second wave deserves attention. In a simple correlational analysis, though, it cannot be distinguished if the effect is produced by time and learning processes or by a positive selection bias; we will comment on this later.

Table 4 lists correlations between the independent variables and the dependent OCB scales. In each column the reported work group indices, GMEAN and GVAR, relate to the dependent model variable: If the independent variables are regressed on the dependent variable 'sportsmanship', GMEAN and GVAR represent the corresponding work group mean and variance of 'sportsmanship'; if the dependent variable is the total OCB score, GMEAN and GVAR stand for the work group specific mean and variance of the total OCB score, and so on.

Table 4: Correlations between independent and dependent variables

independent variables	dependent variables				
	SPORT	CIVIC	ALTRU	CONSC	OCB
FAIR	*.18*	.12	*.16*	*.20*	*.25*
AUTON	*.19*	*.32*	*.26*	.13	*.33*
SATIS	*.20*	.04	.01	*.20*	*.17*
COMMIT	.02	*.23*	*.21*	.06	*.19*
AGE	-.15	.01	-.01	.13	-.03
FORE	.01	*.29*	*.22*	.12	*.23*
MUN1	*.35*	*-.30*	*-.30*	-.09	-.08
MUN2	-.02	.12	.01	.02	.04
MUN3	*-.36*	*.21*	*.32*	.07	.05
WAVE2	*.17*	.04	.05	.04	.13
GMEAN	*.42*	*.40*	*.45*	*.23*	*.27*
GVAR	.09	*-.31*	*-.32*	*-.30*	*-.18*
IB	.10	*.49*	*.29*	*.28*	*.41*

Notes: N=149; Pearson correlations r, p<.05 in italics; p<.01 if r≥.21

4 Results of Regression Analysis and Discussion

Table 5 presents the results of several OLS-regression models. We would like to add one caveat before presenting the results. As LePine et al. (2002) have recently demonstrated, researchers should be careful in interpreting predictors and consequences of single dimensions of OCB. There is convincing evidence that "most of the dimensions of OCB, at least those conceptualized by Organ (1988), are highly related to one another and that there are no apparent differences in relationships with the most popular set of predictors" (LePine et al. 2002, p. 60; see also table 2). Therefore, the authors suggested to treat OCB as a latent construct and recommended not to focus on the specific dimensions of OCB as observed differences were probably caused by measurement error. Following this, we will predominantly focus on the OCB total score.

Table 5: OLS-Regression Models

independent variable	OCB β-coefficient	OCB β-coefficient	SPORT β-coefficient	CIVIC β-coefficient	ALTRU β-coefficient	CONSC β-coefficient
FAIR	–	.16 *	.09	.01	.18 *	.16 (*)
AUTON	.18 *	.17 *	.10	.21 **	.15 *	.01
SATIS	.05	.02	.08	-.04	-.09	.09
COMMIT	.08	.02	.10	.09	-.00	-.21 *
AGE	-.10	-.09	-.19 *	-.07	-.04	.10
FORE	.05	.05	-.05	.08	.08	.04
MUN2	-.09	-.11	-.06	.01	-.12	-.03
MUN3	-.15	-.16	-.17	.01	-.04	-.16
WAVE2	.23 **	.21 *	.16 (*)	.08	.17 *	.01
GMEAN	.44 ***	.46 ***	.42 ***	.35 ***	.58 ***	.09
GVAR	-.10	-.12	-.08	-.09	-.04	-.43 ***
IB	.39 ***	.38 ***	.17 *	.40 ***	.20 **	.31 ***
	$F=8.65^{***}$ (11 df) korr. $R^2=.36$	$F=8.50^{***}$ (12 df) korr. $R^2=.38$	$F=6.22^{***}$ (12 df) korr. $R^2=.30$	$F=10.27^{***}$ (12 df) korr. $R^2=.43$	$F=8.04^{***}$ (12 df) korr. $R^2=.36$	$F=4.41^{***}$ (12 df) korr. $R^2=.22$

Notes: (*): $p<.10$; *: $p<.05$; **: $p<.01$; ***: $p<.001$

Model explanation is moderate but satisfactory in all cases. The independent variables explain 38 % of overall OCB variance. The single predictors show a differentiated picture. For all models there are no significant effects for (assistant) foremen compared to blue collar workers although the signs are positive in most cases as expected. There are no significant differences between the municipalities. However, the negative signs come as no surprise. To corroborate quantitative results we conducted qualitative interviews with blue collar workers, foremen, superiors and managers in all municipalities. We got the impression, that municipality 1 used performance appraisals and incentive bonuses in a far more cooperative sense than municipalities 2 and 3. In municipality 1 the focus was on human resource development instead of enforced system change. As human resource politics will almost naturally be transferred into daily work and leadership style, we had expected a more positive view on OCB in municipality 1 compared to the other two locations. The effects are insignificant, though.

With the exception of sportsmanship, age is no significant predictor of OCB in our study. We find a positive effect of wave 2 compared to wave 1. As participation was organized by the management of municipality 1 in absence of the research group we interpret this finding as a positive selection bias. As performance and OCB appraisals had already taken place when the data were gathered, a causal explanation hints at a selection effect. If events had occurred in reverse order one could have guessed that raters had been

influenced by the volunteers' willingness to participate in the data collection. However, the effect should not be overestimated because of the low number of cases in wave 2.

There are no significant effects for both job satisfaction and commitment on OCB. It remains an open question whether this is to be traced back to problems of low reliability (single-item and 2-item scale) or if substantial reasons account for the results. For example, Moorman et al. (1993) report similar results. Job satisfaction and commitment were insignificant in the prediction of OCB when fairness perceptions were controlled for. If fairness perceptions are not controlled for, we find somewhat higher partial correlations for job satisfaction and commitment which are still insignificant, though (in table 5 this is shown for the OCB total score; results for the OCB subdimensions take a very similar look). The positive effect of autonomy on OCB is quite reasonable. Autonomy may be seen as a personal resource or task feature which is necessary to engage in extra-role behaviors. In the absence of autonomy certain tasks and actions as well as certain kinds of helping behavior will be impracticable.

The fairness hypothesis is supported. Perceived fairness of performance appraisals and pay practices is a significant predictor of OCB. With regard to the OCB subdimensions this holds true for altruism and conscientiousness (on a 10 % significance level). The group hypothesis is fully supported, too. Average work group OCB has a strong and positive effect on individual OCB. Although not significant, the negative effect of work group variance on OCB is also noteworthy. One could argue that individual OCB depends on the existence (GVAR) of group norms and is higher, the more distinctive these norms are developed (GMEAN). The observed effects for the OCB subdimensions may be interpreted as (weak) evidence for the differential validity of the OCB measure: The strongest effect for GMEAN is observed in the altruism model; the absence of group norms of conscientiousness (GVAR) is significantly related to the criterion variable.

Above all, there is a strong and consistent effect of incentive bonuses on OCB (and on all subdimensions of OCB). Thus, the rewards hypothesis must be rejected. The effect is robust and holds no matter if fairness perceptions are controlled for or not. Similar to Schnake and Dumler's (1997) conclusion, we find that financial rewards enhance OCB. One possible explanation could be that theoretical reasoning on OCB is false and that the detected relation is produced by some sort of behavioral mechanism not taken into account by social exchange theory. For example, Shamir (1990, 1991) has argued that human behavior is not always goal-oriented. Motivation could be detached from (economic or social) reciprocity if action was self-expressive, enacted to maintain the self-

concept or served the fulfillment of moral obligations. Assumptions like these may have triggered much of "the current interest in prosocial organizational behaviors, those that are performed with the intent of helping others or promoting others' welfare" (Shamir 1990, pp. 313-314). However, a non-utilitarian explanation of human motivation is hardly able to explain the positive effect of rewards on OCB. We therefore prefer a different solution: Given a plausible and empirically substantiated effect of rewards on task performance, it seems reasonable to look for similarities of OCB and formal performance (Organ 1997). In this line of reasoning several explanations may count:

–   From a technical point of view the instruments used in measuring task performance and OCB overlap. On the (operational) item level, for example, it seems questionable if items like "obeys company rules and regulations even when no one is watching" and "does not take extra breaks" (compare Podsakoff et al. 1990, p. 121; we used German translations, of course, see Staufenbiel/ Hartz 2000) are useful operationalizations of extra-role behaviors. However, in our study LBB-SYS and OCB scale intercorrelations are only low to moderate (between $r=-.03$, n.s., and $r=.57$, $p<.001$). With a maximum of approximately 33 % of shared variance this explanation must be doubted. However, it must be noticed that both, performance appraisal and OCB, were ascertained with questionnaire measures and the same raters at the same point in time. This may account for serious correlated method variance (LePine et al. 2002). Correlated method variance inflates relationships and may thus account for the high partial correlation between incentive bonuses and OCB.

–   A second explanation aims at the raters' cognitive capabilities (Podsakoff et al. 2000, pp. 534-535). Similar to a halo-effect, raters may follow 'implicit theories' of potential and performance, which impose limits upon their capabilities to differentiate between task performance and OCB. Thus, when assessing performance and OCB, raters may not be able to distinguish between in- and extra-role behaviors but simply evaluate employees according to their overall impression.

–   At last, one might ask whether employees are 'good soldiers' or good actors (Bolino 1999). It might be less selfless behavior than much more rational calculation of expected gains that makes employees perform citizenship behaviors. This, indeed, would implicate that employees expected helping behavior to lead to better perform-ance appraisals in the future. In turn, it is very likely that employees interpret rewards as positive signals and thus feel reinforced in their behavioral strategies. In this

instance the measurement problem still prevails but the causes are shifted from the raters' to the employees' side.

5 Managerial and Research Implications

As Schnake and Dumler (1997, p. 225) put it, "managers who wish to encourage employees to engage in OCB should reward employees for engaging in such behavior". From a managerial point of view this seems to be good advice. In the end, it is organizational effectiveness that counts, no matter if employees act selflessly or are rewarded for their efforts. As long as good actors and good soldiers obtain similar achievements, organizations should be keen on keeping both of them. However, it is exactly the notion of altruistic and selfless behavior, which makes OCB so fascinating and special. And therefore, questions are appropriate if actors and soldiers will really equally contribute to organizational goals.

Rewards can make individuals engage in helping behavior but not in 'real' OCB. Thus, rewards cannot solve the general problem of organizational existence. Organizations can only survive if they manage to generate the flexibility and spontaneity which market based arrangements cannot attain. Organizations gain this flexibility by creating the opportunity for social exchange embedded in trustful relations. Thus, social capital cannot easily be replaced by transactional arrangements. Managers who wish to motivate employees to engage in 'real' OCB should respect norms of social reciprocity. That means, managers must be aware of the mechanisms that drive human behavior. As, at least in our view, human behavior is goal oriented, taking social responsibility serious (see, for example, Cascio 2002) will be a much more powerful tool than formal rewards in creating OCB. As stated at the beginning, rewards will motivate certain behaviors and crowd-out others, as work effort cannot be increased unendingly. One can reward both quality and quantity, but in a world of scarcity there is a trade-off; this accounts for in- and extra-role behaviors alike. This of course does not mean that pay for performance is likely to be detrimental to organizational performance. But it shows that pay for performance and organizational fairness must go along as well as corresponding organizational practices must be coordinated and adjusted to each other.

For researchers OCB remains an important topic. However, measuring OCB might be more difficult than previously thought. Measurement could be improved by avoiding

correlated method variance. For example, task performance could be rated by superiors while peers rated OCB. Similar, more sophisticated measurement theories like for example generalizability theory could be applied to estimate measurement error and its effect on research results (for an application see Gerhart et al. 2000). Another argument is more theoretical in nature. LePine et al. (2002) made the point that OCB was rather an aggregate than a latent construct. For OCB measurement this would mean that researchers should "identify activities that contribute positively and negatively to the organization (albeit, the organization's social and psychological context) and then obtain ratings of how likely it is that an employee would engage in those behaviors" (LePine et al. 2002, p. 62). Our argument goes in a similar direction. OCB is an individualistic concept. However, it is defined with respect to its collective consequences, say organizational effectiveness. As Coleman (1990) has argued, the logic of aggregation must be specified if it is to be shown how individual behavior contributes to social phenomena. Thus, it might be useful to think of OCB as an aggregate construct on a collective level. Research on OCB suffers from the same difficulties than the manifold studies on organizational performance and success (March/ Sutton 1997). But, as it is hard to isolate effects of departmental policies or practices on organizational success (see, for example, Becker/ Gerhart 1996; Huselid 1995), it is even harder to determine the factors that make individual behavior contribute to organizational performance. To find the metric of aggregation that links individual behavior with organizational performance is the major task that remains to be done in the future. Once specified, this would contribute too many old and still not readily answered questions in research on organizational behavior.

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Leadership and Ethics in a Managerialist Context

1   Introduction: Searching for Leaders in the Managerial Quagmire

Traditionally, leaders were referred to as 'captains of the ship' (Korac-Kakabadse/ Kouzmin 1997) to denote their stewardship role in operating the organization entrusted to their care. Their primary tasks were to balance competing requirements and align organizational goals with a diversity of human behaviour. The primary source of wisdom and direction, a rather strong direction, was from leaders whose power stemmed primarily from their position in the organization while subordinates simply complied (Manz/ Sims 1990). Contemporary leaders still retain much of the role of organizational stewardship. However, the focus has shifted increasingly to the role of the 'organizational architect. The principal contributing skill of architects is an ability to design and develop organizations; skills that require considerable creative insights and technical knowledge about how to analyze, design and stimulate complex, increasingly globalizing, social and communication networks supported by rapidly advancing IT.

Leadership, one of the oldest professions in organized groups, is currently enjoying a revival. To date there is no record of the counterpart to the modern-day manager among the social groups of a more ancient and simpler past. Tribal chiefs, priests, generals and kings did not manage others, instead they led their followers. They led because they persuaded their followers to believe that they received inspiration and wisdom from above (Fairholm 1991). Possibly because of its personal nature, and increasing social and organizational complexity, leadership lost its appeal in favour of managers with a classical, rhetorical education. The transition from revelation to logic and from charisma to control presents the history of the rise of management to pre-eminence in social and organized settings (Weber 1920; Kouzmin 1980a, 1980b; Fairholm 1991).

A century of scholarly literature has produced a myriad of leadership and management theories and models and at the same time has muted the leadership and management terminology to the synonymous definition of 'good management' (see extensive discussion in Korac-Kakabadse/ Kouzmin 1997). From the so-called 'great man theory' (Bernard 1926; Tead 1935) to the current favour of the transformational leadership thesis (Tichy/ Devanna 1986) and 'New Age' value leadership (Bennis/ Nanus 1985) three generic perspectives have provided a basis for the diversity of theories and models. These are the personality (Freud 1922); the behavioural (Skinner 1953; Homans 1961, Vroom/ Jago 1988) and contextual perspectives (Fiedler 1967). The trait and personality

approaches have received a contemporary revival in the quest for a 'New Age' leader (Senge 1992), whilst the contextual perspective, in the 'age of causality' sought to define an appropriate management style for the diversity of praxis situations exemplified by crises (Kouzmin/ Sainsbury/ Jarman 1995).

The transformational leadership thesis flagged this separation and opened the flood-gates for a leadership revival through the reincarnation of the 'charismatic' leader. The 'age of value' (circa 1980-1990) and the emerging 'age of ideology' (circa 1990) aided their distinct differentiation. The emerging argument holds that "most leaders are good managers, but managers are not necessarily good leaders" (Warburton 1993, p. 29) and that the world beyond the 2000s will not belong to managers but to passionate, driven leaders who are innovative path-finders able to empower others to lead themselves (Warburton 1993). The argument holds that managers are transactional technologists who maintain the balance of operations and are process- or means-oriented (Burns 1978). They are "caretakers of the status quo" (Warburton 1993, p. 28) who think in terms of replicability with a focus on control and accountability (Bennis 1984). Managers relate to other actors in role-terms and favour loyalty, conformity, coordination and team spirit (Fairholm 1991). They prefer security and are effective in situations where they can direct the desired behaviour, control deviation from set norms and punish recalcitrance (Zemke 1987). Managers favour proven technologies and hierarchical structures as they are predictable and are, in themselves, a form of control (McDermott 1969, p. 35). Managers avoid complexity and attempt to ensure tangible, detached control to limit the danger and insecurity of uncertainty (McAdam 1993, p. 8) producing mediocrity and suffocating innovation and creativity (Fairholm 1991).

 Psychologically-powerless managers turn to the domination and control of others, invoking 'power tools' (status, rules and procedures) as a response to the restrictiveness of their own situation (Kanter 1977). Thus, it is argued, considerable evidence supports the view that managers are autocratic leaders or 'strong men' (Manz/ Sims 1990) who, through their commands, exercise positional power in order to secure fear-based compliance from other actors. In terms of leadership style they are limbic leaders (instinctive, tangible and results-oriented) dominated by left-brain functions (analytical, elemental and rational) and exhibit behaviour that values analytical precision, close control and supervision, punitive and evaluative measures (Burgelman 1990; McAdam 1993). They are evaluative thinkers that are convergent in character, who, through the control of the flow of information and ideas, build emotional and physical blocks that

prevent innovation (Henry 1991). Managers are in action by 'operating the ship' or 'rowing the boat' (Osborne/ Gaebler 1992).

Managers exhibit a Kantian (1901) attitude towards the world, characterized by hostility and distrust of everything that is new; they dread chaos. They, in a Kantian (1901) fashion, consider that both contextual parameters (Kant's external world) and human behaviour (Kant's internal nature) have to be formed, organized and dominated by rationality (Kantian understanding and reason) and by a rationality-guided volition in order to make them safe (Kant 1909). Thus, they share the Kantian (1901) fear of 'transcendental contingency'. They fear that the objects (actors, artifacts) could behave amongst themselves in a way quite different from the laws of their experience and thinking unless they bind actors from the outset by these laws.

In contrast (perhaps influenced by the writings of Confucius; Aristotle 1911; Plato 1952; and the Bible), leaders are considered to be transformational philosophers who are creative and outcome or ends-oriented (Bennis/ Nanus 1985). Their attitude towards the world can be characterized as loving, trusting, and surrendering to it in affectionate vision of philosophical genius. They are designers who think globally with the long-term horizon in terms of renewal and operate outside the constraints of structure, often breaking the mould in order to create and achieve a set vision (McAller 1991). They actively search for new frontiers and place a high emphasis on values, creativity, intelligence, integrity, cooperation and sobriety. Leaders are self-confident, mature actors who understand themselves and how they differ from the group (Warburton 1993), effectively use symbols (words, objects, processes, physical settings and arrangements) (Bennis 1982) and encourage leadership behaviour in others (Manz/ Sims 1990). They focus on values, expectations and context and are inspirational (Warburton 1993). Leaders integrate and internalize value principles (Whicker/ Kronenfeld 1987) and teach them to their followers who, in turn, can internalize and express them in independent actions (self-empowerment) (Warburton 1993). The behavioural responses of self-assured leaders (Maslow 1971; Ng 1980; Bass 1981; Metzger 1987) generate an empowering, freedom-enhancing environment (Kanter 1977).

Leaders build socio-psychological contracts with their followers that allow them to lead voluntarily towards common action, whether or not they are present to oversee the behaviour of followers and, as such, inspire innovation (Fairholm 1991; Warburton 1993). In terms of leadership style, they are cerebral leaders (conceptual, intellectual and design oriented), dominated by right-brain functions (holistic, integrative and artistic/ emotional)

and exhibit behaviour that values a sense of identity, emotional integrity, flexibility and empowerment (McAdam 1993). They are imaginative thinkers who are expansive in nature and who actively work on the removal of barriers to creative actions by fostering a creative formative context encouraging innovation (Henry 1991). They are in the centre of action by 'steering the ship' (Osborne/ Gaebler 1992).

Contemporary leadership literature supports the view that leaders are 'ideological' (visionary or philosophical) super-heroes who can inspire and empower others to lead themselves. These super-heroes have ascended from the first order of knowledge; knowledge for the sake of domination, also known as knowledge of positive science, to the second order of knowledge; the knowledge of essence or the knowledge of personal culture. 'New Age' scholars express a need for an intellectual leap forward or trans-cendence from the pragmatic dimension of leadership to the philosophical dimension of leadership. The same values and traits that define leaders (creativity; vision; intelligence; integrity; and energy) are screened out in the organizational selection process in favour of conformity, loyalty, mediocrity, masculinity and team spirit (Fairholm 1991; Korac-Boisvert/ Kouzmin 1995). After a century of management control, measurements, systems, performance and productivity, managers predominate in contemporary organizations to the virtual exclusion of leaders (Korac-Boisvert/ Kouzmin 1995, 1997). Perhaps this scarcity of leadership resources is the 'raison d'etre' for the quest for sensuous, knowledgeable, practical and active business-athletes or 'New Age' leaders (Senge 1992) who can transcend mediocrity and provide synergy for the synthesis of the phenomenological dimensions of social actors: embodiment, empowerment and en-selfment, with the ontologically unstable dimensions of institutional arrangements (economical, political and ideological) that objectify the social landscape (Ahrne 1990).

In summary, the conventional wisdom of managerial control (Kouzmin 1980a, 1980b, 1983, 1992) is seriously challenged as being appropriate to all social and organized settings, where contextual dynamics are intense, rapid or 'turbulent' (Emery/ Trist 1965) and, perhaps, even chronic (Kouzmin/ Jarman 1989).

2 The Challenge: Economic Rationalism and Changing Ethics

Market discipline has had an epochal influence on business and public sector ethics (Korac-Boisvert/ Kouzmin 1995). As documented by both Habermas (1975) and Offe

(1984), amongst others, the Economic Rationalist way of thinking has transformed the way by which both private and public activities are legitimized in society. In addition to market logic, New Public Management (NPM) embraced a separation of policy formulation from operations and an adoption of public sector management praxis such as privatization, outsourcing and partnerships (Gow/ Dufour 2000). As a result, the meaning of some traditional public service values has been altered - such as a greater focus on results than on process. Moreover, changes induced by market forces are described by some as a shift away from a collective-morality, with a value-orientation of community benefits (utilitarian ethics), to a personal-competence morality with a value-orientation of individual benefits (egoistic ethics) (Rokeach/ Ball-Rokeach 1989).

Many managers in private sector organizations (Wiley 1995), and recently in the public sector, have developed cognitive methodologies, such as a bottom-line-mentality, of which they may be quite unaware and ones that can foster unethical action (Korac-Kakabadse et al. 2000). The bottom-line-mentality is a script that supports financial success as the only value to be considered, promoting short-term solutions that are immediately financially sound, despite the fact that they may cause problems for others within the organization or the organization as a whole in the long-term. In public sector organizations, the financial-bottom-line mentality is increasingly being coupled with the traditional political-bottom-line mentality (Wolfe 1991), stemming from the unresolved conflict of Minister-civil servant and Parliament-civil servant relationships.

The entanglement of political strategies from the government of the day with the machinery of government, has thrown into question the political independence and integrity of the public sector. This politicization has gradually seeped down the ranks of the public sector, with officers being confused about to whom they are answerable - their political masters of the day or the wider concept of the community. Accountability, the buzz-word of the past decades of reforms, has given rise to the question - accountable to whom (Walsh 1993)? Furthermore, opening a window on government operations, exemplified by the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, in some instances, has made public officers more unwilling to provide written advice which could be seen as conflicting with the wishes of their ministers (Walsh 1993).

Being servants of government, servants of the law and servants of the public, public servants have traditionally been advised to act in the public interest; be politically neutral; guard confidential information; protect the privacy of citizens and employees; provide efficient, effective and fearless advice; avoid conflicts of interest; and be accountable

(Kernaghan/ Langford 1990). In the contemporary context, such advice causes several difficulties stemming from the ambiguities and contradictions in such expectations.

For example, being accountable and efficient is rather difficult to achieve. Maintaining loyalty and confidentiality and, at the same time, acting in the public interest when they need to implement what is, in their opinion, misguided policy, is extremely difficult. Striking a balance between a representative public service and an efficient and effective public service; and between old (public service) and new (market) values, remains a considerable challenge. Public servants now need to operate in newly-constructed agency structures, which require, in addition to a unique system of recruitment, promotion, reward, recognition and financial management, the adoption of a new set of values (flexibility, teamwork, risk taking).

The situation may further be complicated by the fact that public servants may be subject not only to their government's code of ethics but, also, to codes developed for their profession (law, engineering) and codes developed by professional associations of public servants. Furthermore, the proliferation of IT and the associated ease of information sharing; flattening of organizational hierarchies and increasing formal and informal networks, pose additional difficulties for traditional confidentiality (Kouzmin/ Korac-Kakabadse 2000). The development of cross-sector links, exemplified by a common database of clients, poses challenges to traditional public sector stability of sector and sub-sector structures and, at the same time, signal an eventual shift in the scale of network arrays - where many more people will be tied across broader policy spaces (community-issue/ network dimensions). Such developments conspire to enforce a shift from public administrators to public managers modeled on the image of private sector managers.

The shift from the old system of operations and ethical beliefs (one that ensured control and conformity) to new systems continue to exert considerable emotional stress on public sector officers. The move towards building organizations which reflect the abilities of individual members shows a shift from the 'organizational man' image in which the organization is at the centre to 'individualized corporations', where the individual is at the centre. This signals the shift from 'utilitarian' ethics towards 'egoistic' ethics (Bartlett/ Ghoshal 1995). This shift is part of a broader re-definition of top management's role resulting from the need to replace the obsolete strategy-structure-systems doctrine with a leadership philosophy built on purpose, process and people (Bartlett/ Ghoshal 1995; Kernaghan 1999). The shift from systems-driven to people-oriented management is pivotal, because only then can top-level management broaden its role from strategy

construction to building a corporate purpose and framing structure, as well as developing relevant and effective organizational processes. For this reason, management ethics cannot be treated lightly or in isolation from influential variables such as culture, structure or dynamic environments.

3 Governments' Responses to Declining Ethics

The codification of ethical conduct for the public sector has received considerable attention in the last two decades (Larson 1997; TI 2001). Recent attempts to improve public sector ethics in OECD countries have been sponsored at the highest political levels, such as the UK Committee on Standards in Public Life set up by Prime Minister Major in 1994; the Portuguese Deontological Charter launched by the Secretary of State for Administrative Modernization in 1993; and the United States 1991 President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (OECD 1997).

The models being adopted vary in their forms and context, exemplified, on the one hand, by the United States' ten-part 'Code of Ethics for Government Service', first adopted in 1958 (US 1958; ASPA 1984), and in a Ten Commandments approach covering a small number of general precepts expressed in broad terms, but with no provision for the code's administration (Kernaghan 1975). Australia's 'Guidelines on Official Conduct' (Commonwealth of Australia 1982), revised in 1995, take a Justinian Code approach by providing comprehensive coverage of ethical rules with guidelines for their implementation (Kernaghan 1975). Canada's 'Conflict of Interest Code' (Canada Treasury Board 1985) and updated in 1991 (Canada Treasury Board 1991) is near the middle of this continuum with a number of precepts and a comprehensive ethical framework (CTB 1985; CTB 1991; IPA 1996). Whether ethical rules, in general, or codes, in particular, take the form of legislative or administrative measures, ethical application varies in each society. The US, for example, relies more on legislation to regulate public service ethics through various bills and regulations that prescribe what is acceptable than Australia, Britain or Canada (OECD 1997).

Criticism of codes of ethics include being too specific or too general; unworkable; unused; unknown or, simply, that statements of rules are not the ideal medium for answering complicated ethical dilemmas faced by public servants. Codes of conduct, however, remain important mechanisms for ethical standards, even in societies which have reduced

the rules and regulation approach to public servants in favour of more 'managerial' styles of public management. Some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, now have a broad public service-wide code of conduct from which individual agencies design a purpose-built code to reflect particular objectives and missions (OECD 1997; Australia PSCMP 1997). In other countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway, codes are agency-based as the ethical issues confronting an employee of a defence ministry, for example, might vary significantly from those facing social security officials (OECD 1997). Whatever variety of codes of ethics adopted, it is generally agreed that they have to be workable codes of conduct.

In addition to a variety of accountability mechanisms, such as set guidelines for government activities for checking results having been achieved and due process being observed, some societies have adopted an ethics coordinating body, taking various forms such as parliamentary committees, central agencies or specially created bodies with a variety of functions. For example, a 'watchdog' function may include investigations such as the Australian New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption; 'counselor and advisor' functions, such as the United Kingdom's Committee on Standards in Public Life, which former Prime Minister John Major referred to as an on-going 'ethics workshop'; the US Office of Government Ethics; or 'general promoter' of public sector ethics, such as the New Zealand State Services Commission or the Norwegian Department of Public Administration (OECD 1997). These coordinating bodies act in addition to the departments and managers whose responsibility is to ensure ethical conduct within their jurisdictions.

Different societies emphasize different elements of the ethics infrastructure depending on whether they manage their conduct primarily through guidance and management incentives, such as New Zealand and Australia, or through controls and sanctions, such as Mexico and the United States. Some argue that too much control may slow down government actions, whilst others argue that too little control may result in resources being used for wrong and illegitimate purposes (OECD 1997). Governments need to manage trade-offs between the administrative costs of trying to catch every misdeed, minor mis-demeanour or actual corruption versus the political costs of allowing some mistakes to occur. However, if a society has been plagued with corruption or scandals, it will probably want to emphasize policing and punishment rather than prevention - at least in the short-term.

While public servants' ethical behaviour and judgments are influenced by held values, they are also required to comply with a series of rules and obligations which are contained in legislation (OECD 1997). Proper conduct has always been a pre-requisite to good governance. This requires that an effective ethics infrastructure be firmly in place. Public confidence in government will depend on it.

In exploring the identification, promulgation and championing of ethical considerations, three responses in particular are examined, those of the Australian, Canadian and British governments. The UK, as a unitary state, has led many of the initiatives of privatization, commercialization, quasi-markets and agency structure and has encountered many similar challenges of de-layering, cost cutting, down-sizing and retrenchment.

3.1   Leading Ethically in Government

Most individuals develop heuristics for dealing with organizational issues and dilemmas (Ferrell/ Gresham 1985). Newstrom and Ruch (1975, p. 32) found top executives to be a key reference group in providing an important source of managerial ethical standards. A survey by Weaver and Ferrell (1977) of marketing practitioners reached a similar conclusion, finding that the existence of an enforceable corporate ethics policy influences beliefs toward various ethical behaviours. A cross-cultural study of top Irish, British and US managers (Alderson/ Kakabadse 1994, p. 439) highlights the impact of top management influence on the behaviour and attitudes of personnel lower down the organization and varies according to national culture and identity. The study emphasizes that British and Irish top management need to behave according to the ethical standards set if they are to have the trust of the organization.

The whole of the executive team needs to constantly display a behaviour pattern that accentuates commitment to the organizational ethical code (Alderson/ Kakabadse 1994). The study concludes that codes of ethics, in whatever form (lengthy documents or brief sections in the mission statement), require the clear communication of organizational values espoused and that this "responsibility falls inexorably on top management" (Alderson/ Kakabadse 1994, p. 439). Thus, although socialization and cultural difference shape one's ethical beliefs (Preble/ Miesing 1984), learning and re-enforcement processes are instrumental in re-learning and substituting newly desired behaviours for existing inappropriate ones (Mathews 1988). Managers need courage, fortitude and wisdom, as well as an ethical infrastructure (regulations, law, code of ethics), to lead organizations in

achieving organizational and social good. The same is certainly true for managers in the public sector.

Some have argued that there is nothing more important in upholding public servant's values than the quality of leadership (CCMD 1996; Korac-Kakabadse et al. 2000). It is considered that only through leadership can values of a public service be put into action. For example, leaders need to show how to serve 'clients' or 'customers' in particular contexts and to balance that with the interests and rights of 'citizens'. Because the sum and balance of these interests define public interest, or the common good, equity, citizenship, democracy, the public interest and the needs of clients are all public service values that produce tensions - they carry with them different sets of assumptions in different contexts. Similarly, the new values of 'teamwork' and 'partnership' threaten old values of control and the culture of preserving 'turf'.

Leadership in the public service faces a unique challenge - it has been asked to break new ground and encourage a more open and creative climate. Like other innovations, this implies learning from trial and error. For example, usage of 'good practice', as distinct from 'best practice', suggests that decision-makers have a choice of alternative strategies and models of management praxis (Warrington 1997). This signals the importance of standards and qualities of governance in addition to the more conventional, limiting norms concerning the technical design of policies, organizations or operating systems (Warrington 1997). However, public servants are also called upon to accept a higher level of public accountably in more open environments and often unforgiving of errors.

To provide direction in these situations, there emerges a need for effective leadership, characterized by quality dialogue, vision, discipline and cabinet responsibility (Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999). These characteristics emerged from the study of 12,500 individuals occupying discretionary, leadership, roles across 14 countries (Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999). Dialogue rests on two pillars - openness of discussion and trust. The exchange of information, discussion and debate needs to acknowledge that there is more than one perspective on important issues and that each of these may have something to contribute to a deeper or fuller understanding of reality (Kakabadse 1991; Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999). Hence, dialogue must be sustained long enough for all-important viewpoints to be heard and for senior managers to educate one another until a fuller understanding emerges. Secondly, dialogue acknowledges that truth may not be present at the outset, but only emerges from the quality of dialogue itself - through the engendering of trusting relations. Thus, quality of dialogue requires "openness, patience, an ability to

listen and to absorb and a capacity to resist the rush to judgment - in effect, a willing suspension of belief" (CCMD 1996, p. 4).

Quality dialogue requires maturity and an ability to speak forthrightly about sensitive issues (Kakabadse 1991). The very essence of dialogue consists in the mutual offering of perspectives which allows the movement of followers into leadership roles, both in relation to others less aware than themselves and, also, in relation to those former leaders whose horizons of meaning may now be more limited than those of their former followers. Only through quality dialogue can leaders enhance the quality of inter-facing across complex organizational structures and intricate environments (Korac-Kakabadse/ Korac-Kakabadse/ Myers 1996). Robustness and the courage to stand back, recognizing the nature of current dynamics, and, then, identifying the best ways forward, where guidance seldom exists, are additional elements of leadership (Korac-Kakabadse/ Korac-Kakabadse/ Myers 1996). More often than not, it is getting others to talk, when relationships are strained, that distinguishes the mediocre from high-quality leaders. As can be seen, the enhancement of individual capability needs to be combined with a sensitivity to steer through particular and demanding circumstances. Individuals need to be developed in their own organizational contexts, being taken from a state of professional skill to a higher-order state of trusting judgment as to how to progress within testing situations (Korac-Kakabadse/ Korac-Kakabadse/ Myers 1996). The apt combination of intellectual/ professional and 'street skills' form the foundation for the personal qualities of leadership (Korac-Kakabadse/ Korac-Kakabadse/ Myers 1996).

Vision is conceptualized as strength of purpose that goes beyond personal ambition and a conviction to craft future uncertainty (Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999). Forming a vision is a complex process involving sophisticated negotiation with all the stakeholders who need to assist in achieving that vision. In addition to conviction, visioning requires involvement of the senior team members; the ability to nurture a feedback environment and to establish a platform for visioning which, in turn, requires the establishment of a common language amongst team members.

Discipline is defined as the ability of the top team to constantly behave in accordance with their agreed vision and communicating key messages, in a disciplined way, so that initiatives can be effectively cascaded down the organization (Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999, p. 332). Effective top-teams think issues, not territory and understand that in organizational settings, difference, diversity and tension are normal. They are disciplined

in seeing initiatives through and living with consequences (Kakabadse 1991; Korac-Kakabadse/ Korac-Kakabadse 1996).

'Cabinet responsibility' is conceptualized as agreed behaviour amongst a team of senior managers in a manner that upholds debated and agreed initiatives in a cohesive and disciplined way. Full acceptance of 'cabinet responsibility' provides for the 'grit' that stimulates positive debate as opposed to inhibition and back-room conversation. Promotion of public trust and sensitizing public servants to the ethical and value dimensions of decision-making, through quality leadership, is no easy matter.

Quality leaders are those who have the maturity and the capability to invite, receive and handle feedback and then display the wisdom in identifying appropriate pathways forward when direction is obscured (Kakabadse 1991; Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999). Quality leadership, encompassing maturity and wisdom at the individual level, needs to be incorporated at the team level through cohesiveness of vision and unity of direction (Kakabadse 1991; Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999).

Ethics need attention on a continuing basis in the public service as in other institutions and professions, not because institutions or professions are experiencing major or unique problems, but, rather, because global economic and organizational dynamics create pressures for public servants which, in turn, raise new ethical issues (CCMD 1996). Effective leadership, is crucial for transmitted, nourished and reinforcing values in organized life (Alderson/ Kakabadse 1994; Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999).

When the senior management 'Top Team' nurtures quality dialogue, one that invites and gives feedback, it is highly likely that a shared vision will emerge which, in turn, implies that there will be shared agreement on what to lead (Kakabadse 1991). Similarly, if the top team is disciplined to see initiatives through and there, additionally, exists cabinet responsibility, decisions made will be carried out and there will be agreement within the top team on the issue of how to lead. By effectively combining the 'what' with 'how', senior managers possess the capabilities of quality leadership that provide a way forward though obstacles and paradox. However, often, all four capabilities of quality leadership may not be present within the top team, as illustrated by Cases 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Table 1, which induces a conflict of What ? and/ or How ? to lead.

Table 1: Leadership Capabilities and Impact

Quality Leadership Capabilities	Issue	Level of Agreement					
		Case 1	Case2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6
Dialogue	**What ?**	Y	Y	?	?	X?	X
Vision		Y	Y	?	?	X	X
Discipline	**How?**	Y	? or X	Y	? or X	Y	X
Cabinet Responsibility		Y	? or X	Y	? or X	Y	X
Action Required		WF	DC	CM	ECM	SI	SP

Source: Korac-Kakabadse/ Korac-Kakabadse 1996

Key:

Y = there exists agreement on issues
? = agreement unclear
X = there is no agreement on issues
ECM = external consultancy and mentoring
SP = serious political intervention needed

WF = way forward
DC = development of leadership abilities
CM = consultancy and mentoring
SI = strategic/political intervention

In Case 2 (Table 1), where shared agreement on the issue of 'What to lead' exists but there is no agreement on the issue of 'How to lead', be it due to a lack of discipline, lack of cabinet responsibility, or both, leadership can be enhanced through training and the development of capabilities, leading to maturity, team work and full acceptance of cabinet responsibility for decisions reached. It will be especially important to help individuals in discretionary leadership roles to understand how those capabilities can, and should, be exercised in a public sector context, with strong emphasis on vertical accountability. Further, how such skills can be integrated into daily life and accommodated with the pressures of an increasingly demanding work life, requires further attention. Leadership capabilities can no longer be learned or conceived on their own - they require to be set in a

contextual framework for senior leaders, demonstrating how such skills can contribute to their accomplishment (Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999).

In Case 3 (Table 1), where there is unclear agreement on the issues of 'What to lead', owing to the diversity of perceived operational parameters, but there exists agreement on the issue of 'How to lead', quality leadership may be able to provide a way forward through the development of each senior manager's capability for dialogue and personal counseling/mentoring to enhance each person's level of maturity and wisdom. Each person can recognize the damaging impact of multiple individual interpretations of operational parameters and, in a more balanced way, work towards acceptable settlement. Internal or external consultancy may be used to provide the necessary mentoring of senior managers (Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999; Lambert 2001) - an initiative taken up by the Cabinet Office under the 'Modernizing Government' agenda for the Cabinet office in influential roles (Lambert 2001).

Where there is unclear agreement on issues of 'What to lead', owing to the diversity of perceived operational parameters and, in addition, there exists no clear agreement on the issue of 'How to lead' (Case 4 in Table 1), leadership faces even bigger challenges in finding ways forward. In addition to the development of effective leadership by enhancing capabilities of dialogue (maturity, wisdom), visioning, discipline and cabinet responsibility, there is likely to be a need for assistance of an external consultancy and mentoring support in order to help nurture an internal environment of greater trust and openness - where newly learned capabilities can be reliably applied. Research shows that external consultancy is more effective in assisting senior managers to address sensitive issues in circumstances of low trust for insiders (Kakabadse 1986; Lambert 2001).

In Case 5 (Table 1) where there exists no shared agreement on the issue of 'What to lead', which implies that there is no quality dialogue and/ or shared vision within the top team, quality leadership, alone, cannot provide a way forward, even when there exists agreement on the issue of 'How to lead'. In this instance, in addition to addressing the developmental needs of senior managers in areas of dialogue and visioning capabilities, there is a need for external intervention, at the political/strategic level, in order to coherently define operational parameters and minimize the impact of a dys-functional paradox.

However, when there exists no shared agreement on the issue of 'What to lead' nor 'How to lead' (Case 6 in Table 1), leadership cannot provide a way forward. In this case, there is

an urgency for political and strategic intervention in defining, in the first instance, the parameters for issues of 'What' and 'How' to lead; legislative change; and attention to the considerable developmental needs of senior managers.

Few people learn values primarily through rules - they learn through example from others or through rewards for up-holding values. The question remains as to how values are championed when conflict exists between promoted/ desired and operational values and how that paradox should be overcome. Adopting leadership to the paradoxes and challenges of translating values in theory into professional conduct and principles of public service, at a variety of organizational levels, is highlighted. A comparative view at the substantive issue and the means of leadership implementation capabilities is summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Ethical Leadership Challenges: Australia, Canada and the UK

Quality Leadership Capabilities	Issue	Level of Agreement		
		Australia	**Canada**	**UK**
Dialogue	What?	Y	?	X
Vision		Y	?	X
Discipline	How?	Y	Y	Y
Cabinet Responsibility		?	Y	Y
Action Required		DC	CM	SI

Source: Korac-Kakabadse/ Korac-Kakabadse 1996

Key:

Y = there exists agreement on issues   DC = development of leadership
? = agreement unclear   CM = consultancy and mentoring
X = there is no agreement on issues   SI = strategic/political intervention

3.2 Discussion: Ethics, Leadership and Limitations

As highlighted, values act as general guiding principles in organized life and, as such, are like guideposts for action in un-familiar conditions, including the conditions of forming attitudes about new social situations such as empowerment or increased responsibility. The clarity of organizational values serves as the point of reference for future action. However, values need to be context sensitive. Any policy that champions an innovation that requires a new way of thinking or new values (agency structure, empowerment), but fails to take account of context and contextual variation, cannot provide effective outcomes. Values have a central place in organizations and perhaps the most significant aspect of their institutionalization is their infusion beyond technical requirements (Selznick 1957). However, once institutionalized, values can constrain conduct in two way - by bringing behaviour within a normative order and by making it hostage to its own history (Selznick 1992, p. 232), as in the case with the UK civil service (Trosa 1994).

In order to reduce paradox, leaders need to know policy parameters in order to decide which values matter in the context at hand; how to build them into the organization's culture and social structure and in what ways they are weakened or subverted (Selznick 1996, p. 271). However, civil service leaders cannot define policy or legislation given to them for implementation as it is not in the scope of their role. Discretionary leadership can (re)define organizational reality only in so far as their role permits. Discretionary leadership in the public sector, for example, cannot re(define) policy or legislation set by politicians or legislators. Thus, if the policy parameters are not defined or policy is not sensitive to organizational context, implementation is prone to paradoxes which discretionary leadership cannot encompass. Where these paradoxes are created, there is a need for a policy approach to remedy them (Selznick 1996; Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999).

Discretionary, non rule-bound, leadership cannot over-come the ethical paradox that arises from a policy that is rooted in the past but encompasses the future, as in the case of the UK civil service, which attempts to preserve past values for the future when the organizational context has fundamentally changed and requires new ways of thinking and new values.

Every day, public servants make decisions and take actions that affect the lives and interests of citizens. They handle private and confidential information, provide help,

manage and account for public funds and answer calls from people at risk. Because public servants hold such a significant public trust, ethical values must, necessarily, hold a heightened importance for public servants to equitably operate in society (CCMD 1996). Promoting ethics takes time and the enduring and widespread interest in ethics is the best means of promoting ethical behaviour and encouraging a general sense of civic virtue (Elliott/ Raghavan 1994). Cicero (1971, p. 120) held that if "we firmly adopt moral goodness as our guide - in each and every one of its forms - it will follow, automatically, what our practical duties or obligations must be".

Cicero (1981, p. 161) also observed that "to every one who proposes to have a good career, moral philosophy is indispensable". Professionalism, like pragmatism, is a synthesis of the theory and practice of enlarging human freedom in a precarious and tragic world (Hook 1974). In turn, this synthesis is contingent on the formulation of moral principles and moral education which, in turn, requires choosing and defending a cause. As Plato (1987) argued, political and social good is brought about by virtue of the citizen, not by wealth, power and amusement. An actor's own level of cognitive moral development strongly influences decisions regarding what is right or wrong; the rights, duties and obligations involved in a particular ethical dilemma (Kohlberg 1981; Trevino 1986).

Codes of ethics are probably the most visible sign of an organizational ethical philosophy. However, codes are not an absolute guarantee of ethical behaviour within organizations - they are merely a set of guidelines available to be followed (Alderson/ Kakabadse 1994; Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999). Beautifully framed code of ethics and value statements often gather dust on office walls and do not live in actor behaviour, even in the hearts of the very people who had drafted them in the first place (CCMD 1996, p. ii). Organizational codes have been viewed as the major organizational mechanism for implementing ethical policies. It is equally important to recognize that developing codes is not sufficient. Codes must be tailored to focus on moral outputs desired by the organization. Furthermore, codes should be specific (valuable in interpreting action); public (available to the whole constituency to determine the organization's commitment to fair and ethical practice); clear and practical (realistic and to the point about what happens to violators); revisable (leaving document open to revision); enforceable; and auditable.

Organizations need not be left to the mercy of deep 'internecine' intervention, but can incrementally change through the application of ethics audits. The purpose of an ethics audit is to determine if changes are needed in the internal culture, in present day codes,

and whether the enforcement of an ethics policy is necessary. Such audits require a careful analysis of the existing state of ethical behaviour in the organization, including the validation of current practices, as well as determining both questionable external ethical issues (offers of kickbacks from clients) and internal issues (whether the organization's own compensation system hinders the performance of certain quality procedures). Furthermore, implementing an ethical policy requires support in the form of an ethics training program for all employees. These programs need to interpret under-lying ethical and legal principles and present the practical aspects of carrying out procedural guidelines (Drake/ Drake 1988).

While no one is likely to learn ethics in training programs, such workshops can improve ethical behaviour by sensitizing participants to the importance of enduring ethical principles and facilitating the development of skills for analyzing the application of such principles to ethical and value issues. Training programs can foster an understanding of what the adopted code of ethics means in praxis, possibly stimulating formal changes in unrealistic rules. The value of training programs is particularly evident in organizational change, where actors need support to adjust. Furthermore, training programs provide an intellectual basis and stimulus for a continuing dialogue on ethical issues. Given the complexity of ethical issues, combined with the need for exemplary role models in the executive ranks of the public service, training courses are especially important for senior level officials. Training programs can provide formal opportunities for executive officers to articulate values and assess the extent to which their values are shared by their colleagues. Recent spectacular incidents of mis-government, moral confusion and mis-administration suggest that the need for more open discussion and focused programs may be greater than ever. Furthermore, "deliberate educational attempts (formal curriculum) to influence awareness of real problems and to influence the reasoning/ judgment process can be demonstrated to be effective" in the long term (Rest 1988, p. 23). Public sector staff and management need to train to understand and develop sensitivities to the nuances and ambiguities of ethical situations, recognize ethical problems, appreciate the ethical dimensions in decision-making and accept the multiple and, sometimes, conflicting obligations of their management role.

4   Conclusion

The question as to 'what discretionary leadership can do to build an ethical public sector organization?', has been canvassed and explored. However, this question needs to be addressed further in all policy programs as it is axiomatic that ethical behaviour is not improved by education or a code of ethics alone. Moreover, the desirability of institutionalizing ethics in an un-satisfactory work-culture is certainly questionable. Attempts to raise the profile of ethics in organizations without supportive regulatory measures and a re-enforcing workplace culture may be futile and counter-productive, giving credence to the view that a code of ethics and its associated measures are but a public relations exercise or that they border on moral authoritarianism.

Policy designers and legislators need to be aware of the contextual limitations placed on public service leadership and understand the need for clarity of operational parameters in policy design. Without policy reconsiderations there is a distinct possibility that ethics will become just another managerial tool. Furthermore, organizations need to audit adopted ethics, the ethical expectations of particular roles and what is meant by an official or public conscience. More basically, the debate needs to centre on institutional purposes. A fundamental feature of an institutional ethics program is the clarification and exposition of the particular values justifying an institution's existence; the starting point and the on-going reference point for ethics in public life (Preston 1995).

Policies and procedures need to reflect current social realities and a genuine commitment to building an organization in which deep values are explicitly acknowledged (Longstaff 1995, p. 6). This means going beyond a commitment to short-term commercial values of profit maximization and allowing a full appreciation of what underlies such commitment (Longstaff 1995, p. 6). Only then will other legitimate concerns be weighed in balance.

Morality is economically valuable and the moral character of a society's population is a valuable economic resource. Trust provides an important lubricant to the social system (McPherson 1984). Trust is extremely efficient - saving much trouble by having a high degree of reliance on other people's word (Arrow 1974, p. 23). Trust, in light of Kantian (1901) 'formalism of moral rights', provides an ethical dimension with a universalistic approach. The deontological approach has increasingly been under challenge from the social science perspective of being less concerned with universal absolutes than with the

values which inform behaviour in less macro locations, such as organizations and industries, as well as in social and professional settings (Trevino 1986). The 'pure' understanding of 'ethics', as independent of context, appears appropriate in the increasingly globalized world and its worth is its contribution to the promotion of positive moral standards. Enormous resource costs could be saved in a "perfectly honest and open world that would permit do-it-yourself cash registers and communal lawn mowers" (Okun 1981, p. 86).

However, expunging unethical behaviour is an impossible task and minimizing unethical practices is necessary for any organization. Certain values, such as honesty, respect for the person (which suggests, 'inter alia', that officials should avoid patronage and favouritism and exercise powers fairly and equitably); integrity (justice appears equally respected in developed and developing economies alike); willingness to talk, to listen to other people; and to weigh the consequences of actions on other people, are simply moral virtues that are widely acclaimed in the current leadership and management literature (Kakabadse 1991; Fairholm 1991, 1993; Kakabadse/ Kakabadse 1999). However, to build an ethical culture in public organizations requires polices sensitive to organizational context. Bridging the paradox of that juxtaposition through infrastructure platforms (codes and fundament values applicable to all) with the flexibility of contemporary ethical issues: A flexibility exercised though effective leadership, is a challenge that has taxed many over time. The public sector is no exception.

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7 Implementation

Frank Schirmer

Success Factors in Implementing Contested Organisational Change – Learning from Private Sector Change Politics

1   Introduction

Public management change processes appear to be an exercise in implementing private sector management systems, structures and processes in order to enhance effectiveness of public services. This process sometimes results in a new managerialism (Kouzmin/ Dixon 2003; Jann 2005). However, implementing public sector change often appears to be less effective than expected. Among other reasons, scepticism, resistance, politics and lack of cooperation among actors are seen as causes of implementation failures (e.g. Bogumil/ Kißler 1998; Göbel 1999; Thomas/ Davies 2006).

Over the years, the management literature has considered these 'political process factors' as critical for implementing change – with respect to private sector organizations. Hence, it would appear that related research findings from the private sector would offer a rich body of "vicarious experience" (Bandura 1986, p. 511) for understanding and managing the challenges of public sector change implementation. Therefore, a literature-based conception of change politics and related findings from case study research of change processes in private sector companies are presented in this paper. Assuming that both private and public sector change processes are contested and political by their very nature, the paper intents to contribute to a reflexive and politically sensitive understanding of private and, in conclusion, public sector implementation processes.

To begin with we have to appreciate that change in public sector organizations is less clear cut than some managerialist portrayals might suggest. On the contrary, it appears to be useful to conceive of related implementation processes as 'political processes'. In organization theory, such processes basically are characterised by power struggles, conflicts of interest and manoeuvring among actors (e.g. Pfeffer 1981; Hardy/ Clegg 1996; Buchanan/ Badham 1999). Accordingly, public sector change processes show typical political characteristics:

−   Scepticism and resistance of managers and professionals against New Public Management (NPM) initiatives is reported (e.g. Bogumil/ Kißler 1998; Göbel 1999; Brüggemeier/ Röber 2003; Townley et al. 2003; Thomas/ Davies 2006).

−   Various managerial techniques (like accrual accounting, performance measurement, decentralisation, outsourcing, etc.) and the general managerial ideology of NPM itself

appear to be contested at managerial and operating levels of public organizations (e.g. Hoon 2003; Kouzmin/ Dixon 2003; Townley et al. 2003; Thomas/ Davies 2006; Ridder et al. 2006).

− The mutual dependence of actors with heterogeneous, partly conflicting interests is seen as crucial for the success of NPM initiatives (Bogumil/ Kißler 1998; Göbel 1999; Kouzmin/ Dixon 2003).

− The winner-loser-problem connected with decentralisation initiatives in public bureaucracies is regarded as a major barrier to successful implementation of NPM, particularly with respect to middle managers self interests (Osborne/ Gaebler 1992; Brüggemeier/ Röber 2003).

Regarding politicized change processes, in the related literature it is generally deemed essential to mobilize the cooperation of actors with heterogeneous, partly conflicting interests across traditional departmental boundaries, because their resources (like time, effort, knowledge, loyalty) are needed in order to make change happen. This holds true for private and public sector organizations alike. In terms of a general political perspective on organizational change processes, this is well conceived of as a process of 'coalition formation' (Kanter 1983; Bacharach/ Lawler 1998).

In line with this reasoning, the paper will provide detailed insights into coalition formation processes, their characteristics, dynamics and success factors. The analysis is based on research results of contested decentralisation and de-layering processes in private sector companies in Germany during the 1990s. It is expected that these insights may serve the reader as "vicarious experience" (Bandura 1986, p. 511). They may contribute to a reflexive and realistic understanding and "abstract modelling" (Bandura 1986, pp. 100-101) of public sector implementation processes, because the findings

− also shed light on the limits of managerialist, technocratic, politically sterile approaches to contested change processes in the traditional realm of management – the private sector – which currently serves as a model for public sector change.

− show in detail how mutual interdependencies of actors with conflicting interests at various levels of organizations can have an impact on success or failure of change initiatives – as it sometimes is reported for public sector change.

– demonstrate the roles of middle managers as agents and objects of change –
   comparable with the role of middle managers in public sector organizations - and the
   potentially devastating effects of the winner-loser-problem among middle managers.

– show how resources and political support may be mobilized in contested organi-
   zational terrain in order to make change happen.

To do so, the paper proceeds as follows: 1) To get a deeper understanding of the political
dynamics around mobilizing support for change, the concepts of 'political arena',
'coalition' and 'change coalition' will be explored. 2) Main factors influencing the
processes of change coalition formation will be discussed. 3) The paper proceeds with
main empirical findings with respect to essential managerial activities and stages of
change coalition formation. 4) The paper will conclude with a discussion of the research
results and their relevance for public sector change management.

2   Theory

2.1   The Concepts of Political Arena and Change Coalition

According to political theories of organisational behaviour, organisations in general and
change processes in particular are conceived of as political arenas. They are characterised
by power dependencies and conflicts of interest, negotiations and political manoeuvring
between a wide range of different actors (e.g. initiators, opponents, spectators, victims of
change) of organisational subunits (Buchanan/ Badham 1999; Crozier/ Friedberg 1979;
Mintzberg 1983; Pfeffer 1981, 1992). Theorists argue that political arenas are constitutive
to change processes, due to inherent uncertainties of organisational change. Political
behaviour in change processes is often deemed as 'resistance to change'. It may be of an
disadvantage to the organisation as well as to individual managers, e.g. when information
is withheld, communication barriers are erected and time consuming conflicts are about to
take the upper hand. Struggles of power and interest may be a valuable source of strategic
change, too, particularly when used to recruit allies and to form 'coalitions' to protect
change initiatives against powerful opponents (Kanter 1982, 1983; Kanter et al. 1992).

In line with the organisation behaviour-literature, coalitions in organisations are broadly defined as purposeful, instrumental, deliberately constructed and interacting groups of individuals (Murnighan/ Brass 1991; Pearce et al. 1986; Polzer et al. 1998). Coalitions try to achieve outcomes a single actor would not be expected to achieve. However, due to bounded rationality, neither the expected costs nor the expected benefits of forming a change coalition can be exactly calculated, power effects included (Bacharach/ Lawler 1998; Pearce et al. 1986). Moreover, coalitions in organisations are conceived as being independent of the formal structure of organisations and lacking their own formal structure. In addition, coalitions principally may consist of core members and individuals with more ambiguous membership.

Coalitions of change are conceptualised as temporary political alignments, formed to support change initiators and change initiatives in struggles of power and conflicting interests. According to Kanter et al. (1992, p. 381) these coalitions are conceived as "power tools", pooling supporters of change holding critical resources (such as authority, knowledge, information and money) to make change to occur. Taking a more general viewpoint of power (Pfeffer 1981; Brass/ Burkhardt 1993, p. 441; Crozier/ Friedberg 1979; Hardy/ Clegg 1996), the power of a change coalition is regarded in this paper as a capacity to influence the behaviour of actors in accordance with the coalition's goals. However, the power of a change coalition can not be possessed and stored like money. Power resides in relations of dependency among actors (e.g. between supporters and opponents of change). Consequently, there is a permanent, non-trivial problem to mobilise the above mentioned critical resources in favour of the change coalition's goals (see next section). Regarding potential power effects, power may be used to defeat conflict as well as to manufacture consent (Hardy/ Clegg 1996). Hence, overt conflict is not a prerequisite to study the use of power and its effects.

2.2   Influencing Factors of Change Coalition Formation: Related Fields of Managerial Action

In theory, three influencing factors appear to be of major importance for the formation of change coalitions: compensation of interests, frames of reference and communication processes. According to the literature reviews of Bacharach & Lawler (1980, 1998, pp. 71-72), these factors are closely related to three basic problems of coalition formation: whether to act alone or with others, how to mobilise others and their resources; and how

to co-ordinate group actions with the actions of others in the political arena of the organisation. Hence, in theory, it may also be argued that all three influencing factors are important fields of managerial action – fields of leadership for change - to build up change coalitions.

Compensation of interests

A central feature of an organisational politics perspective in general and of managing change politics in particular is the struggle for interests among and between actors (Mintzberg 1983; Pfeffer 1981, 1992). People in change processes are likely to ask the 'what's-in-it-for-me'-question and to fight for their interests. This, in all likelihood, is true when there is major disagreement about the means and ends of change initiatives and people fear loss from change in one way or another. It is highly probable that, in turn, opposition to change will emerge. Change initiators probably will have to deal with powerful opponents to get their support and to mobilise their resources in order to make change work (Kanter 1982; Schirmer/ Smentek 1994). When facing major adversaries with relatively equal power, negotiated exchanges principally are an appropriate co-ordination mechanism to resolve policy disputes, thereby protecting one's own interests while accommodating the interests of powerful others. Bargaining should overcome major resistance to change and thus mobilise support for change initiatives (Bacharach/ Lawler 1998; Cameron et al. 1993). However, there also may be dysfunctional effects of bargaining. It may be time consuming, to bring in new issues and actors and raise the salience of affected (but hitherto neglected) interests, thus complicating the political arena.

Developing frames of reference

Change processes generally call into question established practises, 'the way things are' and how they have been justified and legitimised in the past (Frost/ Egri 1991; Gioia et al. 1994; Pettigrew 1977; Weick 1995). Thus, new forms of legitimisation are required to de-legitimise the past and to set into practice a new order of organisational co-operation and collaboration. This is assumed to be a management of meaning process, addressing both supporters and opponents of change. "Politics concerns the creation of legitimacy for certain ideas, values and demands ... The management of meaning refers to a process of symbol construction and value use both to create legitimacy for one's own demands and to 'de-legitimize' the demands of others" (Pettigrew 1977, p. 85). Therefore, initiators of change coalition formation are assumed to be involved in both sensemaking, that is, developing revised conceptions of an organisation, and sensegiving, that is, disseminating

revised conceptions to diverse subgroups within and outside organisations (e.g. further supporters of change, internal and external stakeholders; Gioia et al. 1994; Westley 1992). Management of meaning may also be an effective way of preventing overt conflicts among stakeholders in change processes by setting the legitimate frame in which actions and struggles of interest take place (Frost/ Egri 1991; Hardy/ Clegg 1996).

Communication processes

Communication functions as the creation, maintenance and renewal of shared meanings. No less important, however, is the function of communication processes to create and maintain patterns of social inclusion and exclusion, regulating access of individuals to change discourses. Coalition formation is always a matter of inclusion and exclusion. Being included in politically relevant change discourses, occasions for actors emerge to make both their interests and understandings heard. Subsequently, they are on the bargaining agenda when conflict resolutions are needed. Discourse and negotiation about change initiatives, in turn, should have a positive impact on the actor's willingness to identify with an emerging change coalition and support them, thus enhancing the motivation to contribute resources in favour of the change agenda. Feelings of group membership should emerge (Bacharach/ Lawler 1998, p. 76; Humphreys/ Brown 2002; Putnam et al. 1996, p. 389; Westley 1990). These arguments are based on the presumption that actors' voices have a sufficient influence. Conversely, actors' exclusion from change discourses, the suppression or ignorance of voices, should raise resistance to change, possibly strengthening the identity of resisting subgroups in organisations.

Summing up

The research perspective taken here principally aims to explore relationships between political dynamics in organisational change arenas and success of change. Taking this perspective, leading change is primarily a matter as how to control politics of change. More specifically, it is assumed that coalition formation processes and related managerial activities are important for change success. And it is assumed that processes of forming a change coalition are mainly affected by:

− Compensation of interests,

− Management of meaning and

− Communication processes (with related patterns of inclusion/ exclusion).

Moreover, it is assumed that managers who successfully lead change processes will be concerned with managing these influencing factors of change coalition formation.

The paper now turns to case study research results which are aiming at exploring the dynamics of coalition formation in the private sector more deeply.

3   Exploring the Micro-politics of Change Coalition Formation – Results from Case Study Research

3.1   Research Method, Case Selection and Research Context

A main task of analyses of change processes from a political perspective is to explore in depth the different ways people come to an understanding and act in these situations. Moreover, only few field studies exist in this area of research. Hence, a qualitative research approach seems suitable. In particular, a "process approach" (van de Ven 1993, p. 271; Langley 1999, p. 693) is used for describing and explaining the temporal sequence of events leading to a coalition of change in it's natural context, with special reference made to managers' contributions.[1]

The process data, or stories, about coalition formation are based on 67 semi-structured interviews with managers, employees and works council members from 5 major German companies (transport, insurance, telecommunications, chemical and pharmaceutical industry), complemented with company documents and press cuttings. All the interviews were conducted by the author.

All five companies selected for in-depth inquiry were medium to large-sized companies, where restructuring attempts focused on strategic decentralisation and de-layering. At the time of data gathering, restructuring initiatives in these companies had just been completed, or were about to be completed. Notwithstanding other reasons of case selection (see below), these companies were singled out for two reasons. First, drawing on results from a pre-test among 13 companies, and in the light of international studies in this field (e.g. Scase/ Goffee 1989; Dopson/ Stewart 1990; Staehle/ Schirmer 1992; Cameron et al. 1993), it was expected that managers at various levels, and particularly middle managers in large companies, would become targets (probably victims) of decentralisation

and de-layering measures, affecting vested interests and thus stimulating severe politics of change. Second, it was expected that major change processes typically would be complex and uncertain. Hence, many managers in the hierarchy might become both, targets 'and' agents of change, with related power interdependencies and negotiations among them. All in all, it was assumed that this would form a solid ground to study politics of change.

Studying politics of change in German private sector companies during the nineties, we have to take into account the specific institutional context, traditionally characterized by mutual employer-employee commitment and long-term managerial careers at all levels of the hierarchy. This institutional context probably had an impact on coalition formation processes among managers, particularly on bargaining processes, the willingness to smooth out extreme conflicts and to negotiate and compromise. It is assumed here that these context features are similar to those of many public sector organizations.

To develop a relatively complex portrayal of change coalition formation processes, semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted in each of these five companies. The 67 interviews lasted between 1.5 and 3 hours each, 60 of them were recorded. For budget reasons, only 30 of them were transcribed.

The informants represented a broad range of diverse political actors in terms of their distinct interests (e.g. proponents and opponents, ultimate victims of change, members of management and works council members), their centrality in the change process (initiators, implementers, recipients) and their status in the hierarchy (top, middle and lower management, operating employees, staff specialists). The author was lucky to get sufficient access to these actors, due to personal contacts with key players in these companies. Each respondent was asked to give his or her account (story) of the organisational restructuring under study, guided by interview questions addressing key players and their relationships over time (who was involved?), their main interests (what was at stake?), their actions over time (what was done?) and the related effects of these actions (what were the consequences?).

According to Langley (1999, p. 694), a "temporal bracketing strategy" was applied here to make sense of the stories and accounts of each different actor.[2] Grounded in the actors' accounts of processes, an aggregated, coalition centred "activity-event-history" was displayed for each case (consisting of 30-50 pages each; full case-by-case display of process stories is beyond the scope of this paper; they are available on demand from the author; for method see Langley 1999, pp. 703-704; Miles/ Huberman 1994, p. 110).

In terms of method, after initial elaboration on one case, a partly opportunistic, partly deliberate (dis)confirming strategy of case sampling was applied, resembling a replication logic recommended by Yin (2003, p. 46). Each new case thus lead to new insights into and ideas about basic interaction patterns of coalition formation processes. The final description of activity sets and their effects eventually emerged from the cross-case comparison of all the five in-depth case studies. Hence, the approach was partly deductive, partly inductive. To summarise, in terms of method a case-oriented process approach was combined with a cross-case-oriented, qualitative variable approach (Langley 1999, p. 693; see also Miles/ Huberman 1994, pp. 172-173; Yin 2003, pp. 46-47).

3.2   Research Results: Managerial Activities Contributing to Change Coalition Formation

Network building

In all the five cases, usually several months or even years before any related official change activity was initiated, some middle managers had been discussing, developing and promoting new ideas of organisation design among colleagues, up and down the hierarchy and across formal lines of authority. Whether these ideas eventually lead to formal change initiatives, mainly depends on the success of upward influence activities. In this respect, the findings support earlier research results of Floyd and Wooldrige (1997). A senior staff specialist from the transport service company reported:

"There have been discussion circles among middle managers for many years, particularly at the two levels below top management, concerned with new organisational 'solutions', as it were … However, the former CEO did not consider any of these ideas ...".

More specifically, in all five cases, support for middle management change initiatives at the top management level was a prerequisite for further networking among middle managers, an initial impulse for coalition formation. Subsequently, the networking activities became part of a more politically deliberate strategy, aimed at broadening and enriching the quantity and quality of early change supporters. As the change initiator (middle manager) and inner circle member in the telecommunications case put it:

"From the very beginning I tried to get support from the top management team ... There has never been a situation of political instability in terms of lack of top management support for my initiative - which has been very important, I guess ... And, important to note, I had a close contact in the middle management. He was very much accepted by his colleagues and played a crucial role in promoting change ideas. He was a kind of minesweeper in the whole process ... And, last but not least, I fostered informal, confidential contacts to first line supervisors and works council members to find out their mood for change."

Eventually, inner circles of change coalitions emerged from the reported networking activities, consisting of 3 to 8 members, mostly middle managers. They explored the organisational status quo, developed a sense of vision, and knit a network of backers and supporters of change. In terms of Kanter et al. (1992, p. 377), the network comprised change strategists (mainly top managers, sometimes consultants), potential change implementers (mainly middle managers, staff experts, project managers) and change recipients (middle managers, mainly lower level managers, operating staff). Networking activities of inner circle members appear to be a useful way to lay the ground for creating legitimacy for change initiatives throughout the organisation, to explore potential fields of resistance and conflict, and to assess the political readiness for change.

Management of meaning

Developing and disseminating frames of reference in a way that reduces cognitive instability associated with the restructuring processes was one of the main factors affecting coalition formation processes. This was foremost an activity performed by inner circle members (see above) - middle managers in these cases. When this role of management of meaning was lacking, the coalition formation process suffered, as can be seen in two out of five cases. There are two main reasons why the processes failed. 'First', the cohesion of inner circle members itself suffered when frames of reference were absent. Thus, reducing cognitive instability, finding a common language, and providing a new understanding of organisational reality 'within' the emerging inner circle is one of the main functions of developing frames of reference. As one inner circle member from the telecommunications case said:

"We had to develop clear, easily understandable images of change, something that stands to reason ... For example, we used simple phrases like: from tall to flat organization, from vertical to horizontal work processes and so on ... And I wasn't the only one using these phrases. All the early supporters adopted it, so we were able to claim that 'we as change

initiators' had already made up our minds as to the pathway of change ... we have been setting the pace; the others couldn't simply ignore that."

Secondly, without convincing frames of reference the 'power of concepts' (as discussed in the theory section) was missing. This, in turn, leads to a state of disorientation and lack of legitimisation of change goals and measures 'outside' the inner circle, on the part of change recipients and potential coalition members. Consequently, they refrained from joining and supporting inner circle members and withheld the resources needed to make change happen (as in the transport service case).

Developing a shared language, framing the change - this subsequently enables inner circle members to section off spheres of influence in the change process where their influence is deemed to be legitimate and nearly unchallenged. A middle management change-opponent from the telecommunications company reported:

"Our thinking was very much focused around the notion of flattening and downsizing, promoted by (change initiator's name), something we (names of five colleagues) didn't want to support ... But when I argued against it, most of my colleagues notoriously replied: 'You are against it because you fear losing your job'. To be honest, this was exactly true. But we (names of the five colleagues) weren't able to develop a 'reasonable' alternative to it ... because … because we never freed ourselves from (change initiator's name) ideas."

This is pure deep-structure politics of reality (Pettigrew 1977; Frost/ Egri 1991). As a consequence, even powerful opponents of the restructuring processes in the middle of the hierarchy eventually comply with inner circle members' pace setting change interpretations, at least to some extent.

Communicating

Networking and management of meaning are obviously mediated by communication processes. Furthermore, powerful opponents of restructuring processes - middle managers, too - were included in communication processes and discourses of inner circle members. It appears to be another step in successful change coalition formation processes. Inclusion was not only a process of 'disseminating' new frames of reference (a process of 'sensegiving' in terms of Gioia et al. 1994) to potential coalition members. In addition, these were opportunities for powerful opponents to question, to refine or redefine the change initiators' frames of reference (a process of 'sensemaking' in terms of Gioia et al.

1994). Hence, in processes of inclusion, interests and preferences of powerful opponents were revealed and taken seriously. The last point is closely linked to initiating or maintaining trust relations between opponents and inner circle members (see next paragraph). A senior manager in the pharmaceutical-case put it this way:

"He (the change initiator) often made a fool of his management colleagues ... blamed them for being old-fashioned when they argued against change ... Obviously such a behaviour did not motivate them to cooperate. That is to say, he really didn't gain the support of the hierarchy - and I wonder whether he ever wanted to ... And that's why he failed, why the change process ultimately failed."

The main effect of truly 'interactive' communication processes was that powerful opponents subsequently were more inclined to take part in a coalition of change, notwithstanding some unresolved conflicts of interest. An inner circle member from the telecommunications case reported:

"There were long-winded discussions in management meetings, project teams, and informal management groups ... often we had to change our way of thinking ... but the controversies with our opponents helped us (names of inner circle members) sharpen the direction and measures of change .... It was a time of incubation and lasted around six months....but eventually the weapons of the opponents were blunt."

Initiating trust

Trustworthy and fair behaviour of inner circle members enhances the likelihood of getting powerful opponents sustainably involved in coalitions of change. Findings suggest that the perceptions of trustworthiness of inner circle members are enhanced by communication, e.g., when restructuring initiatives are carefully explained to change recipients (not only within middle management).

Opponents of the restructuring processes were principally suspicious about espoused positive effects of restructuring initiatives. In such a climate of doubt, powerful opponents perceive the inclusion into inner circle communication processes as a sign of openness and trustworthiness, enhancing their inclination to join an emerging coalition of change. Failed trust building in the transport-service-case and related consequences were described as follows:

"The top management team didn't realise the emerging problem of distrust (between top and middle management). Due to massive communication barriers they thought they weren't off the track ... For middle managers, however, the situation was completely different. They feared being excluded, being overwhelmed ... So, among middle managers there was a massive feeling of uncertainty and growing distrust of top management ... Eventually it ended up with an informal coalition against change, consisting of middle managers, lower managers and works council members ... Ultimately, the top management team had to re-launch the change initiative, this time with inclusion of middle managers …" (assistant manager, middle level).

However, research results also suggest that interwoven processes of communication and trust building are time consuming (e.g., six months in the telecommunications company). According to respondents, the three successful coalition formation processes had required a 'time of incubation' for new organisational concepts, especially into the mind-sets of powerful opponents. Hence, none of the time spent was wasted.

Furthermore, the research suggests that trust building between inner circles and change recipients is associated with substantial demonstration of concern, taking divergent interests and emerging anxieties of change recipients seriously, beyond the limits of mere rhetoric, and starting negotiations about the 'terms of trade' in the change process. 'Substantial' mainly refers to economic terms, such as preventing actors from job losses, if possible at all; or at least reducing expected change losses in terms of income, status or career advancement to an acceptable amount. It helps to build trust, to smooth and to protect change processes from damaging opposition (emerging in two restructuring processes which ultimately failed). In this respect, the research results are supported by recent findings published by Huy (2001), showing that addressing change recipients anxieties and taking into account their interests is one of the main avenues to successful change.

Negotiating

Middle management turned out to be a heterogeneous group. Some were members of the inner circle (active supporters of change), while others were opponents of restructuring, especially if they expected the change process to result in to a loss of status, discretion, or even the job itself. They eventually could be won over by inner circle members in a process of negotiation. In particular, it appears from the case studies that turning powerful opponents into members of change coalitions is crucial for the success of restructuring

initiatives. Inner circle members - primarily middle managers - have to negotiate the 'terms of trade' with powerful opponents.

"We had to pull in six powerful managers, key players since long ago ... They all opposed the change process because they feared losing their strong positions in the hierarchy ... With backing of the top management and assistance of the personnel department, we dealt out an individual agreement for each of them. We offered them equitable jobs ... and they even negotiated among each other to reach an optimal assignment. We tolerated it ... Each of the six had a new position elsewhere in the company 'before' the change process officially started. It significantly weakened their resistance (against de-layering and decentralising) ..." (initiator of change, telecommunications company).

Loyalty to inner circle members and commitment to the restructuring initiative is primarily exchanged for reduction of middle managers' losses. This exchange often rests on a delicate balance of give and take between the parties involved. If negotiations are successful, powerful opponents buy into the restructuring process and will, in turn, sell the restructuring program to their organisational subunits. If negotiations are not successful, powerful middle managers turn out to be a serious source of enduring resistance, threatening the implementation of decentralisation initiatives (e.g. by forming coalitions of resistance, by indoctrinating their subordinates, by withholding information and knowledge relevant to implementation etc.).

Cross-case comparison shows that the willingness of inner circle members to negotiate the 'terms of trade' is perceived as part of trustworthy behaviour, for it shows respect for the interests of organisation members, initiates exchanges for mutual benefits, and is altogether an effective driver of coalition formation processes. Negotiating the change agenda may aptly be called a "walk on a tightrope" (Huy 2001, p. 78). Huy recently used this phrase to describe middle managers' key task of balancing change and continuity. This task is also addressed here.

4   Discussion and Conclusion

In conclusion, some important implications for public sector change and related political dynamics will be drawn from this study of private sector change politics.

To do so, first we must appreciate that change processes in public sector organizations appear to be less clear cut and more complex than a 'managerial meta-myth' suggests (e.g. Bogumil/ Kißler 1998; Kouzmin/ Dixon 2003; Hoon 2003; Thomas/ Davies 2006). They appear to be contested and dependent upon co-operation of rivalling, partly resisting actors and interest groups in and around public organizations. Accordingly, there are some striking similarities of change arenas between public sector and private sector organizations. Thus, in terms of a general perspective of political behaviour in organizations, it can safely be assumed that fundamental change processes in public sector organizations, such as implementing New Public Management, are political processes by their very nature – as in private sector companies. Therefore, mobilizing extra resources (like effort, personnel, expert knowledge and authority, political backing and support) beyond departmental demarcations is presumably one of the central challenges of change (managers) in public sector organizations. Hence, it is assumed that change managers in the public sector also have to act as coalition builders, in order to pull in the required resources from diverse units and from a number of people on whom they depend – similar to change managers in the private sector.

Keeping in mind these parallels and taking into account the basic theoretical considerations, main findings of the study reported above are regarded as relevant for understanding and managing political dynamics of change in public sector organizations. In particular, 'process characteristics, process drivers' (success factors, as it were) and 'dualities' of change coalition formation as well as the crucial role of 'middle managers' are of concern.

Process Characteristics of Change Coalition Formation

In summary, the findings of this study suggest that successful coalition formation processes tend to resemble a bubble expanding outward from a founding centre. Related expansion processes appear to be characterized by 'four stages', eventually leading to change coalitions which are stable enough to foster decentralisation processes over contested terrain (related managerial activities in brackets):

– Coalition founder's signalling of dependence, in order to get early support and to form an 'inner circle' of the change coalition (primarily by means of communicating and networking).

- Stabilizing the inner circle of the change coalition by creating a shared feeling of legitimacy regarding core change ideas (primarily by means of communicating and management of meaning among inner circle members).

- Opening up the inner circle in order to include change opponents/ rivals into inner circle change discourses and to claim legitimacy for change ideas (primarily by means of trust building, communicating and management of meaning).

- Fostering co-operation with powerful rivals in the political arena in order to smooth devastating conflicts (primarily by means of negotiating and compromising).

However, successful expansion processes don't appear to be strictly linear in this sense. Activities leading to the relevant stages may be performed simultaneously, such as signalling dependence and fostering co-operation with powerful rivals (as in the telecommunications case studied), or repeatedly, e.g. several rounds of negotiating with rivals (as it appeared in the pharmaceutical case).

Process Drivers of Change Coalition Formation

Basically, the data obtained from the fieldwork fit well with the proposed process drivers of coalition formation, the related fields of managerial action and their theorized effects (see theory section):

- Network-building, communicating and trust building: Coalition formation is theorized in this paper as a matter of exclusion and inclusion (Bacharach/ Lawler 1998), requiring the management of communication to regulate the access of particular actors to change discourses and decision arenas, and to foster feelings of group membership. Regarding the cases examined, the 'inner circle' members managed communication processes accordingly. When an inner circle of change was formed, major change supporters gained access to informal discourses and key decision arenas, while access was denied for powerful opponents of change. Later on in processes of successful change coalition formation, attempts were made to include powerful opponents of change into discourses of inner circle members. Inner circle members' activities of communication and trust building are related to attempts of inclusion at this stage.

- Management of meaning: It is theorized that change coalition formation is a matter of politics of reality, legitimizing the claims of supporters and de-legitimizing the critics

of change (Pettigrew 1977; Gioia et al. 1994). Accordingly, the development of frames of reference - management of meaning - was conceived of as an important influencing factor of change coalition formation. A strong case in point is the inner circle's management of meaning in the telecommunications company, where powerful opponents eventually had to admit they were unable to find convincing arguments against the decentralisation and de-layering claims of inner circle members. This in turn de-legitimized their own opposition against change, smoothed conflicts and legitimized the claims of change proponents in subsequent negotiations. Hence, management of meaning is critical.

– Negotiating and compromising: It is claimed here that in contested change processes negotiated exchanges and the compensation of interests are requisite mechanisms to resolve policy disputes, particularly between major adversaries with relatively equal power (Bacharach/ Lawler 1998; Schirmer/ Smentek 1994). Inner circle members eventually acted as negotiators in each of the cases studied, using their control over resources to turn powerful opponents into change supporters, or at least into neutral non-opponents. This was a process of dealing. Loyalty to inner circle members and commitment to the restructuring initiative were primarily exchanged for reduction of change losses, in terms of income, status and career prospects. With regard to the micro-politics of change coalition formation, negotiating complements the previously examined activities.

Dualities of change coalition formation

In addition, the case study findings of successful coalition formation suggest that they are characterized by dualistic processes. This means that seemingly contradictory processes occur simultaneously or in combination with each other. For instance, according to the interviews reported above, the most successful inner-circle formation processes occurred when change initiators managed processes of inclusion and exclusion of potential coalition members simultaneously. Accordingly, managing consent by means of creating shared feelings of legitimacy was combined with defeating conflict by using resource power in successful coalition formation. Furthermore, processes of authoritative sense-giving directed by inner-circle members are combined with more receptive processes of sense-making among proponents and opponents of change. In contrast, when change initiators ignored this dualistic character of change coalition formation, as it was in the transport-service case, coalition formation suffered. It is argued here that the dualities of inclusion and exclusion, as well as, conflict and consent are main challenges of coalition

formation in public sector organizations. All in all, these dualities seem to represent a basic political logic of coalition formation.

The role of middle managers in change coalition formation

Like their counterparts in private sector organizations, particularly middle managers in public sector organizations have been blamed for being unmotivated and inflexible status quo defenders in change processes (e.g. Osborne/ Gaebler 1992; Jackson/ Lapsley 2003). However, they usually are objects, victims 'and' agents of change, both in the private and the public sector. As Ridder et al. (2006, p. 108) point out, middle managers are key stakeholders in public sector reforms. Therefore, it is argued here that deliberate buy-in of reluctant middle managers into change processes by means of coalition formation - as shown above - may be an effective way of strengthening their role as agents of change. It may smooth resistance or devastating conflicts by means of discourse and justification, negotiation and compromising.

Moreover, deliberate coalition formation might foster the co-operation of middle managers, their top managers and lower level managers and thus make implementation processes less disturbed. With support from their top managers, middle managers in public organizations - like some of their counterparts in private organizations reported above - even might become crucial agents of coalition formation processes, part of the inner circle, in order to implement New Public Management. Due to their usually prominent role as mediators in the middle of the hierarchy, they probably are in an outstanding formal position to deal with the reported success factors of coalition formation, like signalling dependence upon others, networking and communicating, negotiating and compromising.

To conclude, the reported process drivers of change coalition formation may be an effective means in order to mobilize resources and political support in contested change terrains. Regarding contested change processes in public sector organizations (like implementation of accrual accounting, output-based performance measurement systems and decentralisation of decision making in Germany), it is to be assumed that deliberate coalition formation among different actors at top and middle management level, local government and state level may be an effective way to make implementation processes of new public management more effective than they currently appear to be (see e.g. Jann 2003). However, particular demands and constraints of public sector change coalition formation processes are to be taken into account, such as legitimate public interests and related policy and program objectives as well as a wealth of legal constraints at the local,

national and supranational level, just to name a few. Hence, the political arena of change probably will be more complex and the discretion of managers engaged in change coalition formation more constrained than in private sector organizations.

Endnotes

[1]   The term process will be used here to focus on "... the actions, reactions and interactions of the various interested parties ... (and their) distinctive account of the process of change" (Pettigrew et al. 1992, p. 7; also Pettigrew et al. 2001, p. 689). Thus, process data in this study consist largely of "... stories about what happened and who did what when - that is events, activities, and choices ordered over time" (Langley 1999, p. 692). Driven by theory, particular attention has been paid to activities of managers concerned with negotiation and compensation of interests, developing frames of reference and multilateral communication, all conceived of as potential process drivers of coalition formation. Any significant change in these activities, reported in the stories about what happened, as well as reported significant changes in the interactions of potential coalition members and/ or interested parties, have been considered as 'events'. These events punctuate the reported streams of activities over time.

[2]   That is, drawing on these stories, attempts were made to bracket seemingly coherent sequences of managerial activities and related changes in interaction patterns of potential coalition members, or interested parties, over time. Core concepts of data analysis -coding tracks- were the above mentioned managerial activities (compensation of interests, developing frames of reference and multilateral communication). Sequences (brackets) were separated by 'events', such as a new team membership structure of supporters or a breakdown of reorganisation activities, as was the case in the transport-service company, for example.

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