

# **Bureaucracy and Administration**

**Edited by  
Ali Farazmand**

# **Bureaucracy and Administration**

# PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

## A Comprehensive Publication Program

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

**EVAN M. BERMAN**

*Distinguished University Professor  
J. William Fulbright Distinguished Scholar  
National Chengchi University  
Taipei, Taiwan*

*Founding Editor*

**JACK RABIN**

1. *Public Administration as a Developing Discipline*, Robert T. Golembiewski
2. *Comparative National Policies on Health Care*, Milton I. Roemer, M.D.
3. *Exclusionary Injustice: The Problem of Illegally Obtained Evidence*, Steven R. Schlesinger
5. *Organization Development in Public Administration*, edited by Robert T. Golembiewski and William B. Eddy
7. *Approaches to Planned Change*, Robert T. Golembiewski
8. *Program Evaluation at HEW*, edited by James G. Abert
9. *The States and the Metropolis*, Patricia S. Florestano and Vincent L. Marando
11. *Changing Bureaucracies: Understanding the Organization before Selecting the Approach*, William A. Medina
12. *Handbook on Public Budgeting and Financial Management*, edited by Jack Rabin and Thomas D. Lynch
15. *Handbook on Public Personnel Administration and Labor Relations*, edited by Jack Rabin, Thomas Vocino, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller
19. *Handbook of Organization Management*, edited by William B. Eddy
22. *Politics and Administration: Woodrow Wilson and American Public Administration*, edited by Jack Rabin and James S. Bowman
23. *Making and Managing Policy: Formulation, Analysis, Evaluation*, edited by G. Ronald Gilbert
25. *Decision Making in the Public Sector*, edited by Lloyd G. Nigro
26. *Managing Administration*, edited by Jack Rabin, Samuel Humes, and Brian S. Morgan
27. *Public Personnel Update*, edited by Michael Cohen and Robert T. Golembiewski
28. *State and Local Government Administration*, edited by Jack Rabin and Don Dodd
29. *Public Administration: A Bibliographic Guide to the Literature*, Howard E. McCurdy
31. *Handbook of Information Resource Management*, edited by Jack Rabin and Edward M. Jackowski
32. *Public Administration in Developed Democracies: A Comparative Study*, edited by Donald C. Rowat
33. *The Politics of Terrorism: Third Edition*, edited by Michael Stohl
34. *Handbook on Human Services Administration*, edited by Jack Rabin and Marcia B. Steinhauer
36. *Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on Law and Values, Second Edition*, John A. Rohr
37. *The Guide to the Foundations of Public Administration*, Daniel W. Martin
39. *Terrorism and Emergency Management: Policy and Administration*, William L. Waugh, Jr.

40. *Organizational Behavior and Public Management: Second Edition*, Michael L. Vasu, Debra W. Stewart, and G. David Garson
43. *Government Financial Management Theory*, Gerald J. Miller
46. *Handbook of Public Budgeting*, edited by Jack Rabin
49. *Handbook of Court Administration and Management*, edited by Steven W. Hays and Cole Blease Graham, Jr.
50. *Handbook of Comparative Public Budgeting and Financial Management*, edited by Thomas D. Lynch and Lawrence L. Martin
53. *Encyclopedia of Policy Studies: Second Edition*, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
54. *Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law*, edited by David H. Rosenbloom and Richard D. Schwartz
55. *Handbook of Bureaucracy*, edited by Ali Farazmand
56. *Handbook of Public Sector Labor Relations*, edited by Jack Rabin, Thomas Vocino, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller
57. *Practical Public Management*, Robert T. Golembiewski
58. *Handbook of Public Personnel Administration*, edited by Jack Rabin, Thomas Vocino, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller
60. *Handbook of Debt Management*, edited by Gerald J. Miller
61. *Public Administration and Law: Second Edition*, David H. Rosenbloom and Rosemary O'Leary
62. *Handbook of Local Government Administration*, edited by John J. Gargan
63. *Handbook of Administrative Communication*, edited by James L. Garnett and Alexander Kouzmin
64. *Public Budgeting and Finance: Fourth Edition*, edited by Robert T. Golembiewski and Jack Rabin
67. *Handbook of Public Finance*, edited by Fred Thompson and Mark T. Green
68. *Organizational Behavior and Public Management: Third Edition*, Michael L. Vasu, Debra W. Stewart, and G. David Garson
69. *Handbook of Economic Development*, edited by Kuotsai Tom Liou
70. *Handbook of Health Administration and Policy*, edited by Anne Osborne Kilpatrick and James A. Johnson
72. *Handbook on Taxation*, edited by W. Bartley Hildreth and James A. Richardson
73. *Handbook of Comparative Public Administration in the Asia-Pacific Basin*, edited by Hoi-kwok Wong and Hon S. Chan
74. *Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and Administration*, edited by Dennis L. Soden and Brent S. Steel
75. *Handbook of State Government Administration*, edited by John J. Gargan
76. *Handbook of Global Legal Policy*, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
78. *Handbook of Global Economic Policy*, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
79. *Handbook of Strategic Management: Second Edition*, edited by Jack Rabin, Gerald J. Miller, and W. Bartley Hildreth
80. *Handbook of Global International Policy*, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
81. *Handbook of Organizational Consultation: Second Edition*, edited by Robert T. Golembiewski
82. *Handbook of Global Political Policy*, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
83. *Handbook of Global Technology Policy*, edited by Stuart S. Nagel
84. *Handbook of Criminal Justice Administration*, edited by M. A. DuPont-Morales, Michael K. Hooper, and Judy H. Schmidt
85. *Labor Relations in the Public Sector: Third Edition*, edited by Richard C. Kearney
86. *Handbook of Administrative Ethics: Second Edition*, edited by Terry L. Cooper
87. *Handbook of Organizational Behavior: Second Edition*, edited by Robert T. Golembiewski
88. *Handbook of Global Social Policy*, edited by Stuart S. Nagel and Amy Robb
89. *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective, Sixth Edition*, Ferrel Heady

90. *Handbook of Public Quality Management*, edited by Ronald J. Stupak and Peter M. Leitner
91. *Handbook of Public Management Practice and Reform*, edited by Kuotsai Tom Liou
93. *Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management*, edited by Ali Farazmand
94. *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration: Second Edition*, edited by Ali Farazmand
95. *Financial Planning and Management in Public Organizations*, Alan Walter Steiss and Emeka O. Cyprian Nwagwu
96. *Handbook of International Health Care Systems*, edited by Khi V. Thai, Edward T. Wimberley, and Sharon M. McManus
97. *Handbook of Monetary Policy*, edited by Jack Rabin and Glenn L. Stevens
98. *Handbook of Fiscal Policy*, edited by Jack Rabin and Glenn L. Stevens
99. *Public Administration: An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis*, edited by Eran Vigoda
100. *Ironies in Organizational Development: Second Edition, Revised and Expanded*, edited by Robert T. Golembiewski
101. *Science and Technology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, edited by Tushar K. Ghosh, Mark A. Prelas, Dabir S. Viswanath, and Sudarshan K. Loyalka
102. *Strategic Management for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, Alan Walter Steiss
103. *Case Studies in Public Budgeting and Financial Management: Second Edition*, edited by Aman Khan and W. Bartley Hildreth
104. *Handbook of Conflict Management*, edited by William J. Pammer, Jr. and Jerri Killian
105. *Chaos Organization and Disaster Management*, Alan Kirschenbaum
106. *Handbook of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Administration and Policy*, edited by Wallace Swan
107. *Public Productivity Handbook: Second Edition*, edited by Marc Holzer
108. *Handbook of Developmental Policy Studies*, edited by Gedeon M. Mudacumura, Desta Mebratu and M. Shamsul Haque
109. *Bioterrorism in Medical and Healthcare Administration*, Laure Paquette
110. *International Public Policy and Management: Policy Learning Beyond Regional, Cultural, and Political Boundaries*, edited by David Levi-Faur and Eran Vigoda-Gadot
111. *Handbook of Public Information Systems, Second Edition*, edited by G. David Garson
112. *Handbook of Public Sector Economics*, edited by Donijo Robbins
113. *Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European Union*, edited by M. Peter van der Hoek
114. *Nonproliferation Issues for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Mark A. Prelas and Michael S. Peck
115. *Common Ground, Common Future: Moral Agency in Public Administration, Professions, and Citizenship*, Charles Garofalo and Dean Geuras
116. *Handbook of Organization Theory and Management: The Philosophical Approach, Second Edition*, edited by Thomas D. Lynch and Peter L. Cruise
117. *International Development Governance*, edited by Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Habib Zafarullah
118. *Sustainable Development Policy and Administration*, edited by Gedeon M. Mudacumura, Desta Mebratu, and M. Shamsul Haque
119. *Public Financial Management*, edited by Howard A. Frank
120. *Handbook of Juvenile Justice: Theory and Practice*, edited by Barbara Sims and Pamela Preston
121. *Emerging Infectious Diseases and the Threat to Occupational Health in the U.S. and Canada*, edited by William Charney
122. *Handbook of Technology Management in Public Administration*, edited by David Greisler and Ronald J. Stupak
123. *Handbook of Decision Making*, edited by Gökтуğ Morçöl
124. *Handbook of Public Administration, Third Edition*, edited by Jack Rabin, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller
125. *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis*, edited by Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney

126. *Elements of Effective Governance: Measurement, Accountability and Participation*, edited by Kathe Callahan
127. *American Public Service: Radical Reform and the Merit System*, edited by James S. Bowman and Jonathan P. West
128. *Handbook of Transportation Policy and Administration*, edited by Jeremy Plant
129. *The Art and Practice of Court Administration*, Alexander B. Aikman
130. *Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration*, edited by Ali Farazmand and Jack Pinkowski
131. *Handbook of Globalization and the Environment*, edited by Khi V. Thai, Dianne Rahm, and Jerrell D. Cogburn
132. *Personnel Management in Government: Politics and Process, Sixth Edition*, Norma M. Riccucci and Katherine C. Naff
133. *Handbook of Police Administration*, edited by Jim Ruiz and Don Hummer
134. *Handbook of Research Methods in Public Administration, Second Edition*, edited by Kaifeng Yang and Gerald J. Miller
135. *Social and Economic Control of Alcohol: The 21st Amendment in the 21st Century*, edited by Carole L. Jurkiewicz and Murphy J. Painter
136. *Government Public Relations: A Reader*, edited by Mordecai Lee
137. *Handbook of Military Administration*, edited by Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson
138. *Disaster Management Handbook*, edited by Jack Pinkowski
139. *Homeland Security Handbook*, edited by Jack Pinkowski
140. *Health Capital and Sustainable Socioeconomic Development*, edited by Patricia A. Cholewka and Mitra M. Motlagh
141. *Handbook of Administrative Reform: An International Perspective*, edited by Jerri Killian and Niklas Eklund
142. *Government Budget Forecasting: Theory and Practice*, edited by Jinping Sun and Thomas D. Lynch
143. *Handbook of Long-Term Care Administration and Policy*, edited by Cynthia Massie Mara and Laura Katz Olson
144. *Handbook of Employee Benefits and Administration*, edited by Christopher G. Reddick and Jerrell D. Cogburn
145. *Business Improvement Districts: Research, Theories, and Controversies*, edited by Göktuğ Morçöl, Lorlene Hoyt, Jack W. Meek, and Ulf Zimmermann
146. *International Handbook of Public Procurement*, edited by Khi V. Thai
147. *State and Local Pension Fund Management*, Jun Peng
148. *Contracting for Services in State and Local Government Agencies*, William Sims Curry
149. *Understanding Research Methods: A Guide for the Public and Nonprofit Manager*, Donijo Robbins
150. *Labor Relations in the Public Sector, Fourth Edition*, Richard Kearney
151. *Performance-Based Management Systems: Effective Implementation and Maintenance*, Patria de Lancer Julnes
152. *Handbook of Governmental Accounting*, edited by Frederic B. Bogui
153. *Bureaucracy and Administration*, edited by Ali Farazmand

*Available Electronically*

*Principles and Practices of Public Administration*, edited by Jack Rabin, Robert F. Munzenrider, and Sherrie M. Bartell

PublicADMINISTRATIONnetBASE



# **Bureaucracy and Administration**

**Edited by**

**Ali Farazmand**

*Florida Atlantic University  
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, U.S.A.*



**CRC Press**

Taylor & Francis Group

Boca Raton London New York

---

CRC Press is an imprint of the  
Taylor & Francis Group, an **informa** business



CRC Press  
Taylor & Francis Group  
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300  
Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742

© 2009 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC  
CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

No claim to original U.S. Government works

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper  
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

International Standard Book Number: 978-0-8247-2369-9 (Hardback)

This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint.

Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers.

For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access [www.copyright.com](http://www.copyright.com) (<http://www.copyright.com/>) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged.

**Trademark Notice:** Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

---

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

---

Bureaucracy and administration / Ali Farazmand, editor.  
p. cm. -- (Public administration and public policy ; v. 153)  
Includes bibliographical references and index.  
ISBN 978-0-8247-2369-9 (hard back : alk. paper)  
1. Bureaucracy. 2. Public administration. I. Farazmand, Ali. II. Title. III. Series.

JF1351.H266 2009  
351--dc22

2009015979

---

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at  
<http://www.taylorandfrancis.com>

and the CRC Press Web site at  
<http://www.crcpress.com>

---

# Dedication

---

To My Son, Cyrus



---

# Contents

---

Preface .....	xv
Editor .....	xix
Contributors .....	xxi
<b>1 Bureaucracy, Administration, and Politics: An Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
ALI FARAZMAND	
<b>SECTION I: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS ON BUREAUCRACY</b>	
<b>2 Bureaucracy and the Administrative System of Ancient World-State Persian Empire: Implications for Modern Administration.....</b>	<b>19</b>
ALI FARAZMAND	
<b>3 Indian Legacy of Bureaucracy and Administration .....</b>	<b>53</b>
V. SUBRAMANIAM	
<b>4 Bureaucracy in the Ottoman–Turkish Polity.....</b>	<b>65</b>
METIN HEPER AND A. ÜMIT BERKMAN	
<b>SECTION II: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES ON BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS</b>	
<b>5 Bureaucratic Links between Administration and Politics.....</b>	<b>85</b>
FRED W. RIGGS	
<b>6 A Parabolic Theory of Bureaucracy or Max Weber through the Looking Glass .....</b>	<b>111</b>
GERALD E. CAIDEN	
<b>7 Building Blocks toward a Theory of Public Administration.....</b>	<b>125</b>
GERALD E. CAIDEN	
<b>8 Bureaucracy, Democracy, and the New Public Management.....</b>	<b>139</b>
STEVEN G. KOVEN	
<b>9 Bureaucracy: A Profound Puzzle for Presidentialism .....</b>	<b>155</b>
FRED W. RIGGS	

**10 Bureaucracy and Modernization.....203**  
HARRY M. JOHNSON

**SECTION III: BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT**

**11 Bureaucracy and the Environmental Crisis: A Comparative Perspective.....221**  
RENU KHATOR

**12 The Role of Efficiency in Bureaucratic Study .....239**  
HINDY LAUER SCHACHTER

**13 Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness, Response, and the Politics Administration  
Dichotomy .....253**  
MICHAEL J. BRENNAN AND STEVEN G. KOVEN

**14 Exit Surveys: Are They Worth the Effort?.....269**  
CAROLE L. JURKIEWICZ, ROBERT A. GIACALONE, AND STEPHEN B. KNOUSE

**15 Training Local Environmental Governance Leaders: A Case of International  
Cooperation .....279**  
ITOKO SUZUKI

**16 Ethical Foundations .....293**  
O. GLENN STAHL

**17 Public Service Ethics and Professionalism: A Primer for Public Officials .....303**  
ALI FARAZMAND

**SECTION IV: BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS  
IN THE AMERICAS**

**18 The American President as a Bureaucratic Leader.....321**  
ROBERT E. DEWHIRST

**19 The Globalization of Public Budgeting in the United States .....327**  
PATRICK FISHER AND DAVID C. NICE

**20 The Wright Brothers' Contract: Lessons in Ambiguity and Bureaucracy .....337**  
ROBERT E. LLOYD

**21 At the Intersection of Bureaucracy, Democracy, and the Media: The Effective  
Agency Spokesperson .....351**  
MORDECAI LEE

**22 Evolution and Revolution: Enduring Patterns and the Transformation  
of Latin American Bureaucracy.....363**  
JACK W. HOPKINS

**SECTION V: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN EUROPE**

- 23** Running the Bureaucratic State: Administration in France.....381  
 DAVID WILSFORD
- 24** Greek Bureaucracy and Public Administration: The Persistent Failure  
 of Reform.....395  
 CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS AND ANDREW C. DANOPOULOS

**SECTION VI: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

- 25** Globalization, Decentralization, and Public Entrepreneurship: Reorienting  
 Bureaucracy in the People’s Republic of China..... 409  
 PETER H. KOEHN
- 26** Coping with Enhanced Administration: Estimating the Effectiveness of Public  
 Service Training in Hong Kong .....433  
 LINA VYAS
- 27** Evaluation of Public Service Training in India: Providers,  
 Consumers, and Outcome .....449  
 AHMED SHAFIQL HUQUE AND LINA VYAS
- 28** Administrative Challenges of Population Policy: Lessons from  
 China and India .....465  
 PAUL C. TROGEN AND LON S. FELKER
- 29** Big Businessmen at the Helm: The Politics of Conflict of Interest  
 in Thailand .....483  
 BIDHYA BOWORNWATHANA
- 30** Sociopolitical Structure and Public Administration in India .....495  
 R.B. JAIN
- 31** Problems of Civil Service Reforms and Development in Bangladesh:  
 Causes and Remedies .....529  
 M. RAFIQL ISLAM

**SECTION VII: BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCRATIZATION, CHANGE  
 AND REVOLUTION**

- 32** Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization in Ancient and  
 Modern Iran ..... 545  
 ALI FARAZMAND
- 33** Bureaucracy, Agrarian Reforms, and Regime Maintenance Politics:  
 The Case of Prerevolutionary Iran .....563  
 ALI FARAZMAND

<b>34</b>	<b>Bureaucracy and Reform in the Arab World</b> .....	<b>583</b>
	JAMIL E. JREISAT	
<b>35</b>	<b>Bureaucracy and Revolution: The Case of Iran</b> .....	<b>597</b>
	ALI FARAZMAND	
	<b>Index</b> .....	<b>615</b>

---

# Preface

---

Fifteen years have passed since the publication of the first edition of the *Handbook of Bureaucracy* in 1994. Given that this period has been marked by an intense global movement of antibureaucracy, antigovernment, and antipublic service and administration, the following questions are quite natural: Why do we need another book on bureaucracy now? Does bureaucracy still matter? The answer to these challenging questions is that despite this intense negative attitude toward bureaucracy, global interest in the first edition of this book has been overwhelming. The book has reached more libraries, university classrooms, and institutional leadership desks than was initially expected. What accounts for such an overwhelming success of the first edition, and the continuing demand for an updated new edition, is itself a remarkable question that all of us in the field of social sciences need to consider, understand, and appreciate.

The world has become more complex, globalization of corporate capitalism and cultures as well as governance systems has become more rapid and widespread, and the tasks of public governance and administration have become more numerous and demand more institutionally tested solutions and ideas to meet the increasing challenges of the age of hyper-uncertainties. Strategic adaptation to global challenges of the age is an essential task for modern governance, but not all new and untested ideas can offer solutions to complex problems that require established institutional solutions. Bureaucracy is one of those ancient institutions that, despite many negative connotations attached to it, has persisted with durability, dependability, and stability—it has been tested for millennia.

Despite all innovations and alternative organizational systems, nothing has replaced bureaucracy as the “core of government and large scale corporate governance systems.” Bureaucracy has survived millennia of changes, turbulence, and adversarial situations, and it will continue to survive because there is no real replacement for it. The overwhelming response to the first volume of this book has been due to the following factors: the need for up-to-date knowledge and information on institutions of government and governance; the interest in what and how things are done elsewhere so comparative knowledge can benefit from it; the essence of bureaucracy as still the core organization of government; the beauty of an impartially balanced bureaucratic organization as the core institution of governance and administration; and the mere fact that bureaucracy may and can serve as a “mothership” of expertise and a springboard to expand into and cover a wider and broader scope of governance activities and functions with diverse organizational subsystems such as network and collaborative or partnership-based organizational arrangements.

Bureaucracy persists because it is instrumental to maintenance, continuity, and enhancement of both capitalist and socialist systems; an instrumental arm of public governance and administration in both its civilian and its military-security forms.



Bureaucracy persists because nothing replaces its structural system and because it offers stable, durable, and dependable institutional arrangement for governance and administration in both public and private or nonprofit sectors, locally, nationally, and globally. Look around and you will find there is no single government or large-scale corporation that is not bureaucratically organized, at least in terms of essential functions. Besides this assertion, we must also recognize that the rapidly changing time of globalization demands swift structural and process adaptations to meet new and changing challenges. Bureaucracy also needs to adapt and respond to the changing dynamics of the world; with a sound leadership, it can and must do it. Bureaucracy can and should regain its age-old status as a noble and able institution of sound public governance and administration. Although it can also be abused as an instrument of repression, control, and evil doing, as history has shown, it is the political leadership that makes use of bureaucracy, good or evil. Politics and politicians change all the time, but it is the bureaucracy and public administrative capacity that always provide continuity, durability, dependability, and institutional stability.

The new edition of the book has a new title *Bureaucracy and Administration* thanks to the positive suggestions and comments from numerous readers, students, and scholars who expressed an interest in this title. The new title also reflects a new generic connotation of “administration” as opposed to public administration, as administration takes multiple forms of nonprofit, non-governmental, and private business, as well as public administration. This is a more suitable title to reach a broader and wider audience of readers, scholars, teachers, and officials and managers in all these sectors. The new title, being different from that of the first edition, will make this book a brand new one in the market. The book is comprehensive yet succinct, and up to date, reflecting the dramatic changes of the last 15 years in governance, business, and public administration. It is a little less voluminous than the first edition, as several chapters of the original volume have been removed for they are outdated and redundant, and a few new chapters have been included. The result is a 35 chapter book full of in-depth analysis and discussion of issues, subjects, theories, concepts, and viewpoints that benefit a wide range of audiences with policy implications.

This book is organized into seven parts and 35 chapters, including a rather lengthy introduction that sets a theoretical framework for the book. Part I “Historical Antecedents on Bureaucracy” has three extensive chapters. These chapters contain a wealth of information on the great ancient civilizations and their administrative traditions, achievements, and contributions to modern administration and governance systems. Select civilizations of Persia, India, and the Ottomans have been covered with great expertise by Ali Farazmand, V. Subramaniam, Metin Heper, and Ümit Berkman, respectively, and describe a long period of history from the earliest time, from the exemplary bureaucracy of Persia to the late nineteenth century bureaucracy of the Ottomans.

Part II “Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives on Bureaucracy and Bureaucratic Politics” contains six chapters by Fred Riggs, Gerald Caiden, Steve Koven, and Harry Johnson that covers a wide range of key conceptual frameworks on bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics, and administrative theory. Analyses from political science, sociology, and public administration are presented by leading scholars in these disciplines. Part III “Bureaucracy and Public Management” contains seven chapters and covers diverse topics by Renu Khator, Hindy Schachter, Michael Brennan and Steven Koven, Carole Jurkiewicz and associates, Itoko Suzuki, Glenn Stahl, and Ali Farazmand.

Part IV “Bureaucracy and Bureaucratic Politics in the Americas” consists of five chapters on diverse issues related to bureaucracy and administration from North America to South/Latin America. These chapters are written by Robert Dewhirst, Patrick Fisher and David Nice, Robert Lloyd; Mordecai Lee, and Jack Hopkins, whose expertise provides readers with a wealth of information on policy and administrative implications. Part V “Bureaucratic Politics in Europe” consists of two chapters by David Wilsford, and Constantine Danopoulos and Andrew Danopoulos.

Part VI “Bureaucratic Politics in Asia and the Middle East,” with seven chapters by Peter Koehn, Lina Vyas, Ahmed Huque and Lina Vyas, Paul Trogen and Lon Felker, Bidhya Bowornwathana, R. B. Jain, Rafiqul Islam, Jamil E. Jreisat, discusses a wide range of topics and issues. Finally, Part VII “Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization, Change and Revolution” consists of three chapters. Here, a focused analysis of bureaucracy, change, reform, and revolution with implications for future governance and administration, both public and private business, is presented. Additionally, an index as well as a list of contributors are provided.

We hope that scholars, teachers, researchers, students, official policy makers, administrators, and managers of a wide range of public, private, and nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations, as well as general readers will find the book useful in understanding and advancing the knowledge of the nature, role, and function of bureaucracy as one of the most important institutions of sound governance and administration all over the world. Bureaucracy has been around for millennia and will continue to be with us in the future too because, as an instrument of rule and governance, it is crucial in both civilian and security-military forms to the maintenance and enhancement of social and political systems of both capitalism and socialism, or a mix of the two systems worldwide.

This book has taken a little longer to complete than initially planned. Numerous changes took place from the time of its design through its completion. Some contributing authors have passed away but they will always be remembered; especially the two long term leaders of the field, Fred Riggs and Ferrel Heady. I would like to first thank all the contributors whose patience has humbled me along the way; they are the ones who will be happy to see this book come to fruition. Second, I would like to thank the publisher, Taylor & Francis, especially the people involved in the project, namely Richard O’Hanley, Raymond O’Connor (who recently passed away), project editor, Rachael Panthier, and other members of the Taylor & Francis team namely Theresa Delforn, Maura May, Karen Schober and Jessica Vakili; and Perundevi from SPi India. They have been very cooperative and patient during the rather time-consuming process of publishing this book; I am grateful to all of them. Finally, I would like to thank my son, Cyrus, who has also endured my preoccupation with this project and spared the time I could have spent with him on the baseball fields, tennis courts, or fishing in the Florida waters.

**Ali Farazmand**  
*Boca Raton, Florida*



---

# Editor

---

**Ali Farazmand** is a professor of public administration at Florida Atlantic University, where he teaches graduate MPA and PhD courses in intellectual development of public administration; organization theory and behavior, organizational change and public management, globalization, personnel and labor relations, bureaucratic politics and administrative theory, ethics, and executive leadership. Professor Farazmand received a BA in business administration from Tehran University in 1971; an MS in educational administration from Syracuse University in 1978; a MPA in public administration in 1978; and a PhD with distinction in public administration from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, New York, in 1982.

Farazmand's research and publications include over 18 authored and edited books and handbooks, and over 100 journal articles and book chapters. A select list include *The State, Bureaucracy, and Revolution* (Praeger, 1989); *Public Enterprise Management* (Greenwood, 1997); *Modern Systems of Government* (Sage, 1997); *Handbook of Bureaucracy* (Marcel Dekker, 1994); *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*, 2nd Ed. (Marcel Dekker/Taylor & Francis, 2001); *Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management* (Marcel Dekker/Taylor & Francis, 2001); *Privatization or Reform* (Praeger, 2001); *Modern Organizations: Theory and Practice*, 2nd Ed. (Praeger, 2002); *Sound Governance* (Praeger, 2004); *Strategic Public Personnel Administration* in two volumes (Praeger, 2007); *Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration* (Taylor & Francis, 2007); and *Crisis and Emergency Management* (Taylor & Francis, 2010). He is also the author of the following books: *Public Administration in a Globalized World* (Routledge); *The Age of Globalization: Governance, Administration, and Transformation* (Routledge); *Transformation of the American Administrative State*; and *Revitalizing Public Administration: A Global Strategic Approach*.

Farazmand is an internationally renowned scholar, and is also an active member of several international professional associations that include the American Political Science Association (APSA), the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration, the Eastern Regional Organization of Public Administration (EROPA), and the International Studies Association (ISA), International Political Association (IPSA), Midwest Political Science Association (MWPSA), to name just a few. He is also the founding editor-in-chief of the new globally refereed journal, *Public Organization Review: A Global Journal* (Springer), now in its sixth volume. Further, he has served as an academic consultant/advisor to the United Nations on governance, public administration, and globalization and administration, preparing and presenting discussion papers at UN-sponsored international conferences worldwide.



---

# Contributors

---

**A. Ümit Berkman**

Faculty of Management  
Bilkent University  
Ankara, Turkey

**Bidhya Bowornwathana**

Department of Public Administration  
Faculty of Political Science  
Chulalongkorn University  
Bangkok, Thailand

**Michael J. Brennan**

School of Urban and Public Affairs  
University of Louisville  
Louisville, Kentucky

**Gerald E. Caiden**

School of Policy, Planning and  
Development  
University of Southern California  
Los Angeles, California

**Andrew C. Danopoulos**

College of Business  
University of Illinois  
Champaign, Illinois

**Constantine P. Danopoulos**

Department of Political Science  
San Jose State University  
San Jose, California

**Robert E. Dewhirst**

Department of Political Science  
Northwest Missouri State University  
Maryville, Missouri

**Ali Farazmand**

School of Public Administration and  
Governance  
Florida Atlantic University  
Fort Lauderdale, Florida

**Lon S. Felker**

Department of Political Science  
East Tennessee State University  
Johnson City, Tennessee

**Patrick Fisher**

Department of Political Science  
Seton Hall University  
South Orange, New Jersey

**Robert A. Giacalone**

Department of Human Resource Management  
Center for Ethics and Organizational Integrity  
Temple University  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

**Metin Heper**

Faculty of Economics,  
Administrative and Social Sciences  
Bilkent University  
Ankara, Turkey

**Jack W. Hopkins (deceased)**

Bloomington, Illinois

**Ahmed Shafiqul Huque**

Department of Political Science  
McMaster University  
Ontario, Canada

**M. Rafiqul Islam**

Department of Peace and Conflict  
Studies  
University of Dhaka  
Dhaka, Bangladesh

**R.B. Jain (retired)**

Former Professor of Political Science  
University of Delhi  
Delhi, India

**Harry M. Johnson (deceased)**

Urbana, Illinois

**Jamil E. Jreisat**

Department of Government and  
International Affairs  
University of South Florida  
Tampa, Florida

**Carole L. Jurkiewicz**

E. J. Ourso College of Business  
Administration  
Public Administration Institute  
Louisiana State University  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

**Renu Khator**

Department of Political Science  
University of Houston  
Houston, Texas

**Stephen B. Knouse**

Department of Management  
B. I. Moody III College of Business  
Administration  
University of Louisiana at Lafayette  
Lafayette, Louisiana

**Peter H. Koehn**

Department of Political Science  
The University of Montana  
Missoula, Montana

**Steven G. Koven**

School of Urban and Public Affairs  
University of Louisville  
Louisville, Kentucky

**Mordecai Lee**

Professor of Governmental Affairs  
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

**Robert E. Lloyd**

U.S. Department of State  
Fort Lauderdale, Florida

**David C. Nice**

Department of Political Science  
Washington State University  
Pullman, Washington

**Fred W. Riggs (deceased)**

Honolulu, Hawaii

**Hindy Lauer Schachter**

School of Management  
New Jersey Institute of Technology  
Newark, New Jersey

**O. Glenn Stahl (retired)**

Arlington, Virginia

**V. Subramaniam (deceased)**

Ontario, Canada

**Itoko Suzuki**

Department of Global Local Studies  
Kobe Women's University  
Kobe City, Japan

**Paul C. Trogen**

Department of Political Science  
East Tennessee State University  
Johnson City, Tennessee

**Lina Vyas**

Department of Public & Social  
Administration  
City University of Hong Kong  
Kowloon, Hong Kong

**David Wilsford**

Institute for American Universities  
Aix-en-Provence, France

# *Chapter 1*

---

# **Bureaucracy, Administration, and Politics: An Introduction**

---

Ali Farazmand

## **CONTENTS**

1.1 Introduction .....	1
1.2 Bureaucracy and History: Civilization and Administration .....	2
1.3 Theoretical Framework .....	4
1.3.1 Meanings of Bureaucracy .....	5
1.3.2 Theoretical Perspectives .....	5
1.3.3 Bureaucratic Evil .....	6
1.4 Bureaucratic Politics and Democratic Theory .....	7
1.5 Bureaucracy and Development .....	10
1.6 Bureaucracy, Change, and Revolution .....	12
1.7 Conclusion: Bureaucracy Persists, Beyond Weber .....	13
References .....	14

## **1.1 Introduction**

Bureaucracy is one of the oldest institutions of government and administration in history. As such, bureaucracy and administration are as old as human civilization, one promoting the other, hence an intimate relationship between civilization and administration. In fact, as an institution of government and administration, bureaucracy has its roots in the ancient world, playing a formidable role in the administration of great empires and civilizations, namely Persian, Chinese, and Roman, with traditions that provided continuity and order to many civilizations and their administrative



systems for several millennia. Why study bureaucracy now? Because there has never been a true alternative to bureaucracy; no organization will ever totally replace it.

The twentieth century saw massive growth and development of bureaucracy with the rise of new nation-states, the end of official colonialism, and expansion and competition of the two ideological systems of capitalism and socialism across the globe. The welfare state in capitalist systems and the socialist state under socialism expanded their realms of functions beyond the limits, and both expanded a burgeoning bureaucracy beyond any defined scope or domain. At the same time, rising political pressures against bureaucracy grew as citizens, politicians, corporate business leaders, and academics intensified a crusade against bureaucracy, labeling it as undemocratic and unresponsive to people, a trend that began in the 1960s and intensified with the election of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the United States and Britain, respectively. Both led a global crusade—financed and promoted by transworld globalizing corporate elites—against bureaucracy and welfare state administrative systems. Their solution was dismantlement of the welfare administrative systems, and privatizing almost everything that governments have been doing for millennia to private business corporations for profit, in the name of efficiency and public individual choice, an ideology advanced by neoconservative and neoclassical economic theory. The result has been a crisis of order and continuity, chaos and corruption, and much more in governance, government, and public administration (Farazmand, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2007).

Today, the twenty-first century world is undergoing rapid globalization of corporate capitalism, and with the collapse of the world socialist leadership—the Soviet Union—there is a growing global chaos in ethnic, ideological, and political, as well as institutional and economic foundations everywhere, or at least it seems that way. Bureaucracy as an old institution is in a serious crisis everywhere, because its institutional capacity has been eroded to the limit. However, several key questions must be asked here: Is bureaucracy dead? The answer is definitely no. Can bureaucracy disappear? Surely not, as it has always survived through history. Why bureaucracy has survived millennia of political changes and what makes it a formidable institution that never dies in history? These are big questions of scholarly research that, along many more questions, have kept thousands of scholars and researchers busy for at least the last two centuries.

This introductory chapter intends to provide a theoretical framework by addressing a number of key questions, issues, and dimensions of bureaucracy as a social phenomenon in the modern history of governance, administration, politics, and society. What follows include a schematic presentation of bureaucracy in history, bureaucracy as an institution and its theoretical framework, bureaucracy and politics, bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics, bureaucracy and development, bureaucracy and dysfunctions, bureaucracy and change and revolution, bureaucracy and governance and government, bureaucracy and administration, bureaucracy and society, bureaucracy and democracy, and the future of bureaucracy in the age of globalization, and more.

### **1.2 Bureaucracy and History: Civilization and Administration**

While bureaucracy was instrumental in getting things done and assisting in political rule in China, Egypt, and Rome later, the Persian bureaucracy developed and advanced by far to the highest level, so much so that even today scholars analyze its features and learn from its superb advancement. Civilization and administration have lived, progressed, and developed together, one reinforcing the other (Waldo, 1992). Thus, public administration is as old as civilization, with bureaucracy serving as the key institution of governance and administration since the earliest of times. The earliest origin of bureaucracy dates back to about 10,000 years beginning in ancient

Susa, one of the earliest sites of human civilizations in early Iran. Bureaucracy served as an organization of public administration on mass scale, first as part of early Iran and its Elamite empire that gave human history one of the two earliest prototype writing alphabets, the Elamite script—the second being the Sumerian alphabet. Ancient China and India also provided some legacies in administrative development, though the former more centralized and limited and the latter short lived and localized, and both with much less organizational cohesiveness, effectiveness, continuity, and efficiency.

Bureaucracy was also developed elsewhere in two other early civilizations, the Egyptian and much later the Roman. The early civilizations owe much to the formidable role of bureaucracy as an instrument of power, public works implementation, and planning and implementation of monumental works such as the Suez Canal in Egypt under the Persians, the Chinese Walls, and the pyramids of Egypt. Bureaucracy is also credited for its engineers, architects, planners, and administrators who made numerous inventions and innovations in public administration in the Persian Empire, the Sumerian city-state, and Egypt (see Chapter 2 for more details). Although earlier bureaucracies were responsible for massive achievements in huge public projects such as underground irrigation systems (Qanats), roads and communications, and legal systems in early Iran, legal codes and mathematical and medical works in Egypt, and elsewhere, it was the later development of bureaucracy that helped build large-scale administrative systems under Persia and Rome, the two most formidable empires of ancient human history.

Thus, the origin of bureaucracy is traced to the ancient world of Persia, China, and Egypt, and much later to Rome. While other bureaucracies of the ancient world were around, it was the complexity, structure, and effective performance of the Persian bureaucracy that made it world famous, gaining a global reputation of being “second to none in human history” (Olmstead, 1948; Frye, 1975; Cook, 1983). Persian administrators were considered the most able, “excellent administrators” who enjoyed high esteem in society as well as in governance systems. Founded by Cyrus the Great in 559 BC, Achaemenid Persia was the most powerful and largest empire the ancient world had ever seen; it lasted over 230 years, and ruled the known world on the principles of “tolerant governance,” respect for local customs and cultures, freedom of religions and associations, free education, “freedom from slavery,” and a dual organizational structure of centralization and decentralization that allowed maximum flexibility in public administration. For the first time in history, Cyrus the Great abolished slavery through his declaration of the first Universal Human Rights Charter in Babylon on October 29, 537 BC, after conquering Babylon and freeing all slaves and prisoners, including over 45,000 Jews, from Babylonian captivity.

In addition to numerous inventions, innovations, and public landmarks such as the gigantic ceremonial royal palace complex of Persepolis with a one mile in both length and width in Persia, the Persian bureaucracy has also given the world ideas of modern governance and administrative systems (in both East and West), organization theory, administrative ethics, the checkbooks, stock market exchange ideas, individual as well as business taxation, property taxation of both fixed and variable forms, public finance and management, legal administration, massive engineering and communicative expertise through the Postal Pony Express postal system, banking systems, and paved and unpaved royal highways that connected the vast empire from the shores of the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean city of Sardis in the Lydian Satrapy of Persia. We also find some high achievements and contributions from the Chinese civil service bureaucracy and from early Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian bureaucracies, though none was ever as large as the Persian was, and all three ceased to exist as they were subsumed into Media and the Persian World State Empire in the sixth and fifth centuries BC (see Chapter 2 for more details).

Bureaucracy was also instrumental for the massive achievements in huge public works projects in sixteenth and seventeenth century Persia under the centralized Safavid Empire and equally under the Ottoman Empire well into the twentieth century until its end. Modern bureaucracy in Europe began to develop since the mid-nineteenth century, first in Prussia and Germany, then in France and England, spreading elsewhere though an earlier version of colonial bureaucratic order had already expanded beyond home countries and was well established in Asia, Latin America, and North America by the Spaniards, British, German, Dutch, and Portuguese empires. Industrialization and centralization once again was accompanied by a needed centralized bureaucracy in these countries.

Colonial bureaucracies were rigid in character, rule bound, exploitative, elitist, and repressive in service of the absolutist monarchies in Europe. Occasionally, mass revolts against the brutal bureaucracies of these repressive regimes were organized by the oppressed to replace such orders with humane and more inclusive systems of administration. We find examples of this sort in the French Revolution, then in the Paris Commune of 1871 in France, led by the urban proletariat and the oppressed against the brutal and corrupt bureaucratic system of the French absolute monarchy, the revolutions of 1848 beginning in France and spreading to almost all over Europe, and others. The American independence movement as well as numerous revolts and revolutions in the North America and Latin America covered the entire period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under colonial rules. Asia and Africa suffered a continuous military–bureaucratic rule under colonialism until 1950s, when most nations broke the yoke of colonial repression though the military still rules.

Did bureaucracy disappear during postcolonialism? No, not at all. The most important legacies of colonialism have been military–bureaucracy and economic dependency that colonial powers left behind, keeping these countries firmly under Western control.

Modern bureaucracy of the Western world advanced with more sophistication, and during the twentieth century, bureaucracy reached its height of power, expertise, and institutional capacities everywhere, prompting numerous scholarly studies on the role, nature, and functions of bureaucracy worldwide. Bureaucracy during the twentieth century played a formidable role in public governance and administration and in business administration, leading to the rise of large-scale corporate organizations and multinational corporations everywhere. Bureaucracy was responsible for many achievements in public sector management of the economy and society, domestic and international governance, and a lot more. However, as noted earlier, by the late twentieth century, bureaucracy came under vicious attacks from many directions, resulting in its diminution in institutional capacity and legitimacy as an instrument of government and administration. Has bureaucracy disappeared, as a result? No, not at all. Bureaucracy has survived millennia of changes, and it will persist. However, its character and functions have been altered significantly—more on this later.

### 1.3 Theoretical Framework

At least three key points catch our attention. One is the meaning of the term bureaucracy, second is the theoretical perspectives of bureaucracy, and third is the issue of bureaucratic politics. There is a vast literature on the second and third points, with implications and scholarly studies reaching monumental weight.

### **1.3.1 Meanings of Bureaucracy**

Bureaucracy has at least three major connotations or meanings: One is the traditional view of the term as defined by Weber and characterized as a Weberian model, referring to any organization of modern society with several ideal characteristics such as unity of command, clear line of hierarchy, division of labor and specialization, record keeping, and merit system for recruitment and promotion, and finally, rules and regulations to govern relationship and organizational performance. This was Weber's characterization as an ideal-type bureaucracy for policy development and implementation (Weber, 1947). To Weber, bureaucracy in modern society is intimately linked, and works together as a necessary organizational instrument, with capitalism. With the growth of government, society, and public sectors, bureaucracy assumes bigger roles due to its unique position of expertise and order-oriented structure, and it is almost impossible to control it. Bureaucratization is an inevitable process that expands and reaches everywhere. Unless controlled, bureaucracy has a tendency to "overtower" society and rule it. With this notion, bureaucracy also means military–security bureaucracies. Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy is the most efficient form of organization for the implementation of policy and getting things done as a machinery of governance. Therefore, his ideal model opens a strategic methodological "comparative approach" in governance and organization theory.

The second meaning of bureaucracy refers to any large organization or institution structured with missions, functions, and processes and with significant impact on its internal and external environments. This is the meaning that Waldo (1992) also adopted, a meaning that is broader and applicable to all fairly large organizations, private as well as public, modern or ancient. In fact long before Waldo raised this view, it was already studied, mentioned, and applied in social science inquiries. Ancient Persian bureaucracy is often noted as the most efficient and effective organization of public administration presenting many of the Weberian ideal characteristics. Therefore, when speaking of federal bureaucracy, or local bureaucracy, this meaning often applies. While Weber's ideal type is criticized for being rigid, inflexible, and not realistic, the second meaning does not make any normative claims though by performance it may produce normative reputations.

The third meaning of bureaucracy, though not much mentioned in academe, is the one sociologists and political scientists refer to as "dynamic" and extends to military and security bureaucratic institutions of government and governance in public and private sectors. Although there is a hazard of making arbitrary distinctions among these three meanings, as they overlap significantly, such distinctions may be useful for a better understanding of the term bureaucracy. We may also add a key feature of all bureaucracies—no matter what meaning we apply—and that is the fact that all bureaucracies are parts of the constitutive elements of the broader social systems—the society, the government, and the organization of economy and culture or religion. Bureaucracies, like any other organizations, are part of, and function within, the broader societal systems that expand and constrain their environments and performance. The vast literature on bureaucracy opens up numerous topics and areas of inquiry in social sciences, a task beyond the capacity and scope of this short introductory chapter.

### **1.3.2 Theoretical Perspectives**

Generally speaking, three theoretical perspectives on bureaucracy are worth considering for analytical purposes. The first views bureaucracy positively as the machinery of government, a necessary

and essential system to organize and run the government affairs in both domestic and international relations. This view considers bureaucracy as an integral part of government and governance system, an unavoidable structural form of organization. Recognizing its shortcomings and problems, it views bureaucracy as the best form for effectiveness, order and stability, and an executive arm of government with no equal matches. It reminds everyone of its impartiality in rule application, its merit-based decisions and professionalized performance, its stability and continuity against all disorders, and its durability and expertise, as well as its vast capacities to perform large-scale tasks no other organizations can (Weber, 1947; Parsons, 1951; Goodsell, 1985). These and other proponents of bureaucracy often remind us of the ancient Persian bureaucracy that was the most efficient and most effective organization of administration of the vast Achaemenid World State Empire (559–330 BC). This perspective has also tended to expand the notion of bureaucracy into a concept of “administrative state,” an institutionalized administrative system with organizational and professional capacities to manage an economy, a society, and its public affairs and serve broad-based public interests—a professional, bureaucratic–administrative system that is also political and does good (Waldo, 1948, 1992).

The second perspective views bureaucracy in negative terms: rigid, slow, pathological, dysfunctional, obstacle, stifling, dehumanizing, and objectifying human and social life. This view is also critical of bureaucracy for being undemocratic and unaccountable to electorate citizens in democracies. Critics of bureaucracy come from all walks of life: from sociology to political science, organization theory, economics, and public administration (Merton, 1957; Mosher, 1968; Hummel, 1976). Their solution is not only breaking bureaucracy and privatizing government and governance functions—through whole-scale privatization, marketization, commercialization, contracting out, and outsourcing—but they also want to keep the core of the bureaucracy in government to steer, to make and lead wars, to grant contracts to private sectors, and to promote corporate and business interests. Typical of this theoretical perspective is the contemporary neoclassical and neoliberal economic and political theorists of “public choice,” and the new public management (NPM) movements.

The third perspective on bureaucracy is a more realistic and more balanced one. Here bureaucracy is viewed in its positive and negative ways, like a coin having two sides that represent good and bad. Literature on this perspective is also heavy, with Waldo reminding us of the utility of bureaucracy as an institution of governance and public administration, with positive features on the one side and negative on the other (Waldo, 1992; Peters, 2001). Look around the world, you will find no government that is not bureaucratically organized in its executive functions, and there is no real alternative to bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is good when it is balanced in its functioning that serves broad-based public interests, free from corruption, repressions, and rigidity. It is bad when it serves specific interest groups—including itself—and against other broad-based interests of the society. An example of this sort is a bureaucracy inviting or joining a military dictatorship and works against the popular demands of the society, civil society, and racial and economic class interests.

### **1.3.3 Bureaucratic Evil**

Bureaucracy becomes ugly and evil when it turns into a full-scale pathological, dysfunctional, and repressive instrument of exploitation, repression, and genocide. Here, bureaucracy—civilian, military, and security—becomes an evil doer and an instrument of evil against good. Examples include Nazi concentration camps against intelligentsia, socialists, intellectuals, Jews, and anyone questioning the military occupation of other nations; the Apartheid regime’s bureaucracy acting

against the majority black population; the colonial bureaucracies in colonies; and any invading and occupational government bureaucracy (military and civilian) that subjugates a territory or nation and its people into objects of repressions and exploitation (Iraq), refugees, and virtual slavery on religious, political and ideological, and ethnic or racist grounds (Guantanamo prison system).

The bloody military coup d'état in 1973 in Chile under General Pinochet, the CIA-led military coup d'état of 1953 under the Shah of Iran, and the military invasions and occupations of other nations by foreign forces are just a few examples of bureaucratic evil. At present, the world is witnessing several of these ugly or evil bureaucratic faces. Bureaucracy becomes dysfunctional when its main goals, mission, and functions of serving broad-based public interests are replaced with hidden, behind-the-scenes and procedures, bribery and corruption, collecting money and other privileges in exchange for select services, dragging feet when the poor and underclass is being served, and engaging in activities that are deemed illegal, corrupt, and unethical.

Did Nazi bureaucrats engage in administrative evil? If yes, are American bureaucrats—from top generals to petty officers and the Blackwater Corporation performing military–mercenary and security jobs—doing evil things in occupied Iraq? Does this question also apply to all other government forces invading and occupying other nations or territories? These are key questions of bureaucratic evil deserving investigation and empirical study.

## **1.4 Bureaucratic Politics and Democratic Theory**

Bureaucratic politics may mean different things to different people. However, generally it refers to a wide range of bureaucratic behaviors, roles, and functions. At least five perspectives or viewpoints explain bureaucratic politics, in their broadest sense, with implications for democratic and administrative theories.

One is the “politics of bureaucracy” with a multitude of its own variants, for example, bureaucracy in policy making versus strict implementation, bureaucracy as a distributional and redistributional force in the budgetary process, bureaucracy as a dominant military ruler, and so on. Here, there is a constant call for “controlling the bureaucracy” by democratic institutions, a cry that complains against bureaucratic tendency to stifle democracy and individual freedom. Its solution is privatization and elected officials in charge. What it does not consider in its perspective is the constructive role of bureaucracy in providing consistency, vertical organizational accountability, order and stability, and professionalism and impartiality in the wake of competing partisan and different sectarian sentiments. But bureaucracy can also engage in various degrees of “bureaucratism,” a phenomenon through which self-serving bureaucrats engage in abusing the power position they enjoy and stifle or undermine constructive behavior in government or society (Farzmand, 1989). Bureaucratism is a political and dysfunctional behavior displayed by bureaucracy and must be prevented through reforms, training, and development of its personnel.

The second perspective of bureaucratic politics is the “the political economy” of bureaucracy, performing a role in the service of specific class or group interests. The politics and economics of bureaucracy therefore cover the external role it plays in society—economically and politically enhancing certain classes or groups against others—and in its internal dynamics, promoting individual personalities, positions, and power centers toward specific interest group or class goals, including its own self-serving goals. The political economy perspective comes primarily from Karl Marx, whose view of bureaucracy is generally negative and exploitative, and considers bureaucracy as an instrument of class rule in service of those in dominant class positions in society—e.g., capitalist bourgeoisie and the socialist state in reverse. According to Marx (1951, 1966), bureaucracy in

capitalism is a circle no one can escape from—all are enslaved by this repressive institutional organization that is organized to serve one goal—enhancing the ruling capitalist class at the expense of the working classes. Bureaucracy also benefits from this as it perpetuates its own realm of control and manipulation, but cannot fool the ruling class elite because its own well-being is intimately linked to that class interests, and it becomes parasitic as it grows bigger.

The third perspective views bureaucratic politics in its distinct administrative service delivery, performance of large-scale achievements through its massive professionalized capacities. Judging this perspective is based on criteria of mass performance management: building and managing public works, bridges, and highways; mobilizing forces in the wake of crises and emergencies; coordinating and competing with adversarial forces in crises; coordinating inter-governmental relations; constructing such historical monuments as the Egyptian Pyramids under Pharaohs and the colossal Persepolis Royal Place Complex as well as the Suez Canal under the Persian Empire by the able Persian bureaucracy. Today, the administrative function and performance of bureaucracy must also be judged in its quality of efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and timeliness, as well as in its service delivery, adaptive, and advancing strategies, all away from military functions, but including security and order functions as these functions distinguish may gain a good or bad reputation for the bureaucracy. The role of bureaucracy in “development” is another feature of administrative function. However, a bureaucracy heavily entangled in security and control orientation is no longer a healthy functioning bureaucracy in the service of broad-based public interests.

The fourth perspective, therefore, is related to the political economy as well, and it is the “system maintenance and system enhancement” role of the bureaucracy in modern society. All political systems are concerned about their maintenance and tend to defend themselves against system challengers, whether democracy or dictatorship, open or closed. Yet a highly politically oriented bureaucracy acting predominantly in the service of system maintenance and enhancement is fragile, repressive, and instrumental in encouraging a growing dictatorship that erodes all institutions of society, including the regime in power, its own organizational legitimacy, and position in society. No one would trust the repressive bureaucracy of the post-1953 bloody military coup d’*état* in Iran that led to the Shah’s military–bureaucratic dictatorship for the next 25 years. Similarly, no one would trust the bureaucracy under the dictatorship of General Pinochet in Chile, or of Somoza in Nicaragua, and Marcos in the Philippines.

A bureaucracy heavily involved in system maintenance and enhancement cannot maintain a balance between its administrative functions and security–military functions, therefore degenerating progressively into a repressive instrument of dictatorship. Such an imbalance requires more resources and attention paid to the security and military roles—a quest that has no end in sight and none is sufficient—and yet the more it receives and spends on this role, the deeper it slides into “delegitimacy” and repression, and becomes the subject of hatred and contempt by the general population. In fact, disobedience, disregard of bureaucratic rules, and violation of repressive laws become more prevalent and acceptable popular behavior. This is a historical lesson that all political systems must learn.

Since the 1980s, bureaucracy has become progressively politicized, marginalized in its administrative service delivery, and monstrasized in its military–security roles, an imbalance that has worried even some of the most conservative politicians of the ultraright of the Bush administration, as did many key figures in the Reagan administration. Reagan promised to slash the bureaucracy once elected. Upon his departure, he left a much larger bureaucracy than he inherited and had promised to dismantle. However, what he did was dismantle the “administrative” bureaucracy while “monstrasizing” the security–military character of the federal bureaucracy for

social control and serving the corporate interests and repressive control and administration of the “public,” rather than administration of the “public affairs” (Farazmand, 2008).

George W. Bush has even gone far beyond Reagan’s scope of mindset and expanded the entire federal bureaucracy and government budget or resources into more militaristic, corporatist, and elitist purposes, many of whom he and his vice president Dick Cheney have direct personal business ties with. The service-oriented administrative role of the bureaucracy has been neglected or forgotten, while the corporate–military-oriented bureaucracy has gone monstrous and is bleeding the entire population, all in the name of the “war on terror,” a fear mongering that feeds into the security–military side of the bureaucratic state for social control—the Patriot Act, the telephone spying, and more—and corporatist system enhancement purposes. Again, public administration has been transformed mainly into “administration of the public” rather than the administration of broad-based public affairs and interests.

This is a pattern that has spread among most countries worldwide; the administrative state has been forced into retreat, and the military–security–bureaucratic state has triumphed. Would this result in increased poverty and destitution, injustice and violence, and possible revolutions worldwide? Yes, most likely. In fact, according to all international records, poverty has increased dramatically worldwide, and violence too has increased, not decreased. Such poverty and instability will call for more social control through police, meaning an even stronger military–security bureaucracy at the expense of administrative public service bureaucracy, a vicious circle no one can escape from, but the ruling corporatist elite, including the bureaucratic elite, will be the prime beneficiaries.

The fifth perspective of bureaucratic politics refers to politicization and bureaucratization of polity, society, and of course the bureaucracy and government. Bureaucratization is a political phenomenon, and politicization is an ideological process for indoctrination of the bureaucracy and the people dealing with it. Politicization injects certain ideological, political, and economic values toward specific goals and mission, for example, globalization of corporate globalization or slogans of market-based reforms, and forces members of the bureaucracy and administrative state to conform, adhere to, and enhance the new values; any rejection or resistance would result in unpleasant consequences, including loss of jobs and income, demotion, character assassination, ostracizing, and even security threat to the system. Both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush have pursued aggressive strategies and processes of politicization of the federal bureaucracy—both civilian and military–security—to serve a particular class of corporate–military–security and business elites from whom they both derived tremendous benefits. Both “monstrousized” the federal bureaucracy—military–security—for particular interests at the expense of the broad-based public interests, and both engaged American military bureaucracy in wars of invasions and occupation as an aggressive strategy to establish and expand a “global empire” (Farazmand, 2008, 2009).

Will this strategy backfire at home and abroad? Yes, it already has. At home the economy is in its deepest crisis with a sinking dollar and collapsing financial market, and abroad more and more countries and their people are challenging American global domination, rejecting its dictates by electing more democratic and independent leaders free from external control, and asserting themselves as more independent nations that range from Latin America to the Middle East and Asia, and even Africa. Again, politicized military–security oriented bureaucracies may gain temporarily through their repressive rules, but lose rapidly as the slightest opportunity to freedom develops and people find themselves willing to sacrifice their lives to get their power back. This has happened in many places in the world, and it is happening in United States of America and Europe as well as in many developing countries. Already in Latin America, countries like Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Brazil have freed themselves politically—and some even economically



and militarily—to a great extent, and Mexico was very close to join them in its recent presidential election.

## 1.5 Bureaucracy and Development

What role does bureaucracy play in the development process? What do development and development administration mean? How does bureaucracy behave in face of change and reform? These are important questions for development and public administration. Traditionally, bureaucracy has played a key role in the processes of nation building and institutionalization of governance and administration. As a central and most powerful institution of governance, bureaucracy—by virtue of its organizational, knowledge, and control capacities—has always been instrumental in governing and public administration not only in developing nations, but also in advanced industrialized countries. Bureaucracy is better organized, better controlled, order oriented, has knowledge expertise, possesses large capacities which most organizations do not have, and it receives its annual budget from the treasury allocated by politicians interested in preserving the status quo and expanding their political interests through bureaucratic organizational channels. There is also an intimate relationship between the bureaucratic elite, the business elite, and the political elite whose desire is often linked to the other two—all three form iron triangles in various fields or sectors.

In pursuing development policies, bureaucracy is in a strategic position to formulate and develop policy proposals, submit them to legislatures for approval, manipulate the process, and form alliance in the legislatures as most bureaucratic elite members are also members of political and business elite. Bureaucracy is also involved in implementing policy decisions coming back from the legislature—whether in parliamentary or congressional and presidential systems, like the United States—and then again involved in evaluation and the whole cycle continues. Besides, usually the chief executives of governments are also head bureaucrats themselves, and must rely on bureaucracy to get things done. In terms of development, bureaucracy is also in key positions to devise, develop, and implement developmental projects, programs, and activities, very often slowly and with probable corruption. Again, traditionally, bureaucracy has made nation building and institutionalization of government possible even in countries like the United States where partisan-based corruption and political changes caused inequality and worse injustice and the federal bureaucracy played a major corrective role against incorrect discriminatory practices of the partisan-based governing systems at federal, state, and local levels. Advanced countries like the United States and European nations are still in development from a previous state to a higher state, and many developed nations have areas in rural and urban sectors that look more like those of an underdeveloped and developing nation.

In developing countries, likewise, bureaucracy has played a major role in the development process, but not fast enough, therefore raising a critical question of why bureaucracy is not the best institution to achieve development goals. Actually, this is a critical question and cannot be simplified with a negative answer, as it all depends on the political elite and governing elite being independent and constructive or not, or are they simply pawns or instruments of foreign colonial and imperialist powers or not. Nevertheless, for faster development process many factors are involved, including a cable and development administrative capacity to initiate and implement development projects and programs effectively and efficiently. Bureaucracy is slow in doing this, but it can be complemented by nonbureaucratic and hybrid organizational systems of administration to manage development. Nevertheless, bureaucracy can play that mothership role, steering and guiding

all other institutional systems in the development process. Several chapters in this book address the role of bureaucracy in development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, as noted above, much of the success of development depends on political elite autonomy from external pressures and dictation and on the degree to which indigenous population are involved.

Development requires sound development administration, and development administration requires sound administrative capacity—with institutional, organizational, managerial, and leadership knowledge, skills, and commitments with values that transcend diversity and differences. Administrative development capacity building requires education and training, program development, leadership training, and a host of other capacity developments. Unless internalized and developed with commitments, mere importation of these ideas and expertise cannot work as they become useless in the face of changes and upheavals—simply put, there is no confidence building involved and no leadership to sustain it even if built. Administrative development is essential for achieving national development goals and objectives. Administrative development helps develop development administration capacity, and the latter is essential to national development process and values.

Does bureaucracy have to do all this by itself? The answer is no, and it can empower citizens and engage them in coadministration processes. It can also guide other organizational systems and networks of organizations to do the job it used to do alone—only this way the bureaucracy reduces the burden of functions and responsibilities by helping others to do it, shedding workload and empowering the civil society, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations and promoting empowerment and diffusing responsibilities.

Studies have shown that bureaucracy is not resistant to changes that may serve national development goals, as long as their positions are not lost to outsiders. For example, privatization in some developing countries like Bangladesh has met little or no resistance from bureaucrats, especially from higher civil servants of the bureaucracy, because most of these higher civil servants are usually involved and connected to the privatized business elite. Lower-level bureaucrats tend to be more concerned than the higher-level bureaucrats (see Islam and Farazmand, 2008). Since the 1980s, the worldwide reforms of reinvention and marketization have led to major changes and restructuring of the public sector in developing nations, affecting their bureaucracies in the form of shrinkage, downsizing, and privatization. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) and other programs are externally required of developing nations as conditions for aid from donor countries.

This pattern has spread, unfortunately, among developing countries worldwide under the slogans of government reinvention, market-oriented reforms, privatization, contracting out, and the NPM. Much of this pattern has been imposed upon most countries under the influence or control of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as of the powerful industrialized countries of the West, such as the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. Conditional aid is a weapon traditionally used by these nations of the North in dictating needy countries of the South desperate for external assistance that are vulnerable to external pressure and domination by the Western powers. Bureaucracy is an instrument of power, an institution of government, and an organization of governance to accomplish tasks assigned to it (Farazmand, 1997, 2001).

Thus, genuine development programs under genuine leadership can produce genuine results and achieve intended objectives. Alternatively, bureaucracy may be used as an instrument of rule, keeping development under check and maintain a state of underdevelopment through corruption, repression, and serving foreign interests so that importation of all kinds continues to keep the country dependent on outsiders. In such a process, the bureaucracy also benefits—via corruption and degeneration, and repression—and develops a tendency to “overtower society,” as Weber

noted (1947), or overburden people with a repressive “class rule,” as Lenin (1971) argued. Then development suffers and dies even before having a chance to breathe, as Amsden (2007) argues.

## 1.6 Bureaucracy, Change, and Revolution

How does bureaucracy react to change, reform, and revolution? Can bureaucracy be abolished in the wake of radical change and revolution? What can be done about it? These are fundamental questions concerning change and development, reform and revolution, and effective governance. Lengthy volumes are needed to adequately address these questions. However, briefly noted here, bureaucracy, by nature, is slow to change and adapt, but under right conditions it can be altered to respond to popular demand. Yet, expectations must be modified as the dynamic ingredients for radical change and transformation are scarce in the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy stands for order, specialization, professionalization, and stability; its propensity for change is low and must be supplemented with additional dynamic energy and forces.

Theories of change and reform point to three types of change and reform: top-down, bottom-up, and institutional (Peters, 2001; Farazmand, 2002). Top-down reforms and changes move from the center downward—from the elite and organizational leaders who for some reasons see a need for change and reform. These reasons can be economic, social, and political or cultural, but mainly it is due to political system maintenance reasons, instituting some reform to pacify rebelling forces below and to preserve the system in control. Very often political regimes in trouble come up with some top-down reforms to preserve the system and prevent social revolutions. This happened in Iran under the Shah in the 1960s, when a program of reform that was mostly symbolic and intended to preserve the repressive regime in place backfired later in the 1970s as the world witnessed. It also happened in the United States during the 1960s, when reforms like Great Society programs and urban community development reforms were initiated to calm down the rising racial and working class tensions of the inner cities. Sometimes, such top-down reforms are motivated by genuine motivation of the top leadership to improve the lot of citizens and to adapt to changing conditions of the world—this also happens a lot.

Bottom-up reforms are most pushed upward by popular pressures demanding change and genuine reforms in a system plagued by corruption, repression, or simply inefficiency. Whatever the motivation, bottom-up reforms and changes are most of the time reformist at best and not revolutionary, as once the motivation loses heat, business as usual starts to creep in. Sometimes, however, people are not satisfied by piecemeal changes and push for more radical ones, a process that can make dynamics hard if not impossible to predict or control. Most revolutionary movements lead to this level and progress further till the system is replaced. Reforms do not bring about fundamental changes; they simply make adjustments to preserve the status quo.

Institutional reforms and changes are rather more comprehensive and embrace not just one organization or agency; they embrace a whole spectrum of institutional arrangements of a government or the entire system of an institution, involving its people, culture, and value systems. It is holistic and combines both top-down and bottom-up approaches, but it goes to the heart of the system and institutionalizes the reforms or changes to make sure that those involved accept and take part in the process. Short of being revolutionary changes, most institutional changes are comprehensive and take a long time to accomplish.

Revolutionary changes come as a result of a radical answer to a fundamental question: What to do with the old regime’s bureaucracy so entrenched and supportive of the old order? This is a central question for all revolutionary leaders, from the French to the Russian and the Cuban, Chinese, and the Iranian revolutions. All revolutionary leaders face the same challenging question. During

the Paris Commune of 1871, which Marx called “the civil war in Paris” (Marx, 1966), the revolutionaries totally abolished the old repressive bureaucracy but did not replace it with a new one to defend the gains, while the old regime’s police and military bureaucracy retreated to Versailles for regrouping and returned with more force and massacred all the revolutionaries in 3 months. Observing this tragic experience, Marx concluded that the old regime’s bureaucracy cannot be trusted and must be totally eliminated and replaced with new antibureaucratic organizations to represent and serve people.

But this is easier said than done, as Lenin and Stalin faced the same question less than 40 years later. According to Lenin, bureaucracy cannot be abolished, but its key positions and officials at all levels must be replaced, with the rest of the bureaucracy kept for operational functioning of the day to day life under the new system, until new cadre of bureaucratic officers are trained and prepared to totally transform the old ones (Lenin, 1971). And this they did in the Soviet system, so did the Chinese under Mao, Cuba under Fidel Castro, and Iran under the Islamic Republic, no old bureaucratic elite, key officers, and supervisory officer administrators could be trusted again (Farazmand, 1989).

Both the Russians and the Iranians had learned this bitter lesson: The former from the mistakes of the Paris Commune and the 1905 revolution in Russia, and the latter from the 1953 bloody coup d’ état, and the overthrow of the democratic government of Prime Minister Dr. Mosaddegh by the CIA and the military generals. Dr. Mosaddegh was warned by friends and progressive political parties to replace all key military, police, and civilian commanding officers, but he did not listen and paid a heavy price, the society and people of Iran also paid that price—how naïve and irresponsible! Similarly, President Salvador Allende of Chile was warned to replace key military generals; he did not listen, trusted them, and paid the same price—with the society and people paying the price. Since then, no revolutionary leader has made the same mistake, though international pressure some times make it difficult to carry out such a policy all the way through, but any hesitation would result in severe consequences (Farazmand, 1989).

Revolutions demand revolutionary changes in the machinery of government and administrative systems. Any piecemeal change will do more harm and undermine the new system; its gains must be consolidated. Thus revolutionary changes include replacement of all key and strategic positions and officials, leaving the lower echelons of the bureaucracy in place but closely supervised to perform necessary functions, only to be led by a new administrative elite, having military commanders loyal to the new regime, and absorbing neutral and loyal members of the old system gradually and cautiously into the new bureaucracy. This is what the Iranian revolutionary leaders did by creating antibureaucratic, parallel organizations against the bureaucracy, and staffed the bureaucracy with new revolutionary leaders, as well as mobilizing the entire population of the citizenry into various grassroots organizations to check on the bureaucracy and to perform essential public service functions.

The Russians also did the same, so did the Chinese and the Cubans. And so did the American-backed military dictators like Pinochet in post-Allende Chile and the Shah’s military and bureaucratic elite in post-coup d’ état 1953 Iran—all potentially loyal officers of the old system were not only fired, but executed, jailed, or they disappeared from the face of the earth. The same was done by American occupying forces after invading Iraq—most Saddam’s military and civilian bureaucratic offices and officers were eliminated, executed, or replaced with new ones.

## **1.7 Conclusion: Bureaucracy Persists, Beyond Weber**

The above rather brief discussion concludes that bureaucracy persists and has survived millennia of all changes—slow and radical, and peaceful and bloody violent ones. Why does bureaucracy

persist? It persists because it provides professionalism and continuity in organizational, cultural, and managerial structure and values; it stands for order and stability in the wake of turbulence. Yet, its slowness and sometime resistance to change make it difficult, if not impossible, to make changes possible. Only resolute decisions and committed leadership can bring about changes in bureaucracy through genuine programs of reform that involve institutional members and those affected by the reforms. Revolutionary changes require revolutionary and fundamental changes in the old bureaucracy, otherwise tenacious old habits die hard and can undermine the new order. Also, crises and emergency situations demand a swift administrative response that established bureaucracies are generally not suited for, unless they have special organizational design capacities prepared and in place for such events (Farazmand, 2007).

What about a stifling bureaucracy unresponsive to rising popular demands? The antibureaucratic movements of the last 25 years or so have caused massive public awareness about the rigid, slow moving bureaucracy insensitive to pressures of a much demanding fast life for citizens who feel more and more unhappy with government performance and bureaucratic obstacles. Understanding the positive side of the bureaucracy is important, and it is time for the traditional bureaucratic models to learn to change, adapt, and relearn to lead organizationally, to meet the challenges of rapid globalization, and to respond to citizens' demands and expectations. Bureaucracy must move "beyond Weber" and adapt to changes and transformations that challenge the administrative or bureaucratic systems. Bureaucracies everywhere are now forced to learn to adapt and change, open up secret and monopolistic information, share it with citizens and other organizations, and perform with transparency and ethical standards. This is the new challenge of the time in the age of rapid globalization (Farazmand, 2009, forthcoming) and "global empire" (Amsden, 2007).

## References

- Amsden, A. (2007). *Escape from Empire*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Cook, J. M. (1983). *The Persian Empire*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Farazmand, A. (1989). *Bureaucracy, the State, and Revolution in Modern Iran: Agrarian Reform and Regime Politics*. New York: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (1997). Professionalism, bureaucracy, and modern governance: A comparative analysis. In A. Farazmand, ed., *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Farazmand, A. (1999). Globalization and public administration. *Public Administration Review* 59 (6): 509–522.
- Farazmand, A. (2001). *Privatization or Reform? Implications for Public Management*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (2002). *Administrative Reform in Developing Nations*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (2004). *Sound Governance*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (2007). Learning from the Katrina crisis: A global and international perspective with implications for future crisis management. *Public Administration Review* 67(SI): 149–159.
- Farazmand, A. (2008). Transformation of the US administrative state: From nation-building and institutionalization to globalization and corporatization. Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Admin (ASPA), Dallas, TX, March 7–11.
- Farazmand, A. (2009). Building administrative capacity for the age of rapid globalization: A modest prescription for survival in the 21st century. *Public Administration Review* 69(6): forthcoming.
- Frye, R. (1975). *The Golden Age of Persia*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Goodsell, C. (1985). *The Case for Bureaucracy*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

- Hummel, R. (1976). *The Bureaucratic Experience*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Islam, R. M. and Farazmand, A. (2008). Perceptions of civil servants toward privatization and development: An exploratory study. *Public Organization Review: A Global Journal* 8(1): 37–52.
- Lenin, I. I. (1971). *State and Revolution*. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1951). *Selected Works*. Moscow, Russia: Progress Books.
- Marx, K. (1966). *The Civil War in France*. Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press.
- Merton, R. (1957). Bureaucratic structure and personality. In R. Merton, ed., *Social Theory and Social Structure*, pp. 195–206. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Mosher, F. (1968). *Democracy and the Public Service*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Olmstead, A. T. (1948). *History of the Persian Empire: The Achaemenid Period*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social Systems*. New York: Free Press.
- Peters, G. (2001). *The Future of Governing*, 2nd edn. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Waldo, D. (1948). *The Administrative State*. New York: Ronald.
- Waldo, D. (1992). *The Enterprise of Public Administration*. Novato, CA: Chandler & Sharp.
- Weber, M. (1947). *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*. Translated by A. M. Parsons and T. Parsons. New York: Free Press.



---

**HISTORICAL  
ANTECEDENTS ON  
BUREAUCRACY**

---

**I**





## *Chapter 2*

---

# **Bureaucracy and the Administrative System of Ancient World-State Persian Empire: Implications for Modern Administration**

---

Ali Farazmand

### **CONTENTS**

2	.1	Introduction.....	20
	2.2	Administration of Susa and the Federal Elam .....	21
	2.3	Administration of the Median Empire .....	22
2	.4	The World-State Persian Achaemenid Empire .....	24
	2.4.1	Cyrus the Great as the Founding Father.....	25
	2.4.2	Darius the Great and the Administrator.....	27
	2.5	Organization and Administrative System of the Empire .....	29
2	.5.1	The Great King and the Central Government .....	29
2	.5.2	The Satrapy System .....	30
	2.5.3	Central Control of the Satrapies .....	31
	2.5.4	Administrative Policy toward Subject Peoples .....	33
2	.5.5	The Persian Bureaucracy.....	34
2	.5.6	The Environment of the Bureaucracy .....	34

2	.5.7	The Bureaucratic Elite .....	36
	2.5.8	Structure and Process of the Bureaucracy.....	37
2	.5.9	Professionalization of the Bureaucracy.....	38
	2.5.10	Bureaucracy and Public Management .....	39
	2.5.11	Administrative Reforms of Darius.....	40
	2.5.12	Roads and Communication.....	40
	2.5.13	Economic Reforms and Financial Management .....	41
	2.5.14	Legal Reforms and Justice Administration .....	42
	2.5.15	Local Government Reform.....	43
	2.5.16	Conclusion: Implications for Modern Public Administration.....	43
	2.5.16.1	Lessons for Modern Public Administration and Bureaucracy....	45
N	otes	.....	49

## 2.1 Introduction

Iran, formerly Persia, has one of the longest and richest traditions of public administration and civilization in the world. With a global reputation of being “excellent administrators,” Persians have, in the past, made significant contributions to the global theory and practice of governance and public administration. Around 8000 years ago, the Iranian bureaucracy and public administration first developed in the city-state of Susa—one of the oldest sites of a ancient civilization contemporary to Sumer—and subsequently became the major institution of governance under the powerful Elamite, the Median, and the three Persian empires of Achaemenid, Parthia, and Sasanid (6000 BC–651 AD). When the Sasanid Persian Empire fell to the Islamic Arab forces in 651 AD, it had already achieved the highest level of state and administrative traditions. Its advanced cultural, state, and administrative heritage passed on to the Islamic Caliphate, who almost completely adopted the Persian state and administration systems in governing the new empire led by the bedouin Arabs. This heritage is alive even today, despite centuries of foreign invasions and influence on Iran, as Iranians have always found ways to restore and continue their past traditions and national character of independence.

The bureaucracy of the Persian Empire was a formidable institution of administration and governance, and it was both effective and efficient. The organizational and administrative principles developed under the Persian Achaemenid Empire had significant influence on the Roman administration and were adopted almost completely by the Islamic, the Ottoman, and later the Iranian Safavid empires. Evidence of the influence of these principles can even be found in almost every contemporary government in the Middle/Near East, as the Persian Achaemenid legacy affected the entire region. The Persian administrative system, however, began to decline during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Public administration in modern Iran is, therefore, a product of both the indigenous ancient tradition and modern concepts of organization and management borrowed from the West. Despite the declining nature of the Iranian administrative legacy, it is worth studying the once glorious tradition of public administration and bureaucracy that affected the whole known world.

This chapter highlights some of the Iranian traditions of administration, governance, and bureaucracy from the beginning, around 6000 BC, to the end of the Persian Achaemenid world-state empire in 330 BC, when the conqueror Alexander, the not-so-great, burned its ceremonial capital, Persepolis. Though the political and administrative history of Iran under the Elamite, Median, and Persian Achaemenid empires is covered in this chapter, the central focus remains only

on the Persian Achaemenid period. Furthermore, owing to space constraints, the decentralized Parthian and the advanced centralized Sasanian administrative systems are not discussed here. This chapter attempts to introduce some of the Iranian contributions to the history of public administration and human civilization, as the two have been developed together with one reinforcing the other.

While much is known about the Greek and Roman contributions to modern political and administrative systems, little is said or written in the West about the rich Persian or Iranian traditions of state, culture, and administration and the contributions they have made to the rest of the world. Iranians have made significant contributions, both directly and indirectly, to the Islamic as well as Western world and their administrative systems. When the city-states of Athens and Sparta were busy devising alternative forms of political systems, the Persians were already administering with high managerial efficiency the largest and mightiest empire the ancient world had ever seen.

The purpose of this chapter is fourfold: (1) to present the Iranian historical traditions of governance and administration, (2) to present some key features of the Persian bureaucracy and administrative system under the world-state Achaemenid Empire, (3) to discuss some of the contributions that the Persians have made directly or indirectly to the history of public administration, and (4) to draw some lessons/implications or applications for the modern administrative state and public administration in both developed and developing nations. This chapter is drawn mainly from my past publications, ongoing research, as well as forthcoming works on Persian bureaucracy and public administration.<sup>1</sup> Numerous other historical sources have also been consulted, though some are not referenced here.

## **2.2 Administration of Susa and the Federal Elam**

Considered as one of the oldest sites of ancient civilization, Susa (in the present southwest Iran) began its political life around 6000 BC, first as a city-state, then as an empire rivaling Sumer in Mesopotamia, and subsequently as the capital of one of the oldest empires of antiquity, Elam, around 3000 BC. Thus, the earliest experience of state tradition and administrative functions on a massive scale in Iran began around 6000 BC. The main instrument of public administration and governance under the long history of the federal state of Elam was the bureaucracy, which also played a powerful role under the Median and the Persian empires.<sup>2</sup>

Unlike the small city-state of Sumer, the Elamite empire was formed and administered on a massive scale and governed a large territory comprising present Iran and a major part of the Near East, at times including Babylonia and Assyria, for over 2500 years. Its conquest and rule of Babylonia for 500 years was undone by no other force until the Babylonian conquest by Cyrus the Great, in the sixth century BC. The bureaucracy and administrative system of the federated state of Elam—a federation of five major kingdoms (Kassite, Gutti, Lullubi, Susiana, and Elam) under the overlordship of the Elamite king—was well developed and experienced. Furthermore, their bureaucratic contacts with the Assyrians and Babylonians gave them useful insights. However, being a rival to Sumer, Babylon, and Assyria, the Elamite federal government developed the first Iranian tradition of public administration on a massive scale, though that tradition originated much earlier in the great city-state of Susa.

While internal independence of the federated states was maintained, intergovernmental relations (IGRs) among them were regulated by numerous administrative rules and ordinances. Public administration flourished under the Elamites, who made significant contributions to both Iranian and world civilizations and their administrative traditions. Without exaggeration, the Elamite

federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history.

The federal structure of the Elamite empire was organized into three administrative layers of governance, and the various provinces were ruled over by: (1) the “governors” (*Halmenik*), who were under the control of (2) a “viceroy” (*Sakanakkun*), who was subject to (3) the great king of Elam (*Zunkir*). The kings used two capitals: one in the lowland city of present Dizful and the other in Susa, the oldest civilized center of politics, trade, communication, and administration between the East and West.<sup>3</sup>

Religion strongly flourished in ancient Elam, where the female Great Goddess was considered to be very powerful and equivalent to the male God. In addition, certain kings of Elam were also elevated to the level of “Messenger of God,” “regent,” and ruler on earth.<sup>4</sup> It also appears that Elamites had some conceptions of an “after-life, in which various burial gifts would be of use.”<sup>5</sup> Administration of Elam was developed and reflected both secular and religious aspects of law, politics, and government.

A remarkable achievement and legacy of the ancient Elamites was the “development of their own script, the proto-Elamite script—the designation applied to the earliest pictographic stage in contrast with the later Elamite linear script.”<sup>6</sup> The Elamite written language was used as the official language in the bureaucracy for a long time, rivaling the Sumerian and Akkadian languages even over a thousand years later, during the Old Persian Empire of the Achaemenids.

Other major administrative achievements of the Elamites included the development and use of a binary weight system, which had a major influence on the fraction systems of the whole Mesopotamia; a massive number of administrative and business documents; major architectural works; the development and management of a gigantic system of underground canals (*Qanat*) for irrigation, an Iranian invention that turned the arid land into an agricultural land; the construction and maintenance of numerous public works and enterprises, such as roads, bridges, cities and towns, communication centers, and economic and commercial centers; and the development and use of an advanced legal system—Elamite Penal Law, Civil Law, and Administrative Law. In addition, Elamites were the first to introduce the role of witnesses in the elaborate judicial proceedings with an “ordeal trial.”<sup>7</sup>

Numerous administrative and business documents reveal evidence of extensive Elamite IGRs among the federated kingdoms, indicating the development of an active intergovernmental management and federalism, perhaps the earliest in history. In the cities, thriving activities reigned, where along with the villages, professions of all kinds flourished, showing clear evidence of variety and stratification of professional and, hence, social classes in ancient Elam.<sup>8</sup>

### 2.3 Administration of the Median Empire

The arrival of the Aryans, a people of Indo-European origin, on the Iranian plateau during their second wave of migration from central Asia around 1400 BC changed the composition of the population and the political power in Iran and the whole Near East. This group of young pastoral people was destined to change the history of mankind by conquering the known world in a single generation. They established a world-state empire with a largess heretofore unknown, and with an administrative system that was politically effective and managerially efficient. Of the two major branches of the Aryan people, the Medes succeeded first in establishing a formidable empire state rivaling Babylon, Lydia, Egypt, and Assyria. Centered in Ecbatana, or “place of assembly,” in

modern Hamadan in central Iran, the Median Empire mastered the statecraft of both military and civil administration by the seventh century BC. By capturing Nineveh, the capital of Assyria, the Medes conquered the world power ceaselessly in 612 BC, and by totally absorbing Elam by 600 BC, they set the stage for annexing Babylonia and moving further beyond.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, the first half of the first millennium BC was “a turning point in human history,” for the “center of the world ‘politics’ of the age shifted from the watered valleys of the Nile and the Mesopotamia to the less climatically favored region of the east and Iran.”<sup>10</sup> Thus, among all the main players of that time, the Iranians emerged as the most victorious and were destined to dominate world politics for the next millennium. This was accomplished by Persians, of course, under Cyrus the Great, who conquered the known world of antiquity and established the first world-state empire in “political history.”<sup>11</sup>

The Medes left behind several major legacies in administration and governance, as well as a huge empire they built, which included all territories of the former Assyrian empire and most of Asia, in a very short period of time. They were young, vigorous people with great military ambitions, and with refined skills in government and administration. They, for the first time in history, adopted the concept of “state” and turned that idea into practice. Under the brilliant military leadership of King Cyaxares, they were also “the first who organized the Asiatic armies by uniting them into separate units—spearmen, archers, and cavalry.”<sup>12</sup> The Medes sought to regularize relations among peoples in society, and all citizens had access to and dealt with a unified entity, the Median state. The military officials and civil bureaucrats of the state were all considered as “servants of the state,” at the head of which stood the King. The state concept promoted impartiality among citizens dealing with the administrative state of the empire.

The Medes also adopted a federated system of governance and administration, an early system of federalism based on collective decision making. They established a strict administration of justice, particularly since the time of King Dieoces, a just arbitrator with high reputation for fairness, who was chosen by the Median Assemblymen as their king. He established the monarchy, organized the sovereign domain with utmost efficiency and effectiveness, and united the diverse peoples of the large Median Empire.<sup>13</sup> The federal system of government allowed great flexibility among non-Median peoples or nations under the supreme authority of the Median king. The Magian priests played a major role in the state and administration of the empire.<sup>14</sup>

The second major legacy of the Medes was their development of an administrative system based on a trained bureaucracy with high expertise and prestige. They mastered the statecraft and bureaucratic administration and followed a system with high efficiency and effectiveness, maintaining respect for the local people’s inputs, which was different from that practiced by the Assyrians who uprooted the subject peoples with utmost brutality. The bureaucracy under the Medes was professionalized by two principles: (1) elaborate training and apprenticeship for administrative positions and (2) systematic experience in office characterized by role specialization, organizational hierarchy, and unity of command system. Undoubtedly, they learnt considerably from the Elamite administration and from the Assyrian bureaucratic empire through long military and administrative encounters with them.

Though many bureaucrats came from the nobility and Magies, who played a formidable role in the Median government and society, many also came from the class of common men who had great ability and aspired to join the ranks of the “men of pen” to serve the State and the King. The formation of a professional association by the bureaucrats led to the creation of a guild system that was closed to nonbureaucrats, and can be considered as the first administrative guild system of the world. This professional association served its members as well as the state. In short, the Medes had gained Iranians the reputation of being the first “excellent administrators” in history.

## 2.4 The World-State Persian Achaemenid Empire

The Median Empire was at its zenith of military power and was preparing to annex the rest of Mesopotamia and Babylonia, while the other branch of the Aryans, the Persians, was already emerging as a powerful kingdom in their base in Parsa (modern Fars) on the plains of south Iran. Their forces under Cyrus II, the Persian King, defeated the Median army in a battle commanded by the Median overlord Astyages, considered as the most powerful man on earth, who had summoned his grandson Cyrus II—the King of the free Persian kingdom, Anshan—with the intention of punishing him for his contacts with the last Babylonian prince Nabonaid. However, the mighty Median Empire fell to Cyrus in 559 BC, and thus emerged one of the most brilliant military and political leaders of antiquity, Cyrus the Great, at the age of 40 years who led the young and vigorous Persians (and Medes) in their “turn on the conquest of the world.”<sup>15</sup>

The Achaemenid Persian Empire, founded by Cyrus the Great in 559 BC, was the largest and the mightiest empire that the ancient world had ever known. The traditional infrastructure in military, politics, governance, administration, culture, and economics that the Persians established had a long-lasting effect not only on Iran, but also on the entire Near/Middle Eastern government and their administrative systems. The Persian influence on European governance and administrative systems can also be observed, as an indirect transfer of Persian knowledge and practice took place through both Greeks—philosophers, thinkers, artisans, scientists, professionals, and mercenaries who had fled inter-Greek wars and taken safety shelters in the peaceful and economically prosperous Persia where they were welcomed and supported—living in Persia and the Romans who borrowed much from Persia and passed them on to Europe, thus leaving a great legacy that is found even in the modern administrative state of the West, including the United States. Much of these knowledge transfers also took place for centuries after the conquest of Iran by Islamic forces in the seventh century, a period in which Persia produced remarkable philosophers, thinkers, scientists, poets, artists, and public administrators who contributed to the glorious Islamic civilization in the Middle Ages, when the West was in darkness. The Persians rivaled the ancient Greek philosophers and thinkers, and revived, developed, and established new bases of civilization with contributions in all the areas of science, art, administration, and philosophy—a knowledge base that was then transferred and contributed to the European renaissance.

How was such a huge empire with far extended territories and multinational diversity administered? What were some of the key features of the Achaemenid administrative system, and what can be learnt about the efficiency and effectiveness of its famous bureaucracy operating in every corner of the realm? What contributions did the Persian Achaemenids make to the theory and practice of governance and public administration, and what can be learnt from the Persian administrative system for the modern administrative state? The following is an attempt to answer some of these and other related questions.

First, the background on the founding father, Cyrus the Great, who established the empire and laid the constitutional foundation of the largest empire that the ancient world had ever seen, is presented. The background also covers a discussion on Darius the Administrator, who reorganized, reformed, and stabilized the empire with a sound administrative system. Second, the organization and administrative system of the empire is discussed in some details, outlining the position and status of (1) the Great King and the central government; (2) the famous *satrapy* system of governance, the institutional mechanisms of control over the *satrapal* administration, and the administrative policy toward subject peoples; and (3) the Persian bureaucracy. Third, the discussion on the Persian bureaucracy is presented, which includes the environment in which it operated, the positions and function of the bureaucratic elite, the structure and processes of

the bureaucracy and administration, professionalization of the bureaucracy, and bureaucracy and public management. Fourth, the administrative reforms of Darius the Great are discussed with a focus on roads and communication systems, economic reforms and financial management, legal reform and justice administration, and local government reform. Finally, a conclusion is provided with an analysis of the nature of the Persian Empire, with some of the implications for modern public administration and governance.

This chapter covers the pre-Aryan Iranian traditions of state, governance, and public administration in the ancient city-state of Susa and subsequently, under the Elamite empire, the Median Empire, and the world-state Persian Achaemenid Empire (6000–330 BC), when the latter was conquered by Alexander. However, neither the later Parthian decentralized administration nor the Sasanian advanced state and centralized administration have been discussed here.

### **2.4.1 *Cyrus the Great as the Founding Father***

Cyrus the Great was the founding father of the Persian Empire as well as the new Iranian monarchy and its new constitution. In less than 30 years, Cyrus the Great expanded the Persian Empire from Asia in the East to Eastern and Southern Europe and North Africa, including Egypt and most of the Greek territory, in the West. More than 47 empires, kingdoms, and nations were incorporated into the empire, forming a truly multinational, multiracial, and multicultural realm with a high diversity of ethnic and religious backgrounds. Only part of Greece, namely Athens and Sparta, escaped—at times—the expansion of this mighty empire. However, even these were both directly and indirectly ruled or influenced by the Persian gold, the shadow of the Persian might, and the “Great King’s Peace” with the conditions imposed on them.<sup>16</sup>

Like the Medes, the Persians under Cyrus the Great adopted the concept of “state” and formed the global world-state empire of the Achaemenids. The Persian army was formidable. So was Persian gold which, along with the Persian diplomacy, influenced peoples of resistance, including those of the Athenians and Spartans, changing their policies and helping favored officials among them to gain positions of power and influence. Persian gold often accomplished tasks for which the army was not needed or in situations where it was not suitable to be deployed.

Cyrus the Great was unrivaled in ancient history, indeed perhaps in the entire political history of the world. Cyrus was a military genius and a brilliant political leader with grand ambitions, macromanagement approach, and global perspectives. He was also a man of great energy and talents. But more importantly, he was a man of great wisdom, influence, and tolerance. His charismatic leadership transcended all boundaries of races, colors, religions, and nationalities. He was highly regarded by the Persians and most of the non-Persians in all corners of the far-extended empire. Persians called him the Father, Greeks and Babylonians called him the Lawgiver, and Jews called him the Saver or Deliverer.<sup>17</sup>

Under Cyrus the Great, a universal liberal policy of tolerance and respect for the local traditions, customs, and religions of the diverse peoples in the empire was adopted and institutionalized for the next two centuries, with modifications adopted by his successors later. This policy was also adopted by the Parthians and Sasanians during the next millennium, and thus internalized a trait that remains as a major feature of the Iranian national character. Cyrus founded a democratic government based on freedom of religion, association, race, and color, and this was the first incident in the ancient world and indeed in the entire political history. He outlawed slavery, and unlike other empires, slavery was not practiced under the Achaemenid Empire.<sup>18</sup> According to Herodotus, “No race is so ready to adopt foreign ways as the Persian,” but “themselves they consider in every way superior to everyone else in the world, and allow other nations a share of good qualities.”<sup>19</sup>



Two important points demonstrate this liberal policy established by Cyrus the Great: One is his Declaration of the First Universal Human Rights Charter on October 29, 537 BC, right after conquering Babylon without bloodshed. In that Declaration, which was recorded on a cylinder in Old Persian, Akkadian, Elamite, and Babylonian languages, Cyrus the Great (1) abolished human slavery—no human can or should subject another human to bondage of slavery, it is too inhumane; (2) established—freedom of associations, religions, and traditions; (3) decreed—free education for all children in the entire empire; (4) constituted—respect for all cultures, ethnicities, and local traditions and customs; (5) advanced—equality of subject peoples before Persian Laws and toward opportunities for administrative and leadership positions, regardless of color, race, gender, or religions; (6) promoted—appreciation and promotion of merit and talents in science, education, administration, military, and leadership functions. Since 1971, the United Nations has been celebrating Cyrus the Great's Charter of Universal Human Rights on October 29 every year, with a copy of the Cylinder hanging on its interior wall. The second point is Cyrus the Great's Theory of Tolerant Government: Cyrus was very conscious of the settled civilizations of some of the conquered peoples, and, as part of his global design, sought to create "a synthesis of ancient civilizations" aimed at uniting all human world. Under the "Theory of Tolerant Governance," all nationalities, ethnic peoples, and cultural differentiations were not only respected but also celebrated, and their equal rights before universal laws of Persia and Persian government was guaranteed through his declarations that served as a powerful institutionalizing Constitution of the empire for the next two and a half millennia to the present day. Despite many setbacks in history caused by the devastating invasions, first by youngster Alexander—who burnt the global icon of Persia, Persepolis, hoping (unsuccessfully) to diminish its mighty power and culture—then by the invading bedouin Arabs who attempted to erase everything pre-Islamic in Persia in the seventh century, and later by the savage Mongolians in the fourteenth century, the Persian liberal theory of "tolerant governance" was never weakened. On the contrary, it has become a deeply institutionalized feature of Persian and Iranian national characteristic and a key ingredient of its citizens' civilization to the present time.

Cyrus the Great's idea of a "globalized united state of Persia" covering and synthesizing numerous civilizations under the Persian rule was put into practice for the first time in history, but his "administrative policy" was even far more noble and just than that of any other in the ancient civilization that had existed in the world of antiquity. For that same reason, Cyrus the Great has since been remembered as a towering noble, liberal democrat and a "humane" leader,<sup>20</sup> leaving behind many great legacies for his fellow Iranians and non-Iranians in the next two millennia; indeed, he is a gigantic leader personality revered by peoples of all faiths and cultures worldwide. Most of Cyrus' conquests involved little or no bloodshed as people and nations or Kingdoms/empires joined the Empire and accepted the Sovereign authority of Persia. While making a decision, he consulted with professional experts, key generals, members of the nobility, and high-level administrators, and he relied on their consensus. Cyrus never developed an elaborate royal court system himself, though his administrative establishment served him well; therefore, the corruption, an obvious characteristic of most royal courts in the history of the empires before and after him, was not an issue or a challenge to his empire. Furthermore, he did not have enough time to spend in Persia proper to devote to the details of administration and his government. He adopted, in principle, the administrative system of the Medes and to an extent some of the earlier Assyrian organization, but he departed from any previous systems of governance and administration.

In kingship, Cyrus organized his expanding empire on the basis of a *satrapy* system and appointed his own governors. The former system of vassal-king used under the Medes and Assyrians disappeared in the Persian tradition of governance (more on this in the subsequent sections). As a restless conqueror and a charismatic, skilled statesman, at the age of 70, he was still in expanding campaigns. He died in 530 BC, 3 days after receiving a mortal wound in a battle that

he won in the far northeast. Persians lost a father, and the empire began to experience a short period of turmoil over the succession issue. Cyrus the Great was a founding father and a world conqueror, leaving behind many legacies for the Iranians and non-Iranians alike. As the history's first recipient of "The Great" title over 2500 years ago, today Cyrus is recognized worldwide as a towering democratic statesman, a universal lawgiver, a savior, a brilliant military leader, and a giant political leader in human history.

### 2.4.2 *Darius the Great and the Administrator*

Cyrus's designated successor Prince Cambyses was the viceroy and king of Babylon and had already conquered Egypt, where he adopted the Pharaoh's title and ruled Egypt for many years as their king and observed the local traditions to an extent as he did in Babylon. He was a relatively experienced governor and a trained fighter, but also a harsh ruler at times. Cambyses's 7 years of rule characterized a critical decade of the Persian Empire. He expanded the realm until his conspicuous death in 522 BC, and spent considerable time in structuring and organizing the empire, during both his father's and his own rule. His sudden death, on his way back to Persia from Egypt, resulted in a major debate among the Great Seven Persian leaders, who met secretly to depose a powerful and opportunist magi who falsely claimed himself as Cyrus's son Bardiya, and therefore his successor, and to decide on a Constitution for the empire. The real Bardiya—*satrap* of the northeast region of the realm—was in fact killed earlier while Cambyses was still in Egypt, and consequently, the pretender magi gained popularity. Representing the noble aristocracy and being aware of the facts, the seven paladins (Otanés, Gobryas, Darius, Ardumanish [Aspathines] and their seconds, Intaphernes, Hydarnes, and Megabyxus), first exposed and killed the usurper, then debated on the future system of government for Persia.

According to Herodotus,<sup>21</sup> the main arguments were about the forms of government that Persia should adopt. While all agreed that no one could ever replace Cyrus the Great as a leader in history, they debated on the three systems or forms of government to be adopted: democracy and government by people, oligarchy and rule by a council of nobles or aristocratic council similar to the Roman Senate that emerged centuries later, and monarchy and rule by the king with a professional bureaucracy—civil and military. Otanés opted for the democracy, Megabyxus was for oligarchy, while Darius persuaded the uncommitted ones in favor of unified monarchy. Subsequently, all the six agreed to monarchy and chose Darius as the Great King, while Otanés "then withdrew on condition that he and his descendants should not be subject to any man,"<sup>22</sup> a condition that was granted.

Thus, Darius became the Great King on October 5, 522 BC. Like many great Persians, Darius was of high birth, well trained as a noble, and had a powerful personality. He had gained status under Cyrus, namely as the King's spear-bearer (however, different accounts are presented by historians on Darius's position under Cyrus). Darius was also a great military leader. He was very young, in his twenties, when he assumed the kingship. From the beginning, he took serious steps to document his major achievements. As Cook points out, "Darius laid great stress on the fact that he fought nineteen battles and took captive nine kings in one and the same year." It was his *annus mirabilis*.<sup>23</sup>

In a few years, Darius expanded the empire farther into Asia in the east, including India, and to the west, taking over most of the Greek territories as well as North Africa, reaching the Atlantic Ocean. The Achaemenid Persian Empire reached its largest size under Darius, prospered economically and politically, and its stability and maturity ensured harmony in the relationship between the ruling Persians and all subject people, and provided an opportunity for personal and

professional development. Darius's achievements were too many to count, but he had a personality characterized by an ability to control his temper, persuasive communication ability, decisiveness in decision making, and mental and physical strength. But, the most remarkable characteristic features of Darius were, apart from military and territorial conquests, his decisiveness in decision making, long-term strategic vision, organizational brilliance, and keen interest and skills in micro- as well as macromanagement and the details of government and administration.

While Cyrus the Great was a great conqueror and a genius military-political leader, Darius was a great political and administrative leader—a great administrator. Cyrus was a father to Persians and a savior or deliverer to Jews, while Darius was a lawgiver to all subject peoples. However, because of his interest in details of administration with an efficient financial management, he was called by some as a shopkeeper who maintained a sound financial order of the empire. Cyrus never had time to build an elaborate administrative and royal capital for his mighty empire, but Darius spent considerable time doing so, and, therefore, the foundations of the royal-ceremonial megacity, Persepolis—the wonder of the East and the richest city on earth—were laid, and the three capital cities of Susa, Pasargade, and Ecbatana continued to retain their significant importance as they had under the Medes and Elamites earlier. During Darius's rule, Persians reached their height of glory in military, administrative, political, economic, sociocultural, and religious aspects. The Royal Court became elaborate with more palaces, with kingship well institutionalized and powerful.

Founded by Cyrus the Great, the Persian Empire was further expanded and developed, which was later consolidated, and stabilized under King Darius, who reorganized the serious need for an able administrative state. He instituted and implemented a comprehensive program of reforms in administration and bureaucracy, government, economics, finance, law and justice, and communication systems. These reforms had long-lasting impacts on Persia with legacies in public administration traditions around the world for the next two millennia right up to the present day, particularly in the Near/Middle East.

Under Darius, the Persian administration became more bureaucratic, the army became omnipotent, and the distance between the King and subjects increased, but he always kept faith with the great nobility. "He exerted power. He thought big, and what he did was a matter of urgency."<sup>24</sup> As Darius expressed it himself, "what was said to them by me, night and day it was done."<sup>25</sup> He was an outstanding organizational and administrative strategist, and strategic public management was a key feature of his reformed administrative system.

While Cyrus's style of governance was based on "rule of consent," Darius made his own decisions after hearing the opinions of his numerous advisors. He was a benevolent monarch,<sup>26</sup> but he maintained a balance with the great nobility and never betrayed their interests. The court under him became elaborate, and, unlike Cyrus the Great or any other subsequent Achaemenid kings who had only one wife, Darius married six wives and had numerous legitimate children, all placed in commanding positions in the army or *satrapy*, or both. Darius died in November 486 BC, after 37 years of reign. He had one military setback in his expedition against the nomadic Scythians or barbarians of north-central Asia. Although he did not destroy them, they never again became a serious problem for the empire. Darius built many palaces and was actively engaged in massive public-work projects, leaving behind remarkable legacies in governance and public administration, as he did in other areas such as economics, arts, and architecture.

Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes, whose pomp and power as the Great King of Persia surpassed that of any other in the ancient world. Under Xerxes, the empire did not expand—its Western expansion was checked by a setback that he experienced in the war against Greeks, but his setback was balanced by his triumph over Athens and by making Greeks accept the King's

Peace with conditions. Under Xerxes, the construction of Persepolis was completed, and Persia reached its highest glory of organization, military force, and cultural and ceremonial traditions. The Persian Royal Court was the most elaborate; the number of foreign exiles, professionals, and mercenaries at the service of the King increased tremendously. Xerxes displayed the glorious power and status of Persia to the world, while Darius was a great king, a great organizer and administrator, and a conquerer. However, no king ever reached the status of Cyrus the Great.

## 2.5 Organization and Administrative System of the Empire

The organization and administrative system of the Achaemenid Empire manifest unique features unknown before, with contributions to the modern administrative state and governance system. Although the Median administrative and court systems were adopted by Cyrus the Great, with some features of the Assyrian organizational structure used in principle, the magnitude of the empire he had founded required a far more effective organization and administration. The vast Persian Empire was organized based on a powerful central government, a strong *satrapy* system, a highly effective and efficient administrative system based on a professionalized bureaucracy, a liberal governance policy, and a formidable army commanded by the great aristocratic nobility as well as exceptionally talented personalities who belonged to the class of common citizens of various nationalities.

### 2.5.1 The Great King and the Central Government

A five-level hierarchical structure formed the refined systems of governance and administration of the empire, with an organizational authority flowing from the Great King and central government to the *satrapal* and local governments. This hierarchical structure can be divided into two general levels: central and *satrapal*. At the top of the pyramid was the Great King with his court and the central government armed with an efficient, professional bureaucracy and the army; the next level comprised the *satrap* and his court establishment, followed by the *sub-satraps* in charge of the provincial and local administrative districts.

The state was headed by a hereditary monarchy. The king was the supreme sovereign, enjoying a religious sanction: “By the grace of Ahura-Mazda I am king; Ahura-Mazda gave me the kingdom” are the words of Darius in the Behistun inscription. In their inscriptions, Xerxes and Artaxerxes also stated about Ahura-Mazda, the Persian God “who made Xerxes (Artaxerxes) king.”<sup>27</sup> As the empire grew larger and incorporated the previous empires, the Persian kings “sought and obtained the sanction of the religion of these countries,” nationalities, and peoples for their sovereignty.<sup>28</sup> Cyrus the Great was called to rule the Babylonians in the name of their god Marduk, and Darius and Xerxes adopted names relating to the Egyptian god Re.

The Persian King had supreme authority and recognized “no equal on earth.”<sup>29</sup> His titles, Great King and King of Kings, had unique meanings to his kingship, for there were no other kings under the Persian King.<sup>30</sup> The Greeks called him *Basileus*, “the one and only real king in the world.”<sup>31</sup> Cambyses was made king of Babylon—an exception—but only in subordination to Cyrus, who was the “king of lands.” Like his successors, Darius claims that he is “one king of many, one lord of many; the great king, king of kings, king of the countries possessing all kinds of peoples, king of this great earth far and wide.”<sup>32</sup> The succession from Cyrus the Great to Darius and all the following kings was based on the Achaemenid blood, and Darius’s succession was based on the virtue of “his being the oldest surviving line of the hereditary royal family.” Xerxes succeeded him because of his mother Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus.<sup>33</sup>

The king's will as expressed in words was law. His word, however, was based on consultation with various sources, including the Persian nobles, the official experts of the bureaucracy (a custom required of the king), the Council of Advisors and the Council of Cabinet Ministers with respect to the countries and peoples of the concerned *satrapies*.<sup>34</sup> "The king of Persia might do whatsoever he desires," yet, in practice, he generally had regard for law and custom, and indeed "in certain respects, he was practically limited by the privileges enjoyed by the Persian nobles,"<sup>35</sup> including, but not limited to, the six prominent families associated with Darius in the overthrow of Gaumata, the Magi. These families enjoyed unannounced access to the King, and only from these families he could marry.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, the King's supreme authority was limited by custom, tradition, and the nobility.

Second, after the Great King, the Court played a formidable role in politics and administration of the empire, for it was the central government. The centrality of the Court can be explained by the concentration of various powerful institutions, officials, and personalities. Clearly, the professional bureaucracy was the key institution of the central government (more on this later). Such key officials, like the *arstibara* (spear-bearer), the *vacabara* (bow-bearer), *atabara* (law-bearers or royal judges), *hazarapati* (commander-in-chief of armed forces and the Immortals, the Ten Thousand permanent bodyguards of the King, or the Kingsmen), the Grand-Vizir or prime minister as the cabinet secretary, and *ganzabara* (the treasurer), as well as many important persons were powerful forces in the court, accompanied by the harem later in the empire.<sup>37</sup>

Third, the strategic elite of the central government in Susa were the main governing power—after the King himself, and the empire and its administrative system were based on it. Of this, the treasury as well as the legal and military elites constituted the most powerful administrators (more on the bureaucracy later). The above-mentioned three powerful institutions formed the central government and the first levels of hierarchy in the *satrapal* administration of the empire.

### 2.5.2 *The Satrapy System*

A *satrapy* was an enormous territory, which included several nations, kingdoms, and people, and was headed by a *satrap* or governor appointed by the Great King from the capital city of Susa, the central government. Cyrus the Great particularly adopted, in principle, the general organization of the Median and Assyrian empires, but the *satrapal* system of governance and administration that he established was a Persian innovation with distinct characteristics. The Assyrians and Medians had tried a similar system on a smaller scale, and had divided their territories based on vassal-kingship and provinces, territories that were much smaller than *satrapies* in size and importance. On the contrary, the vast Achaemenid Empire was divided into major *satrapies*—20 under Cyrus, 22 under Darius, and 23 or more under Xerxes—which was maintained for most of the duration of the 230 years of the empire. For example, several *satrapies* included Egypt and Libya, Babylon, Syria and "Beyond the River," Asia Minor, Macedonia with several islands, India, Parthia, Media, and Bactria. The Greek islands were also grouped into three to four *satrapies*, including Lydia with the strategic city of Sardis, a major *satrapal* power center in the west and the end point of the Royal Road.

The *satrapal* system in the united state of Persia was based on several organizational principles and institutions of political and legal control. These principles included (1) tolerant governance; (2) centralization combined with a sufficient degree of decentralization; (3) a multiplicity of institutional controls; (4) equality before the law; (5) the divine kingship—the Great King as the sovereign, supreme authority, and also the head of the State; (6) the standardization of the state functions and administrative processes based on (7) a centralized, professionalized, and powerful bureaucracy.

Below the Great King and his central government was the *satrap*, the governor of an enormous territory with tremendous power in civil, judicial, and military administration. Appointed from Susa by the King, the *satraps* were almost always recruited from the Persian nobility, although initially this position was also assigned to exceptional non-Persians, and later to a woman. At the district level, great flexibility was exercised on the recruitment and appointment of non-Persian local leaders as well as Persian administrators and governors. Local people were also allowed to choose their own leaders. As will be seen in the subsequent sections, the tolerant liberal policy of the system founded by Cyrus the Great allowed the diverse peoples and nations of the empire to practice their local customs and traditions as long as they did not pose a challenge to the central authority of the sovereign and his protector of the realm, the *satrap*.<sup>38</sup>

The *satrap* was granted a broad range of authorities, powers, functions, and responsibilities. His ruling establishment was modeled after the central government and the Great King's court. He ruled a vast territory covering different nations and peoples, even monarchies, and was surrounded by a miniature court of his own. He was the highest judicial authority and the head of the state administration in the *satrapy*. His discretionary power was wide in policy and administrative affairs, but in major policy issues he had to defer decisions to Susa.<sup>39</sup>

The functions and responsibilities of a *satrap* included maintenance of law and order; oversight of general administration; supervision in collection of taxes and tributes, as well as mobilization and supply of military forces and material resources for wars and defense; maintenance of the universal roads, and postal and communication routes; maintenance of the canals and other waterways, such as Darius's Suez Canal in Egypt and Xerxes's Athos Canal in Europe, and building and maintenance of public works; managing intergovernmental affairs with both the central government and other *satrapies*; and dealing with the neighboring *satrapies* on political and military affairs.

The fifth level in the hierarchy of the Persian governance and administrative system from the central government was the *sub-satrap* or provincial governor, an official recruited from both the ruling Persian or Median race and non-Persian local leaders. Thus, each *satrapy* was also divided into *sub-satrapies* or provinces headed by a *sub-satrap* or governor, totally answerable to the *satrap*, although provincial officials and peoples had direct access to the central government. The provincial or *sub-satrapies* were further divided into administrative districts headed by district administrators or political leaders of the local communities. For example, the *satrapy* of "Beyond the River" was divided into various provinces and local administrative districts, including Syria, Palestine, Phoenicia, Samaria, Judea, and Arabia.

There were of course strong *satrapies* and weak ones, but generally, the *satraps* were powerful figures. And, in some *satrapies*, for example, "Beyond the River," certain provinces were allowed some degree of local self-governance, such as the Phoenician city-states, which voluntarily joined the empire and proved their continued loyalty to the united state of Persia.<sup>40</sup> Babylon lost its special status after a revolt that was put down under Xerxes, who then ordered its reduction into a part of the "Beyond the River" *satrapy*. That was the end of Babylon as a special *satrapy* or even as an important name.

### 2.5.3 Central Control of the Satrapies

Several institutional mechanisms established by the central government served as checks and balances in the *satrapy* system. This was essential for the administrative system to (1) maintain central control over the entire empire; (2) forestall any possible independence, disaffection, and revolt; (3) prevent abuse of authority and power by the *satraps*; (4) prevent corruption and decay in the

system; (5) protect the diverse subject peoples in the multinational united state of Persia; and (6) maintain the territorial integrity of the empire.

First, there was a separation of civil from military administration in the *satrapy*. While being in charge of civil administration with wide discretion, the *satraps* lacked the command of the military, which was given to an independent commander appointed by the central government and confirmed by the Great King. However, at times and based on personality, geographical, and kingship considerations, overlapping civil and military functions and authorities were also granted to certain *satraps*. Therefore, toward the end of the empire, it is evident that some *satraps* assumed both the military and civil administration. The separation of military–civil administration denied the *satraps* the ability to mass both the powers and to possibly challenge the central authority. The military commander kept the *satraps* under check and control of the central administration and the king from afar. Then, what was the chance of a conspiracy and joint revolt? Very slim or zero.

Second, the independent commander-in-chief of the armed forces had enormous power, was close to the king, and was in control of the Persian army across the empire. Given the rapid communication system in place, the commander was able to monitor any changes of situations in *satrapies*, and the central government was swift to respond to challenges or revolts in any part of the united state of Persia.

The third institutional control of the *satrapy* was the presence of the “eyes of the king” in the *satrapal* courts, an official appointed by the king who functioned as a State Attorney in legal matters. Fourth was the Inspector General of the State, the “ears of the king,” appointed and removed by the central government. The latter institution was highly admired by monarchs of the ancient world and was adopted by Charlemagne, the first holy emperor of Rome, to secure “cohesion between the various parts of his empire” more than a thousand years later.<sup>41</sup> The fifth institution of control was the periodic “examiners” of the State or representatives of the Great King who gave unexpected visits to *satraps* and their administrators, and reported any corruptions and mismanagement in the *satrapies* to the central government.

The final institutional control over the *satrapal* position was the “King’s secretary, an officer who forms part of every governor’s [*satrap*] establishment” in the *satrapy*.<sup>42</sup> Appointed by the central administration to provide reports on the functioning of the *satrapy*, this powerful official served as (1) an independent liaison between the king and his *satrap*, (2) a monitor to check the *satrapal* court and his administration, (3) the powerful agent of the bureaucracy and the king, and (4) a model bureaucrat for the *satrapal* and provincial administrations. He was the key officer-confidant who could read the king’s letters and instructions to the *satrap*.

An example of how this official was instrumental to the effective central control over the *satrapal* power is the case of Oroetes, the powerful *satrap* of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, who had a thousand Persians as his bodyguards. To remove and punish him for many crimes he had committed and for his defiance of the central authority, Darius “called a meeting of the leading men in the country” for consultation to decide on the appropriate method of stopping him. Thirty of the companies who were present competed very vehemently for the privilege of undertaking this service, and thus Darius was forced to make them draw lots. The winner at once carried the king’s instructions and order to Oroetes’s court, “opened the papers one by one, handing them to the king’s secretary” with the instruction to read them aloud, ordering the guards to refuse to serve Oroetes. The instruction also included the words: “King Darius commands the Persians in Sardis to kill Oroetes,” an order which was carried out at once.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, powerful as the *satraps* were in their large territories, significant institutional mechanisms of control were exercised over them by the central administration of the united state of the

Persian empire. Some of the above-mentioned institutions of checks and balances were added to the system by Darius in his major administrative reforms discussed in the following section.

#### 2.5.4 *Administrative Policy toward Subject Peoples*

A most important feature of the Persian system of governance and administration of the empire was a universally applied liberal organizational policy of “tolerance and respect for subject peoples” throughout the far-extended territories of the realm. “The Persian was a tolerant government,”<sup>44</sup> with an administration characterized by both centralization and decentralization.<sup>45</sup> As a founder of the vast empire with multinational peoples, Cyrus was very conscious of the settled civilizations, and he sought to create a united world-state with all diversities. He therefore adopted the liberal organizational policy of tolerant government. The traditional lives and customs of the many diverse peoples—indeed hundreds, even over a thousand—gathered into the vast empire were allowed to continue at local and even provincial levels, as long as their local practices did not conflict with the centralized principles of administration and bureaucracy that were applied in carrying out the will of the king and in managing the political and economic policies of the realm. Administration of such a vast empire had to be flexible with respect to the local governance.

Cyrus the Great never abandoned—neither did his successors—the tolerant administrative policy toward the subject peoples, even when he had to deal with a subsequent revolt in Sardis, where he had appointed a Lydian in-charge of the treasury. In Babylon, he at first appointed a local leader as a governor for 3 years, with his eldest son, Cambyses, as the viceroy and king’s representative, adopting the local conditions of governance and administration. Subsequently, Gobryas—the conquering army leader in Babylon—was appointed as the *satrap*. When Cyrus conquered Babylonia, a large number of Jews in captivity were freed and sent to Palestine in 538 BC, where he ordered their temple be rebuilt at the expense of the royal treasury. He sent “Shesh-bazzar as governor with the store of gold and silver vessels that Nebuchadnezzar [the last Babylonian ruler] had removed” to Jerusalem.<sup>46</sup>

The centralized system of administration was based on various governmental, political, military, and bureaucratic institutions as well as on some traditions. Centralization was the key to effective and efficient administration of the vast empire—effective for political control, and efficient for organizational and managerial performance. However, decentralization also served the system in two ways: (1) it was a central component of the “tolerant governance” policy, allowing local and provincial leadership, and respect for traditions of the subject peoples; and (2) it provided the administrative system with maximum opportunity for flexibility and efficiency. Both the organizational principles of centralization and decentralization complemented each other toward the effective administration of the empire.

Unlike the Assyrians before and the Romans later, who reduced the subject peoples to being slaves and obliterated their customs and traditions, the Persians, from Cyrus the Great to the subsequent generations of rulers, maintained the universal policy of tolerant governance and administration. Not only were the Persians tolerant toward various traditions, customs, and religions in their realm, but they also took further steps and “actively supported the temple-worship of the gods of their subjects, or contributed to the building of their temples, and conferred on the priesthood and religious institutions special privileges. Cyrus and Darius not only permitted the rebuilding of the Jewish temples in Jerusalem, but also laid the cost of it on the royal treasury.”<sup>47</sup>

The administration of the “Beyond the River” *satrapy* with Damascus as its capital was, for example, conditioned by two principles: (1) the “diversity of ethnic and national groups,



exhibiting various patterns of relationship, vis-à-vis the Persian authority, and (2) considerations of administrative efficiency, with allowance for the interests of the local groups.”<sup>48</sup> “Beyond the River,” with the territories of Syria and Palestine, was initially organized together with Babylonia as “Babylonia and Beyond the River,” implying more significance to the former. However, it was soon separated, perhaps under Darius, into two *satrapies*, an organizational restructuring that was reversed, thus signifying the latter. Under Xerxes, Babylon was punished for the revolt and reduced to a province of the “Beyond the River” *satrapy*, and its previous status was never recovered again.<sup>49</sup>

Two types of organizational subdivisions were adopted in the *satrapies*: (1) the administrative units for managerial efficiency and administrative purposes, and (2) the division based on ethnic, religious, and racial groupings in accordance with the tolerant governance policy. While the administrative subdivisions could expand or contract at different times, the ethnic grouping was generally unchanged. This dual system of administrative organization was one of the major innovations that the Persians introduced to the “governance system.”<sup>50</sup> Both types of administrative subdivisions along with the organizational principles of centralization and decentralization were integrated into the professionalized bureaucracy of the empire.

### 2.5.5 *The Persian Bureaucracy*

After the king and the noble-led army, the bureaucracy was the most powerful institution of the Persian world-state empire. It was the most efficient and most effective organizational instrument of governance and administration along with the Persian army. Its high efficiency manifested in various managerial functions and processes, while its effectiveness was demonstrated in its performance as an instrument of political and administrative control throughout the far-extended empire.

The Persian bureaucracy was gigantic, centralized, and professionalized. Its size, functions, and performance surpassed any of the bureaucracies in ancient times. It was omnipresent and omnipotent in every corner of the realm. “Everywhere the armies of the Great King went, there the Achaemenid bureaucracy was planted with all of the constants of administration—military, financial, and judicial—and communication with other provinces and [*satrapies*] was insured by the official language.”<sup>51</sup>

### 2.5.6 *The Environment of the Bureaucracy*

The Persian bureaucracy operated in an environment that was vast and diverse, as well as stable and peaceful. The economy of the empire was prosperous, as the vastness and diversity of the climate and natural resources of the empire provided an abundance of revenues for the treasury. The Achaemenid government recognized the significance of a sound economy for the maintenance and enhancement of the empire and its world-state scale of operations. Through various economic and financial reforms, and with a sound judicial system in place, the Persian economy throughout the realm developed with a monetary system, leading to the growth of early capitalism, mercantilism, and free trade.

Capitalism grew along with the feudal system of economy and social relations, where aristocracy maintained the ruling status, but the society was court-oriented and court-guided. Silver coins and other precious metals were used as major instruments of exchange, while gold, which was plentiful, was used primarily for royal, political, and military purposes. Taxation was also

based on the kind of goods and services, as well as on money and precious metals. An advanced weight measuring system was adopted, and fixed and variable property taxes were collected with efficiency. The diversity of the economic system in the extended territories from east to west, with all their climatic differences, provided the empire with a sound and flexible economy. No doubt, the peasantry carried the burden of taxation, particularly toward the end of the empire when overtaxation and bureaucratic abuse became major problems and contributing factors to its vulnerability to external challenges. However, overall, the economy flourished under the powerful and stable Persian Empire.<sup>52</sup>

The prosperous economic environment throughout the empire—with the exception of some areas and the drought years, of course—was conducive for the growth and development of professional middle-class bureaucrats engaged in various activities of public administration. Rewards for government performance were available and patronage appointments were numerous. Taxation was a major basis for revenue collection, but other ways of filling the treasury were also extensively available.<sup>53</sup>

Similarly, the political environment was highly favorable to the development and empowerment of the Persian bureaucracy. The Persian bureaucrats were in a dominant position with regard to the subject peoples, but their power was checked for fairness and administrative efficiency. By and large, the empire enjoyed stability and peace for over two centuries, a period long enough to produce a politically conducive environment for administrative as well as socioeconomic activities. The central and *satrapal* governments provided the key bases of political support for the bureaucrats, but the bureaucrats also enjoyed political support from the military and the economic and political elites at all levels. Further, their expertise served them as a formidable basis for power and politics.

The peaceful political environment attracted a large number of Greeks—politicians, exiled rulers, and professionals—who found the Persian realm as a suitable place to live and excel. The 30-year war between Athens and Sparta caused a decay in both the nations, drained their resources and energy, and drove innumerable Greeks of high significance to Persia, where all of them were welcomed and supported by the Persian administration. They excelled in their areas of interest, and the Achaemenid Persia provided them with the opportunity to promote their Hellenic values and traditions. Persia enabled them to make contributions to the modern traditions of culture, science, politics, and government.

The religious environment was also favorable, as freedom of religion was recognized and respected by the authority. Furthermore, religion–state relations were intimate, and at times, gave legitimacy to each other, a practice so extensive in ancient history, indeed in all human history. Similarly, the cultural and ethnic diversity was also respected. This allowed the Persian bureaucracy to operate in a fluid cultural and religious environment characterized by extreme diversities and tolerance for such diversity. As Persians carried the burden of supplying the empire with the leadership cadre in military and civil administrations, they were encouraged to have larger families and were rewarded for having more sons, for there was a perception of strength in numbers. As stated by Herodotus, “those who have most sons receive an annual present from the king on the principle that there is strength in number.”<sup>54</sup>

The Persian boys were educated from the age of 5 to 20 years, and along with some writing and reading skills, they were taught three things: “to ride, to use the bow, and to speak the truth.”<sup>55</sup> Physical education was emphasized and begun at dawn almost every day, and children of the nobility went through an even more rigorous program of training. Cadet schools were set up since Darius’s time to train Persian boys and girls and appoint them in the army, the court offices, and administrative posts. Persians were also taught not to pollute rivers, to respect their elders, and to

have mercy on the weak. “They have a profound reverence for rivers: they never pelt a river with urine or spittle, or even wash their hands in one, or allow anyone else to do so.”<sup>56</sup> Persians were further taught to balance faults against the good deeds in judgment. As reported by Herodotus,

I admire also the custom which forbids even the king himself to put a man to death for a single offence, and any Persian under similar circumstances to punish a servant by an irreparable injury. Their way is to balance faults against services, and then, if the faults are greater and more numerous, anger may take its course.... What they are forbidden to do, they are forbidden also to mention.<sup>57</sup>

One of the central cultural characteristics of all Persians was telling the truth and avoiding lies, for lying was considered as a crime and liars were subjected to severe punishment, a key national cultural feature of Iranians throughout the millennia till the present day. Other cultural features included a belief in “good thought, good talk, and good deed,” advised by the Persian Prophet Zardosht or Zoroaster. Herodotus again reported that “They consider telling lies more disgraceful than anything else, and next to that, owing money. There are many reasons for their horror of debt, but the chief is their conviction that a man who owes money is bound also to tell lies.”<sup>58</sup> While telling the truth was rewarded by the society, the Persian judges and their justice administration were harsh on individuals who committed the crime of telling lies. These cultural values shaped the Persian administrative values and affected the bureaucratic behavior of the system.

The legal environment was similarly supportive, as the administrative-legal reforms of Darius (more on this later) provided a universal legal environment in which equality before law was strictly observed. The royal judges and the process of jurisprudence had no mercy on violators and abusers of the system.<sup>59</sup> In short, the Persian bureaucracy operated in a generally stable environment, where law and order were well maintained.

### **2.5.7 The Bureaucratic Elite**

Persians were the ruling elite in both civil and military administrations, although local elites were allowed to function as traditional leaders, as long as they did not question the legitimacy of the sovereign King and the Persian authority. However, Persians formed the formidable strategic elite in bureaucracy and public administration, as they did in the military administration. With few exceptions, only the Persians and Medes served as the key strategic military commanders.

The strategic position of the bureaucratic elite was based on the economic privileges that they possessed for belonging to the nobility. The nobility, therefore, provided the major cadre of the strategic bureaucratic elite in both civil and military administrations. This laid pressures on the nobility for supplying the commanding-leadership manpower to the vast empire. The operational bureaucratic elite were recruited from the population throughout the entire realm. However, the central administration maintained effective control over the huge bureaucracy through both strategic and operational elites. Strategic management, as we know it today, was a central feature of the Persian bureaucracy and administration across the empire. So was emergency management, as the Persian bureaucracy was forced to be prepared for all kinds of natural and man-made emergencies. Disasters were bound to occur and contingent programs to manage such emergencies were in place with trained officials coordinating volunteer workers. Nothing could stop the operation of the Persian administration. Nevertheless, the Persian bureaucracy was not without red tape, particularly concerning major policy questions that had to be addressed to

the central administration in Susa and Persepolis. However, the greater overall efficiency of the administrative system often overshadowed any red tape expected in a gigantic bureaucracy.<sup>60</sup>

### 2.5.8 Structure and Process of the Bureaucracy

The Persian bureaucracy was gigantic, with a n organizational domain beyond i magination. As expected, the local and regional bureaucracies had limited direct contact with their counterparts in other regions or areas of administration, for the eastern and western extremities of the empire made it extremely difficult or impossible for such interorganizational communication. However, such interorganizational communication was common among the bureaucracies of the neighboring *satrapies*. For example, the Babylonian bureaucrats had frequent communications with their counterparts in Media and “Beyond the River,” or the bureaucrats of the latter *satrapy* with their counterparts in Egypt. Nevertheless, no local or regional bureaucracy could break away from the control of the central administration.

The bureaucracy was divided i nto several g reat depa rtments, e ach with a h uge n umber of patronages a nd career ap pointees. The depa rtments o f t reasury a nd fi nance, communication, transportation and roads, public works, justice administration, and internal law and order formed the most important organizational structure of the Persian bureaucracy. There were also numerous public or state enterprises managing various public authorities operating like private business. Taxes and tolls were collected at waterways, communication points, city entrances, roads, bridges, harbors, ports and forts, transportation facilities, etc. Public enterprises also managed production factories and service industries.

The royal court, at both the central and *satrapal* centers, was the largest among all the bureaucratic establishments. Temples of all the religions also served as the major institutional bases for the bureaucracy throughout the empire. Although no clear statistical figure is reported by historians on the size of the Persian bureaucracy, a cursory estimation of the number of the personnel—patronage and career bureaucrats—performing a wide range of duties and functions indicate a bureaucracy of well over three million. This i ncluded a r ange of functionaries from petty officers, informers, foot earners, and workers in the courts to high officials in middle and strategic positions.

Persians never used slavery as a system of social and economic organization, but they benefited from an abundant number of mercenaries and contractual functionaries serving the bureaucracy, as well as from the conquered peoples, who were obligated to provide various services to the united state of the empire. Periodic services performed by subject peoples can also be i ncluded i n the overall size of the bureaucracy, and thus, leading to a large figure of six to eight million employees who worked in the Persian bureaucracy. Management of such a huge bureaucracy with a remote control was a gigantic task, particularly in the absence of the communication technologies available in modern times.

As mentioned earlier, the Persian bureaucracy combined a d ual o rganizational p rinciple of centralization and decentralization. While the central administration was in absolute command of the bureaucracy, the *satrapal* system provided adequate flexibility in the administration of provincial and district/local territories. The latter was allowed to exercise a great deal of decentralization, while conforming to the overall centralized policies of the administrative system based i n Susa and Persepolis.

The administrative functions and processes of personnel, finance, communication, organizational coordination, and justice were facilitated by various systems employing the most efficient

methods and tools that the ancient time could offer. Recruitment was based on both patronage and merit, as the professionalized bureaucracy grew on a merit basis, whereas patronage and personally based recruitment were both common and considered important for political purposes. The treasury department was always the busiest organization in disbursing monetary compensations and rewards to those serving the state and the Great King.<sup>61</sup>

### 2.5.9 *Professionalization of the Bureaucracy*

Elevation of the bureaucracy and bureaucrats under the Median Empire laid the foundation for professionalization of the Persian bureaucracy. The Medes were masters of statecraft, and they left behind an excellent administrative structure with exceptional organizational qualities. However, explaining the Achaemenid Persian bureaucracy and administration is a different story. Further, professionalization of the bureaucracy took place under the Achaemenid Empire with various principles that seemed to have remained significant throughout the duration of the Persians' rule. These included (1) recruitment based on merit and knowledge, (2) prior experience, (3) long-term apprenticeship training, (4) adherence to certain professional rules set by the establishment, (5) constant eagerness and attempts to improve personal performance and achieve excellence, and (6) acceptance by the professional association or "guild system," which was highly protective and closed to nonbureaucrats. The bureaucrats as "men of pen" were highly regarded and enjoyed prestige, power, and privileges in society.

Professionalization of the bureaucracy also led to the formation of a strong civil-service system based on examination, merit performance, and pay system. While patronage played a major role in the bureaucracy, professional civil servants thrived in the Persian administration. The professional civil servants provided the continuity of office and performance in the implementation of the official policies issued from the central and *satrapal* administrations.

While Persians as the ruling elite enjoyed a superior position in the empire, followed by Medes, the privileges of a professional bureaucracy were by no means diminished for non-Persian bureaucrats around the vast empire. Indeed, bureaucrats all over the realm were rewarded for good performance and for their professional qualifications regardless of their national, racial, or religious backgrounds. In fact, the evidence clearly indicates that semislaves, mercenaries, and individuals of low social background were highly rewarded for their good service in the bureaucracy, both at the central and *satrapal* administrations, and were promoted to high positions. Jews, Greeks, Lydians, Egyptians, and other nationalities with slave-like backgrounds were able to rise to high positions in the court bureaucracy, and subsequently to governorship positions of provinces and administrative districts. For example, Nehemiah, who served as an eunuch in the Royal Court, who through both performance and loyalty was elevated to high position in the central bureaucracy as the "cup-bearer of the Great King Artaxerxes [440 B.C.] at Susa." On hearing the bad news about his city Jerusalem, he "gained the ear of the King—and of the queen: like elsewhere in history, harem culture prevailed in the second century of the Persian Empire. Leave was granted to him to return and rebuild Jerusalem."<sup>62</sup> Ezra, "a priest and scribe," was also elevated and granted royal permission, accompanied by a body of priestly, temple and lay followers, with rich gifts for the temple and extensive powers to inquire the religious conditions, to instruct people, and to appoint judges for all the Jews "Beyond the River."<sup>63</sup>

The professionalized bureaucracy was central to the government of the vast territory, with vast diversity of culture, ethnicity, climatic conditions, and geographical extremities. It relied heavily on the central government for continuity and stability of the united state. Bureaucracy

was transformed into a uniting institution with a common official language and with a common goal of serving the state and the Great King. The Persian bureaucrat enjoyed power, prestige, and high esteem in society and in the government. While the professional bureaucracy provided the state with stability and continuity of functions, patronage played a formidable role in the political system—maintenance and enhancement of the empire and its values. There were innumerable patronage officers who served the state and the king at all levels and each district.<sup>64</sup>

There were both harmony and conflict between the career and professional bureaucrats who were held in high esteem and prestige in society and the numerous patronage appointees who also held influential positions in government. The strategic political appointees were obviously entrusted with high authority and tasks of leadership. However, their relationship with the professional bureaucrats was characterized by harmony, and not hostility. In a conflict, it was not uncommon for the patronage appointees to lose to the entrusted professional administrators who had proven their loyalty and competence to the State and the Great King.<sup>65</sup>

However, professionalization of the bureaucracy increasingly led to a high position in the society, such that it was transformed gradually into a power contender, not with respect to the Great King to whom it was loyal and subordinate, but, in general. As time passed, during the second century of the empire, the excessive bureaucratization led to increasing possibilities for bureaucratism and abuse of power. This problem was compounded by overtaxation and resulted in a general public disaffection with the administration's bureaucracy. Eventually, it took its toll on the empire, as the political and popular attitudes had already changed the perception of power among the peoples in the realm and made the empire susceptible to serious invading challengers like Alexander, who had never abandoned his idea of invading Persia. His challenge was never taken seriously by the Persians and thus, they did not make adequate preparation to meet his assault.<sup>66</sup>

The administrative capital of the empire was Susa, and the religious, ceremonial, or dynastic center was Persepolis, while Ecbatana (modern Hamadan), Babylon, Balkh, Memphis, Sardis, and other major cities also served as commercial, strategic, and provincial capitals. Ecbatana also served as a major treasury center, and thus, an administrative capital. Pasargade was also an early capital of the government built by Cyrus the Great. Some of the major *satrapal* capitals included Memphis in Egypt, Sardis in Lydia, and Babylon in "Beyond the River." The official languages of the bureaucracy and administration of the empire included Elamite, Akkadian, or Aramaic, and the Old Persian of cuneiform script written on clay tablets. But Elamite and Aramaic continued to dominate the bureaucracy, while the Old Persian served mainly the royal purposes. The bureaucracy's effectiveness was also owing to official languages of Elamite and Aramaic, which were used universally throughout the extended corners of the empire. The twin languages served as a unifying communication force to connect all peoples of the multinational empire.

### **2.5.10 Bureaucracy and Public Management**

A central feature of the Persian Achaemenid bureaucracy was its ability to perform huge public management projects. These projects were of several kinds: capital project management, maintenance public management, operational management, organizational management, and development public management. Much can be learnt from the Persian bureaucracy in the above-mentioned areas, particularly in development management and capital management, the former for developing nations and the latter for the developed countries. The Persians relied heavily on team management, a system that was alive in Iran up to the 1960s, particularly in the rural/agricultural systems.

Team management has been a long historical tradition of Iranian public management, only to lose its application in mid-twentieth century. The Persian bureaucracy managed massive projects of public works, such as building and maintaining long roads to the far corners of the empire, building and maintaining huge communication and transportation systems, and building dams and underground irrigation systems stretching thousands of miles from the water origin. Strategic management was a key feature of the bureaucracy. The Persian administrative system became even more efficient since the reign of Darius the Great, who launched major reforms in the economy, administration, justice, and management of the empire.

The administrative reforms of Darius had several organizational and managerial themes that laid the foundation for a sound management system, very much necessary for the effective administration of a world-state empire. These organizational and managerial themes included (1) the legitimacy of the Persian administrative state or bureaucracy, (2) the stability and favorability of the environment in which the bureaucracy and public management operated, (3) the sound leadership provided by the Persian administrative elite, (4) the professionalization and standardization of the bureaucracy, (5) the application of the Universal Law of Darius, (6) the liberal administrative policy of “tolerant governance” introduced by Cyrus the Great, (7) the antiwaste and anticorruption policies, (8) the expediency in organizational communication and managerial performance, and (9) strategic and emergency management.

### **2.5.11 Administrative Reforms of Darius**

The administrative reforms that Darius launched were comprehensive, with far-reaching consequences. While Cyrus the Great founded the empire, Darius reorganized and reformed it, with great interest in micromanagement and details of its administration. During his reign, the Persian Empire reached its height, with a sound administrative system to maintain and manage its united world-state. The reforms of Darius focused on areas of governance, in general, and administration, in particular. His governance policy did not deviate from that of Cyrus, but simply reinforced it, while his organizational and administrative policies and programs extended far beyond what Cyrus had originally perceived.

Darius’s administrative reforms covered the main areas of postal service and communication, taxation, economic management and financial administration, legal affairs and justice administration, and local government.

### **2.5.12 Roads and Communication**

The communication system was highly developed for that time, to facilitate the dissemination of information necessary for the administration of the state and for keeping the central government informed of all events throughout the realm, and to stay connected with the *satrapies*. Various forms of formal and informal channels of communication constituted the core of the system for information dissemination. An efficient system of roads and postal services was founded under Cyrus the Great and was expanded under Darius, which linked weak parts of the empire to Susa and Persepolis. As described by Herodotus, the road system was “excellently maintained and secured.”<sup>67</sup> Roads were measured *in parasangs* (3.75 miles), and all corners of the empire were connected with major roads to the capital, Susa and Persepolis.

The most famous of these Royal Highways was the royal highroad connecting Susa to Sardis in Europe, which, like other roads, had posting stations at regular intervals with well-maintained

inns and caravanserais, and garrisons at various stations. The other famous road was the road connecting Bactria, the capital of the north-central region of central Asia, to Susa. These and all other roads also served the riding postal services, a pony express, which was a Persian innovation and invention, a contribution to the worlds of governance, communication, commerce, and administration. Although the riding postal system was used primarily for royal and administrative purposes, commercial use was not uncommon. The riding messengers were ready on all stations, where by day and night and under any weather conditions they rode swift horses and delivered messages. While normal travelers took about 90 days to travel the Sardis–Susa road, the riding messengers passed it in 5 days. All couriers were salaried employees of the state. Transportation on these roads was advanced to the level of excellence, and only Romans achieved similar excellence some 800 years later.<sup>68</sup>

In addition to the developed land-communication network, sea transportation was extensively used since Darius's time, when the world's first and largest oceanic navigation was carried out from the Indus to the African shores and the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal in Egypt, which was built under Darius. Sea transportation from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal was a major achievement in ancient time, for it facilitated the commercial as well as military navigation on the high seas, connecting the western and eastern ends of the empire and shortening the transportation time.<sup>69</sup>

### 2.5.13 Economic Reforms and Financial Management

Rarely among ancient monarchs do we find kings like Darius, “who so thoroughly understood that the successful state must rest on a sound economic foundation.”<sup>70</sup> Darius's economic reforms were wide in scope and included the three sectors of government corporations or state enterprises, private sector (both urban and rural), and public sector, secular and religious. All three sectors flourished under his economic reforms, reinforcing each other through partnerships. Although the feudal aristocracy dominated, commercial and mercantilistic economy prospered. The economic reform also included the major tax reforms with fiscal and monetary reforms as its backbone, affecting the tax structure, public finance, price system, and the banking and financial institutions throughout the united state of the empire. For the first time in the ancient world, a fixed taxation was administered and stabilized, and the weights and measures were standardized with great details and specifications. Lands were carefully surveyed and various taxes—individual, collective, property, import–export, and excise—were collected, along with a wide range of other taxes and tributes. These included municipal and public enterprise taxes, tolls on major roads and waterways, taxes on harbors and marketplaces, animal taxes, property taxes, etc. In addition to various taxes (fixed and variables), tributes were fixed on conquered peoples, except Persians. Persians never paid fixed taxes, but they paid the heavy blood tax, as they provided the empire with manpower for commanding frontline military and administrative positions in the bureaucracy. The monetary policy of the state also affected the price and interest rate systems and along with other financial measures, stabilized the flourishing economy.<sup>71</sup>

The monetary reform included an established universal coinage system, which along with the increasing urbanization, promoted a monetary economy, replacing the barter system to a great extent. Gold and silver coins were minted and used mainly for military, political, and administrative purposes, while copper and other precious metal coins were used for various economic and commercial activities. Gold was rare and gold coins (*darics*) were coined only by the Great King, while silver and other coins were minted by *satrap*s for payment to soldiers and mercenaries and for



commercial and public management purposes. The general term for tax was the old Persian *baji*, and the tax collector was *bajikara*. The central treasury was located in Susa, Ecbatana, and Persepolis. Accountants (*hamarakaras*) and treasurers (*ganzabaraz*) were carefully selected and were well paid. While the free enterprise system was promoted, state regulations were used to monitor and stabilize the economy and control market abuse.<sup>72</sup>

Banking activities expanded for the first time in the ancient world, and the number of banking institutions proliferated. The two most famous banking houses Egibi and Marashu & Sons operating in Babylon are the two examples; they were contracted out by the State for tax collection and financial management, and thus, the term “contract management” originated. Despite the prosperous and stabilized economy, the peasantry throughout the empire experienced hardship, for they paid the heavy price of taxation and supply of labor. The urban working class shared that hardship too, but they had the advantage of mobility, whereas the peasantry was mostly confined to the land under the aristocratic nobility, who both suppressed and protected the peasantry at the same time. This benevolent behavior of the feudal nobility was a major structural aspect of the Iranian land tenure and rural-agrarian society, well into the middle of the twentieth century.<sup>73</sup> Taxes of all kinds were collected with efficiency, and pay for services was a common financial management practice (today’s user fees), particularly in urban areas. Public managers rarely had cash flow problems, for the treasury system had a constant flow of revenues coming in. The Persepolis treasury was the largest in the recorded history of the ancient world.<sup>74</sup>

### **2.5.14 Legal Reforms and Justice Administration**

Darius’s legal and judicial reforms were probably among the most famous and recognized elements of his administrative reform package. Like the universal coinage and standardization of weights and measures, and comparative values of prices in the economy, Darius’s Universal Ordinance of Laws and codes were significant measures that were applied equally throughout the empire. The Universal Law of Darius recognized no status or favoritism and was enforced by the Persian administration and Persian judges who, according to Herodotus and other sources, never failed to serve “universal justice”<sup>75</sup> and as stated in the Bible, “The law of the Medes and Persians does not change.”<sup>76</sup>

Darius borrowed from the Babylonian law of Hamurabi, and ordered the collection and study of Egyptian as well as early Iranian Elamite legal codes for consideration in his legal reform program, but his “universal law” was distinctive in several ways. Unlike any previous laws, Darius’s laws were both comprehensive and universal; they covered almost every aspect of political, social, economic, legal, military, and administrative systems, and the laws were applied throughout the entire empire. While the Hamurabi law was confined only to the Royal Court of Babylon, the Universal Law of Darius was enforced in far extended districts of the realm. The Old Persian terms of *data* and *data-bara* were used for law and judges, respectively, and term for local judges, *dayyan*, were also used in local court trials. Ordeal trials were used with witnesses necessary for the delivery of the verdict. Use of trial attorneys was allowed, and judges and court procedures were inspected periodically by the royal representatives from the central administration of justice. Established by Cyrus the Great, Darius’s reform reinforced a universal policy of fairness and justice as a foundation of state stability. Darius also ordered the collection and study of Egyptian and Elamite legal codes for consideration in his legal reform. Thus, administration of justice constituted an essential component of Darius’s administrative reforms. However, injustice and repression were not uncommon from time-to-time after Darius, particularly during the second century of the empire.<sup>77</sup>

### 2.5.15 Local Government Reform

The administrative structure of the local governments in the *satrapies* was modeled after the central administration, with variations reflecting diversity of geographical, ethnic, and cultural regions. Variation in local government administration was also a reflection of the universal policy of tolerance by the Persian administrative state toward the subject peoples. Such flexibility in local administrative leadership and governance served the united state of Persia, but it also presented the potential for possible abuse of privilege. However, the functions of the local governments did not change, as they all performed similar tasks of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the bureaucracy was the unifying institution of power and administration of the empire for the central government in Susa and Persepolis.

Darius's reform changed certain conditions in the local government, all aimed at better coordination between the local and central administrations. Direct local–central contacts were allowed for the first time between the two levels of government. Though this provided opportunity for the central government to check on the provincial and *satrapal* government, it also added tension to the local–provincial–*satrapal* relationships. Second, increasing professionalization of the bureaucracy led to further standardization of tasks in the administrative functions, thus facilitating the centralized administrative control, particularly through auditing and other forms of achieving accountability. Uniformity and standardization of administrative processes contributed to further bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness, while maintaining flexibility in local government leadership. Local traditions and customs were preserved and respected, but the bureaucracy maintained its firm institutional mechanisms of control over the local government administration. However, the professionalization of the well-entrenched bureaucracy developed a tendency toward increasing bureaucratism and abuse of bureaucratic power, particularly during the last 50 years of the empire.

The gradual convergence of local conditions with the dominant Persian cultural values and traditions—whether naturally or by coercion or both—eventually replaced the local traditions with the ruling cultural values. But, the Persians also adapted to the local conditions they had settled in. By the second century, Persian colonies and their gradual integration with the local peoples had already become a natural reality; Persians were everywhere. Somehow, both the ruling Persians and the local peoples found themselves in most places having a common interest of living together and sharing a common civilization. It was the overtaxation and increasing corruption in the courts which, along with the resting mindset of complacency among Persians—a peaceful mindset that the empire was too strong and invulnerable—gradually weakened the empire from within, making it susceptible to external threats.<sup>78</sup> None had ever challenged the Persian army for over 200 years, and Persia felt invincible with its ruling elites dropping their guards against creeping forces of challenges from within—complacency became the worst enemy of the empire.

The resting mindset, along with the engagement in luxury life among the ruling elite, prevented the empire from continuing the earlier traditions of vigilance like constant renewal, which the Persians so dearly maintained. They never took Alexander's quest seriously, and neither made adequate preparation to meet such an onslaught, nor did they send adequate forces to stop his advances.<sup>79</sup> Nothing had happened in the last half century of the empire “to show that Persia was too weak to resist a serious invasion, especially if anything should arouse Iranian national sentiment.”<sup>80</sup>

### 2.5.16 Conclusion: Implications for Modern Public Administration

The Persian tradition of public administration dates back to as early as 6000 BC, when the first experiences in the state building and administrative organization began in the Near East. As a city-state and one of the earliest sites of human civilization, Susa in Iran began political life around

6000 BC, leading to the first Iranian tradition of administration on a large scale. Subsequently, as a contemporary power to Sumer, Babylon, and Assyria, Susa expanded its political life as the capital of the federated Elamite empire for over 2500 years, and then the capital of the mightiest empire on earth, the Persian Achaemenid Empire.

The Iranian experience in state building and public administration, therefore, continued to dominate the entire Near/Middle East, Asia, and major parts of Europe, though Iran also received initial influence from the settled civilization of the Mesopotamia through contacts. The Elamites ruled with a federal system of government for over 2500 years, and left behind many traditions of government, politics, administration, law, and civilization; their legacies include the Elamite language, used as an official language of the Elamite and Persian bureaucracies for over 3000 years. Elamite contributions to art, religion, politics, and public management were considerable; their public management achieved a remarkable innovation in developing a gigantic underground irrigation system stretching thousands of miles, turning an arid land into a fertile one.

The arrival of the Aryans on the Iranian plateau during their second wave of migration in the middle of the second millennium BC resulted in a major change in the political life of the entire Middle/Near East and Asia. In a single generation, the Medes captured the entire area and by 600 BC, they were preparing to annex Babylonia, remainder of the Mesopotamia, to their vast empire territory. However, they fell to the emerging Persians, who were destined to turn the history of the ancient world around. By conquering virtually the entire known world, the Persians under Cyrus the Great founded the mightiest and largest empire that the history of mankind had ever seen, and the vast territories of the Persian Achaemenid Empire—covering Asia, the Near/Middle East, Africa, and a major part of Europe—provided a peaceful and prosperous environment most suitable for the development and growth of economy, commerce, art, culture, religion, civilization, politics, and administration for over 230 years.

Begun by the Medes, the Persian administrative traditions flourished so greatly that their legacies and impacts have been felt not only in Iran and in the regions that were under their influence, but also in many parts of the modern West. Iranians gained a universal reputation of “excellent administrators,” and the Persian bureaucracy was famous for its high efficiency in public management and effectiveness in administering the largest empire on earth, covering virtually the entire known world (except Athens and Sparta, which were also directly and indirectly influenced by the Persian gold, which bought favored party politicians and rulers in Athens and Sparta, respectively, and by the King’s Peace, which set the conditions for IGRs). The conqueror of the empire, Alexander, found the Persian systems of governance and administration so superior that he adopted the whole system with little or no change for his entire domain, and this tradition was followed by the subsequent Parthian and Sasanian empires for the next millennium.

The fall of the Persian Empire to the Islamic Arabs in 651 AD did not result in the demise of Persian administrative excellence. On the contrary, the superior Persian traditions of state, culture, and administration captured the conqueror once again, and the bedouin Arabs almost entirely adopted the Sasanian state and administrative systems. The Persian bureaucracy continued its long tradition with its own language and culture, and the Persians once again managed to display their national character of independence, high culture, and administrative excellence. This happened particularly during the Abbasid Caliphate, which was totally Persianized and under Persian control.

The Persian administrative tradition continued to improve during the revived period of the Safavid Empire (1500–1700), in which the bureaucracy and administration had achieved high standards in public management and public service, particularly in public works and enterprise

management. However, this historical tradition began to decline during a prolonged period of relentless invasions by barbaric Monguls and Turks, and later during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the weak, despotic Qajar rule, inviting all kinds of foreign interference into the Iranian politics and administration.

The modern Iranian public administration began on the ancient traditions of Persian bureaucracy and administration, on the one hand, and the modern concepts of management and organization borrowed from the West, on the other. This historical essay has outlined the traditions of state and public administration under the Persian Empire and before, but the focus had been on the Achaemenid Empire (559–330 BC). However, no discussion was made on the Parthian and Sasanian administrative systems. The latter empire achieved a high level of advancement in theory and practice of organization, state, and administration, and discussion of its administrative legacy can be quite elaborate and lengthy.

### *2.5.16.1 Lessons for Modern Public Administration and Bureaucracy*

This section focuses on the following questions: What can we learn from the administrative system of the Persian Achaemenid Empire? What are some of the implications of the Persian bureaucracy on the modern theory and practice of organization, public management, and the administrative state? The Persian Empire was both gigantic and multinational, with high diversity in languages, cultures, customs, traditions, and regions. It was managed by an administrative system that was politically effective and managerially efficient. Are there any implications from this administrative system on managing large administrative states or powerful countries like the United States in modern times? The following is an outline of possible answers to these questions:

1. A major lesson to be learnt from the administrative system of the Persian Achaemenid Empire is the gigantic size of the bureaucracy and administrative state, which covered multinational and multi-racial territories, with extreme diversities and complexities. That huge bureaucracy was managed with such a high efficiency that no geographical area in the empire could escape the machinery of the central government.
2. A related implication is that the Persian bureaucracy and administrative system were both centralized and decentralized. Its centralization enabled the central government to maintain its firm control over the entire realm, while decentralization at local and provincial levels allowed adequate flexibility to adapt to the local conditions for the purposes of governance and administration. Even self-governance was allowed in some localities. In fact, for the first time in history, Persians put into practice the concept of “partnership in governance,” a practice which was unique in the ancient times, though the Medes and Elamites practiced a federated system of governance before and the Greeks did it in their island states. However, the nature of the governance partnership practiced by Persians was unique with implications for modern governance.
3. Another related lesson to be learnt is the consistent liberal policy of government and administrative tolerance that the founding father Cyrus the Great established as part of the constitution of the vast empire. The universal liberal policy or “government tolerance” was a humane insurance policy against abuses and devastation of subject peoples, a tragedy that was so common under the previous and subsequent empires in the region. The Persian liberal theory and practice of tolerant governance and administration were new phenomena never tried earlier. The Persian Achaemenids

did rule their empire in a new way. Calculated frightfulness was not their practice. Deportations were relatively few. Tolerance of local forms of religion, social organization and even government was policy. Documented and orderly provincial government was an imperial goal (witness the treasury system). And many peoples of the empire were involved in its governance and functioning: Elamites and Babylonian scribes, Iranian and non-Iranian priests, Jewish and Greek mercenaries, Babylonian bankers and real estate dealers, Ionian tyrants and democrats, and Spartan and Athenian exiles—to name a few.<sup>81</sup>

The Persian Empire was generally a peaceful empire, and such policies and actions of tolerance and partnership in governance and administration were integrative, and they were “something new in the history of Near Eastern attempts to create polities, which transcend ethnic and national boundaries. The polity in this case was the Persian Empire.”<sup>82</sup> The peoples, the *dahyava*,

were not to be seen as separate nations held enslaved by one nation, but as integral parts of the empire, the one real polity, over which the King and the Persians admittedly ruled... Darius and his successors ruled a large land mass containing a bewildering variety of ethnic groups for almost two hundred years. They did it with very little violence and without the need for almost annual military activity characteristic of the smaller Assyrian empire. Rebellions were comparatively rare, and most involved political and dynastic party efforts to grab power at the center of government, rather than attempts by parts of the empire to break away from the centre. Thus, Persian imperial philosophy...was effective. The conqueror of the empire, Alexander, incorporated much of this new thinking into his own idealistic vision of empire, and thus the Achaemenids made a direct contribution to the political and social concepts of the Hellenistic world.<sup>83</sup>

The liberal administrative/governance policies of the empire rejected discrimination based on race, color, religion, or party affiliation. These basic human rights were preserved and protected by not only the formal policy, but also the legal procedures of the Universal Law of Darius applied throughout the realm. There is a great deal to be learnt from these Persian administrative policies and practices for the modern administrative systems, particularly in the United States with major ethnic, color, racial, and national diversity. The dual characteristics of the administrative system—centralization and decentralization—can also be an important application or lesson for the modern administrative systems around the world.

4. Other implications are the federalism and IGRs, which were characteristic of the Elamite and Median empires. Hence, the Iranian contribution to modern political and administrative systems should also be noted, as Iran was the original developer of the federal system of governance in the world. Obviously, the Greeks also borrowed from the earlier Elamites and passed this heritage on to the modern Western political theory, just as the Achaemenids made direct contributions to the Hellenistic world under the Selucid rule after Alexander. Achaemenid contributions to politics and administration of the modern world, therefore, were both direct and indirect through the Hellenic channels as well as other means by later Persian scholars, thinker, philosophers, and scientists.
5. The Elamite language was a major contribution to the world’s political history, civilization, and administration. The Elamites first, and Persians later, were the innovators in developing and managing gigantic underground irrigation systems turning arid lands into workable

lands, and this system has been used for thousands of years in the entire Near/Middle East. This was a major achievement in managing water treatment, natural-resources management, and efficient distribution of scarce resources—a managerial achievement that has direct applications for development management today.

6. The Aryans—Medians and Persians—were the first in the political history to develop the concept of “state” and to turn that concept into an operational reality. The empire was considered a state, and the Achaemenid Empire was hence a world-state empire. The state was everything in the realm, and nations, peoples, and officials served the united state, which represented the Great King, the sovereign authority, who recognized no equal on earth, a devout worshipper of Ahura Mazda, the first monotheist God and “who contained within his person and his office the welfare of the empire.”<sup>84</sup>
7. Another lesson to be learnt is the professionalization of the bureaucracy, leading to the development of a closed guild system formed by the scribal bureaucrats enjoying privileges, prestige, power, and high esteem in government and society. The Persian bureaucrats were both efficient and effective, managerially, politically, and administratively. The guild was closed to outsiders, but professionals who were qualified to enter were welcomed. Apprenticeship training and general education was vital for joining the profession. Since Darius’s time, there were colleges attached to major temples and military centers, where cadets and civil servants were trained for civil and military services, and where priestly and cult-requirements and medicine were studied.<sup>85</sup> “Similarly, for appointment to the army, the court offices, and to administrative posts in the provinces, the existence of something like cadet schools was important.” At the courts, “all the boys of the foremost Persians,” as observed by Xenophon, were educated.<sup>86</sup>

Professionalization of the bureaucracy also resulted in the formation of a civil service system based on examination, training, stable pay system, and merit performance. The professional civil servants were held in high esteem in society, and they provided the administrative state with continuity in policy implementation and managerial efficiency. Therefore, the concept of civil service is not unique to the modern West; much has been learned, and more can be learnt from the ancient Persian administration, as well as from others.

8. Women did very well under the Achaemenid Persia, where they were integrated into the administrative and political systems of governance throughout the empire, and this included both Persian and non-Persian subject peoples. Two clear examples demonstrate the important role that women played in the empire’s public administration: One is the appointment of several women in high Satrapal positions, such as governors of regions and satrapies, a practice unprecedented in Mesopotamia till then, though in early Iran’s Elamite empire women also held high governance positions. The second example is the extensive and widespread organizational practice of educated—free for all—women as personnel managers in large-scale capital projects such as building dams, irrigation systems, and public enterprise management. Recent discoveries attest to the fact that women performed exemplarily as “compensation managers” in the construction of the gigantic Persepolis, a mega palace city one-mile long in diameter, the richest city and wonder of the ancient world that took about 85 years from the start under Darius the Great King to its completion under Xerxes the Great King in the fifth century BC. Gender-based public administration was also complemented by ethnic-based public management practices across the vast realm of the empire that included hundreds, if not thousands, of nationalities and ethnic cultures, a tradition consistent with the theory of “tolerant governance.”

9. The administrative reforms of King Darius were major contributions to the following generations of empires and states. The taxation reforms and the financial systems operational in the empire gained the Persians a major reputation of running a huge empire with a sound economic system and financial stability, leading to all kinds of economic, professional, artistic, cultural, and administrative prosperity. The stable and peaceful empire promoted all aspects of human civilization, passing its legacies to the subsequent generations for the next two millennia. A direct lesson to be learnt here is that administrative reforms, if genuine and implemented seriously, can have significant impacts on the management of the economy and society, and on a more effective administration of government. If Persians did it 2500 years ago, then it can be done in modern times as well.
10. Still another important aspect of the Persian administration was its excellent “emergency management” system, prepared for all kinds of natural and man-made disasters. The Persian military and civil administrations were well prepared and guarded against possible emergencies. It was a central policy of the government that the empire must be prepared to meet all kinds of human and natural emergencies. Therefore, the Persian administration was skilled in emergency management. It was also an administrative ideology that the Persian army and bureaucracy should experience no setbacks in the face of crisis and emergencies. The treasury, of course, was always ready to finance projects and activities for such a purpose. The effectiveness of the emergency management was mainly based on the “strategic” philosophy and ideology characteristic of the Persian administrative system—thinking strategically and managing accordingly. The Persian bureaucratic elite mapped out long-term strategic as well as short-term operational plans for expanding and maintaining organizational domains, and for efficient management of acquired human, natural, and financial resources of the empire.
11. Another implication is the multimechanisms of institutional control over the *satrapal* governance and administration by the central government under the Persian Achaemenid Empire. Chief among these institutional checks and balances were the “ears and eyes of the king” and the special secretary of the king in the *satrapal* courts, as well as the unannounced royal judges and inspectors who made surprise visits to provincial and local bureaucrats and governors. By reporting directly to the central government, these independent visitors made significant contributions to the overall checks and balance system of the government, and in the achievement of effective accountability in bureaucracy and public administration.
12. The dual systems of administrative division of the empire territory based on ethnic, cultural, and religious purposes of local self-governance, along with the administrative division of the *satrapies*, provinces, and local geographical districts for political effectiveness and managerial efficiency had the potential benefit for governing nations with diversity in race, culture, ethnicity, and religions.
13. The huge public works of the Persian administration must also be mentioned. The bureaucracy, both civil and military, was heavily involved in major public-works development projects, and the development management was efficient. Roads, public baths, caravanse-rais, inns, communication centers, commercial and trade centers, underground irrigation systems, bridges, waterways and canals, etc. were built, developed, and maintained. Building and maintaining extensive roads and waterway canals were gigantic projects, which required massive manpower with tremendous organizational coordination and managerial supervision. Huge numbers of mercenaries and non-slave free workers were employed in the enormous public-works projects that were carried out with maximum efficiency. Public enterprise management was a major function of the Persian public administration under

the Achaemenid Empire. The Persians relied heavily on team management and teamwork as the basic organizational forms to manage small and large public works. This ancient Persian tradition was continued as part of Iranian public and private management up to the middle of the twentieth century, particularly in rural/agrarian Iran, but was gradually abandoned in the face of rural bureaucratization under the Shah in the 1960s. Team management has already become a global strategy to improve organizational performance in both public and private sectors.

14. The successful administrative reforms of King Darius had several organizational and managerial themes that bear major implications or lessons on modern public administration. Further, Romans adopted them and passed them on to the modern system of management. These included (1) the legitimacy of the Persian administrative state or bureaucracy, (2) the stability of the administrative environment, (3) the sound organizational leadership provided by the Persian administrative elite, (4) the professionalization of the bureaucracy, (5) application of the Universal Law of Darius, (6) the liberal administrative policy, (7) the antiwaste and antibureaucratic policies, and (8) the expediency in organizational communication and managerial performance.
15. The stable and peaceful world-state empire of Achaemenid Persia attracted large numbers of Greek people—politicians, professionals, scientists, and paid mercenaries—who were driven out by the long period of war between Athens and Sparta. Persia harbored and supported them, and it was through this peaceful state that the Hellenic values of politics and government were promoted, and Greeks' contributions to modern public service were facilitated.
16. Finally, “partnership building” was another common practice for governance under the Achaemenid Persian Empire, a practice so popular today in the public administration literature. Partnership building was practiced in several forms: between state (public) and private sectors (e.g., banks and financial institutions for tax collections), state and ethnic groups and nationalities, *satrapy* and local functional groups, etc.

These are some of the features of the Persian administrative systems that can contribute potential lessons and has implications for modern public administration in both developed and developing countries. However, further research is needed to shed more light on the Persian administrative contributions to modern public administration and government. No doubt, the administrative system of the Persian Empire, excellent and effective as it was, had shortcomings, problems, and deficiencies that must be addressed as part of a comprehensive analysis. However, no theoretical analysis or, generalizations, has been provided in this rather limited chapter.

## Notes

1. Farazmand, A. Stale tradition and public administration in Iran in ancient and contemporary perspectives, in Farazmand, A. (ed.), *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*, Marcel Dekker, New York, 1991, Chapter 19, pp. 255–270; Bureaucracy, bureaucratization, and debureaucratization in ancient and modern Iran, in Farazmand, A. (ed.), *Handbook of Bureaucracy*, Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, 1994, Chapter 43, pp. 675–686; Professionalism, bureaucracy, and modern governance: A comparative perspective, in Farazmand, A. (ed.), *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Modern Systems of Governance*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1997, Chapter 2; *Slate and Bureaucracy in Persia (Iran): 8000 Years of Public Administration*, forthcoming.



2. Cameron, G. G. *History of Early Iran*, Greenwood Press, New York, 1968; Ghirshman, R. *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest*, Penguin Books, New York, 1954.
3. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. I, part II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1971, p. 648.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 662–672.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 680.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 675.
7. *Ibid.*; also see *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, part I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1973, pp. 271–288.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 680.
9. Dhalla, M. N. *Zoroastrian Civilization*, AMS Press, New York, 1977; Frye, R. *The Heritage of Persia*, The World Publishing Co., New York, 1963; Frye, R. *The Golden Age of Persia*, Harper & Row, New York, 1975; Olmslead, A. T. *History of the Persian Empire: The Achaemenid Period*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1948.
10. Ghirshman, *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest*, p. 75.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Herodotus, *The Histories*, translated by Aubrey de Selineourt, Penguin Books, New York, 1984, pp. 83–84.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
15. Ghirshman, *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest*, p. 113.
16. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. VI, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1953.
17. Cook, J. M. *The Persian Empire*, Schocken Books, New York, 1983; Herodotus, *The Histories*; Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*.
18. Cook, *The Persian Empire*, Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*.
19. Herodotus, *ibid.*, p. 97.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 234–241.
22. Cook, *The Persian Empire*, p. 55.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
25. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 55.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Quoted in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1960, p. 185.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Herodotus, *The Histories*; Cook, *The Persian Empire*.
30. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960, p. 185.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*; see also Cook, *The Persian Empire*; Farazmand, State traditions, see p. 72; Frye, Heritage or golden ages, pp. 50, 51, 68.
34. *Ibid.* See also *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 2nd edn., 1988, pp. 82–83.
35. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960, p. 186.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. Farazmand, State tradition; Cook, *The Persian Empire*; Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*.
39. *Ibid.*; *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Ghirshman, *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest*, p. 144.
42. Herodotus, *The Histories.*, p. 256.

43. *Ibid.*
44. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960, p. E 87.
45. *Ibid.*; Cook, *The Persian Empire*; Ghirshman, *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest*; Farazmand, State tradition.
46. Cook, *The Persian Empire*, p. 41; *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. VI, 1953, pp. 176–179.
47. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960, p. 188.
48. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 2nd edn., 1988, p. 147.
49. *Ibid.*; Cook, *The Persian Empire*.
50. *Ibid.*; Frye, *The Heritage of Persia*; Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*.
51. Frye, *ibid.*, p. 97.
52. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960; vol. VI, 1953.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Herodotus, *The Histories*, p. 98.
55. *Ibid.*
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*
60. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960.
61. *Ibid.*; Cook, *The Persian Empire*; Frye, *The Golden Age of Persia*; Herodotus, *The Histories*; Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*.
62. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. VI, 1953, p. 169.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
64. Farazmand, A. P. Professionalism, bureaucracy, and modern governance: A comparative perspective, paper presented at the 1993 Conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, September 1–4, 1993.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.*; Cook, *The Persian Empire*; Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*.
67. Herodotus, *The Histories*.
68. Ghirshman, *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest*; Frye, *The Golden Age of Persia*; Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*; *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960, p. 193.
69. *Ibid.*; Cook, *The Persian Empire*.
70. Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*, p. 185.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 185–194; Frye, *The Heritage of Persia*; Ghirshman, *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest*; Olmslead, *History of the Persian Empire*.
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*
75. Herodotus, *The Histories*.
76. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia*, pp. 98–103.
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*
80. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. VI, 1953, p. 24.
81. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 2nd edn., 1988, p. 111.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
85. Cook, *The Persian Empire*, p. 71.
86. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, I, 9. As quoted in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. IV, 1960, p. 191.



## *Chapter 3*

---

# Indian Legacy of Bureaucracy and Administration

---

V. Subramaniam\*

### CONTENTS

3.1 Introduction .....	53
3.2 Evolution of Imperial Bureaucracy.....	54
3.3 Demise of the Goal of Imperial Unity .....	58
3.4 British East India Company .....	61
3.5 Marxist and Weberian Attitudes.....	62
References .....	63

### 3.1 Introduction

Karl Marx and Max Weber were more or less in agreement about the irrelevance of ancient imperial bureaucracies to the modern industrial world. Max Weber in his famous essay on bureaucracy dismissed them as patrimonial or prebendal with a few asides [1]. Marx, according to one interpretation of the “Asiatic Mode of Production” (AMP) [2], regarded them as the cause of centuries long stagnation of the process of economic evolution and was happy that British colonialism in India would set in motion fundamental changes [3]. Their views were at least partly responsible for the lack of sociological interest in ancient bureaucracies for sometime. Attention was focused on them in the first instance in a revivalist manner by nationalist historians of India, China, or Iran, who proudly unraveled the structures and processes of administration of their countries in

---

\* Author is deceased; material updated by the Editor.

ancient times. Since then, some comparisons have been made: Balazs [4] felt that the study of eternally bureaucratized China will help in understanding bureaucratized communist regimes; Eisenstadt [5] regarded bureaucracy as a power group in rivalry with other groups including the sovereign—and others have challenged and criticized Weber's concept of patrimonial bureaucracy, Marxists and neo-Marxists have produced volumes on AMP, but with no real interest in bureaucracy as such. But the subject deserves a lot more investigation, comparison, and analysis in its own right.

Of the three fully developed ancient bureaucracies of India, China, and Iran, the Indian legacy has made a widespread contribution to modern public administration in the third world, mainly through the agency of the British Empire. This happened because the British had no precedents, experience, or ideas available in their own domestic nonbureaucratic arrangements for applying to their new Indian possessions in the late eighteenth century and hence they picked up, polished, and adapted the relevant practices of Indian administration to their immediate needs. As their empire expanded onto Southeast Asia and Africa, they simply transplanted these onto their new possessions thus spreading the Indian legacy over large areas of the globe. For this reason alone, the administrative legacy of ancient India is worth careful study.

This chapter is a preliminary exploration of that legacy in terms of its modern relevance from a sociological angle and falls naturally into four parts. In Section 3.2, we discuss briefly the evolution of a tentacular imperial bureaucracy about the fourth century before Christ and its socioeconomic context. In Section 3.3, we analyze how and why the goal of imperial unity through imperial conquest and imperial bureaucratization was given up through a collusion between the literati and the rulers which was established in China through a neo-Confucian synthesis and how diluted administrative practices interlaced with feudalism were transmitted in India through centuries of political division and foreign conquest. Section 3.4 explains how the main remnant of the tradition, the district overlord-coordinator, was taken over and modernized by the British East India Company at the right time and spread all over their Afro-Asian Empire. In Section 3.5, we take a brief critical look at Marxist and Weberian attitudes to pre-British bureaucracies in India.

## 3.2 Evolution of Imperial Bureaucracy

Early Hindu political institutions were not imperial; there were several democratic republics on one side and several monarchies with some ethical and institutional controls on the other. Most republics were conquered and absorbed by neighboring kingdoms, but the Indian republican tradition is preserved for us not only in the writings of Greek scholars, but also in the republican conciliar constitution of the Buddhist Sangha [6]. For quite a long while, the monarchs fought each other according to well known rules without absorbing and integrating rival kingdoms into a larger empire, being satisfied with proclaiming a vague paramountcy. The Rajasuya sacrifice performed by victorious monarchs, just confirmed and acknowledged this paramountcy. This arrangement gave way to imperial conquest and territorial absorption by the fifth century BC when the Nanda dynasty founded an empire in the Gangetic valley—which was soon after expanded and consolidated by Chandragupta Maurya into the famous Mauryan Empire, a little earlier to the first empire of Shi Huang Ti in China, and contemporaneous with the Achaemenid Empire in Iran. The three world states or empires thus took shape within a few years of each other—and in all the three cases, the power holders opted for some form of bureaucracy to integrate their conquests and preserve their hold. In other words, the occasion and provocation for ancient bureaucracy was the need to knit and rule a new empire of sizeable area. The logic behind this is worked out

in the structure of the famous contemporary work Kautilya's *Arthashastra* [7]. The first six "books" or sections describe in great detail a centralized bureaucracy while the next nine discuss the ways of acquiring other lands by war and diplomacy to build an empire. The order seems reversed; the acquisition of empire coming after the details of its administration, but their mutual relationship is clear.

The options for an empire builder were few and clear. In a small kingdom or republic, a flexible mode of governing without elaborate formal structures was the norm. But with a large empire, the options were letting the old rulers continue as tributaries, or creating a new feudal order of nobles with full local power or structuring a new bureaucracy of paid loyal officials. The bureaucratic option was chosen as the best way to consolidate power with loyal officers without their own power-base. The logic behind this comes out clearly in Chapters X and XII of the first book of *Arthashastra* dealing with the testing of ministers and officials with various temptations and the ruthless manner in which "thorns" (traitors) were to be dealt with. The bureaucracy was to be based not on birth or relationship, but on merit and loyalty alone without which the bureaucratic option to entrench power and hold an empire together would not work.

We have a very detailed account of the structure and functions of Mauryan imperial bureaucracy in both *Kautilya's Arthashastra* and from the inscriptions of Emperor Asoka [8]. The first source is important as it formed a prescriptive model for not only the contemporaneous Mauryan administration, but also for generations of authors and for later empires and even smaller kingdoms. The second source provides an account of the practical details of administration in the Mauryan Empire at the time of Asoka.

*Arthashastra's* first six "books" form probably the most detailed manual of monarchical administration in the ancient or medieval world, though more scholarly attention has been devoted to the last nine books on war, diplomacy, and international relations. The instructions on administration cover all areas and functions with brutal detail and clarity.

Indeed, the second book, with its 38 chapters, is one of the most specifically detailed account of imperial administration anywhere in the ancient world. Thus Chapter X on royal writs discusses all grammatical and stylistic nuances and Chapter XI on gems and gifts is a virtual catalogue of all contemporary products. Other chapters elaborate central administration, provincial, regional, field and village administration, municipal administration, financial and resource administration, and justice and military administration. In fact, the titles of chapters in this second book illustrate the tentacular nature of Mauryan bureaucracy.

- Formation of Villages
- Division of Land
- Construction of Forts
- Buildings Within the Forts
- Duties of the Chamberlain
- Business of the Collection of Revenue by the Collector-General
- Business of Keeping up Accounts in the Office of Accountants
- Detection of What is Embezzled by Government Servants out of State Revenue
- Examination of the Conduct of Government Servants
- Procedure of Forming Royal Writs
- Examination of Gems That Are to Be Entered into the Treasury
- Conducting Mining Operations and Manufacture
- Superintendent of Gold in the Goldsmiths' Office
- Duties of the State Goldsmith in the High Road

Superintendent of Commerce  
 Superintendent of Forest Produce  
 Superintendent of the Armory  
 Superintendent of Weights and Measures  
 Measurement of Space and Time  
 Superintendent of Tolls  
 Regulation of Toll Dues  
 Superintendent of Weaving  
 Superintendent of Agriculture  
 Superintendent of Liquor  
 Superintendent of Slaughterhouse  
 Superintendent of Prostitutes  
 Superintendent of Ships  
 Superintendent of Cows  
 Superintendent of Horses  
 Superintendent of Elephants  
 Training of Elephants  
 Superintendent of Chariots  
 Superintendent of Infantry  
 Duties of the Commander-in-Chief  
 Superintendent of Passports  
 Superintendent of Pasture Lands  
 Duty of Revenue Collectors; Spies Under the Guise of Householders, Merchants, and Ascetics  
 Duty of a City Superintendent

It is impossible to discuss such a wealth of detail in a brief chapter, but some important points may be noted, Kautilya glides lightly over contractual theories of kingship, assumes that a high concentration of power is necessary for civilized society to carry on, and advises the King against all sorts of stratagems, to be strong and diligent. At the same time, no man can run a state single-handed; one needs a central team of advisers and a large team of field executives. Kautilya implicitly bypasses the options of feudalist power-sharing and patrimonial delegation—and advises the monarch to choose all advisers and officers by various tests for loyalty and merit. The testing against “allurements” and particularly “religious allurements” in Chapter VII of the first book implies a separation of religion from politics and a sharp focus on ability and loyalty in the choice of ministers and officials.

The structure of central administration is given in great detail both in *Kautilya's Arthashastra* and in the Asokan inscriptions [9]. They agree about two or three top levels in central administration; a minister or ministers called Mantrin (Kautilya) or Mahamatra (Asoka); a council of ministers at the next level (Mantri parishad), and many top officers and public servants variously called Amatyas or Sachivas, in a clear hierarchy. These three levels were retained with slightly changed names in the later Gupta Empire in the fifth century AD and under Harsha in the seventh century. The general of the army was also a *Mantri* of equal status, as were the viceroys or *Kumaras* of the four large regions or provinces of the Mauryan Empire. Their high and equal status is borne out by the high annual salary of 48,000 panas assigned to them. The members of the council were either part-time or consultative and drew 12,000 panas, but the public servants “amatyas” drew 24,000 panas, or half of what the top Mantrins earned.

The army administration was separately organized as was accounting and financial administration through separate hierarchies. The office of Collector General (Samahartri) and the Accountant General (Akshapataladhyaksha) were separate and each had its own hierarchy. Chapter VI of Book II on the former goes into detail about the distinctions between current receipts and last balance, and between necessary and profitable expenditure while Chapter VII on accounts details various types of accounting deceptions and their punishment, and a separate long Chapter VIII focuses on embezzlement. Kautilya goes into minute detail about everything, but even more so in regard to finance. Thus Chapter XXI of Book II, on tolls, details various punishments for various offences relating to toll evasion and Chapter XVI on commerce discusses government monopolies of local produce and imports in detail and suitable ways of increasing profit. Two detailed chapters are again assigned to gold and currency.

The central administrative structure was generally replicated in the regions or provinces governed by viceroys. These were subdivided into divisions and districts. The district has continued to be the nerve center of field administration today [10]. The district officer then called Pradeshtri or Sthanika seems to have been much the same as his present day counterpart. He combined revenue collection and magisterial duties and supervised the work of other technical or clerical officials (Yuktas) as well as village government under the Gopa. The Asokan inscriptions as well as Kautilya's work generally agree in most regards. As a great Buddhist emperor, Asoka of course appointed Dharma mahamatras or ethical superintendents to elevate the moral tone of the society.

How was such an elaborate tentacular bureaucracy sustained in loyalty and efficiency in those days of difficult communication? It was achieved essentially through three factors: an elaborate system of internal spying and inspection, the hard work and vigilance of the emperor and his cohorts, and thirdly through a skeletal monetary economy with cash payments.

This bureaucratic system founded by Kautilya, Chandragupta, and Asoka was adopted by the successor empires of the Guptas, and of Harsha with minor changes in name and substance [11]. Thus we find an officer for war and peace, Sandhivigraha, another officer Uparika associated with provincial administration, Kumaramatyas or experienced officials, and Dandanayaka standing for a police or an army officer. The Guptas in the North and the Cholas in the South made a sophisticated system of village self-government an integral part of the administrative system. But the overall structures of central and provincial administration were essentially modifications of the Arthashastra–Asoka model.

Imperial unity did not, however, last in India as it did in China. The Mauryan Empire declined after Asoka and was replaced by the Sunga dynasty ruling over a smaller area. India was divided into a number of fairly sizeable independent states with the western parts being under Persian satraps. The Indianized Kushan Empire after straddling a good part of North India and areas of Central Asia lasted for a century after Christ spreading Buddhist culture.

This was followed by another period of border incursions and independent states until the Guptas in the fourth century welded a good part of India into an empire after subduing the Saka invaders. The empire declined due to Hun invasions and other disintegrative factors, giving way to several independent kingdoms. The empire of Harsha in the seventh century covering North India up to the Narmada River, a loosely knit federal empire was the swansong of the Hindu imperial tradition. After four centuries of smaller empires and some independent kingdoms, the Muslim invaders established a sultanate in Delhi from the late twelfth century. While their rule covered a good part of North India, it was checkered by change of dynasties, assassinations, intrigues, and rebellions and was not characterized by steady patterns of administration. The exception was Sher Shah in the late fifteenth century, whose revenue administration formed a model for the Mughuls.



The Mughul Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provided a steady pattern of administration, but its decline in the eighteenth century was followed by total anarchy in large parts of North India, when the British East India Company began its career or gradual conquest. Throughout the long period from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century, South India witnessed the rise and fall of the Vijayanagar Empire, the Bahmani Kingdom, the Muslim sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda largely under their Hindu ministers, the rise and fall of Mahratta power, and several smaller viceroalties and kingdoms. This extremely cursory historical account underscores the point that India had no imperial administrative continuity as China had under the mandarins. Some administrative ideas, however, survived in modified or resuscitated forms. Let us investigate the causes of discontinuity in India and the nature of the modified continuity.

### 3.3 Demise of the Goal of Imperial Unity

The central fact of Indian history is that unified empires did not last long and for a good part of her history, India was politically divided. We suggest that the basic explanation for this contrast with China cannot be derived from Wittfogel's hydraulic despotism but is to be sought in the ambivalent attitude of Brahmins in particular and intellectuals in general toward the state. The Wittfogel explanation based on hydraulic despotism gets nowhere as both India and China had large rivers and needed to control them for substantial food production. We know for a fact that India and Sri Lanka (and Southeast Asia to a lesser extent) evolved the decentralized caste-oriented self-sufficient village under similar conditions while China evolved a tightly organized bureaucracy. It follows that organized control of flowing water could not have been the compulsive reason; rather it was the way that the whole problem of social and political control was viewed by the princely and intellectual elites—collectively and functionally—that seems to have been the governing factor. The most significant fact is that the mainstream of Hindu intellectual thinking in regard to social control was based on the *Dhanna Sastras* dealing mostly with social and caste duties and rituals, with “Rajaniiti” or politics as a marginal part of it, in contrast to the Chinese literati's commitment to state service. I have analyzed and discussed the contrast in detail elsewhere [12] and will just summarize the argument briefly here.

It is well established that the durable relation between the literati and a unified empire was not decreed by nature but was achieved by a deliberate historical process substantially different from anywhere else in the world. About six or seven centuries before Christ, Europe, India, and China were all divided into many small political units, i.e., kingdoms, tribal republics, and city states. A little later a process of unification by conquest began in all of them, through the Roman Empire in Europe, the Mauryan Empire in India, and the Chin dynasty in China—and this was followed in all the three by a period of imperial disintegration. After that, however, their paths diverged. In Europe, the regional kingdoms faced the united continental Catholic Church of scholar priests and both the state and the Church together were confronted with conquering and encircling Islam—giving rise to medieval feudalism, and church–state rivalry and a chain reaction leading to the nation-state and capitalism. In India, the imperial tradition disappeared and reappeared without real continuity. In China, however, the Han Empire succeeded the Chin after a period of disintegration and created an enduring imperial tradition of unity through the cooperation of scholars with a unified Chinese Empire which brought the country back to “harmony” after each period of disintegration. It was thus an enduring collective human contrivance, originally opposed by the very literati who became its pillars later.

The China of Confucius was a “feudal” country of many kingdoms and the gentleman-scholar of the Confucian School was expected to take service with different princes according to his free choice. Shih Huang Ti, then unified China by conquest, virtually exterminated the feudal aristocracy, almost destroyed Confucian literature, unified the script, and centralized the empire as far as possible in those times. The Confucian scholars or Chiint-su, however, were implacable opponents of the imperial regime as described by the emperor’s adviser Li Ssu thus [13]:

In the past the empire was troubled and divided. No one could succeed in uniting it. Thus the princes reigned simultaneously. In their discussions the scholars speak of ancient times in order to decry the present. They use false examples to stir up confusion in the actual state of affairs, they proclaim the excellence of the doctrines they have studied to abuse what your Majesty has established.

On Li Ssu’s advice, Confucian classics were burned and the feudal nobility killed or transported to Shensi. While the old feudalism was destroyed, the centralized tyranny was resented so much that there were risings all over China in his son’s time. Finally two leaders emerged after years of civil war, and Liu Pang, founder of the Han Dynasty defeated his rival and unified the country. After some unfruitful efforts to resuscitate a facade of feudalism, the Hans settled for a compromise with the Chiintsu. The old books were “recovered,” i.e., rewritten to legitimize the collaboration of the literati with the empire as loyal administrators. The Han emperor’s supreme achievement was to persuade the new scholar class to whom the feudal age was personally unknown to accept as Confucian ideal, obedience to the emperor.

By this clever distortion of the ancient feudal idea, the Han emperors made the doctrine of Confucius the strongest support of the centralized autocratic monarchy which the Sage had never known and which his followers formerly opposed to the last gasp [14].

This “first great revolution” in Chinese history perpetuated the twin institutions of unified empire, and scholar officialdom in mutual support. The scholars characterized every period of division as a temporary deviation from the harmony of unified empire with legend was as much its life-blood as the scholars’ services. Thus the confusion following the Han period was ended by the short lived Sui Dynasty, which restored the unified empire and the Mandarinate, followed by the Tang Dynasty which finalized the recruitment process by examination of scholar officials—which lasted along with the unified empire right until the first decade of this century.

By contrast, the Hindu Sastras and the epics with their long passages and even chapters (e.g., Santiparva of *Mahabharata*) on statecraft do not elevate it above Dharma. Kautilya was the only exception who placed imperial statecraft above all else in his *Artha Sastra* in the sixth century BC and thus legitimized the successful emergence of the centralized Mauryan Empire. But Hindu Dharma Sastras and Puranas began gradually undermining his extreme state-worship. Kautilya staked too much on a powerful state—with powers to disrobe monks, tax the rich merchants into abject submission, and even keep the Brahmins in their place. Any such ideology required the continuous support of a vested interest other than that of the king and his household.

This was created out of “a hitherto irreconcilably reactionary class,” the Chi<sup>1</sup> in tzu, by converting them into an aristocracy of educated scholar-officials into supporting a centralized monarchy so that “the ideal of a centralized state became closely associated with the scholar class and the followers of the Confucian school” [15]. There was no such evolution in India where developments took, in fact, the opposite path but unfortunately Indian as well as western scholarship has often mistaken Kautilya’s ideal as representing Indian reality for the best part of Indian history. The

fact is that the Brahmin scholars, even while they took service under various kings, were never organized into the support of a centralized state, and generally stuck to the theory that Dharma rules and protects the king only so long as he upholds it. Some went out of their way to tear to pieces Kautilya's thinking which was akin to that of Li Ssu in China, a century later. The Kautilyan ideology withered away in its crucial aspects in regard to a centralized empire though his more mundane teachings in regard to day-to-day administration were preserved and practiced by smaller kingdoms—in contrast to the continuing collusion of scholars for centuries with a centralized empire in China. This resulted in the strangest paradox of Asian political history.

The Chinese scholars followed Kautilya's advice of establishing a tentacular bureaucracy for a centralized empire without having heard of him while the Brahmins followed Confucius' advice of taking service rather independently with competing princes in a divided India. *It was an ironic consummation of Confucian Brahmins for India and Kautilyan Mandarins for China.*

The Brahmin–Kshatriya rivalry is fully attested by Puranic and epic stories [12]. Summing up the rather confusing evidence in Puranas and reading between the lines, the Brahmins generally exercised the rights of coronation, legitimation, and advice, but their intellectual abilities and sacramental monopolies were challenged by Kshatriyas—particularly those following Buddhist and Jain religions from time to time, but not consistently. It is possible that Brahmin power was somewhat reduced during the period of Buddhist dominance of Emperor Asoka but only relatively, it is quite likely that the great Hindu reassertion during the period of the Gupta Empire and of Puranic compositions—saw Brahmin sacramental and legitimizing rights fully restored. Simultaneously they were extended to South India and Southeast Asia in a big way. At the same time, a continuing debate on the intellectual and social fronts was joined between Buddhism and Hinduism leading to the absorption of the former by the latter by the ninth or tenth century.

Throughout this long seesaw, there were only one or two definite occasions when Brahmins could have been roped into a permanent alliance of service to a unified Indian Empire namely, the formation of the Mauryan Empire, when Brahmin Kautilya advocated a centralized empire or Chakravarti-Kshetra—before Asoka's time of Buddhist dominance—or later when the Gupta Empire was established with a Brahminical bias. But it did not happen as in Han China for any number of unknown reasons. The Brahmins were lukewarm but not implacably opposed, but by the Gupta period the threshold of active collusion could not be reached due to the increasing dominance of Dharma Sastras. We can never really say whether Brahmin intellectuals were lukewarm because imperial political unification seemed difficult or it became difficult because of the noncooperation of intellectuals.

Our main thesis may be rephrased thus. A rigidly structured institution like rational-functional bureaucracy required the total collusion of the intellectual elite (who staffed it) and the imperial power elite (who used it) over centuries in precapitalist gemeinschaft agricultural societies, China achieved it in several stages, but India in spite of producing the best blueprint for it in Kautilya's Arthashastra, did not for reasons discussed earlier. Instead, the intellectual elite built up a form of cultural integration which lasted until the advent of the British and which formed the basis of the Indian educated middle class.

There was some continuity of the Kautilyan bureaucratic model in other ways. Successive generations of scholars writing on statecraft replicated his ideas in a redefined adaptive manner keeping alive the same ideas of proper administration. Secondly, the general imperial administrative structure of Kautilya was adaptable for smaller empires after the seventh century, of the Vakatakas, Pratiharas, and Palas and they were also borrowed by the Mughul Empire later. But they could not be sustained in their fullness in a gemeinschaft society, without the total commitment of the intellectual elite. They underwent serious erosion in several ways. The later empires, including

even Harsha's empire were loose—and ultimately local power centers of a feudal tributary nature grew up. In fact postseventh-century Hindu administration in North or South Indian empires was essentially a combination of feudalism, bureaucracy, and village self-government. This combination had the advantage of avoiding anarchy when central power weakened.

Mughul administration, however, fashioned more of a centralized militarized prebendal bureaucracy [16]. The Mansabdhar in charge of an area was essentially the commander of a certain number of horses and an executive who was helped in revenue administration by lower level bureaucrats. This office was only for life and his family was divested of all perks and official possessions on his death. It was thus a strange mixture—neither feudal nor bureaucratic. The Mansabdhar had no local roots in this apparently centralized bureaucracy—and this led to total anarchy in large areas when the empire declined.

To sum up, the Kautilyan heritage continued to live on in terms of scholarly books on statecraft, and in a diluted feudalized form in Hindu states, while the Mughul centralization with a militarized bureaucracy, left large areas as a prey to anarchy when it disintegrated. But the Hindu literati, suppressed and ignored in this system came into their own with the advent of English education in the mid-nineteenth century, forming the new derivative middle class which took over government and bureaucracy after India's independence [17]. Their revivalist pride in Hindu India's achievement, particularly of the Arthashastra–Asoka bureaucracy forms an obvious romantic intellectual link apart from the continuing use of the district overlord in administration.

### **3.4 British East India Company**

The institution of the district overlord had survived in some weak form during the anarchy following the break up of the Mughul Empire in the eighteenth century. When the East India Company acquired the Diwani of Bengal (revenue collecting rights) from the Mughul emperor they did not take over this institution straight away. There was a horrendous interregnum of wholesale plunder, leasing of revenue to rapacious tax collectors and a man-made famine. Ultimately, under Warren Hastings as governor-general, a full-time officer called collector was appointed to collect land revenue and later he was progressively clothed with the responsibility of law and order, agriculture, roads, education, indeed almost all aspects of administration, thus replicating the traditional Indian district overlord [18]. The institution was first justified by governors-general like Sir John Shore—on the need to present a united authoritarian figure to the Orientals. In this century, it was justified by the Simon Commission as the need to bring face to face the common man with a complaint and an officer combining authority to settle it. Indeed British viceroys and statesmen were never tired of singing its praises. When the British organized their administration in Southeast Asia and in Africa later, they replicated this institution.

The adoption and export of this ancient Indian administrative institution to all the Afro-Asian possessions of the British Empire was initiated and facilitated by two major factors. In the first place when the British came to India, they had nothing in their own domestic administrative arrangements which they could transplant or replicate in India. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the British landed aristocrats including country squires governed the country on a voluntaristic pattern based on the gentleman-amateur ethic [19]. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, British intellectuals and politicians reviled “bureaucracy” as a continental disease of France and Prussia. They had nothing in their own administrative repertoire as the French had, for governing their Indian acquisitions. They were happy to revive and use the traditional Indian idea of the district overlord in the late eighteenth century.

The second factor was the strong influence of utilitarian philosophy on Indian administrators in combination with their own paternalism in the mid-nineteenth century [20]. James Mill and John Stuart Mill, T. B. Macaulay, James Stephen, and Charles Trevelyan were all imbued with the utilitarian spirit of reform which they could not fully implement in their own homeland against traditionalist critics, but in India they had a free hand. The district overlord was to be recruited not ascriptively, but by a modern performance test, i.e., a competitive examination designed by Macaulay and to be armed with thoroughly streamlined legal codes bettering Code Napoleon. Thus the Indian district collector—the scion of the Mauryan Empire, revived and modernized by the British rulers in India bestrode the empire for a century—and is still around somewhat politicized—as the district coordinator and the hope of district development in India, Malaysia, and Africa.

### 3.5 Marxist and Weberian Attitudes

Our analysis of ancient Indian bureaucracy as such seems self-sufficient in terms of our parameters. But a brief glance at Weber's and Marx's ideas in this regard may be attempted cautiously. The first difficulty in this is that there is no agreement among competing Marxists and non-Marxists as to what is meant by Marx's AMP or Precapitalist Mode of Production [21]. Secondly, several scholars have pointed out, the meager undeveloped European orientalist sources from which Weber and Marx drew [22]. Without bothering to study that debate we can look at the question afresh in our own way.

We may assume that Weber's characterization of modern legal rational bureaucracy involves (1) the mutual complementarity of these characteristics, and (2) assumes that a market and monetary economy was essential for these characteristics to be sustained. It then follows that ancient bureaucracies having only some of the characteristics and not being based on a monetary economy could not continue as legal-rational bureaucracies. We can argue that this mode of dismissing them is arbitrary. The Mauryan bureaucracy in India or the Han and Tang bureaucracies in China and certainly the Persian bureaucracy exhibited the main characteristics of the Weberian list, of hierarchy, rules and regulations, division of labor, and career orientation in a sustained manner for long periods, in an economy which was at least partly monetary though predominantly barter and exchange based.. There is thus no need to lump them under some pejorative labels like patrimonial or prebendal for nonstudy. The real argument for a sharper identification of modern legal-rational bureaucracy away from ancient bureaucracies was never spelled out precisely by Weber himself though it may be inferred by the second remove by marrying the general approach of Weber to that of his great contemporaries Tonnies and Durkheim. These two were more preoccupied with the emerging reorganization of Western society from all-purpose natural groups into functional artificial associations—a development which Tocqueville had noticed already in America, which artists and poets bewailed, and which Frazer had noted by contrast in his *Golden Bough*. Tonnies dealt with this development as such in detail while Durkheim was more concerned with its “consequence anomie” and the “organic” mode of integrating the emerging social units. Weber was aware of their work and its close relation to his own, but for unknown personal reasons these three contemporaries would not draw sustenance from each other's work.

It is, however, clear to us that relating them gives us better explanation of the strength and weakness of ancient bureaucracies than Weber was inclined to inquire. Thus the impersonal legal-rational characteristics of modern bureaucracy—are sustained by a *Gesellschaft* society that is

itself organized into partly impersonal functional associations. This correspondence, makes it easy for bureaucracy's recruitment of personnel from society and its smooth interactions with society just as a monetary economy makes a bureaucratic career dependent on job performance with bureaucracy as a vocation—unlike in feudalistic prebendal or other modes of remuneration. To the extent to which bureaucracy's impersonal characteristics were divorced from that of a *gemeinschaft* society, it was vulnerable either to continuous dilution by contact or ineffectiveness by isolation. The lapses of bureaucratic into feudal structures in ancient India developed partly because of this. A similar development also overtook even Tudor bureaucracy in England after Elizabeth I because it was evolved during a period of limited transport and communications and had fulfilled its main purpose of unifying the country.

It was an enlightened landed aristocracy that took power in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and ran the country on a voluntaristic basis without much bureaucracy for a century and a half, while bureaucracy took shape later in Louis XIV's France and Frederick the Great's Prussia when feudalism was in its death throes and a *gesellschaft* society was evolving along with faster communications [23]. It was this harmonious simultaneous evolution of society into *gesellschaft* and bureaucracy that sustained both in the nineteenth century and later. It was the isolation of bureaucracy in a *gemeinschaft* society that diluted it sooner or later.

Marx's AMP has been interpreted differently by Marxists themselves, but let us assume for the sake of argument that it meant bureaucratically controlled state monopolies in production without private property. It is doubtful if that picture was obtained at all, in India, in its fullness during any period. In fact, during the late eighteenth century, when the East India Company was just entering India, it did not show such a picture at all. There was some state controlled production by Kharkhanas under the Mughuls at one end, a substantial accumulation of capital for investment at another end, and a large surplus of privately manufactured cotton goods for export—a strange combination indeed. The firm establishment of British rule, far from generating an outburst of local capitalism as Marx might have expected, killed the textile industry, diverted Indian capital into money-lending and gold or ornament manufacture, and created a purely salaried and professional bourgeoisie. Later Marxists like Kusinen have explained this as an alliance of monopoly capitalism in its imperial phase with the traditional elite (Degras). Whatever the merits of the original or refurbished AMP concept, it is clear that it gives no insights into the role of ancient or medieval Indian bureaucracy in the context of the society at that time and Wittfogel's modified theory relating hydraulic society and bureaucratic control (which is disowned by several Marxists) does no better as we have already argued. In short, one purpose of this chapter is to argue that neither Marx nor Weber have all that much to offer in understanding ancient bureaucracies and to suggest a really fresh look at them without rigid Weberian or Marxist commitments.

## References

1. Gerth, H.H. and Wright Mills, C. *From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1946; Weber, M. *Economy and Society*, Bedminster Press, New York, 1968.
2. Marx, K. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1973.
3. Feur, L. *Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, Fontana Library, London, 1969.
4. Balazs, E. *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964.
5. Eisenstadt, S.N. *Political Systems of Empires*, Free Press, New York, 1967.
6. Prasad, B. *State and Government in Ancient India*, Motilal Bemirsidas, Delhi, 1958.

- 7 . Sastry, S.R. *Kmtilya's Arthmastra*, Mysore Printing and Publishing House, Mysore, 1967.
- 8 . Puri, B.N. *History of Indian Administration*, Vol. I, *Ancient Period*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1968, Chapter III.
9. Ibid.
- 1 0. Ibid.
- 1 1. Ibid.
- 1 2. Subramaniam, V. *Cultural Integration in India*, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, Chapter II.
13. Fitzgerald, C.P. China. In *A Short Cultural History*, Praeger, New York, 1961, Chapter IV.
- 1 4. Ibid.
- 1 5. Ibid.
- 1 6. Puri, B.N. *History of Indian Administration*, Vol. II, *Medieval Period*, Bh aratiya Vidya Bh avan, Bombay, 1975, Chapter VI.
- 1 7. Subramaniam, V. *Transplanted Indo-British Administration*, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1977; Sub ramaniam, V. (ed.). *Public Administration in the Thir d World*, G reenwood Pu blishing Group, Westport, 1990, Appendix II.
18. Subramaniam, 1977, *ibid.*, Chapter 7.
19. *Ibid.*, Chapters 6 and 10.
- 20 . Misra, B.B. *The Indian Middle Classes*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1963; Sen, A.K. and Williams, B. *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1982.
- 2 1. Krader, L. *The Asiatic Mode of P roduction*, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1975; Anderson, P. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, New Left Book, New York, 1974; Lichtheim, G. *Marx and the Asiatic Mode of Production*. St. Anthony's Papers 14, Oxford, 1963.
- 2 2. Turner, B. *For Weber: Essays on t he Sociology of Fa te*. R outledge & K egan P aul, L ondon, 1981, pp. 278–284.
23. Subramaniam, V. British administrative institutions: Paradoxes of acceptance, adaptation and rejection. *The Round Table*, 72, 306–316, 1983.

## Chapter 4

---

# Bureaucracy in the Ottoman–Turkish Polity

---

Metin Heper and A. Ümit Berkman

### CONTENTS

4.1	The Initial Institutionalization Pattern and Its Degeneration, <i>ca.</i> 1299–1789 .....	66
4.2	The Emergence of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition and the Reactions to It, <i>ca.</i> 1789–1909.....	68
4.3	Consolidation of the Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition, <i>ca.</i> 1909–1950 .....	70
4.4	The Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition on Trial in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century .....	73
4.5	The Early 2000s.....	77
	Notes .....	79
	References .....	79

In the Ottoman–Turkish political evolution (from 1299 to the present) both government and civil bureaucracy went through significant changes. An early classification among the political institutions of the Ottoman Empire was that by Lybyer (1913), which distinguished the “Ruling Institution” from the “Moslem Institution”: the former was made up of the sultan and his household, the civil bureaucracy, and the military; the latter consisted of the religious bureaucracy. The “executive” and “administrative” functions were carried out, at least during the earlier centuries, by the civil and religious bureaucracies, respectively (İnalçık, 1954). According to another classification (Karpas, 1968, p. 72), the latter together formed the “men of pen,” who were distinguished from the “men of sword,” or the military. In the Republican Turkey (1923 to the present), the “general



civil service” comprised officials and employees of the central government, including judges, foreign service personnel, teachers and professors in public schools and universities, and the administrative and clerical staff of the ministries (Kingsbury and Aktan, 1955, p. 22).

This chapter is an analysis of the place of the higher civil servants in the Ottoman and the Republican Turkish politics. The bureaucratic elite in question were primarily involved in “politics” rather than in “administration.” The higher bureaucrats, in fact, considered themselves as a group quite different from the middle and lower bureaucrats. Midhat Pasha, grand vizier during the late 1860s, referred to the middle and lower echelons of bureaucracy as “ordinary functionaries and secretaries” (Pakalın, 1940, p. 41). And one author referred to the higher civil servants of the Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey as “high cadre” (Atay, 1969, p. 365). Certainly, higher bureaucrats in both the Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey were far superior to the rest of civil servants, by virtue of the education they received (Berkes, 1964; Dodd, 1965; Mardin, 1969a).

During the Ottoman period, higher civil servants generally carried the title of “pasha.” Before the *Tanzimat* (Reform) period, starting in 1839, that title was given to the governors of the provinces, the viziers of the capital, and the officials immediately below in rank. After 1839, the officials in the first four (of nine) grades of the civil (and military) hierarchy had the title of pasha (Deny, 1936, pp. 1030–1031). Republican Turkey retained that title for officers only (and that for a while). During the Republican period, the higher civil service comprised undersecretary, general director, chairman of ministerial boards of inspection, and other officials in similar advisory and controlling positions in the highest ranks (Dodd, 1965, p. 269; Roos and Roos, 1968, p. 27).

## 4.1 The Initial Institutionalization Pattern and Its Degeneration, ca. 1299–1789

The aloof attitude of Ottoman and Turkish higher civil servants toward their subordinates, was a replica of their relations with social groups, and later, with politicians. The Ottoman–Turkish polity and its social structure developed out of a nucleus of *ghazi*<sup>1</sup> traditions and in the process adopted Islam. The group of *ghazis* that eventually formed the state had come into contact with Islam when they were placed on both sides of the Islam-Byzantium frontiers. They had, however, even during those earlier centuries, preserved the autonomous norms of a ruling tradition (Witteck, 1965, pp. 17–18). Later, this tradition was reinforced when the Ruling Institution was served almost exclusively by the converts to Islam having the status of slaves of the sultan (İnalçık, 1973).

Although initially, young “Turks” were recruited, gradually Christian boys, specially levied and educated, constituted the backbone of the civil and military bureaucracies. From the brightest among them, a group was selected to be trained in the Palace School (Enderun), established by Mehmet the Conqueror (1451–1481), shortly after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. There they received an intensive training lasting as long as 12 years. Eventually, a chosen few were given responsible positions in the civil bureaucracy. Others were destined to serve in the military (Toynbee and Kirkwood, 1927; Miller, 1941; Gibb and Bowen, 1950). Such a recruitment pattern and the special education which the recruits went through made them faithful servants of the sultan: “[The civil bureaucrats and the members of the military were] entirely devoted to the will and commendments of the Grand Signor, that is, one who does blindly all that he orders, and if possible, all that he thinks” (Miller, 1941, p. 70).

Thus during this earlier period in the Ottoman–Turkish political evolution, bureaucrats supported an absolute system of government with power concentrated at the apex of the polity, that is, in the sultan. This concentration of powers was considered necessary in order to preserve harmony

through providing justice. An old maxim repeated in Turkish political literature from *Kutadgu Bilik* in the eleventh century to the *Gülhane* Rescript of 1839, indicated the need for upholding justice: “A ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice” (İnalçık, 1964, p. 43).

As a prop to the institutionalization pattern delineated here a fief, or timariot, system had been established. The state held the legal ownership of the land where the fiefs worked, leaving only the right of usufruct to the distinguished members of the cavalry. The cavalry obligated the villagers, part of the *reaya* (subject people who paid taxes but had no part in government), to cultivate land or to go through a military drill and be part of a cavalry unit which joined the sultan’s army in time of war. The merchants and craftsmen were rigidly organized into guilds. Istanbul had not existed as a Muslim city before its fall in 1453, and the conquerors found there no ancient Islamic society with its inner structure already full-grown, and, therefore, no natural leaders in ancient families with an inherited social prestige (Hourani, 1968, p. 47).

This particular social structure ruled out the flourishing of any autonomous local aristocracies. And members of the polity other than the sultan were essentially salaried functionaries of the state with no feudal privileges. They did not usually own any significant amount of land; after their death, their riches would be seized by the state. The sultan monopolized all of the economic resources (Heper, 1980).

The system that emerged was essentially a closed system, save for limited interactions with other systems through war, and as such was primarily an indigenous system with no trace of Westernization or the democratization processes. The concept of the “Ottoman way” was thus developed; it included a belief in the superiority of the system. At the time it *was* superior, particularly in military terms, to the systems around it. The awareness of this fact led to an overconfidence in the system itself and to an undue effort to keep it intact. Thus was developed the concept of *nizam*, roughly meaning “preservation of order.”

However, as soon as the Ottoman Empire was consolidated into its quasimedieval structure (*ca.* the second part of the sixteenth century), destructive forces began to work within it. In the first place, fundamental transformations that took place in the pattern and volume of production and trade, and of precious metal stocks, and the resultant price increases in Europe, played a fundamental role in the disintegration of the socioeconomic structure of the empire. In the process, handicrafts declined; industry could not flourish. The ensuing adverse trade relations led to financial difficulties. Second, the wars that the empire engaged in toward the end of the sixteenth century and thereafter, no longer provided war booty and, in the last analysis, led to financial losses (Shaw, 1976, pp. 171–174).

As a consequence, the fief system was eliminated, and the taxing rights were sold to private parties—the so-called tax-farmers. This was followed by the emergence of *ayan*, or local notables. The resultant compartmentalization of power and politics between the center and the periphery loosened the grip of the sultans on the economic resources of the empire, with an accompanying slackening of their control on the bureaucracy.

Consequently, two cardinal principles of the military were abandoned: the prohibition against marriage before retirement on pension, and the prohibition against engaging in any craft or trade (Gibb and Bowen, 1950, p. 182). Concerning the civil component of government, first, the initiation of policy was gradually transferred from the sultan to the grand vizierate. During the seventeenth century, the grand viziers’ official residence, which in time came to be known as the Sublime Porte, became the real center of government. The Imperial Divan still met, but only occasionally and for purely ceremonial matters (Lewis, 1961, p. 372). Second, with the degeneration of training (Toynbee and Kirkwood, 1927, p. 26) and with the introduction of nepotism into the ranks of the civil bureaucracy, that institution developed political orientations not in keeping

with the political philosophy of the earlier period: there was a growth in caprice in government. During this period of change, the Ottoman “government became decidedly less ‘constitutional’ than it had been” (Gibb and Bowen, 1950, p. 199).

During the early Ottoman centuries, the civil bureaucracy was a relatively insignificant component of the government. During the period of disintegration, it benefited from the disintegration of power at the apex. At the time, civil bureaucratic elite became part of the ruling oligarchy comprising the military, religious, and civil bureaucracies; they shared with the other members of the oligarchy norms deriving from neotraditionalism and Islam. A set of bureaucratic norms in the form of Westernization goals was to develop only when the civil bureaucratic elite began to make contacts with the West from the eighteenth century onward. In the latter set of norms could be found the seeds of a bureaucratic ruling tradition.

## 4.2 The Emergence of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition and the Reactions to It, ca. 1789–1909

The period of nearly a century, extending from the accession of Sultan Selim III (1789) to the First Ottoman constitutional period (1876–1879), is a crucial era for the emergence and development of the bureaucratic ruling tradition (Findley, 1980, 1989). During this period, efforts were made to curb the disintegration process that had started two centuries earlier; in the process the civil bureaucratic elite became the leading component of government. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the following century, however, the civil bureaucracy and the worldview it represented came under severe attacks.

From the end of the eighteenth century it was conceived as appropriate to diverge from the old order, which had degenerated anyway, in order to save the empire (Shaw, 1971). The new worldview admitted the superiority of European countries, at least in some respects, and of the need to adopt first some “techniques” and later full “technologies” from those countries.

In accordance with the new strategic decision to abandon a static concept of society, an effort was made to free the polity from any ready-made formula, which would impede its ability to effect the changes deemed necessary. From this point on the public, policies and programs were to be complimentary neither to basic Islamic formulae nor to the “will” of the ruler in its old sense; the only criterion in promulgating such policies and programs was going to be “reason” (Berkes, 1964, pp. 132–133).

It was really the civil bureaucratic elite who, in the process, assumed the policy-making function. The sultan was responsible for promulgation of policy decisions, but more and more they were developed by the advisory councils of the quasiautonomous ministries and departments and by advisory councils outside and above the ministries or departments. All these agencies were gradually staffed by a new generation of civil servants different in their outlook and with a new sense of responsibility (Lewis, 1961, p. 99).

The rise to prominence of the civil bureaucratic elite was a consequence of the efforts of Sultan Mahmut II (1807–1839) to relegate into a secondary position the other powerful groups in the polity. The first move along these lines was against provincial notables who had deprived the central ruling bodies of some of their economic resources. In 1812, immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Russia, Mahmut II began to suppress such notables. He crushed them by military means, often using one against the other, or deprived them of their titles and leases so that they were forced to submit. It was then decided to entrust public services in the provinces exclusively to salaried civil servants appointed by the central government. The tax-farming system was

abolished in 1831, and the central administration appointed revenue collectors (*muhassıls*) directly attached to the central government (Lewis, 1961, p. 61; Shaw and Shaw, 1977, pp. 1–54).

Once the provincial notables were to a large extent suppressed, Mahmut II could make his move against the Janissaries, the cream of the military. After much maneuvering, he was able to get rid of them in 1826. He also entrusted to the civil bureaucracy the administration of *evkaf*—the charitable foundations and endowments which constituted the chief repository of ecclesiastical economic power (Chambers, 1964, p. 317).

The economic resources so retrieved came to a great degree under the control of the civil bureaucracy. The objective was to develop a bureaucracy able to save the empire through political formulae based on “reason.” The newly created military, known as *Nizam-ı Cedid*, or New Order, was expected to support the civil bureaucracy in the latter’s mission in question. The military bureaucracy was rendered subordinate to the military.<sup>2</sup>

Contacts of the bureaucracy with the West had started long before Sultan Selim III’s reign, when some bureaucrats were sent to Western capitals on fact-finding missions. More organized contacts with the West followed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Early borrowings from the West were in the area of the military. Then, as the earlier assumption of Ottoman supremacy was abandoned, the Sultans began to send regular diplomatic missions instead of ad hoc envoys to the major Western capitals.

In the capital, what may be considered as the first institution of education for the new group of higher civil servants was the Translation Chamber, established by Mahmut II in 1833 when, after the Greek revolt in the late 1820s, he gave up his reliance on Greek interpreters and replaced them with Muslims. The Muslims were to master French in the Translation Chamber. The establishment of this chamber was soon followed by founding of several schools to provide training for bureaucratic careers. The basic goal was to train “enlightened statesmen” (Onur, 1964, pp. 45–46).

The civil servants who received education in the said chamber and the schools viewed themselves as a group apart from social groups, as from the sultan. In their opinion, they were the only group fit to administer the empire (Mardin, 1962, pp. 179, 182–183, 187–188). They were known as “the group of high officials belonging to the Reşit Pasha school” (Pakalın, 1940, p. 59).<sup>3</sup> The members of this group considered themselves as the servants of the state, not of the sultan (Mardin, 1957a, p. 13). They assumed that the policies developed by them and freed from Islamic traditions would be best for the empire. Grand Vizier Âli Pasha, of this group of bureaucrats known as the Old Ottomans, justified the measures he had taken in order to stay on top by saying that he could not trust other people (Mardin, 1955, p. 10).

In order to ensure the continuity of their pattern of rule, the Old Ottomans developed the idea of “institutions replacing individual rulers.” Reşit Pasha argued that consistency and intelligent administration could only be obtained if “institutions” were established and if these institutions were endowed with a ruling tradition.<sup>4</sup> Such an approach was diametrically opposed to the council of a certain Sarı Mehmet Pasha, who in the eighteenth century had argued that the Ottoman Empire could be saved only if competent sultans could be had (Wright, 1935).

In their efforts to realize the autonomy of the civil bureaucracy, the Old Ottomans resorted to heavy-handed policies. Such methods found their opponents in the persons of the Young Ottomans. Some members of the civil bureaucracy broke camp in the 1860s with the grand viziers of the decade (Âli and Fuat Pashas), and started agitating for the introduction of some sort of a liberalization process. They put particular emphasis on “representation”: “Âli was... [in the Young Ottomans’ view] the symbol and apex of a tyrannical bureaucracy. Namık Kemal [a leading critic of the Old Ottomans] wrote with effective irony about the peasant who visiting Istanbul and seeing

many fine houses, thinks there must be many Sultans. There are many Sultans, the peasant is told, but they lack the title. They are ministers” (Davison, 1963, p. 223).

It is significant, however, that the Young Ottomans had only a rationalist democracy in mind. According to Namık Kemal, “the government could limit individual rights and liberties only by laws conforming to abstract good” (Berkes, 1964, p. 211). According to the Young Ottomans’ version of representative principle, the good of the country was to be decided not by a handful of bureaucrats but by a larger group of intelligentsia.

The bureaucratic ruling tradition espoused by the Old Ottomans experienced even more difficult years during the era of Abdülhamit II (1876–1909). The strategic decision of the Hamidian era was to a great extent abandon Westernization and replace it with “Islamic civilization” (Berkes, 1964, pp. 261–262, 268). The neotraditionalism in question rejected both the secular policies of the Old Ottomans and “liberal” policies of the Young Ottomans. One reflection of this new approach was the emphasis placed on religion under the banner of Pan-Islamism, formulated to hold the empire together through Islamic solidarity.

Abdülhamit II tried hard to render the civil bureaucracy subservient to him. For instance, he allowed no grand vizier to become entrenched in office until he found men he trusted. During the 6 years after he prorogued the Parliament in 1877, there were 16 tenants of the grand vizierate. In the eyes of Abdülhamit II, “meritorious bureaucracy” was “loyal bureaucracy” (Pears, 1917, p. 106).

However, even during this period, bureaucratic orientations acquired during the Old and Young Ottoman times were not entirely abandoned. As Lewis (1961, pp. 194–195) has noted, “The government of Turkey was still the accepted and recognized prerogative of an elite of professionals who retained all the rights and duties of politics, including that of opposition.”

In the persistence of such political orientations among the bureaucratic elite, secularly oriented high schools played a crucial role. Among such high schools, the Civil Service School, or *Mülkiye*, continued to be an intellectual center. Even under the pressure of the Hamidian regime it remained a “forcing ground of new ideas” (Lewis, 1961, pp. 180–181). Of the many forces which contributed to the revolution of 1908, as a consequence of which Abdülhamit II was removed from his throne and the Second Constitutional Period inaugurated, a Western type of education and Western liberal ideas among the Ottoman intelligentsia have been considered important (Kazamias, 1966, p. 99). Among others, some of the high officials had become rallying points for discreet opposition against Abdülhamit II (Hourani, 1968, p. 59).

It must be noted that although the earlier political orientations persisted during the Abdülhamit era, the members of the civil bureaucracy who had such orientations were largely precluded from holding influential positions. Nevertheless, as indicated, the ruling tradition of the earlier decades was not altogether abandoned. It is true that during the Young Turk period (1908–1918)<sup>5</sup> that followed the Abdülhamit era, the military spearheaded Westernization efforts. The civil bureaucracy, however, was not entirely out of the political scene.

### 4.3 Consolidation of the Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition, ca. 1909–1950

The leaders of the Young Turk era were, according to Berkes (1964, p. 329), the “Turks who had broken with tradition through education.” This description of those leaders unequivocally shows the strategic decision of this period: again it was a decision to resort to Westernization. In fact, this was the period during which the ground was prepared for the early Republican secularizing reforms.

In 1916, a bill was passed with the aim of doing away with the *Şeriat* (Islamic Canon Law). The bill also provided for taking away from Sheikhulislam (the highest religious official) the administration of those primary schools which operated with the income of the pious foundations. The new Marriage Act introduced civil marriage instead of the religious one. The Koran was translated into Turkish, despite great protest from the religious community (Sugar, 1964, p. 134).

On the whole, the military spearheaded the efforts at secularization. From the late Abdülhamit II era, because of the significance attached to increasing military threats from abroad, emphasis had been placed on higher military schools. The military schools far outnumbered the schools from which the civil functionaries came (Ramsaur, 1957, p. 18). Besides their greater numbers, the military schools were better in quality than the civil schools: “In the Empire the best schools, teachers, and equipment had been provided for the officers: the officer corps had hence become Westernized early” (Sugar, 1964, p. 162). The military thus assumed leadership of the secularization process. In fact, during the early years of the Young Turk era, the officers dismissed “(p)alace-oriented pashas and reactionary and useless functionaries” (Pears, 1919, p. 244; Lewis, 1961, p. 238), whom they despised (Whitman, 1919, pp. 162–163).

However, as a whole, the civil bureaucracy continued to play a significant role. Despite the militaristic trappings of the Young Turk government, internal policies of that government necessitated paying increased attention to the civil bureaucracy. For one thing, the policy of developing a “national economy”<sup>6</sup> made it imperative that a governmental machinery for “economic planning and control” be developed (Sugar, 1964, p. 160). Still more significantly, the objective of progress involving “cultural” change<sup>7</sup> made the involvement of the civil bureaucracy in carrying out “progressive” policies indispensable:

It is noteworthy... that as early as the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the part played by Enver the Soldier appears to have been spectacular rather than genuinely dominant, and that the movement was directed and sustained behind the scenes by Talat Bey, (originally) a Salonican telegraphy clerk and Javid Bey, a financier of Jewish extraction—that is by Turks who had received their training in two non-military branches of Western technical achievement. (Toynbee and Kirkwood, 1927, p. 39)

In fact, the contribution of civil functionaries to the Young Turk movement had begun during the last years of the Abdülhamit II era. Junior bureaucrats—schoolteachers, telegraph clerks, and junior administrators—had joined the camp with the military in the movement against the regime (Rustow, 1964, p. 361; Ahmad, 1969, pp. 1–13). During the Young Turk period, special attention was given to these lower echelons as part of the socialization activities of the Committee of Union and Progress—the political organ of the Young Turk movement (Szyliowicz, 1966, p. 269).

Consequently, as already noted, the civil bureaucracies were not altogether out of the political scene; to a certain extent, they participated in the politics of the Young Turk era (İnal, 1951). As a continuation of the political ideology of the Young Ottoman,<sup>8</sup> the Young Turks championed, at least in their early years, the liberal political norms. In the face of Islamic resistance, however, the movement soon reverted to heavy-handed policies, to effect an “enlightened despotism” (Yalman, 1956, p. 55).

With this reorientation, the ruling tradition of the military and civil bureaucracies was again revived. In the process, the intellectuals of the Young Turk movement further elaborated on the earlier concepts. One such intellectual was a certain Ahmet Rıza, a bureaucrat. He aimed at awakening Turkish people through education. Rıza introduced a concept which implied invariable

relations between “things.” Since such a law could only be conceived by experts, it was necessary to leave politics to the latter (Mardin, 1969b, pp. 6–7). Another intellectual of the period was Abdullah Cevdet. The core of Cevdet’s thought, too, consisted in the idea of educating the people, who were to be guided by the elite (Mardin, 1969b, pp. 12–16).

In these ideas, one can easily see the seeds of various concepts later encountered in the bureaucratic ruling tradition of the early Republican era (1923 to the present). The new strategic decision of the early Republican period was “wholesale” acceptance of “Western civilization”—a total transformation of the social, economic, and political life of the nation.

However, as a contemporary author has noted, Atatürk believed that only after “cultural” awakening could the Turkish nation attempt economic development (Karaosmanoğlu, 1968, p. 116). The transformation was to be total in a cultural sense (Mardin, 1971). It was still to be selective Westernization, but borrowing from the West was no longer to be hindered by Islamic traditions.

By far the most significant step in the formation of the leading cadre of the Republic was what is often referred to as “Angora Reform”—to solidify the hold of Atatürk and his close associates on the dominant intellectual group in Turkish society. Atatürk believed that reason and scientific method could create an almost unlimited future of material progress (Ward, 1942, pp. 51–52). Thus, if an elite could be trained with a secular and rational bent of mind, such a group could lead Turkey to prosperity and esteem (Frey, 1965, pp. 40–42).

The new political cadre of the early years of the Turkish Republic emerged from a small group composed of Atatürk and his close associates. These intellectual-political leaders, however, comprised a tiny group in terms of the polity proper. Even if the new political-“cultural” goals aimed at transforming some “superstructure” institutions only, the implementation of the ensuing policies would have necessitated the services of a bureaucracy. For this purpose, out of the three institutions, initially, the military was utilized to a great extent. However, once the War of Independence (1919–1922) was over, the military was played down and more attention was paid to the civil bureaucracy. The new approach made it necessary, of course, that the religious bureaucracy be suppressed to a large extent.

On the other hand, what emerged from the war was a civil bureaucracy with a dual loyalty: “Alongside national young bureaucrats... (there were) bureaucrats from the Sublime Porte. The nationalist wing of the bureaucracy always found the Sublime Porte wing in opposition to itself in the reformist movements” (Avcioğlu, 1969, p. 155). Consequently, first, some purges were made, and second, steps were taken to gain the loyalty of the remaining former bureaucrats, who had to be employed because of a lack of qualified personnel. However, as the civil bureaucratic cadres were less than satisfactory for carrying out the Westernization policies, a new breed of civil servants had to be created (Heper, 1980–1981).

As a result, a long-range program of educating a new generation of civil servants loyal to the Republican ethics was adopted (Atay, 1969, p. 448). Consequently, the new schools of higher learning, according to Atatürk, were intended to be not merely the training ground for high officials and legal specialists but, more important, the basis of a new jurisdiction consistent with revolutionary ideals and in harmony with the social needs of Turkey (Wortham, 1931, p. 207).

The formal education offered in these schools was conducive to an extremely elitist political attitude. It aimed at creating graduates who were intellectually superior, well-versed in normative-theoretical formulations (Kazamias, 1966, pp. 135, 147, 151, 220ff). As a result of this pattern of education and the specific mode of modernization—Westernization with an emphasis on only selective institutions—reformism soon acquired a static meaning (Selek, 1968, p. 713). For instance, when in 1945 a land reform bill was proposed:

(T)he deputies in the Assembly banded into two groups as soon as the debate on the law started—one in favor of the law, the other opposed to certain parts, namely to the drastic expropriation aspects of the law... The first group was composed mostly of intellectuals and government officials who adopted a social-intellectual approach to land reform. The second group, composed mostly of deputies with some personal interests involved, adopted a technical viewpoint. (Karpas, 1959, p. 119)

Gradually the civil bureaucracy's place in the polity was solidified. The civil bureaucracy was organized as a career civil service. Special laws and regulations protected the bureaucracy from arbitrary interference by the political executive. A civil servant who was denied promotion or removed from an attractive post remained in the service and could seek promotion and reinstatement by appeal to the Council of State (the Turkish version of France's Conseil d'Etat). The later council was composed of civil servants and as such provided a secure bulwark against unfair treatment. The civil bureaucracy was also made a caste system through the seniority rule and an educational caste system. Initial entry was governed by educational qualifications; thereafter, seniority played a significant role. Lateral entry was insignificant (Eren, 1963, p. 36; Chambers, 1964, pp. 308–309). The civil bureaucrats, secure in their jobs, enjoyed relatively high salaries. During the war years, their salaries were reinforced with assistance in kind—coal, clothing, sugar, fat, rice and the like (Karpas, 1959, pp. 129–130).

The bureaucratic ruling tradition reached its zenith in the late 1930s, when the civil bureaucracy adopted the principles Atatürk and his associates had developed and when its place was reinforced in the polity and society. At the same time, however, forces were preparing the doomsday of the happy marriage between the bureaucratic and political elites of the 1930s. While the ruling elite had assumed “an integrated and classless society” to be raised “to the level of contemporary civilization” through populist and nationalist and to a lesser extent *étatist* policies, their non-doctrinaire and ambivalent economic approach allowed the strengthening of certain social and economic interests in society.

The new economic groups had no ambition to capture the political office so long as the political–bureaucratic elite satisfied themselves with reforms that did not unfavorably affect the economic interests of the new groups. When this came to an end, the new groups decided to capture the government. They were aided by an emerging liberal intelligentsia opposed to the repressive policies of the 1940s (Frey, 1965, p. 282). With the coming to power of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1950, a new era started.

#### 4.4 The Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition on Trial in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

The Democrats wished to break the shackles that had been imposed upon the polity by the bureaucratic elite; they were opposed to the latter's prescriptive static Westernization and rather cautious economic policies (Heper, 1991, p. 679). The Democrats made a distinction between Westernizing reforms “accepted by the people” and those not accepted (Tunaya, 1962, p. 223). They made concessions on religious matters (Reed, 1954, p. 281). Concerning the economy, they wanted to speed up the processes toward more liberal economic policies. The intellectual–bureaucratic reaction against the Democrats was primarily a reaction to the new concept of state, which was perceived as contrary to the earlier bureaucratic ruling tradition: the intellectual–bureaucratic elites thought that politics was no longer used “to promote the interests of the nation as a whole,” but



to promote the ends of “a privileged few.” Second, because of concessions on the Westernization reforms, “irrational” was preferred to “rational.” Intellectualism was abandoned; politics was no longer based on “reason.”

Under the shield of autonomy granted to them in 1946, university professors had largely initiated the intellectual–bureaucratic reaction. Four basic ideas had been given special emphasis: (1) action should be guided by ideas, (2) ideas should be intellectually respectable, (3) politics should not be a process of providing benefits to certain social groups, and (4) the civil bureaucracy should be given a more prominent place in Turkish polity.<sup>9</sup> The professors’ most willing audience were the civil bureaucrats (Berkes, 1964, pp. 89ff.).

As would be expected, the democrats reacted negatively to the ideas. When a law was passed to restrict academic freedom, a faculty member from the School of Political Science (*Mülkiye*) of Ankara University asked a deputy (an old family friend) why he had sponsored that bill; the deputy’s answer was “I can’t stand the ideas you spread in the faculty. I wanted to put a stop to them” (Ross, 1960, p. 17). A similar statement was made by the then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, too (Aksoy, 1957, p. 11). At the time, the government passed separate laws to restrict academic freedom.

Even if the civil bureaucrats did not play as active a role as the university staff members, they, too, in their own way tried to keep alive the bureaucratic ruling tradition. Despite the fact that the DP governments dismissed some key bureaucrats, reduced the economic status of the civil bureaucracy, and avoided the usual bureaucratic channels as much as possible,<sup>10</sup> the bureaucratic elite asserted their right to rule, that is, to contribute substantially to the making of critical decisions. “Unshakably confident of ... [their] higher responsibilities to the nation” they did not look with favor at the efforts to make them more responsive to closer public scrutiny (Bent, 1969). Imbued with a paternalistic philosophy (Eren, 1963, p. 170), they complained that the new political elite dragged politics down into the streets (Yalman, 1956, p. 227). In response to a survey question the author put to them, 34 of the 36 civil servants, who held the highest bureaucratic posts in the 1945–1960 period, agreed (in 1969) that “what Turkey needs more than anything else is experienced and informed people significantly contributing to public policy-making,” and, needless to say, they considered themselves as best fitting that definition (Heper, 1976, p. 516).

Unlike the civil bureaucratic elite at the time, the military, too, took democracy as a discourse at a higher level of rationality. As a consequence, the 1961 Constitution, drawn up in the wake of the 1960 military intervention, legitimized the de facto political influence of the bureaucratic intelligentsia. Article 4 stipulated, “The nation shall exercise its sovereignty through the authorized agencies as prescribed by the principles laid down in the Constitution.” The 1924 Constitution had simply stated that the nation would exercise its sovereignty through the Grand National Assembly. The authorized agencies included the newly created Constitutional Court and National Security Council; the Council of State, which had new powers; the Turkish Radio and Television agency, which had autonomy and independence from the government; the universities, which were now granted full academic freedom. The Constitution allowed incomplete political participation, and it designated certain bureaucratically staffed agencies as the watchdogs of the political regime (Heper, 1985, pp. 88–89).

The political elite, however, had no sympathies with the regime, that the 1961 Constitution aimed at institutionalizing in Turkey. Celal Bayar, president of the republic from 1950 to 1960, declared the Constitution was no more than a constitutional legitimating of the bureaucracy and the intellectuals (Mardin, 1973, p. 186). Süleyman Demirel, several times prime minister after 1965, repeatedly complained that the country could not be governed with the 1961 Constitution (Heper, 1985, p. 89), and the Justice party governments of the late 1960s and the Nationalist

Front governments of the 1970s continually challenged the jurisdictions of the Council of State and the Constitutional Court.

The bureaucratic elite's response was that of engaging in "negative politics"; the bureaucracy on one side and the government and parliament on the other became hostile powers (Heper, 1977, pp. 80–82). The bureaucratic elite also attempted to promote the idea of state capitalism, feeling that they needed a new kind of legitimation (Karpat, 1973, p. 91).

Significant social and structural changes caused by economic development, rural immigration, and urbanization in a milieu now infused with "liberalism"<sup>11</sup> led to ideological polarization and political fragmentation. In such an environment, the bureaucratic elite could not keep their ground. Particularly from 1973 onward, what Kalaycıoğlu (1988, p. 166) calls "amoral partyism" increased by leaps and bounds. From 1973 to 1980, Turkey was governed by coalition governments, their members heavily engaged in unrestrained patronage and nepotism. Never before in Turkish political development had civil servants been reshuffled to the extent they were during this period (Heper, 1979–1980, pp. 105–106). While in the 1962–1974 period, the average number of years that a director general of a state economic enterprise kept his office was 3.5 years, and for the 1974–1980 period, the corresponding figure was 1.7 years (Tutum, 1980, p. 290). In addition, the more critical posts were usually filled by ideologically committed militants or even by outright partisan roughnecks. Even the most sensitive agencies, such as the police and security services, were not immune from such penetration of the civil bureaucracy by political parties (Tutum, 1976, p. 29; Çulpan, 1980, p. 3; Karpat, 1981, pp. 38–40).

Thus, when the military intervened in September 1980 they no longer viewed the bureaucratic elite as the upholders of the norms that held the community together and, thus tried to inject some degree of rationality<sup>12</sup> into politics. In fact, in the eyes of the military the bureaucratic intelligentsia had rather low status. General Kenan Evren, head of the junta, accused those in the civil bureaucratic ranks of having subscribed to "reactionary ideas" and "perverted ideologies."

Initially, the military took action against those civil servants who had committed administrative acts falling under the category of "punishable offense." Extremist governors and mayors were replaced with more moderate officials or by retired officers. Later, measures were taken against many other officials, too. Several civil servants either retired or were simply relieved of their duty. The military also took action against the Council of State and universities. Constraints were placed on the jurisdiction of the Council of State. Through the newly established High Board of Education the military wished to rationalize the promotions and appointments in universities, and see to it that the curricula at the universities would not challenge the normative bases of the Republic. There were also some efforts to streamline the bureaucracy structurally so as to make it more efficient and effective, that is, turn it into a legal–rational bureaucracy. The latter approach to bureaucracy was an upshot of the fact that, unlike the earlier one, the military intervenors of the 1980–1983 period had, particularly in economic matters, a less étatist orientation.

In this last respect, the post-1983 Motherland Part governments went even further and adopted a liberal economic policy.<sup>13</sup> The earlier policy of import substitution was replaced by an export-oriented one. From now on, an emphasis on market forces rather than regulation from above was to carry the day. The relevant objectives concerning the bureaucracy were twofold: reducing the scope of the bureaucracy in politics and rendering the bureaucracy more efficient and effective. For this purpose, four policies were adopted: privatization of state economic enterprises, simplification of bureaucratic procedures and other organizational reforms, decentralization at the localities, and reduced bureaucracy at the center.

Concerning the first three objectives, the Motherland Party governments scored only limited success. Although privatization of the state economic enterprises was a cornerstone of those governments'

programs, little progress could be made in that direction. Even with regard to those enterprises that were profitable, the buyers expected the state to provide watertight guarantees. In order to make those in the red more competitive, subsidies made to them from the general budget were reduced to a minimum. In response, the enterprises constantly raised the prices of their goods and services. They could do this with impunity as they continued to have a near-monopoly in their respective markets.

With respect to reform of bureaucratic procedures and organizations, the overriding goal was to encourage the exercise of initiative. This could take place, it was reasoned, if everybody knew what they were supposed to do. Thus, efforts were made to define function, authority, and responsibility, better. The purpose was to achieve an improved division of labor and coordination among the various bureaus and to encourage the delegation of authority. However, officials were reluctant to change their administrative styles. For instance, they resisted the delegation of authority. The governments also tried to make civil servants more enthusiastic about their work, and for this purpose the following measures were adopted: application of a merit principle for more successful functionaries (e.g., promotions by jumping echelons and paying of bonuses), more frequent pay increases, and greater flexibility in moving people through set civil service positions. The Motherland Party governments were also keen to facilitate the citizens' dealing with the bureaucracy; thus they sought to simplify the procedures where the citizens had face-to-face interaction with government officials. These efforts to make easier citizens' relations with the bureaucracy met with some success. Where the elaborate rules and regulations had to be left intact, the governments urged the officials emphatically to be as helpful to the people as possible. The governments' success in making the officials more enthusiastic about their work and be more helpful to citizens was less than satisfactory. Here, too, the officials could not easily shed their traditional behavior patterns. And, on the whole, they could not adapt themselves to the policy shifts in many areas introduced by the Motherland Party governments. The governments' response to this state of affairs was twofold—decentralization at the localities and debureaucratization at the center.

Decentralization at the localities primarily concerned municipalities. At the major urban centers, a two-tiered municipal system consisting of a metropolitan municipality and a number of district municipalities was established. The tutelage powers of the Ministers of Interior and Public Works and Resettlement over the metropolitan municipalities were greatly curtailed. The resources at the disposal of the municipalities were greatly bolstered.

Decentralization vis-à-vis the municipalities in the major urban centers, however, stopped at the level of metropolitan municipality; it did not extend to the district municipalities. The district mayors felt that they would have been more effective if they had greater autonomy. In their turn, the officials at the metropolitan level regarded the district mayors as novices who should first go through a period of training.

The attitude of the metropolitan municipality toward the district municipalities reflected the traditional attitude of the center toward the periphery. Later, even the limited decentralization in question was not maintained intact. Primarily, as a reaction to the high level of inflation that Turkey experienced from the mid-1980s onward, the central government cut back on its lending to the municipalities. In addition, as a consequence of some alleged irregularities at municipalities the central government expanded its oversight of them.

It follows that in the late 1980s, the Motherland Party governments became unwilling to delegate authority to localities. This did not mean that they were ready to reinstate the traditional bureaucrats at the center, in power and status. In fact, Prime Minister Turgut Özal and his close entourage gave short shrift to counsel from the traditional civil servants. Despite their so-called liberal revolution, Özal's government felt no compulsion to convert the public bureaucracy into a legal-rational one. Instead, during this decade, too, political elites tried to turn the bureaucracy into a virtually subordinate arm of the government. And now they were even more successful.

Their first tactic was a further politicization of the public bureaucracy. They placed their followers in a number of important agencies. Civil service posts were made less secure; many functionaries were obliged to work on a contract basis. Certain higher civil servants in critical agencies were purged. Within the existing agencies, some autonomous units were created: they were headed by persons brought from outside. Some functions were transferred from an existing agency to a newly created one. The latter, too, were led by officials appointed from outside the bureaucracy. What used to be the autonomous agencies were brought under the closer control of the government.

Those portions of the bureaucracy not considered fit for the implementation of new policies and consequently left to their own devices continued to function in a cumbersome manner than before. Citizens, including members of weighty social groups, faced a bureaucracy labyrinth that showed strong signs of pathology. A bureaucracy that, at times, had been the most significant element of the center now became either extremely politicized or deadwood. This was basically a consequence of the historical rift between the center and the periphery and the inability of the bureaucratic and political elites to develop a harmonious relationship among them and of their inability to effect a transition from virtually complete bureaucratic domination to virtually complete political domination.

## 4.5 The Early 2000s

In 1999, a coalition government comprising the Democratic Left Party, the Nationalist Action Party, and the Motherland Party and led by Bülent Ecevit came to office. In November 2000 and February 2001, it faced two severe economic crises. The result was a radical devaluation of the Turkish Lira and widespread unemployment. There was a need for drastic measures in the economy, including an International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored economic reform program. Kemal Derviş, an expert Turkish economist and in recent years World Bank vice-president, was called in by the government to serve as a minister in the cabinet responsible for the economy. Mr. Derviş, acting in tandem with the World Bank and IMF policies, tried to revitalize market forces and lessen government intervention in the economy, which meant giving priority to economic considerations over the political ones. Privatization was seen to be the most critical path for the market mechanism to function, which would at the same time reduce, if not totally eliminate, the abuse of public resources and using public offices for purely political and partisan goals.

Parallel with the attempts to reduce the effect of the “political” over the economy, such regulatory agencies as the Fair Competition Board, the Capital Market Board, the Banking Board, the Energy Board, and the Telecommunications Board were established. These Boards tended to constitute the new bureaucratic power centers. Indeed, these developments adversely affected the status of the traditional civil bureaucratic elite, as only those at the heads of the new regulatory agencies began to make the crucial decisions with respect to the economy. This occurred to such an extent that even the Ecevit government itself became critical of these new agencies and accused them of acting too autonomously.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile relations with the European Union (EU) were on the right track mostly due to Kemal Derviş’s and Foreign Minister İsmail Cem’s international experience and popularity. The traditional bureaucracy regarded this development as yet another threat to its role and power, as the EU, alongside the IMF, seemed to be the additional political superordinates. However, on the whole, the Ecevit-led coalition government established a working relationship with the civil bureaucracy, which was based on mutual respect rather than total agreement on all issues (Kınıkoğlu, 2002, p. 21).

Yet, the coalition had its problems; an especially serious one was with respect to the Turkey–EU relations. A burning issue in this regard was the degree to which Turkey should make compromises

on those issues considered critical with respect to the national unity in and territorial integrity of that country. While the Nationalist Action Party defended the position that Turkey should not make undue sacrifices, the Motherland Party gave the impression that it was for the accession of Turkey to the EU, virtually at all costs. For this and also other problems that cropped up because of Ecevit's worsening health problems, the government decided to go to elections 18 months ahead of the schedule. In the elections held on November 3, 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) swept the votes, and formed a majority government.

Though it had its roots in religiously-oriented political parties that preceded it, the JDP defined itself as a democratic-conservative party would subscribe to reformist and modernistic policies, and at least until recently (2006) it acted as such (Özel, 2003, p. 81; Heper, 2006). For instance, the JDP government opted for an economic policy based on "free but intelligently regulated market economy" (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Programı, *passim*).

The new government has indicated that its style of governance would alter the existing étatist economic policy that they had inherited, which they viewed as unresponsive to the needs and demands of the people. Not unlike the Özal governments of the 1980s, the JDP government, too, regarded the civil bureaucracy as closed, elitist, ineffective, and inefficient, and therefore, in need of reform (Öniş and Keyman, 2003, p. 97). In its attempts to reform the bureaucracy, the government also received support indirectly and sometimes directly from the EU and the IMF. The JDP government also enacted an important new legislation for further democratizing the polity, which included the establishment of the Ethics Board concerning the civil servants as well as measures for the protection of individual rights and liberties (Berkman, 2007). As part of those measures, it introduced the Free Information Act.

As would have been expected, the JDP government also tried to appoint to critical posts bureaucrats who would not oppose and sabotage their policies. This would have been, of course, what every other government would have done. In the case of the JDP government, however, there was another reason for their acting in this manner: the bureaucratic cadres that the new government took over, not unlike many members of the secularist intelligentsia in general, were of the opinion that, given their Islamic roots, the JDP government would be engaged in Islamic dissimulation, or *takiyye*, that is hiding one's real intentions until the time is ripe for disclosing them. They, thus, came to think that the new government would be prone to adopting the tactic of "one man, one vote, only once." Since as a consequence, the bureaucratic cadres in question would not have been sympathetic to the JDP politicians, the latter tended to bring to the higher echelons of the civil service people who had served in the municipalities that the political party controlled from the 1990s onward.

This particular situation in the country also gave rise to a conflict between the government and the secularist president and other such self-appointed guardians of secularism in Turkey, as the judiciary, the bulk of the faculty members as well as the military. The president often blocked the appointment of the bureaucrats favored by the JDP governments, to civil service. In order to get around the opposition the JDP governments appointed their men to the higher echelons of the civil service as "acting" heads of the bureaus for which they were going to be responsible. This in turn has led to legal battles over the bureaucracy between the president and the government, the former attempting to use the Constitutional Court for his own particular purpose and the latter trying to circumvent legal obstructions so created by taking advantage of some legal technicalities like the norm that the decisions of the Constitutional Court cannot be applicable concerning those decisions already taken. This ongoing tension in the Turkish polity has interfered with the efficient and effective functioning of the civil bureaucracy.

Under these circumstances, the government has attempted to decentralize the administration. On this issue, too, the government had to overcome stiff resistance from the secularist camp. However, the government's success on economic plane—its achieving a relatively quick recovery

in the economy in the aftermath of the two severe economic crises of 2000 and 2001, pulling down the hyperinflation to one digit figures by 2005, and making possible high growth rates—as well as starting Turkey’s accession talks with the EU, (October 2005) seem to have been gradually strengthening the hand of the government vis-à-vis its detractors.<sup>15</sup> To such developments in favor of the government, one should also add the growing tide of neoliberalism in the international arena, with its prescription for “limited state” and “delimited democracy” (Keyder, 2004, p. 81). One may thus expect the government to have more control over the civil bureaucracy as the first 10 years of the twenty-first century pass by. Given the democratic–conservative discourse and praxis of the JDP government, the increased control in question would render civil bureaucracy more efficient, effective, and professional, and not more religiously oriented.

## Notes

1. Ghazis had been a community of marching warriors that formed the seed of the Ottoman state.
2. Mahmut II created the Office of Serasker (commander of the army), which became the nucleus of the future civilian War Ministry. Through it the civil bureaucracy was able to contain the power of the military until the Young Turk revolution in 1909 (Chambers, 1964, p. 316).
3. As grand vizier, Reşit Pasha, played an important role in the initiation of the Tanzimat (Reform) period in 1839, which continued until 1876.
4. Although Reşit Pasha was a protégé of Sultan Mahmut II, he at times complained of the narrow-mindedness of the latter (Mardin, 1957b, p. 10).
5. The reforms in questions were carried out after 1913, when the Committee of Union and Progress came into power.
6. It was during this period that the first conscious efforts were made to formulate a national economic policy. However, economic policy was largely derived from the political goal of “Turkification.” Against the interests of a minority economic elite consisting entirely of Christians and Jews—the so-called Levantines—the economic policies of this period were directed toward creating Turkish Muslim entrepreneurs (Avcıoğlu, 1969, pp. 127–133).
7. Largely limited to certain lifestyles borrowed from the West.
8. For the links between the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, see Mardin (1969b).
9. These views were expressed, inter alia, by Savcı (1955a,b) and Soysal (1962). On the close relationship between the school and political socialization of civil servants in Turkey, see Heper and Kalaycıoğlu (1983).
10. A stronger emphasis was placed on state economic enterprises; the upper echelons of these enterprises were staffed by personnel relatively sympathetic to the DP politicians, and every effort was made to provide these personnel with comfortable incomes.
11. While stacking the bureaucratic agencies against the political ones, the 1961 Constitution also enlarged the scope of individual rights and liberties; the bureaucratic elite had wished to have such safeguards against “the absolutism of majority.”
12. On the bureaucracy during the interregnum of 1980–1983, we draw upon Heper (1984).
13. For the period from 1983 to the present, we essentially draw upon Heper (1989) and Heper (1990a,b).
14. Cumhuriyet, Istanbul daily, November 29, 2001.
15. On the last point, see Heper (2005).

## References

- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Programı (“The Justice and Development Party Program”), Ankara (2002).
- Ahmad, F., *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1980–1914*, At Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969.

- Aksoy, M., Üniversite Hadisesi ve Başbakan, *Forum* (February 15, 1957).
- Avcıoğlu, D., *Türkiye'nin Düzeni. Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1969.
- Atay, F.R., *Çankaya: A tatürk'ün D oğumundan Ö lümüne Kadar Bütün Hayat Hikayesi*, D oğan Kardeş, İstanbul, 1969.
- Bent, F.T., The Turkish bureaucracy as an agent of change, *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 1: 47–64 (1969).
- Berkes, N., *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, The McGill University Press, Montreal, 1964.
- Berkman, U., Ethics Board: Panacea or Fashion—The Turkish Case, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 30: 50–59 (Summer 2007).
- Chambers, R.L., [Turkey:] The civil bureaucracy, in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1964.
- Çulpan, R., Bürokratik Sistemin Yozlaşması, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 13: 31–45 (1980).
- Davison, R., *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963.
- Deny, J., Pasha, in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (M.T. Huntsma et al., eds.), Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1936.
- Dodd, C.H., The social and educational background of Turkish officials, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1: 268–276 (1965).
- Eren, N., *Turkey Today and Tomorrow. An Experiment in Westernization*, Praeger, New York, 1963.
- Findley, C.V., *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1980.
- Findley, C.V., *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1989.
- Frey, F.W., *The Turkish Political Elite*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965.
- Gibb, H.A.R. and Bowen, H., *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Middle East*, Part I, Oxford University Press, London, 1950.
- Heper, M., Political modernization as reflected in bureaucratic change: The Turkish bureaucracy and a “historical bureaucratic empire” tradition, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 7: 507–521 (1976).
- Heper, M., Negative bureaucratic politics in a modernizing context: The Turkish case, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 1: 65–84 (1977).
- Heper, M., Recent instability in Turkish politics: End of a monocentric polity? *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 1: 101–113 (1979–1980).
- Heper, M., Center and periphery in the Ottoman Empire with special reference to the nineteenth century, *International Political Science Review*, 1: 81–105 (1980).
- Heper, M., Transformation of charisma into a political paradigm: “Atatürkism” in Turkey, *Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization*, 1: 65–82 (1980–1981).
- Heper, M., Bureaucrats, politicians and officers in Turkey: Dilemmas of a new political paradigm, in *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change* (A. Evin, ed.) Leske and Budrich, Opladen, Germany, 1984.
- Heper, M., *The State Tradition in Turkey*, The Eothen Press, Walkington, England, 1985.
- Heper, M., The motherland party governments and bureaucracy in Turkey, 1983–1988, *Governance*, 2: 457–468 (1989).
- Heper, M., The state and debureaucratization: The Turkish case, *International Social Science Journal*, 126: 605–615 (1990a).
- Heper, M., Turkey, in *Public Administration in the Third World: An International Handbook* (V. Subramaniam, ed.), Greenwood Press, New York, 1990b.
- Heper, M., The state and bureaucracy: The Turkish case in historical perspective, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration* (A. Farazmand, ed.), Marcel Dekker, New York, 1991.
- Heper, M., The justice and development party government and the military in Turkey, *Turkish Studies (London)*, 6(2): 215–231 (June 2005).
- Heper, M., A democratic-conservative government by pious people: The justice and development party in Turkey, in *Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* (I.M. Abu-Rabi, ed.), Blackwell, New York, 2006.

- Heper, M. and Kalaycıoğlu, E., Organizational socialization as reality-testing: The case of the Turkish higher civil servants, *International Journal of Political Education*, 6: 175–198 (1983).
- Hourani, A., Ottoman reform and the politics of notables, in *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East* (W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers, eds.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968.
- İnal, M.K., *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar*, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul, 1951.
- İnalçık, H., Ottoman methods of conquest, *Studia Islamica*, 2: 104–129 (1954).
- İnalçık, H., (Turkey:) The nature of traditional society, in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow, eds.), Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 1964.
- İnalçık, H., *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (N. Itzkowitz and C. Imber, trans.), Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1973.
- Kalaycıoğlu, E., Political culture and regime stability: The case of Turkey, *Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies* 2: 149–179 (1988).
- Karaosmanoğlu, Y.K., *Politikada 45 Yıl*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1968.
- Karpat, K.H., *Turkey's Politics. The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1959.
- Karpat, K.H., Land regime, social structure and modernization in the Ottoman Empire, in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers, eds.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968.
- Karpat, K.H., Structural change, historical stages of modernization and the role of social groups in Turkish politics, in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey* (K.H. Karpat, ed.), Brill, Leiden, 1973.
- Karpat, K.H., Turkish democracy at impasse: Ideology, party politics and the third military intervention, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2: 1–143 (1981).
- Kazamias, A.M., *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966.
- Keyder, Ç., The Turkish bell jar, *New Left Review*, 28: 65–84 (July–August 2004).
- Kınıkoğlu, S., The Democratic Left Party: Kapıkulu politics, *Par Excellence, Political Parties in Turkey* (B. Rubin and M. Heper, eds.), Frank Cass, London, 2002.
- Kingsbury, J.B. and Aktan, T., *The Public Service in Turkey. Organization, Recruitment and Training*, Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brussels, 1955.
- Lewis, B., *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961.
- Lybyer, A.H., *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1913.
- Mardin, Ş., Âli Paşa ve Hürriyet, *Forum* (October 15, 1955).
- Mardin, Ş., Yeni Osmanlıların Hakiki Hüviyeti: Tanzimat Bürokrasisi, *Forum*, July 1 (1957a).
- Mardin, Ş., Tanzimat Fermanının Mânası: Yeni Bir İzah Denemesi, *Forum*, November 15 (1957b).
- Mardin, Ş., *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Political Ideas*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1962.
- Mardin, Ş., Power, civil society and culture in the Ottoman Empire, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2: 258–281 (1969a).
- Mardin, Ş., *Continuity and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks*, Robert College, İstanbul, 1969b.
- Mardin, Ş., Ideology and religion in the Turkish revolution, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2: 197–211 (1971).
- Mardin, Ş., Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics? *Daedalus*, 102: 169–190 (1973).
- Miller, B., *The Palace School of Muhammed the Conqueror*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1941.
- Öniş, Z. and Fuat Keyman, E., Turkey at the polls: A new path emerges, *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2): 95–107 (April 2003).
- Onur, V., *Tanzimat Devrinin Büyük ve Unutulmaz Devlet Adamları*, Ziraat Bankası, Ankara, 1964.
- Özel, S., Turkey at the polls: After the tsunami, *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2): 80–94 (April 2003).
- Pakalın, M.Z., *Son Sadrazamlar ve Başvekiller, Cilt I.*, Ahmet Said Matbaası, İstanbul, 1940.
- Pears, Sir Edwin, *Life of Abdülhamid*, Constable, London, 1917.
- Pears, Sir Edwin, *Forty Years Under Abdülhamid*, Henry Holt, New York, 1919.



- Ramsaur, E.E. Jr., *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1957.
- Reed, H.A., Revival of Islam in secular Turkey, *The Middle East Journal*, 8: 267–282 (1954).
- Roos, N.P. and Roos, L.L., Changing patterns of Turkish public administration, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 5: 28–36 (1968).
- Ross, I., From Atatürk to Gürsel—What went wrong in Turkey? *New Leader* (December 5, 1960).
- Rustow, D.A., (Turkey:) Military, in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow, eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1964.
- Savcı, B., Türkiye’de Demokratik Savaşın Şekli Prensipleri, *Forum*, (January 15, 1955b).
- Savcı, B., İktidar Savaşı Yapmadan İktidar, *Forum*, (July 1, 1955b).
- Selek, S., *Anadolu İhtilali*, İstanbul Matbaası, İstanbul, 1968.
- Shaw, S.J., *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 1797–1807*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971.
- Shaw, S.J., *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976.
- Shaw, S.J. and Shaw, E.K., *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey. 1808–1975*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.
- Soysal, M., Yanlış Reçete, *Yön*, February 28 (1962).
- Sugar, P.F., Turkey: Economic and political modernization, in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow, eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964.
- Szyliowicz, J.S., Political participation and modernization in Turkey, *Western Political Quarterly*, 19: 266–285 (1966).
- Toynbee, A.J. and Kirkwood, K.P., *Turkey*, Charles Scribner’s & Sons, New York, 1927.
- Tunaya, T.Z., *İslamcılık Cereyanı. Meşrutîyetin Siyasi Hayatı Boyunca Gelişmesi ve Bugüne Bıraktığı Meseleler*, Baha Matbaası, İstanbul, 1962.
- Tutum, C., Yönetimin Siyasallaşması ve Partizanlık, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 9: 9–32 (1976).
- Tutum, C., Türk Personel Rejiminin Sorunlarına Genel Bir Bakış, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 13: 95–107 (1980).
- Ward, B., *Turkey*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942.
- Whitman, S., *Turkish Memoirs*, Heinemann, London, 1919.
- Witteck, P., *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, Luzac, London, 1965.
- Wortham, H.E., *Mustapha Kemal of Turkey*, The Holme Press, London, 1931.
- Wright, I., Walter Livingston, *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsels for Vezirs and Governors of Sarı Mehmet Pasha*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1935.
- Yalman, A.E., *Turkey in My Time*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1956.

---

**THEORETICAL AND  
CONCEPTUAL  
PERSPECTIVES ON  
BUREAUCRACY AND  
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS**

---





## Chapter 5

---

# Bureaucratic Links between Administration and Politics

---

Fred W. Riggs\*

### CONTENTS

5.1 Introduction .....	86
5.2 Bureaucratic Variables.....	87
5.2.1 Tenure .....	87
5.2.2 Income .....	89
5.2.3 Interdependence .....	90
5.3 Extrabureaucratic Institutions.....	91
5.4 Traditional Institutional Framework.....	92
5.5 Modern Politics .....	92
5.5.1 Single-Party Regimes .....	93
5.5.2 Open Constitutive Systems .....	93
5.6 Parliamentary Regimes .....	94
5.7 Presidentialist Systems .....	95
5.7.1 Cabinet Members.....	96
5.7.2 The Congressional Agenda .....	97
5.7.3 A Bland, Decentralized Two-Party System.....	98
5.7.4 Judicial Review.....	99
5.7.5 Bureaucratic Politics under Presidentialism .....	99
5.8 Bureaucratic Power in the Third World .....	100
5.8.1 Bureaucratic Power.....	101
5.8.2 Traditional Monarchies .....	102

---

\* Author is deceased; material updated by the Editor.

5.8.3 Constitutional Models .....	103
5.8.4 Open Politics.....	104
5.8.5 Presidentialist Regimes.....	104
5.9 Conclusion .....	105
Notes .....	105
References .....	108

## 5.1 Introduction

Comparative public administration can scarcely be studied in a meaningful way without taking politics into account. Similarly, of course, comparative politics requires attention to administrative aspects. The myth of a dichotomy between politics and administration has hampered the study of both the aspects of governance as a coherent and unified process. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a framework for comparative analysis in which the links between administration and politics can be better understood.

Such a framework requires a focus on bureaucracy. There are no doubts that originally rulers created bureaucracies to serve them as instruments of administration to implement their policies. However, as soon as anyone received an appointment to serve as a public official, that person discovered that the position carried power and created political interests. It is not an exaggeration to think of bureaucracy as a class, and as a class that has both pronounced interests and the power to protect them. However, by definition, bureaucracy is only a part of a larger system of governance. We can only understand how bureaucrats behave (politically and administratively) when we take that larger system into account.

The history of the word *bureaucracy* reflects the changing role of public officials in different systems of government. It was coined in the eighteenth century to refer to a state dominated by appointed officials (Albrow 1970; Riggs 1979). I shall use *bureaucratic policy* for this concept, which is an essential one in this chapter. In popular usage, *bureaucrat* became a term of derision. Needless to say, this sense of the word is ruled out of the present discourse. However, in technical usage the word soon came to mean a ruling class composed of public officials—a similar evolution changed the meaning of “aristocracy” from a type of polity to the name of a class. Then the meaning of “bureaucracy” evolved further until it came to mean the class of appointed officials or the positions they occupy, whether or not they exercise power. Those who think of bureaucrats as politically “neutral” administrators have carried the idea another step, conceiving of public officials as a kind of powerless apparatus, devoid of self-interest or power.

The myth of a dichotomy between administration and politics rests, in general, on the construction of this word: it postulates a politically neutral “state apparatus,” that is, the bureaucracy, which merely implements the policies adopted by a ruling group, whether it consists of a “class,” in the Marxist view, or of constitutionally prescribed “political” institutions.

In the American context the dichotomy led to another twist: only careerists—those with long-term tenure—were seen as “politically neutral” and hence as “bureaucrats,” whereas transients—holding public office for a limited period of time—were redefined as “political” appointees, and hence not bureaucrats. This peculiar usage could be sustained only by a perverse semantic twist in which “political” was assigned a narrow meaning, referring just to partisan orientations: an action was termed “political” only when it had implications for a political party. Clearly, however, most political action is nonpartisan, involving efforts by a wide variety of individuals and groups to influence the allocation of resources—to determine who gets what, how, and when, as Harold Lasswell wrote—and all appointed officials (transient and careerist) have such political interests. A minority of them are also involved in partisan activities.

Bureaucrats whose long-term careers are at stake clearly have much more to gain or lose in the conduct of government than do transients who shift, without much trauma, to nongovernmental roles. Hence we must conclude that supposedly “nonpolitical” careerists in fact have the strongest motivation to play “bureaucratic politics,” whereas the political roles of transient bureaucrats, who can as readily step out of as into governmental roles, are more partisan and personal.

Since most bureaucrats in nonpresidentialist regimes are, in fact, careerists; this narrowed sense of the word seems, on its face, to be reasonable. It permits an equation between careerists—who do need to avoid partisanship in America in order to keep their jobs—and the idea that “bureaucrats” can be “nonpolitical.” Sadly, the notion of “bureaucracy” is narrowed even more when the word is used to refer only to civil servants, excluding military officers or just to intermediate-level officials, excluding both the few at the top and the many at the bottom.

To understand the functions and powers of bureaucracy in a global and comparative context, however, we cannot accept any of these arbitrary limitations. Here I must use “bureaucracy,” generically, to refer to all appointed officials regardless of their tenure in office, their civil or military status, or their rank. When it is important to distinguish between different kinds of officials, we can easily do so by means of modifiers or other terms, such as civil servants versus military personnel, careerists versus transients, or office holders in various levels, ranks, or classes. Although bureaucratic features can also be found in private organizations, here I shall restrict the term to governmental bureaucracies, and almost always to those working in an executive branch, excluding the staff of legislatures, courts, and other autonomous governmental bodies.

To summarize, public bureaucracies (as defined above) always perform both administrative and political (including nonpartisan) roles. In order to understand how their administrative functions are performed, we need to consider their political roles; and conversely, to understand their political functions we also need to think about their administrative roles. Accordingly, we need to study the institutional factors that affect the motivation and capacity of public officials to engage both in political action and in administrative tasks. I shall first, discuss three intrabureaucratic variables—tenure, income, and interdependence—that affect bureaucratic performance. Then I shall look at the extrabureaucratic institutional context of bureaucracy, going from the traditional to the modern, including the third world.

This emphasis on institutional variables does not imply that social, economic, cultural, geographic, and historical variables are also not important. However, in contemporary research on comparative administration and politics, they have already been studied a great deal at the expense of institutional analysis. Moreover, it is difficult to generalize globally about these variables: because of their infinite variability, they are best studied, I think, in specific time or place contexts, as they are in interdisciplinary area studies programs.

## **5.2 Bureaucratic Variables**

The interest and ability of bureaucrats to govern, to perform both administrative and political functions, depends on their tenure, income, and interdependence.

### **5.2.1 Tenure**

Tenure involves an expectation of long-term employment. According to the dictionary, tenure means permanence of position. Although often used today in a more specific sense to refer to a cademic tenure, the term applies in general to all bureaucratic posts. Bureaucrats who hold their positions

for indefinite periods of time not only acquire administrative competence from deep experience, but because they have a long-term interest in the preservation of their positions, perquisites, and income, they are both motivated and able to use their offices for political (usually nonpartisan) purposes also.

By contrast, transients who enter public service expecting to leave in a few years are likely to be ambivalent, their commitment to bureaucratic values competing with alternative orientations based on their past life and future prospects in the private sector. Their bureaucratic interests, *per se*, are essentially ephemeral. We may also expect their administrative capabilities to be inferior to those of careerists. Since they must leave public service after a short time in office, they have little opportunity to organize themselves for bureaucratically oriented political action, and they may well focus their ambition on postemployment opportunities. Their political interests, therefore, are less bureaucratic than those of careerists and are more likely to be personal or ideological. Bureaucratic politics, therefore, is primarily a function of careerism of tenured officials.

Among careerists, we need to distinguish between those whose appointments rest on patronage and those recruited and promoted in the context of a “merit” system, that is, procedures whereby the capacity of candidates for appointment is carefully evaluated and promotions are given on the basis of performance. In broad historical terms, most careerists have held their tenure outside of any merit system.

In traditional kingdoms and empires rulers were able to appoint whomever they chose, for whatever reasons, to posts in their bureaucracies. As long as officials loyally served their masters and developed minimal levels of competence—or at least appeared to do so—they were allowed to keep their posts.<sup>1</sup> In the American case the original patronage appointees of the Federalists expected to hold their posts indefinitely, that is, to have tenure (White 1948). It was only after the spoils system had institutionalized transience that the reformers coupled the reinstitutionalization of tenure with the merit system.

When bureaucratic tenure is rooted in a merit system, public officials gain expertise that permits them not only to fulfill administrative goals but also to struggle effectively for their bureaucratic interests. Moreover, bureaucracies following a merit system become more interdependent, as explained below. Consequently, merit-based bureaucracies are more motivated and able to act collectively in support of their class interests than are patronage-based bureaucracies.

In general, premodern bureaucracies were based on patronage and modern bureaucracies involve the use of a merit system. An important and conspicuous exception is provided by the Chinese imperial mandarin, whose members gained their positions (for the most part) only after passing tough competitive written examinations. Actually, the Chinese model was historically influential in the development of modern Western bureaucracies,<sup>2</sup> and it remains important in those that encourage a class of higher level officials to rotate assignments between different government programs and at various levels.

Such officials acquire an overall perception of government and its problems that permits them to be referred to quite appropriately as “mandarins.”<sup>3</sup> In the American case, by contrast, because of a different recruitment and promotion system, expertise translates itself into a strong commitment to the specific programs in which officials hold their tenure. It is more precise to refer to such officials as “functionaries,” rather than as mandarins. This distinction helps us understand differences between the dynamics of bureaucratic politics and administration in the industrialized democracies. It may be less important in contemporary third world contexts.

Both mandarins and functionaries are strongly motivated to engage in nonpartisan politics, that is, politics designed first of all to safeguard their own positions and income. To the degree that their access to these benefits is controlled by extrabureaucratic institutions, however, their security and advancement depend on how well they perform their assigned administrative

functions. When extrabureaucratic controlling institutions decline or collapse, bureaucrats gain power but administer less well.

In traditional monarchies or empires, the erosion of extrabureaucratic controls normally led to the corruption and fragmentation of patronage-based bureaucracies without entailing the overthrow of ruling families whose titular sovereignty was needed to legitimize bureaucratic power. By contrast, in the twentieth century, the interlocking character of merit-based bureaucracy has led to the creation of many bureaucratic polities, that is, system in which officials (mainly military officers) have seized direct power, via coups, whenever modern institutions of constitutional government fail to cope with mounting problems. Under these conditions, bureaucratic self-interest dictates the maintenance of the bureaucratic system, but without external controls, officials are able to use and abuse their offices with few restraints. Predictably, then, the quality of public administration suffers and bureaucratic abuses proliferate.

### 5.2.2 *Income*

Full-time, salaried officials are so prevalent in the modern world that we tend to assume that this is the normal situation in all bureaucracies. However, in premodern bureaucracies it was normal for officials to receive only a small part of their total income from official stipends or grants. In large measure their offices entitled them to functions from which they could directly generate personal income. The role of “publican” in New Testament times is well known—these were officials of the Roman Empire who collected taxes, retaining a more or less large share for themselves. Such tax farming was so lucrative that people were willing to buy the positions. Indeed, sale of office has been widely practiced.<sup>4</sup> Even in the Chinese Empire where recruitment to the bureaucracy was normally governed rather strictly by means of public examinations, the sale of office was practiced from time to time.<sup>5</sup> Clearly, by implication, offices could be sold only if they provided lucrative means of income that would more than cover the cost of buying a post. In fact, in the Chinese, as in most traditional bureaucracies, it was necessary to pay officials or give them gifts in exchange for services rendered—just as in private professional life a doctor or lawyer is paid a fee for his assistance.

We lack a familiar term for the unofficial, nonsalary income of officials. However, we may well appropriate “prebend” for this purpose. According to its dictionary definition, a prebend is a stipend drawn from a special endowment—as for the support of a clergyman. Max Weber used the term in his classic discussion of premodern bureaucracy: “We wish to speak of ‘*prebend*’... wherever the lord assigns to the official rent payments for life... they are goods permanently set aside for the economic assurance of the office” (Weber 1946:207). In my discussion of the contemporary “prismatic” model I extended this idea to situations where various income sources controlled directly by the officials concerned supplement their official salaries.<sup>6</sup>

In the contemporary world prebendary income for officials can be found in all third world countries where public revenues are inadequate to cover salaries at a sufficiently high level to enable bureaucrats to sustain what they regard as a proper standard of living. In those countries where bureaucracy constitutes the ruling class—that is, “bureaucratic polities”—the capacity of officials to exploit their offices for personal gain becomes virtually unlimited. Much of the literature on “bribery” and “corruption” treats this phenomenon as aberrant and immoral. Clearly it does violate the expectations of official behavior applicable in affluent industrialized countries where public revenues are adequate to pay reasonably competitive salaries to public officials, and it is normal for them to live on this official income. However, in societies where traditional bureaucratic practices



are well remembered, and where a “formalistic” dichotomy between what is officially prescribed and what is actually practiced prevails, it is scarcely surprising if the real (prebendary) income of many, if not most public officials, should far exceed their formally prescribed salary levels.

A common assumption about full-time salaried bureaucracy is that it renders individual officials helpless in their struggle against centralized state power: they must do as they are told in order to retain income. Certainly, centrally financed bureaucracies are far less likely to disintegrate into atomistic bureaucratic politics of the sort familiar in traditional societies, leading ultimately to feudalism.

However, there is a political price to be paid. Salaried officials are more likely to act collectively. They cannot so easily splinter off individualistically, as semisalaried prebendaries can do. Moreover, salaried officials become fully dependent on the state, and this gives them an uncompromising interest in the fiscal viability of government. As full-time tenured employees who have acquired the technical competence needed in both civil and military matters to sustain the state, their capacity to exercise collective power is greatly enhanced.

Normally, under the control of civilian extrabureaucratic political institutions, officials use their power potential to secure legislative authority and budgetary support for their programs. However, when these extrabureaucratic institutions fail to work successfully, the opportunity arises for organized groups of bureaucrats (normally military officers) to seize power and establish regimes more congenial to their interests. Although the bureaucratic politics that result from such events may degenerate in the direction of “sultanism,”<sup>7</sup> most military rulers recognize that, to stay in power and avoid future coups, they must provide a minimal level of governmental competence—at least they need to assure the revenues (whether from internal sources or foreign grants and loans) required to fund the heavy burden of official salaries.

It is possible, however, for these politics to limit their financial burdens by permitting the development of prebendal practices—notably all kinds of bribery, influence peddling, and payoffs, which permit “salaried” officials to enjoy a life style much higher than what their official stipends could support. The financial expectations of full-time salaried officials overload the resources of poor countries, contributing to the breakdowns that lead bureaucrats, seeking to safeguard or enhance their perquisites and uneasy about prevailing conditions, to conspire and seize power.

### **5.2.3 Interdependence**

In the simplest bureaucracies each official may be authorized to perform many functions, but with growing differentiation of roles, interdependence between officials and bureaus increases. Modern bureaucracies, by contrast with traditional ones, are highly interdependent. The collection and distribution of revenues, above all, is separated from policy-implementing functions. Military and civil offices are clearly separated, and a wide range of welfare services is organized independently of those dedicated to the maintenance of public order. Organization-wide tasks are established in “staff” agencies, which interlock with programmatic “line” functions.

Broadly speaking, the interdependence of components in modern bureaucracies can be explained as a result of the increasing interdependence of all roles in contemporary industrialized and technologically sophisticated society. However, more specifically, it is linked to the development of the merit system in career services and the dependence of public officials on salaries for full-time work, as explained above. The merit system is typically associated with professionalization, which makes individual specialists increasingly dependent on complementary roles. As for salaries, they cannot be paid reliably without coordinated services for collecting, paying, accounting,

auditing, etc. Moreover, reliance on salaries as one's sole source of income implies dependence on the system that generates payrolls.

All of this is quite familiar to observers of contemporary government in all countries, but we need imagination to reconstruct the essential simplicity of traditional bureaucracies in which most functions of government were consolidated under the control of individual officials at all levels, enabling them to "go it alone" when centralized control waned. Although the transformation of relatively undifferentiated bureaucracies into highly differentiated interdependent ones in modern times has not affected the class interest of bureaucrats, it has transformed their options. In order to understand this transformation, we need to consider the various types of extrabureaucratic institutions of governance with which bureaucracies interact.

### **5.3 Extrabureaucratic Institutions**

By definition, bureaucracies do not stand alone. They are created by someone else—originally by monarchic rulers and today, usually, by constitutionally rooted governing bodies. These authoritative institutions, however, vary in their viability—some collapsing more readily and more often than others—and in their capacity to control the agents who are officially charged with the duty of carrying out their instructions. These extrabureaucratic institutions provide the context within which we can understand how bureaucratic roles are performed.

When military officers rule a country, we know that these extrabureaucratic civilian institutions have failed: in the resulting power vacuum, appointed public officials become the ruling class. In traditional societies such a process resulted in feudalism, a system in which office holding became hereditary. In our times, the interdependence of modern bureaucracy makes feudalism impracticable. Instead, bureaucracies retain their coherence as a system of interdependent roles, but since they lack formal institutions for self-government, the only way to come to power within a bureaucratic polity is to seize it by a coup d'état. Although some civil servants typically participate in such coups, their reliance on violence means that they must be directed by military officers.

In this chapter, I shall assume that the administrative performance of appointed officials (i.e., bureaucrats) is related to their political power. However, the nature of this relationship is complex. It is never easy for extrabureaucratic institutions to maintain effective control over bureaucracy, and often enough they fail. Such failures can be attributed both to their own internal failures and to the growing power of bureaucracy. Broadly speaking, the administrative effectiveness of bureaucracy is optimized when its power position is balanced with that of extrabureaucratic institutions. This means that when bureaucratic power radically exceeds that of the extrabureaucratic institutions (or diminishes excessively) administrative performance levels decline.

This view conflicts with the widely accepted myth that politics and administration can and should be divorced—such that public officials should not exercise power but should follow politically neutral administrative public service norms, and by contrast, that the politically dominant extrabureaucratic institutions ought to monopolize the shaping of public policies. This myth has been widely disseminated in the third world, especially since World War II, primarily under American influence. Instead of achieving its intended goal of enhancing administrative capabilities, I believe it has, quite perversely, proven counterproductive, because it has encouraged the unbalanced growth of bureaucratic power at the expense of the capacity of extrabureaucratic institutions to monitor and control public bureaucracies. Ultimately, therefore, it has tended to undermine rather than to enhance the administrative capabilities of struggling third world regimes.

When we ask why this myth should have become so widely accepted the answer is paradoxical. It is paradoxical because, although many American political scientists have long argued against the dichotomy between politics and administration, the myth persists in everyday life and even permeates much of the research and teaching that is carried on under the name of comparative (or development) administration.<sup>8</sup>

## 5.4 Traditional Institutional Framework

The monarchs who created bureaucracies more than 2000 years ago to serve their administrative (especially military) needs immediately confronted a formidable task, that is, how to counterbalance the growing power of their own appointed officials. Not surprisingly, hereditary rulers often failed, and their “servants” usurped power, reducing titular masters to the role of puppets. However, they could not do so by means of a coup d’état, the typical modern basis for creating a bureaucratic polity. Instead, given their relatively undifferentiated structure and prebendary support base, bureaucracies often dissolved into amorphous or even atomic self-serving cells that simply undercut the power of monarchs and the administrative capabilities of their regimes.

Bureaucratic power sometimes produced “feudalism” in which officeholders appropriated their titles, converting them into family possessions. This led to an extreme localization of power as the authority of kings and emperors became purely symbolic.<sup>9</sup> Under the Byzantine Empire, by contrast, bureaucratic power did not become hereditary, but it became so corrupt that officials used it with impunity to protect their expedient interests at the expense of imperial power.<sup>10</sup>

An alternative scenario evolved in the Middle East. Here, starting with Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad in the eighth century, the rulers chose personal slaves to serve as bureaucrats—they had no personal rights and could not transmit their roles to their children.<sup>11</sup> In the Egyptian case, ultimately—during the Mameluke dynasties, from 1250 to 1517—enfranchised slave officials serving in the sultans’s entourage usurped the authority of their rulers. They were able to seize power by assassinating and replacing sultans, a process that became institutionalized over a period of two-and-a-half centuries.<sup>12</sup>

The most successful traditional bureaucratic empire was the Chinese, whose emperors established a counterbureaucracy, the Censorate, designed to monitor and control officials with operational responsibilities. They also relied on a large imperial establishment based on the harem, a horde of eunuchs, and palace favorites recruited by direct patronage.<sup>13</sup> The Confucianist merit system, sponsored by Chinese emperors in order to guarantee a supply of obedient public servants, eventually armed the bureaucracy with a cohesive force that enabled it both to triumph over its imperial masters and to retain its integrity as a coordinated ruling class. Nevertheless, it always needed imperial legitimation in order to safeguard its own interests. Even so, the bureaucratic system collapsed from time to time, contributing to dynastic failure and intervals of anarchy.

## 5.5 Modern Polities

The replacement of royal sovereignty with new self-governing institutions based on the principle of popular sovereignty, as represented through political parties in elected assemblies, and by responsible heads of government, greatly enhanced the capacity of extrabureaucratic institutions to control officials, and also permitted a vast expansion of differentiated bureaucratic functions with an interdependent structure staffed by tenured salaried personnel.

We are easily confused by the varieties of modern polities because we lack a collective term for the set of institutions designed to implement popular sovereignty: namely, an electoral system, an elected assembly, and a party system. For convenience, I refer to this composite set of extrabureaucratic institutions as a *constitutive system*. The relevant sense of constitutive has this dictionary definition: “having power to institute, establish or enact.” The term was selected, because it resonates with such related words as constitution, constituents, and constituency (Riggs 1969:243–246).

### 5.5.1 *Single-Party Regimes*

Some critics have argued that single-party authoritarian regimes are “modern,” yet lack a constitutive system. However, if we do not define “party system” rigidly by insisting that it must have more than one party, the objection does not hold. As I understand a party system, it is the system formally responsible for nominating and electing officials to public office. As such, it may contain only one party, or it may contain two or more parties. Clearly in countries like the former Soviet Union and China today, the Communist Party does perform this function. Moreover, there are elected assemblies and “elections,” even when voters have no option but to support a single candidate for office. Consequently these regimes do have a constitutive system.

The significant point is that when a constitutive system contains only one party, that party is able to manage the elections and dominate the assembly. Moreover, as in all modern polities, the constitutive system is able to control the public bureaucracy, primarily by means of party groups of committees established to monitor the performance of key elements in the state “apparatus.” Clearly this effort is not always successful, as seen in the rise of collusive “family circles” (Fainsod 1963).<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the curtailment or abolition of private organizations typical in such polities dictates a mammoth expansion of bureaucratic functions, thereby greatly increasing the difficulties involved in controlling the bureaucracy. Mikhail Gorbachov’s *perestroika* reflects a current attempt to ameliorate these problems in the Soviet Union by curtailing the extent of central domination over bureaucratic behavior. The goal is simultaneously to enhance the performance levels of public administration and to transfer some functions to an embryonic “private sector,” subject to market rather than direct political controls.

### 5.5.2 *Open Constitutive Systems*

More responsiveness to public opinion and openness to dissent is achieved in polities whose constitutive system contains a competitive party system—one with two or more parties. No doubt critics will complain that to the degree such polities permit private capitalism, economic power becomes unequally distributed and great inequities can result. However, it also seems apparent that without a vigorous private sector, the economic basis for support of a multiparty system and a powerful elected assembly cannot exist. “Open constitutive systems”—as we may call those containing multiparty systems—are able to control their bureaucracies just as well as the “closed constitutive systems” that have only one party.

However, the way such controls are exercised varies significantly depending on the way the chief executive (or head of government) is chosen. In parliamentary systems the norm involves selection, via the elected assembly, of a governing cabinet under the leadership of a prime minister. By contrast, in presidentialist systems, based on the principle of “separation of powers,” we find independent election of a president and an assembly, each with a fixed term of office.

The term *presidentialist* is used to make an important distinction: since parliamentary systems also often have “presidents,” whether directly or indirectly elected, we need to distinguish clearly between “presidentialist” systems, based on the separation of powers, and other kinds of “presidential” systems. Moreover, *presidential* is often used in discussions of the role of the president, rather than the constitutional system as a whole. Whether or not the head of state is called a president seems to have no particular importance, and this concept is therefore not used here. What is important is the distinction between two ideal types of open constitutive system: the parliamentary and the presidentialist. No doubt there are numerous varieties of each, and increasingly also hybrids, such as we find in the French Fifth Republic. Because of its historical significance the American regime is treated as a prototype for presidentialism, but comparative analysis of other presidentialist systems is needed to demonstrate its general properties. Because the bureaucratic role under parliamentarism and presidentialism is strikingly different, I shall discuss each in turn.

## 5.6 Parliamentary Regimes

In parliamentary regimes, authority is concentrated in a cabinet whose members have been elected by the parliament and are responsible to it. Since they normally stand or fall as a collectivity, the system creates powerful motives for members to reach agreements among themselves before presenting government policies to parliament. A parliamentary cabinet, therefore, is a very potent directorate for the bureaucracy—representing the combined power of an elected assembly, party leaders, and a coordinated executive body.

Parliamentary regimes need bureaucratic support, of course, and they find, for the most part, that they can rely on career officials to help them govern. Because they have tenure and assured income, these officials can be expected to give priority to their governmental responsibilities with minimal extragovernmental commitments. Typically, such bureaucracies have an elite (mandarin) class whose members monopolize higher bureaucratic posts and rotate between departments, thereby acquiring a generalist (cross-cutting) sense of the state as a whole rather than a specialized (corner-based) knowledge within particular program or policy domains. Such mandarins have the broad outlook needed to help a cabinet govern effectively. No doubt they also have their own interests, and they exercise substantial political power as “advisers” to the cabinet, but it is difficult for them to push autonomous policies on their own.

Few, if any, higher officials in parliamentary regimes are transients. No doubt, there are many reasons for this. Highly qualified outsiders, for example, are unlikely to find public office attractive when no assurances of tenure can be offered, since the duration of a cabinet is continuously open to termination by a nonconfidence vote in parliament. By contrast, career officers are quite ready to accept temporary “political” appointment provided they can be sure of returning to permanent positions in the bureaucracy following a cabinet change. Moreover, as long as direct contacts between career officers and parliament can be inhabited, there is little reason for cabinet members to distrust the careerists whom they select to serve as staff members. By contrast, the external connections of transients—where they come from and where they will go later on—may be seen as far more dysfunctional.

Perhaps above all, as cabinet members themselves are powerful elected politicians, there is little need for transient bureaucrats to staff top governmental positions. This point becomes clearer when we look at the extreme contrast that can be found between parliamentary systems (where cabinet members are elected politicians) and bureaucratic polities (where they are all career officials). Presidentialist systems, by contrast, cannot compose their cabinets of elected politicians or

of career officers. Consequently, they are compelled to recruit transients, not only to the top levels but also to many subordinate positions, as will be discussed in the following section.

In view of the reliance placed by parliamentary cabinets on career bureaucrats (mandarins), it is understandable that these officials should exercise great influence over public policies, especially by “advising” (manipulating) their “masters.”<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, when we compare these regimes to traditional monarchies, we see that their capacity to hold bureaucracies accountable is far greater. Even so, they cannot monopolize power, and bureaucrats inevitably exercise a great deal of effective political influence.

Parliamentary regimes evolved, for the most part, out of monarchies in which bureaucracies were well established prior to the development of representative institutions. This is not to say that they were “merit” systems, based on objective examinations for recruitment and promotion, but parliamentarism did emerge in contexts where a state apparatus of appointed career officials already existed. As the new constitutive systems emerged, it was easier to maintain existing bureaucracies than to transform or replace them in any radical way. The replacement of patronage by merit systems in the bureaucracy appears to have been a function of industrialization more than of democratization.

Both monarchic and parliamentary regimes have always been well aware of the risks involved in bureaucratic power. As new institutions for representative government took shape, pains were taken to make sure not only that bureaucracy would remain under control but even that the control structures would be strengthened. No doubt such efforts were not uniformly successful, as we may infer from the fact that the original meaning of “bureaucracy,” a word coined in eighteenth-century France, was a polity dominated by appointed officials.

Efforts to maintain control over bureaucracy take various forms. On the European continent, in a civil law context, we find a highly legalistic environment in which official conduct is continuously monitored with the help of complex rules and procedures of “administrative law.” In Great Britain, by contrast, with its common law traditions, greater reliance is placed on a privileged class of generalist administrators, recruited by examination from the most prestigious (upper-class) universities, who are rotated between various departments and ministries. Their personal loyalty to the “constitutional” (limited) monarchy is counted on to reinforce their accountability to parliamentary institutions and legal constraints.

Except for the United States, the more stable Western democracies studied by comparativists are almost universally parliamentary. Not surprisingly, therefore, parliamentary bureaucratic politics provides the norm against which presidentialist systems, such as we find in the United States, are seen as unique, exceptional, and possibly perverse.<sup>16</sup> The myth of a dichotomy between politics and administration that has its roots in the presidentialist need to use transient bureaucrats simply makes no sense in other kinds of regimes.

## **5.7 Presidentialist Systems**

The dichotomy myth also makes no real sense in presidentialist systems but, based on the narrow construction of “politics” to mean “partisan politics,” it helps to rationalize the transient or careerist dichotomy. Moreover, because of the prevalence of “iron triangles” that link bureaus to congressional committees and interest groups, there can exist under presidentialism a powerful incentive for bureaucrats to administer well in order to assure continuing support for their programs. This dynamism provides a functional equivalent to the market system and makes the politically neutral teachings of behaviorism and business management theory seem especially relevant and attractive to public administrators.

Nevertheless, the problems involved in trying to provide integrated direction and management under the leadership of the chief executive in a presidentialist system are far greater than those found in parliamentarism. The fundamental problem arises from the need to use transients both at the cabinet level and in many other high public offices. Although transients, precisely because they will soon leave government service, are unable to constitute an organized political threat to the regime, their lack of experience in government, their divided loyalties, and their essentially anarchic and unfocused sense of direction present any president with a stupendous political or managerial problem.

Admittedly, the views advanced here are based mainly on the U.S. experience. The existence of some 30 polities in the third world that have attempted to establish presidentialist regimes needs to be fully taken into account in a proper comparative study of presidentialism. However, I cannot do so here for several reasons.

First, substantively, since all of these regimes have experienced at least one breakdown and military (bureaucratic) rule, we cannot rely on them for evidence about the possibilities for sustained control over the bureaucracy in a presidentialist system. Only the United States has successfully maintained such a control system since it was launched over 200 years ago. A second reason is less substantial: there is simply no time or room in this chapter for a broad comparative analysis of presidentialist systems.<sup>17</sup>

To understand the peculiar features of bureaucratic politics and administration under presidentialism, as revealed in the American case, we need to consider four essential features: (1) a cabinet composed of transients, (2) a vast congressional agenda, (3) a bland, decentralized two-party system, and (4) the need for judicial review.<sup>18</sup> No doubt the presence of these features is well known, and nothing new will be said about them here. However, their links to the core presidentialist feature (separation of powers) and to the dynamics of bureaucratic politics and administration in America are less well understood. My purpose here, therefore, is to explain some of these linkages.

### 5.7.1 *Cabinet Members*

Cabinet members cannot be drawn from Congress without undermining the independent authority of the president. This rule is strengthened by, though it does not depend on, Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which states that “No Person holding any Office under the United States shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office” (the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has a similar rule, but French elected politicians may hold cabinet posts by surrendering their parliamentary seats). Moreover, American cabinet members cannot safely be recruited from career officials without jeopardizing the independence and leadership capabilities of the president.

If neither elected politicians nor career officers can staff a cabinet, the only remaining option for the president is to select outsiders, that is, transients, to head government departments. They necessarily lack the inside knowledge and experience of careerists. Moreover, since they cannot count on remaining in government service after the current president leaves office, conflicts of interest arise based on cross currents between an official’s duties and his or her former and prospective employers in the private sector.

Although transients holding cabinet posts in a presidentialist regime can exercise more power, individually, than any bureaucrats do in parliamentary regimes, their real power is inherently less than that of the elected politicians who serve in parliamentary cabinets. Moreover, their collective

power, as a “cabinet,” is far less because they do not have to act collegially to keep the government in power. Instead, each cabinet member is cross-pressured by the countervailing interests of the bureaucracy under his or her authority, by relevant congressional and interest group forces, and by the pulls of the presidency. As a result, presidentialist cabinets are necessarily fissured and noncollegial. They cannot count on the partisan, legislative, and public support that enables parliamentary cabinets both to govern and to act jointly so as to retain their majority in the assembly.

To compensate for the unavoidable divisiveness of a presidentialist cabinet, presidents must recruit even more transients to help them coordinate the whole bureaucratic machinery. From this necessity has evolved the large and complex Executive Office of the President in the United States and a host of transient employees scattered throughout the bureaucracy. One recent report claims there were some 3000 “non-career employees in the executive branch” in 1984 (Piffner 1987).

From its inception the American bureaucracy has included many transients. No doubt, initially, under the Federalists, they often retained their positions after new presidents came to office, but they had neither been recruited through a “merit” system, nor did they have legal assurance of tenure in office. From the time of the Jacksonians until the 1880s, frequent rotation in office became normal, although some valued officials were able to retain their positions. Subsequently, starting with the Pendleton Act, career officers began to replace transients in many positions although they never supplanted them.<sup>19</sup>

Although the vast majority of federal officials are now careerists, the American bureaucracy as a whole has always contained a mixture of transients and careerists. The myth of a dichotomy between politics and administration powerfully legitimized the efforts of civil service reformers to extend the career services. The use of “bureaucracy” to mean only career civil servants also strengthened this campaign because it (falsely) implied that public officials are politically neutral, lacking their own class and self-interest. They are, of course, politically interested, but nonpartisan. In recent years, especially under the Reagan administration, the number of transients has grown so much that there is a rising demand for new limits. Consequently, criticisms of the dichotomy myth can be attacked as retrogressive because, by blunting the distinction between political appointees and (supposedly nonpolitical) careerists, they seem to favor the recrudescence of patronage and spoils.

## **5.7.2 The Congressional Agenda**

The need to employ transients at the highest levels of bureaucracy to help the president integrate a severely dispersed bureaucratic power structure becomes more understandable when we consider the implications of the congressional agenda. Because of the separation of powers, this agenda is necessarily vast—unlike the agenda of parliaments, which need do little more than accept or reject programs presented to them by the government of the day. A huge agenda necessitates the delegation of real power to specialized standing committees as well as the development of an elaborate congressional bureaucracy. Given the presidentialist separation of powers, therefore, the authority for most public policies, programs, and budgets rests with congressional committees and subcommittees rather than with Congress in plenary session.

As a result, American bureaucrats have to be accountable to dispersed power centers in Congress—as well as to the president and the courts. This is the root cause of the strongly centrifugal forces within the career bureaucracy. It anchors the “iron triangles”—which link bureaucrats with Congressional committees and interest groups—and poses a fundamental and typically presidentialist



problem of the urgent need for policy integration. As noted above, a cabinet staffed by transients who must, acting independently, secure congressional support for their programs cannot perform these coordinative functions. Consequently, presidents need to create their own countervailing forces. They can scarcely rely for this purpose, on careerists who are strongly committed to their own programs. They must therefore develop an integrative executive office staffed by personally recruited transients.

### 5.7.3 *A Bland, Decentralized Two-Party System*

In parliamentary regimes it is possible for a strongly committed party with its own dedicated membership and constituency to exercise real power even though it holds only a minority of seats in the parliament. This fact promotes the development of highly centralized, policy-oriented, multifunctional political parties. By contrast, in a viable presidentialist system, parties must be loose coalitions designed to secure a popular national majority in presidential elections. Consequently they eschew sharp stands on really controversial issues that might antagonize many voters. They are, therefore, necessarily “bland”: they cannot produce well-focused and integrated public programs, nor can they form sufficiently coherent policy guidelines to unify a bureaucratized cabinet. Indeed, the party-in-Congress has perilous relations with the party-in-the-administration.

To win congressional and local elections, moreover, parties must be locally responsive. This means that a successful party must often contradict itself in many localities. It can win nationally only by aggregating local majorities. Thus it must be loosely organized and highly decentralized. Successful American parties are not “weak” insofar as they do hold vast coalitions together for successful national campaigns, but they have to be both bland and highly localized.

Because of these properties, American parties cannot guide either the legislature or the executive on most policy issues. Instead, the heavy burden of policy direction falls directly on each president, transients in the cabinet and Executive Office, and the members of Congress. They cannot expect a political party, as such, to offer coherent guidelines, nor can they rely for advice on career officials whose primary allegiance is to their own programs. This reinforces the considerations mentioned above, which compel presidents to recruit their own personal staff and executive officers (mainly transients, often old friends) to provide integrated policy direction for the whole bureaucracy. As members of Congress find their work load mounting, they also add to their personal and committee staffs, composed mainly of transients. It is doubly misleading to refer to these transient bureaucrats as “political appointees.” They are not accountable to a political party but belong to the personal entourage of the president and the members of Congress who employ them. Moreover, the term suggests a false dichotomy, that careerists are “nonpolitical,” thereby unconsciously reinforcing the myth of separation between politics and administration.

The need for volunteers to help run costly national electoral campaigns also motivates a “spoils” system, which intensifies the pressure to appoint transients throughout the bureaucracy. Because presidentialist parties have to be decentralized, they generate widely dispersed demands for “pork barrel” projects and, correspondingly, for “political” appointments. With transients in control at the center, it is difficult to bar the selection of transients in the hinterlands.

Because presidentialist parties also have to be bland, they cannot make focused demands for specific programs and policies. The rise of interest groups and lobbies, therefore, is directly proportional to the blandness of party programs. This accounts for the importance of lobbyists in a presidentialist system as links between congressional committees and careerists in the bureaucracy.

The basic dynamics of presidentialist parties, therefore, contribute simultaneously to the incidence of both party-oriented transients and program-oriented careerists in government service.

### **5.7.4 Judicial Review**

In order to umpire the unavoidable disputes and boundary problems that arise from the separation of powers, a powerful court system is needed. However, when courts exercise the power of judicial review, they become arbiters of rules and procedures to such an extent that bureaucrats must continuously consider the legal consequences of their acts and the possible unconstitutionality of the laws they implement. This means that, in addition to their responsiveness to the president and Congress, they must continually orient themselves to past and impending court decisions—a factor that, again, reinforces the extreme dispersal of bureaucratic power and often the timidity of public officials.<sup>20</sup>

### **5.7.5 Bureaucratic Politics under Presidentialism**

On the basis of the American example, then, we may conclude that the basic dynamics of a presidentialist system based on the separation of powers leads to a highly dispersed pattern of bureaucratic politics. This pattern has fundamental administrative and political consequences that are interlocked. These consequences, however, have significantly different implications for careerists and transients.

Career officials realize that their personal success requires them to satisfy the expectations and demands of specific interest groups and concerned members of Congress. These groups and their congressional allies, in turn, know that their needs will be best served by well-qualified officials whose long-term experience and training enable them to administer well. The careerists, accordingly, know that their own self-interests will be best served by good administration of their programs.

Although these careerists are strongly motivated by program politics, they must also be non-partisan in order to protect their careers when chief executives change. It serves their interests, therefore, to claim to be “nonpolitical.”<sup>21</sup> Moreover, to achieve their administrative goals, they are more likely to be helped by the management tools developed in private enterprise than by any kind of sophisticated political analysis of their roles. While acting politically, they need to adopt a nonpolitical posture.

By contrast, the political or administrative motives of transients are more fuzzy and ambivalent. On the one hand, they are motivated to serve those who appoint them: knowing that they have no tenure, they realize they can be summarily discharged at any time. However, this very knowledge also leads them to consider the options open to them in private employment, how best to utilize their experience and connections in government after they leave the public service. Accordingly, their inclination to master the massively complex problems of governmental integration and to serve the general public interest in accordance with presidential guidelines was with their own long-term personal ambitions and financial interests (Riggs 1988a). Ironically, therefore, the political interest of “political appointees” is much less clearly focused and bureaucratically oriented than is that of the careerists.

If this account is correct, a presidentialist system can provide the political motives for high levels of administrative performance in selected governmental programs. At the same time, it disperses power and dilutes real executive power: a popularly elected president is vested with high

authority and great expectations but, because of his necessary reliance on transients, he is severely handicapped in his ability to deliver on those expectations. A system that depends so much on the services of transients is highly vulnerable: it is likely to collapse and to be replaced by a bureaucratic tyranny run by careerists, mainly military officers—as we shall discuss here.

## 5.8 Bureaucratic Power in the Third World

According to statistics collected in 1965 (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) some 57 third world regimes out of a total of 141 (about 40%) had lost power at least once in military coups—100% of the 33 with presidentialist constitutions have experienced at least one breakdown and episode of military rule. More recent figures would not significantly change this finding. Since military officers form part of every country's bureaucracy, the phenomenon has a lot to do with bureaucratic politics—and administration.

**Table 5.1 The Fate of the 32 Contemporary Monarchies**

20 (63%) have lost power since 1920
9 (45%) lost power to coups
11 (55%) lost power for others reasons
12 (38%) remain in power

Source: Riggs, F.W., *Admin. Change (Jaipur)*, 9(2), 105, 1985.

**Table 5.2 The Fate of New States with Constitutive Systems**

109 total of new states with constitutive systems
48 (44%) new states lost power in coups
61 (66%) have retained their constitutive systems
<i>Single-party regimes</i>
34 total
29 (85%) have retained power as of 1985
17 (59%) originated in resistance movements
12 (41%) did not originate in resistance movements
5 (15%) were overthrown by coups
<i>Parliamentary regimes</i>
42 total
29 (69%) were still in power in 1985
13 (31%) lost power to coups

**Table 5.2 (continued) The Fate of New States with Constitutive Systems**

<i>Presidentialist regimes</i>
33 total
33 (100%) were overthrown at least once
30 (91%) were overthrown by coups
21 (70%) pre-1920 regimes
9 (30%) post-1920 regimes
3 (9%) were overthrown by different (noncoup) means
<i>Summary</i>
5 out of 34 (15%) single-party regimes broke down
43 out of 75 (57%) open states lost to coups

Source: Riggs, F.W., *Admin. Change (Jaipur)*, 9(2), 105, 1985.

Although some may claim that the first modern coup d'état was staged by Napoleon Bonaparte on the 18th Brumaire (November 9, 1799), in its typically contemporary form coups are a distinctive phenomenon in third world countries. As noted above, although bureaucracies in traditional empires and kingdoms were often able to appropriate power from their rulers, it was unusual for them to displace them. Napoleon's project resembles modern coups in that it was launched at a time when the first French Republic was collapsing. It resembles the traditional Mamluke pattern<sup>12</sup> when Napoleon crowned himself emperor on December 2, 1804, with the help of a captive pope.<sup>22</sup> Modern coups, by contrast, produce "presidents" who have to legitimize their authority by reference to the myth of popular rather than divine sovereignty.

No doubt, from an historian's point of view, the explanation of a coup require that a large number of interdependent variables be taken into account: They constitute a unique configuration in each individual case. However, from the point of view of comparative politics and administration, it is useful to focus on two closely linked variables that seem to play an important part in any general theoretical explanation. The first concerns the role of public bureaucracy and the second involves the viability, or should we say fragility, of regimes. Let me take up each separately.

### 5.8.1 Bureaucratic Power

Virtually all of the new states that were liberated from imperial rule after World War II inherited a well-established and modernized public bureaucracy. By contrast, most of them did not inherit an institutionalized constitutive system. However, there were significant differences among the states concerning the viability of these systems: some were simply much more fragile than others.

Those that were more fragile soon found themselves in the awkward position of being unable to control their own bureaucracies, hence unable to govern. In a situation of political crisis and collapsing public administration, groups of public officials came to the conclusion that it was necessary for them to seize power in order to prevent complete anarchy. Since there is no constitutionally

legitimate formula in any country whereby appointed officials select their own leader, the only remaining road to power involves violence or the threat of violence. Exceptionally, desperate civilian leaders called on career officers to rule—as in Burma in 1958. Even there, after parliamentary government was restored, General Ne Win returned to power by a coup in 1962. Usually, then, a bureaucratic cabal, headed by military officers, seizes control of a collapsing regime.

The enhancement of bureaucratic power by coup is a logical extension of the process of bureaucratic indigenization that preceded independence in many new states. We must remember that the colonial bureaucracies created to implement imperial rule were never staffed exclusively by expatriates—to save money, local personnel typically filled a large number of subordinate positions. Depending on the policies of their imperial masters, indigenous officials had already replaced expatriates in many posts prior to independence, a process that was rapidly completed after liberation. Indeed, the demand for promotions by frustrated subordinates within colonial bureaucracies became one of the most important forces behind the independence movements. The political or administrative role of bureaucracy in the new states, therefore, reflects a tension between the forces involved in the creation of new extrabureaucratic constitutive systems and those acting to indigenize the existing bureaucratic machinery of government.

We may, nevertheless, distinguish between the older and the newer states of the third world. Those that were liberated in the twentieth century, notably after World War II, in Asia and Africa had relatively “modern” bureaucracies in which some kind of merit system had been developed. By contrast, those that secured their independence in the nineteenth century, particularly in the Americas, inherited a patronage-based premodern type of bureaucracy. Let me hypothesize that it was easier for extrabureaucratic constitutive systems to retain control over patronage-based than over merit-based bureaucracies. This would explain why, in Latin America, the incidence of coups increased as merit systems, especially in the military services, grew. The exceptional case is that of the United States.<sup>18,23</sup>

### **5.8.2 Traditional Monarchies**

The traditional form of extrabureaucratic institution was monarchic. In traditional monarchies, as I use this term, kings actually rule—they are not mere figureheads. No doubt, under feudal or quasi-feudal conditions, hereditary officials did deprive them of real power, and the throne became an empty title. In modern times, some monarchies persist after surrendering power to new political institutions based on the notion of popular sovereignty. These constitutional monarchies should be classed as parliamentary regimes—Thailand is an exceptional case inasmuch as the monarchy surrendered power to a bureaucratic polity in which power was seized by public officials (Riggs 1966). We cannot generalize about the political role of “monarchy” if all these cases are included—but when we restrict the notion to regimes in which a king really rules then it becomes a useful concept.

Many monarchies were replaced by new imperial authorities when they were conquered by the Western powers or Japan. Even when these powers had democratic constitutional governments at home, the format of imperial conquest and exploitation was essentially traditional in character. Ultimately, neither the new imperialism nor the old monarchies could survive the forces released in the twentieth century by the global spread of capitalism and industrialism.

The pervasive power of these forces is well known and needs no further comment here. However, we need to note that the legitimacy of traditional kingships found in conquered countries was

undermined by conquest, even when they were formally retained under indirect rule. Moreover, the sacred and hierarchic roots of legitimacy for traditional monarchies were destroyed by the secularism and egalitarian norms that spread with Western influence.

The most dramatic manifestation of the end of traditionalism involved the collapse of the Western empires. Liberation movements based on the new norms of egalitarianism and secularism simply overpowered the war-weakened metropolitan powers. Most, but not all, of the remaining traditional monarchies have now also succumbed. About 20 independent non-Western traditional monarchies that survived until World War I have by now lost their powers (see Table 5.1). Of these, almost half surrendered power to their own bureaucracies following a coup d'état. Exceptionally, the Iranian monarchy fell before a revolutionary movement that was motivated more by traditionalism than by Western secularism.

According to my analysis, as of 1985, 12 traditional monarchies still remained in power. An important reason for their survival was probably the existence of natural resources, notably oil deposits, which permitted them to secure so much foreign exchange that they could run their governments without need to tax their people: for example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Brunei. A few, like Bhutan, are sufficiently remote from the outside world to protect their ancient institutions. To administer their domains, however, all these surviving monarchies have expanded their bureaucracies and, unless revolutions intervene, may eventually experience a fate like that of Thailand in 1932, when activists within its bureaucracy seized power.

### **5.8.3 Constitutional Models**

Far more interestingly and importantly, the new states usually borrowed constitutional regimes from their former imperial masters, or they organized single-party authoritarian regimes based on the Soviet (Bolshevik) model. In all these cases a constitutive system had been established as the popularly based ruling institution. However, in almost half of these states these institutions collapsed after an initial "vestibule" period during which they struggled to govern and keep the bureaucracy under control.

According to my 1985 data (see Table 5.2) there were then 109 new states, of which 48 (44%) had succumbed at least once to a coup d'état—many had succumbed more often. In these 48 states, therefore, the bureaucracy had displaced its constitutive system. There were 61 states (56%), by contrast, that had retained their constitutive systems and were able to sustain, however precariously, a balance of power with their public bureaucracies.

As the figures in Table 5.2 show, the success ratio of the different kinds of constitutive system varies greatly: of 34 single-party authoritarian regimes, only five (15%) succumbed to coups, whereas of 75 with open (i.e., multiparty) constitutive systems, 43 (57%) succumbed to coups. No doubt it is easier for authoritarian regimes that ban opposition parties and suppress their opponents to sustain their control over the machinery of government than it is for polities based on the protection of minority rights and civil liberties.

An additional factor should be taken into account, however, 17 (59%) of the surviving single-party regimes originated in resistance movements that fought liberation wars. They often received advice and assistance from the Soviet Union, and they followed the Bolshevik model of party organization within a revolutionary front. However, when we consider that 12 (41%) of the surviving single-party regimes obtained their independence by peaceful negotiation, we cannot attribute success merely to the mode of liberation.

### 5.8.4 *Open Polities*

This point can also be analyzed by reference to the history of the open constitutive systems: in general, the presidentialist regimes originated after the revolutionary war, whereas most parliamentary regimes came into existence by negotiation. In these countries, however, revolutionary origin appears to have a negative relation to postrevolutionary survival. Actually, the difference between the fates of presidentialist and parliamentary regimes is quite striking and deserves closer analysis.

Of the 33 new states that adopted a presidentialist constitution, at least 30 (91%) have experienced coups—and the remaining 3 have succumbed for other reasons. By contrast, of the 42 states coded as basically parliamentary in structure, only 13 (31%) have been displaced by military coups. (As the Fijian case suggests, that number would be somewhat higher today.) Could such a radical difference be accounted for, by external factors? Since most of the presidentialist cases can be found in Latin America, it is easy to think that the geography, culture, economic conditions, or discordant relations with the United States could account for the differences. No doubt U.S. influence or intervention is also involved in the non-Latin cases, notably the Philippines, South Vietnam, South Korea, and Liberia. Even so, the statistical contrast is suggestive, and it compels us to consider the possibility that presidentialist systems are inherently difficult to sustain. If so, even a weak premodern bureaucracy might well find itself compelled by the failure of a government to try in its own self-interest, to fill the “vacuum.” If we are to understand the political role of bureaucracies and its relation to the viability of extrabureaucratic (constitutive) systems, we need to pay attention to the design of these systems and the typical problems they create, especially as they relate to the control and direction of bureaucracies.

### 5.8.5 *Presidentialist Regimes*

Because of its disastrous record, it is particularly relevant to analyze the presidentialist model. American political scientists, when studying the American polity, have tended to accept its Constitution as a given, and while they study its specific problems in great depth, they usually accept the system as a whole as essentially viable, simply because it has lasted for over 200 years. Comparativists, while studying political phenomena outside the United States, have often also accepted the American model as a good one that might well be exported to other countries. When it fails elsewhere, they tend to attribute such failure to nonsystemic factors—economic, social, geographic, cultural, etc.

My data suggest that we should at least consider an alternative perspective, one suggesting that presidentialism is an essentially fragile formula. Instead of asking why others fail, should we not ask why the U.S. presidentialist constitution has not collapsed?<sup>23</sup> This is not the place for a survey of all the essential weaknesses in the presidentialist model. However, one of these weaknesses is especially relevant to the focus of this chapter, namely, the need for transients to staff the highest offices of the bureaucracy.

If careerists are allowed to occupy these top positions, the balance of power is upset and the president becomes merely a figurehead for the bureaucracy. Recognizing this possibility, however, presidents who seek to enhance their power by appointing transients to top positions encounter another difficulty: unless they are very shrewd and careful, the transients, because of their inexperience and conflicting interests, may serve them poorly. Thus presidents run the risk of cronyism and familism. Not only does this lead to a decline in administrative capabilities, but it also

discredits the regime and provokes resistance, both by careerists in the bureaucracy and by an increasingly alienated populace.

Other dilemmas encountered in the design of presidentialist regimes are also critical, especially the danger of a deadlock between the president and Congress. Although, as in the Philippine case, a president may seek to resolve such a deadlock by usurping power and ruling by martial law and edict, the far more usual scenario involves a coup in which a group of military officers, fearing a complete collapse of governing functions and hence also disaster for the bureaucracy, decides to step in, overturn the government and the constitution, and rule by fiat.<sup>24</sup> Although such disasters have also occurred in parliamentary regimes, they are much less frequent. This suggests the need for a parallel study of the structures and processes that enable parliamentary regimes, more often than presidentialist ones, both to sustain a relatively open society and at the same time to maintain sufficient control over their public bureaucracies to assure an adequate level of administrative performance.

## 5.9 Conclusion

Although the foregoing survey of the political or administrative role of bureaucracy in many different kinds of regimes has been cursory, it may be adequate to support the general proposition that all bureaucracies have their own political interests and power enough to protect them. However, the way in which they do this has a major impact on their administrative performance, ranging from one extreme, in bureaucratic polities, where their role as a ruling class enables them to flout administrative values, to a nother extreme where, in balance with a well-established constitutive system, they find that the best way to assure their own self-interest is to administer well.

Ironically, when they are so motivated, especially in presidentialist systems, it seems to be expedient for career officers to deny their own political interests and activities and to pretend that they are completely nonpolitical. The myth of a dichotomy between politics and administration that can emerge out of this situation has led, I believe, to a grave distortion in the study of American public administration, and this distortion has had damaging consequences when extended to other countries where, unintentionally, it has provided tools for strengthening bureaucracy without a parallel development of equivalent power in the countervailing extrabureaucratic institutions of government.

## Notes

1. "The Prefect, by the way he implements the Emperor's instructions, can execute a policy in direct contravention of those instructions-and no one dare inform the Emperor in such a case" (Carney 1971, Book II:103).
2. An explanation of the Chinese ("mandarin") background of the Indian Civil Service and, through it, the British civil service system can be found in Teng (1943).
3. "If through some miracle a group of mandarins from the [Chinese] Imperial court could come to Paris... they would have to adjust to modern technology and democratic procedures, but otherwise they could act like genuine French mandarins" (Dogan 1975:4).
4. Max Weber provides an illuminating analysis of the political tensions between traditional rulers and bureaucrats involved in tax-farming and the purchase of office. "The mode of tax-farming or the transfer of taxes," he writes, "can thus vary widely, according to the distribution of power between the lord and the tenant [official]" (Weber 1946:206). Concerning Hapsburg rule in Spain and the Spanish Indies,



we read that “In the seventeenth century there were very few posts which were not granted at one time or another, without much regard to the capacity of the applicants, in return for cash payments” (Parry 1953:1). “The Spanish Crown in the sixteenth-century sold offices more openly than the English but less freely than the French” (Parry 1953:3). Details on the French experience can be found in Swart (1949). The main incentives for the sale of public office were financial: “In an age when government finance, no less than custom, made the payment to most officials of adequate salaries quite out of the question, a system of payment by prerequisites was inevitable” (Parry 1953:2). The availability of such prerequisites made candidates willing to pay for them. For embattled rulers, as a result, “The sale of colonial offices had become a regular and important source of revenue” (Parry 1953:4). Of course, there were also political considerations. Parry tells us that “Viceroys and governors, if allowed to appoint the holders of such offices, might use their patronage to create private factions. They could not do so if the offices were sold, with proper safeguards, at public auction” (Parry 1953:2). Thus the controlled sale of office tended to centralize control and contain the growth of regional bureaucratic power. Ultimately, however, the system failed because, as Parry reports, “In actual money the system must have cost the Crown far more, in the end, than it brought in purchase prices. The cost in other ways—the lowering of standards and of morale throughout the service, the creeping paralysis of administration, the loss of confidence in royal justice—cannot be computed.” Apparently it contributed much to the collapse of the Hapsburgs (Parry 1953:73).

5. During the Sung dynasty “the sale of office... was not allowed to approach the proportions once reached in the Han, and later under the Manchus, when its prevalence seriously damaged the morale of the service” (Kracke 1953:76).
6. “The prebendal basis, characteristic of traditional bureaucracies... requires each official to procure a large part of his income for himself, as from fees, gifts, rents, tributes or other payments not directly allocated or distributed to him by a central treasury” (Riggs 1964:44).
7. The term “sultanism” has been proposed by Linz. Following Max Weber’s lead, Linz identifies a form of traditional authority in which the ruler “exercises his power without restraint at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment to an ideology or value system” (Linz 1975:259).
8. Elsewhere I have tried to explain the rise and persistence of the dichotomy myth in American politics and scholarship (Riggs 1988b). Although the immediate causes for the rise of the myth were inherent in the political reform movement that tried to stem the “spoils” system that overburdened the American bureaucracy with transients, the ultimate cause involves the dynamics of presidentialism, which necessitates the employment of transients in the public bureaucracy. Viewed in this context, the dichotomy myth became a useful weapon in the struggle to achieve a balance between careerists and transients in American public administration.
9. Coulborn (1956), on the basis of comparative analysis, reconstructs a scenario in which feudalism rises from the ashes of collapsed bureaucratic empires. Among its features are hereditary office-holders who may or may not possess fiefs. European feudal lords (bureaucrats?) appropriated their fiefs as family possessions, while in the Japanese case landless but hereditary officeholders (*samurai*) became more numerous, as the great lords (*daimyo*) consolidated their control over large fiefs. “The feudal class, including both enfeoffed vassals and landless salaried retainers, was on the way to becoming a hereditary bureaucracy” (Reischauer 1956:35).
10. Bureaucratic politics in fifth century Byzantium relied on three interlocking prerequisites of office: *praescriptio fori*, or the right of an agency to try cases involving accusations against it; *sportulae*, or the fees and tips exacted by officials in exchange for their services; and *suffragium*, the rules governing the purchase and ownership of office. These rules made the Byzantine bureaucracy a self-governing body able to defy the imperial authority (Carney 1971, Book II:106–111).
11. Such a system prevailed in the Ottoman Empire, in which, according to S.N. Eisenstadt, “The personal subservience and the social autonomy of the bureaucracy were insured by the system of having it composed mostly of members who were the sultan’s personal slaves, and had been recruited from alien elements.” Eisenstadt’s monumental work and extensive bibliography provide a starting point for anyone interested in studying the bureaucracies that developed in traditional monarchies and empires (Eisenstadt 1963). Concerning the origin of the slave official system, Lane-Poole tells us that:

From the time when the Arabs came in contact with the Turks on the Oxus and brought them under the rule, Turkish slaves had been highly prized in Muslim households. Their physical strength and beauty, their courage, and their fidelity had won the trust of the great emirs, and especially of the caliphs, who believed they could rely more safely upon the devotion of these purchased foreigners than upon their own jealous Arabs.

When those in the caliph's service had shown their talent and loyalty, they were often emancipated and appointed to government offices, especially in the palace and as governors of provinces (Lane-Poole 1968:59, 60).

12. Details can be found in Lane-Poole:

The annals of mamluke dominion are full of instances of a great lord reducing the authority of the reigning sultan to a shadow, and then stepping over his murdered body to the throne. Most of these sultans died violent deaths at the hands of rival emirs, and the safety of the ruler... depended mainly upon the numbers and courage of his guard... A coalition would be formed among a certain number of disaffected nobles, with the support of some of the officers of the household or of the guard and their retainers would mass in the approaches to the royal presence, while a trusted cup-bearer or other officer, whose duties permitted him access to the king's person, would strike the fatal blow; and the conspirators would forthwith elect one of their number to succeed to the vacant throne (Lane-Poole 1968:244–245).

The word *mamluk*, according to Lane-Poole, means "owned" or "belonging to" and was "applied to white male slaves captured in war or purchased in the market" (1968:242). A recent and somewhat opinionated account is given by Glub (1973). A short but useful summary of the Mameluke dynasties is contained in the Egypt entry in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

13. "The Censorate was destined... to develop elaborate procedures for checking on the day-to-day operations of all the central governmental agencies; in later dynasties this system covered the whole empire" (Kracke 1953:442). According to Weber, a constant struggle prevailed in the Chinese empire between the literati bureaucrats and the palace establishment but "in the long run and again and again the literati won out" (Weber 1946:442).
14. Under the heading "Party Organization and Controls at the Oblast Level," Fainsod (1963:62–92) gives exceptional insight, based on documents captured by the German army, into the mechanisms whereby the Communist party sought (not always successfully) to control the conduct of bureaucrats in the state apparatus.
15. In England, we are told, "higher civil servants determine not only how policies should be effected, but also, to a very significant extent, which should be effected" (Chapman 1970:153). Similarly, in Canada, "even officials who claim total administrative detachment in fact play politically significant roles" (Campbell and Szablowski 1979:210).
16. For example, we are told in that in the normal (i.e., parliamentary) model, relations between civil servants and legislators are "mediated" by cabinet members, whereas in America one finds the "end-run model," that is, the "extreme case of direct linkage" between officials and legislators (Aberbach et al. 1981:233–235).
17. A round table on Comparative Presidentialism was held at the world congress of the International Political Science Association in August 1988 and plans have been made for panels on this theme at future conferences of the American Society for Public Administration, American Political Science Association, and International Sociological Association.
18. The "essential" features are those that are needed in order for a presidentialist system not to breakdown and lead to military rule. A provisional effort to identify such essential or "paraconstitutional" features is offered in Riggs (1988c).
19. Information on the patronage system initiated by the founding fathers is given in White (1948). President Andrew Jackson "did not introduce the spoils system," according to White, but he "did introduce rotation into the federal system..." However, as the rotation in office mounted, partisanship in office grew (White 1954:4–5). Although the Pendleton Act firmly established career services in the U.S. federal government, it did so very cautiously, placing only about 10% of federal position in the new "classified civil service," and these were mainly very subordinate posts (Van Riper 1984:105). Subsequently, of course, the percentage of careerists greatly increased, but transients never disappeared.

20. Dwight Waldo thinks of “the judicial functions and apparatus as constitutionally privileged and functionally specialized instruments of public administration” (Waldo 1987:5). Rosenbloom (1987) summarizes recent developments and offers a good bibliography. A detailed discussion of problems involved in judicial review of acts by government agencies can be found in Ball (1984:227–257). Ball’s symposium, as a whole, reviews the multiplicity of controls imposed over federal bureaucrats in America.
21. No doubt the “nonpolitical” label also serves the interests of careerists in other ways. Peters, for example, notes that “For administrators, this presumed separation of administration and politics allows them to engage in politics without the bother of being held accountable politically for the outcomes of their actions” (Peters 1978:137).
22. The Mamluk usurpers, in 1250, of the title of sultan clearly felt a need for legitimation by the sacred authority of the caliph. An opportunity arose when the first great Mamluk sultan, Beybars—a successful general who had assassinated and replaced his predecessor, Kutuz, in 1260, “invited an exiled representative of the extinguished Abbasid caliphate to come to Cairo [in 1261], where he enthroned him with splendid pomp as the rightful pontiff of Islam... and received from him the gold-embroidered black turban, the purple robe, and the gold chain and anklets, which denoted the duly appointed and spiritually recognized sovereign of the caliph’s realm” (Lane-Poole 1968:264–265). A line of powerless caliphs remained in Cairo subsequently until 1538, when the caliphate was assumed by the Ottoman sultans. Throughout this period these caliphs obediently legitimized the rule of Mamluk sultans as they came to power, whether by inheritance or, more importantly, by a coup.

An apparently successful modern example of monarchist usurpation might be found in Iran, where Reza Khan Pahlavi, an army officer, seized power in 1921. Four years later he ousted the Qajar shah and launched a new dynasty. This maneuver seemed to have succeeded when his son, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, succeeded him in 1941, following British and Soviet intervention during World War II. No doubt he would have lost power during the premiership of Mohammad Mossadeq (1951–1953) had not the American CIA helped him to topple Mossadeq from power. In historical perspective, his success was short-lived for, as everyone knows, the monarchy came to an end in 1979 in the face of an Islamic fundamentalist revolution spearheaded by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

In 1912, following the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty in China, a presidentialist republic was established with General Yuan Shih-kai as president. Impatient with Congress and republican ideas, Yuan tried, without success, to start a new Imperial dynasty. Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who seized power in the Central African Republic on January 1, 1966, had himself crowned emperor in December 4, 1977. On September 20, 1979, he was deposed by the former president, David Dacko, with French military assistance. These episodes suggest that once the monarchic idea had been discredited, it was futile for coup leaders to try to resurrect the formula.

23. In Riggs (1988c) I have speculated about a half dozen fundamental problems in presidentialist systems and tried to suggest some of the American governmental practices that enabled this regime to survive.
24. Elsewhere I have tried to explain the typical scenario of a coup d’état and its underlying bureaucratic dynamics (Riggs 1981).

## References

- Aberbach, J.D., Putnam, R.D., and Rockman, B.A. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.
- Albrow, M. *Bureaucracy*. Praeger, New York, 1970.
- Ball, H. *Federal Administrative Agencies, Essays on Power and Politics*. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984.
- Campbell, C. and Szablowski, G.J. *The Superbureaucrats*. Macmillan, Toronto, ON, 1979.
- Carney, T.F. *Bureaucracy in Traditional Society*. Coronado Press, Lawrence, KS, 1971.
- Chapman, R.A. *The Higher Civil Service in Britain*. Constable, London, 1970.

- Coulborn, R. A comparative study of feudalism. In *Feudalism in History* (R. Coulborn, ed.). Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1956.
- Dogan, M. The political power of the western mandarins. In *The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants* (M. Dogan, ed.). Wiley, New York, 1975.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. *The Political Systems of Empires*. Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1963.
- Encyclopedia Britannica. Egypt. History: Mohammedan period. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 8. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., Chicago, IL, pp. 86–90.
- Fainsod, M. *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*. Vintage, New York, 1963.
- Glub, J. *Soldiers of Fortune: The Story of the Mamlukes*. Stein & Day, New York, 1973.
- Kracke, E.A. *Civil Service in Early Sung China, 960–1067*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1953.
- Lane-Poole, S. *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages*. Methuen, London, 1901. Republished by Frank Cass, London, 1968.
- Linz, J. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. In *Handbook of Political Science* (F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds.), Vol. 3. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1975, pp. 175–411.
- Parry, J.H. *The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies Under the Hapsburgs*. Ibero-American 37, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1953.
- Peters, B.G. *The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective*. Longman, New York, 1978.
- Pfiffner, J.P. Political appointees and career executives. *Public Administration Review* 47:57–65 (1987).
- Reischauer, E.O. Japanese feudalism. In *Feudalism in History* (R. Coulborn, ed.). Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1956, pp. 26–48.
- Riggs, F.W. *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 1964.
- Riggs, F.W. *The Island: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity*. East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1966.
- Riggs, F.W. The structures of government and administration reform. In *Political and Administrative Development* (R. Braibanti, ed.). Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1969, pp. 220–324.
- Riggs, F.W. Shifting meanings of the term “bureaucracy.” *International Social Science Journal* 32:563–584 (1979).
- Riggs, F.W. Cabinet ministers and coup groups. *International Political Science Review* 2:159–188 (1981).
- Riggs, F.W. Bureaucratic power and administrative change. *Administrative Change* (Jaipur) 9(2):105–158 (1985).
- Riggs, F.W. Bureaucratic politics in the US: Benchmarks for comparison. *Governance* 1(4):343–379 (1988a).
- Riggs, F.W. The interdependence of politics and administration. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 31(4):418–438 (1988b).
- Riggs, F.W. Survival of presidentialism in America. *International Political Science Review* 9(4):247–278 (1988c).
- Rosenbloom, D. Public administrators and the judiciary. *Public Administration Review* 47(1):75–83 (1987).
- Swart, K.W. *Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century*. Nijhoff's-Gravenhage, the Netherlands, 1949.
- Teng, S.-Y. Chinese influence on the Western examination system. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 7:267–312 (1943).
- Van Riper, P.P. *History of the United States Civil Service*. Row, Peterson & Co., Evanston, IL, 1984.
- Waldo, D. A theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics also. *Lecture at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Chicago, IL, 1987.
- Weber, M. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (trans. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills). Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, p. 206.
- White, L.D. *The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History, 1789–1801*. Free Press, New York, 1948.
- White, L.D. *The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829–1861*. Macmillan, New York, 1954.



## Chapter 6

---

# A Parabolic Theory of Bureaucracy or Max Weber through the Looking Glass

---


Gerald E. Caiden

### CONTENTS

6.1	A Parabolic Curve of Bureaucratization .....	111
6.2	Max Weber through the Looking Glass.....	112
6.2.1	Specialization .....	113
6.2.2	Hierarchy .....	117
6.2.3	Rules and Regulations.....	119
6.2.3.1	The Bus Company.....	119
6.2.3.2	The Police Department.....	119
6.2.4	Management by Administrators.....	120
6.2.5	Impersonality.....	121
6.2.6	Careerism.....	122
6.3	Implications.....	123

### 6.1 A Parabolic Curve of Bureaucratization

For some time, students of bureaucracy have been concerned with its apparent contradictions. On the one hand, its institutionalization of legal–rational authority makes it more productive than most alternative forms of human organization, especially on a large scale. Yet it manifests so many potential organizational deficiencies or bureaupathologies that it can become most unproductive. Can it be that there is in operation the same kind of process that economists and others have



**Figure 6.1** A parabolic curve of bureaucratization.

observed in respect to utility, namely a parabolic curve whereby with increasing resources, utility at first accelerates, then experiences diminishing marginal returns, and finally reaches a point of nonutility? With increasing bureaucratization, does productivity first accelerate, then experience diminishing returns, and finally reach a point of actual decline?

When, during the nineteenth century, industrializing societies experienced the increased productivity of bureaucratization, scholarship concentrated on the functionality of bureaucracy. Weber's ideal type analysis could be (and was often) interpreted as a justification and exhortation of bureaucratization, although he, like Durkheim and others, also noted its alienating effects on individuals and its other dysfunctional elements. As bureaucratization increased, its dysfunctions became more apparent and attracted more and more attention during the first half of the twentieth century, and bureaucracy itself became subject to increasing criticism. But only in the second half of the century has research concentrated on the dysfunctional bureaucracy, suggesting that further bureaucratization may induce so many bureaupathologies that bureaucracy will become dysfunctional, productivity will decline, performance will be inhibited, and many of the already overbureaucratized organizations would be better off if they debureaucratized. So influential have these critics been that policymakers now look for alternative ways of delivering public services other than through public bureaucracies and responsive management experiments with debureaucratization to increase productivity.

Studies of selected allegedly overbureaucratized organizations exhibiting bureaupathologies on an extensive scale (such as multinational corporations, armed forces, prisons, legal systems, mail services, and welfare agencies) do suggest a parabolic curve effect (see Figure 6.1). They also indicate how the functional elements of bureaucracy—specialization, hierarchy, rules, managerial direction, impersonality, and professionalization—if overdone can turn dysfunctional and eventually unproductive. In combination, the various dysfunctions alienate not only clients but also members or employees. Overbureaucratized organizations are not pleasant to deal with or comfortable to work in. They irritate more than they please. They add to rather than detract from life's daily trials. This paper sketches how the functional elements of bureaucracy when overdone become dysfunctional.

## 6.2 Max Weber through the Looking Glass

No analysis of bureaucracy can avoid acknowledging the debt to Max Weber, whose conceptualization has yet to be surpassed. Not only did he outline the advantages of legal-rational authority

in organizing human activities, but he also referred to some of its disadvantages, increasingly so toward the end of his life when bureaucratization was fast becoming the norm of contemporary society. Despite his warnings, bureaucratization has almost been deified by organizational analysts who have preferred to blame its apparent shortcomings on the inability of people to adapt themselves to bureaucratization rather than delve into inherent shortcomings. Today, the term “bureaupathology” is no longer applied to organizational misfits, but, as the word would suggest, to the pathologies, sicknesses, or shortcomings of the bureaucratic form of organization (see Table 6.1).

The virtues of bureaucracy are well known. But if the bureaucratization process is carried too far, if it is hastily pursued, and if it is misapplied, then the virtues turn into vices. Just where and when this occurs are matters of speculations, but again that through analysis and experimentation it is possible to discern the range when the functionality of bureaucratization becomes dysfunctional, just as when eating at first satisfies hunger but, if persisted in, becomes gluttony. There is a transition zone which will vary in happenstance and will differ from organization to organization. This transition zone can be likened to the downward sloping curve of marginal utility, save that in this case, it is the downward sloping curve of productivity, or to be much more exact and precise, organizational deficiency, for it is efficiency that will decline much before productivity, until further bureaucratization results in inefficiency, then loss of productivity, and certainly dysfunctionality.

The analogy of eating and overeating is not all that far-fetched. What constitutes overeating will vary according to the size of individuals, their energy levels, their diets, their health, their habits, and even their cultural perceptions as to built. For a long time the individual who overeats may not be aware of the fact and the consequences may be hidden. Nothing untoward may happen, but medically the body reacts, and the eventual dysfunction may shorten life and certainly cause medical complications. So, too, what constitutes bureaucratic dysfunction will vary according to the size of organizations, their purposes, their structures, their tolerance of inefficiency, and even their perceptions of organizational health. Organizations may not be aware of what is happening slowly to them for there may not be any outward signs of bureaucratic dysfunction, but eventually they will suffer bureaupathologies which, if not treated in time or properly, will lead to their demise.

Care must be taken not to confuse symptoms with causes. It is not difficult to list and classify bureaupathologies, all the things that can and do go wrong in organizations. Indeed, it is an interesting exercise to remind ourselves how fallible we are and how many things can go wrong in our organizations. But listing them does not tell us what causes them or, better still, how we can cure them. The symptoms may have multiple causes requiring complex correctional actions, including drastic surgery, ongoing chemotherapy, and extensive (and expensive) convalescence. In the search for causes or some major causes, we do not have to go much beyond Max Weber’s conceptualization of bureaucracy, for within each characteristic lie the seeds of its own decay. In short, if one overorganizes or if one overbureaucratizes, then the same virtues become vices, and if not reversed or corrected or compensated, they will result in self-destructive tendencies, which if not halted in time may eventually lead to organizational demise.

### 6.2.1 Specialization

The virtues of the division of labor have long been admired. The industrial society has carried the division of labor to its logical conclusion in the workplace. Industrial engineering has extended job differentiation, position classification, and simple task performance, epitomized by Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times*. Now job fragmentation is universal, most employees in large organizations are required to do a very limited number of activities, using very little of their total abilities



**Table 6.1 Common Bureaupathologies**

Abuse of Authority/ Power/Position	Favoritism	Kleptocracy	Procrastination
Account padding	Fear of change, innovation, risk	Lack of commitment	Punitive supervision
Alienation	Finagling	Lack of coordination	Red-tape
Anorexia	Footdragging	Lack of creativity/ experimentation	Reluctance to delegate
Arbitrariness	Framing	Lack of credibility	Reluctance to take decisions
Arrogance	Fraud	Lack of imagination	Reluctance to take responsibility
Bias	Fudging/fuzzing (issues)	Lack of initiative	Remoteness
Blurring Issues	Gamesmanship	Lack of performance indicators	Rigidity/brittleness
Boondoggles	Gattopardismo (superficiality)	Lack of vision	Rip-offs
Bribery	Ghost employees	Lawlessness	Ritualism
Bureaucratese (unintelligibility)	Goobledygook/ jargon	Laxity	Rudeness
Busywork	Highhandedness	Leadership vacuums	Sabotage
Carelessness	Ignorance	Malfeasance	Scams
Cheating	Illegality	Malice	Secrecy
Chiseling	Impervious to criticism/suggestion	Malignity	Self-perpetuation
Coercion	Improper motivation	Meaningless/make work	Self-serving
Complacency	Inability to learn	Mediocrity	Slick bookkeeping
Compulsiveness	Inaccessibility	Mellownization	Sloppiness
Conflict of interest/ objectives	Inaction	Mindless job performance	Social astigmatism (failure to see problems)
Confusion	Inadequate rewards and incentives	Miscommunication	Soul-destroying work
Conspiracy	Inadequate working conditions	Misconduct	Spendthrift
Corruption	Inappropriateness	Misfeasance	Spoils

*(continued)*

**Table 6.1 (continued) Common Bureaupathologies**

Counterproductiveness	Incompatible tasks incompetence	Misinformation	Stagnation
Cowardice	Inconvenience	Misplaced zeal	Stalling
Criminality	Indecision (decidophobia)	Negativism	Stonewalling
Deadwood	Indifference	Negligence/neglect	Suboptimization
Deceit and deception	Indiscipline ineffectiveness	Nepotism	Sycophancy
Dedication to status quo	Ineptitude	Neuroticisim	Tail-chasing
Defective goods	Inertia	Nonaccountablitiy	Tampering
Delay	Inferior quality	Noncommunication	Territorial imperative
Deterioration	Inflexibility	Nonfeasance	Theft
Discourtesy	Inhumanity	Nonproductivity	Tokenism
Discrimination	Injustice	Obscurity	Tunnel vision
Diseconomies of size	Insensitivity	Obstruction	Unclear objectives
Displacement of goals/ objectives	Insolence	Officiousness	Unfairness
Dogmatism	Intimidation	Oppression	Unnecessary work
Dramaturgy	Irregularity	Overkill	Unprofessional conduct
Empire-building	Irrelevance	Oversight	Unreasonableness
Excessive social costs/ complexity	Irresolution	Overspread	Unsafe conditions
Exploitation	Irresponsibility	Overstaffing	Unsuitable premises and equipment
Extortion		Paperasserie	Usurpatory
Extravagance		Paranoia	Vanity
Failure to acknowledge/ act/answer/respond		Patronage	Vested interest
		Payoffs and kickbacks	Vindictiveness
		Perversity	Waste
		Phony contracts	Whim
		Pointless activity	Xenophobia

and potentialities. Their work is routinized, allowing almost no variation in performance and no scope for initiative. In many cases they are mere appendages of machines or machine minders. Very quickly their work becomes boring to them. It is the same thing over and over again, a boring ritual in which they are, for all intents and purposes, dehumanized. For them, the mechanics of work are soul-destroying. They are easily replaceable cogs, having no personal impact on the work they do.

Under such dehumanizing conditions, it is no wonder that few show any enthusiasm for their work, for the job they perform, and for their place in the scheme of things. They are so divorced from the end product, so isolated in the total organization, and so alienated from the industrial system that forces them into such servile labor, that they come not to care whether the work is done properly. They do their part, but if every so often they do it poorly, as imperfect beings must do occasionally, they carry on as if nothing untoward has occurred, hoping that in the pressures of the moment, nobody else will have spotted anything wrong. They are not going to draw attention to their own mistakes for they know when they do, they will be reprimanded, punished, and eventually replaced. So flawed products are detected only by a system of routinized checks and inspections, which, while more interesting to perform and allowing greater personal style, is not much more rewarding to perform well. It is difficult to generate interest in doing a good job.

Once people working under such a dehumanized, impersonal, and mechanical system discover they can get away with occasional flawed work, they then test to find out how much flawed work they can get away with. Who notices? Can flawed work be traced back to the individual? Somebody eventually notices, but that may be well after the event or so far from the place of occurrence that nothing can be done. The organization as a whole has to live with flawed productivity, and in fact learns to accept a certain percentage or degree of failure. Flawed output is allowed for, written into the costs of production as returnable items or reprocessed services, and the work has to be done all over again, not necessarily by the original offenders. The responsible organization may never discover its culpability. Flawed products and services are suffered by members, clients, and customers who alone bear the loss simply because they do not know what to do or whom to complain to or believe that nobody will heed their complaints or, in the worst case, they are dead, victims of a flawed system of production and delivery; hence, the need for quality control.

Eventually, people discover how much they can get away with, undetected and untraceable. They care not whether the work is done properly or at all. Theirs is a switched off, mindless existence as far as their job is concerned. Nothing more is required of them. They avoid becoming bored into insanity by thinking of interests off the job or by devising amusing games with or about work to provide some personal interest, or they resort to pure escapist thoughts and daydreaming, and narcotics. Their minds are not on their work. Their concentration lapses. They look for any excuse for a diversion or a break, and they skillfully manufacture interruptions in the routine. They work at half-pace, a gentle pace comfortable to all. Work norms are set well below capacity, which can be attained when they are sufficiently motivated or scared as the case may be, but which cannot be maintained for long without driving people to desperation. Thus, not only is performance flawed but the organization works somewhat below capacity unless machines replace human beings altogether in the work process.

For most caught in excessive division of labor, there is a detachment that cares not whether the jobs are spoiled, or targets are reached, or property is stolen, or the work is constantly disrupted. While they themselves may not deliberately act wrongly, they do not prevent others from doing so. They keep their minds on their own business, which is staying out of trouble. They do not inform on wrongdoing, which would be a breach of work etiquette in their position, and, when required by peer pressure and identification, they protect wrongdoers by covering up. They drift

through life, or at least work life, in a dream, doing whatever is necessary to justify their continued employment and membership, but not much more. They do not believe—with reason—that anything they do will change their job situation. It will all be much the same wherever they go and whatever they do.

Here is a gigantic system which on the whole is the most productive but in the individual or the particular is actually quite unproductive. It wastes huge resources and potentialities. It enslaves most participants to mindless, soulless work, using a minute portion of their capabilities. It suffocates them and destroys their enthusiasm and initiative. It deadens them to please to do better, improve performance, produce more, and contribute more of themselves. It destroys their enterprise. Common sense tells us that this excessive division of labor cannot be the most productive form of organization. At some point, it ceases to be functional. At the final stage, it promotes organizational sabotage by internal dissidents who have long given up on it and who take perverse joy in wrecking their own organizations.

### **6.2.2 Hierarchy**

The virtues of hierarchy are well known. Hierarchy concentrates authority, provides direction, and ensures coordination. It enforces accountability through direct and clear lines of responsibility from top to bottom in a bureaucratic organization. It is simple and easily understood. Those in the upper reaches of hierarchy set the tone, give orders, and ensure that the lower reaches carry out the orders given them. Those in the lower reaches carry out the orders given them and report to their superiors on what they do. The bureaucratic organization moves with purpose, order, and discipline, with everyone pulling in the same direction and combining with everyone else to that end. If, however, hierarchy is carried too far, with layers upon layers of authority, something quite different results.

Excessive hierarchy encourages irresponsibility. Everyone below the apex has fixed jurisdiction, fixed authority, and fixed duties and obligations, which are only fragments of the whole. Their vision is deliberately curtailed. They are warned not to exceed their bounds, not to invade somebody else's territory, and not to concern themselves with matters outside their responsibility. So, apart from the apex, the interest of all becomes the interest of none. Nobody needs be concerned with the whole, only with his or her small part, and as long as that area seems to be doing well, it matters not that the whole may be jeopardized, although such subsystem optimization may work against the best interests of the whole system, which may require greater self-discipline and common sacrifices. The assumption is that the apex knows what is going on and looks after the interests of all. Should the apex fail to realize its responsibility to the whole, there is no way formally that the vacuum can be filled, and woe betide those who take upon themselves the task of filling apparent vacuums unless authorized expressly by the apex or some external overriding authority.

Unfortunately, excessive layers of hierarchy block the apex from knowing what really is going on far below it and jeopardize its ability to protect the interests of all against the interests of some. Each layer of authority tries to differentiate itself from immediately adjoining layers and to distance itself from them. Together they create both real and artificial or self-contrived barriers. Often only insiders know what distinguishes one layer from another, why one rank or title differs from another, and where one stops and another takes over. A complex organization resembles medieval jousting as each rank wards off challenges from inferiors and endeavors to encroach on the space of superiors. Such status seeking may decline into absurd symbolism as savage fights take place over who sits next to whom and who has the place closest to the window, door, fan, fireplace,

or the boss's office. Lord, help the newcomer who mistakenly crosses the lines and provokes indignation well out of proportion to the incident. Strikes occur over trivial matters, trivial to outsiders but not to insiders. Such trivial warfare may well prevail over the interests of the whole organization, to say nothing of the public interest.

Warring factions impede the flow of information, knowledge, and communications vital to the smooth operation of the whole. Instead of passing information along, each layer filters and censors it, exaggerating its own importance and omitting detrimental items. The more the layers, the more distortions occur. What should be known by all is known only by a few, if any. Knowledge and the manipulation of knowledge constitute power. When somebody knows something that somebody else should know but does not, the former can control the latter, who is thereby made dependent. Everyone soon finds this out and so joins the game. Those who know enjoy creating a mystique around their knowledge ("the aura of knowing") while cherishing secrecy and silence. Finding out what they should know is one of the major tasks of the middle levels of hierarchy.

Another major task of the middle layers of hierarchy is justifying themselves. What exactly do all the middle layers do? If the truth be known, they really manufacture work for themselves so that they can point to how much work they perform even if that work does not really advance the organization, and more importantly they manufacture work for lower layers, possibly needlessly. Actually their main job may be just to be there, to take the blame when things go wrong above and below them, and that alone may justify their existence within the organization. Taking the blame is an important organizational function that has to be performed by someone, but since no one likes to take the blame, least of all when he or she is not responsible for making the mistakes. People take pains to protect themselves; the art of self-protection in this case involves the needless manufacture of paperwork or red tape in bureaucratic parlance.

Excessive red tape frustrates the hierarchial apex as much as it does clients of the organization. It further distances those at the very top from what is really going on. They are already isolated enough if they do not remove themselves altogether by indulging in the grosser forms of elite behavior. Having reached the top and being successful in their own eyes, they tend to self-indulge, to surround themselves with excessive privileges (the rewards of getting to the top) and act imperiously. The world they live in is so different from everybody else's: it is the world of the rich and famous. They are in danger of cutting themselves off even from their own organization. They do not wish to be reminded of what it used to be like lower down the hierarchy and may go so far as to kick the ladder away. In any event, they do not willingly descend. They do not want to dirty their hands again. If they do, it is largely for show and the more quickly they can get back to elite comforts, the better. In short, the two worlds at the top and bottom of the hierarchy have little in common; they could be on different planets. In their overprotected cocoon, the elite hear what they want to hear and they are told what it is supposed they want to be told. The picture they get of the organization is what *ought to be* going on, not what *is* going on. Calamity catches them by surprise, and their shock is real, not posed. They really do not know.

If the people at the apex do not know what is going on, who does? Nobody. This well-controlled, disciplined organization is headless. Leadership is diffused, and power is fragmented and scattered. All people can do is insist on their authority because they probably lack commensurate power. In this amorphous state, things do fall between the cracks and things do get lost and misrouted. The surprise is not that excessive hierarchy works well (it does not), but that it works at all and works so well in the circumstances. It works so well because it is a very fluid organization in which who ever wants to lead can lead. It gives ample scope for opportunism, entrepreneurship, and power plays to satisfy even the most manipulative. But this is a far cry from the usual picture of bureaucracy as restrictive, prohibiting, and unenterprising, and it is rather different from the way bureaucracies are supposed to work.

### **6.2.3 Rules and Regulations**

We know why the rule of law is preferred to the rule of men; it is less capricious, arbitrary, and discriminating. Rules and regulations do much to ensure equality, uniformity, equity, consistency, and order. But if rules and regulations are carried too far, they can defeat their intent, to say nothing of the purposes of the organization. Rules have a habit of taking a life of their own, their purpose and origin forgotten. Having too many rules creates confusion, red tape, and indecision if rules include all formal policies, guidelines, laws, and written directions. Inevitably, with bureaucracy and rules playing such a commanding role in contemporary life, examples of the dysfunctions of excessive rule making are legion. Two of my favorite examples are selected and discussed below.

#### **6.2.3.1 The Bus Company**

A large city was poorly served by its regional rapid transit agency. Buses were infrequent and service was erratic. No maps of the total route structure were available to the public. Bus stops gave no indication of which buses stopped and what routes they took. Bus indicators gave only the final place of destination, and no route maps or timetables were available on buses. After much public protest, the bus company decided to systemize its route structure, standardize timetables, and publish route maps and timetables for the whole system and for individual bus routes. Actually very few bus maps and timetables were published and stocks were soon exhausted. Nonetheless, the bus company insisted on following its overall schedule, which, while standardizing the timetables, did not allow for daily fluctuations in traffic flow, number of riders, and weather conditions. Soon the rider public was protesting that the buses were not stopping at bus stops to pick up passengers. Investigation revealed that by picking up passengers, the drivers could not stick to the company's rigid timetable. So rather than fall behind the timetable, they often did not stop in rush hours when traffic was slow, and people anxious to get to work on time were left standing often watching buses pass half empty.

#### **6.2.3.2 The Police Department**

Another large city was rocked by a police corruption scandal. To reduce the possibility of any repetition, the mayor insisted that the police department tighten up its rules and discipline. The department was ordered to codify all its policies, rules, regulations, guidelines, and practices, together with relevant legal and city council decisions on police work. In all, the code came to 1600 pages, divided into four volumes. Every police officer was enjoined to know the code by heart. As legal decisions, mayoral instructions, council guidelines, and internal rules changed so often, the code was printed in loose-leaf form, so that whenever changes were made, the relevant page was taken out, and a new version substituted. Soon, so many changes were taking place that every day more and more pages had to be replaced, some several times a month. The police, who it must be admitted never really attempted to memorize the code, gave up consulting the code altogether and made paper airplanes out of the loose-leaf replacements.

These two stories illustrate several dysfunctions of excessive red tape. The rules and regulations become captive of the legal profession, which writes them in such a way as to prevent court challenge and override. Unfortunately, only lawyers and judges can understand them. Nobody else has a notion of what they mean. Being unable to comprehend them and realizing that rules cannot cover every conceivable situation anyway, the bureaucrats substitute their own group norms, which are based on common sense, experience, and prevailing notions of fairness. Such working group norms are not rules, and they do not operate like rules. Furthermore, the written rules and

the unofficial norms often clash. In following the latter, under peer pressure, bureaucrats run afoul of their hierarchical superiors, distort organizational policies, and corrupt the organization in the sense of deviating, deliberately and conspiratorially, from declared intentions. Dual standards exist. One is the publicly declared, official written declamations, and the other is the working practices. Bureaucrats disliked by peers, superiors, or both can be whipsawed as norms are put against rules, and they and their clients can be terrorized by their unrelenting oppressors. Once again, the actual working situation is quite different from an organization supposedly governed by rules, for the excessive use of rules can make for capricious, arbitrary, and discriminatory practices.

#### **6.2.4 Management by Administrators**

Bureaucracy requires the full-time employment of administrative generalists to manage the organization operated by technical specialists who produce and deliver its goods and services. This class of managers, which dominates the upper layers of the hierarchy, decides on major issues, raises and allocates the resources required by the specialists, sorts out jurisdictional disputes, ensures a smooth work flow, makes and revises the rules, and, in brief, performs all those tasks that have to be done to enable the organization to function and the specialists to get on with their jobs. The idea is that the administrators take care of all the extraneous factors to allow the specialists to concentrate on doing their work without having to worry over what to do and where to get the wherewithal to do it. The administrators service the specialists who carry out the real work of the organization. Of course, this is the concept of staff and line. The line fights the battles, while the staff decides where and when the battles will be fought by which fighting (line) units and services the line units, which can concentrate on fighting instead of being diverted by searching for billets, fashioning weapons, and foraging for supplies. This way, all is harmony, agreement, and efficiency.

When administrative rule is overdone, as is now so often the case in organizations, large and small, quite a different picture emerges. The administrative staff generalists are superimposed on the (line) specialists. They capture most of the top positions and take the lion's share of organizational privileges and rewards. The message is clear—if one wants to go to the top, become an administrative generalist. Since most bureaucrats aspire to get to the top, they realize that sooner or later they must make a career switch. They must leave the ranks of the specialists and join the administrative or managerial class, or they will miss out. When they do, the organization probably loses the best of its line practitioners, the masters of their crafts, and gains uncertain, inexperienced, untutored administrators, whose performance is probably mediocre on work they perhaps do not enjoy and never quite master. At least this way they get some obnoxious ignoramus off their backs at last, even though they themselves become obnoxious ignoramus to others. Fortunately, not all organizations misuse talent this way by exaggerating administrative rule, but too many ruled by administrative generalists do so at an unknown cost to society and to their organizations, simply because they will not alter the reward structure or dogmatically believe in the superiority of the administrative class.

To enhance its appearance of superiority or “knowing,” the administrative class has created a profession of its own, full of mystery to the uninitiated, with its own special jargon and terminology and emphasis on credentialism. One is not accepted unless recognized by other members of the club. But once they are accepted, the club is very protective of its members and will rarely admit to making a mistake or harboring the unworthy unless they run afoul of the law. Usually bad administrators are not dropped; they are passed on to another unsuspecting organization to start again. They may even be promoted, but to circumscribed positions where the potential harm

they can do is limited. Actually, it is difficult in complex organizations to determine how much impact they make, whether for good or bad. Rarely can specific outcomes be attributed to certain individuals. Rather, everything is a group effort, joint venture, and collective decision making, not in a giant mosaic where individual pieces can be identified but in a spinning gyroscope where all is fused and confused. Nonetheless, the administrators take full credit. All too often by the time the damage they have done is discovered, they have already moved on to greener pastures, while behind them others are trying to pick up the pieces and compensate for past mistakes which they were unable to prevent.

The criterion of administrative performance is success, the organizational success. Administrators do not see themselves in a support role, but in a leadership role. Organizational success is not due to line performance, but to their organizational leadership, not entirely of course, but it is leadership that counts most. The ranks may fight the battles but the staff generals win the war. So the administrators must impress their organizational successes on the world. Marketing success is important to them, more important than achieving success. To them, everything is going well, things are looking up, and problems are being resolved; they are enduringly optimistic. And well they might be, because they choose and determine the criteria of their organizational success, manipulate the criteria at will to project success, and suppress evidence to the contrary. They have their own organizational equivalents to the classic “the operation was a success but the patient died.”

The two greatest deficiencies of administrative rule are the reluctance of administrators to admit their technical ignorance and their lack of proprietary interest. Administrators may be imposed on the specialists and have no technical knowledge at all other than what they pick up as they go along. Or they come from the ranks of the specialists and their administrative duties prevent them from keeping up with the specialists as they should. In any event, they are not as knowledgeable as the specialists on the details. Yet their leadership image impels them to decide technical issues which they are not properly qualified to judge. Professing knowledge and wisdom they lack, they make incredible technical blunders. Perhaps the story of the Sydney Opera House is as good an example as any. A design was selected that even the designer confessed he did not know how to construct, but the administrators proceeded anyway. After all, it was not their money at risk. They were playing with other people’s money. Most administrators do, and by definition all administrators in bureaucratic organizations do. Administrative rule must take the major blame for the misuse and abuse of public monies by puffing up the self-importance of administrators who forget that they are supposed to serve others than themselves.

### **6.2.5 *Impersonality***

The virtue of bureaucracy and bureaucrats is that they are impersonal, act impartially, put aside all extraneous and personal considerations, and decide rationally. Presumably the rational decision is the right decision. But impersonality can be carried too far, especially in human service organizations where the aim is to assist deserving clients. Excessive impersonality turns clients into dehumanized objects—cyphers, symbols, cards, cases, files, or numbers—and inevitably becomes quite insensitive even to genuine human plights. Bureaucrats have stood impassively by while terrible indignities have been inflicted on their fellow beings. Such impersonality has turned certain bureaucracies into fearful machines of human suffering, degradation, and murder, instruments of man’s evil to man.

Even in welfare bureaucracies where humane treatment is the objective, the impersonality of the administration is dysfunctional as if the organization were itself uncaring, whereas that is



not the case. The situation is terribly one-sided. An organization with resources to help confronts anxious potential clients who need help they can obtain nowhere else. Once accepted as clients they become dependent on it, scared that its help may be withdrawn at any time or without good reason or by mistake of uncaring bureaucrats. They need reassurance, a kind word and civility in their face to face dealings with the organization's representatives. They resent anonymity and impartiality, which they see as masking indifference (which could well be) and, worse, the petty manipulation of rules to make them servile, obedient, and uncomplaining clients. It is not too far-fetched in the guise of impersonality for mentally ill bureaucrats to exploit their organizational power and their clients' dependency to inflict cruelty (as in *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*) or even to misuse bureaucratic procedures to kill clients (as in *The Hospital*).

Bureaucrats as well as their clients suffer from excessive impersonality. They are asked to be what they cannot be. They would not be human if they could put aside every extraneous and personal consideration. They are part and parcel of the society in which they live, and they know its values, prejudices, social structure, power relationships, and such like factors institutionalized by bureaucratization. They know their place in the social order and the behavior expected of them in the positions they hold. They hold these positions because they were attracted by the potential to help those less fortunate than themselves or to improve the lot of mankind. Impersonality grates on their helping hand outlook. They want to project their friendly personality, and they cannot be impartial to pain, suffering, poverty, and cruelty. Excessive impersonality frustrates them, irks them, angers them, and eventually impels them to leave or to suffer that common bureaucratic disease in human service organizations of "burnout." Bureaucrats with burnout who go through the motions of the job without that spark of infectious enthusiasm which is so crucial for its successful performance are not much help to their clients in need and distress going through prolonged life crisis, and they can hardly be expected to fight indifference, discrimination, cruelty, injustice, vindictiveness, and other maladies perpetuated by bureaucracies on the underprivileged in society.

### 6.2.6 *Careerism*

Careerism certainly helps to attract and retain qualified and competent people to devote their working lives to bureaucratic organizations. Appointments are made on merit alone. Employees have guaranteed tenure as long as they do an acceptable job. And as a reward for their organizational loyalty, they receive a pension at retirement. Thus assured, they can devote themselves and their talents to advancing the interests of their employer and concentrate on doing a good job without worrying distractions. If carried too far, the concept of careerism can produce a quite different type of employee.

The career system is a closed system. Successful probationers stay with the same organization for the whole of their working lives. They know no other organization. They gain no other experience. They work with much the same people. The organization is incestuous. All who enter are socialized to conformity. Those who decide on promotions look for people much like themselves. The whole system is self-perpetuating. Its quality depends on whom it first attracts and whom it manages to retain. If it attracts quality, that quality will move through the organization, but if it fails to attract high-quality people or high-quality people leave early, then mediocrity predominates.

As progression is assured (vacancies occur through expansion, retirement, or death), there are few incentives to excel. Employees can relax, knowing that sooner or later their turn will come.

They do not have to exceed the comfortable norms set by the mediocre. If they miss their turn, they can safely serve out their time to retirement without exerting themselves beyond the doctrine of the minimum, that is, the minimum necessary to avoid being retired before time. An organization of mediocre time-servers is not quite what Max Weber had in mind when he enumerated the advantages of the bureaucratic form of organization. He did not dwell on those who as they approach retirement resist changes that appear to them as inappropriate or restrictive. Hence, although everyone seems to be in favor of change, nothing much different actually happens. The organization goes on much the same but falling further behind need and potentiality.

### 6.3 Implications

Excessive bureaucratization can make for quite a different organization and quite different outcomes than Max Weber's analysis would lead one to expect. In time, it negates all that bureaucratization is supposed to promote. Excessive specialization may well result in uncaring, uninterested employees, working well below capacity and unwilling to stop the organizational saboteurs among them. Excessive hierarchy may well result in ignorant, powerless elites who are captives of bloated middle management busy manufacturing needless work for others. Excessive rules may well result in corruption and arbitrariness. Excessive impersonality may well result in insensitivity, indifference, petty manipulation of clients, and employee burnout. Excessive careerism may well produce a staff of mediocre time-servers. Together, these constitute quite a caricature of bureaucracy, but if we look around at the real world of organizations, one cannot be sanguine about the possibility that some large organizations, some autocratic organizations, and some secret fraternal organizations have already succumbed to excessive bureaucratization.

It is important for any organization to recognize, if possible, two points. One is where diminishing marginal efficiency (or output or performance) occurs and the other where marginal efficiency actually evaporates. This can only be done through complex and continued measurement of the operations of the whole organization. What is needed is the equivalent of the control room in a computerized production line. Such organizational monitors are now being devised but the costs are high and their deployment raises other important issues as the implementation of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act illustrates.

But it is unnecessary to go to such lengths to profit from the foregoing analysis. Every organization can safeguard itself against overbureaucratization in simpler ways by directing close attention to each bureaucratic characteristic. Excessive division of labor is already being tackled by work integration, job rotation, mechanization of routinized operations, and a holistic view of members or employees. Even so, it will remain a fact that most people are overeducated for the work they do and if anything the spread of high technology will increase the gap. (Who will need to tell time or spell when machines do that already?) Work, not education, needs to be restructured to allow more active participation by those who perform it by increasing tasks and expanding decision-making responsibilities.

Unfortunately, excessive hierarchy prevents restructuring work in this way. Unnecessary layers, particularly at middle levels of the organization, need to be consolidated and the whole structure reduced so that the distance between top and bottom is shortened. Computerization has given organizations the opportunity of shrinking middle management and they have seized it. Similarly, excessive red tape and formalities need to be minimized and the gap between the formal rules and the informal group norms reduced, again by allowing line people to assume greater responsibility

for deciding how to perform their tasks. This too is being done through genuine decentralization and the implementation of the New Public Management. Administrative rule does not have to be taken to such extremes, and reward structures should be arranged to permit line people to receive more than managers who exercise, at least on paper, authority over them, and steps should be taken to prevent the isolation at the apex.

Likewise, organizations should accept that the idea of impersonality is demanding, particularly in welfare and human service bureaucracies. The personal touch may be desirable, as long as care is taken to prevent discrimination, prejudice, and arbitrariness. Work should not be structured as to demand perfect human beings to perform it, and greater attention should be paid to detecting and overcoming personal stress on the job and burnout. For this and other reasons, there should be greater freedom of entry and exit in the organization at all levels, without penalties imposed on promotion prospects or retirement benefits. Careerism has its place but not to the detriment of organizational performance. No one is owed a living and organizational generosity should not substitute for a proper social welfare system and adequate retraining facilities of members or employees who no longer pull their weight. In any event, younger generations are not so prepared to stick to one employer or organization; they want more mobility and they expect several career changes in their lifetime.

These are but samples of what can and should be done in dealing with overbureaucratization. The analysis still leaves open more serious questions as to where and when bureaucratization has been wrongly applied, how bureaucracy itself can be replaced by alternative schemes of human organization, and what refinements still need to be made in the bureaucratic form to make organizations more error-free, innovative, and adaptive. Reengineering now does this with much success. We do not have to stand Max Weber on his head. We just need to peer more closely at him through the looking glass.

## Chapter 7

---

# Building Blocks toward a Theory of Public Administration

---

Gerald E. Caiden

### CONTENTS

7	.1	A Theory of Collective Action and Communitarianism .....	128
7	.2	A Theory of the Public Interest.....	129
7	.3	A Theory of Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization .....	129
7	.4	A Theory of Public Trust, Responsibility, and Accountability .....	129
7	.5	A Theory of Government Intervention and Regulation .....	130
7	.6	A Theory of Public Policy .....	131
7	.7	A Theory of Public Goods and Services.....	131
7	.8	A Theory of Public Initiatives and Enterprise .....	132
7	.9	A Theory of Nongovernmental Organization .....	132
7	.10	A Theory of National Planning and Utilization of Resources .....	133
7	.11	A Theory of Social Welfare and Equity.....	133
7	.12	A Theory of Public Ethics.....	133
7	.13	A Theory of Administrative Reform .....	134
7	.14	A Theory of Public Value and Worth.....	134
7	.15	A Theory of Bureaucratic Growth .....	134
7	.16	A Theory of Public Investment and Employment .....	134
7	.17	A Theory of Public Law and Regulation.....	135
7	.18	A Theory of Collective and Individual Rights and Obligations .....	135
7	.19	A Theory of Collectivist or Administrative Limitations .....	135

7	.20	A Theory of Public Service .....	136
7	.21	A Theory of Citizenship and Public Participation.....	136
7	.22	A Theory of Public Sector Productivity and Effectiveness.....	136
7	.23	A Theory of Public Sector Management .....	137
7	.24	A Theory of Public Choice.....	137
7	.25	A Theory of the Good Society (Utopia?).....	137
		References .....	137

Public administration is the study of the state in action, that is, the *administrative* state as contrasted with the political, economic, or social aspect of the state as an institutionalized collective power. A theory of public administration would entail a theory of the administrative state, something more than a theory of government but less than a theory of collective action. More likely, it would be a refined theory of governance in action that would reach further back than the modern bureaucratic state, which is barely 200 years old. It would be broader in scope than any idiosyncratic form of institutionalized collective power, and it would have to take into account the international superstructure that binds the community of nations into a real world network. Although this form of governance has been growing at an increasingly accelerating pace, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, there is still no global theory of the administrative state and few related to it, despite its obvious centrality in contemporary society and its clear staying power.

Could there be any universal elements on which a global theory of the administrative state could be based?

I have sought to identify such elements that are not time specific or culture bound, that are truly universal, and that are common throughout the world in all systems of governance. They had to be based on reality, that is, how public administrators think, behave, and act and how others view their conduct and disposition. At the same time, they had to reveal the *de facto* value base not found elsewhere and also the ideological foundations of public administration norms. They had also to cut across public professions, functions, and specialties. Despite such a demanding agenda, I claim to find at least 25 such elements or building blocks. Some go back thousands of years. Notions of public trust and integrity and public responsibility and accountability predate the earliest recorded civilizations and the earliest surviving written records of public business. Others, such as public choice, are relatively new and are very much contemporary concerns bolstered by the realization that the power of the administrative state is so enlarged that it can do both great good and great harm. A few, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are still evolving and are not yet fully articulated, let alone universally accepted. So what follows is very much a preliminary map; a rough, hasty, incomplete, and fuzzy sketch of the terrain that has to be traversed before a global theory of the administrative state and public administration can be formulated.

Work in these 25 fertile patches could in time, combine several elements and link all. Some may be integrated; others may have to be split. There is no telling at this early stage what may develop. The aims of such an endeavor are clear: it is to ground public administration on a firm theoretical foundation, to establish its intellectual value, and to guide research. It is to help practitioners understand the ideological dimensions of their activities and to provide a clear value base with universal guidelines as to what is and is not permissible conduct. It is to provide a more concentrated focus to theoretical explorations in public administration and to link widely divergent public administration postulates. It is to go beyond the rather culture-bound limitations of previous

attempts to unite theoretical endeavors that emphasize the positive side to collective action, government intervention, public entrepreneurship, and communal initiatives.

Despite increasing internationalization of the world's economy, politics, and culture, the nation-state has more than held its own against the battering of regionalism and supranationalism. The number of states has more than trebled and is likely to increase still further. Once again, the state as the major potent and autonomous organizational actor in contemporary society has become the focus of political analysis (Evans et al., 1985), and clearly the state in question is the administrative state, not so much Hobbes's tyrannical Leviathan or the heartless totalitarian state, but the caring, interventionist welfare state, the *superfamilia* (Chodak, 1989) advancing the general interests of all members. This has all come about because of the global advances made in public policy and administration since 1789 when the new American Constitution and the French Revolution transformed public perceptions of society, government, and official public conduct and the bureaucratic revolution transformed the state's ability to harvest public resources and deliver public goods and services.

The discipline of public administration has concentrated on the emergence of the administrative state, virtually ignoring anything that preceded it. In the absence of global analysis, studies have been fragmented into the studies of individual or specific administrative states, and the theories that have been developed have largely been and continue to be idiosyncratic. Since the field has been dominated by American scholars, what is mostly available are theories about public administration as practiced in the United States, as if they were universal, whereas in fact the peculiarly American administrative state has little in common with public administration in other parts of the world. The field still resembles a Tower of Babel where scholars and practitioners bent on a common task speak different languages and have great difficulty in comprehending the grand design. Even current attempts to reformulate American public administration theory despite their recognition of the global nature of the field, still tend to be somewhat insular and myopic. They take the American scene (pluralism, capitalism, democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law, guaranteed basic human rights, administrative due process, public service, professionalism, and so on) too much for granted and assume that all their readers are as familiar and versed in American public administration theory as they are, which is not the case.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the struggle toward a valid theory of the administrative state. No universal theory exists. There are theories about the idiosyncratic forms that the administrative state has taken in particular countries, and there are theories about public administration or rather American public administration or Western-style public administration but little of global dimensions. Laments about the failure to construct a truly universal or international discipline go back at least 50 years (Dahl, 1947), but attempts by international agencies to impose universalistic doctrines have been thwarted time and time again by a id recipients, as being culturally imperialistic, intellectually suspect, and operationally impractical. Perhaps this indiscipline has been fortunate in fostering originality and innovation, but in higher education cadres it has given the appearance of scholars who did not know what precisely they were about, unable to see the wood for the trees, and lacking academic class, and in the field it has divided practitioners from scholars, the former tending to see the latter as barely tolerable parasites and the latter tending to be frustrated at their removal from the cutting edge of action. Both sets have been carried away by fads and fancies, whim and chance, that have taken public administration first in one direction and then in another without any apparent logic or reason. Even the buzz words change rapidly. Of course, other social sciences suffer similar defects, but at least they do have a common core of universally recognized theory, a shared foundation which has stood the test of time and enabled them to progress intellectually. In contrast, the study of public administration seemingly stumbles along, largely descriptive,

often polemical, less frequently analytical and introspective, rarely theoretical, “rather peripheral to the facts of political and administrative behavior, and to the forces which shaped social change” (Self, 1986a, p. 329), and proceeding “from order to chaos” (Lundquist, 1985). The fault is largely the failure to explore the essence of the administrative state.

To understand the administrative state does mean joining forces with political theorists who have been exploring the nature of the (political) state. For half a millennium, they have been clearing a track. They have described its origins and evolution, the different forms it has taken, the roles it has played, the powers accredited to it, its legitimacy, its employment by rulers and acknowledged authorities, its strengths and weaknesses, and even its psyche. It would take a lifetime to cover the literature on the subject, and still the survey would not be complete. Suffice to say that the state is not just a collection of governmental instruments or the institutionalization of collective decision making or the repository of the collective force of its citizens. It is more than its concrete manifestations. It embodies sets of abstractions concerning government, law, legislation, and law enforcement; concerning the legitimate use of coercion, power, authority, and persuasion; concerning social inequities, injustices, indignities, and inhumanities; concerning the ambitions, dreams, desires, and ends of mankind; concerning human conduct, behavior, relations, and expectations. No wonder it means different things to different people and so much thinking about the state is embedded in ideology. It is a matter of belief whether the state is seen as being necessary at all, whether it is too big or too small, whether it is doing too much or not enough, whether, it has too much or too little power, whether it is under too much or too little control, whether it is worthwhile and provides value for money or not.

Yet when it comes to the administrative state, that part of the state that is responsible for getting done what the state wants done, ideology and belief have taken a back seat. The proof has been in the doing, in the end product or outcome in the results. What works has been recognized as an art form reducible to scientific study, bereft of subjectivity. It has all too glibly been assumed that public administrators have taken their cues from political actors and seen as their task the best (meaning most economical, productive, efficient, and effective) ways of getting done what they have been told has to be done. The real world has never been quite this simple. The public administrators have their own beliefs, traditions, self-interests, and professional norms that have impacted not only how things have gotten done but also what has been judged feasible to attempt, thwarting political intentions. Deep down, there has been a professional belief system or ideology governing the administrative state among its practitioners, rarely articulated. Indeed, one is struck by the remarkable absence of ideology at least overtly in the practice of public administration, how rarely ideology has contributed to its pragmatic development, and even theorists have shied away from ideological concerns. At least, the principal actors have taken pains to emphasize public policy needs and pragmatic considerations, and to downplay any ideological foundations or implications.

Yet if one tries to get at the essence of the administrative state, one quickly becomes enmeshed in an ideological thicket. This is best seen in examining the progress in theoretical building blocks or infrastructure for the edifice of the administrative state, each of which is capable of being universalized or globalized or internationalized.

## 7.1 A Theory of Collective Action and Communitarianism

The administrative state constitutes possibly the largest organization in any country if one includes the whole machinery of government, together with public enterprises, military and police forces,

parastatals and NGOs official overseas representations, and neighborhood associations, however ill-knit. This huge assembly constitutes collective action encountered primarily with public as opposed to private concerns. It forms part of the even greater entity of human organization and collective action that transcends the individual person which is so inclusive as to challenge generalization. Theories abound, indeed so many that they defy simple classification. Attempts to integrate and consolidate them were evident in the early issues of *Administrative Science Quarterly* and Bertram Gross's encyclopedic effort (Gross, 1964) after the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* had rather glossed over the subject even though the entry under "Organizations" was one of the longest. Since the 1960s, little attempt has been made to find a universal theory covering all human organizations and all collective nonprivate action. Theories in this area continue to proliferate, and they are expressed in increasingly obtuse and difficult language beyond the comprehension (and knowledge) of most practitioners.

## 7.2 A Theory of the Public Interest

The state, and certainly the administrative state, is to operate in pursuit of the common good, the general welfare, the overall quality of life for present and future generations, the collective realization of social values and rights: that is, those factors which affect all more or less equally and in the same way. For public administrators, it is a moral obligation to achieve what is good for society as a whole, not the welfare of any particular class including their own, "a good which enhances common life and is shared by all" (Cochrane, 1974, p. 330), not just the greatest good of the greatest number of the aggregation of individual and group interests. Plato and Aristotle were quite clear on this, as were the authors of *The Federalist Papers*. Echoes of this sentiment can be heard from the earliest days of recorded history in many diverse cultures. It remains a basic tenet of American public administration theory (Wamsley, 1990), despite its carping critics. It is the bureaucratic equivalent to exhortations to rulers to be just and to act justly, and needless to say it is a normative, ethical, and dynamic concept to guide practitioners in what they do and how they proceed.

## 7.3 A Theory of Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization

Since the predominant form of organization within the administrative state is bureaucracy, so an essential ingredient in understanding its essence is a theory of bureaucracy. For the past century, that has meant Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which is timeless and universal, is hardly surprising given its origins. But the Weberian model is incomplete, and ever since his work was translated from German, scholars have been busily filling in the gaps. Although it is not yet complete, this aspect of the administrative state is among the best understood and the most widely propagated. As a result, attention has switched to organizational alternatives to bureaucracy and the nonbureaucratic delivery of public goods and services.

## 7.4 A Theory of Public Trust, Responsibility, and Accountability

As the administrative state was all too prone to misuse its authority and resources and to deviate from its pursuit of the public interest, so it cannot be trusted to be unsupervised; it has to be held publicly answerable for all its actions through external, political, legal, hierarchical, and



professional accountability, to which moral accountability has been recently added (Dwivedi and Jabbar 1988), and accountability for managing the diverse expectations generated within and outside public organizations (Romzek and Dubnick, 1983). In short, to be accountable is to answer for one's responsibility and for the trust reposed in one; to report, to explain, to give reasons, to respond, to assume obligations, to render a reckoning, and to submit to outside or external judgment. For too long, the debate between Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer in the early 1940s dominated the theory in this area without being resolved while it became apparent that public officials could not be trusted to police themselves and public watchdogs were ill-equipped to perform effectively. All measures are dumbfounded by political incompetents, corrupt officials, authoritarian ethos, bureaucratic inertia, anonymity, and the government that is unconstitutional, secret, of special interest, bureaucratic, collaborative, discretionary, independent, contracted, professional, and privileged. None of these excuses any public official from being morally responsible "for an outcome insofar as (1) the official's actions or omissions are a cause of the outcome; and (2) these actions or omissions are not done in ignorance or under compulsion" (Thompson, 1980). And this is where the theory stands with its obvious universal implications.

## 7.5 A Theory of Government Intervention and Regulation

The justification for the exercise of authority to protect people from others and themselves need not be repeated simply because the *raison d'être* of the state is grounded in its protection of its members from external attack and its maintenance of order. Nobody quite envisaged their evolution into the garrison state or warfare state or the police state or their assumption of totalitarianism and tyranny, and ever since the state has taken on these features, theorists have been keen to define limitations to state intervention and regulation and to justify revolts, that is, disobedience against intolerable interference with individual privacy. This in turn has led to disputes over what is *public* or rather what should be public. In pursuit of the general welfare, the administrative state has enlarged its functions from personal and group security and survival to concerns about food and water supplies, sanitation and sewerage, communications and trade routes to the provision of (full) employment, guaranteed safety nets, environmental protection, preservation, and equal opportunity. Indeed, the administrative state has been asked to do so much that current fears are that it has been asked to do too much, that it is overloaded, that it has assumed functions it cannot perform at all or as well as other institutions, that it does not have the capacity to perform adequately: in short, that it should shed some of its activities, especially its commercial activities and possibly its underfinanced welfare activities and other "gray" areas of government which could be performed by the private sector and NGOs.

While there are clear ideological motives related to the nature of capitalism, competition, private property, individualism, and markets, the growth of administrative state activities has been forced/argued by the logic of the situation, that is, sheer necessity or unavoidability due to the failure of private initiative and enterprise, natural calamities, population pressures, democratization, decline of religion, and the nature of industrialization and urbanization. Similarly the shedding of state activities has ideological overtones, but it is largely decided pragmatically with respect to the availability of alternative suppliers willing and able to assume cast-off state activities, cost-effectiveness, public funding, policy unevenness, and mismanagement. Often the theory has followed practice very much, as the state had to exist before the concept of the state could be accepted. So too it is likely that the administrative state has to be settled before theories about it are formulated. Right now, the boldest attempt to formulate such a theory after the fact is Chodak's study of the statization of Western societies in which eight processes are discerned:

1. Multiplication of state functions
2. Monopoly control over economic management, education, and other selected areas of social activity
3. A new stage of social development: old and new interpretations of development
4. State responses to social and economic problems, including services for the populace at large and welfare systems for the needy and unemployable
5. Transformation of the stratification structure
6. Emergence of two-sector mixed economies and systems of direct and indirect regulatory practices
7. Spread of a bureaucratic mentality and appearance of a new double morality
8. Change in the conflict structure of society (Chodak, 1989, p. 13)

All organizations will be public because they will be under public authority and within the reach of government interference. Their purpose will be to free human energies, not restrict them, in the service of collective not individual ends. This is different from those who see government intervention as the result of interest groups struggling among themselves to maximize the benefits of their members, or the sheer irresistible dynamics of Keynesianism, or the many failures of capitalism rather than political reaction to rapid technological, economic, and social changes (Self, 1986b), although Chodak tries to combine all these explanations.

## **7.6 A Theory of Public Policy**

Public policy, like public administration, still lacks an all-encompassing theory per se and is the product of several different theoretical perspectives concerning the goals of state activities and efforts to develop knowledge relevant to public policy-making. In trying to provide a theoretical basis for the study of public policy, Yehezkel Dror identified many different models, including rational comprehensive theory, economic rational model, satisficing theory, sequential decision model, incremental model, systems theory, elitism, group theory, institutional model, optimal qualitative model, and extrarational model (Dror, 1968), all of which are oriented toward the improvement of policy-making, its outcomes and processes, its modes of inquiry and access to relevant information, its quality and efficacy, its responsiveness and morality. Clearly, there is such a need as etatization proceeds, and Dror has sketched out an optimal framework for the policy sciences that has still to be filled in. Its philosophical basis is largely neoutilitarian, scientism, and rationality.

## **7.7 A Theory of Public Goods and Services**

Although Adam Smith acknowledged the need for public goods and services, only in the 1950s was a structured theory formulated by Paul Samuelson based on Pareto optimality and market failure, and by Tiebout's case for local public goods (Batina, 1990, p. 389). Private goods were fully rival and excludable, whereas public goods were not. Nonexcludability was the crucial factor in determining which goods should be publicly provided. Then the public choice theorists explored "impure public goods," goods that were not public or private but characterized by excludable benefits which could be provided by nongovernmental suppliers if an exclusion mechanism could be installed at a reasonable price (Cornes and Sandier, 1986). This notion further expanded the list of

public goods that could be privately provided. From a different direction, the externalities of social costs of private goods were expanded to market failure and public goods. Simply put, the mere existence of an externality was not a sufficient cause for government intervention as bargaining or liability assignments could provide nongovernmental means for neutralizing externalities. Corrective means included private as well as governmental action. Furthermore, as governments could fail just as markets could, public goods and services should be competitively provided to prevent the pitfalls of monopoly. Unfortunately, many government functions cannot mimic free market concepts, particularly not those public goods and services from which society as a whole benefits; immediate gratification is not possible, and the long-term overall community needs cannot be assessed.

## 7.8 A Theory of Public Initiatives and Enterprise

Keynes maintained that governments should not do things which individuals were already doing (even if it could do them better) but do those that were not done at all, that is, to fill in the gaps left by private enterprise and initiative. Against this, collectivists have wanted to do away with most private provision, market forces, and private property in favor of government or collectivist provision. Both approaches admit the existence of state-owned enterprises, public corporations, and government-controlled corporations, in which surpluses accrue to the public, decisions rest on social as well as commercial criteria, and accountability is held by government and consumers: that is, public elements are mixed with enterprise elements. How states assume such public enterprises varies, as illustrated in the case of railways, where they have been nationalized for ideological, economic (natural monopoly), developmental, military, technological (unification), financial (bankruptcy), and national (reduction of foreign ownership) reasons. The rationale for public enterprise can be reduced to five arguments, namely (1) ideology—state ownership as an end in itself and a transfer of wealth producing assets from private to public sector (2) nationalism—an end to imperialist or foreign domination and external dependency and ensuing local supply, (3) power—an end of dominance of certain interest groups and their special privileges or deliberate exploitation of the public sector for consolidating their political position, (4) pragmatism—a shift in public opinion, promotion of development and employment, encouragement of competition and influence on markets, and mitigation of hardship, and (5) natural monopolies—preference for ownership over regulation. Whatever be their origins, governments are concerned about their performance, define principles governing their operations, and spell out concrete performance measures to which they must conform or face termination.

## 7.9 A Theory of Nongovernmental Organization

Unlike the deliberate efforts at nationalization (or privatization), NGOs have just grown over the years, to form a third sector composed of some 29 different types. Are they part of government, or are they, as private bodies constitutionally irresponsible like President Roosevelt's National Recovery Administration, as the U.S. Supreme Court ruled? They are too common to be considered aberrations, and they conduct activities essential for the administrative state. Just where do they fit? So far, it has been virtually impossible to generalize about this menagerie other than to say that they muddy the waters when it comes to public–private distinctions, accountability, governmental coordination, and legitimacy.

## **7.10 A Theory of National Planning and Utilization of Resources**

Although distinctly out of favor, with the worldwide failures of national planning and resource utilization and the discredit of bureaucratic centralism (a euphemism for national planning), theories were once popular to justify government intervention in the economy to overcome market failures, mobilize and conserve natural resources, and boost national development prospects. Planning lays out a course of action that can be followed to lead to desired goals. It implies order, logic, and rationality and also regulation, control, and loss of freedom. It puts administrative efficiency above pluralist democracy, expertise over popular choice, bureaucracy over participation, secrecy over openness, conformity over variety, although several theorists argue that all these are compatible with the right choice of planning system (Bowden, 1978; Mannheim, 1965). Most countries have some form of national planning, and even those which do not have resorted to it during emergencies (Graham, 1976). The World Bank used to advocate national planning but has seemingly lost all faith in it, at least in economic matters, at a time when there is an increasing support for international planning in environmental and other global concerns of increasing importance for the future of the planet and its inhabitants.

## **7.11 A Theory of Social Welfare and Equity**

The prophets urged rulers to promote justice and govern justly, to do right and to act correctly, to rule humanely and to help the needy. Philosophers ever since have agreed, but they have had difficulty formulating what is socially right, although in the contemporary world all states are welfarist. As a result, several different concepts of social welfare, social justice, and social good have been fashioned into different forms of the welfare state to do away with want. Should the administrative state attend to every need of its members or only selected needs? Should it distribute them equally, equitably, or differentially according to what criteria and with or without respect to the ability to pay, social position, and employability? What does natural justice, fairness, suggest? What is efficient? As Titmuss has pointed out, for many so-called welfare benefits there are really partial compensations for disservices, for social costs and social insecurities that are the product of a rapidly changing society; “They are part of the price we pay to some people for bearing part of the costs of other people’s progress” (Titmuss, 1976, p. 155), but those not in want are reluctant to pay the price and for those who receive it, it may undermine their need to save and their will to work. The welfare state rests on the certainty that everyone someday will need the help of others (Logue, 1979, p. 87).

## **7.12 A Theory of Public Ethics**

Governments should act ethically, for they set the standard and style to the governed. Likewise, public officials are expected to act ethically, to observe a common code of right conduct. It has been easier to define wrongdoing and forbid its practices than to spell out and justify right doing; hence, the quest for professional codes of ethics, accompanied by a burgeoning literature on public ethics, dirty hands, official misconduct, and corruption. Here, there is a growing international consensus which bodes well for a universal theory within easy reach.

### 7.13 A Theory of Administrative Reform

As with public ethics, since the 1960s there has been a growing literature concerned with overhauling government, reengineering the administrative state and public service reform to keep pace with accelerating turbulence and to overcome organizational rigidity, professional conservatism, and handicapping bureaucratic pathologies.

### 7.14 A Theory of Public Value and Worth

Not so in this area of public value, where there is fundamental disagreement whether or not the public sector is worth its keep and whether or not investment in it is valuable. Do the outputs justify the inputs? The fact that the argument is usually put in these terms and reduced to Pareto optimality or value-for-money, cost-benefit analysis is testimony to the hegemony of the liberal conception of the administrative state as an unfortunate necessity, valuable only in providing the conditions under which freedom (i.e., the individual pursuit of utility) can flourish (e.g., protecting against invasion and crime, enforcing contractual obligations, and guarding against fraudulent weights and measures). Its value and worth should be measured by the extent to which it enables people to pursue life, liberty, happiness, and property. Against this view of the liberal administrative state, there has been both revolutionary and evolutionary socialism with their stress on the value of the public goods and services, public property, equal access, fair shares, and societal enrichment and community to offset social disintegration and atomization. The jury is likely to be out for a long time yet on this one.

### 7.15 A Theory of Bureaucratic Growth

By any measures, the administrative state, more popularly known as the public bureaucracy, has grown enormously over the last 200 years. It is only in the past decade that attempts have been made to reverse this situation—and then more by mirrors—making for a pause in growth. What accounts for such bureaucratic growth? One theory suggests bureaucratic aggrandizement, empire building, and self-interest. Another attributes it to the enlargement of the public sphere as society grows more complex and complicated: that is, more public authority is necessary to superintend the modern industrial and postindustrial society, and Big Government has to offset Big Business. Yet another blames democratization, public demands, and rising public expectations. Growth is attributed largely to the nature of warfare and welfare together. Others point to frequent crises requiring government intervention (Higgs, 1987). And so it goes.

### 7.16 A Theory of Public Investment and Employment

Keynes has come closest to a general model of public sector investment and employment which assumes that the administrative state plays a continuous role in securing economic stability and growth, including the notion that the state is an employer of the last resort and an instigator of infrastructure investment. Another, quite different theory sees the administrative state as pure spoils for whoever commands it. Due to the obvious deficiencies of the spoils system, economists, planners, and accountants have ventured to depoliticize public investment and employment in favor of more rational, logical, and scientific ways of managing public resources based on more

objective criteria and leaning heavily on management sciences. Labor leaders have urged public employers to be model employers, to set an example to the public sector, and to innovate in industrial relations, working conditions, and social values (equal pay, nondiscrimination, equal opportunity, and redeployment).

## 7.17 A Theory of Public Law and Regulation

Outside English-speaking countries, public administration is studied under the umbrella of public law. The administrative state is or has been largely seen as an instrument for implementing public law as authorized by legitimate governmental authority, rather than as an instrument for implementing public policy and a political actor in its own right. Recent political analysis has begun to redress the balance and contrast the different views of the state vis-à-vis society and other social institutions. Thus, at least eight different concepts of the state have been identified in Germany, over the past two centuries, namely, *Obrigkeitsstaat* (authoritarian), *Beamtenstaat* (bureaucratic), *Rechtsstaat* (rule of law), *Parteienstaat* (party), *Fuehrerstaat* (dictator), *Bundesstaat* (federal), *Sozialstaat* (social), and *Wohlfahrtsstaat* (social welfare) (Kristad, 1989, p. 99), all with different implications for the theory of public law and the constitutional basis for administrative law. In comparison, public and administrative laws elsewhere have been left largely to lawyers. As yet, there is no agreed universal philosophy of law that clearly delineates the areas of government intervention but has developed criteria which should prevail when intervention occurs—due process and equal protection assured by rule making and judicial review—and has contributed the most to the protection of individual rights.

## 7.18 A Theory of Collective and Individual Rights and Obligations

The Bible did not stress rights but obligations or duties to God, and it was logical to switch them to the state instead. But what were the obligations of the state in return? Protection certainly, and a protection that was to extend to the protection of fundamental or basic human rights of individuals per se, derived from the fact that they are human beings, as spelled out by Thomas Paine and various bills of rights. When someone has rights, against whom are these rights to be enforced and who is to provide for these rights? Clearly, it is the administrative state which must protect those rights and also enforce them against itself. In time, those rights have been extended to include what society is deemed obligated to do for the individual, and those obligations have grown from legal and civil rights to economic, social, and even cultural rights. For this reason, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, 1948, is now deemed too narrow and is long overdue for revision if only its member states could reach an agreement over what should be the rights of every human being, something that they have yet to reach.

## 7.19 A Theory of Collectivist or Administrative Limitations

Rights against the state are only one aspect of limitations on the administrative state. The debate on what the state should or should not do has been reopened in recent years and determined ideologically or empirically. It is now recognized that even with the best will, the state is incompetent to perform some activities and its overall performance is inhibited by sheer lack of resources, time,

capacity, experience, and organization. The administrative state also suffers from unavoidable bureaucratopathies. Size has its problems, entropy others. Public organizations, just like any others, come and go, appear and disappear, according to their ability to solve social problems and internal malfunctioning, despite their persistence. Definite limitations have been spotted by Meyer (1985) and Christopher Hood's case for the imperfectability of public administration (1976).

## 7.20 A Theory of Public Service

The issue whether public administration should be an administration *of* the public or administration *for* the public seems to be resolved clearly in favor of the latter. The administrative state is an instrument for furthering the general interest, and its officials are servants of the public. The ideology of public service has been drilled into public officials for centuries, if not thousands of years, and the penalties for substituting self-interest and utilizing public office for serving the self-interest of private careers have also been well established. On the basis of this well-known ideology, lists of “dos” and “don'ts” for public servants have been elaborated. This building block of public service professionalism seemed well on its way to being fairly complete until in recent years when it has been severely eroded or undermined by the attractiveness of the business sector, privatization, materialism, consumerism, and egotism that seem to have placed more stress on individual/private interests than on the public/community interests.

## 7.21 A Theory of Citizenship and Public Participation

The role of a citizen is another building block which is rapidly being completed, after much neglect. The *public* in public administration has at last begun to receive as much attention as the *administration*. The citizen is not a cipher, recipient, consumer, object, or resident, that is, something passive being manipulated, molded, shifted, influenced, and acted upon by the administrative state, but a contributor, a participant, a giver, a resource, a doer, a mover and shaker, notions that go back at least as far as the idealization of Athenian democracy and updated to prevent the bestiality of totalitarianism. The question has shifted away from whether citizens should participate to what forms ensure their greatest impact in the global push toward democratization, civic organization, and citizen contribution to public policy, administration, and management.

## 7.22 A Theory of Public Sector Productivity and Effectiveness

Due to the harsh criticism of public sector parasitism, the need to prove beyond any shadow of doubt the worth and value of public sector activities has prompted scholars and researchers to produce indisputable measures of public worth and performance that could act as general indicators as profits do for business. With the advent of the hollowed out state, mixed enterprise, hybrid public–private organizations, joint ventures, increased emphasis on privatization and contracting out, decentralization, a new public profession of evaluators, inspectors, and accountants/auditors who endeavor to ensure adequate standards of service is evolving, and its professionalization will be invaluable in building this block of theory.

## 7.23 A Theory of Public Sector Management

Formulating a separate theory of public sector management is a research very much in progress to differentiate public administration from business administration. But much of it has tended to blur rather than clarify the divide, especially as the growing middle ground of NGOs rather muddies the waters as their very public missions are steered by increasingly privatized managerial goals. Also, making government more businesslike, with emphasis on efficiency has injected business values that compete and often undermine specifically public values, such as justice, equity, nondiscrimination, access, freedom of information, and accountability, and veer more to autocracy, imperial organizational self-interest, corruption, and irresponsibility more than toward democratic administration.

## 7.24 A Theory of Public Choice

As with a theory of public sector management, this building block is well in the making but still falls short because of its too ready adherence to free market principles and privatized economic values.

## 7.25 A Theory of the Good Society (Utopia?)

Ever since the dawn of civilization, philosophers have strived to describe the perfect society, the ideal state, the Utopia to which all should aspire and by which present societal arrangements should be judged. In this Utopia, would there be privilege, property, discrimination, injustice, sloth, indifference, war, crime, and immortality? Of course not. The Good Society is the ideal for which public officials should work. It would presumably provide the highest quality of life for all, and it would maximize individual potentialities. Presumably, it would be a democracy, not just any democracy but a truly participative democracy in which happiness would result from the sheer joy of achievement and virtue and everyone would enjoy the good life. However visionary, a theory of the Good Society is an indispensable building block, for without it public administrators are tempted to forget the ends of the state and lower their sights too much.

When rounded out, these 25 elements or building blocks, each of which is capable of being internationalized, should be integrated into a general theory of public administration. Some pieces of this intellectual jigsaw puzzle are already at hand. But too many are still missing or wrongly shaped to fit into a coherent pattern. We cannot show the way to people trapped in cruel, crippling, and corrupt administrative states if we ourselves cannot properly justify our ideas of public administration and convince even our own politicians to heed us. We cannot assume that the political marketplace will buy our wares unless we have worthwhile products to sell and parade them more attractively than we do. But first we have to agree among ourselves that our enterprise of theory building should be given a higher priority in our own value system.

## References

- Batina, R. G., Public goods and dynamic efficiency: The modified Samuelson rule, *Journal of Public Economics*, 41:389–400 (1990).
- Bowden, G. T., Planning—yes, but by whom? in *Planning, Politics and the Public Interest* (W. Goldstein, ed.), Columbia University Press, New York, 1978.



- Chodak, S., *The New State: Etatization of Western Societies*, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, Co, 1989.
- Cochrane, C. E., Political science and "the public interest," *Journal of Politics*, 36:327–355 (1974).
- Cornes, R. and Sandier, T., *The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
- Dahl, R. A., The science of public administration: The e problems, *Public Administration Review*, 7:1–11 (1947).
- Dror, Y., *Public Policymaking Reexamined*, Chandler Publishing Company, Scranton, PA, 1968.
- Dwividi, O. P. and Jabbra, J. G., *Public Service Accountability: A Comparative Perspective*, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, CT, 1988.
- Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., and Skocpol, T., *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
- Graham, O., *Toward a Planned Society*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976.
- Gross, B. M., *The Managing of Organizations*, Free Press, New York, 1964.
- Higgs, R., *Crisis and Leviathan*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.
- Hood, C. C., *The Limits of Administration*, John Wiley & Sons, London, 1976.
- Kristad, G. O., Radicals and the state: The political demands on West German civil servants, in *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives* (J. A. Caporaso, ed.), Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1989.
- Logue, J., The welfare state: Victim of its success, Special issue on "The State," *Daedalus*, 108:69–88 (1979).
- Lundquist, L., From order to chaos: Recent trends in the study of public administration, in *State and Market* (P. Lane, ed.), Sage, London, 1985.
- Mannheim, K., *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965.
- Meyer, M. W., *Limits to Bureaucratic Growth*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1985.
- Romzek, B. S. and Dubnick, M. J. Accountability in the public sector: Lessons from the challenger tragedy, *Public Administration Review*, 47:227–238 (1983).
- Self, P., What's gone wrong with public administration? *Public Administration and Development*, 6:329–338 (1986a).
- Self, P., *Political Themes of Modern Government: Its Role and Reform*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1986b.
- Thompson, D., Moral responsibility of public officials: The problem of many hands, *American Political Science Review*, 74:905–916 (1980).
- Titmuss, R. M., Welfare state and welfare society, in *Welfare: Readings in Philosophy and Social Policy* (N. Tines and D. Watson, eds.), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976.
- Wamsley, G. L., ed., *Refounding Public Administration*, Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1990.

## Chapter 8

---

# Bureaucracy, Democracy, and the New Public Management

---

Steven G. Koven

### CONTENTS

8.1 Introduction .....	140
8.2 Classic Formulation of Bureaucracy.....	140
8.3 Criticisms of Bureaucracy .....	142
8.4 Bureaucracy–Democracy Value Conflicts.....	146
8.5 New Public Management .....	148
8.5.1 Defining New Public Management.....	148
8.5.2 Global Application of New Public Management .....	150
8.6 Conclusions .....	152
References .....	153

Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal cost—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form. (Weber, 1982, p. 196)

Today's environment demands institutions that are extremely flexible and adaptable. It demands institutions that deliver high-quality goods and services, squeezing ever more bang out of every buck. It demands institutions that are responsive to their

customers, offering choices of nonstandardized services; that lead by persuasion and incentives rather than commands; that give their employees a sense of meaning and control, even ownership. It demands institutions that empower citizens rather than simply serve them. (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 12, 15)

## 8.1 Introduction

Contradictions and tension existing between the values of bureaucracy (order, efficiency, uniformity) and democracy (transparency, flexibility, responsiveness) have been discussed widely in the political science and public administration literature (Behn, 2001; Etzioni-Halevy, 1983; Finer, 1941; Frederickson, 1980; Friedrich, 1940; Hyneman, 1950; Yates, 1982). Since the time of the ancient Greek city-states, scholars and citizens have debated how to best assure that the will of the people would be observed and how to protect the people from unwanted actions by a small group of masters.

We are often reminded that the fear of tyranny and the dread of concentrated power were primary motivators in writing the U.S. Constitution. The Founding Fathers hoped that checks and balances built into the constitution would reduce the prospects for the accumulation of power. By limiting power, liberty and freedom would be preserved. Individual liberty would be protected by institutional mechanism such as the veto, judicial review, and the system of federalism. The Founding Fathers, however, were silent in regard to the role of administrators and the potential abuse of power by appointed officials. Since the creation of the constitution, these appointed officials have taken on additional power. This delegation of power to the administrative branch does not conform to either the theory or mechanism of the separation of powers in the constitution. Scholars in the past have discussed in greater detail the constitution's silence in regard to the administrative branch of government (Woll, 1963, p. 15). Constitutional silence is problematic and can lead to confusion in terms of how to limit bureaucratic power.

This chapter will describe the classic formulation of bureaucracy, criticisms of bureaucracy, bureaucracy–democracy value conflicts, and the new public management (NPM). Finally, the chapter offers insights regarding bureaucracy and other potential threats to democracy.

## 8.2 Classic Formulation of Bureaucracy

Max Weber's analysis of bureaucracy is said to account for his lasting impact on the field of public administration. The framework for his conception of bureaucracy is found in his ideas of power, domination, and authority. Weber distinguished three types of authority on the basis of their claim to legitimacy. Traditional authority was legitimated by time and by the sanctity of tradition. Charismatic authority was legitimated by personal leadership characteristics. Finally, legal–rational authority was legitimated by its accordance with formally correct rules and by the right of those in authority to issue commands (Etzioni-Halevi, 1983, p. 27).

Legal–rational authority is the basis of bureaucracy. Weber argued that, from a technical viewpoint, bureaucracies were capable of attaining the highest degree of rationality and effectiveness. Hierarchy facilitated planning, coordination, control, and discipline. Employment on the basis of qualification increased the knowledge and competency base. Rules saved effort

through standardization. Impersonal detachment promoted objectivity and prevented inequitable treatment.

Weber considered bureaucracy as essential for modern organizations. He formulated the following propositions about legal authority systems:

1. Official tasks are organized on a continuous, regulated basis.
2. Tasks are divided into functionally distinct spheres, each furnished with the requisite authority and sanctions.
3. Offices are arranged hierarchically, and control between offices is clearly established.
4. The rules according to which work is conducted may be either technical or legal. In both cases trained men are necessary.
5. The resources of the organization are quite distinct from those of the members as private individuals.
6. The office holder cannot appropriate his office.
7. Administration is based on written documents and this tends to make the office the hub of modern organizations.
8. Legal authority systems can take many forms, but are seen at their purest in a bureaucratic administrative staff.

In addition to these propositions about the structure of legal authority systems, Weber defined the characteristics of the ideal bureaucratic staff. These characteristics included the following:

1. The staff members are personally free, observing only the impersonal duties of their offices.
2. There is a clear hierarchy of offices.
3. The functions of the offices are clearly specified.
4. Officials are appointed on the basis of a contract.
5. Officials are selected on the basis of professional qualifications, ideally substantiated by a diploma gained through examination.
6. Officials have a monetary salary, and usually pension rights. The salary is graded according to position in the hierarchy. The official can always leave the post, and under certain circumstances pension rights may also be terminated.
7. The official's post is his or her sole or main occupation.
8. There is a career structure, and promotion is possible either by seniority or merit. Promotion is made according to the judgment of superiors.
9. The official may appropriate neither the post nor the resources, which go with it.
10. The official is subject to unified control and a disciplinary system (Albrow, 1970, p. 43–45)

These features constitute Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. Weber viewed bureaucracies as the most satisfactory form of organization. This was attributed to its precision, speed, clarity, continuity, unity, strict subordination, and reduction of interpersonal friction.

Weber is known for his contribution to bureaucratic thought. He also delineated various limitations to his model, acknowledging that bureaucracies could create a new elite. This new elite had the potential to control elected leaders through effective use of expertise. In addition, bureaucracies were thought to be antagonistic to democratic notions of popular sovereignty. This fear of elite control and rule by a narrowly selected technocracy does not seem to have abated over time. Today, concepts of bureaucrats and bureaucracies, in general, seem to have fallen to exceptionally low levels as government agencies are normally associated with ineptitude and inefficiency.

### 8.3 Criticisms of Bureaucracy

Bureaucracies have been widely criticized for their antidemocratic character. In addition, a host of other failings are associated with the idea of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971). The concept of the overweight, coffee drinking, nonproductive government official has been imprinted in American consciousness. “Bureaucrat bashing” has become a national sport with popular media figures such as Rush Limbaugh capitalizing on the antibureaucratic antipathy. Scorn and distrust of government officials, however, have been ever present in American history.

Since the late 1960s, politicians have rode the antibureaucracy bandwagon. George Wallace, in his 1968 presidential campaign, asserted that bureaucrats were overpaid, arrogant, nonresponsive, lazy, and “pointy headed.” In 1976, Jimmy Carter successfully campaigned on the promise to cleanse Washington of its Watergate residue. In 1980, the Governor of California, Ronald Reagan, campaigned as a political “outsider” who would bring a new perspective to Washington and replace the status quo.

The apotheosis of bureaucracy bashing was reached in the administration of Ronald Reagan. In his inaugural address Reagan stated, “Government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem.” As Reagan’s supporters cheered wildly, it was apparent that attitudes toward government had shifted significantly from earlier eras when leaders such as Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy enjoyed widespread support for expanding the government’s size and scope. As late as 1961, when Kennedy’s call to “ask not what your country can do for you” but “what you can do for your country,” government service was still perceived as a noble calling, worthy of honor and respect. Following Vietnam, Johnson’s Great Society, Watergate, and the perceived ineptitude of the Carter administration, the image of government and its workers became badly tarnished.

By 1980, Americans were ready to embrace, once more, the message of limited government and the free market. Laissez-faire principles of lower taxes and less government regulation were applauded, as the rallying cry to “get government off the backs of the people” grew in popularity. Numerous books and academic articles supporting limited government began to appear in print. The view that major societal problems such as poverty, economic growth, and crime were either beyond the scope of government or actually exacerbated by the government, gained legitimacy. Government had changed its spots from the fixer of society’s problems to the cause of society’s problems. The only answer would be to cut government programs, cut government workers, cut regulations, create proper incentives, and watch the private sector allocate resources to the most productive citizens.

To a great extent government has not yet recovered from its halcyon days of the 1960s. Some analysts even assert that government will never be seen in the same light as it was in the past. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York City appears to have generated some renewed patriotism, yet this “rally around the flag” phenomenon may not be enduring. It is expected that politicians will revert back to their “blame the bureaucrat” stance, and intelligence gathering bureaus such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation can come under increased scrutiny for their “lapses” in providing adequate information about terrorists.

Anti-Washington rhetoric can still be found in both national and local election campaigns. George W. Bush, like Reagan, the sitting Governor of a large state, campaigned as an “outsider” who had different values than that of the “insider” Al Gore. George W. Bush and his campaign advisors used buzzwords such as character, decency, and respect for the office of the presidency, to suggest that the Clinton presidency and Democrats lacked these values. The perception was built that the outsider would once again (as in Reagan’s time) have to ride into the town to clean up the mess left by the outgoing administration. The image of a new group preserving the honesty

and dignity of the office was created. Just as the reformers of the past would eliminate corrupt “machine” politics, the new politicians would fix the “broken” public sector exemplified by Clinton. Just as the honest and upstanding Jimmy Carter would replace the “dangerous” and amoral Richard Nixon, the principled Republicans would remove the influence of the “morally challenged” Democrats, personified by Bill Clinton.

Government workers were tarred with the same brush that struck leaders such as Clinton. Bureaucracy became a permanent “whipping boy” as cycles of blame, removal, and cleansing seemed to repeatedly sweep the nation. While elected leaders come and go, the “blame game,” nevertheless seemed to leave a permanent residue of distrust or scorn. This residue becomes a further obstacle for permanent civil service workers to overcome. It becomes more difficult for the value of “neutrally competence” to gain credibility, and workers become frustrated at the criticism hurled in their direction.

Fear of nonelected power wielders such as those appointed to government agencies, is an enduring issue. In a classic treatise on bureaucracy, von Mises (1944, p. 2) castigated bureaucracy, stating that everyone seemed to agree that “bureaucracy is an evil.” Mises contended, however, that bureaucracy was only a symptom and not the seat of the evil. The real evil was thought to be the “new system of government” which restricted individual freedom and assigned more and more tasks to the government (p. 9). Like Reagan, Mises talked about good and evil with bureaucracy being used as a tool of the evil doers. Using this metaphor, bureaucracy is transformed into the Star Wars “Darth Veda” character, while the “Luke Skywalker’s” of the world fight for individual freedom and justice against the tyrants of bureaucracy.

While bureaucracy is often viewed as evil, it has been recognized as indispensable for modern societies. Max Weber clearly thought that “legal–rational” types of authority were superior to other types of authority, such as charismatic or traditional types of authority. Francis E. Rourke (1984, pp. 15–16) claimed that both underdeveloped and developed nations require the services of highly trained bureaucrats. The presence of such highly trained bureaucrats provides assurance that the decisions of political leaders will be guided by objective advice from trained personnel (Wilson 1887). These trained bureaucrats also assure continuity as they often remain on their jobs for longer periods of time than elected officials. While advantages of bureaucracy exist, fear of an autonomous bureaucracy is still widespread. The fear derives from the fundamental issue of whether bureaucracies represent the “master” or servant of the people. Analysts question: whose interests does the bureaucracy serve? These concerns are summarized below:

[T]he autonomy that these bureaucratic skills generate is a source of widespread anxiety in all political systems, because of the possibility that administrative agencies will become in effect self-directing organizations—responsive to cues and directions they give themselves rather than to those they receive from the political bodies that are the source of legitimate authority in the state. No fear has been more constant in modern politics—shared by revolutionaries and reactionaries alike—than the apprehension that bureaucracies might become a power elite and dominate the governmental process in which they are meant to play a subordinate role. (Rourke, 1984, p. 16)

Terry (1995, p. 4) also discussed this theme of fear of bureaucratic power. According to Terry, people fear bureaucracies for the following reasons. Public bureaucracies are perceived as wielding too much power. Career civil servants are no longer thought to be responsive and accountable to elected political authorities. Furthermore, unaccountable power is incongruent with the values of the American democratic system. For democracy to flourish, the appointed officials should not

exercise arbitrary discretion but should be more accountable to elected leaders and the voters who put them into office.

Huntington (1981) argued that opposition to power and suspicion of government as the most dangerous embodiment of power, were central themes in American political thought. Other critics of bureaucracy point out that the power exercised by bureaucrats in the so-called fourth branch of government is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution.

In order to check the power of bureaucracies, a number of strategies have been implemented: constant reorganization, politicization of the bureaucracy, budget cuts, and exclusion of career executives from policy discussions. In addition to these strategies, the size of both executive and legislative staffs have been increased in order to reduce the expertise gap that exists between these institutions and the administrative branch of government (Terry, 1995, p. 5). Other institutions, however, must also depend upon experts but often will use “their own” experts to come up with alternative policy prescriptions.

Criticism of bureaucracy spans the ideological spectrum. Bureaucracies have been criticized by those on the ideological “right” (such as Mises) who fear its potential effects on individual freedom, and by those leaning more toward the ideological “left.” Those on the ideological left, claim that public bureaucracies have failed because they have not done enough to address societal problems. These individuals do not fear bureaucracy for its potential insidious impact on freedom but demand more protection in the fight against inequity and injustice. In theory, the government can expand to protect the poor and weak against those who would deprive others of basic human rights. For example, analysts claimed that government has a role to play in regulating working conditions, environmental conditions, and in providing a basic safety net. In the past, the U.S. government passed laws limiting the number of hours children were permitted to work, established minimum wage levels, and promulgated antimonopoly guidelines.

Other laws were passed in the areas of protecting the air, water, and soil quality from hazardous pollution. “Safety net” programs were established such as the Food Stamp program which provided food for the poor and the Medicaid program that provided basic health care for lower-income individuals. In recent years, government spending has increased rapidly in areas such as health care and social security. During the George W. Bush administration, spending expanded rapidly in the areas of defense and antiterrorism.

In the past, government activism was advocated in the name of promoting specific sets of values (Frederickson, 1980). To these analysts, government is not an evil but is the embodiment of good. Implicit in this perspective is the acceptance of the concept of positive liberty. Positive liberty suggests that governments must do more than negate threats to individual liberty. Government should solve problems and right the wrongs. The public sector should take a proactive stance in promoting values such as social equity, fairness, opportunity, and justice. Government should promote justice, expand opportunity, and advance fairness. This view of an activist government is consistent with current views on the value of participation and citizenship.

A good deal of literature has evolved, in recent years, delineating the concept of democratic citizenship (King and Stivers, 1998; Shklar, 1991; Stivers, 1994). According to this view, participation by citizens should enhance accountability, responsiveness, and social equity. The concept of social capital is intertwined with the idea of citizenship. A major proponent of social capital development is Harvard Professor Robert Putnam. Putnam (1995), claimed that America’s democratic tradition is dependent on the existence of civically engaged citizens who are active in all sorts of groups and associations. He noted that the prospects for improvement in education, urban poverty, crime, and health care increased where the communities were civically engaged. To his dismay, however, Putnam documented a substantial decrease in the level of civic engagement and the level of “social capital” in the United States, stating:

A society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. If we don't have to balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more accomplished. Trustworthiness lubricates social life. ... we Americans need to reconnect with one another. (Putnam, 2000, pp. 21, 28)

Advocates of democratic citizenship generally decry the lack of political input from average citizens, and support increased levels of citizen participation. These advocates also express concern over the potential for nonelected officials to abuse the power of their office (Etzioni-Halevi, 1983; Mises, 1944; Terry, 1995). Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p. 549) argued that public administrators should focus on their responsibility to serve and empower citizens. They stated that “emphasis should not be placed on either steering or rowing the government boat, but rather on building institutions marked by integrity and responsiveness.” The authors believed that promoting an ethic they termed “The New Public Service” could support institutions. This New Public Service is distinguished by the following characteristics.

1. Helping citizens articulate and meet their shared interests. In the New Public Service the primary role of government is not to merely direct actions of the public through decree. Government becomes a player in the process of moving society in one direction or another. Governments act in concert with private and nonprofit groups to seek solutions to community problems.
2. Building a collective, shared notion of the public interest. The goal of public administrators is creation of shared interest and shared responsibilities. Widespread dialogue and deliberation are central to the process. Government should bring people together to facilitate unconstrained and authentic discourse concerning future directions for society. Government should assure that solutions are consistent with democratic norms of justice, fairness, and equity.
3. Acting democratically through collective efforts and collaborative processes. Programs of civic education and development of leaders can stimulate civic pride and civic responsibility. An aim of the New Public Service is to make sure that government is open and accessible. Government should operate to serve citizens and create opportunities for citizenship.
4. Serving citizens, not customers. Public servants should not merely respond to the demands of customers but should focus on building relationships of trust and collaboration among citizens. In government, considerations of fairness and equity should play an important role in delivering services.
5. Paying attention to statutory and constitutional law, community values, political norms, professional standards, and citizen interests. Public administrators should be influenced by and held accountable to many institutions, norms, values, and preferences. They should make decisions through a process of dialogue, citizen empowerment, and broad-based citizen engagement.
6. Valuing people, not just productivity. Public organizations are more likely to succeed if they are operated through the processes of collaboration and shared leadership. Attention should be paid to the values and interests of individual members of an organization, their norms, values, and preferences. Public officials should not crave security (old public administration value), or competition in a market (NPM view), but should want to make a difference in the lives of others.



7. Valuing citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship. Public administrators should not think that public resources belong to them. Public administrators should accept responsibility to serve citizens by acting as stewards of public resources, conservators of public organizations, facilitators of democratic dialogue, and catalysts for community engagement.

Other authors have also called for a return to the values of democratic citizenship. Some assert that public administrators should become an active agent of democratic education and reform. For example, King and Stivers (1998) called for more active citizenship and a more facilitative, less expertise-driven approach to administration. Stivers (1994) claimed that administrators could become more accountable to citizens by developing the capacity to listen. This should help administrators hear neglected voices and engage in reciprocal communication with the public. Box et al. (2001) argued that NPM claims to make the government customer centered and therefore more responsive in its delivery of services. NPM, however, fails to adequately place public administration within the context of democratic rule. Democratic theorists, such as Box, reject the idea of citizens as mere customers and advance ideals such as citizenship, public interest, social responsibility, and dialogue.

Many of the citizenship theorists recognize the inherent conflict between the values of democratic responsiveness and bureaucratic professionalism. For example, Stivers (1994, p. 364) stated that in public administration responsiveness is a problematic concept in that “Democracy would seem to require administrators who are responsive to the popular will, at least through legislatures and elected chief executives if not directly to the people. Yet administrators and scholars alike tend to treat responsiveness as at best a necessary evil that appears to compromise professional effectiveness, and at worst an indication of political expediency if not outright corruption.” This issue of the inherent conflict between the values of responsiveness and those of professional effectiveness is discussed in further detail below.

## 8.4 Bureaucracy–Democracy Value Conflicts

Bureaucracy has been criticized on many grounds. Those considered to be on the ideological “right” have focused upon the danger of control and potential loss of individual freedom. Mises (1944) contended that bureaucratic growth represented a danger to “what people used to call democracy” but that the leaders of the community not the bureaucrat were to blame:

[D]emocracy becomes impracticable if the eminent citizens, the intellectual leaders of the community, are not in a position to form their own opinion on the basic social, economic, and political principles of policies. If the citizens are under the intellectual hegemony of the bureaucratic professionals, society breaks up into two castes: the ruling professionals, the Brahmins, and the gullible citizenry. Then despotism emerges, whatever the wording of constitutions and laws may be. (p. 120)

Mises concluded that democracy is consistent with self-determination and inconsistent with citizen apathy. He asserted that citizens had to gain an independent judgment on fundamental political and economic problems through their own thinking. Democracy was viewed as a “treasure that must be daily defended” and could not be sustained without trouble (p. 121). Citizens had a responsibility to be informed, aware, and capable of making rational decisions that would foster their interests.

In a more modern update of anxiety with discretionary power of bureaucrats, Gruber (1987, p. 11) stated that bureaucracies pose a problem for democracy when they make decisions (public policy) that short-circuit electoral channels of public control. Short-circuiting the electoral system increases “the potential for significant governmental action to be taken in the name of the public without being influenced by the public.” This problem for democracy is lessened if bureaucratic discretion is controlled.

Bureaucracy has also been described as an enemy of the citizen (Hummel, 1977, p. 20). Some contend that the entire phenomenon of professionalism (characterized by the drive for neutrality, order, efficiency, control, standardization, and quantification) can subvert active citizenship (Cooper, 1984). Inactive citizens in turn increase the power of appointed officials. This represents a danger to the democratic ideal that is grounded in the view that bureaucracies do not order the people to follow directives, but work for the people to foster the larger society.

A focus on the values of technical expertise and specialized knowledge rationalizes a politically passive citizen. Such a focus also supports the perception that citizens are merely consumers of public services waiting patiently for their portion of the public pie. According to Daniel Elazar, profound differences exist, on the one hand, between the concept of consumer recipients of services and the ideal of politically active citizens. Consumers pick and choose among goods that are offered to them. Citizens share in both determining the activities of the government and in utilizing product of government. Champions of the ideal of democratic citizenship contend that identifying public administration too strongly with technical expertise risks substituting a market of consumers for a polity with citizens (Cooper, 1984).

It has been argued that bureaucracies have the potential to become antidemocratic yet are not antidemocratic by their nature. Beetham (1987, p. 112) noted that bureaucracies were necessary to maintain democratic order. He thought that they only become an antidemocratic force when they become self-enclosed and exclusive, when information is protected by secrecy, and when organizational power is used to control and manipulate. These characteristics are not inherent to bureaucracies but are believed to be necessary for the fulfillment of specific tasks that are performed by public sector bureaucracies. Secrecy and control are thought as useful to perform tasks related to national security and other mandates. Beetham (1987, p. 119) stated,

[B]ureaucratic administration is not inherently anti-democratic. Its organizational capacities only become so when protected by secrecy, and it attains an independence of its own. This autonomy, though real, creates the illusion that bureaucracy is self-activating, when the reasons for its self-enclosure lie outside itself, in the tasks it is required to perform. Any analysis must start with these. If it does not, we shall fail to understand why bureaucracies are so successful in resisting attempts to make them more open and accountable. We shall thereby attribute to them a power greater than they possess, and make our own contribution to perpetuating the myths of bureaucratic malevolence and bureaucratic invincibility.

The issue of the interface between bureaucratic management and democratic values has taken on renewed interest with the rise of NPM. As the NPM calls for renewed emphasis on managerial values, criticism of this perspective has arisen. For example, Terry (1993) viewed the application of the concept of entrepreneurship to the public sector as misplaced, dangerous, and a serious threat to democracy. Box et al. (2001, p. 613) viewed the market model of management as going beyond earlier reforms and threatening to eliminate democracy as a guiding principle in public-sector management. They stated that “the market model of administration evident in NPM hinders any

return to substantive democracy and limits the degree to which citizens can meaningfully affect policy and administration.” The authors contend that NPM claims to be responsive in its delivery of services, yet fails to understand the democratic foundation of public administration.

In another critique of NPM, Moe (1994) questioned the unwritten assumptions behind Vice President Al Gore’s *National Performance Review* (NPR). According to Moe, the Gore Report (NPR Report) represented an intentional break in management philosophy from earlier studies going back to the beginning of the Republic. Moe noted that earlier organizational management studies all emphasized the need for democratic accountability. They accepted as a fundamental premise the view that the government of the United States is a government of laws passed by representatives of the people assembled in Congress. Previous government reports emphasized the view that authority and accountability had to be centralized by the president for laws to be implemented. The Gore Report discounts this clear linkage between government action and accountability to the people.

According to Moe, the NPM sought to mesh the public and private sectors. Advocates of the doctrine of NPM argued that federal government agencies should be viewed as entrepreneurial bodies that should function in a competitive market environment. Such a meshing was viewed by Moe as both unrealistic and ill-advised. He predicted that implementing the recommendations of the Gore Report would make the government less accountable to citizens. Accountability would decline as a consequence of the weakening of the presidency and evisceration of central management agencies. Furthermore, Moe questioned the managerial similarities between the private and public sectors. He stated that “the management of the executive branch is not like the management of General Electric or the Ritz-Carlton Hotels. The mission of government agencies is determined by the representatives of the people, not agency management. Government does not have the option available to private sector managers of simply stopping the performance of some activity because it is not profitable or unpleasant.” (p. 119).

A clear dichotomy does not exist between democratic values and bureaucratic values. A better way to look at these values is one of mutual coexistence along a continuum. Referring to Kaufman’s (1956) suggestion that administrative organizations operate in pursuit of different values at different times, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) stated that it makes sense to think of one normative model as prevailing at any point in time. During one value’s time (such as neutral competence), however, other values are never totally neglected. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, p. 557) argued that “in a democratic society, a concern for democratic values should be paramount in the way we think about systems of governance. Values such as efficiency and productivity should not be lost, but should be placed in the larger context of democracy, community, and the public interest.” These authors call for refocusing on citizenship values yet they have admitted that currently the NPM and its surrogates have been established as the dominant paradigm in the field of governance and public administration.

## 8.5 New Public Management

### 8.5.1 Defining New Public Management

A new paradigm focusing upon the value of efficiency and entrepreneurship in the government appears to be emergent. This paradigm has been characterized as the “NPM” and is viewed by some analysts as a normative reconceptualization of the entire field of public administration. Principal components of the NPM include efforts to improve performance and methods to achieve better results (Behn, 2001, p. 24).

“High priests” of NPM Osborne and Gaebler (1992, p. 12) presented a simple thesis. They claimed that the kind of governments that developed during the industrial era, with sluggish centralized bureaucracies, preoccupation with rules, and hierarchical chains of command, simply no longer worked very well. They thought that public bureaucracies no longer worked well because the old public bureaucracies failed to change when the world began to change. The bureaucracies designed in the 1930s and 1940s were viewed as an anachronism, not fitting into the rapidly changing, information-rich, knowledge-intensive societies of today.

Charles Goodsell (1993) neatly summarized the arguments of Osborne and Gaebler. According to Goodsell, the principal issue for Osborne and Gaebler is not what the government should do but how it should do it. To “reinvent” itself, the government must be adaptable, responsive, efficient, and effective. It must be able to produce high quality goods and services, it must be led by persuasion rather than command, be responsive to customers, empower clients, and be entrepreneurial.

Goodsell (1993) questioned the fundamental ideas of new public administration. He claimed that a sensible alternative to reinventing government was to return to the fundamentals of American public institutions. Such a return would entail support for the values of republican, constitutional, and democratic governance. To accomplish this return, people must understand that they are in charge of American governance through their elected representatives. Mandates of the constitution and other laws of the land must supercede the more narrowly tailored directives that are intended to improve service delivery. According to Goodsell (1993, p. 86), “government must operate according to the Constitution and laws of the land, not niche mission statements.”

Ten principles described how the transformation from the old hierarchical model to the new entrepreneurial model would transpire. Osborne and Gaebler (1992, p. xvii) offered these 10 principles (the “map”) as a “rough draft” and not the final word about reinventing government. They stated that “We have developed our map by looking around us, at the successful public sector organizations we see emerging, piece by piece, all across this country... We as authors are not inventing new ideas so much as synthesizing the ideas and experiences of others. Those about whom we write are reinventing government. They are the heroes of this story.”

Osborne and Gaebler stated that they were “as bullish on the future of government as they were bearish on the current condition of government.” The 10 principles discussed below offer solutions to the problems of government, and were provided by Osborne and Gaebler in an effort to help transform public institutions “from staid bureaucracies into innovative, flexible, responsive organizations” (p. xxii):

1. Catalytic government: Steering rather than rowing. Entrepreneurial governments increasingly should move away from rowing or the delivery of services to steering. Steering recognizes a wide range of alternative courses of action. Those who steer defined their future while those who row relied on traditional assumptions. Steering organizations looked for the best method to achieve their goals. Innovative alternatives to standard delivery of services by public employees included franchising, contracting out, public–private partnerships, volunteers, and vouchers.
2. Community-owned government: Empowering rather than serving. Entrepreneurial governments shifted ownership of public initiatives into the community. They empowered citizens and neighborhood groups to be sources of their own solutions. They changed the focus of programs from that of collecting clients to that of empowering citizens.
3. Competitive government: Injecting competition into service delivery. Entrepreneurial governments injected competition into the governing process. The advantages of competition included achieving greater efficiency, being more responsive to the needs of customers, encouraging innovation, and boosting the morale of public employees.

4. Mission-driven government: Transforming rule-driven organizations. Entrepreneurial governments have mission-driven organizations. These organizations turned employees free to pursue missions with the most effective methods they could find. Excessive rule making stifled experimentation and innovation.
5. Results-oriented government: Funding outcomes, not inputs. Entrepreneurial governments based agency performance and fund allocation on policy outcomes. Traditional governments based funding on inputs such as how many children were enrolled in school rather than on outcomes such as how well children improved their reading scores.
6. Customer-driven government: Meeting the needs of the customer. Entrepreneurial governments regard client citizens as customers. Traditional public-sector managers get funding from government institutions not from individual customers. Traditional government agencies feel they have to please interest groups, political leaders, and government bodies. Entrepreneurial agencies serve customers first.
7. Enterprising government: Earning rather than spending. Public entrepreneurs find innovative ways to “do more with less.” Entrepreneurial governments do not just spend money that is allocated by institutions but find ways to “earn” their own money. Methods to earn money include using user fees, entrepreneurial loan pooling, and profit centers. Entrepreneurial governments create incentives for separate entities to earn their own money. Public entities that could earn money include: public marinas, public golf courses, water services, and sewer services.
8. Anticipatory government: Prevention rather than cure. Public entrepreneurs should not just deliver services but should meet needs. Entrepreneurs can prevent needs from arising in the first place by taking proactive steps. Public institutions can use strategic planning to examine the current situation, set goals, develop strategies to achieve goals, and measure results.
9. Decentralized government: From hierarchy to participation and teamwork. Entrepreneurial leaders instinctively reach for the decentralized approach. They move decisions into the periphery, put discretion into the hands of customers and into the hands of nongovernmental organizations. Entrepreneurial leaders flatten hierarchies and give authority to their employees. Teamwork, participatory management, labor-management cooperation, quality circles, and employee development programs are examples of decentralized government.
10. Market-oriented government: Leveraging change through the market. Public entrepreneurs respond to changing conditions with innovative strategies aimed at allowing market forces to work. Just as Franklin D. Roosevelt changed the way mortgages were issued, the government can provide incentives to structure the marketplace so that it better fulfills a public purpose. Government structures the private sector but does not play a direct role in service delivery.

These 10 principles have effectively altered the dialogue and created a new paradigm for the public sector. The principles helped to unleash new ways of thinking and acting for government officials. This new paradigm does not appear to be unique to the United States, but appears to have taken hold throughout the developed world. Osborne and Gaebler (1992, p. 328) correctly predicted such a global revolution.

### **8.5.2 Global Application of New Public Management**

Christopher Hood (1991, p. 3) observed that the rise of NPM was an international trend in public administration. While “Westminster nations” such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia are cited for their aggressive adaptation of NPM reform, other nations from Korea to

Brazil, from Portugal to Sweden have moved to reform their conception of public management (Kettl, 1997, p. 446). Reforms include aspects of NPM such as more explicit standards for performance, linking rewards to measured performance, breaking up centralized personnel systems, creating smaller units, adopting term contracts, adopting greater flexibility in hiring, and “doing more with less.”

The greatest embrace of these principles appears to have taken place in New Zealand. Major changes occurred in New Zealand, as government officials enthusiastically adopted the principles of NPM. As a result of these changes, New Zealand overhauled its welfare state, restructured commercial functions, and sold off many public agencies. Other changes adopted in New Zealand included adoption of user fees, increased contracting (with both public and private service providers), heightened competition over provision of services, fewer regulations, and decentralizing management.

New Zealand jettisoned its old civil service system and allowed department managers to negotiate individual contracts with employees. Government-owned businesses (such as the national railway, the telecommunications system, and the broadcasting corporation) were forced into competitive markets. Individualized work and performance contracts replaced the rule-based civil service system. Government agencies hired senior managers on a contract basis and held managers accountable to performance standards. The entire structure of the governmental work force changed with significant reductions in personnel. New Zealand’s core departments witnessed major job cuts in local areas (Kettl, 1997, p. 453).

Firing government employees and slashing services are often associated with the political rise of the “New Right” and the growing popularity of conservative philosophies. A direct linkage between the principles of NPM and “New Right” views, however, is not apparent. Principles of NPM were endorsed by Labor governments in New Zealand and Australia, as well as by the Social Democratic Party in Sweden. The administration of Bill Clinton was at the forefront of the NPM movement. Their commitment to these principles was elaborated in Vice-President Al Gore’s National Public Management Report that was previously discussed.

Typically, however, conservative governments are linked to the principles of NPM. Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain is widely recognized for her support of NPM principles. Many examples of implementing these principles exist. During the Thatcher administration public housing units were sold to tenants, publicly funded training systems were privatized, vouchers and school choice were expanded. In the early 1990s, the British government restructured its National Health Service. The Thatcher administration also instituted greater managerial accountability, hired heads of executive agencies competitively from the public and private sectors, and issued specific performance contracts. Major cuts were made in the number of national government employees. After 15 years of Thatcher–Major reforms, the civil service in the United Kingdom had been reduced by nearly 30%.

The Australian variant of the NPM adopted many of the same principles but differed in focus from the British–New Zealand model (Kettl, 1997, p. 453). The Australian adaptation of the NPM emphasized the need to transform human resources as the keystone for broad reform. Reforms stressed enhancing the skills of workers in government service and inculcating a culture of continuous improvement. In theory, this culture of continuous improvement would help people achieve agency objectives and increase capacities in the public service. In contrast, the British–New Zealand model sought a more fundamental reduction in the size and scope of the public sector through more “radical” changes in the way the state managed its programs. While the British–New Zealand model endorsed substantial dismantling of civil service rules, significant privatization, and substantial delegation of authority to lower level managers, the Australian model emphasized new investments in training and providing incentives to workers. The Australian model supported more gradual and continuous change.

## 8.6 Conclusions

Fear of bureaucratic organizations has always been present in the American political system. This fear of concentrated power has led to the creation of a system that differs from the relatively closed European administrative system that relies heavily upon credentials from “proper” schools of higher learning. The American bureaucratic system, in contrast, is more open to various classes and groups, better reflecting the value of representation.

While American bureaucracies are more open, the general population also holds them in disdain. In recent years, “bureaucracy bashing” seems to have taken on an art form. Everyone seems to revel in blaming all the problems of the world on inefficient, wasteful, arrogant, and unresponsive bureaucrats. It has become commonly accepted that bureaucracies are inefficient, they suppress liberty, they support elite priorities, they are unresponsive to the masses, they do not exercise enough discretion, they exercise too much discretion, and they are not accountable to citizens.

To a large extent, NPM has arisen as a response to such criticism. NPM and its entrepreneurial doctrine, however, does not appear to be a magic bullet that will save a nation from the evils of mismanagement. NPM can enhance accountability and managerial command over systems that are perceived to be out of control. Empowering managers at lower levels of government, however, carries inherent risks. Managers may be more “successful” if given additional discretion. However, “success” must be defined. Who defines success determines how agencies are perceived. Defining success will determine who will win and who will lose in the struggle over scarce public resources. One must always remember that nonelected government managers are less accountable to the voting public and therefore empowering appointed officials represents a retreat from principles of both pure and representative democracy.

Democracy and bureaucracy are often viewed as mutually exclusive concepts. This type of thinking, however, appears to be misplaced. Values of efficiency can coexist with values of representation. Well-run, efficient organizations can be responsive to the will of the people. Bureaucracies are not inherently democratic or antidemocratic. The “tool” analogy seems relevant. Bureaucracies should not be viewed as inherently good or evil, but as tools that can be harnessed for a variety of purposes. They can exercise neutral competence in carrying out the policy preferences of elected leaders. They can be inefficient and incompetent but should be responsive to the desires of elected leaders. In different periods, bureaucracies can respond to the values of representation or of neutral competence (Kaufman, 1969).

Democratic societies have responsibilities toward the people. If they do not support the vision of responsiveness to citizen input, they cannot depend on others for confirmation of this form of governance. Some analysts claim that democracy in America is not doing a good job in regard to citizen responsiveness. One criticism is that government today is more responsive to money interests than to citizen interest, that in order to be elected, officials need money for television advertising, and in order to get the money, officials must be responsive to the interests of the powerful. Furthermore, there is ample evidence pointing to unhealthy levels of apathy and cynicism among average citizens.

Former President of Harvard University, Bok (2001, p. 397) expressed dismay over what appear to be disconcerting trends. He contended that participation in governance holds American society together. This common bond is believed to be threatened by forces such as immigration, the escape into private-walled communities, the emergence of multinational corporations with allegiances to many countries, and the growth of special interest groups, each intent on its own particular policy objectives. Bok (2001, p. 389) noted that the generation of Americans aged 18–29 appears to know less, care less, vote less, and be less critical of leaders, than young people in the past.

People today like to blame abstractions such as “the bureaucracy” for their problems. Politicians have found a good scapegoat for the ills that some people feel have descended on the American way of life. Those who despair about problems in America, however should not blame “bureaucracy.” If blame is necessary, usual suspects (such as economic inequality, money in politics, corporate greed, immigration, poor schools, globalization, or declining morals) should be rounded up. Bureaucracy, however, should be left off the list.

## References

- Albrow, M., *Bureaucracy*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970.
- Beetham, D., *Bureaucracy*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1987.
- Behn, R.D., *Rethinking Democratic Accountability*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2001.
- Bok, D., *The Trouble with Government*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001.
- Box, R., Marshall, G., Reed, B.J., and Reed, C., New public management and substantive democracy, *Public Administration Review*, 61(5):608–619 (2001).
- Cooper, T.L., Citizenship and professionalism in public administration, *Public Administration Review*, 44(special issue):143–149 (1984).
- Denhardt, R. and Denhardt, J.V., The new public service: Service rather than steering, *Public Administration Review*, 60(6):549–559 (2000).
- Etzioni-Halevi, E., *Bureaucracy and Democracy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1983.
- Finer, H., Administrative responsibility in democratic government, *Public Administrative Review*, 1:335–350 (1941).
- Frederickson, G.H., *New Public Administration*, The University of Alabama Press, University, AL., 1980.
- Friedrich, C.J., Public policy and the nature of administrative responsibility, in C.J. Friedrich and E.S. Mason (eds.), *Public Policy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1940.
- Goodsell, C., Reinvent government or rediscover it? *Public Administration Review*, 53(1), 85–87 (1993).
- Gruber, J., *Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1987.
- Hood, C., A public management for all seasons? *Public Administration*, 69(1):3–19 (1991).
- Hummel, R., *The Bureaucratic Experience*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1977.
- Huntington, S.P., *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.
- Hyneman, C.H., *Bureaucracy in a Democracy*, Harper, New York, 1950.
- King, C. and Stivers, C., *Government Is Us: Public Administration in an Anti-Government Era*, Sage Publication, Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998.
- Kaufman, H., Emerging conflicts in the doctrine of public administration, *American Political Science Review*, 50(4):1057–1073 (1956).
- Kaufman, H. Administrative decentralization and political power, *Public Administration Review*, 29:3–15 (1969).
- Kettl, D.F. The global revolution in public management: Driving themes, missing links, *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 16(3):446–462 (1997).
- von Mises, L., *Bureaucracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1944.
- Moe, R., The ‘reinventing government’ exercise: Misinterpreting the problem, misjudging the consequences, *Public Administration Review*, 54(2):111–122 (1994).
- Niskanen, W., *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, Aldine, Chicago, 1971.
- Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T., *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, 1992.
- Putnam, R.D., Bowling Alone, *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1):65–78 (January 1995).
- Putnam, R.D., *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000.



- Rourke, F.E., *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, 3rd edn., Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1984.
- Shklar, J.N., *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
- Stivers, C., The listening bureaucrat: Responsiveness in public administration, *Administration and Society*, 22(1):86–105 (1994).
- Terry, L., Why we should abandon the misconceived quest to reconcile public entrepreneurship with democracy, *Public Administration Review*, 53(4):393 (1993).
- Terry, L., *Leadership of Public Bureaucracies: The Administrator as Conservator*, Sage Publication, Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA, 1995.
- Weber, M., Bureaucracy, in *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds.), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1982.
- Wilson, W., The study of administration, *Political Science Quarterly*, 2(2):201 (1887).
- Woll, P., *American Bureaucracy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1963.
- Yates, D., *Bureaucratic Democracy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982.

## Chapter 9

---

# Bureaucracy: A Profound Puzzle for Presidentialism

---

Fred W. Riggs\*

### CONTENTS

9.1	Controlled or Dominant Bureaucracy .....	156
9.1.1	Dispersed Power .....	156
9.1.2	The U.S. Exception .....	157
9.2	The Bureaucratic Design.....	157
9.2.1	Some Misperceptions .....	158
9.2.2	The Ubiquity of Patronage .....	159
9.2.3	Congressional Relations .....	160
9.3	Retainer Power .....	160
9.3.1	Dependency in Modern Bureaucracies .....	161
9.3.2	Expansion of Retainer Bureaucracies.....	162
9.3.3	Bureaucratic Retention versus Rotation.....	163
9.4	Presidentialism: The Fixed Term.....	164
9.4.1	The Puzzle of Separated Powers.....	164
9.4.2	The Bureaucratic Implications of Divided Government.....	165
9.5	The American Exception.....	166
9.5.1	The Exceptional Environment.....	166
9.5.2	The Constitutive System.....	168
9.5.3	A Semipowered Bureaucracy .....	168
9.5.3.1	Federalism.....	168
9.5.3.2	Privatization .....	169

---

\* Author is deceased; material updated by the Editor.

9.6	Bureaucratic Professionalism.....	169
9.6.1	The Rise of Professionalism .....	169
9.6.1.1	Rotationism .....	169
9.6.1.2	Nonpartisan Careers.....	170
9.6.1.3	Functionism.....	171
9.6.2	The Consequences of Professionalism.....	172
9.6.3	Positive-Intrinsic Consequences .....	172
9.6.4	Positive-Extrinsic Consequences.....	173
9.6.4.1	Regime Survival .....	173
9.6.4.2	Public Administration .....	174
9.6.5	Negative-Intrinsic Consequences.....	175
9.6.5.1	The Senior Executive Service .....	176
9.6.5.2	The Patronage Alternative.....	176
9.6.6	Negative-Extrinsic Consequences.....	177
9.6.6.1	Bureaucratic Power .....	178
9.6.6.2	A Myth Perpetuated.....	179
9.7	Costs of Presidentialism: A Summary.....	179
9.7.1	The Need for Comparativism .....	180
9.7.2	Political Competence .....	180
9.7.3	Basic Reform .....	181
	Notes .....	182
	References .....	199

## 9.1 Controlled or Dominant Bureaucracy

Modern states need a system of public administration that is capable of implementing its policies well enough to satisfy its citizens and also to retain the support of its bureaucrats. When uncontrolled public officials are not paid adequately or lack the security and status they consider fair, they often revolt, stage a coup d'état, and create a *bureaucratic polity* (i.e., a political system dominated by bureaucrats and led, in every case, by military officers).<sup>1</sup>

In order to sustain effective public administration, bureaucrats must be empowered enough to utilize their expert knowledge, experience, and good judgment in solving the innumerable complex and interrelated problems generated by industrialized or postindustrial societies. However, when bureaucrats become politically dominant, as they are by definition in a bureaucratic polity, they typically run wild: they become corrupt, lazy, and oppressive because no political institution is strong enough to discipline and guide them, to set policies and norms, and exercise effective control over public officials. A critical issue for every modern state, therefore, is how to empower officials enough to assure good public administration without permitting them to become dominant.

### 9.1.1 Dispersed Power

Different constitutional systems vary in their ability to accomplish this difficult task. In general, the concentrated power found in *parliamentary* systems, where cabinet government links the executive and legislative authority, has a much greater potential for controlling and guiding the state bureaucracy than does any *presidentialist* regime.<sup>2</sup> In the latter, the separation of powers has two profoundly dysfunctional consequences for the regime: first, political division and the

resulting inability to provide coherent guidance for the bureaucracy weaken the system and render it vulnerable to be overthrown by a coup d'état; second, lack of coordination at the top generates dispersal of power below.<sup>3</sup> Resulting intrabureaucratic cross-pressures hamper public administration and provoke both public and bureaucratic dissatisfaction. Thus, presidentialist regimes are inherently vulnerable to disruption because of both their essential inability to maintain effective control over the state bureaucracy and the maladministration that unavoidably results.

Actually, all presidentialist regimes experience breakdowns—typically by a coup d'état and the seizure of power by public (mainly military) officials<sup>4</sup>—except for the United States. If we assume that the typical case is to be expected, then we need not explain what this generalization predicts. Heady makes the same point, though more cautiously: “Despite the popularity of the American Constitution as a model, its staying power has not been matched elsewhere” (1987, p. 14).

### 9.1.2 The U.S. Exception

What needs to be explained, therefore, is the exceptional case: why has the U.S. Constitution never been suspended? During the Civil War and some other grave national crises, the American Constitution has indeed been severely tested and elected Presidents have even exercised unconstitutional authority, but they have never suspended the Constitution nor discharged Congress.<sup>5</sup> Although the balance of power has fluctuated, Congress has always retained the power to block American Presidents by refusing to enact the laws or policies they propose.

I believe that a variety of important (and sometimes essentially undemocratic) practices are largely responsible for the exceptional ability of the U.S. constitutional system to survive (they are examined at length in Riggs, 1993b).<sup>6</sup> One aspect of the subject that has hitherto been ignored involves the relative lack of power of the American bureaucracy. Had the U.S. bureaucracy been as powerful as the bureaucracies found in virtually all other democracies—both presidentialist and parliamentary—it would probably, during a severe crisis, have seized power.

In order to explain this exception, we need to understand four factors that affect the power position of the U.S. bureaucracy: (1) the creation of a *nonpartisan professionalized career system*, (2) continuing reliance on *politically appointed transients and nonpartisan consultants*, (3) the influence of *federalism*, and (4) the impact of *private enterprise* as manifested in the use of nongovernmental organizations to implement many public policies. Analysis of these features in a comparativist perspective helps us to reassess the relations between politics and administration in America. It will also demonstrate, I believe, the value of using a comparative approach to enhance our understanding of the American constitutional system. Only when we abandon the notion that comparative politics and comparative administration apply only to the study of foreign governments can we gain a deeper understanding of our own system.

## 9.2 The Bureaucratic Design

Two variable dimensions of the bureaucratic design profoundly affect both the extent of bureaucratic power and the administrative capabilities of a bureaucracy: duration in office and the qualifications of officeholders. Combining them produces a fourfold matrix of long-termers (with and without technical qualifications) and short-termers (also with and without qualifications). We can visualize these possibilities as shown in Table 9.1.

**Table 9.1** Bureaucratic Design Variables

	<i>No Qualifications</i>	<i>With Qualifications</i>
Long-term	Retainers	Careerists
Short-term	Politicos	Consultants

The terms used here are somewhat arbitrary but they should help us discuss these basic variables and their significance, for both bureaucratic power and administrative performance. In general, *duration affects power* and *qualifications affect performance*. The more the bureaucrats in a polity are long-termers (whether as careerists or as retainers), the more capable they are of exercising power; and the more qualified they are, the more effective they are as administrators.<sup>7</sup>

Empowered officials are better administrators than powerless ones, provided they cannot become politically dominant. This statement implies a four-degree scale of bureaucratic power: from the top down it ranges from dominant to powerful to semipowered to powerless. Both extremes produce maladministration.<sup>8</sup>

Careerists link long-term service with qualifications. This is the ideal combination provided—and this is basic—the state can maintain effective control over them. When such control cannot be maintained, careerists can seize power (through a coup) and bureaucratic domination ensues, leading not only to autocracy but also to maladministration. Presidentialist regimes are fragile: they typically cannot maintain long-term control over a powerful bureaucracy. Eventually, during severe crises, either the bureaucrats or the President seizes power—both presidential and bureaucratic autocracies, however, are equally fragile and both are, therefore, likely to collapse. By contrast, most (though not all) parliamentary regimes are able to sustain their control over a powerful bureaucracy indefinitely, and thereby both ensuring effective public administration and continuing support for the regime.

A relatively stable semipowerful bureaucracy has emerged in the United States during the last century as a result of its exceptional mixture of short-termers and professionalized careerists. This mixture has enhanced the regime's administrative capabilities while curtailing bureaucratic power. The proposition that a presidentialist regime can persist only if its bureaucracy is semipowered rests primarily on the exceptional experience of the United States by contrast with that of all other such regimes.

### 9.2.1 *Some Misperceptions*

It is only possible to recognize and explain the exceptional qualities of the American experience when it is compared explicitly with that of other countries committed to the same constitutional formula. Without such a context, American writers on Public Administration often treat the prevalence of patronage during the first decades of the Republic and the subsequent development of the spoils system as either a lamentable aberration or the result of the failure of the Founding Fathers to recognize the need for effective public administration or a professional career service when they drew up the Constitution.<sup>9</sup>

If the Founding Fathers had, indeed, prescribed a career bureaucracy in the written Constitution, it would have made the system unworkable. Actually, they simply took for granted the viability of the only system they knew about—the retainer system they inherited from their former

British overlords.<sup>10</sup> Fortunately, this system survived for only 40 years. How and why it was then changed proved crucial for the maintenance of the American republic.

### **9.2.2 *The Ubiquity of Patronage***

All presidentialist regimes originating before the twentieth century inherited patronage-based bureaucracies from the imperial powers that administered them before they acquired their independence. Their bureaucrats had been recruited by kings as favorites and protégés; subsequently they became long-term retainers. When independent successor republics came into existence, the only way they could imagine to staff their bureaucracies was based on patronage. Retainers still prevail in all of them, except the United States.

By contrast, patronage has been largely eliminated in contemporary parliamentary regimes in favor of careerist bureaucracies. This reflects both the superior willingness and the capacity of such regimes to carry out this fundamental reform, and also their ability to maintain effective control over the powerful bureaucracies produced by their reforms. The inability of presidentialist regimes to accomplish this transformation resulted, I believe, from both the resistance of powerful retainers and the reluctance of Presidents to abandon patronage: without it they would have been unable to maintain the power of their office in balance with that of an elected Congress.

The executive power in parliamentary systems is exercised by cabinets that are, in fact, organs of a parliament—they last only so long as they retain a parliamentary majority and their members are, normally, elected members of that body. This compels them to act as a unified body and gives them powerful political support. The resulting fusion of executive/legislative powers enables them both to carry out bureaucratic reforms and to maintain control over powerful bureaucracies composed exclusively of careerists.

Any President who appointed members of Congress to a cabinet while permitting them to retain their seats would jeopardize the executive's autonomy in relation to Congress.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, a President cannot name career officers to the cabinet or to other high level positions without risking domination by the bureaucracy.<sup>12</sup> In order to retain power and initiative in the executive office, therefore, every President must recruit individuals from outside Congress and the career bureaucracy to fill most cabinet positions. Moreover, Presidents are not obliged to retain their cabinet members—they may be discharged at any time. Actually, therefore, they are top level transient bureaucrats. A cabinet composed of career bureaucrats would easily dominate the President, making that position untenable.

Moreover, the unavoidable links between Congress and key bureaucrats in a regime based on divided power fundamentally undermine presidential authority. Hence, I believe, all Presidents in presidentialist regimes need a substantial number of personal protégés in office in order to maintain the constitutional separation of powers. This necessity combines with the persistence of traditional patronage systems to compel all Presidents in presidentialist regimes to maintain and depend heavily on political appointees.

The President's direct need for patronage is also reinforced, indirectly, by the political needs of members of Congress. Consider that, to maintain its autonomy within a presidentialist system, every Congress has to tackle a huge agenda. It cannot merely accept or reject governmental initiatives as does a parliament where party discipline requires that, in order to keep its cabinet in power, majority members must normally vote for every government measure. Consequently, MPs typically have neither the incentive nor the capacity to influence bureaucratic appointments.

By contrast, to handle its large agenda, every Congress must delegate significant decision-making powers to its members and the committees in which they serve. This normally entails

personal autonomy in their voting behavior.<sup>13</sup> As a result, Presidents typically find that, to secure the congressional votes needed to gain approval of their own policies, they must use patronage (and support local, “pork barrel” projects). Thus, members of Congress have both the interest and the power to influence a President’s patronage appointments when they choose to demand posts for their own political protégés—especially those who helped them win their seats.<sup>14</sup>

### 9.2.3 *Congressional Relations*

Put differently, the structural inability of Presidents to rely on party discipline—even when their own party has a majority in Congress—generates strong pressures to trade jobs for votes. By appointing the nominees of members of Congress, a President can win votes for his or her policies. Reciprocally, members of Congress need patronage to reward supporters who helped them win at the polls. Consequently, the minimum number of political appointees needed to staff a presidentialist bureaucracy is magnified by every President’s need to win the support of fractious members of Congress.<sup>15</sup>

Unfortunately, such trade-offs only win short-term benefits for a President. Members of Congress are likely to think of these bargains as mere indulgences; after they have supported a bill or two favored by the President, will they not ask for new favors in exchange for more votes? At least, this seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon in presidentialist regimes.

If all patronage appointees were well qualified to administer government programs and to implement public policies, heavy reliance on patronage under presidentialism might prove administratively acceptable. However, as everyone knows, although friends and supporters are sometimes well qualified for a post, it often happens that they are not. The maladministration that frequently results from patronage appointments not only hampers the performance of specific tasks but, cumulatively, erodes the ability of any government to achieve its own goals, undermines the confidence of citizens in the capacity of representative government to meet their needs, and simultaneously destroys the morale and loyalty of public officials themselves. Ultimately, when and if a presidentialist regime is overthrown by a military coup group, few citizens rally to its defense; indeed, they often hail the usurpers as saviors.

As the American case shows, a presidentialist regime does not need to depend exclusively on transient appointees. Indeed, all contemporary regimes rely heavily on long-term bureaucrats, whether they be retainers or careerists. Since careerists can administer more effectively than retainers, they are better able to uphold the credibility of the regimes they serve. However, they are also more likely to dominate them. The unique quality of the American system is that it, alone, stumbled upon a way to establish a relatively weak career bureaucracy linked with transient appointees. By contrast, the retainer bureaucracies that other presidentialist regimes have never been able to replace are both politically powerful and administratively ineffectual. We need to know why this is so. Since American Public Administration still lacks an accepted term for the concept, its significance has been overlooked. Actually, retainers still play decisive political/administrative roles in all presidentialist regimes except the United States—and even in the United States, they have been important.

## 9.3 Retainer Power

Although retainers lack tenure (i.e., they have no contractual basis for keeping their posts), they are typically able to generate political power. At first, they may rely on individualistic expedients

to remain in office.<sup>16</sup> Eventually, however, they create networks (“informal organizations” or trade unions) designed to safeguard their interests and resist efforts to discharge them from the public service. Merely because bureaucrats are appointed as political protégés and lack legal tenure in their jobs does not mean that they cannot exercise political power. As the statistics indicate,<sup>5</sup> retainer bureaucracies in all of the pre-twentieth-century presidentialist regimes (except the United States) were able to stage successful coups.

### 9.3.1 *Dependency in Modern Bureaucracies*

To explain the motives as well as the capacity of modern retainer bureaucracies to seize power, we need to understand that all modern bureaucrats (both merit-based career officers and patronage-based retainers) have a common feature, namely, their dependence on salaries and the perquisites of office. The fundamental differences between premodern (traditional) bureaucracies and modern (salaried) bureaucracies are not well understood. Contrary to a widespread assumption, the basic distinction is based on neither the replacement of patronage officials by careerists nor the substitution of a merit system for political favoritism—this belief is rooted, I think, in the unique history of the American system.

Actually, many modern bureaucracies, like that of the United States and all other presidentialist regimes, still rely heavily on patronage while some premodern bureaucracies established the merit principle utilizing examinations and lifelong tenure as a basis for staffing the government. Chinese dynasties provide the most notable examples, but in other empires, such as the Ottoman, similar principles prevailed.

The most important difference between traditional and modern bureaucracies, I believe, involves the dependence of the latter on salaries as the main, if not exclusive, basis for income security. By contrast, premodern bureaucracies were *prebendary* in the sense that they could, quite legitimately, augment whatever stipends they received from the government by contributions (gifts, commissions, fees, rents—not really bribes) offered by those who benefited from their services. No doubt, corruption is endemic in all governments and we can scarcely claim that modern officials always live exclusively on their legal income. Nevertheless, as a gross comparison, modern bureaucrats are primarily salary-dependent whereas premodern (prebendary) officials were not.<sup>17</sup>

The significance of this difference becomes apparent when we remind ourselves that officials, like everyone else, have their own interests to defend, their expedient needs to satisfy. However, their control over public offices and resources gives them weapons of power (especially in the armed forces) not available to other citizens. Consequently, modern bureaucrats—and only bureaucrats—can seize power through a coup d’état led by a cabal of military officers. Military coups are a recurrent feature of many states in the third world today, especially in presidentialist regimes. According to the data I collected in 1985, 111 third world republics had been established. Of these, 49 (44%) had broken down because of coups. Of the 111, 33 had presidentialist constitutions and all but 3 (91%) had experienced coups.<sup>18</sup> By contrast, of 35 states with single-party authoritarian regimes only 6 (17%) had experienced coups,<sup>5</sup> (Riggs, 1993a).

Such coups are a modern phenomenon—premodern bureaucrats did not stage coups although, of course, they often exercised great power within traditional monarchies (Riggs, 1991a, pp. 491–492). Even badly run governments, so long as they relied on traditional bureaucracies, had little to fear from revolts by appointed officials.<sup>19</sup>

Although we conventionally think of these coup-based regimes as “military dictatorships,” they typically gain the full support of civil servants who hope, thereby, to assure the maintenance of



their positions, income, and other perquisites as public employees. Civil servants frequently share power in the cabinets created by a military junta or council. They often have the “technocratic” expertise required to run a government that military officers lack. Rank and file civil servants, although not active participants in a coup, typically remain passive in order not to “make waves” and to assure their continued job security—indeed, they rarely offer any resistance to a coup. After all, they usually have no reasons to support an ousted government that has, in fact, treated them harshly. Thus, contemporary appointed officials have all become political actors in the broadest sense,<sup>20</sup> but this is especially true of the retainers found in presidentialist regimes.

### 9.3.2 *Expansion of Retainer Bureaucracies*

In order to understand the special grievances of retainers, we need to recognize that, although modern bureaucrats are salary-dependent, those in career services can normally expect their income and status to improve with seniority, but retainers, by contrast, often experience losses due to the tendency of retainer bureaucracies to grow. To the degree that careerism prevails (whether in its traditional or modern forms), the problem of bureaucratic expansion is not a major problem; the regime can appoint only as many officials as are needed to fill vacancies when they occur.

By contrast, the thirst of all presidentialist regimes for patronage generates bureaucratic expansionism when rotation is not practiced—that is, when retainers are, indeed, able to stay in office. Every new President and every member of Congress seeks to appoint new officials. If former appointees could be discharged according to the principle of rotation in office, the bureaucracy would not need to grow. However, because of their dependence on salaries and their eagerness to protect the security, status, and fringe benefits associated with public office, most hold over incumbents are resentfully willing to accept the shame of being superseded in order to keep their posts despite, typically, diminished real income and reduced status. Thus, the self-interest of retainers plus their capacity to exercise power enable them to cling, desperately, to their deteriorating positions. Moreover, demoralized and underpaid officials, especially when they are poorly qualified or inappropriately posted, do unsatisfactory work. By lowering the quality of public administration, they augment popular discontent and, eventually, erode their own job security that, after all, depends on effective tax administration and salary management.

So long, therefore, as a President cannot impose rotation on incumbent bureaucrats, presidentialist bureaucracies are bound to expand. Moreover, since new patronage appointees bump the retainers whom they replace, it is predictable that downgraded retainers will not only swell the ranks of an expanding bureaucracy but also become demoralized and increasingly ineffective as public servants. As a result, the payroll grows and real income declines (perhaps by inflation) while tax burdens mount. The grievances that drive popular insurrections cumulate as do the discontents that provoke military coups.

The only way to overcome these basic dysfunctions involves reducing the number of patronage appointments. This might be done by accepting the right of retainers to keep their offices while curtailing the number of new patronage appointees. As retainers gain experience, they may learn to administer more effectively—but the corruption of office by retainers is also an incurable problem and if they cannot be discharged when they administer ineffectively, seniorism and incompetence will increase and newly elected Presidents will be helpless to remedy the situation. When Presidents insist on their patronage powers but cannot compel incumbents to resign, no real solution is possible. Clearly, the remedy involves discharging incumbents (i.e., enforcing a policy of rotation).<sup>21</sup>

### 9.3.3 Bureaucratic Retention versus Rotation

If we assume that incumbents will strive to retain their posts and that, collectively, they can exercise significant power, we may conclude that presidents will normally experience great difficulty when they try to rotate officials out of office. Indeed, the capacity of incumbents to hold on to their offices is truly intimidating.<sup>16</sup> Presidents soon discover that it is much easier to make patronage appointments when incumbents are allowed to retain their jobs than it is to try to oust them.

A good solution to the problem of patronage and bureaucratic expansionism is available to parliamentary regimes that can more easily establish a ubiquitous merit-based career system. This is clear from the case studies, but it is also evident on theoretical grounds: (1) cabinets enjoying parliamentary support have enough undivided political power to control a large entourage of career officials and to give them reasonably unified direction, without much need for patronage, (2) the continuous risk of a cabinet's discharge by a parliamentary vote of no confidence offers little incentive for qualified outsiders to accept indefinite and necessarily precarious positions in government, and (3) members of Parliament, depending for their election on party backing more than on individual supporters, have neither the power nor the motive to press for patronage appointments. For somewhat different reasons, it is also possible for autocratic monarchies, a single ruling party, and even a military dictator to maintain a viable career (or retainer) system in the public bureaucracy while minimizing patronage appointments.

By contrast, presidentialist regimes cannot afford to abandon patronage, but they need not insist that all public offices be filled by protégés; they can, in principle, accept a compromise under which many, if not most, bureaucratic posts are staffed through a merit-based career system. No doubt they will always need patronage positions, although it is not easy to determine how many are really necessary. However, establishing a merit system permits a presidentialist regime to improve its administrative capabilities, and limits the growth of bureaucracy by restricting the number of positions to those necessary for effective public administration—provided, however, that it can first establish the principle of rotation in order to discharge unnecessary retainers.

The greatest obstacle to the introduction of a merit system, I believe, involves the powerful forces that sustain the principle of retention—incumbents ordinarily have both the incentive and the power to hold on to their jobs even when they experience demotions, humiliations, and demoralization. Moreover, so long as the government is greatly overstaffed, it can ill afford to recruit additional officials through a merit system. It can afford to introduce or expand the merit system only when it can, at the same time, create vacancies by discharging retainers.

Presidents and members of Congress often find themselves in a double-bind; approving a merit system of career appointments reduces their ability to use patronage both to enhance their power positions and to deal with the separation of powers but without a merit system, the quality of public administration deteriorates so much that it undermines public confidence in the regime. In this dilemma, retention of patronage appears unavoidable; so long as they cannot discharge incumbents, they really cannot afford to develop a merit-based careerist bureaucracy—its size and costs (political and economic) simply become insupportable.

If these arguments are valid, then it seems to me that it is impossible for any presidentialist regime to establish a merit-based career system without first establishing its right to discharge incumbents, that is, to institutionalize a policy of rotation. The “in-and-outers” must really be *amphibians*, willing to go out.<sup>22</sup> In most presidentialist regimes, however, retainers strive (like *fish*) to stay in—to lose the security of government jobs is, virtually, to die. Divided governments, based on the separation of powers, understandably lack the fused authority needed to control retainer power effectively.

## 9.4 Presidentialism: The Fixed Term

Although the separation of powers is usually viewed as the fundamental principle of presidentialism (by contrast with the fusion of powers inherent in the parliamentary form of government), a basic rule is needed to maintain the separation of powers, namely, the requirement that *the head of government must be elected for a fixed term in office*. This rule is a necessary—though not a sufficient—basis for the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed separation of powers; it is possible, I believe, for the separation principle to be eroded or nullified even though the fixed term election rule is adhered to. Moreover, although the concurrent power of a judicial system may vary substantially, I believe all presidentialist regimes need a court system with enough authority to restrain elected officials who seek to violate the separation of powers. Despite these caveats, we may treat the fixed term rule as definitive for presidentialism.

The Founding Fathers debated the length of the President's term and eventually accepted 4 years, with the option of re-election, but they never considered the possibility that a President (as head of government) could be removed from office for political reasons by a simple vote of Congress—impeachment was to be only for “high crimes and misdemeanors,” not policy differences. They could scarcely have considered this idea because parliamentary regimes had not yet become institutionalized and they were unable, by themselves, to invent the concept. The American founders would surely have opposed the rule as giving Congress too much power; it could undermine the sense of national unity that they hoped to create among the citizens of 13 contentious and self-consciously “sovereign” states by establishing the President as the head of state, a surrogate for the King. The distinction between heads of state and of government had yet to be made.

### 9.4.1 *The Puzzle of Separated Powers*

Let us assume that bureaucrats will only stage a coup when they are truly provoked—they need motives in addition to ambition for power. The main reason why retainers establish political networks reflects their desire to protect their jobs. Severe provocations are also needed to generate the incentives for collective political action in support of a coup.

Such provocations arise in every presidentialist regime because of the cross-pressures on bureaucracy generated by the separation of powers, see Section 9.1.1.<sup>1</sup> The constitutional teaching that sovereignty resides ultimately in the people, while a superb legitimizing myth, provides little concrete help for a government that needs the support of a powerful and effective bureaucracy but lacks a concentrated fulcrum for the exercise of executive authority.

The founders of modern Public Administration theory in America have long wrestled with the dilemmas posed by the presidentialist formula. Frank J. Goodnow (1900) proposed a pseudoparliamentary fusion of the powers exercised by President and Congress to be achieved by means of a unified political party that could dominate both branches and thereby correct the problems arising from divided government. Were such a fusion achievable, Goodnow argued, we would be able to separate clearly the expression of the will of the state from its execution. The “executive” function (not that of the President only but that of the President and Congress acting in concert) would then be implemented by three types of authorities: the judicial authorities who apply the law in individual cases, the executive authorities who supervise the execution of the will of the state, and the administrative authorities who implement its details.<sup>23</sup>

A more realistic scheme for understanding and accepting the principles of governance in America was proposed by W. F. Willoughby (1927). He distinguished between the executive

and administrative functions; the former, he claimed, centers in the office of the chief executive whereas the latter can be located in Congress. “The administrative function,” he wrote, “resides in the legislative branch of the government” and the executive function “is vested by constitutional provisions in the chief executive” (10, pp. 10–11).<sup>24</sup>

According to Herbert Kaufman’s more contemporary data, this corresponds to the American reality. We should remember, he tells us, that the legislators “can write a specific mandate or prohibition or authorization into a law, or reduce the funds available for a particular program or part of a program, or inquire into an individual action” (1981, p. 164).<sup>25</sup> Louis Fisher, a respected American scholar and staff member of the Congressional Research Service, has written “The constitutional and political responsibilities of Congress require its active and diligent participation in administrative matters” (1981, p. 40).<sup>26</sup> It is important to recognize, of course, that although these powers are sometimes exercised by a Congress acting in plenary sessions, more usually individual members, committees, and subcommittees acting independently—though with the consent of their colleagues and the assistance of their appointed staff members and government agencies—make the crucial decisions that actually guide the day-to-day operations of government agencies in America.

Conventional American Public Administration theory has reacted against this reality, promoting the idea that exclusive authority over the national bureaucracy ought to be exercised by the President as chief executive. Congressional involvement in public administration is viewed as an abuse to be corrected. Leonard D. White’s classic text on public administration deplores the excesses of legislative intervention in the conduct of public administration and, under the norm of unity of command, supports the efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Committee on Administrative Management in 1936 to establish three overhead management agencies and six executive assistants who would empower the President to implement his constitutional obligation to “see that the laws are enforced” (White, 1939, p. 69).

A widely helpful opinion links the executive and administrative functions as a comprehensive responsibility of the President to be accomplished through both politically appointed and career officials, acting independently of a Congress that, in principle and subject to presidential veto powers, should focus its energies exclusively on its legislative functions. All of these positions, I think, reflect the essentially unresolvable problems of trying to rationalize the structure of authority over bureaucracy in a regime unnecessarily burdened with the constitutional separation of powers.

### **9.4.2 *The Bureaucratic Implications of Divided Government***

No doubt American Public Administration will continue to wrestle with the logical contradictions implicit in the presidentialist formula while both bureaucrats and politicians will have to cope as best they can with the unfortunate consequences. These consequences need to be assessed from two contrasting points of view.

At the administrative level, they generate a cute cross-pressures; presidential authority can lead (ideally) to emphasis on the managerial values of efficiency and effectiveness, congressional demands generate insistence on political responsibility and responsiveness, and judicial decisions often give priority to standards of legality and the protection of citizens’ rights versus bureaucratic abuse of power (Rosenbloom, 1983). When bureaucratic demoralization and confusion result, administrative performance suffers. As noted, bad public administration generates popular discontent and may even fuel revolutionary movements. However, the cross-pressures that undermine administrative effectiveness in presidentialist regimes also motivate bureaucratic responses,

that is, political action. At the political level, such responses involve much more than the efforts of individual officeholders to safeguard their jobs. More significantly, they generate efforts to transform the political system. Confused and frustrated officials support concerted efforts to magnify their own authority and even, in extreme cases, to seize power through a coup d'état.

In the United States, bureaucratic protest is only marginally evident, by contrast with what is often found in other countries. One example is the *Blacksburg Manifesto* that, although an academic document, proclaims the “ultimate responsibility” of public administrators to the constitutional order and asserts that, in this context, they “may have to incline their agencies’ responsiveness toward the President at one point and toward Congress at another, or at other times toward the courts or interest groups that are likely to serve the long-term public interests as the agency sees it” (Wamsley et al., 1990, p. 49). In this perspective, the Manifesto asserts, “The Public Administration needs to assert, but also to be granted, its propriety and legitimacy as an institution,” so that civilian public administrators, “like judges before them or like their military colleagues today, could question a directive of their political superiors and have the question regarded as a sober second thought rather than as an act of bureaucratic sabotage” (p. 43).<sup>27</sup>

In most other presidentialist regimes, by contrast, bureaucratic grievances mount and reinforce popular discontents fueled, in part at least, by the constitutionally based confusions that hamper public administration and produce disastrous results that, in turn, provoke popular resistance movements. The fact that public officials are retainers rather than professionally qualified careerists in most of these cases contributes both to administrative failures and to the anxieties felt by public officials. Cumulatively, these forces drive the rebellions that, under military leadership, lead to coups and bureaucratic domination accompanied by suspension of the constitution and the voiding of electoral politics.

## 9.5 The American Exception

The fact that despite severe crises—including a major civil war, a devastating depression, and two world wars—there has never been a coup d'état or other catastrophic collapse of the American presidentialist polity gives us a basis for testing some of the hypotheses advanced in the foregoing discussion. Several approaches may be followed.

One approach would accept a popular interpretation that attributes American “exceptionalism” to its distinctive historical, geographic, cultural, economic, and social environment. I do not dismiss this mode of explanation but I prefer to start from an analysis of the distinctive rules and practices that, on the one hand, have permitted the American presidentialist polity to function more or less well and, on the other, to produce a bureaucracy that, for various reasons, lacked the motivation and the capacity to seize power. The persistence of these distinctive practices, however, also needs to be explained and so, following the logic of circular causation, we must eventually return to the environmental factors.

### 9.5.1 The Exceptional Environment

One such factor involves the psychosocial basis of the motives and behavior of appointed officials. At the risk of oversimplification, consider how Abraham Maslow’s explanation of the hierarchy of human needs might help us.<sup>28</sup> Let us suppose that all bureaucrats, everywhere, share some fundamental human needs for livelihood and security; their expediency needs. In addition, at a higher level, they seek self-actualization through achievement, ideally expressed by achieving the

goals of the public agencies in which they are employed or their professional norms; their principled needs. To the degree that they find that their expedient needs are not met, however, these basic requirements take priority over the principled goals.

Stable political regimes provide enough security of income and status to permit then-bureaucrats to focus their energies on accomplishing organizational objectives, and these normally include political as well as administrative functions. They will strive to secure adequate resources and to clarify and implement their goals so that they can succeed in their official duties. By contrast, in poor countries, deplorable working conditions and insufficient material rewards have a destructive effect on the morale of public officials, inclining them to stress their unsatisfied expedient needs.

Admittedly, it is easier to satisfy the expedient needs of public officials in relatively affluent industrialized democracies than it is in poverty-stricken third world countries. However, we should remember that a century or two ago Western countries were not much better off than those of the third world today. Nevertheless, coups were rare in all the Western countries before they became industrialized. Perhaps some historical differences may explain this disparity.

The countries that experienced few or no military coups made the transition to modern bureaucracy before experiencing a radical proliferation in the number of salaried officials. Although traditional monarchs did rely on patronage and their appointees usually became retainers, they were unlikely to replace them with new incumbents every few years. Moreover, as these kingdoms evolved into parliamentary systems—whether they took the form of constitutional monarchies or republics—merit-based career officials eventually replaced retainers while bureaucracies expanded slowly, in parallel with the growth of the state's income.

Moreover, bureaucratic expansion during the nineteenth century occurred rather slowly, in parallel with the process of industrialization. This meant that, on the whole, the expedient interests of public officials were well cared for—many, no doubt, felt that their situations were actually improving as regular salaries replaced prebendary income. The presidentialist regimes, for the most part, also evolved slowly during the nineteenth century and their salaried bureaucracies expanded concurrently with the industrial revolution. Consequently, despite revolutionary struggles and civil wars, few coups occurred during these formative years.

By contrast, in the twentieth century, following the industrial revolution and the establishment of a world capitalist system, all the bureaucracies of the third world had traumatic experiences when they gained their independence. New and inexperienced political regimes replaced the entrenched imperial authorities who had created colonial administrations as instruments of domination and economic exploitation. These new states inherited large-scale and costly post-industrial bureaucracies that they could not afford to support at pre-established salary levels. Because of inflationary pressures, the real income of many officials declined. Consequently, regardless of regime type, the new states often could not satisfy the basic needs of their bureaucrats who, in turn, supported coups to replace constitutional regimes with military authoritarianism.

Since the presidentialist regimes experienced military coups more frequently than the new states that acquired parliamentary systems or single-party rule, I conclude that there must have been some additional factors in presidentialist systems that compounded the typical difficulties experienced by all the new states of the twentieth century. The dynamics of bureaucratic expansionism in all these countries was surely part of the problem. The persistence of retainer bureaucracies in most presidentialist systems led to the growing frustrations described in Section 9.4.2.

The dynamics of bureaucratic dissatisfaction was, of course, compounded by the grave problems inherent in presidentialism that I have already mentioned.<sup>4</sup> Collectively, these problems are so acute that we should expect every presidentialist regime to break down and experience military rule from time to time. Since military (bureaucratic) authoritarianism also has profound structural

weaknesses, these polities will also soon collapse and be replaced either by a new coup group or by a regime based, again, on constitutionalism and representative government—typically repeating the fragile presidentialist design (Riggs, 1993a).

No doubt some presidentialist regimes (e.g., in Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela) have been more stable than others. However, all of them—except for the United States—have experienced at least one breakdown followed by military (bureaucratic) rule. To account for this exception, we need to look at the U.S. experience more closely.

## 9.5.2 *The Constitutive System*

Every modern regime contains two major components: a constitutive system and a bureaucracy. I use the term “constitutive system” to refer to a complex of institutions found in every contemporary state where popular sovereignty (rather than monarchic absolutism) provides a basis for political legitimacy (Riggs, 1969, pp. 243–246). *Every constitutive system has at its core an elected assembly (Parliament, Congress, Soviet, Legislature), an electoral system (including an electorate), and a party system, plus a head of government.* Differences between the constitutive systems determine the properties of parliamentary, presidentialist, and single-party regimes.

The separation of powers, usually viewed as a distinctive feature of presidentialist regimes, is actually a result of the rule that the head of government is elected for a fixed term and, hence, not accountable to the parliament (see Section 9.4). By contrast, of course, the head of government in parliamentary regimes may be discharged by a parliamentary vote of no confidence. This difference governs relations between the two major components of a constitutive system, creating the basic features of presidentialism as distinguished from parliamentarism.

Every presidentialist regime, consequently, is less able to control a powerful bureaucracy than is a parliamentary system. The reasons are discussed in Section 9.1.1. To explain the ability of the United States, exceptionally, to survive without a breakdown, we need to understand two important facts: first, how the American constitutive system has managed to function despite its inherent flaws<sup>5</sup> and, second, why the American semipowered<sup>8</sup> bureaucracy has been unable or unwilling to stage a coup. The first topic is examined in Riggs (1993b). Here my focus is on the second.

## 9.5.3 *A Semipowered Bureaucracy*

From its inception, the U.S. bureaucracy has been semipowered and this has greatly facilitated the exercise of control over it by a relatively weak constitutive system. Four basic factors contribute to this outcome: *federalism, privatization, rotationism, and functionism.*<sup>29</sup>

### 9.5.3.1 *Federalism*

Federalism in the United States was explicitly incorporated into the Constitution and is as important as the presidentialist design. I believe federalism is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for the survival of presidentialism for two reasons: it hampers domination by a single political party<sup>30</sup> and it weakens the central bureaucracy.

Only the effects of federalism on bureaucracy will be discussed here. Clearly, when a bureaucracy is fragmented geographically among a great number of autonomous states and municipalities, the size of the central bureaucracy becomes so small, relative to the total number of public officials,

that its power potential is seriously reduced. However, when the armed forces are centralized, this factor may not be decisive. In the U.S. case, a long tradition of localized militias and scattered military bases has greatly reduced the relative power position of the armed forces based in Washington. Elsewhere, more typically, the armed forces are concentrated in the capital city, greatly facilitating coups.

### 9.5.3.2 Privatization

Privatization refers to the practice of contracting with private organizations (both nonprofit and profit-making) to carry out functions that are normally administered by public officials in other countries. Ira Sharkanski has estimated that “more people work for private firms under contract to the U.S. government than work for the government directly” (1979, p. 5). The implications are evident; the more public functions are performed by nonofficials, the fewer the number of officials. Without privatization, the federal bureaucracy would be at least twice as large as it is or has been; thus, privatization greatly reduces the U.S. bureaucracy’s power potential.

Two intrinsic properties of the U.S. bureaucracy that may be even more significant remain to be analyzed, namely, rotationism and functionism. Together, they explain both the rise and significance of bureaucratic professionalism in the United States.

## 9.6 Bureaucratic Professionalism

When Andrew Jackson became President in 1829, he found a host of retainers in office. Leonard D. White tells us, “The spirit of the Federalist system favored continuity of service from the highest to the lowest levels.... No property right in office was ever established or seriously advocated, but permanent and continued employment during good behavior was taken for granted” (White, 1951, p. 369). The rotation system changed all of that; it was established during the Jacksonian period. White reports that President Andrew Jackson (1829–1837) “did not introduce the spoils system” but he did “introduce rotation into the federal system” (1954, pp. 4–5).<sup>31</sup>

### 9.6.1 The Rise of Professionalism

We normally associate the Jacksonian era with the rise of the spoils system, but it was the introduction of rotation that, historically, expanded the practice of spoils, encouraged the routinization (bureaucratization) of the public services, and paved the way for bureaucratic professionalization.<sup>32</sup> How radical the Jacksonian transformation was for all later American Presidents (plus American governors and mayors) becomes apparent only in a comparativist perspective; in other presidentialist regimes, the retention of incumbents has remained the norm, despite the ability of successive Presidents to make new appointments. They typically displace and anger incumbents but do not replace them.<sup>33</sup>

#### 9.6.1.1 Rotationism

The immediate cause of the Jacksonian “revolution” was the access to power of a populist President during the wave of a substantial expansion in the electorate, both geographically and socially.<sup>34</sup> No doubt the tremendous surge of populist support for Jackson, as a vigorous man of the people,



also empowered him to attack existing officeholders who were widely unpopular as upper-class elitists—indeed, most of them were gentlemen, that is, men of property and education. Rotation was also facilitated by the many attractive opportunities offered by the growing private sector and the new settlement opportunities found within a rapidly expanding geographic frontier. Whatever the reasons, the principle of rotationism soon became well-established and enabled American presidentialism to abort the development of a retainer bureaucracy that would have become powerful enough to jeopardize its survival.

Retainer power evolves gradually but inexorably. Hold-over officials—especially if they have been downgraded by new patronage appointees—are peculiarly vulnerable to “corrupting” influences. Having lost status and income, they are easily moved to establish self-protective networks (whether as “informal organizations” or “formal unions”). Moreover, they form unethical alliances with private interests and political parties and use these connections both to enhance their influence in the Congress and to secure benefits for their clients.<sup>35</sup> So long as retainers can prevent rotation, they can also block the introduction of a merit system; both are viewed as threats to their own job security. Perhaps above all, when the political (constitutive) system fails to govern acceptably, angry retainers can use their established networks to mobilize support for a military coup group conspiring to overthrow the regime.

By contrast, transients subject to rotation cannot form long-term alliances with outsiders or members of Congress. They have little to lose by the introduction of a merit system and they may even hope that their experience would qualify them for re-entry into the government’s new career system. The growing public anger at bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency that drove the American reformers, after a long and bitter political struggle, to secure the adoption of the Pendleton Act in 1883 was made possible, I believe, by the absence of significant bureaucratic resistance.<sup>36</sup>

The highly partisan rotation policy, therefore, paved the way for the civil service reform movement by degrading the quality of public administration so much that widespread popular dissatisfaction made reform a major political issue. “For more than thirty years,” Van Riper tells us, the introduction of the merit system was viewed as “the most essential governmental reform” (Van Riper, 1958, p. 83). A widespread perception of abuse was expressed, typically, by an observer who wrote in 1841 that “performance of official duty was far less requisite to a tenure of office than electioneering services. Hence the offices had become for the most part filled with brawling offensive political partisans of a very low moral standard—their official duties performed by substitutes, or not performed at all” (White, 1954, p. 310).

### 9.6.1.2 *Nonpartisan Careers*

The provisions of the Pendleton Act that resulted from the reform movement actually laid the foundations for a truly unique type of career system. Most notably, it made tenure to office conditional on a “nonpolitical” (i.e., nonpartisan) pledge. Remember that partisan transients typically received their appointments as a reward for services performed during previous campaigns—to remain in office they were often, if not normally, constrained to support future campaigns, not only by being activists but by paying assessments (White, 1954, pp. 332–343). Now, career officials would be immune from pressure to support party campaigns, either financially or by partisan services—a right most careerists were eager to protect.<sup>37</sup>

This stipulation reflected the reality that, to gain political support for the establishment of a merit system, it was necessary to insist that all careerists refrain from supporting any political party.<sup>38</sup> The notion both reflected and promoted the myth of a dichotomy between politics and

administration; the evils of the rotation system were attributed to “politics” and the proposed career service was seen as a “nonpolitical” device.

The reform effort could scarcely have succeeded, therefore, without widespread acceptance of the idea that public administration could be separated from (party) politics—that is, career officials could be isolated from political parties and would not become activists in partisan campaigning.<sup>39</sup> Although the dichotomy myth was born of political expediency, it has come to be accepted as both a normative and an empirical truth. Some of its far-reaching implications for bureaucratic politics and the study of public administration are discussed in Section 9.6.4.2.

Although the “classified services” established under the Pendleton Act continued to grow at the expense of positions reserved for “political appointees,” the system of rotation in office remained entrenched and several thousand new appointees are still named by each incoming President.<sup>40</sup> Rotation and careerism have, therefore, coexisted in an uneasy and often embattled relationship to the present day.<sup>41</sup> In order to evaluate the significance and interdependence of careerists and transients in American government, we need to understand that these careerists are all functionaries rather than mandarins and that the necessary role of mandarins has to be played, however imperfectly, by transient political appointees.

### 9.6.1.3 *Functionism*

The underlying dynamics for the rise of professionalism in the American bureaucracy may be attributed, quite unintentionally, to several provisions of the Pendleton Act that made functionism the norm. Most importantly, it stipulated that the exams should be practical, a provision with far-reaching implications. It also rejected the notion that only young people should be recruited for entry-level tenured careers; rather, positions were to be open and available to qualified candidates, regardless of age. Finally, recruitment was to be apportioned on the basis of population so that candidates from all the states would have equal opportunities for government jobs.<sup>42</sup> A completely new kind of career system evolved, exceptionally, in the United States as a result of these specifications.

To understand how exceptional the American system was, we need to be clear about the properties of the classical mandarin system manifested in the original Chinese model as it was adapted to the needs of the Indian Civil Service and the British administrative class.<sup>43</sup> It was the starting point for the debates that led to the Pendleton Act but resulted in a very different kind of bureaucratic system. A mandarinate is recruited by academic, not practical, exams; recruitment is closed, not open; and it leads to a status-based, not a position-based, career system. Put differently, academic exams (philosophical, literary, historical, mathematical, etc.) paved the way for young university graduates to enter a generalist career service in which personal rank, not positions to be filled, is emphasized.<sup>44</sup>

A generalist mandarin class or cadre has two properties of fundamental importance: first, it is powerful and second, it can coordinate programs at a macropolicy level. Its members identify themselves with the bureaucracy as their primary frame of reference and source of self-esteem. Consequently, mandarins easily establish close bonds or intrabureaucratic networks that enhance their power position. They lack “professional standing” in the sense that they do not have university degrees in a particular field of expertise such as medicine, law, education, or agriculture. However, their experience (rather than their university training) gives them genuine managerial competence and an ability to look at the overall needs of a government. They understand how diverse and often competing programs can be coordinated and they can achieve administrative excellence without formal pre-entry training in Public Administration.

The provisions of the Pendleton Act precluded the development of a mandarin in America. Instead, a highly diversified set of functionally specialized career officers came into being, each oriented to specific jobs, program areas, policies, and ultimately, professions. A foundation had been laid by the Morrill Land-Grant College Act of 1862 that was intended to help finance institutions that would “teach agriculture and the mechanic arts” and enhance the opportunities of “the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life” (Edmond, 1978, pp. 15–16). Apportionment among the states provided an impetus for the new land grant colleges to strengthen and develop their training programs so as to equip their graduates to take the “practical” civil service examinations. Strangely, a substantial and growing literature on the characteristics and problems of the profession pays little or no attention to the linkages between bureaucratic appointments and professional status, see Moore (1970) for a good example of this literature.

The traditional liberal arts colleges (especially the Ivy League schools) were effectively bypassed by the authorizing legislation, for both geographic and substantive reasons. The new state universities were able to strengthen their burgeoning professional schools by adding academic departments. They gradually evolved into great state universities well equipped to train an increasingly professionalized career bureaucracy in the United States. The convergence of these factors produced a higher level of professionalism in the U.S. bureaucracy than any to be found in other countries, regardless of their constitutional design.<sup>45</sup>

### **9.6.2 *The Consequences of Professionalism***

Although the rise of a professionalized career bureaucracy was neither the intention nor the immediate result of the Pendleton Act, it was a long-term consequence. The practical exams were gradually transformed into tests of professional knowledge and capabilities. Open recruitment permitted experienced professionals, not only recent university graduates, to enter the public service, thereby facilitating the professionalization of the U.S. career bureaucracy. Initially, I believe, many professionals were reluctant to accept the controls imposed by a bureaucratic hierarchy, but eventually they found that they could influence administrative policies and they began to exert pressures through their own organizations to create conditions favorable to their professional standards and norms, including recognition of professional standing (degrees and certificates) as requirements for specific categories of bureaucratic posts (Willbern, 1954, p. 15).

Bureaucratic professionalization had several important consequences that can be described systematically by reference to two variables: positive/negative and intrinsic/extrinsic. By the first, I refer to evaluation of the results as good or bad; by the second, to the immediate or direct effects of something versus the indirect or feedback effects. Circular, not linear, causation is taken for granted in this discussion—if A causes B, it is assumed that by a feedback effect, B also influences A. When circular causation has a negative effect, we often speak of it as a vicious cycle. To refer to a positive effect, we may speak of a benign circle instead. Professionalism in the U.S. bureaucracy is implicated in both vicious and benign cycles. One could discuss these interdependent relations in any order but I will look at the positive effects before the negative and, under each heading, the intrinsic before the extrinsic. However, because of circular causation, each aspect has implications for the others.

### **9.6.3 *Positive-Intrinsic Consequences***

Bureaucratic professionalism has surely enhanced the level of administrative performance within specific niches. Engineers, for example, are qualified and motivated to perform well within the

domain of their special competence. Their motives are complex, however. Although subject to hierarchic intrabureaucratic and political constraints, they also respond to norms established by the professional associations in which they participate. No doubt their early socialization in professional schools lays the foundation for the sensitivity to professional norms that is reinforced throughout the life of a professional by continuous involvement in interest networks that link the schools with officials and private sector practitioners.<sup>46</sup>

Medical and legal associations are familiar to all, but parallel organizations can be found in every professional domain. All three branches of the presidentialist regime are also implicated insofar as professionalism has penetrated both Congress and the courts. By a feedback effect, for example, court decisions affecting bureaucratic conduct and criteria have increased the need for and influence of lawyers in many government agencies. Decisions affecting health benefits, safety standards, environmental safeguards, and so on have similarly enhanced the role of physicians, engineers, and natural scientists.

A useful distinction is needed between standing and standards. Professional standing is acquired by certification upon completion of required training programs in a school, but professional standards become internalized as behavioral norms that are continuously reinforced by associates and reference groups. By stressing “practical” tests, the Pendleton Act enabled professional standing to become, gradually, a major criterion or prerequisite for personnel recruitment. The consequence has been that professional standards (often in conflict with each other as well as with governmental rules and political goals) have become the basic guidelines for administrative performance by innumerable American career officials (Wilson, 1989, p. 60).<sup>47</sup>

#### **9.6.4 Positive-Extrinsic Consequences**

The prevalence of professional standards in American Public Administration has produced two important results: it has facilitated the survival of American presidentialism and has motivated the rise of Public Administration in America.

##### **9.6.4.1 Regime Survival**

The first consequence was unintended and is still unmeasured, namely, a significant reduction in the power position of the American bureaucracy reduces the possibility of a coup d'état. This can be explained as a feedback effect of the provisions of the Pendleton Act. Most bureaucracies—whether anchored in a top echelon of mandarins or based on retainers—generate a powerful sense of intrabureaucratic loyalty and identity. Of course, mandarins, like professionals, have standards, but these are bureaucratic standards—they relate to the esprit de corps or morale of officials as officials and they reflect a strong sense of loyalty to the state. The familiar term administrative state is quite appropriate when referring to mandarin-powered regimes and it helps us understand why notions of the state are so prevalent in most parliamentary systems. By contrast, I believe it is an imprecise term to characterize the United States which might more precisely be called a network state.

As for presidentialist systems outside the United States, bureaucratic solidarity assuredly evolves among retainers, but it becomes self-serving to the degree that status anxiety motivates the development of informal organizations or networks dedicated to the preservation of bureaucratic privileges and security. Intrabureaucratic networks among retainers as well as mandarins, however, can generate high levels of solidarity and power.

Whenever a regime fails to adopt policies that confront its great problems effectively and, therefore, aggravate its major crises, a powerful bureaucracy is likely to support a coup. To the degree that parliamentary regimes are politically effective, mandarin bureaucracies are unlikely to become disaffected enough to back coup attempts. Moreover, their experience and loyalty to the state enable them to administer effectively enough to permit the regime to implement its policies, thereby dissolving the motives for a revolt.

By contrast, whenever a regime is severely hampered in its efforts to cope with crises, the risks of a coup are enhanced. A vicious circle comes into effect; retainers lack the qualifications and standards needed to administer well and, as performance of the state declines, they become more disaffected. At critical junctures, their power position enables them to support successful coups.

The American exception reflects the fact that its professionalized bureaucrats lack the solidarity to support a military coup. Moreover, their professional competence helps them carry out relevant policies and programs within their niches, that is, when they are compatible with the professional standards formulated by the associations in which they are active. These associations help link many American bureaucrats with private sector constituencies and the legislative committees (with their staffs) that form the broader interest networks in which they participate. The personal satisfaction experienced by professionals who are able to satisfy their standards means that they do not want to seize power. Moreover, because of their semipowered status as a bureaucracy, they could not succeed even if they were to support a coup attempt.

Moreover, functionaries, in ambivalent alliance with members of Congress and powerful lobbies, buttress the capacity of that overloaded body to handle a vast agenda of public policy issues and to maintain its autonomy as a separate branch of government. Well entrenched professionals in the bureaucracy, working with supportive members of Congress and their own staff professionals, also cooperate to maintain the system of seniority that helps incumbents win elections and retain cherished committee assignments (Riggs, 1993b). The resulting autonomy of government agencies permits different and even conflicting norms and policies to flourish and coexist. It enables a host of governmental functions to become relatively autonomous and stable—they can survive successive elections regardless of which political party happens to be in power. The main functions of government have become self-perpetuating and they help the regime as a whole to work, even while frustrating successive Presidents who find that they cannot guide or coordinate a massive infrastructure of highly autonomous bureaus.

#### 9.6.4.2 *Public Administration*

A second *positive-extrinsic* effect of bureaucratic professionalism involves the development of Public Administration as an academic field. Clearly, Public Administration was not a recognized profession, nor were “practical” exams created to test administrative capabilities for almost half a century after the Pendleton Act. Gradually, however, the need for explicit training in Public Administration gained recognition, textbooks were prepared, and professional training in this area came into existence. A management exam was established for MPA graduates. Although many professionals in the bureaucracy recognized the need for additional training and knowledge to help them administer more effectively, no professional role as a line administrator has evolved in the American bureaucracy. At best, some of the staff fields of Public Administration have gained such recognition—that is, one can be a professional in personnel, budgeting, accounting and auditing, planning, or office management, but it is difficult to find positions earmarked for “professionals” in general Public Administration.

A notable aspect of Public Administration as a field of teaching and research—if not as a profession—is its disposition to avoid politics. This attitude is rooted in the Pendleton Act’s stipulation that careerists should be nonpartisan, neither supporting financially nor working in an electoral campaign. Actually, careerists were delighted with this stipulation which overcame an onerous burden that patronage appointees (both retainers and transients) had long carried. The dichotomy between politics and administration may have been an important consideration driving the reform effort, but I suspect that it was also a weighty consequence of the legislation.

The new training programs that arose chose to focus on preparing civil servants for entry to the nonpartisan career services. Military officers already had their own training programs, including those at West Point and other military academies and staff colleges. Partisan appointees were typically politicians whose party services were being rewarded—professionally oriented training programs could scarcely reach them. Given these constraints, Public Administration evolved necessarily as a “nonpolitical” (i.e., nonpartisan) activity intended primarily for future and present civil servants. As a fragile new academic project, training in “Public Administration” could not survive bureaucratic opposition—quite the reverse, it needed (nonpartisan) bureaucratic support in order to assure graduates of career appointments.

Under these conditions, the study of government as a unified focus of teaching and research became subdivided into two contrasting and even antagonistic fields: Public Administration programs eschewed politics, turning to business management and all the social sciences except politics for inspiration, while political science systematically downplayed public administration as either unworthy of serious study or even an essentially “nonpolitical” activity (Waldo, 1968, pp. 7–8).<sup>48</sup> The negative consequences of this orientation are discussed in Section 9.6.6.2.

### **9.6.5 Negative-Intrinsic Consequences**

Professionalization produces American bureaucrats who cannot manage and coordinate programs that cut across the interests of many government agencies—turf warfare and intrabureaucratic struggles are inescapable. Even within the same agency, when several different professional fields are involved, conflicts proliferate.

All presidentialist constitutions, by definition, generate an overriding problem of power dispersion in the bureaucracy by creating three centers of legitimacy (executive, legislative, and judicial), each of which impinges directly, and with conflicting normative and action implications, on the bureaucracy. The adoption of a functionist mode by Congress, under the Pendleton Act, for institutionalizing the career bureaucracy reinforced this divisive force, especially by paving the way for the emergence of bureaucratic professionalism, leading to the proliferation of powerful interest networks. When viewed from the perspective of would-be integrators who seek to reconcile divergent forms and overlapping jurisdictions, the combined pressures for the dispersal of power are overwhelming. Career officials, especially the professionals, build their own power base and often appropriate policy-making powers from Congress. Krislov and Rosenbloom tell us that “the bureaucratic agency may actually organize a constituency in order to assure an adequate level of support for its activities.... Policymaking is largely transferred from the elected branches of government to bureaucratic agencies” (1981, pp. 82–83).<sup>49</sup>

In this context, predictably, successive American governments have struggled in vain to find a workable strategy for achieving coordination. As Seidman (1980) writes, “The quest for coordination is in many respects the twentieth-century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher’s stone. If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable,

harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent” (p. 200). Willbern (1954), by contrast, has pointed out that at the intergovernmental level, professionals may well serve a positive coordinating function, helping to link activities that would otherwise remain uncoordinated (p. 17). Nevertheless, it has seemed unfortunate to many that the British model of generalist administrative elite was not established in the 1880s. However, when the power potential of any mandarin is understood, it becomes clear that if the United States had embraced that model, it would almost surely have succumbed to bureau power.

### 9.6.5.1 *The Senior Executive Service*

In the absence of any understanding of this relationship, it is not surprising that efforts were made from time to time to create an American mandarin that could coordinate the far-flung and highly dispersed apparatus of governance in America. A project to establish a cadre of generalist civil servants became one of the strong recommendations of the second Hoover Commission in 1955. The proposal was long resisted by Congress, however. Its members saw that “rotation of career administrators would break up long-standing and mutually profitable relationships between congressional subcommittees and career officials in the line agencies and bureaus of the executive branch” (Mackenzie, 1981, p. 127; 1987). Resistance to a youthful British style class of future mandarins proved invincible. A compromise that was finally accepted appeared in the form of a senior mandarin to be created by recruiting established functionaries. After an intense struggle led by President Jimmy Carter, Congress endorsed the idea, and the Senior Executive Service (SES) was established through the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. So far, however, the SES has not displayed the properties of a genuine “mandarin” class, nor has it become a cadre of “super-bureaucrats” (Campbell and Szablowski, 1979, p. 217).

The SES has not even impressed its incumbents as a highly prestigious or financially attractive career goal—something that would truly astonish anyone familiar with the power and high status of the “ mandarins ” in parliamentary regimes.<sup>50</sup> In both the Chinese and British prototypes, authentic mandarins were recruited as young nonprofessionals and spent their entire careers as generalists—perhaps this is the only way a true mandarin can be formed (Dogan, 1975, p. 4).<sup>42</sup>

In the American case, outstanding professionals who might have been recruited for the SES already had well-established networks and standards that could not easily be reconciled with those of a mandarin. The essential failure of the SES project, however, is fortunate for the survival of American presidentialism; a genuine mandarin system would have undermined the power positions of both the President and the Congress, creating a kind of “meritocracy” reminiscent of Plato’s Guardians. Admittedly, this is a speculation since we have no example of a viable presidentialist regime with an established mandarin of generalists, but the logic of the scenario seems pretty persuasive.<sup>51</sup>

### 9.6.5.2 *The Patronage Alternative*

By default, the best mechanism available to an American President in the attempt to coordinate the host of competing professionalized bureaucratic agencies is reliance on patronage appointments. Unfortunately, perhaps because of the dichotomy myth and their preoccupation with careerists, students of American Public Administration have failed to pay serious attention to both the need for and the costs of employing a large number of transients as public administrators, including members of the Cabinet.

Political scientists have, of course, studied this subject but in a political context that directs attention to the problems of the presidency and Congress rather than the bureaucracy. The Cabinet and the office of the White House offer contemporary Presidents their main opportunity to create a governing apparatus that can modify the diverse priorities of professionals in the career bureaucracy so as to align them with the popular “mandate” given by the electorate. Traditionally, this was done by appointing *politicos*, people without professional commitments of their own whose primary loyalty was to the President and policies endorsed by the winning party.

Increasingly, however, amphibians or technopols rather than *politicos* are employed to staff the executive entourage or “sacerdotal collegium” (Newland, 1987, pp. 49–52). The term *amphibian* has been used to characterize in-and-outers who find themselves equally at home inside and outside the government service.<sup>52</sup> Typically, departmental secretaries and their assistants are broad-gauge professionals whose personal networks reach extensively into the constituencies served by government departments and agencies. Instead of helping the President coordinate diverse overlapping programs and policies, amphibians, I suspect, often share the professional standards and norms of career officers under their authority. By contrast, cabinet members in a parliamentary regime are primarily politicians without professional commitments. The fact that they must stand or fall as a collectivity provides an external sanction to reinforce their intention to coordinate diverse policy goals in the interest of the state.

Presidential cabinet members are subject to no such constraints. They stand or fall as individuals, each vulnerable separately to the President’s preferences and their ability to command support from members of Congress, especially as expressed by relevant committees, increasingly, the executive office of the President, rather than the cabinet, has become the locus of political coordination in the American system. Ultimately, of course, the President must almost stand alone as the person finally responsible for coordinating the deeply dispersed structures of power (Newland, 1987; Pfiffner, 1987, 1991; Durant, 1990; Moe, 1985).<sup>53</sup>

Despite their vast patronage powers, American Presidents can never really dominate the careerists nor assure coordination among them. As Wamsley tells us:

The political appointee ... does not stride in the door of the government organization as the powerful proconsul of an emperor but more like a tentative and lonely ambassador appointed to a beleaguered foreign outpost.... Their fortunes lie more in the hands of Congress, particularly its committees and subcommittees, and of interest groups than the president or White House staff. (Wamsley, 1990, p. 136)

The proper role of transients (both *politicos* and *amphibians*) in the American government remains a lively theme of debate. Without them, the dispersed orientations of a professionalized and semipowered bureaucracy would almost threaten chaos. Although patronage appointees cannot truly coordinate or reconcile intrabureaucratic conflicts, the problem would surely be much greater without them. They provide a completely inadequate solution to the problem of coordination, yet without them, malcoordination would become so great a problem that it alone would threaten the collapse of the system—not because of a coup but rather *through* internecine strife.<sup>54</sup>

### 9.6.6 Negative-Extrinsic Consequences

Bureaucratic professionalism in the United States has reinforced the myth of a political/administrative dichotomy. The importance of the dichotomy myth as a reform slogan is familiar to all students of American Public Administration, and much has been written on the validity/invalidity of the



dichotomy. However, its consequences need more careful analysis. The professionalization of the American bureaucracy which underpins its semipowered status owes much to this myth. At least, it supplemented the other factors that can be attributed to the Pendleton Act, as explained in Sections 9.6.1.2 and 9.6.1.3.

Moreover, the separation of Public Administration as an academic field of study and teaching from the study of politics can easily be attributed to the myth—see Section 9.6.4.2. If careerists were to be “nonpolitical” civil servants, it seemed to follow that they should study only nonpolitical subjects such as those taught in all professional schools. When the project to establish professional schools of “Public Administration” emerged, it accepted the need for a nonpolitical orientation.

Consequently, the phenomena that generated American Public Administration theory as a distinctive and important field of research and teaching also hampered the analysis of the power potential of appointed public officials. Had a comparative framework been used, students of American government would have noticed how exceptional its bureaucracy is. No doubt, the parochialism of a mode of analysis that focussed attention exclusively on the truly unique situation in the United States hampered any serious effort to go beyond the stereotypes generated by the dichotomy myth.<sup>55</sup>

#### 9.6.6.1 *Bureaucratic Power*

Quite clearly, all bureaucracies in democratic regimes are significantly more powerful than the semipowered U.S. bureaucracy. Moreover, all the governments of the industrialized democracies are able to control and use powerful bureaucracies effectively for administrative purposes. The United States alone among presidentialist regimes has been able to avoid a regime breakdown—and it is the only such regime that has a semipowered bureaucracy. Surely if, like others, it had a powerful bureaucracy, it would also have experienced one or more catastrophic breakdowns during a time of major crisis.

Paradoxically, the relative lack of power of the American bureaucracy and the continuity of the U.S. regime combined to render the idea of a dichotomy between politics and administration plausible. In other countries—and especially in (undemocratic) bureaucratic polities—appointed officials (military and civil) are powerful enough to block serious analysis of their operational methods, and their characteristic pre-entry training requirements call for legal, humanistic, or even scientific education but not for a professional education in Public Administration—unless, sad to say, the approach has been denatured by the omission of its political aspects.<sup>56</sup>

Bureaucratic professionalism, then, has been a major factor in the explanation of the relative weakness of American civil servants while also providing a context in which the creation of training programs for public administrators could flourish. Although “Public Administration” never gained full recognition as a profession within the U.S. bureaucracy, it did acquire marginal respect both for its contributions to various career staff roles and for its capacity to help line administrators enhance their own careers. These advantages have actually induced many contemporary American administrators to support Public Administration as a useful and nonthreatening activity. Their willingness to collaborate in organizations like American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) provides evidence of this attitude, by contrast with the situation in most other countries where public officials and academics teaching Public Administration typically distrust each other and avoid contact with such associations.

### 9.6.6.2 A Myth Perpetuated

This cooperative attitude facilitates Public Administration as an academic field, provided—we may speculate—the myth of a dichotomy between politics and administration is sustained. So long as serious inquiry into the phenomena of bureaucratic power is avoided, Public Administrationists are protected from threatening scrutiny by officials and officials are not menaced by scholarly inquiry. As for American political scientists, who might have been expected to look critically at the power position of career officials, we find that they have largely ignored the subject. Perhaps this is so because they accept the myth uncritically or because their penchant for specialization has led them to focus on the components of constitutive systems and to relegate the study of bureaucracy to specialists in Public Administration.

Although the dichotomy myth still prevails in America, there are exceptions which deserve attention. For example, Nachmias and Rosenbloom remark that “all developed nations are thoroughly dependent upon a body of highly specialized and hierarchically organized administrators.... Bureaucrats have sometimes been considered a (new) ruling class” (1978, p. 10). Heady (1991) has explained that “comparative public administration is linked closely to the study of comparative politics, and must start from the base provided by recent and current developments in the comparative study of whole political systems” (p. 6). Scholars like these may eventually lead both public administrationists and political scientists in America to see how bureaucracy inescapably links politics and administration.

The dichotomy myth by itself, admittedly, would not have led to the emergence of Public Administration as an important focus of attention in America. Among the other contributing factors we must include the specifications of the Pendleton Act—practical exams; open recruitment for positions, not ranks; and apportionment among the states—all of which reinforced each other to generate the forces that led to the emergence of professionalism in general and to the field of Public Administration as an unsuccessful candidate for professional status.

The negative aspect also needs to be recognized; careerism could never displace the need for transients as political appointees in the United States. They scarcely recognize Public Administration as a relevant field for pre-entry training while Public Administration specialists tend to ignore transients as an irrelevant and undesirable remnant of the spoils era. Whenever political scientists study political appointees, they usually treat them in the context of the presidential institution rather than of bureaucracy and public administration.

To summarize, an important negative-extrinsic consequence of professionalism in the U.S. bureaucracy involves its contribution to the rise of Public Administration as a specialized and very insular field rooted in the politics/administration dichotomy myth. The time has come, I believe, to transcend this limitation; comparative analysis can now reveal the highly political causes and consequences of professionalized bureaucracy in the United States.

## 9.7 Costs of Presidentialism: A Summary

The manifest purpose of the function-oriented merit system reforms rooted in the Pendleton Act was *administrative* rather than *political*; it produced a growing body of bureaucratic specialists whose institutional memory and professionalism enabled them to implement public policies with some consistency and efficiency despite changes in the presidency. However, these improved administrative capabilities had profoundly important political implications; the creation of stable interest networks based on increasingly entrenched relationships between professionals in public service,

congressional subcommittees, and interested private associations or groups (e.g., the “military–industrial complex”) meant that most governmental functions would be performed with minimal intervention from the White House and with the active participation of Congress and the court (Riggs, 1988a, pp. 363–365). Moreover, the dispersal of bureau power which resulted meant that a bureaucracy which was politically weak because of its heavy reliance on transients remained weak (or semipowered), thereby overcoming the risk of a coup d’état inherent in all contemporary presidentialist regimes.

### 9.7.1 *The Need for Comparativism*

The comparative study of presidentialist regimes is needed to clarify these relationships—they remain obscure so long as American government is studied in isolation. All presidentialist regimes originating before the middle of the twentieth century (except the United States) relied heavily on patronage without rotation, leading to the emergence of retainer dominated bureaucracies. Such bureaucracies are both politically powerful and administratively ineffectual. This combination is potentially explosive; it undermines popular support for the regime and provokes bureaucratic disloyalty. During crises, retainer bureaucracies have the power and the motives for revolting and seizing power, after a coup d’état led by military officers (Riggs, 1991b; Farazmand, 1991).

The United States exception is based, in part at least, on a significant historical difference. Administrative performance by “gentlemen” retainers during the first 40 years was probably above average and, during this short period, bureau power could not develop, although abuse of power by some officials fueled the Jacksonian revolution. During the half century which followed, under the rotation system, transients dominated the bureaucracy but were inherently incapable of mobilizing enough power to overthrow the regime, even though their administrative performance was so bad that it alienated many citizens. The reform movement which led to the enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883 initiated the growth of a careerist system dominated by specialists, many of whom were, in time, replaced by professionals.

Because of the external orientation of professionals—and their participation in powerful interest networks which link officials with lobbyists, members of Congress, and associations responsible for the maintenance of professional standards—the reshaped American bureaucracy has remained semipowered. Its political weakness is reinforced by a superstructure of in-and-outer politicians and amphibians as well as by federalism and heavy reliance on private organizations to implement many governmental functions. This historical sequence was not replicated elsewhere; all of the older presidential regimes acquired predominantly retainer bureaucracies that could not be replaced by careerist systems despite noble reform efforts. Two major exceptions are the regimes of South Vietnam and South Korea whose pre-existing mandarin traditions enabled their bureaucracies to replace republican government after one presidency. A third exception is that of the Philippines where, despite a half-dozen coup attempts following a period of presidential authoritarianism, presidentialism survives. In this case, a specialist career bureaucracy established during the long period of American domination was simply incapable of seizing power.

### 9.7.2 *Political Competence*

The motivation for any coup stems, I believe, not primarily from the ambitions or greed of government officials but rather from the inability of a regime to adopt appropriate policies and maintain effective control over the bureaucrats charged with responsibility for their implementation. No

doubt any government, during critical times, may find that it cannot cope with severe challenges. However, a great structural difference radically limits the effectiveness of all presidentialist regimes by contrast with parliamentary ones. The constitutional separation of powers in these regimes assigns authority to three branches of government and gives each of them approximately equal powers over the bureaucracy. As a result, not only is it difficult for the regime to formulate adequate policies but also a confused and cross-pressured bureaucracy is also often unable to implement effectively the policies that are promulgated. By contrast, the fusion of powers characteristic of parliamentary regimes enables them to formulate and implement policies much more easily. The fact is that all of the industrialized democracies except the United States have parliamentary forms of government and display no intention to switch to presidentialism.<sup>57</sup>

The retention by the United States of a constitutional design that was invented in the eighteenth century before any country had established a parliamentary system can be attributed in part to its reluctance to abandon some antiquated but fundamental practices that were rejected as undemocratic by the newer presidentialist republics. However, I believe that even so, the American regime would have broken down during major crises such as the Civil War, two world wars, and a major depression had its bureaucracy not been both relatively weak (semipowered) and reasonably effective. The professionalization of its career services since the end of the nineteenth century, as augmented by federalism, privatization, and the persistence of transient political appointees in the upper reaches of the bureaucracy, continues to account for this remarkable exception.

### **9.7.3 Basic Reform**

Despite its survival and obvious strengths, a growing sense of frustration and disillusionment with government is apparent in contemporary America (Dionne, 1991). Talk about “gridlock” and the evils of “divided government” is rife, especially during presidential campaigns. Almost universally, however, this discourse takes for granted the viability and persistence of a presidentialist constitution. Nevertheless, in a comparativist perspective, we can easily see that this constitutional design is essentially flawed and its maintenance imposes a heavy burden on the American people. We are, therefore, confronted with a profound dilemma. Comparative analysis of many viable democracies, all subscribing to some kind of parliamentary system, might clarify the options whenever consensus could be reached on the need for basic amendments to the existing U.S. Constitution.

Because parliamentary systems vary widely among themselves, and some work much more successfully than others, it will not be easy to reach consensus on any single alternative to the existing constitutional design in the United States. Moreover, the very survival of the regime for two centuries provides the basis for a powerful argument that it is safer to tinker with and sustain a flawed system that works than to accept the far greater risks involved in seeking consensus on an alternative design.

No doubt, it would be wildly irresponsible to promote any radical restructuring of the persisting Constitution in the United States before undertaking a deep analysis, based on extensive comparisons with experience elsewhere, in order to learn more about the fundamental dynamics of alternative systems and the requisite strategies for gaining consensus on possible options. Any such analysis ought to pay serious attention to the role and problems of public bureaucracy, including both its power potential and its administrative capabilities.

The focus of such a continuing enterprise ought to be on the conditions needed for representative government to survive, to be viable. No matter how idealistic the procedures and goals of a constitution may be, democratic values are easily sacrificed whenever autocratic and authoritarian

systems destroy a fragile democracy. We now need to mobilize all relevant resources—research, education, mass information, and political action—in a coordinated effort to understand the requisite conditions for the maintenance of viable constitutionalism.

## Notes

1. Despite the normal assumption in American Public Administration that bureaucrats are “nonpolitical” administrators, in fact all modern bureaucracies have their own expedient interests and both the will and ability to exercise political power. The widespread incidence of coups throughout the third world reflects not just military power but, more generally, bureaucratic dissatisfaction and influence—many civil servants support and work for the military juntas that spearhead the seizure of power because they also feel threatened by political anarchy and recognize that their security and income depend on regime maintenance. A cabinet composed mainly of career officials (both civil and military) is typical of all bureaucratic polities, reflecting the triumph of bureaucratic power (Riggs, 1966, 1981). Interestingly, the original concept of a bureaucracy was that of a polity dominated by appointed officials (Riggs, 1979).

The seizure of power by armed officials in many third world countries is only the tip of an iceberg. In fact, in every contemporary state, the ability of the regime to maintain control over its bureaucracy and share power with it in the development and implementation of public policy is problematic. Parliamentary systems are inherently better equipped to exercise such control than presidentialist regimes because the concentration of power in a cabinet that is also a majority-based ruling committee of the parliament provides a framework within which a state bureaucracy (composed almost exclusively of careerists, including mandarins) can be prevented from dominating the polity. Put more positively, only parliamentary regimes can maintain effective long-term control over a mandarin bureaucracy (Dogan, 1975, pp. 3–24) while permitting them to exercise great de facto power as policy “advisers.”

In presidentialist regimes, by contrast, the dispersal of power between the executive and legislative branches weakens the capacity of governments to constrain the bureaucracy, rendering them vulnerable to the seizure of power by appointed (mainly military) officials. So vulnerable are such regimes to bureaucratic power that, I believe, only a politically weak bureaucracy—as found in the United States—can be kept under control in a presidentialist system.

2. Both parliamentary and authoritarian regimes are often called presidential regimes because they elect—substantively or tokenistically—their heads of state. In this sense, all republics are presidential by contrast with monarchies. In this chapter, I shall discuss only one kind of presidential regime, one in which the President is really elected (not just confirmed in office) to serve as the head of government as well as the head of state. To emphasize this point, I shall use the admittedly awkward terms presidentialist and presidentialism for this concept. Presidential is used only to characterize the office of the President, and this word’s P is capitalized to distinguish the head of a presidentialist regime from other kinds of presidents.
3. It is important to discriminate between the geographical and functional distribution of power. The word centralization is often used for both. Here, I shall use it only for the geographic distribution of power between central and local governments. Both parliamentary and presidentialist regimes may be centralized or localized, so this concept does not distinguish between them. However, the localization of power, as in a federal system, probably contributes (though not always) to the survival of presidentialism.

By contrast, the concentration or dispersion of power, by functions, varies with our regime types. All presidentialist regimes must disperse power because each of the three main branches exercises autonomous authority based on rather crudely distributed “functions”—executive, legislative, and judicial. By contrast, power in parliamentary systems is concentrated since cabinets unite the “executive” and the “legislative” functions in a single structure. It is much easier, therefore, for parliamentary bureaucracies to follow coherent and coordinated policies based on cabinet rule than it is for presidentialist bureaucracies who are always cross-pressured by three competing sources of authority—unity of command is an empty phrase for them.

4. Every presidentialist regime confronts serious difficulties that are inherent in the separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, leading sometimes to gridlock

or stalemate. Such difficulties also seriously hamper the operations of every President and Congress, viewed as separate institutions, and they usually ruin political parties and the party system while also bewildering the electorate and corrupting the electoral-system (details are presented in Riggs, 1993b).

5. As of 1965, more than 30 countries had adopted American-style presidentialist constitutions and all of them had experienced breakdowns, usually (91%) through a coup d'état whose leaders scrapped the constitution and ruled autocratically. By contrast, the capacity of parliamentary regimes to resist breakdown was much greater than that of presidentialist systems. Only 31% of the 43 new states that established parliamentary forms of government experienced such collapses (Riggs, 1993a). Although an updated receding will no doubt lead to some revision of these findings, the difference is so dramatic that it raises insistent questions about the problems with presidentialism.

A variety of important, though often essentially undemocratic, practices have enabled the United States to deal with these problems more effectively than its counterparts in other presidentialist regimes, where, as we have seen, breakdowns have universally occurred. These practices—which I call para-constitutional because of their importance for the survival of any presidentialist regime—include federalism, single-member-district majoritarianism, nonvoting by many eligible citizens, senioritism, lobbyism, and relatively unregulated capitalism. My first effort to examine the relation of these “isms” to the survival of presidentialism in the United States can be found in Riggs (1988b). Subsequently, I found confirmation that the absence of these practices in other presidentialist regimes contributed to their breakdown. Many of these practices are so patently undemocratic that they have been rejected and replaced in the newer presidentialist democracies. Although their retention by the older U.S. regime has been severely criticized (the Electoral College symbolizes many such relics), their importance for the survival of representative government in the United States remains largely unrecognized.

Several scholars now recognize the inherent obstacles to the success of presidentialism, but they have not analyzed the reasons for the American exception. Juan Linz, for example, has written most perceptively, “Presidentialism is reluctantly problematic because it operates according to the rule of “winner-take-all”—an arrangement that tends to make democratic politics a zero-sum game, with all the potential for conflict such games portend” (1990, p. 56). By contrast, he argues, it is possible for even small political parties in parliamentary systems to win seats in the legislature and even to join coalition governments. Clearly, Linz is thinking mainly of the President’s ability to promulgate policies which will, assuredly, alienate defeated partisans who are committed to different outcomes.

However, in the American case, a powerful Congress seriously limits the President’s authority and thereby dampens the impact of the winner-take-all game. Moreover, the President’s patronage powers are seriously moderated by Congress, and the presence of an overwhelming number of careerists in contemporary America has radically reduced the President’s authority over appointments. Consider, also, that bureaucratic fragmentation due to federalism and the great power of capitalism and free enterprise in the United States inhibits the number of government-financed benefits—health, education, social security, welfare—over which the President can exercise control.

A vigorous capitalist market system in the United States also offers innumerable job opportunities in the private sector that, for most people, are more attractive than public office. This also reduces the costs of the winner-take-all syndrome. By contrast, in other presidentialist countries, the demand for government jobs is disproportionately large because of the relative weakness of the private sector. Such factors as these have simply lowered the stakes of the zero-sum game in the United States (Riggs, 1993b).

6. When a constitutional crisis leads a President to usurp power, the Congress is discharged and the constitution suspended. Clearly, a constitutional stipulation authorizing the executive and legislative branches to exercise independent authority by no means assures the survival of such a system. In any test of strength, a President can normally quash the Congress. The basic rule sustaining a presidential regime is the requirement that the head of government be elected for a fixed term, not subject to dismissal by a legislative vote of no confidence. Impeachment is not such a vote since it is a judicial procedure designed to oust Presidents guilty of “high crimes and misdemeanors” and does not automatically lead to a change of government but only to the replacement of the President by someone (e.g., a vice president) of the same political persuasion.

Although Congress sometimes overshadows the President in presidentialist regimes, I do not know of any case in which a Congress has usurped power and abolished the presidency. When a presidentialist regime confronts a deep crisis, therefore, the typical scenario involves crushing the Congress and suspending the constitution, occasionally by the President with military support but much more often by the military acting alone.

7. Although *retainer* is normally used for family servants, it has also been employed to mean “civil service retainers” (W3), and I shall use it only in this sense, to identify patronage (political) appointees who retain their posts—to be distinguished clearly from merit-based careerists whose tenure in office is assured by a legally binding contract with the state. Historically, a king’s retainers become officials and the word was long used to refer to them. Although the word has fallen out of use in democratic regimes, I see no reason not to use it to refer to patronage appointees who retain their offices on a long-term basis (cf. Section 9.3, Table 9.1, p. 99).<sup>16</sup>
8. The familiar dichotomy between powerful and powerless does not enable us to distinguish adequately between significant levels of bureaucratic power. The four-level scale from powerless through semi-powered to powerful and dominant is discussed in Riggs (1992)—when precise measurement is needed, a numerical scale could be used. Following a coup, public officials in a bureaucratic polity are politically dominant and, by contrast, nonparty officials in a single-party regime are typically powerless. Democratic regimes typically have powerful bureaucracies, whether they be presidentialist or parliamentary in character. The United States is exceptional among such democracies because its bureaucracy is only semipowered, a property that contributes significantly, I believe, to the survival of this regime.
9. Article II of the U.S. Constitution prescribes, “The Executive Power shall be vested in a President.” A useful analysis of what the founders meant by the executive powers can be found in Cronin (1989, pp. 180–208). American writers on Public Administration usually claim that the administrative functions are implied by the President’s executive powers, but others admit that all three branches of government in a presidentialist system have authority over bureaucrats. The classic explanations offered by Goodnow and Willoughby, for example, assign the “executive/administrative” functions to different branches.<sup>23,24</sup>

Still others claim that the Constitution is silent on public administration. Thus, Stillman, a contemporary, writes that the Constitution leaves “a blank slate involving ‘administration’ as something to be filled in and defined by later Americans” (Stillman, 1991, p. 20). Clearly, he views administration as something different from the executive function, something that still needed to be created after the Constitution had been established. He even argues that, during the first century, American public administration—if it existed—was determined by the regime’s statelessness (i.e., the lack of a career bureaucracy). Genuine public administration, he asserts, arose only as and after the creation of an American (administrative) state following the introduction of the career system.

I differ from Stillman about the first American century when, I think, we did have a state, but it was clearly not an administrative state possessed of a career bureaucracy. We might call it a civic state in which citizens, through “republican” institutions, could manage their own affairs and the limited apparatus of government—Webster’s dictionary gives “attendant on citizenship” as the original meaning of civic. The Jacksonian ideal of amateurs in government seems to fit this model as does the Athenian model of a city state in which officeholders were selected by lot (Waldo, 1980, p. 84). Surely administrative functions are performed in a civic state even though it lacks a professional career service.

No doubt the quality of American Public Administration was radically changed after the establishment of career services, a transformation that also led to the development of Public Administration as a subject field. (Following Waldo’s example I shall use public administration for the function and Public Administration for the subject field that studies this function [1980, p. 6n]). In this field, the administrative function is often understood as part of or even identical with the “executive” function. Borrowing from business administration, the President may be said to have powers similar to those of the “CEO” of a private corporation, that is, someone responsible for “managing” the whole federal bureaucracy. Indeed, management is often used—instead of the “administrative” or “executive” function—to

talk about the President's role, viewing Congress and the courts as interlopers who have no legitimate right to shape bureaucratic behavior.

Some writers in Public Administration go even further, claiming that the career bureaucracy ought to be recognized as a fourth branch of government with its own inherent authority—see Section 9.4.2.<sup>27</sup> In this perspective, the administrative function is seen as different from that of all three branches of a presidentialist regime. Bureaucratic agencies should possess separate authority coequal with that of the three other branches.

My own opinion is that neither the Founding Fathers nor modern writers on Public Administration have made a clear distinction between the administrative and the executive functions (or even management). Although the Constitution clearly assigned the “executive function” to the President (as “Chief Executive”), all three branches of any presidentialist regime are inextricably involved in the administrative function as they cross-pressure the bureaucracy to accept norms that are often in conflict with each other (Rosenbloom, 1983). Trying to institutionalize public administration as a fourth autonomous function cannot really work.

The apparent dilemmas of Public Administration in America are inherent in the basic rules of any presidentialist regime within which no integrated structure of authority is possible and all efforts to generate a consistent and coherent view of the administrative function in such regimes are bound to fail. In short, the institutionalization of separated powers sets a context within which powerful and administratively competent bureaucracies cannot be managed effectively; only a fragmented, and hence semipowered, bureaucracy can be long sustained. This constraint, rather than any specific constitutional provision, severely limits the kind of bureaucracy that can be tolerated by any presidentialist regime—see Riggs (1994).

10. Actually, the founders could scarcely have imagined the concept of bureaucratic careers based on examinations and the merit system. Although the idea had been invented by the Chinese 2000 years earlier, it became established in Europe only after the American Constitution was promulgated.<sup>43</sup>

The system they knew was one in which patronage appointees, under autocratic European rulers, held their positions for a long time as a result of seniority, inertia, and family obligations—indeed, they sometimes inherited posts as a family possession for many generations, a remnant of feudalism. Although they were originally viewed as family retainers, they also served the state which was ruled by their masters, the royal families and the aristocrats. The royal bureaucracy and arbitrary government against which the Declaration of Independence protested (“swarms of Officers to harass our People and eat out their substance”) were, indeed, ruled by retainers.

The founders had no alternative vision of a better way to recruit and maintain the administrators of a republic, but they did expect that officials appointed by the President would help implement the laws passed by Congress and that they would stay in office unless discharged for good reasons. Alexander Hamilton, for example, refers to “the assistants or deputies” of the President who “ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence.” Thus, he presupposed political patronage and favored the retention principle over rotation; writing about the propensity of “every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations,” he alleged that such a practice “could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of the government” (Hamilton, 1961).<sup>31</sup>

11. The Founding Fathers realized this when they specified (Art. I, Sec. 6) that “no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.” When members, like Richard Cheney or Les Aspen, accept cabinet positions, they must vacate their seats in Congress.
12. Note that bureaucracy often refers only to careerists, by contrast with retainers or transients, generally presupposing the qualities Max Weber attributed to his “ideal-type.” When Durant writes about “helping appointees and bureaucrats to understand their different motivations,” he clearly uses “bureaucracy” to refer only to careerists (Durant, 1990, p. 321). This usage, of course, makes sense in parliamentary systems where virtually all appointed officials are careerists so that “bureaucrat” is a comprehensive term for all nonelected public officials, military and civil. However, the identification



of bureaucracy with careerists (and especially with civil servants but not military officers) handicaps the American understanding of public administration because it mistakes a part for the whole—like using apples to mean fruit or Yankees to mean Americans.

In his discussion of the “intellectual crisis” in American Public Administration, Vincent Ostrom tells us that “Wilson rejected a theory of *democratic* administration while propounding a theory of *bureaucratic* administration as the one rule of ‘good’ administration for all governments alike” (emphasis added) (Ostrom, 1989, p. 65). In this usage, bureaucrat refers to career civil servants, only a part of the total set of appointed federal officials and a tiny part when Wilson wrote.

To make sense in comparative analysis, bureaucracy has to include transient political appointees (and military officers) as well as career civil servants. This understanding would impair the neat hierarchic stereotype of civil service careerists that Ostrom apparently had in mind when speaking of Wilson’s “bureaucratic administration.” No doubt, in the context of presidentialist (by contrast with parliamentary) regimes, many, if not most, bureaucrats are not “careerists”—at best they are “retainers.” However, in the United States, the top layer of bureaucrats actually consists of “transients,” short-term presidential political appointees. Although a small minority within the bureaucracy, they exercise great power (Newland, 1987).

In a comparativist context, therefore, we simply cannot use bureaucracy to refer only to merit-based career officials even though that concept fits most nonpresidentialist regimes. In order to make comparisons with presidentialist systems (especially that of the United States), we need to use bureaucrat generically to include all nonelected officials (i.e., transients and retainers as well as careerists). Fortunately, my usage is not idiosyncratic; for example, Aberbach and colleagues write of their survey, “Nearly half of the American ‘bureaucrat’ sample are non-career appointees” (1981, p. 44 and 94).

Many administrators, of course, are elected in the United States, especially in local government, and I would exclude them from the category of bureaucrats. The fact is that both appointed and elected officials can and do perform political and administrative functions in every country. We simply need to be able to distinguish officials, structurally, on the basis of mode of selection (election or appointment) and, functionally, on the basis of what they do (political and/or administrative).

Note that in this usage, official is not a synonym for bureaucrat. Rather, it includes both elected and appointed officeholders. Although all elected officials are necessarily “politicians,” they are also often “administrators.” Similarly, although all appointed officials are administrators, they can also be politicians.

In view of the decisive political role played by military officers in many countries—notably after a group of them has seized power in a coup d’état—we must constantly remind ourselves that the category of bureaucrats includes not only civil servants but also the armed forces. Our analysis will be greatly sharpened if we always remember to use bureaucracy to include all the appointed officials in a government’s executive branch—both military officers and civil servants—without assuming that they perform only “administrative” roles. In fact, many perform important “political” functions also.

13. Over 40 years ago, I found that local/regional and committee priorities often prevail over party loyalties as determinants of U.S. congressional voting behavior (Riggs, 1950, pp. 170–192). In a few presidentialist regimes, exceptionally—Chile is an example—strong party discipline reduces the voice of individual members of Congress. However, I believe that in these cases also the winning parties demand posts for important supporters.
14. When the effective powers of Congress are vitiated, we might speak of a quasipresidentialist rather than a genuinely presidentialist system. Presidents who bypass Congress may rely, instead, on their enhanced popular, partisan, or military influence and on the use of executive or emergency orders. Although this strategy weakens Congress temporarily, it eventually undermines the President’s authority by diminishing the ability of the executive power to gain legislative legitimacy for its policies and it fails to eliminate the interest of members of Congress in patronage.

Hartlyn describes this problem in Colombia; a “President had massive appointive powers, whose significance was augmented by the importance of spoils and patronage to the clientelist and brokerage-oriented parties and by the absence of any meaningful civil service legislation. Presidents could appoint

cabinet ministers without congressional approval” (Hartlyn, 1989, p. 13). The effect of the growing power of the President was “to marginalize Congress further from major decisions, reducing its functions to ones of patronage, brokerage and management of limited pork barrel funds” (Hartlyn, 1989, p. 21).

Although the usurpation of powers by a President is an important cause of congressional weakness, I believe an even more basic reason involves the party system—a hegemonic party, as found in Mexico, is a recipe for congressional weakness (Riggs, 1973). To sustain a viable Congress and hence the separation of powers, a competitive party system is needed, and the exercise of influence over presidential patronage seems to be unavoidable as a price for the maintenance of party competition.

15. Mainwaring reports that in Brazil, “The only glue (and it is a powerful one at times) that holds the President’s support together is patronage—and this helps explain the pervasive use of patronage politics.... Both Vargas and Kubitschek pressed for reforms that would strengthen the merit system and protect state agencies from clientelistic pressures, but they were defeated by a Congress unwilling to relinquish patronage privileges” (Mainwaring, 1989). A similar dynamics prevails, I believe, in all presidentialist systems—although, as we shall see, its force has been mitigated in the United States by the development, exceptionally, of a nonpartisan merit system.
16. The inherent insecurity of all retainers who, by definition, lack legally protected tenure in office leads them to adopt a variety of expedients to protect their positions and optimize their prospects for indefinite retention of office. One that is well known is that of the *workhorses*, people who, by hard work, make themselves indispensable. Any bureaucracy that relies solely on transients would experience a rapid collapse. The availability of workhorses provides some protection for an otherwise endangered presidentialist system because it enables the regime to perform necessary tasks with at least minimal success. Because of their invaluable contributions, workhorses are usually retained, though often in subordinated and ignominious positions.

Retainers who are not workhorses may, nevertheless, resist discharge by other means. Some, whom I would call *turtles*, are well protected by their external alliances—friends and relatives in high places, especially in the Congress and among wealthy landowners, business men, and the social elite. Such external patrons provide a protective shell to help the turtles survive even though they treat their posts as sinecures and do little or no work, moving slowly, like turtles.

A third category of retainers survive by their wits and by corruption; they might be called *foxes*. Unscrupulously, they are willing to indulge in blackmail, bribery, deceit, and trickery in order to perpetuate their precarious hold on public office. The presence of many turtles and foxes among the retainers in a bureaucracy undermines its viability as a tool of public administration and generates much public anger.

17. In earlier work, I mentioned interdependence and tenure as additional variables distinguishing traditional from modern bureaucracies. I now believe that only income (the salary/nonsalary distinction) clearly marks this distinction. Modern bureaucracies are usually more complex and interdependent than traditional ones, but this variable does not provide a sharp distinction between them. As for “tenure,” I now see that it is not a clear differentiator; patronage prevailed in premodern bureaucracies, but the retention of office by incumbents and merit-based careerism also developed, notable in the Chinese case. Although careerism prevails in most modern bureaucracies, patronage is common in some, notably those found in all presidentialist regimes (Riggs, 1991a, pp. 487–490).
18. Of the three Asian presidentialist regimes created in the twentieth century, two inherited powerful career bureaucracies. These two, South Vietnam and South Korea, experienced coups immediately after the terms of their first elected presidents. A third, the Philippines, broke down when its elected president, Ferdinand Marcos, seized power in 1972 and ruled autocratically until 1986 when presidentialism was restored under President Corazon Aquino. Six unsuccessful coup attempts marred her rule. Their failures, I believe, can be attributed to the relative weakness of the Philippine bureaucracy which, alone among presidentialist systems, had been established under American rule, following the merit system principles imposed by the United States during its administration of that conquered country.
19. Because much, if not most, of the income of traditional officials was secured from extragovernmental sources, bureaucrats lacked the incentives found in modern politics for seizing power, and we find no

examples of a real coup d'état in these societies, with the possible exception of the Mamlukes in Egypt (Riggs, 1991a, pp. 491–492).

20. The historical reasons for this phenomenon are elaborated in Riggs (1993a). Most importantly, the new states typically inherited well-entrenched modern bureaucracies whereas the institutions of representative government required to control them were established only as independence approached. Not surprisingly, when and if these newborn institutions failed to solve serious problems, especially those involving public finance and domestic security, threatened officials were willing to support a coup that promised to stabilize their own status and incomes.
21. A costly alternative to rotationism was developed in Chile where civil servants could retire “with fifteen years service and a relatively good pension. Agency heads, however, would retire with what was known as *la perseguidora*—a pension that kept pace with the salary of the current occupant of the post retired from.... Agency heads were thus appointed as a culmination of their careers and could be persuaded to retire to allow a new President to make new appointments” (Valenzuela, 1984, p. 262). Another common bureaucratic practice in Chile deprived officials of significant functions while respecting their job security. “The *huesera* (or common grave), a series of offices for individuals with no official responsibilities...became a feature of many agencies” (Valenzuela, 1984, p. 264). In Chile, moreover, to overcome resistance from entrenched bureaucrats, “new agencies...that could carry forth new program initiatives of the new administration were brought into existence without having to abolish older ones. Even the conservative and austerity-minded Jorge Alessandi added 35,000 new employees to the public sector during his tenure in office” (Valenzuela, 1984, p. 263).

Similarly, in Brazil, Presidents often expanded the apparatus of government by creating new state agencies in order to enhance their power and overcome congressional resistance (Mainwaring, 1989, p. 15). As in Chile, this practice enabled the President to make patronage appointments without discharging incumbent officials. The point to remember is that although rotationism was avoided, a high political and economic cost was not. Thus, some of the political benefits of rotationism were achieved, but only at immense cost. Meanwhile, bureaucratic expansionism persisted.

22. It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of “in-and-outer” on the basis of the roles they play when they go “out.” In the nineteenth century American spoils system, getting a government job was often crucial for an incumbent and being forced out of office by rotation was highly traumatic. Like a fish out of water, a discharged spoilsman truly suffered, longing for the security of the old-fashioned retainer system, as it had been inherited from Europe and maintained by the Federalists and Jeffersonians before Jackson launched the rotation principle.

By contrast, those who easily re-enter private life after a period of public service are more like amphibians—a well-chosen term already in use (Campbell, 1986, p. 200). Campbell makes an overlapping distinction between *politicos* and *amphibians*; the former includes campaign workers who claim a reward for having helped bring a President to power whereas the latter have no special partisan claim for a reward but they can offer their experience and “expertise within a substantive policy field” (Campbell, 1986, p. 200). Virtually, all the fish were and are *politicos*. The difference between my treatment and Campbell’s is that I think we need to consider the postemployment prospects of transients in addition to their pre-employment records; contrasting the poor fish with the more fortunate amphibians.

Hugh Heclo has this phenomenon in mind when he refers to *technopols* as “people with recognized reputations in particular areas of public policy.... There are subordinate and superordinate positions through which they climb...but these are not usually within the same organization.” Upward mobility is determined by “the assessments of people like themselves concerning how well, in the short term, the budding technopol is managing each of his (or her) assignments in and at the fringes of government” (Heclo, 1978, p. 107). Such people are *mobicentrics* and they will become increasingly powerful and prevalent in American society.

Campbell also speaks of career officials who are sometimes tapped by a President to serve as temporary political appointees. This normal practice in parliamentary systems is usually traumatic for incumbents in presidentialist America; like the amphibians, they can easily move from career to transient roles and may even feel honored by a “promotion,” but like the fish, they cannot return home. Once

“politicized,” they lose their welcome in the career services and usually have to re-enter private life after a stint as a political executive. The infrequency with which career officials take political appointments in the United States may well reflect their reluctance to accept such a “terminal” invitation as much as it does executive indifference to their talents. However, as mobcentricity increases, we may find that many careerists become amphibians, accepting political appointments as a stepping stone to new and more lucrative roles outside government.

23. John Rohr explains, “This threefold way of executing the will of the state is crucial for understanding Goodnow’s book.” A careless reading, he says, would equate the “will of the state” with the President’s authority as chief executive and then “equate both of these with Public Administration” (Rohr, 1986, p. 86).
24. Willoughby’s notion of the executive function corresponded to Goodnow’s; he expected the President to integrate and control the whole bureaucracy as its members sought to implement the laws adopted by Congress. He would rely mainly on his patronage appointments—from cabinet officers on down, including thousands of in-and-outers—to accomplish this function. Willoughby also emphasized, however, that the administrative function per se belongs mainly to Congress as performed by the non-partisan career officers who work primarily with its members and committees.
25. Congressional decisions impact on political appointees as well as careerists, often compelling them to relate more closely to Congress than to the President.<sup>46</sup> Herbert Kaufman studied six American bureau chiefs, half careerists and half transients. He reports that all of them “were constantly looking over their shoulders...at the elements of the legislative establishment relevant to their agencies.... The legislative relations of administrative agencies consist largely of contacts with the chairmen, members, and staffs of the committees and sub-committees that have jurisdiction over the administrators” (Kaufman, 1981, pp. 47–48). By contrast, he tells us their contacts with the presidency often seemed to be quite marginal. Nevertheless, in a presidentialist regime, each of the three separate branches of government can and must play an important role in guiding and controlling appointed officials (members of the bureaucracy). By contrast, of course, direct intervention by any parliament in the management of government programs is more limited—again, because of the fusion of powers inherent in the design of parliamentary systems.
26. Despite the appointment of career officials to most of the positions to which congressional patronage previously applied, complaints against the abuse of power by members of Congress are often heard in the United States, especially from critics on the Republican right. A good example can be found in the Heritage Foundation’s book *The Imperial Congress* which asserts that “America faces a constitutional crisis stemming from two causes: the congressional failure to observe traditional limits on its power and the acquiescence of the other two branches of government in the resulting arrogation of power” (Jones and Marini, 1988, p. 1). In countries where extensive patronage continues to prevail, this kind of “arrogation” of congressional power may be even more prevalent.
27. Elaborating on the frustrations of American bureaucrats, the *Blacksburg Manifesto* tells us, “Public Administrators were the people in no-man’s land who were left with ambiguities and a discretion that was viewed, on the one hand, as a threat to them (and to others) and, on the other, as a challenging opportunity to keep the constitutional process from becoming a stalemate in which the public interest would be the ultimate casualty” (Wamsley et al., 1990, p. 45).

In response, we should claim that “the popular will does not reside solely in elected officials but in a constitutional order that envisions a remarkable variety of legitimate titles to participate in governance.” Accordingly, Public Administration ought “not to cower before a sovereign legislative assembly or a sovereign elected executive.... Rather the task of the Public Administration is to share in governing wisely and well the constitutional order that the framers of the Constitution intended as an expression of the will of the people who alone are sovereign” (p. 47). “This means ... that the Public Administrators may have to play the role of balance wheel in the constitutional order, using their statutory powers and professional expertise to favor whichever participant in the constitutional process needs their help at a given time in history to preserve the purposes of the Constitution itself” (p. 49).

28. A sophisticated analysis of the psychology of interpersonal relationships and human needs as they arise in different organizational contexts can be found in Shepard (1965, pp. 1125–1127), including a description and critique of Abraham Maslow's theory. A shrewd application of this theory to public administration can be found in Howard McCurdy (1977). For details, see Maslow (1962).
29. The awkward neologism *functionism* is used here to signify the principle that careers should be oriented to specific programs, policy areas, or "functions." Incumbents whose careers are based on this principle are called *functionaries*. Ideally, functionism is also functional (i.e., conducive to system survival), but we cannot use *functional* as a synonym for *functionism* without risking ambiguity. Some nonfunctionist principles are, actually, quite functional. The two terms, in short, designate two different concepts. Professionalism in the U.S. bureaucracy has flourished because of functionism, but clearly not all functionaries are professionals.
30. A two-party system is probably strengthened by a federal structure that hampers the emergence of a national hegemonic party. Opponents of any party in power at the center can rally to opposition parties locally, thereby creating power bases from which to campaign for power nationally. By contrast, in a centralized polity, once a party becomes entrenched in power, it can more easily defeat all efforts by opposition parties to replace it.

This principle may only work, however, for a centripetalized party system where many citizens do not vote and the rival parties seek the support of moderate or centrist forces. When a centrifugalized party system is combined with federalism, as in the Brazilian case (Mainwaring, 1988), federalism may well have a negative impact on the survival of presidentialism. For further comments on this point, see Riggs (1993b).

31. Leonard White comments that Jackson "may well be criticized for failing to see the consequences of the theory of rotation . . . (but) he can hardly be criticized for the purposes he sought to achieve—to destroy the idea of property in office, to cut down an officeholding class, and to give all citizens an equal opportunity to enjoy the privilege of participating in the task of self-government" (White, 1954, p. 5). White also tells us that "the requirements of party machines for the sinews of war, the doctrine that citizens generally should have a turn at the business of government, and the anxiety of thousands of citizens for the privilege of office, all conspired to build a nation-state-local party organization" and "to break down the stable, permanent, politically inactive type of career (i.e., retainer) system that had grown up during the first four decades of the Republic (White, 1954, pp. 12–13). By establishing rotation in office, Jackson was able to replace many (though fortunately not all) retainers with spoilsmen.

It is important to distinguish between two types of patronage appointees: those who are able to keep their jobs (the retainers) and those who are forced out of office so that newcomers can take their places (the transients). When White wrote that Jackson did not introduce "spoils," he was commingling retainers with transients—both are recruited by patronage. In other presidentialist regimes, by contrast to that of the United States, powerful retainers were able to block rotationism and, as a result, to prevent the rise of careerism. A retainer bureaucracy is both politically powerful and administratively inept.

Nineteenth-century transients were often called *spoilsmen* whereas their contemporary counterparts are the *in-and-outers*. Despite significant differences, it is important to identify their shared properties as transients. No doubt, transients are pervasive in all presidentialist systems at the higher levels of governance. However, at middle and lower levels, retainers prevail in all presidentialist regimes with nineteenth century origins except that of the United States where careerism at these levels has become institutionalized.

32. Ironically, Jackson can also be credited with the bureaucratization of the American public services which he accomplished by making agencies more impersonal and subjecting them to formal rules and regulations (Crenson, 1975, pp. 131–139). We should not equate bureaucracy with career services but, rather, with formal hierarchies of office governed by rules and regulations, regardless of how the offices are filled. The retainer system which Jackson restricted depended heavily on the personal idiosyncracies of its long-term incumbents rather than on formally prescribed rules and regulations.
33. Although the Jacksonian revolution had remarkable effects, we should not exaggerate its extent. Probably no more than 10% of incumbents (certainly less than 20%) were actually removed from office

during the Jackson administration (White, 1954, p. 308). Throughout the following decades, “a hard core of experienced men . . . remained steadily at work” despite “the clamor for removals and partisan appointments to resulting vacancies” (White, 1954, p. 349). In short, despite the conspicuous role played by transients, a substantial number of retainers were able to maintain the essential functions of public administration. After 1829, “two personnel systems were thus in operation. . . . The patronage (transient) system held the public attention, but it was primarily the career (retainer) system that enabled the government to maintain its armed forces, to collect its revenue, to operate its land system, to keep its accounts and audit its expenditures. . . . The adjustment of the two systems remained even a century later an object of concern” (White, 1954, p. 362).

The reform movement was driven, of course, not only by the flagrant abuses of power indulged in by partisan transients but also by the irresponsible behavior of the retainers whom I have called “turtles” and “foxes.”<sup>16</sup> Although experienced and indispensable “workhorses” were often good public administrators, as White claimed, they were largely invisible and could scarcely protect the status quo from its critics.

34. The aggregate vote in the presidential election of 1824 was only 356,000; by 1836 it had risen to 1,500,000 and in 1849 to 2,400,000. Although population growth was undoubtedly a factor, the major reasons were the elimination of property restrictions, especially in the new western states, and a growing interest in politics (Nevins and Commager, 1956, p. 175). In his first annual message to Congress (December, 1829), Jackson declared, “More is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience. . . . Where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another” (Hofstadter, 1954, p. 51). The successful establishment of rotation reflected the emergence of mass politics at an early period in U.S. history—by contrast, elsewhere, entrenched property rights and the seeming stability attributable to government by retainers have persisted to the present day.
35. In Brazil, where the retention of patronage-based offices prevails despite energetic reform projects,<sup>15</sup> Mainwaring tells us, “The political class has been acutely aware of the overshadowing of the legislature by the bureaucracy and has responded by expanding the influence within the bureaucracy . . . (with) catastrophic consequences upon the efficacy of the state apparatus” (1988, p. 24). Clearly, powerful networks composed of private interests, bureaucrats, and political parties, working with legislators, are able to secure particularistic concessions for themselves. Although superficially similar to the “iron triangles” found in America, these networks are more amenable to particularistic interests and less likely to promote universalistic policies and programs as a result of the pervasiveness of retainers. As triangles, they are “soft” (not iron), representing retainers rather than careerists, and rich families or corporations rather than functionally organized interest networks associated with large numbers of voters.
36. I can only hypothesize about this relationship because I cannot find concrete documentation for it. Van Riper emphasizes the importance of the civil service reform movement led by “a small group of predominantly wealthy and politically conscious easterners with a philanthropic turn of mind, aided by an aroused public opinion” (Van Riper, 1958, p. 80). A more detailed profile of the reformers is given by Hoogenboom, “The civil service reform movement was essentially conservative. . . . Reformers wished to return to the good old days before Jacksonian democracy and the industrial revolution—days when men with their background, status, and education were the unquestioned leaders of society.” They “attacked the hated spoilsman’s conspicuous source of strength in the civil service” (Hoogenboom, 1961, p. 197). See also White (1958, pp. 278–302).

In the American case, transient spoilsmen could scarcely have organized enough political support to present any significant opposition to the reformers—they lacked the power that entrenched retainers could offer in other countries. Evidence of such resistance can be found in the many obstacles to post-war merit-system reform encountered by American and United Nations public administration advisers in Latin America (Ruffing-Hilliard, 1991).

37. The Pendleton Act forbade career employees “to coerce the political action of any person” and penalties were prescribed for “political assessments of or by competitive employees, or by any other federal officials” (Van Riper, 1958, p. 99). In 1939 and 1940, responding to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s efforts to discipline recalcitrant Democrats in Congress by means of patronage, the Hatch Acts were

enacted. The first act extended the prohibition against partisan activities to unclassified employees (except those in top policy determining posts) and the second strengthened the terms of this prohibition by extending it to all state and local employees paid in full or in part by federal funds. Officials violating this proscription could be removed from office (Van Riper, 1958, pp. 340–341). No doubt, career officers were happy to comply with laws which enabled them to avoid onerous partisan tasks and financial assessments.

38. The provisions of the Pendleton Act, perhaps unintentionally, were not hostile to the long-term interests of transient appointees. Some, already out of office, may have hoped to re-enter the public service as careerists, beneficiaries of the act's open recruitment policy. Even transients, still in office but facing discharge because of rotation, may have supported merit system reforms in the hope that they could be "blanketed" into a position. The American "rank-on-the-job" tradition—by contrast with the "rank-in-the-man" system prevalent in most parliamentary regimes—has enabled some Presidents, almost clandestinely, to convert their transient appointees into retainers by "covering" their positions into a classified service. This probably could not have been done in any rank-in-the-man system where overt changes in personal status would have been far more conspicuous. Although transients in the bureaucracy could not exercise collective power, no doubt, some of them individually supported the reform movement from which they may have hoped to benefit.
39. The nonpartisanship of American careerists may be contrasted with the bureaucratic partisanship typically found in other presidentialist regimes. Consider, for example, the situation in Chile where merit systems and partisanship have been commingled. According to Valenzuela, "The Chilean civil service was recruited and promoted through a Chilean version of the spoils system: party recommendations, and legislative support, in addition to formal credentials, were important in gaining entry and crucial in rising to higher office. The civil service was fragmented ... by strong partisan loyalties that prevented the development of institutional loyalties" (Valenzuela, 1984, p. 271).

Because of its American colonial heritage, the Philippine presidentialist regime has installed an examination-based career system. However, according to Carino (1989), its "career" officials were often openly partisan. She reports, for example, that "a third of middle-level bureaucrats in a survey mentioned helping in a n e lectoral campaign—against civil service rules. Another third acknowledged nurturing political ambitions.... Civil servants also sometimes played off the executive against Congress, claiming the ability to get appropriations despite the absence of the President's support" (p. 12, 14). In addition to the career officials, of course, there were always a substantial number of presidentially appointed "agency heads and such aides as could be justified as 'policy determining, highly technical or primarily confidential'" (p. 10).

This was the "normal" pattern of bureaucratic politics in the Philippines before the advent of the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972. He sought to institutionalize an intermediate, highly politicized, and well-paid layer of political appointees, the "Career Executive Service," to serve as the cadres of his authoritarian regime and help him perform functions of the dissolved Congress. When President Corazon Aquino came to power in 1986 and sought to re-establish a democratic presidentialist regime, she imposed sweeping bureaucratic replacements, purges of many officials, and tumultuous reorganization schemes. The partisanship involved in this highly traumatic and often unsuccessful effort to "de-Marcosify" the bureaucracy is summarized in Carino (1989) and described in more detail in her earlier monograph (1988).

The Philippines and Chile are sometimes mentioned as good examples of presidentialist regimes (in addition to that of the United States) where the merit system has been successfully installed. Closer scrutiny suggests, however, that they have developed modernized retainer systems. Without the politics/administration dichotomy myth and strict enforcement of nonpartisanship in its professionalized bureaucracy, the American regime might also have broken down as all the other presidentialist regimes have.

40. In 1947, 92% of all federal bureaucrats in the continental United States were career officials—that is, some 8% were political appointees. According to a recent report, there are now about 3000 political appointees as compared with 2.1 million civilian federal employees—about 0.15% (Lynch, 1991, p.

54). This transformation is remarkable; the overwhelming majority of appointed federal officials in the United States are now nonpartisan careerists. Nevertheless, the patronage appointees, despite their small number, play politically and administratively essential roles that cannot be ignored.

41. The supporters of careerists in America are sometimes referred to as *bureauphiles*, by contrast with their opponents, the *bureauphobes*, who favor *transients* in office. A *bureauphobic* call for more reliance on political appointees was issued by Lynch (1991), himself an experienced in-and-outer, when he complained that the Volcker Commission “has created an image of political appointees that seriously misunderstands modern government operations.” Instead of cutting back on political appointees, Lynch tells us, “more responsive government today requires substantial increases in their numbers.” He thinks that “the executive should have enough political positions to provide adequate staff for its policy, public affairs, congressional affairs, general counsel, and intergovernmental relations divisions.... Responsive government requires a close link between the political ideas that win elections and the policies of government.” Because the Volcker Commission sought to isolate “government operations from winning political ideas,” Lynch concludes, “those recommendations deserve to be shelved.... They violate the most basic notions of democratic government” (pp. 54–55). Specialists in American Public Administration, he thinks, ignore this point of view at their peril.

A *bureauphilic* perspective is offered by James Piffner who deplures “the present trend toward increasing numbers of political appointees. Reversing this direction would increase the capacity of the government to function efficiently and effectively without sacrificing political accountability or responsiveness” (Piffner, 1987, p. 64). Similarly, Dwight Waldo says, “We are now witnessing a devaluation of neutral competence; some would say, a frontal attack on neutral competence. There has been a substantial invasion of political appointees, many of whom I judge to be willfully ignorant of government and woefully insensitive to public norms” (Brown and Stillman, 1986, p. 145). Neither the *bureauphobes* nor the *bureauphiles* seem to be aware of the constitutional causes and consequences of the phenomena they deplore.

42. Since apportionment opened the door for favorable treatment of applicants from all the states—a nineteenth-century counterpart to contemporary “equal opportunity” rules—graduates of the new, widely dispersed land grant colleges where “practical” courses were taught became eligible for appointments, displacing graduates of the older liberal arts colleges. This laid the foundation for professionalism in the American bureaucracy, precluding the development of an American generalist cadre or mandarin system. *Ex-transients*, having been appointed for partisan reasons from all the states, were also beneficiaries of the apportionment principle.
43. The British Empire extended to Canton, China where agents of the East India Company were deeply impressed by the effectiveness of the exam-based mandarin bureaucracy in ruling the world’s largest empire over long periods. Later, when the company began to experience severe difficulties administering the growing Indian empire from London (the tendency of British retainers in India to become *Indianized* *prebendaries* [*nabobs*], going into business on their own account, compelled London to realize that drastic measures were needed to reassert imperial control over its far-flung and distant possessions), they decided to borrow the Chinese design. Glimpses of the indiscipline prevailing among Englishmen in India in the eighteenth century can be found in Spear (1963, pp. 80–94). By the mid-nineteenth century, the successful Indian (Chinese) mandarin system was extended to England where only youthful graduates of the most prestigious universities (Oxford and Cambridge) were entitled to take classical and literary exams through which an elite corps of generalists—the “administrative class”—joined the government service and became its ruling cadre (Teng, 1943).
44. Was there a kind of culturally determined egalitarianism in America that prompted rejection of the British model of an elitist administrative class? Paul Van Riper has suggested that this rejection rested on a deep-seated aversion to the elitism inherent in the recruitment of graduates from prestigious universities to serve as future mandarins (1958, p. 101); however, he also tells us that the congressional debate thoroughly explored “the likely effects of the proposed legislation upon the constitutional position of the President and Congress, upon the party system” (1958, p. 97). Whether consciously or otherwise, members of Congress may have sensed that careerists, rooted in functionism, would be more responsive



to legislative committees and more dependable as political allies than an elite core of bureaucratic generalists (Riggs, 1988a, pp. 363–365, and 376, n. 40).

45. Aberbach and Rockman (1988) characterize the bureaucophilic view that “a professionalized bureaucracy ... elevates the effectiveness of government” as “the ‘mandarin’ perspective—a term that resonates, for historical reasons, better in Europe than in the United States” (p. 606). We need to understand the reasons for this historical dissonance and to recognize the basic difference between a professionalized bureaucracy and a mandarinate.

*Mandarins*, following the European (parliamentary) model, include generalist (cross-cutting) elite cadres who can, indeed, become a “ruling class,” gaining widespread acceptance of their autonomous authority. By contrast, in the U.S. (presidentialist) system, a different model of policy-oriented (corner-fighting) specialists, climbing intraagency career ladders, should be referred to as *functionaries*, a far less potent or authoritative class of bureaucrats than the mandarins. Many, if not most, of them are professionals whose extrabureaucratic standards and reference groups differ strikingly from the orientations typical of mandarins.

It does, therefore, convey a misleadingly “European” notion to speak of American careerists as mandarins. Fortunately, we can use the broader term, *careerists*, to refer to all merit-based officials regardless of whether they are generalists or specialists—mandarins or functionaries. Remember, however, that retainers are not careerists, and most bureaucrats in presidentialist regimes (except in the United States) are retainers. For more details, see Riggs (1988a, pp. 364–365, 376, n. 40). In America, virtually all careerists are functionaries, and many of them are now also professionals.

According to Aberbach and Rockman, bureaucophobes argue that only officials appointed by the elected political authorities (i.e., the transients) ought to have “discretionary authority within the administrative apparatus”—they are exponents of the “mandate” perspective (1988, p. 606). This perspective gains its importance in the American context from the power of professionals in the career bureaucracy. In order to compel them to give more weight to the politically based priorities of elected politicians, especially the President, transients appointed by each successive administration are charged with a mandate to oversee and direct the careerists, compensating for their professional “biases.”

Concerning the change from the British closed mandarin model to the American open functional model, Paul Van Riper tells us, “We thoroughly adapted (the British model) to the American political and social climate” (Van Riper, 1958, p. 100). This cultural explanation needs to be amplified by consideration of the structural (constitutional) implications of the substitution of functionaries for mandarins in the American polity.

46. Francis Rourke tells us that the “closed (iron triangle) system is long gone, a casualty of the ‘glasnost’ that swept over American government beginning in the 1960’s” (Rourke, 1991, p. 119). Among the causes that he identifies are the growing scrutiny of bureaucratic conduct by legislators and interest groups, the growth of grass-roots political activism, the increased extrabureaucratic expertise found in think tanks, congressional staffs, and research agencies, and the rise of “issue networks,” that is, interactive public interest groups and professionals armed with expert knowledge. Rourke’s more recent thinking on this subject can be found in his APSA paper (1992).

The “iron triangles” metaphor is admittedly too rigid to characterize the American political system as a whole, but the phenomenon itself has not disappeared. Rather, it has become absorbed in a larger and more comprehensive structure of interest networks. In addition to the traditional triangles, we find “issue networks” that link bureaucratic professionals with professional schools, private practitioners, and a host of nonprofit research and action organizations. I would add, also, the golden webs formed by in-and-outers, beneficiaries of the “revolving door” which incumbents use to establish intricate networks of collaboration among officials, consultants, and private organizations, again cutting across all three branches of the presidentialist regime and penetrating a vast number of autonomous regulatory agencies, boards, and commissions.

Taken as a collectivity, interest networks constitute a gargantuan and complex system of interests, issues, and norms that sustain the highly dispersed structure of policy planning and implementation in vast reaches of American public life. I believe that these networks actually ease the burdens carried by

American Presidents and make the executive office more viable. By contrast, no doubt, some observers view this infrastructure as an impregnable monster on which the President cannot really impose his will. After outlining three available but equally unsatisfactory options open to a President who seeks to dominate and direct the executive establishment, Hecló concludes that there is no “neat way out of this trilemma.” Instead, he thinks, the President “is bound to become a creature of the issue networks and the policy specialists” (Hecló, 1978, p. 122).

The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, offers another perspective on this phenomenon. For example, we read in Jones and Marini’s *The Imperial Congress* about how the (“Democrat-controlled”) Congress has usurped presidential powers and undermined the presidentialist Constitution’s prescribed separation of powers. A chapter by “H. A. Mellor” (pseudonym for a former DOD official and congressional aide) details some of the practices whereby interested members of Congress intervene in the appropriations and policy-making processes of the Defense Department to achieve very costly and unfair results through “micromanagement” that seriously undermines the powers of the presidency. Mellor concludes, “The final irony in the struggle between Congress and the executive branch is that, were Congress to more evenly share its responsibilities, treating the executive as a coequal, rather than as a servant, many of these problems would disappear” (Mellor, 1988, p. 129).

Nevertheless, from a comparativist perspective, American Presidents are more fortunate than their counterparts in polities where the interest networks are not so well developed or have highly personal and particularistic priorities. Outside the United States, I believe, Presidents must personally intervene in more current issues or face more public fiascos and disasters than the American President; at least this is a hypothesis that deserves to be investigated.

47. “A professional,” according to Wilson (1989), is “someone who receives important occupational rewards from a reference group whose membership is limited to people who have undergone specialized formal education and have accepted a group-defined code of proper conduct.... In a bureaucracy, professionals are those employees who receive some significant portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow practitioners located outside the agency” (p. 60). Here, Wilson stresses professional standards. A cause–effect relation is implicit; when recruitment is limited to people with professional standing, we may expect them to adhere to professional standards.
48. In 1968, Waldo observed, “The attitude of political scientists (toward Public Administration) ... is at best one of indifference and is often one of undisguised contempt or hostility” (p. 8). He also claimed that “it is now unrealistic and unproductive to regard public administration as a subdivision of political science” (p. 7).
49. The rotation and functionist merit system reforms which have enabled the American government—exceptionally, I believe—to fend off the dangers inherent in bureaucratic power and dissatisfaction have lulled most American academics into a misplaced confidence in the essential durability of presidentialism as a constitutional design. This perception has spread to other countries where some reformers see presidentialism as a more stable political system than parliamentarism. Prindle (1991) claims that a widespread preference in the third world for presidential regimes suggests that they are more viable than parliamentary systems (p. 62). This perception may reflect a failure to distinguish between frequent cabinet changes and regime collapse. Admittedly, a highly polarized multiparty parliamentary regime is very likely to experience many cabinet crises. Such crises, however, occur within a constitutional regime—they do not necessarily generate a regime breakdown.

An interesting test case is provided by Nigeria which began its life as a new state in 1960 with a British-style parliamentary government. Following the coups of 1966 and 1975, a presidentialist constitution was promulgated in 1978. In 1985 another coup occurred. The military regime under General Ibrahim Babangida which followed, promised to reconstitute representative government through a five-year process launched in 1987, leading to a revised version of the 1978 constitution. The Nigerian case is exceptional, however. For the most part, representative governments reconstituted after a phase of bureaucratic domination have recreated the basic structure of their precoup regimes. The empirical evidence<sup>5</sup> clearly shows that presidential regimes are much more likely to break down as a result of a coup than are the parliamentary regimes.

50. As reported by Ventriss (1991), a recent survey found that “only 13% of SES managers would recommend a governmental career to young people” (p. 275). The enthusiasm generated by direct recruitment of junior mandarins from the universities (as in the United Kingdom) cannot, apparently, be replicated when senior officials are wrenched out of their long-term functionary (or professional) roles and secure interest networks to become nouveau “mandarins” in a bureaucratic stratum lodged precariously between suspicious political appointees and envious former colleagues in the career civil services.

More practical considerations added to the demoralization of the SES. Bonafede (1987), for example, reports that more than half of the career members of the SES have “left the government and at least 1000 ‘simply retired’ because of disagreements over the pay cap, the limitations on bonuses, the inadequate relocation allowances and other points of conflict” (1987, p. 135—quoting Blair Childs, executive director of the Senior Executives Association). Former executives who retired from the SES are reported to have “increased their annual salaries by an average of \$17,800 in the private sector,” and about 46% of current SES members “are thinking of leaving because of inadequate salary” (Bonafede, 1987, p. 136).

One might add that in a parliamentary system financial incentives for top civil servants need not be tied to those of legislators; by contrast, in the United States, “the pay link bonding the salaries of executive level personnel with those of members of Congress is generally condemned and is widely regarded as the cause of the inability to set fair and equitable government salaries” (Bonafede, 1987, pp. 136–137). The point, of course, is that Congress incurs so much public wrath when it tries to raise the salaries of its own members that it compensates by supplementing its own income from outside sources (essentially “prebendary” in character) while penalizing the executive branch by setting pay limits that restrict official salaries to no more than their own. Ironically, the weakness and low morale of the SES may, perversely, enhance the viability of presidentialism in the United States—notably by not really undermining it.<sup>54</sup>

51. Had the British model been adopted without significant revisions, a youthful cadre of future mandarins, recruited from elite universities, would have rotated among government programs, acquiring a generalist (cross-cutting) orientation that could have taken them to the top of the executive branch as powerful superbureaucrats. One of their early goals would have been to reconcile turf battles between rival bureaus in the same department but, eventually, they would have intervened in interdepartmental struggles to help secretaries resolve their own intracabinet conflicts. It is important to remember that a presidentialist cabinet—unlike its parliamentary prototype—has no motive for solidarity. “In the day to day work of the Cabinet member, each man fends for himself without much consideration of Cabinet unity” (Fenno, 1959, p. 247). If mandarins (“superbureaucrats”—see Campbell and Szabowski, 1979) became top advisers or “undersecretaries,” they would seize the opportunity to counteract the dispersing pressures of the presidentialist format. For a lucid account of the way different American Presidents have attempted to work with and coordinate their cabinets members, see Campbell (1986, pp. 37–57).

Ultimately, I imagine, they would also be able to curtail the powers of Congress, perhaps through a constitutional amendment to set limits on the terms of office of all elected officials and require congressional committees to elect their leaders—such an attack on “senioritism” would be eagerly supported by liberal reform leagues (the common cause and public citizen lobbies) and even the Republican right. Thomas G. West, a resident scholar at the Heritage Foundation, reminds us, “In the 1968 election, 98 percent of House incumbents who ran for reelection won.... Until this pattern of automatic reelection changes, senators and congressmen have no incentive to change” (1988, p. 311). No doubt, the new superbureaucrats would find eager allies on both the right and the left to join in a major reform campaign to “democratize” the American government.

If such strategies were to succeed, the American President would be reduced to a purely symbolic head of state, national parties would wither as effective political organizations, while their volunteer and Political Action Committee (PAC) supporters would lose interest in them; the superbureaucrats would constitute a kind of “college of cardinals” to nominate future Presidents gifted with the prestige and pliability needed to serve as national figureheads. A pliable Congress would continue to legitimize the government’s decisions, but its frequently rotating members would find themselves dependent on mandarin officials for the information needed to ratify “sound” legislation.

No doubt, this futurist vision of the power potential of a mandarin state sounds far-fetched, yet it could inspire a British science-fiction novel: *The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870–2033* (Young, 1958). Actually, the concentrated and politically entrenched cabinet in a parliamentary system is far better equipped to manage and control such a mandarin state than is any dispersed and fragile presidentialist regime, including that of the United States. No doubt British cabinets are not as cohesive as we imagine. Colin Campbell tells us that “executive harmony does not come as readily to British governments as Americans expect” (1986, p. 27). Nevertheless, despite the impression given by “Yes, Minister,” the power potential of British executives surely exceeds that of American Presidents.

52. Discussing the consequences of the rise of issue networks, Hecló observes, “Instead of party politicians, today’s political executives tend to be policy politicians.... Their reputations among those ‘in the know’ make them available for presidential appointments. Their mushiness on the most sensitive issues makes them acceptable. Neither a craft professional nor a gifted amateur, the modern recruit for political leadership in the bureaucracy is a journeyman of issues” (Hecló, 1978, p. 106; 1981). Although the President can make many final choices, he/she is constrained to select amphibians who are acceptable to competing issue networks rather than reward politicians who supported the winner’s electoral campaign.

Moreover, the President is also constrained by the unwillingness of many highly qualified people to undergo the costs of accepting (and retaining) political appointments; for example, relatively low salaries, painful questioning in the Senate, and elaborate and time-consuming clearances. Commenting on “The Quiet Crisis” growing out of the inability of the U.S. government to attract qualified personnel, Bonafede (1987) writes of “the dilemma over fixing government salaries comparable to those in the private sector, and the resulting controversy created by the issue,” plus the “harm to the quality of government caused by the exodus of public officials” (p. 134). He discusses the grueling experience of nominees facing Senate confirmation hearings and hostile reporters, the red tape and delays associated with security and conflict of interest clearances, and such factors as “petty aggravations, low pay, high cost of living, inadequate expense allowances, long hours, and the surrender of much of their personal privacy” (p. 139).

Such perceptions clearly identify some of the significant costs of maintaining a viable presidentialist system of government, but without a comparative framework, it is difficult to understand its constitutional basis; we are left to deal with the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of these problems.

53. Anyone who counts on the judicial branch to facilitate the coordination of government programs will, I suspect, be disappointed. Although the effects of court proceedings on public administration have received a good deal of attention, I do not know of any discussion of their implications for the dispersal/coordination of bureaucratic activities. My guess is that judicial decisions actually intensify the dispersal of power in American bureaucracy, compelling agencies to employ more lawyers, to rely more on administrative law and procedure, to establish their own quasi-judicial processes, and to compel administrators to become ever more specialized in their knowledge not only of program policies and methods but also of the laws and precedents affecting their implementation.

This might, perhaps, engender even more specialization, boundary maintenance, and rigidity which, in turn, justify the intrusion of more political appointees to promote coordination, flexibility, and political sensitivity. The proliferation of judicial and congressional staff services and their associated technical requirements and procedural limitations also reinforces these processes. Although public administration may suffer as a result, the resilience of the constitutional system is enhanced. However, admittedly, these are speculations and I cannot defend them with any self-assurance.

54. Durant’s stimulating discussion of “appointee–careerist relations” provides ample evidence of the conflicts and accommodations generated by the fundamental cleavage within the American polity between bureaucratic transients and careerists. What his analysis leaves out, however, is any explanation of why this cleavage is necessary for the survival of democratic presidentialism, even though it produces fundamental problems, both political and administrative, of great magnitude (Durant, 1990). Similarly, Paul Light tells us, “Presidents and their appointees must move quickly to succeed. In responding to

that pressure, careerists must be sensitive to the dynamic nature of the policy process” (Light, 1987, p. 173). Light’s analysis, based on the data collected in the 1985 Presidential Appointee Project of the National Academy of Public Administration, is rooted solely in the American experience and offers no comparisons to suggest the truly exceptional character of this situation.

Actually, of course, the appointee-careerist dichotomy oversimplifies the American reality where, for example, there exist many independent regulatory agencies which, collectively, are often viewed as a “headless fourth branch” of government. It is impossible to discuss this phenomenon here. Its critics allege that by delegating legislative or executive or judicial powers to these autonomous agencies, the effective powers of both the President and Congress have been seriously eroded—a strong attack on them is offered by Nolan Clark, currently an official of the Federal Trade Commission, who writes that “almost without exception, independent regulatory agencies have failed to promote the public interest” (Clark, 1988, p. 271). I can only speculate about the extent to which comparably autonomous bodies have been created in other presidentialist polities, but I suspect that, despite their many flaws, they facilitate the survival of American presidentialism by reducing the burdens placed on both the President and the Congress and reducing the stakes in the winner-takes-all electoral sweepstakes identified by Juan Linz.

Both the bureauphiles and the bureauphobes seem to think that we are free to choose a very different design; they would increase the ratio and enhance the power of career officers (and independent commissions) or subject them to more stringent control by transient appointees. The “realpolitik” model—or Hecló’s “conditional cooperation” (Hecló, 1977, p. 193)—accepts the status quo, however, and offers a formula for trying to make unavoidable confrontations manageable in a system that cannot survive without both careerists and transients. However, I suspect that the realpolitik formula might be strengthened if it explicitly recognized that maintenance of the American constitutional system actually depends on the cleavage, thereby rebutting the more extreme views of both the bureauphobes and bureauphiles.

55. The noncomparativist way of viewing American Public Administration still hampers our ability to understand public administration anywhere, and especially in the United States. Had students of American government paid attention to the tragic experiences of all the countries that emulated the American presidentialist design, they would have seen that constitutive systems in presidentialist regimes are typically unable to control their bureaucracies and coups have taken place in almost all of them.

They might also have seen that although the exceptional survival of the U.S. regime can be explained, in part, by the relative workability of its constitutive system (attributable in large measure to the persistence of some undemocratic practices), a fuller explanation must also take into account the relative (political) weakness of its bureaucracy. This weakness is due to such factors as federalism, privatization, and transience of political appointments combined with a professionalized career bureaucracy. The capacity of this mixed bureaucracy to administer well in specialized program areas also reduces the incentive for military coups.

Comparative analysis might also have led to the conclusion that parliamentary regimes are typically able to control more powerful and administratively effective bureaucracies and that generalist administrators (mandarins) can well coordinate complex interagency programs (health care or drug enforcement, for example) that cannot be managed by the American professionalized bureaucracy. The cultivation of a top cadre of mandarin administrators in the United States, however, would seriously undermine its presidentialist regime. Reliance on transient political appointees is an unavoidable necessity for regime survival in the United States, despite their inability to help the President achieve effective coordination in a highly dispersed (and professionalized) bureaucratic system.

Viewing American bureaucrats as essentially nonpolitical actors has also blinded Americans working in the third world to the vast incongruity between powerful bureaucracies and weak constitutive systems in many of these countries. They could not see, therefore, how projects designed to enhance the administrative capacity of these bureaucracies would further strengthen them politically, contributing thereby to the likelihood of coups and bureaucratic domination, with accompanying deterioration of administrative capabilities.

56. The political realities that enabled Public Administration to emerge as an important field of study in the United States have remained invisible to analysts who assumed that they could ignore politics as a factor relevant to their analysis. They remained unaware of the exceptional political weakness of American career officials which enabled them to cultivate Public Administration as a nonpolitical subject. Paradoxically, bureaucratic rulers who display, in an extreme form, the unity of politics and administration are quite tolerant of university programs in Public Administration, whereas they look askance at departments of political science. Precisely because the former, under American inspiration, are viewed as nonpolitical, they are seen as nonthreatening, whereas the latter are feared as potential troublemakers for the ruling group.
57. The French Fifth Republic has been cited as an exception, but, I believe, it is at most semipresidential. As the Chirac interlude (1986–1988) indicated, the need for parliamentary support compelled a Socialist President to nominate a Gaullist prime minister. Moreover, the basic structure of the French bureaucracy and the government's capacity to control it resemble the situation found in parliamentary regimes much more than what we see in any presidentialist system. Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not the 1956 experience will be replicated. An alternative scenario, of course, might be the creation of a Sixth Republic, but we can only speculate on what its properties might be.

## References

- Aberbach, J. D., Putnam, R. D., and Rockman, B. A., *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.
- Aberbach, J. D. and Rockman, B. A., Mandates or mandarins? Control and discretion in the modern administrative state, *Public Administration Review*, 48(2):606–612 (1988).
- Bonafede, D., Presidential appointees: The human dimension, in *The In-and-Outers, Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington* (G. C. MacKenzie, ed.), Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1987, pp. 120–140.
- Brown, B. and Stillman, R. J., II, *A Search for Public Administration: The Ideas and Career of Dwight Waldo*, Texas A & M University Press, College Station, TX, 1986.
- Campbell, C., *Managing the Presidency*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 1986.
- Campbell, C. and Szablowski, G. J., *The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behavior in Central Agencies*, Macmillan, Toronto, 1979.
- Carino, L., *Bureaucracy for a Democracy: The Struggle of the Philippines Political Leadership and the Civil Service in the Post-Marcos Period*, Occasional Paper No. 88-1. University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration, Manila, 1988.
- Carino, L., A dominated bureaucracy: An analysis of the formulation of, and reactions to, state policies on the Philippine civil service, Unpublished paper (1989).
- Clark, N. E., The headless fourth branch, in *The Imperial Congress* (S. Jones and J. A. Marini, eds.), Pharos Books, New York, 1988, pp. 268–292.
- Crenson, M. A., *The Federal Machine: Beginnings of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian America*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1975.
- Cronin, T. E., The president's executive power, in *Inventing the American Presidency* (T. E. Cronin, ed.), University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1989, pp. 180–208.
- Dionne, E. J. Jr., *Why Americans Hate Politics*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991.
- Dogan, M., The political power of the western mandarins, in *The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants* (M. Dogan, ed.), John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1975, pp. 3–24.
- Dogan, M. and Kazancigil, A., eds., *Comparing Nations: The Pendulum Between Theory and Substance*, Basil Blackwell, London, 1993.
- Durant, R. F., Beyond fear or favor: Appointee–careerist relations in the post-reagan era, *Public Administration Review*, 50(3):319–331 (1990).

- Edmond, J. B., *The Magnificent Charter: The Origin and Role of the Morrill Land-Grant Colleges and Universities*, Exposition Press, Hicksville, NY, 1978.
- Farazmand, A., ed., *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*, Marcel Dekker, New York, 1991.
- Fenno, R. F., *The President's Cabinet*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1959.
- Fisher, L., Congress and the president in the administrative process: The uneasy alliance, in *The Illusion of Presidential Government* (H. Hecl and L. M. Salamon, eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1981, pp. 21–43.
- Goodnow, F. J., *Politics and Administration: A Study in Government*, Russell and Russell, New York, 1900.
- Hamilton, A., Madison, J., and Jay, J., *The Federalist Papers*, No. 72 (C. Rossiter, ed.), New American Library, New York, 1961, p. 136.
- Hartlyn, J., Presidentialism and Colombian politics, Paper for Georgetown University Symposium on Presidentialism, Hecl, Hugh, 1989.
- Heady, F., American constitutional and administrative systems in comparative perspective, *Public Administration Review*, 47(1):9–16 (1987).
- Heady, F., *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, 4th ed., Marcel Dekker, New York, 1991.
- Hecl, H., *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1977.
- Hecl, H., Issue networks and the executive establishment, in *The New American Political System* (A. King, ed.), American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 87–124.
- Hecl, H. and Salamon, L. M., eds., *The Illusion of Presidential Government*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1981.
- Hofstadter, R., *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made it*, Vintage Books, New York, 1954.
- Hoogenboom, A., *Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865–1883*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 1961.
- Jones, G. S. and Marini, J. A., eds., *The Imperial Congress: Crisis in the Separation of Powers*, Pharos Books, New York, 1988.
- Kaufman, H., *The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1981.
- Krislov, S. and Rosenbloom, D. H., *Representative Bureaucracy and the American Political System*, Praeger, New York, 1981.
- Light, P. C., When worlds collide: The political-career nexus, in *The In-and-Outers* (G. S. Mackenzie, ed.), Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1987, pp. 156–173.
- Linz, J., The Perils of Presidentialism, *Journal of Democracy*, 1(1):51–69 (1990).
- Lynch, E. J., No, we do not have to omit any political appointees, *Government Executive*, 23(4):54–55 (1991).
- Mackenzie, G. C., The paradox of presidential personnel management, in *The Illusion of Presidential Government* (H. Hecl and L. M. Salamon, eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1981, pp. 113–146.
- Mackenzie, G. C., *The In-and-Outers: Presidential Appointees and Transient Government in Washington*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1987.
- Mainwaring, S., Brazilian party underdevelopment in comparative perspective, Revised version of paper presented at the International Political Science Association Congress, 1988.
- Mainwaring, S., Presidentialism in Latin America: A review essay, *Latin American Research Review*, 25(1):157–179 (1989).
- Maslow, A., *Towards a Psychology of Being*, Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ, 1962.
- McCurdy, H. E., *Public Administration: A Synthesis*, Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park, CA, 1977.
- Mellor, H. A., Congressional micromanagement: National defense, in *The Imperial Congress* (G. S. Jones and J. A. Marini, eds.), Pharos Books, New York, 1988, pp. 107–129.
- Moe, T. M., The politicized presidency, in *The Managerial Presidency* (J. P. Pfiffner, ed.), pp. 135–157. Reprinted from John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds. *The New Direction in American Politics*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1985.

- Moore, W. E., *The Professions: Roles and Rules*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1970.
- Nachmias, D. and Rosenbloom, D. H., *Bureaucratic Culture: Citizens and Administrators in Israel*, Croom Helm, London, 1978.
- Nevins, A. and Commager, H. S., *The Pocket History of the United States*, Pocket Books, New York, 1956.
- Newland, C., Public executives: Imperium, sacerdotium, collegium? *Public Administration Review*, 47(1):45–56 (1987).
- Ostrom, V., *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*, University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, AL, 1989.
- Pfiffner, J. P., Political appointees and career executives, *Public Administration Review*, 47(1):57–67 (1987).
- Pfiffner, J. P., *The Managerial Presidency*, Brooks/Cole, Pacific Grove, CA, 1991.
- Prindle, D. F., Head of state and head of government—in comparative perspective, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 21(1):55–72 (1991).
- Riggs, F. W., *Pressures on Congress*, King's Crown Press, New York, 1950.
- Riggs, F. W., *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity*, East-West Center Press, Honolulu, HI, 1966.
- Riggs, F. W., The structures of government and administrative reform, in *Political and Administrative Development* (R. Braibanti, ed.), Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1969, pp. 220–324.
- Riggs, F. W., Legislative structures: Some thoughts on elected national assemblies, in *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective* (A. Kornberg, ed.), McKay, New York, 1973, pp. 30–93.
- Riggs, F. W., Shifting meanings of the term, *Bureaucracy*, *International Social Science Journal*, 314:563–584 (1979).
- Riggs, F. W., Cabinet ministers and coup groups: The case of Thailand, *International Political Science Review*, 2(2):159–188 (1981).
- Riggs, F. W., Bureaucratic politics in the U.S.: Benchmarks for comparison, *Governance*, 1(4):343–379 (1988a).
- Riggs, F. W., The survival of presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional practices, *International Political Science Review*, 9(4):247–278 (1988b).
- Riggs, F. W., Bureaucratic links between administration and politics, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*, Marcel Dekker, New York, 1991a, pp. 485–509.
- Riggs, F. W., Public administration: A comparative framework, *Public Administration Review*, 51(6):473–477 (1991b).
- Riggs, F. W., Coups and crashes: Lessons for public administration, Paper Presented at APSA Conference in Chicago, September 1992.
- Riggs, F. W., The fragility of the third world's regimes, *International Social Science Journal*, 136:199–243 (1993a).
- Riggs, F. W., Presidentialism: An empirical theory, in *Comparing Nations: The Pendulum between Theory and Practice* (M. Dogan and A. Kazancigil, eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993b.
- Riggs, F. W., Bureaucracy and the constitution, *Public Administration Review*, 54(1):65–72 (1994).
- Rohr, J. A., *To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1986.
- Rosenbloom, D. H., Public administrative theory and the separation of powers, *Public Administration Review*, 43(3):219–227 (1983).
- Rourke, F. E., American bureaucracy in a changing political setting, *Journal of Public Administration: Research and Theory*, 1(2):111–129 (1991).
- Rourke, F. E., Politics and professionalism in American bureaucracy, Paper Presented at the American Political Science Association Conference in Chicago, 1992.
- Ruffing-Hilliard, K., Merit reform in Latin America, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration* (A. Farazmand, ed.), Marcel Dekker, New York, 1991, pp. 301–312.
- Seidman, H., *Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980.
- Sharkanski, I., *Wither the State?* Chatham House, Chatham, NJ, 1979.



- Shepard, H. A., Changing interpersonal and intergroup relationships in organizations, in *Handbook of Organizations* (J. March, ed.), Rand McNally, Chicago, IL, 1965, pp. 1115–1143.
- Spear, T. G. P., *The Nabobs: A Study of the Social Life of the English in Eighteenth Century India*, rev. ed., Oxford University Press, London, 1963.
- Stillman, R. J. II, *Preface to Public Administration: A Search for Themes and Direction*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991.
- Teng, S.-Y., Chinese influence on the western examination system, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 7:267–312 (1943).
- Valenzuela, A., Parties, politics and the state in Chile: The higher civil service, in *Bureaucrats and Policy Making* (E. N. Suleiman, ed.), Holmes & Meier, New York, 1984.
- Van Riper, P. A., *History of the United States Civil Service*, Row, Peterson, Evanston, IL, 1958.
- Ventriss, C., The challenge of public service, *Public Administration Review*, 51(3):275–279 (1991).
- Waldo, D., Scope of the theory of public administration, in *Annals* (J. C. Charlesworth, ed.), Monograph #8, ASPSS, Philadelphia, PA, 1968.
- Waldo, D., *The Enterprise of Public Administration*, Chandler & Sharp, Novato, CA, 1980.
- Wamsley, G., et al., Public administration and the governance process: Shifting the political dialogue, in *Refounding Public Administration* (G. L. Wamsley et al., eds.), Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1990, pp. 31–51.
- West, T. G., Restoring the separation of powers, in *The Imperial Congress* (S. Jones and J. A. Marini, eds.), Pharos Books, New York, 1988, pp. 309–329.
- White, L. D., *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, rev. ed., Macmillan, New York, 1939.
- White, L. D., *The Jeffersonians*, Macmillan, New York, 1951.
- White, L. D., *The Jacksonians*, Macmillan, New York, 1954.
- White, L. D., *The Republican Era*, Macmillan, New York, 1958.
- Willbern, Y., Professionalization in the public service: Too little or too much, *Public Administration Review*, 14(1):13–21 (1954).
- Willoughby, W. E., *Principles of Public Administration*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1927.
- Wilson, J. Q., *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, Basic Books, New York, 1989.
- Young, M. D., *The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870–2033*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England, 1958.

## Chapter 10

---

# Bureaucracy and Modernization

---

Harry M. Johnson\*

### CONTENTS

Notes .....	218
References .....	218

Although Max Weber regarded bureaucracy as more effective for certain tasks than earlier forms of organization and provided a classical “ideal type” description of it (1968, vol. III, pp. 956–1005), he is one of the originators of negative stereotypes about “bureaucracy” and the modern world in general. His extremely negative and pessimistic view (1930, pp. 180–183) has been taken as gospel by many other critics. Bureaucracy in the modern world is said to have become dull and inappropriately routinized. Closely related is the thesis that modern bureaucracy has stifled, if not actually killed, individuality and creativity. The distortion that modern organizations have created human robots and crushed out individualism was taken up in a recent “Point of View” essay in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. In “The Persistence of Individualism” Michael McGerr (1993), a professor of history at Indiana University, is skeptical. He ends his one-page op-ed piece as follows: “Our nation may well be exceptional not for the power of organization, but for the persisting sense of human agency. We need to explain why.”

No author that I know of provides a better answer to Mr. McGerr’s questions than Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), known mainly as a sociologist. This chapter is little more than a secondary work on Parsons. All I can claim for myself is that my interpretations of his theory have not been

---

\* The author is deceased; the material is updated by the editor.

obvious to most of his critics, and that I have interwoven ideas from many works by Parsons to bring out how modern formal organizations are interdependent with other important phenomena in modern societies. None of Parsons's papers on bureaucracy does this.

"Modern" societies have qualitative characteristics different from those of "traditionalist" societies. All societies in all evolutionary stages have tradition and traditional aspects, structural and processual. But modern societies, when compared with traditionalist ones, are not to the same extent "stuck" in tradition.

Parsons saw grounds for cautious hope in the "struggle" now objectively going on between an increasingly complex and difficult world and our far greater functional capacity at present, when compared with the past, to cope with complex problems, in both cognitive and moral respects. Of course, no theory of progress can make overall judgments of inferiority/superiority, and many individuals understandably prefer to live in a relatively "backward" social environment. A scientific theory of sociocultural evolutionary progress must have relevant criteria that in principle can be objectively applied in the relevant scientific community. As far as Parsons's theory is concerned, I do not think that enough potentially qualified people have yet made a serious attempt to understand it. My impression is that many social scientists have rejected it on the basis of secondhand errors.

Two errors about Parsons should be forestalled, if possible, from the outset. First, his "functional" theory does not imply "perfect" internal ordering, integration, or solidarity in social systems. Parsons *was* interested in the question of what we might mean by a perfectly integrated action system, but (following in particular Freud and Durkheim as models here) he regarded an integrated action system as a theoretical limiting case, heuristically useful for functional analysis of the more or less malintegrated cases we meet with in actuality—that is, cases involving various sources, kinds, and rates of deviant behavior, orientational confusion (anomie), alienation, and more or less debilitating conflict (as well as the quite-to-be-expected incomplete consensus to be found in all societies).

The second error or set of errors would be to assume that Parsons's refusal to be totally pessimistic about the prospects for "modernity" in the late twentieth century and beyond means that he was insensitive to the terrible costs and dangers involved in modernization. Parsons was acutely aware of tragedy in human life, and regarded as virtually inevitable for some time to come a great deal of agonizing state of suffering. He regarded the distant future of the human species, however, as uncertain and impossible to predict. He was also aware of strong ideological tendencies to romanticize the past. The masses of people until quite recently, even in relatively advanced societies, have been slaves, serfs, or peasants, illiterate, living short lives in hovels without conveniences such as fresh running water, electricity, and public sanitation.

Parsons describes and analyzes more explicitly than most people do what we vaguely mean when we speak of relatively "advanced" societies when compared with "underdeveloped" or "developing" ones. The latter have varying approximations to modernity in some respects, while the relatively advanced societies on the whole exhibit closer approximations.

Some of the developing societies have so far done little more than acquiring some of the more superficial trappings of modernity such as highly destructive weapons, while still clinging to such outmoded features of the traditionalist past as largely ascriptive social structures, as in Somalia; the attempt to make relatively specific religiously based law prescriptive for the society as a whole, though the society may have several religious groups and varying degrees of "secularized" belief/unbelief/disbelief within it; and governments that refuse to permit more than one political "party" while pretending to command virtually total political support.

“Modern” social structure is indeed relatively recent in important respects, is difficult to establish, and is in no society fully established and universally supported. Further, it is possible for any society to regress under various circumstances. (Whenever possible I shall refer to four of Parsons’s collections: 1967, 1969, 1977, 1978. The separate chapters were originally published at different dates. It is better to use the collections, however, because Parsons gives valuable additional introductions to each collection and to parts. For the best overall view of Parsons’s work, see 1977 and 1978. Parsons stretches the mind with his kind of analytical theory. A reader previously unacquainted with it may have to read this brief article more than once.)

According to Parsons, there is no known society that does not have at least one religion, one language, one kinship system, and a rather impressive amount of technology. These and possibly a few other “true universals” are starting points for evolutionary development.

An important conception is what Parsons calls “evolutionary universals” (1967, Chapter 15). These are cultural and social innovations so important for further development and for the functional “potential” of societies that they have been “hit upon” and institutionalized several times and in quite different, largely independent traditions: but they are not strictly universal even now. There are six evolutionary universals, in temporal order in three pairs, as follows: social stratification of kinship lineages (a “breakthrough” at first but profoundly transformed later) and cultural legitimation of political authority (inherently hierarchical), bureaucratic organization and the development of money and markets, and generalized norms (law) and democratic associations.<sup>1</sup>

One of the two criteria for sociocultural evolutionary advance is, in Parsons’s term, “enhanced adaptive capacity,” which we can read as “enhanced *functional* capacity”—that is, the *potential* ability to handle or cope with any one or any combination of the types of functional problem with which all societies must cope. Evolutionary change is judged in part with reference to a complete list of four abstractly stated invariant types of problem, which make meaningful comparison possible—comparison between societies of the past and societies of the present and between societies of the same time period.

The second criterion of evolutionary advance is actually implied in the first: the change must be institutionalized to some extent in some actual society. This criterion is implied in the first because we must be able to compare societies with the change with those without it. To put it another way, progress is not merely a matter of speculative arguments: there must be evidence that steps of change can actually work and work better than alternatives in the same field. Thus the ultimate test, for example, between state-owned and state-controlled “economic” enterprises and “privately” owned enterprises is comparison of actual performance. Such a comparison is inherently complex, however, and takes time. Hence the “case” for the view that such a structural arrangement is on the whole better than another can be strengthened by plausible arguments explaining why the structural arrangement might work better. Parsons presents empirical evidence mixed with analysis.

(For brief discussions by Parsons on scientifically fundamental analogies between biological systems and action systems, on the one hand, and between the biological sciences and the sciences of action, on the other, see Parsons 1977, Chapters 4, 5, and 11. For deeper discussion of action evolution and many references to empirical studies, see Parsons, 1966, 1971, 1977, Chapter 11; Lidz and Parsons, 1972.)

Parsons divides evolutionary history (of action systems) into three broad stages, the rationale for which is not discussed here. The third or modern stage, in a loose sense, began when universalistic law began to emerge in several parts of the world, to a great extent independently.

But modernity began “in earnest,” so to speak, when a society (or a large part of it) institutionalized a disciplined, activist “this-worldly” orientation under the legitimation of “supernatural” religion. In other words, Parsons took over, developed, and subtly modified Max Weber’s Protestant-ethic thesis, without Weber’s ambivalence toward modernity if not total pessimism about it. “This-worldly activism” refers to the Calvinists’ commitment to contribute toward “building the Kingdom of God *on earth*.” The expression goes back to the “Lord’s Prayer” in the New Testament. Jesus is said to have instructed his disciples to pray to God, the Father, as follows (in part): “Thy Kingdom come [we pray that it may come], thy will be done [we should do God’s will], on earth as it is in Heaven.” This prayer implies, of course, that human societies are imperfect and need to be improved. The Roman Catholic emphasis, however, had been on the salvation of individual souls, their entering into Heaven after their life and death in this world. An important part of the plan of salvation was administration of sacraments to the laity of ordained priests (a mode of attaining salvation that Weber refers to as a form of “magic”—certainly an extension of that term as it is used in anthropology). The word “ascetic” in “ascetic Protestantism” means self-disciplined, strict, as opposed to characterized by repeated cycles of self-indulgent “sinning” followed by repentance. Characteristically, however, Parsons emphasizes that through the centuries the Roman Catholic Church in effect had prepared for the individual responsibility emphasized in the Reformation, by strongly emphasizing morality as well as trust in the sacraments. Furthermore, the early Christian Church had of course taken over the emphasis on morality from Judaism and Zorostricism of ancient Persia.

We often forget massive facts. Parsons points out that the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was a true bureaucracy in a time when the general social structure had become so strongly based on ascription that there was a decline from social models provided by the Roman Empire. The Church was able to have a bureaucratic structure of offices because of the celibacy of the clergy. Members of the clergy could not have legal heirs to inherit their offices. Moreover, Parsons also points out that the Church preserved the system of Roman law and that there is a direct filiation between the legal system of the Church and the civil codes of many European countries.

It should be emphasized that with or without the so-called magical sacraments, there is, *today*, little or no difference between Protestants and Catholics with regard to this-worldly activism (see Tiryakian, 1975). Several Popes have engaged in it. Moreover, as Parsons points out, in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, Jews were emancipated from the ghettos of Northern Europe and at the same time emancipated from the rather extreme traditionalistic Orthodoxy that informed those ghettos. From then on, as everyone knows, Jews have made outstanding contributions in the “modern” sense. Ironically, their emphasis on literacy and learning for all men and women, which had been devoted to understanding and debating the subtleties of the complex traditionalistic law, was now turned to advantage in all the “modern” pursuits, as modern universalism slowly and gradually put anti-Semitism in question and opened up new opportunities for emancipated Jews. Anti-Semitism still exists, but in greatly reduced forms, and the drastic and terrible period of the Nazi movement was a reaction against modernity, not an aspect of it, except of course in the sense that failure to adjust smoothly to modernization could not occur, logically, without the prior occurrence of modernization (see Parsons, 1969, Chapters 3 through 6; Gerhardt, 1993).

A somewhat extended quotation from Parsons (omitting four footnotes) will serve to illustrate the systematic incisiveness and “realism” of his functional and evolutionary analysis (1967, Chapter 15, pp. 517–518, dealing with the sixth evolutionary “universal”):

Especially, though not exclusively, in national territorial states, the stable democratic association is notoriously difficult to institutionalize. Above all this seems to be a function of the difficulty in motivating holders of immediately effective power to relinquish their opportunities voluntarily despite the seriousness of the interest at stake—relinquishment of control of governmental machinery after electoral defeat being the most striking problem. The system is also open to other serious difficulties, most notably corruption and “populist” irresponsibility, as well as *de facto* dictatorship. Furthermore, such difficulties are by no means absent in private associations, as witness the rarity of effective electoral systems in large trade unions.

The basic argument for considering democratic association as being universal, despite such problems, is that, the larger and more complex a society becomes, the more important will be the effective political organization, not only in its administrative capacity, but also, and not least, in its support of a universalistic legal order. Political effectiveness includes both the scale and operative flexibility of the organization of power. Power, however, precisely as a generalized societal medium, depends overwhelmingly on a consensual element, that is, the ordered institutionalization and exercise of influence, linking the power system to the higher-order societal consensus at the value level.

The vote, says Parsons, is a unit of power (since it must be counted, and, along with the other votes in the aggregate, is binding), and equality of the franchise is functionally important for linking up the power and effectiveness of formal organizations, including of course bureaucracies with societal solidarity, through equal access to occupational employment on the basis of universalistic standards.

The Calvinist movement was especially significant because it crystallized and integrated all the six “universals” “in earnest,” as I have put it. The six evolutionary “universals” mentioned earlier are stratification, cultural legitimation of authority, bureaucracy, money and markets, universalistic law, and democratic associations. The Calvinist movement enhanced all these six evolutionary universals.

The Calvinist unplanned “breakthrough” to a secular this-worldly activism was not an evolutionary universal but a “unique” advance, because other promising starts of this kind had not been adequately institutionalized. For instance, Islam made a promising beginning and did contribute to modernity with such cultural achievements as the Persian Khayyam’s—the inventor of modern Algebra—numerals (erroneously known as Arabic numerals), including the zero, and contributed to the Renaissance in the West by hiring Jewish Persian scholars and Christian scholars to translate and thus recover many of the literary treasures of Greece. (For a brilliant essay, Weberian–Parsonsian in inspiration, tentatively accounting for the Islamic lapse into traditionalism, see Bellah, 1970, Chapter 8; see also occasional remarks in Parsons, 1937, the section on Weber, Parsons, 1978, Chapter 9.)

On the functional superiority of bureaucratic organization, Parsons, as usual, is very much to the point:

The basis on which I classify bureaucracy as an evolutionary universal is very simple. As Weber said, it is the most effective large-scale administrative organization that man has invented, and there is no direct substitute for it. Where capacity to carry out large-scale organized operations is important, e.g., military operations with mass forces, water control, tax administration, policing of large and heterogeneous populations,

and productive enterprise requiring large capital investment and much manpower, the unit that commands effective bureaucratic organization is inherently superior to the one that does not. It is by no means the only structural factor in the adaptive capacity of social systems, but no one can deny that it is an important one. Above all, it is built on further specifications ensuing from the broad emancipation from ascription that stratification and specialized legitimation make possible (1967, Chapter 15, p. 507).

Stratification of kinship lines permitted innovations by the lines with most prestige, but of course restricted access to higher positions for all those, the great majority, who were not in the “right” line. Today, of course, even large-scale business firms that were formerly ruled at the top by heirs of successive generations are usually run by people with no known kinship descent from the founders.

Officials in some earlier bureaucracies were often slaves, except in Persia, which had the model bureaucracy and had abolished slavery since the time of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian Empire, on October 29, 327 BC. As Parsons points out, however, this practice was not an example of open access to high positions; as members of the emperor’s household, high officials who were also his slaves represented him and shared in the prestige of his household. They were not exactly ascribed to their positions, but neither were they appointed from the population at large. A related fundamental point is that service in a modern formal organization is voluntary. In the United States, this is true even of military service, though at “need,” the government could of course resume conscription.

Among the most important differences between traditionalistic formal organizations and modern ones are the vastly greater importance and variety of professional roles in the modern organizations. “Professions” should not be taken as just any occupation. Professional roles require a great deal of formal specialized training and commitment to relatively high moral standards in carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities.

The increased professionalization of roles in modern formal organizations goes along with a decrease in the use of magic. It is rare indeed to hear about executives who consult astrologers even in their personal lives, but in their official activities, they are certainly expected to base their decisions, as far as possible, on scientific and derived technological knowledge, on controlled statistical surveys, and on other more or less rational procedures.

Another big change is the greatly reduced importance of the “labor” role, in the sense of occupational positions requiring relatively little specialized training. This reduced importance of the labor role is not simply the other side of professionalization. It is also owing to the automation and, in relatively advanced modern societies, to the shifting of low-paying jobs to “developing” countries. Everyone by now is familiar with the growing demand in the United States not only for improved education, but for greater equalization of access to it. (The best single paper on the diversity of modern formal organizations and its rationale is Parsons, 1968a, “Le Breton.”)

With regard to the ideological distortions of “bureaucracy” as excessively routinized and as crushing individuality and creativity, we should note, in passing, that both automation and professionalization have exactly the opposite tendencies. Even in modern armies (the proverbial site of stereotypical bureaucracy), practically every participant must be able to cope with a great deal of discretion, in the sense of independent judgment in carrying out his or her duties.

Traditionalist bureaucracies, with ascribed heads, have been an obstacle to the development of money and relatively open and impersonal markets, because hereditary heads are afraid to relinquish tight control over productive enterprises. Here again, it may be suggested that the Protestant ethic helped to break down this barrier by emphasizing the need to improve the system and the

belief in the essential equality and dignity of all individuals. Parsons was convinced that the way to the Industrial Revolution was prepared by the Reformation. (For an extremely subtle but quite cogent functional analysis of the importance of money and markets, see Parsons, 1967, Chapter 15, pp. 507–510. This essay is perhaps the most important single work referred to in this chapter because of its compact functional defense of the social institutions of a “modern” society. Reading of it, however, is greatly facilitated if one has some previous knowledge of the four-function schema and the generalized symbolic media such as the one that I attempt to provide.)

On the importance of generalized universalistic law and the seventeenth-century “break-through,” Parsons says, in part:

Although it is very difficult to pin down just what the crucial components are, how they are interrelated, and how they develop, one can identify the development of the general legal system as a crucial aspect of societal evolution. A general legal system is an integrated system of universalistic norms, applicable to the society as a whole rather than to a few functional or segmental sectors, highly generalized in terms of principles and standards, and relatively independent of both the religious agencies that legitimize the normative order of the society and vested interest groups in the operative sector, particularly in government... Although many of the elements of such a general normative order appeared in quite highly developed form in earlier societies, in my view their crystallization into a coherent system represents a new step, which more than the industrial revolution itself, ushered in the *modern* era of social evolution. (1967, Chapter 15, pp. 510–511, emphasis in original)

Modern formal organizations of all types are controlled by two or three, or even more levels of formal law. One level, of course, consists of the internal rules of the organization as a collective “unit” in its “home” society and in any foreign society in which it may have branches. Although these organizational units include many we call “private” organizations, actually they are all “public” in the functionally important sense that their internal legal systems must be consistent with the law of the “state” (in the United States, with both the federal law and “state” law). Further, in the United States or Canada or any other modern society with two or more levels of public law, these levels “control” (regulate) the internal-organizational level. The enforcement agencies at the public levels will, at need, enforce the internal rules of any organization, provided that these internal rules are indeed consistent with the public law. This means, in effect, that the internal rules become “public” as well.

But the so-called private formal organization is indeed private in the important sense that its internal policy and operating decisions with regard to its subcollectivity goals are made by its own executives and staff. The specific content of these decisions is not determined by public officials.

All these levels, from constitutional law all the way down to the level of “internal” rules, in modern societies increasingly closely approximate the ideal of attainable universalism (equal treatment under the law); however, the rich still have an advantage in that they can afford to pay highly skilled, specialized lawyers, rather than rely on the run of the mill.

In the earlier period, Calvinism was notoriously oppressive, but Parsons emphasizes that liberalization took place within the Calvinist tradition itself—that is, it did not await development elsewhere which could then be taken over. Two of the most fundamental aspects of modernity, namely, the institutionalization of a more this-worldly and more highly generalized and diversified legal system, and the institutionalization of scientific research, occurred or began even before the



gradual liberalization of Calvinism. (The well-known persecution of Galileo indicates, of course, that scientific research was not institutionalized in his days. On the developments in science and technology in seventeenth-century England, see Merton, 1970; and on the Puritan influence on law, see Little, 1969.)

In any case, what is sometimes called the rule of law, the most important foundation of a “modern” society, can hardly be “complete” or fully realized as a principle and a basic factor in practice, without the “separations” of law from direct religious morality, of executive authority from religious ascription, and of the law itself from executive powers. These three “separations” are examples of what Parsons called differentiation, one of the four fundamental aspects or overlapping phases of evolutionary process. The four evolutionary processes are called, in Parsons’s technical terms, value generalization, integration or inclusion, differentiation, and adaptive upgrading. This series of somewhat overlapping processes is an example of Parsons’s famous four-function schema, and the order of terms in the series is significant as a hierarchy of control and conditioning.

Among the changes Parsons made in Weber’s account of the Reformation was to emphasize the “deposit” or “residue,” so to speak, that stern, dogmatic Calvinism left behind it in the later religious stage of what Parsons calls “unbelief.” He also distinguishes between *unbelief* and *disbelief*.

Disbelief is what a modern person might feel about an ancient Aztec religion, with its ritual sacrifices of human beings, although of course, many modern scholars have been interested in analyzing Aztec beliefs and practices for their internal coherence and their functions and dysfunctions for Aztec society. *Unbelief is far from affective indifference*. Many people who go to church or synagogue or whatever, today, do not believe “literally” in the Incarnation and the Resurrection (to take Christian examples), but that does not mean that such religious symbolism and its implications no longer have any resonance. Parsons is not the only commentator to point out the important difference, sometimes, between “belief that” and “belief in.” You may not believe that God in a burning bush appeared to Moses, but you may still believe in some of the Ten Commandments. The deposit these churchgoers still have faith in is one of the “sacred” values—in the Christian case of interest here—the value of individual activism in making a “better” society, the sacredness of the individual, the inalienable responsibility of the individual for his or her own moral decisions, the doctrine that “love thy neighbor” summarizes the Jewish Law and the Prophets (where “neighbors” now include, in principle, all human beings everywhere). Thus, “Christians” today may or may not believe in an afterlife in Heaven, but even if they do, they are very much interested in life in this world before death, and take it for granted that social structure (whatever they may call it) can and certainly should be improved. They may also be interested in money, preferably a large amount, but that does not necessarily mean that they are interested in money alone.

Durkheim (1954), of course, brilliantly analyzed the positive functional significance of religious beliefs and rituals for the periodic renewal of societal solidarity. In a memorable passage, he asks rhetorically whether the holidays and rituals of the French revolutionaries differed in any essential respect from the ritual dances and impersonations of his Australian aborigines. Of course, there are evolutionary differences, but Durkheim was making an important point and was anticipating the concept of civil religion. The by now “classical” reference, however, for the civil religion of the United States at least, is Robert Bellah’s brilliant analysis (1970, Chapter 9). The importance of this, it seems to me, is that it is possible for a modern society to have “the best of both worlds.” In other words, a modern society can have both religious heterogeneity and freedom, on the one hand, and the unifying, “effervescent” symbolism of “sacred” ceremonies, on the other. This is possible because the civil religion does not depend directly on any one of the

potentially divisive heterogeneous religions, and both “fundamentalists” and highly secularized “unbelievers” can participate. Besides participating in the national holidays of the American civil religion, I have had the good fortune to participate more than once in the solemn yet festive ceremonies of the First of August toward nightfall in Switzerland, a special example in the West of a religiously, ethnically, and linguistically heterogeneous society indeed. Even as a foreign visitor, I have been deeply moved by the public reading of the compact of the original Confederation (1292), the lanterns, the unpretentious speeches, the communal meals outdoors, the citizens seated at long wooden tables, and the common view, from a mountain slope, of many other bonfires lighting up the same rituals in many other local communities.

The term “secularization” has quite diverse meanings, of which the following are among the most important:

1. Paul and the other early Christian missionaries to the Roman “pagan” world were too weak to challenge the Roman god-emperor directly, and they gave unto Caesar what was Caesar’s, but in rejecting the sacredness of the Emperor and of the social order of the pagan Roman Empire, they were secularizing the social structure of “this world” (of their time, of course).
2. When the much later Calvinists set out to “build the Kingdom of God on earth,” they were secularizing the Gospel itself by putting a new emphasis on transforming the social structure of this world in accordance with God’s will as they saw it, while not, of course, giving up their hope of paradise and resurrection.
3. The (much later) separation of church and state was a secularization of the state.
4. When people give up “supernatural” religion, or even supplement it with doctrinal systems such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, or “godless” Communism, they are following, at least in part, secular faiths.

(On the historical background of the Reformation in sociological terms, and on secularization, see Parsons, 1967, Chapter 12; 1978, parts III and IV. For excellent defenses of Weber against the many attacks on his Protestant-ethic thesis, see Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. ix–lvi; Nelson, 1973; Little, 1969. Parsons, 1937, argues that Weber’s series of studies on the religions of India, China, Israel, and Christianity was, in effect, the rough equivalent of a controlled experiment.)

Instead of thinking vaguely about functional needs, exigencies, conditions for survival, or problems (take your pick of terms), or attempting to make a detailed list of specific functional needs (a hopeless task), Parsons developed a logical and exhaustive classification. It was a fundamental move, beautifully simple. This scheme is known as the *LIGA paradigm*, after the initial letters of the four general types of function: *L* for Latent pattern-maintenance and tension-management, *I* for Integration, *G* for Goal attainment, and *A* for Adaptation (see Parsons, 1961, vol. I, pp. 30–79). This functional scheme applies to subsystems of larger systems, to structure, to process, and to what Parsons came to call generalized symbolic media, which is discussed in the following paragraphs.

In societies or other social systems, a great many action decisions implicitly make use of one or more of the four ways in which it is possible for one “unit” to seek to guide, control, or make specific the action decisions of others with whom he, she, or it is interacting. A social “unit” in the relevant sense may be an individual in his or her capacity as a role “occupant” or may be a collective unit—a subcollectivity such as a formal organization, which acts through individuals whose particular roles in the subcollectivity are authorized to represent in certain ways the subcollectivity as a whole.

The “four ways” are cross-classified according to *channel-type* and *sanction-type*. There are two channels, situational and intentional. Using a situational channel, an actor offers or threatens to change the situation of the other. Using the intentional channel, the actor tries to direct the other’s motivation without offering or threatening to change the other’s situation. Each channel has a positive and a negative possibility. Thus, through cross-classification, we arrive at “four ways” or four *generalized symbolic media* by which an actor may hope to affect another’s action decisions.

The four media symbolize or stand for four social values, which in turn are implemented (to varying extents) by the four functional subsystems of social systems, beginning with societies. These media, values, and functional subsystems together constitute one complex application of the famous four-function scheme, which can be applied to all types of action systems, including, for instance, personalities. (For a more detailed treatment of the complexities of social generalized symbolic media, see Parsons, 1967, Chapter 9; 1969, part IV.)

I am now going to approach the American societal value system indirectly through a bit more attention to the generalized symbolic media of social systems. It should be understood that the American societal value system is a variant of modern societal value systems. Societal values are normative conceptions of what a society should be as far as its members have been able to formulate (largely implicitly or latently) such a grand conception.

The four generalized symbolic media in the social system symbolize, respectively, from the “top” down, that is, from the broadest in scope to the most specific, the four social values corresponding to the four functional requirements, exigencies, or “needs” of social systems, as follows: value commitments (L) stand for integrity, the value of the *pattern maintenance* subsystem (or, in the social-system case, the fiduciary system); influence (I) stands for solidarity, the value of the *integrative* subsystem of social systems, which is called the societal community; power (G) stands for collective effectiveness, the value of the *goal attainment* subsystem of social systems, which is called the polity; and money (A) stands for utility, the value of the *adaptation* subsystem of social systems, called the economy.

It should be obvious that these generalized symbolic media can be abused. In all social systems, they are “controlled” to some extent by institutionalized normative patterns, which Parsons, following some but not all usage, calls social institutions. These are normative patterns, not organizations, although Parsons does occasionally use the term “institution” (as perhaps most people do) to mean a social organization—the usual meaning in phrases such as “institutions of higher learning,” “cultural institutions.” In Parsons’s writing, the context will enable the reader to decide which usage is meant, provided he or she is aware of Parsons’s basic usage, as in “the institution of the family,” “the institution of authority,” and “the institution of contract.” Social values such as utility, collective effectiveness, solidarity, and integrity are too broad and have too little specificity to be adequate guides to conduct. Societies must have more specific patterns defining, for instance, fraud, undue influence, abuse of power, property rights, and which contracts will be valid and which will not in a court of law. It should almost go without saying that the degree and extent of institutionalization of such patterns vary widely from one society to another, as does the complexity or elaboration of custom and law with regard to any one area such as authority or contract or freedom of the “press” (meaning essentially all “mass media” such as newspapers, radio, television, and movies).

Social values, in modern societies especially, are often stated pretty explicitly, but, as Parsons points out, in earlier evolutionary stages, the two levels of values and norms or social institutions are more likely to be “fused” rather than “differentiated,” so that the value system must be inferred, much as an anthropologist “reconstructs” the culture and social organization of some remote tribe he or she is studying, by using what he or she hears from the members of the society as evidence.

They are competent informants in the same sense as native speakers of a language are “competent” speakers. This “fusion” in traditionalist societies contributes to their being stuck in tradition.

Formal organizations are at one level of social structure. As Parsons conceives of normative social structure as a whole, it has four levels—in order of decreasing generality and increasing specificity of normative control: societal values and their specifications; social institutions; subcollectivity structure, including the rules of specific formal organizations and the more or less taken-for-granted, sometimes routine, mutual expectations that prevail in particular households; and, finally, the structure of social role-types that are found in many specific subcollectivities—for example, corporation chief executive officer, accountant, and member of a maintenance crew.

Parsons’s term “cybernetic hierarchy of control and conditioning” is appropriate, in part, because the normative order constitutes a series of levels of control, as in a cybernetic system designed by an engineer. Similar to such information-processing systems, in human action systems also there are feedback and more or less successful correction of errors and deliberate departure from the controlling codes (1977, Chapter 8). Any LIGA series—of subsystems, structural elements, processes, or media—constitutes a cybernetic hierarchy of control and conditioning. A good illustration is the series of levels and components of normative social structure: social values, social norms, or institutions, the structure of subcollectivities, and the structure of social roles. The two higher or controlling levels of function, L and I, or Latent pattern maintenance and Integration, give direction or guidance to the two lower levels, G and A, or Goal attainment and Adaptation. The higher levels control but do not determine; actors making decisions in their varying specific situations must interpret for themselves how the guidelines apply. In complex societies, lawyers are often called upon, of course, to help in this process; and lawyers represent both the interests of their clients and the integrity of the legal system—they mediate through interpretation of the law and through persuasion and influence, as well as by strategy and tactics on behalf of the client.

Actually, all the levels are both controlling and conditioning, but the higher levels do control the lower levels. From another perspective, all the levels are conditions that must be fulfilled to “solve” the problem of order in social systems. All hierarchies of control and conditioning in the theory of action are in terms of declining scope and increasing specificity, not in terms of functional importance. In the LIGA series of levels and components of normative social structure, social roles are at the more conditional end, in the A position, yet everything that gets done in any social system is ultimately done by individuals-in-roles. At the same time, in the limiting case of integration, every role includes in its normative content “components” from the controlling levels above it. Hence, we speak of levels and components of normative social structure. Where all elements in a series are necessary for certain outcomes (here, value implementation and fulfillment of functional requirements, exigencies, or “needs”), it would make no sense to say that any one of the elements is generally more important than any other. The four elements in this case, as in others in action systems, are important in different ways and make different but interdependent functional contributions. Since action systems, like any other type of empirical system, can fail or give out, it is of course just as important, in a functional analysis, to note the lack or inadequate supply of any type of contribution as to note the evidence of presence and relative adequacy.

Despite the fact that formal organizations are at the third level in the LIGA hierarchy of control and conditioning, we must also reckon with the fact, as Parsons notes, that some formal organizations are much more important than others. This is obvious for certain business firms in a given industry, or for certain universities in the academic world.

We could even arrange formal organizations themselves in a rough LIGA hierarchy. No one “church” is at the top, but, in the aggregate, organized religious groups, as guardians of values

social and personal, are clearly in the L position. The traditional “three branches” of government—judicial, legislative, and executive—all have formal organizations. In Parsonsian terms, the Supreme Court and the lower courts are partly L, concerned with the integrity of the law; partly I, in that—in the Supreme Court, for instance—the members try to persuade one another toward a consensus; and partly G, in that their decisions are binding. Congress—to use an American example—is to a large extent a democratic association using influence, but the aggregate of its votes has power in the technical sense, subject to the approval by the courts and to veto by the President. The executive branch is primarily G, concerned with the collective-goal attainment, but the President in particular, like all top executives in modern formal organizations, spends most of his time trying to persuade—that is, using influence—though he or she may also offer implicit “deals” to obtain votes (here using power, technically). University departments of government or political science understandably pay a great deal of attention to the mass media, which to a certain extent (in their editorial policy) are using influence (I) and to that extent “control” the collective-goal attainment process but are not directly a part of it. There is mounting pressure to change the rules for funding political campaigns—quite understandably since, although “pressure groups” are quite legitimate as users of influence properly speaking, it is not consistent with the democratic process that pressure groups should be able to buy legislation, as to a certain extent they are now able to do by being allowed to contribute and distribute campaign funds. Finally, university departments of government or political science understandably pay a great deal of attention to one of the most important bearers of all four media—commitments, influence, power, and money—namely, the electorate. The electorate in one sense is not part of government in that most of its members are not full-time officials in any one of the three branches. In another sense, however, the citizen’s right to vote does make him or her a member of two branches directly and sometimes of courts as well (where citizens vote for judges). In fact, Parsons remarks that in this sense, citizens with the right to vote are officials. These points clearly show the analytical nature of Parsons’s functional analysis. Technically, for example, the use of power involves “private” organizations, as well as to varying extents the branches of government, in collective-goal attainment (G). But all formal organizations are involved in all four types of process—LIGA.

A somewhat different hierarchy of formal organizations is constituted by the series of modern full-scale universities, professional associations, and labor unions, with universities clearly close to the top of this hierarchy of control and conditioning (see especially Parsons and Platt, 1973).

The graduate schools are certainly among the most “progressive” agencies in a modern society, with their emphasis on research of all kinds, notably in the sciences. They train most of the future professionals—lawyers, medical doctors, engineers, and not least future members of the academic profession itself.

Both graduate and undergraduate training must be enormously important for advancing freedom and equality of religion in a modern society. In private universities, most theologians and clergymen and women receive their training, and in the faculties of religion that have the greatest prestige—whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish—what Parsons calls “extended ecumenism” is a strong influence; in other words, the faculties include representatives of not only the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, but frequently of the other religions of India, Hinduism and Buddhism in particular, as well. In the great public universities, there is of course, no direct training of theologians and clergy as such, instead there are religious studies programs, which put a strong emphasis on objective scholarship, study of all religions (in principle), and respect for all religions.

Both graduate and undergraduate programs provide training in the arts, including performance skills in music, painting, writing, theater, and dance.

The undergraduate programs, with their “distribution” requirements, help to create a relatively well-informed leadership among citizens, including creative and critical leadership with regard to “ideology” in one of its senses—the vital moral and intellectual activity of planning and comparing social goals and programs for the future. Insofar as undergraduates participate in the religious studies programs, they are also likely to be relatively enlightened citizen supporters of religious pluralism.

Finally, Parsons strongly defends what he calls “the bundle,” by which he refers to the inclusion of all these graduate and undergraduate activities—pursuit of science and the humanities, theoretical and more directly practical training, book knowledge and the performing arts—in the same organization, the full-scale university. He points out that this inclusiveness tends to spread the influence of rationalism as far as the various activities allow it and provide prestige to all these diverse activities and respect for them all (see Parsons, 1978, Chapter 7).

Instead of trying to eliminate self-interest, as some Utopian dreamers would like to do, the best we can realistically hope for and work toward, Parsons contended, is to harness self-interest so that it will tend to improve the functioning of social systems, indirectly benefiting other “selves,” as well as any particular role occupant’s “self” or set of role occupants’ “selves.” This means we must have institutionalization, as structure and process.

*For full institutionalization, first of all there must be normative ideas or patterns definite enough to become objects for consensus. These are the four levels and components of social structure. Second, the normative content must be internalized in the personalities of those to whom it applies. Third, as a backup, there must be sanctions, both positive and negative. Fourth, the normative content must help to define which interests are socially acceptable and which are not, and full institutionalization will be reached only when some actual existing interests are defined as acceptable and are righteously and successfully defended—in other words, institutionalized interests become “vested interests.” Social structure by definition is therefore, to some extent, conservative.*

We must keep in mind that even “deviant” or revolutionary groups must have the equivalent of institutionalization within them; such groups, of course, have special problems in coping with the larger society, and vice versa.

Some degree of institutionalization is necessary to the very survival of social systems. Following Emile Durkheim (1960), Parsons distinguished between the internal environment of a social system (le milieu social) and its external environment or environments (e.g., natural, biological, and psychological).<sup>2</sup>

The very personalities of a social system’s members or participants are in large part, analytically external to the social system itself. The subcollectivities and roles that compose the social system are, analytically, only those parts or aspects of the total action of all the personalities involved that are defined by more or less institutionalized normative rights and obligations, as conforming, deviant, or rebellious actions in the system. It is obvious enough that a formal organization must worry about having customers or supporters and therefore, must worry about external competing organizations, but, as Parsons says, the most immediate environment of a formal organization is made up of those aspects of its own members’ personalities that are not part of the organization itself.

From the point of view of a participating “unit” (subcollectivity or social role), the normative order of a social system, abstracted from concrete individuals, is an internal environment in a double sense. First, the internal environment enables the acting unit to do things he, she, or it would otherwise not be able to do; acting units can adapt it to their own purposes to some extent, creatively. Second, in a more general sense, acting units must adapt to it to gain social approval

and necessary social support from others and to avoid suffering negative sanctions. Without the internal environment or social milieu, acting units vis-à-vis one another would not be able to act rationally because they could not depend on the fact that the purposes of others would harmonize with their own purposes. Thus, the “problem of order,” as Parsons calls it, is to some extent “solved” by this shared or institutionalized internal environment. From this, it follows that the internal environment makes some degree of solidarity possible (see Parsons, 1937, 1968, 1977, Chapter 8).

One of the ways in which the internal environment functions for the social system is to provide its leaders with a ready accepted rules and procedures by which they can realistically hope to mobilize consensual motivation for new specific collective projects—directed to external environments and the relation of the system to these factors. Thus, internal and external are intimately interrelated.

Parsons mentions, in two or three places, the simple but fundamental point that whatever satisfactions social and cultural systems can provide, they ultimately can be enjoyed only by individuals, especially human individuals. Perhaps, the central idea of this theory is expressed in the term “institutionalized individualism,” which conveys that individuals enjoy or do not enjoy social systems (the systems as such are incapable of enjoying anything); that it is largely because, and to the extent that, institutionalized social structure exists, that human individuals can enjoy much of anything; and that social systems “work” or “function” largely by helping to shape or “control” individuals’ interests through socialization, controlled by social institutions, which themselves are made more effective to the extent that they are legitimized by social values.

Two value orientations in advanced modern societies seem to be about as generalized as it is possible for values to be—consequently as sweeping in their latent possibilities or potentialities as one might wish. These values, of course, are freedom and equality—for “units” of social systems, including subcollectivities and roles, and ultimately, for concrete individuals. Since, as we have seen, some constraints and inequalities are functionally necessary, it is obvious that the “ideal” modern society would have some complex balance between freedom and equality, on the one hand, and inequalities and normative constraints, on the other.

(Another of Parsons’s best paper is 1977, Chapter 12, in which he shows how equality/inequality and freedom/constraint relate to the four types of functional problems. One effect of modernization is to differentiate values more clearly from the three “lower” levels of social structure. Thus, we can see that a modern society has six highly generalized values: four for the media anchored in four functional subsystems, and two values related to the four in ways that Parsonsian theory makes plain. The six values are not given equal weight or the same relative weight, however, in the value systems of all modern societies.)

Values are more effective than we may realize. For example, most black or African–American leaders and educated African–American voters put their faith in the so-called American dream of equality and freedom, and respect activists such as Thurgood Marshall and Martin Luther King, Jr., both of whom accomplished progressive change basically by appealing to American social values and working to mobilize political support under the rule of law. Mahatma Gandhi was a British-trained lawyer and at the same time a charismatic leader, white-robed like a mendicant mystic, of the largely illiterate Indian masses. When he mounted his nonviolent campaign for Home Rule or independence for India, he knew that he could rely on British values of freedom and democracy to get him a large measure of support in Great Britain itself, and he was correct. Parsons points out that Harold Laski (one of his old professors at the University of London),

among other Marxists or neo-Marxists, had confidently maintained “that no ‘ruling class’ would ever relinquish its position peacefully” (1967, Chapter 15, 517 n., emphasis in original), yet when the British Labour Party let India go free, the British Conservatives did not rise up and revolt; they submitted to the rule of law, the values underlying it, and the procedures of democracy that partly implemented them.

Implicit in these examples of the practical importance of values are suggestions to the effect that value implementation in progressive change must overcome often-formidable impediments, of which crude vested interests are not necessarily more important than deep-rooted ideological distortions, held to in good faith as if they were sacred principles. I will illustrate this point with American examples that will be familiar to people who attempt to keep up with “the news.”

Closely allied to the dogma of unregulated markets is “The less government, the better.” Yet, Durkheim was closer to the truth (which Parsons accepted) that the more complex and highly differentiated modern societies are, the more government is required to help integrate the diversity and to achieve approximations to basic modern values such as equality of opportunity.

Absolutely unavoidable inequalities in occupational achievements and status mean, among other things, that, statistically speaking, some children have a tremendous “headstart” in life because they are being socialized by parents who are unusually well educated, have had broader occupational experience, and have “better” social connections. This will be so, no matter how “democratic” the society is. If the relatively disadvantaged children are going to have even rough “equality of opportunity,” then costly government services and regulations are necessary, such as public schools at all levels, health care, and minimum standards of “welfare.” This remains, no matter how “irresponsible” or “misguided” poor parents may be who have children for whom they cannot provide. Government services are also needed in the maintenance of highways, harbors, sanitation systems, and environmental protection—the more so, the more populations grow and are concentrated in urban centers.

In the United States certainly, but perhaps no more than in many other societies, the movement toward equality of opportunity is impeded by gross ideological distortions about “race,” ethnicity, and “country of origin”: for example, the grossly ignorant beliefs that it is “race” that determines the quality or level of people’s culture and social organization, and that skin color is an indicator of *innate* capacities, strong or weak.

Regardless of “race” and ethnicity, it is another serious ideological distortion and impediment to the implementation of American values to think that high occupational achievement or high income (not necessarily closely related) is the result of factors such as great innate ability and hard work only. Such pleasant self-flattery is an ideological distortion because it ignores massive facts. No one in a modern society especially, but in any society actually, makes significant achievements without the help of social values and social institutions. No one in a modern society can get along without the great assistance provided by government services, among others.

Such impediments to overcome as those just mentioned is perhaps the evidence of the strength of institutionalized values that we make, for any progress at all toward full implementation and integrity of the value system. There is no reason to suppose that other modern societies are essentially different from the United States in this respect, though the specific ideological distortions may differ. (Many references could be given, but see especially Parsons, 1967, Chapter 13, in which he distinguishes between *assimilation* and *inclusion*, and discusses the handicaps of certain ethnic or religious groups.)



## Notes

1. The three direct quotations from Parsons in this chapter all come from “Evolutionary Universals in Society,” which was originally published in *The American Sociological Review* (June 1964), vol. 29, number 3. I am grateful for the permission to use these quotations.
2. Technically, what I call the internal environment of societies is the internal environment of the “general system of action.” However, explications of this concept would exceed acceptable space limits of this chapter. The difference is important for full appreciation of Parsonsian theory, but not for most readers who are mainly interested in “bureaucracy” and “modernization.”

## References

- Bellah, R.N., *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World*, Harper & Row, New York, Evanston, and London, 1970.
- Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Alien & Unwin, London, 1954.
- Durkheim, E., *The Division of Labor in Society*, Free Press, Glencoe, IL, 1960.
- Eisenstadt, S.N., ed., Introduction, in *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968, pp. ix–lvi.
- Gerhardt, U., ed., *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism*, Aldine de Gruyter, Hawthorne, NY, 1993.
- Lidz, V.M. and Parsons, T., eds., *Readings on Premodern Societies*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1972.
- Little, D., *Religion, Order, and Law*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1969.
- McGerr, M., The persistence of individualism, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, Feb. 10, A48 (1993).
- Merton, R.K., *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England*, Howard Fertig, New York, 1970.
- Nelson, B., Weber’s protestant ethic: Its origins, wanderings, and foreseeable futures, in *Beyond the Classics: Essays in the Scientific Study of Religion* (C.Y. Glock and P.E. Hammond, eds.), Harper & Row, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1973, pp. 71–130.
- Parsons, T., *The Structure of Social Action; A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers*, McGraw-Hill, New York and London, 1937.
- Parsons, T., An outline of the social system, in *Theories of Society* (Parsons, E. Shils, K.D. Naegle, and J.R. Pitts, eds.), The Free Press of Glencoe, a Division of Crowell-Collier, New York, 1961.
- Parsons, T., *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966.
- Parsons, T., *Sociological Theory and Modern Society*, The Free Press, New York, 1967.
- Parsons, T., Components and types of formal organization, in *Comparative Administration Theory* (P.P. LeBreton, ed.), University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA and London, 1968a.
- Parsons, T., Order as a sociological problem, in *The Concept of Order* (P.G. Kuntz, ed.), University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA, 1968b.
- Parsons, T., *Politics and Social Structure*, The Free Press, New York, 1969.
- Parsons, T., *The System of Modern Societies*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1971.
- Parsons, T., *Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory*, The Free Press, New York, 1977.
- Parsons, T., *Action Theory and the Human Condition*, The Free Press, New York, 1978.
- Parsons, T. and Platt, G.M., *The American University*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1973.
- Tiryakian, E.A., Neither Marx nor Durkheim—perhaps Weber, *American Journal of Sociology*, 81:1–33 (1975).
- Weber, M., *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1930.
- Weber, M., *Economy and Society*, 3 vols., Bedminster Press, New York, 1968.

---

**BUREAUCRACY AND  
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT**

---





## *Chapter 11*

---

# **Bureaucracy and the Environmental Crisis: A Comparative Perspective**

---

Renu Khator

### **CONTENTS**

11.1	India: Environmental Bureaucracy in a Social System .....	223
11.2	Environmental Bureaucracy in Hong Kong.....	227
11.3	Environmental Bureaucracy in the United States .....	230
11.4	Explaining Differences: A Global Approach to Comparison.....	232
	References .....	235

Environmental degradation has reached a point of global and universal crisis. Since the formal recognition of the problem in the early 1970s, most nations have tried to respond by adopting new laws and establishing independent bureaucracies. Between 1972, the time of the first United Nations Conference on Human Environment, and 1992, the time of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the number of nations with environmental bureaucracies increased by 10 times—from 11 to over 150. Thanks to the pioneering work of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), most nations today have some form of national policy for the protection of the environment. Interestingly, most of the environmental policies are regulatory in nature. Since bureaucracies are the prime institutions for regulatory control and monitoring, they are automatically at the


center of all activity—winning praise and taking blame. The near-global and universal emergence of environmental bureaucracies raises an important question for scholars of comparative public administration: Do these bureaucracies perform comparably? Is their performance tainted by their contexts?

In relation to public administrationists, policy analysts and political scientists have paid greater attention to the need for comparison. The literature in these fields focuses on the issue of comparability, or rather noncomparability, and the factors that force the environmental performance of one system to be different from that of another (Enloe, 1975; Kelley et al., 1976; Lester, 1989; Solesbury, 1976; Siegel and Weinberg, 1977; Lundqvist, 1980; Kelman, 1981; Reich, 1984; Brickman et al., 1985; Knoepfel et al., 1987; Kamieniecki and Sanasarian, 1990). Several of the studies identify the determining role of administrative systems in explaining policy performance across nations. Others find political-cultural factors to be of greater significance. A pioneering work in this area came from Vogel (1986), who, after comparing the American and British styles of regulation, concluded that the administrative culture of the United States fostered an incompetent image of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency even when its overall performance was not significantly different from that of its British counterpart.

While administrative structures have always been a favorite explanatory variable among political scientists and policy analysts in comparative models, comparative studies on environmental administrative systems—studies that use administrative systems as a dependent variable—are not many. There is a dearth of comparative work that includes non-Western systems, which are assumed to be either noncomparable or irrelevant for cross-learning purposes. Kamieniecki and Sanasarian (1990) cite a number of factors that serve as stumbling blocks in this area, particularly accuracy of data, comparability of language usage, differences in political systems, and dependency on foreign assistance. Scholars try to reduce this void by offering periodic “overview” analyses of a group of case studies from the non-Western world (Lehman, 1992). Although these overviews are precious, an effort should be made to develop a common intellectual nexus and learn from cross-comparisons (Kamieniecki and Sanasarian, 1990).

The objective of this study is to put environmental bureaucracy in a global context, an approach being demanded by several scholars in the environmental policy field (Barrett and Tierivel, 1991; Goodman and Redclift, 1991; Guimaraes, 1991). The idea is to use environmental bureaucracy as a dependent variable, as an entity that does not exist in a vacuum and cannot be deemed effective or ineffective on its own. Bureaucracy is being perceived as an entity that is affected by forces outside its own parameters. It is an entity that is neither monolithic nor static; an entity that has a definite form and character, for without any form and character of its own it cannot be said to meet the first two conditions. In prior studies, bureaucracy served as an explanatory variable—a variable that was assessed to see why things did not work, why outcomes were different in different settings, and how they affected other institutions.

In this study, we first explore the form and character of three different environmental bureaucracies: United States, Hong Kong, and India. The selection of these three bureaucracies is important. They offer not only three different political settings (liberal democratic, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and democratic, respectively), but also three different economic settings (industrialized, newly industrialized, and industrializing) and three different global settings (leading, integrated, and integrating). The selection of the cases sets the stage for using the global and comparative approach advanced by Garcia-Zamor and Khator (1994) in *Public Administration in the Global Village*. They argue that the administrative system should be viewed within the parameters of its external systems, including political, economic, and global. They suggest that the degree and nature of penetration from external systems can offer a common ground of comparison.



**Figure 11.1** Classification of administrative systems based on penetration continuum.

They specifically raise three questions: (1) To what degree is a system capable of functioning in the global context? (2) To what extent is an administrative system able to correspond to the social and cultural norms of the society? (3) To what extent is an administrative system congruous to its political setting? These criteria significantly enlarge the scope of administrative systems and public administration. The administrative system stretches beyond the Weberian boundaries of rationality, hierarchy, neutrality, and role orientation and relies upon international pressures, social expectations, and global responsibilities as its driving forces. Administrative systems are viewed on a continuum, ranging from complete integration to complete disjointment (Figure 11.1). A completely integrated system is assumed to be in full harmony with outside forces (global, social, and political)—depending upon them and responding to them. On the other hand, a completely disjointed system is in constant conflict with these forces. We shall be returning to this model again in the concluding section of this chapter.

## 11.1 India: Environmental Bureaucracy in a Social System

The Indian bureaucracy has historical roots. It bears the marks of its precolonial heritage and the signs of the British colonialism for over 200 years. Commenting on its evolution, Jain (1981) says

On attainment of independence, India inherited from the British a monolithic, strictly hierarchical administrative structure, with the line of command running unimpeded from the Viceroy and Governor-General in Delhi to the farthest village, albeit conforming to certain well-established traditions. The purpose of such a system was to keep the interest of British power in India dominant, ensure that the government secured the revenue it needed, maintained law and order to serve the cause of peace and security.

In its modern form, the environmental bureaucracy manifests the British traditions and values brought to India during colonization. At the same time, its functioning is a product of the country's social fabric woven with delicate threads of religion, caste, and cultural beliefs. Hindu religion, practiced by 82% of the Indian population, defines the relationship between human beings and their physical environment as interdependent (Dwivedi and Tiwari, 1987). The inherent

dependency of human beings on their surroundings does not leave room for environmental degradation, yet degradation of the environment is severe in India. Natural resources such as rivers, the ocean, and trees are all glorified as forms of god, yet dams are built on rivers, toxins are dumped into the ocean, and trees are constantly chopped for fuel, fodder, and construction. Today, only 11% of the land surface in India is covered with adequate tree cover, 70% of all available water is polluted, and most major cities are choking with severe air pollution (Agarwal and Narain, 1999).

The first signs of environmental regulation in India came in the late nineteenth century, when the British government declared forests as the property of the state. In an 1878 law, the government classified forests in three categories: village, community, and restricted. People were allowed to use only “village forests” for their fuel and fodder needs. To monitor this policy, a forest bureaucracy was necessary. This forest bureaucracy eventually set the stage for the coming environmental bureaucracy (Khator, 1989). For the next 90 years, the federal government remained mostly silent; only individual states made some sporadic attempts to regulate the environment.

The next real attempt to shape the environmental bureaucracy was in 1972, when then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi established the National Committee on Environmental Planning and Coordination. This action came in direct response to a United Nations call to prepare a report on the status of the environment for its scheduled conference in the same year (Caldwell, 1972). The task of the committee was basically exploratory; it was not granted any regulatory or advisory functions. In later years, however, this committee proved to be a precursor of a full-fledged regulatory bureaucracy. The government, alarmed by the committee’s report, passed a trend-setting law in 1974 to curb water pollution. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 created a centralized, cohesive bureaucracy in the form of Water Boards, which were set up as a network, with the Central Board accountable to the central government at the top and state boards answerable to individual state governments, as well as to the Central Board at the second layer. The task of the boards was predominantly regulatory: regulating businesses on the one hand and municipalities on the other. The boards were the point of gravity because, unlike in the United States, the Indian public did not have the right to take an offending party (business or municipality) to court without the consent of the boards. All public complaints were required to go through the boards, even though the boards could process only 5% of such complaints (Khator, 1991). The revenue of the boards came partially from their respective governments and partially from the fees collected from offenders through a law passed in 1977 (Cess Act of 1977). Since their inception, both the Water Act and the Water Boards have been subjected to serious criticism and controversy: scholars have called them inefficient and ineffective (Lalvani, 1985; Puri, 1987; Agarwal and Narain, 1999).

In 1980, the Indian government realized the complexity and multiplicity of environmental issues. It responded to the situation by creating the Department of Environment, which later was transformed into a full-fledged ministry, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). Today, the environmental bureaucracy consists of water boards (which also implement air pollution control laws), Environmental Committees at the state level, and a Central Water Board and a Ministry at the federal level. The federal layer has grown considerably in strength—from an exploratory committee of 15 in 1972 to over 1090 personnel in 2005 (Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2004–2005, Chapter 14). It has 18 divisions, including Conservation and Survey, Forest Conservation, Wildlife Conservation, Impact Assessment, and Education and Information. The members of the environmental bureaucracy are selected through a common Civil Services Examination. They are permanent civil servants (their positions are secured by the Constitution of India), and they are expected to perform their tasks in a hierarchical organization with full

neutrality. Their primary task is to implement the laws passed by parliament. Under the Eleventh Five-year Plan (2008–2012), Rs. 8841 crores were allocated to the MoEF. This budget was almost 60% the size of the budget allocated under the previous Five-year Plan.

The environmental bureaucracy in India performs regulatory and nonregulatory functions. Its regulatory functions follow the same procedure as in the United States: the source of the problem is identified; standards are set; compliance is monitored; and noncompliance is punished. Its nonregulatory functions are unique and important—because they assume a proactive role of the bureaucracy in distributing and redistributing the use of natural resources (Khator, 1989). One such program is social forestry, under which the government offers seeds and saplings of forest plants to villagers to be planted on river banks and unused property. It is hoped that these artificially grown forests will fulfill the fuel and fodder needs of the forest-dependent peoples and will protect the natural forests from unnecessary assault (Fernandes and Kulkarni, 1983).

India's entry in the global market place has placed additional challenges on the environment. With the rising standard of living afforded by the software industry, demand on land and raw materials are increasing sharply. The environmental bureaucracy has recognized this problem and is addressing it by drafting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The purpose of the draft policy is to provide a healthy balance between development and the environment. Two other changes are noteworthy: one, the bureaucracy has wholeheartedly embraced the digital age and has adopted the practices of e-governance. It even provides a Web-Based Disciplinary Cases Monitoring and Management Information System to monitor the status of disciplines, prosecutions, appeals, and complaints. The other is the institutionalization of judicial services. The Ministry is currently in the advanced stages of adopting various actions for setting up Environmental Courts in consultation with the Ministry of Law and Justice (Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2004–2005, Chapter 12).

The functioning of the environmental bureaucracy is riddled with many problems. To begin with, developmental priorities of the country undercut the position of the environmental bureaucracy; it finds its task of promoting the environmental cause difficult, particularly in times of fiscal austerity. Often, the task of the environmental bureaucracy is not only to regulate the business, but also more important to regulate other bureaucracies (transportation, development, agriculture, and industry) that may overlook the environmental aspect in their plans. Without the unwavering support of the people and that of the government, the environmental bureaucracy finds itself in an awkward position.

Second, the overarching influence of business in Indian politics makes it difficult for the environmental bureaucracy to implement laws. Horowitz (1989, p. 201), while discussing the general capacity of governments in developing societies, points out that they lack the penetrative capacity necessary for effective implementation. The lack of penetrative capacity in India is the result of corruption and monopoly. Corruption can, more often than not, offset the cost–benefit ratio of compliance. If an offender is able to buy off a regulator at a cost substantially lower than the cost of compliance, regulation is not likely to take place.

Similarly, until recently, the near-complete monopoly of the Congress Party in India also hindered the ability of environmental groups to articulate the interests of their constituencies efficiently. The ruling Congress Party in India was closely aligned with business, making it difficult for nonbusiness or antibusiness groups to find any meaningful representation in the government. Lack of constituency weakens the position of environment groups.

I have argued elsewhere that the local policy culture—the surroundings in which local bureaucrats must function—is not favorable for bureaucratic functioning in India (Khator, 1992). In the



pollution control field, for instance, local elites, who need to be regulated for creating pollution, have a strong hold on local affairs. Regulators lack the ability to break their hold and force them to comply with regulation. These local elites almost always have connections in the higher echelons of the bureaucratic machinery; in cases of conflict with local regulators, they are capable of reaching bureaucratic superiors to pressure the local regulators. In a hypothetical case, let us say a regulator finds the waste discharge from a given industry is beyond the permissible limits. He is offered a bribe to ignore it or to delay the process. Now he has a choice of either accepting the bribe and benefiting from his authority or rejecting the bribe and bearing the consequence of being demoted by his higher-ups. A rational regulator will make a rational choice. Local policy culture offers no protection to regulators to force compliance. A case in point is social forestry, where, under the government's plan to distribute free seedlings, it was found that most of the benefits went to the higher-caste farmers, who have significant clout in the local area. The effectiveness of the policy was undermined in this case because the recipients of seeds or saplings planted them for profit. The resulting crop of eucalyptus could not provide fuel and fodder to the poor and thus could not reduce the strain on natural forests.

Why are the regulators weak? Some scholars blame social circumstances (Jain, 1991). As a result of strong social bonds, regulators in India perceive themselves first as members of their social, ethnic, and religious groups and then as members of the bureaucratic machinery. In particular, systems such as social caste (which divides the country in social hierarchical categories), sons of the soil (which promotes regionalism), and ethnoexpansionism tend to have harmful effects on bureaucratic functioning. Aside from promoting corruption, the prevalence of these practices taints the image of the bureaucracy, which in India is perceived to be corrupt and dysfunctional (Dwivedi and Jain, 1985). This hurts the cause of building a constituency. Jain (1991, p. 8) argues that the social structure of India has shaped its bureaucracy and has given rise to bureaucratic dysfunctionism.

Overall, the environmental bureaucracy in India suffers from serious contradictions. Its tone is decisively regulatory, yet its authority comes from advisory and consultative capacities. There are serious loopholes in the implementation network. The environmental bureaucracy has a built-in flexibility (it does not offer time schedules and strict standards), yet the bureaucratic culture is full of rigidity and rule-bound orientation. Another contradiction occurs in political-bureaucratic relations. While there is a close alliance between business and the ruling elite, there is little evidence that this alliance is used to build a cooperative culture for decision making. Policy making is closed and one-sided, with little consideration for what is feasible and reasonable. Scholars describe the current system of environmental standard setting as “nonparticipative, non-consensual, and non-transparent” (Reich and Bowonder, 1992, p. 655). The approach used is a “fire-brigade” approach, focusing all the energy on crises and making decisions in a panic-stricken environment. Maneka Gandhi, former Minister of Environment and Forests, pushed the Public Liability Act after the Bhopal tragedy (Reich and Bowonder, 1992). The process of passing the act did not involve any consultation with the industry, who, in the act, is forced to provide Rs. 25,000 (approximately \$500) compulsory insurance to people handling hazardous waste. Understandably, the law is yet to be implemented.

The most serious contradiction is between the desired image and the available image of the bureaucracy itself. While the government passes blame on to the people, evidence continues to mount against the government itself. On several occasions, this contradiction has proved embarrassing. Justice Krishna Iyer, while giving his judgment on an environmental controversy (the 1980 *Ratlam Municipality vs. Virdhi Chand and Others* case, in which Virdhi Chand had sued the Ratlam Municipality for not providing adequate protection), said

One wonders whether our municipal bodies are functional irrelevancies, banes rather than boons and “lawless” by long neglect, not leaders of the people in local self government. It may be a cynical body minus the people and plus the bureaucrats are the pathetic vogue—no better than when the British were here. (Varandani, 1987, p. 122)

When it comes to the integrity of the bureaucracy, scholars and analysts also raise questions:

The municipal organizations today, which are required to enforce existing provisions against pollution, are themselves the major polluters. Their own outdated methods of solid waste management, the crude dumping grounds, the inadequate drainage systems which carry raw sewage along the siltage, polluted water sources, inadequate administrative machinery are some of the glaring examples as to how the controlling authorities help spread pollution in cities. (Puri, 1987, p. 288)

In brief, the environmental bureaucracy in India suffers from both inadequate horizontal relations (with other bureaucracies) and superficial vertical relations (with regulators and the public). It is a misfit in the compartmentalized structure of the bureaucracy. Its role is all-encompassing, multi-layered, and complex. Because of the inherent contradictions, it faces a barrier that is proving to be insurmountable.

## 11.2 Environmental Bureaucracy in Hong Kong

In contrast to India’s parliamentary, federal, and democratic setting, Hong Kong offers a bureaucratic–authoritarian, colonial, and city–state setting for its bureaucracy. The two countries are also on the opposite ends of the economic growth continuum. While India is a poor country with per capita GDP of \$2,600, Hong Kong is a newly industrialized country with a per capita GDP of \$42,123 very close to the \$45,800 figure for the United States. Socially and culturally, the two countries are comparable: both harbor a family-oriented and tradition-rich social culture. While Hong Kong society is not segregated into social classes, such as observed in the Indian caste system, the philosophical underpinnings of Confucianism still divide the society based on gender and age. Once known only for its amiability to Chinese refugees, Hong Kong is now acclaimed in the world for its ultramodern commercial and financial infrastructures. The miraculous economic growth of Hong Kong is the result of the economic strategy that integrates the territory’s economy with the global economy.

As a former British colony, Hong Kong is naturally attracted to the British ideals and paradigms of public administration: merit-based, hierarchical, neutral, and rational bureaucracy. Harris (1988) describes Hong Kong bureaucracy as politically apathetic and ideologically detached. Yet it is the bureaucracy in Hong Kong that is at the nexus of all political activity. Its power and legitimacy come from its practice of seeking wide public consultation on political issues. Its authority and legitimacy are rarely questioned. The job of the bureaucracy is simple: it is expected to provide a conducive environment for economic growth. The process of public administration is described as a two-stage process: “First, policy is made and second, monies are authorized” (Rabushka, 1976, p. 35). The job of public administrators is described by Harris (1988, pp. 70–71) as follows:

In Hong Kong, officials dominate where they must—though they prefer the “market” to take care of the decision-making process. Their objective is not to distort the market

process, but rather to provide the conditions to make the process more effective. . . . Where it is inefficient, it is not necessarily a question of will, but lack of will.

The environmental bureaucracy of Hong Kong is part of this larger setting. The Hong Kong policy on the environment is still in its infancy. While water distribution and land use laws have been on the books for several decades, environmental degradation control laws are new to the territory. As in India, formal interest in the environment appeared in Hong Kong in 1972, when the Governor of Hong Kong appointed an advisory committee on environmental pollution on land and water (commonly known as EPCOM). This committee was established in response to the United Nation's call to prepare a report on the status of the environment in the territory. The report of this committee prompted the Hong Kong government to appoint another exploratory committee in 1974 to review and suggest measures to rectify the problem of environmental degradation (Bidwell, 1988). The team was instructed specifically to suggest actions that would not "interfere with the industry or otherwise impair the potential economic growth; and it should not add to the cost of government" (Bidwell, 1988, p. 19).

Recommendations of the review team set the tone of environmental bureaucracy. The review team suggested emphasis on planning rather than control, on consensus rather than conflict, on economic noninterventionism rather than active interference, and on administrative flexibility rather than uniformity (Khator, 1990). More specifically, the team asked that several ordinances on pollution control be passed and a permanent environmental agency to coordinate the efforts be established. The result was the Environmental Policy Unit (EPU), founded in 1977. It consisted of one Environmental Protection Adviser (appointed by the Governor, himself an appointee of the British government) and four Environmental Protection Officers, one each for waste, air, water, and noise (also appointed by the Governor). Its task was to advise the government on planning.

Interestingly, the government retained EPCOM although its composition changed significantly. Its members were now drawn from various public and private sectors. It was chaired by the Secretary of Environment and provided permanent representation to three main industrial organizations: the Chinese Manufacturers Association, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. It also secured seats for environmental groups as well as other governmental departments. EPCOM was meant to become a unique forum for public consultation. However, it was a delicate arrangement, because of the ever-existing possibility that the industrial lobby would take over the committee.

The environmental bureaucracy finally found its ground in 1980 when the first ordinance, the Water Pollution Control Ordinance, was enacted. Ordinances on air control and noise control followed in 1983 and 1988, respectively. In order to centralize all environmental activities, the government also granted the environmental bureaucracy agency-level status. The newly created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grew in staff and budget strength. However, its implementation powers were still limited, as they were dependent on persuasion and consultation. It was only in 1986 that it received full implementation powers, its status raised to department level, and its name changed to the Environmental Protection Department (EPD). The economic agenda of the territory provided extreme challenges to the infant environmental bureaucracy. Its home was shifted from one policy area to another; first placed under the Secretary for Home Affairs, it was subsequently shifted to the Administrative and Environmental Affairs Branch, then to the Health and Welfare Branch, and then to the Lands and Works Branch, until finally, in 1989, it found its home in the Planning, Environment, and Lands Branch. In 1997, Hong Kong returned to China as its Special Administrative Region (SAR) with the promise of maintaining a high degree of autonomy for 50 years. The EPD continued its role in post-1997 years; however, on April 1, 2005,

it received a new structure which transferred policy making powers from the Bureau to the EPD, thus making it a consolidated bureaucracy with both functions—policy making and policy implementation. Today, the EPD functions in nine divisions and has staff strength of 1600.

The environmental bureaucracy now performs regulatory functions. Its regulatory policy follows the usual pattern of permit–monitor–prosecute. Inspections, ambushes, and video surveillance are used to monitor and catch offenders. More than 74,000 inspections were carried out in 2003. About 600 cases were successfully prosecuted, bringing approximately HK\$5 million in fines (Environmental Protection Department, 2005).

In 2004, the EPD collected HK\$4.6 million in violation fees (Environmental Protection Department, 2005). Interestingly, despite the territory's mature capitalism, the Hong Kong government does not prefer market-oriented mechanisms to check environmental degradation. Several reasons account for this, the most important of which is the unwillingness of the government to alter its competitive edge in the international market. The territory's dependency on the international market economy may explain its less-than-forthright approach to environmental problems. In the following section, I explore the effects of the global economy on Hong Kong's environmental policy.

The Water Pollution Control Ordinance as passed in 1980 and implemented in 1987 had two unique features: leniency and flexibility. In the name of environmental pollution control, the ordinance not only allowed the continuation of the existing level of emission discharge into the colony's waterways, but, to the environmentalists' dismay, permitted a 30% increase over current levels. On the basis of the ordinance, industries received a quota that was 30% higher than their current level of discharge. This meant that water pollution from industrial discharge was going to increase in the future. To make matters worse, industries could also request a waiver from this already lenient policy. Second, to prevent sudden shocks to the system, the ordinance allowed an implementation strategy that was both flexible and gradual. The ordinance required the gradual establishment of several pollution control zones over an extended period. The Tolo Harbor Zone was considered to be the area most severely hit by water pollution; thus the first water zone was in this area. After a year-long pause, the second zone was declared in the Southern region, including Repulse Bay, a prime tourist area. Two more came into existence during the following year.

Thus, the environmental policy in Hong Kong had an industrial overtone: it protected industry; fostered industry; and made sure that industry was equipped to compete in the world market. Hong Kong relies primarily on small-scale, family-oriented industries that operate on minimal profit margins. Sheltering these industries is almost essential for the territory's economic survival. How, then, does the "government of bureaucrats," as the Hong Kong government is called, reconcile the differences between economic growth and environmental protection? Hong Kong has developed an industrial approach to environmental protection. The environmental bureaucracy, acting as caretaker and decision maker, has invented several mechanisms to caress industrial growth while pushing a parallel environmental agenda. Other than regulating, it performs two very critical tasks: (1) it serves as a depository of information, relieving industry from the burden of single-handedly investing in research and development; and (2) it functions as a consensus builder, searching for a middle ground on which economic and environmental interests can be reconciled. The second function is performed by its EPCOM unit; the first function is accomplished, to a large extent, by the Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC) unit, established in 1967. Realizing the significance of an environmentally friendly technology in the future, the council expanded its scope by establishing an environmental wing. This wing advises small and medium industries on pollution control methods. Its task goes so far as to design individualized treatment instruments for house-based, tin-shade, small family operations. Usually its customers are referred to it by

environmental regulators; however, several opt to knock on its doors of their own free will. The council is financed by annual governmental subvention (HKPC, 1989, p. 48).

The environmental bureaucracy in Hong Kong suffers from the usual criticism and controversy (Downey, 1987; Lam, 1987), but these are within the parameters of “open feedback.” Charges of corruption are never made and questions regarding the integrity of the regulators are rarely raised. In fact, the majority of the criticism is against the policy rather than the implementers. Evidence indicates that, unlike the Indian environmental bureaucracy, the Hong Kong bureaucracy maintains a good image of neutrality and sincerity. In a survey of environmental regulators in 1990, researchers found that only 5% of street-level regulators belonged to environmental interest groups, and more than half refused to call themselves environmentalists (Khator et al., 1992). In the same survey, more than 80% of them applauded the cooperative attitude of business. Interestingly, by an overwhelming majority, the regulators cited Hong Kong’s dependency on the international economy as the single most important barrier in the territory’s slow environmental progress.

### 11.3 Environmental Bureaucracy in the United States

The United States offers another interesting political, social, economic, and international setting for our study. An industrialized democracy with per capita GDP of over \$41,000, the United States enjoys leadership status in the world. Its political system with a presidential form of government and federalism offers a complex context for bureaucracy. In fact, Riggs (1994) goes so far as to say that the political setting of the United States is responsible for producing a semipowered bureaucracy—bureaucracy that is highly professional and yet is extremely disconnected.

A vast amount of literature on the failures of the American environmental bureaucracy already exists. Comparative studies, in particular, paint a dreary picture of the abilities of the environmental bureaucracy. It is often compared with European counterparts. The findings, more often than not, ridicule American environmental policy, and consequently the bureaucracy, as inefficient, ineffectual, and outright irresponsible. What are the reasons for such flawed performance? The reason for the failure generally lies in the political setting. In a comparative study, Lundqvist (1980) compared the performance of the American clean air policy with that of the Swedish clean air policy: the former reflected the hastiness and unreliability of the “loser hare” while the latter reflected the slow and steady run of the “winner tortoise.” He claimed that this was, in part, due to the conflict-oriented, nationalized, and litigant style of decision making in the United States. In contrast, the Swedish style of decision making was consensus-oriented, localized, and voluntary. Lundqvist’s findings were echoed by those of many other studies (Vogel, 1986). Several case studies undertaken in the United States on individual program performance also seem to assign the burden of program failure to political factors. There are other scholars, however, who defend the American performance by offering success stories. Rosenbaum (1989, p. 234) says in defense:

Taken uncritically, this tacit consensus about program failures would seem a damning indictment of bureaucracy’s role in federal environmental protection and a discouraging omen for the future. Yet there is empirical evidence that some programs, in some instances, have worked reasonably well—or, at least, that the environment has improved when the programs were operating.

A careful examination of the American political setting is warranted at this point. The tone and direction of the environmental policy and environmental bureaucracy in the United States were set in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. In particular, two features of the act defined the scope and nature of the environmental bureaucracy. The first was an “action-forcing” provision included in Section 102 of the act. This provision required the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to perform certain acts within a given period and in a given manner. This style of implementation was kept alive in the legislation that followed in the 1970s. For instance, the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 required the EPA to propose a set of national standards on air quality within 30 days, to adopt state plans within one year, and to develop technology standards for auto emission within five years. This was a strategy of “speculative augmentation” that was bound to put an excessive burden on the bureaucracy and consequently was bound to fail (Jones, 1975).

According to Rosenbaum (1989), action-forcing provisions (or “hammer clauses”) had serious implications for the environmental bureaucracy, which, at that time, included 3 presidential staff agencies, 12 cabinet departments, and a few other independent agencies. They set strict time tables, assigned specific guidelines, and left the bureaucracy open to litigation. This meant that the bureaucracy had to stay constantly on the defensive. Collectively, these provisions challenged the traditional modes of administrative behavior by making the bureaucracy directly accountable to the public and by giving it an “untrustworthy and unreliable” image. These provisions put a considerable burden on the bureaucracy for setting uniform standards, producing fast results, and working in an open environment. This ran contrary to the British and Swedish administrative styles, which relied on discretion and flexibility.

The second feature of NEPA defining the nature of the environmental bureaucracy was the provision for environmental impact assessment (EIA). This provision placed the burden of identifying environmentally sensitive projects, assessing their impact on the environment, and eventually using the environmental criteria in decision making about the agency. This put the environmental bureaucracy further on the defensive, for it was the bureaucracy that had to do the justifying. The act, with its EIA provision, also pitted the environmental bureaucracy against the developmental bureaucracy and allowed critics to label the environmental bureaucracy as antidevelopment and antigrowth. A glaring example of this conflict occurred in June 1993, when a federal court passed a judgment requiring the Clinton administration to prepare an environmental impact study on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) before sending it to Congress for approval. Critics immediately labeled this requirement as antigrowth, for the resulting delay of several months could have likely hurt the economies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada.

Furthermore, the task of EIA places a heavy burden on the environmental bureaucracy. The EIA provision is based on the assumption that the bureaucracy possesses the scientific ability to conduct such studies. It is also based on the assumption that accurate costs and benefits can always be determined. Paradoxically, these assumptions that place trust in the bureaucracy eventually make the bureaucracy more vulnerable—vulnerable to litigation and to the whims and fancies of the scientific community. The EIA decisions of the bureaucracy have been and continue to be challenged, in the courts by industry for being too harsh and by the public for being too soft. The process of litigation itself, regardless of the outcome, weakens the bureaucracy by tarnishing its image, splitting its clientele, and making it a topic of media-led investigations. This entire process creates unnecessary adversity and promotes the image of the bureaucracy as ineffective and often even antidemocratic.

Today, the United States has one of the world’s most complex and comprehensive environmental bureaucracies. The genesis of the consolidated environmental bureaucracy dates back to the early 1970s, when President Nixon reorganized it by bringing several federal programs under the umbrella of the EPA. Since then, more than 20 new agencies dealing with environmental issues

have been created to implement more than 150 new laws passed during the last 20 years alone. The EPA's network now includes 10 regional offices, with a staff of over 18,000 and a budget of \$7.6 billion (Environmental Protection Agency, 2006). This reflects a more than doubling of the staff and a 16-fold increase in the budget since 1972 (a large amount of this increase amounts to waste treatment grant money committed for Superfund and local governments). Along with the EPA, several federal agencies—including the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, National Parks Service, Forest Service, Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), Council on Environment Quality, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Department of Energy—work for the environmental cause (Office of Management and Budget, 2006).

The American environmental bureaucracy faces many problems, including fragmentation, politicization, and excessive public and media exposure. The fragmented nature of the bureaucracy is evident from the fact that there are some 1800 subunits engaged in overlapping activities. Rabe (1986) argues that the nature of the bureaucracy—highly professionalized and greatly specialized—is the main source of institutional fragmentation. Commenting on the level of fragmentation, he notes that “federal control of all exposures from the manufacture, use, and disposal of vinyl chloride would have required the participation of five federal agencies and involvement of 15 separate laws” (1986, p. 14). Fragmentation leads to duplication, unnecessary turf fighting, and wastefulness. Although there are some scholars who find merit in fragmentation (Clarke and McCool, 1985), in general most consider this to be a liability. They also agree that the fragmentation results from the unique American political setting. This setting is built around the principles of the separation of powers, interest group lobbying, and federalism.

Environmental issues in the American setting are highly politicized. Even though such issues enjoy a certain degree of bipartisan support in Congress, party politics is evident in many other areas. During the Reagan years, for instance, the Republican Party worked under the principles of the new federalism. New federalism and its emphasis on decentralization affected the environmental cause adversely. The budget and staff of the EPA were slashed; assistance to state and local governments was reduced; and national priorities were redefined in favor of economic growth (Kraft and Vig, 1990). Similarly, during the George H. W. Bush years, the focus on competitiveness hurt the environmental cause and continued the trend begun during the Reagan years. The fragility of Bush's support of the environmental cause was exposed during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The presidential elections of 1992, which put Democratic William J. Clinton in the White House, provided better support for environmental groups. Vice President Al Gore produced a more conducive setting for environmental decision making. However, with the election of George W. Bush in 2000, environmentalists feared that Bush would be far less concerned with the well-being of the environment or even hostile to the movement. Critics claim that Bush was more receptive to corporate and economic interests than to environmental and public health interests. For example, the Bush administration withdrew the U.S. signature from the Kyoto Protocol that Clinton had signed, has attempted to roll back major CAA standards, and has repeatedly attempted to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to petroleum exploration.

## 11.4 Explaining Differences: A Global Approach to Comparison

In the three cases studied here—India, Hong Kong, and the United States—we find that environmental bureaucracy suffers from the image of being ineffective, inefficient, and insensitive. Some common reasons account for this image: (1) environmental issues are complex, and managing them

is a daunting task; (2) there is much ambiguity about the long-term impact of these issues; (3) the logic of environmental management is threatening; it aims at changing those very fundamental values and priorities of modern societies so precious to us; and (4) environmental administration often involves costs that are immediate and appear to be exceeding the long-term benefits. Costs are costs, whether in the form of cleanup projects or technological investments.

Beyond these common barriers, however, are reasons where differences mount as a result of administrative settings and strategies. When we compare the three bureaucracies on a common continuum of penetration, we realize that while all of them are being penetrated by their external systems (political, social, and global), they are not being invaded by the same set of factors and to the same degree. In other words, the settings pose unique problems for individual bureaucracies. If the problems are unique, then the solutions must also be unique. The quest for uniqueness, however, involves a painful process of separating factors that are not so unique, or, in other words, are standard. This is where comparative analysis is most useful, because it is only through comparison that we can separate the unique from the “standard.”

In our study, the Indian environmental bureaucracy is found to be most severely restricted by its social system (see Figure 11.2a). The effect of the global system, although present, is minimal. In fact, the forces of the global system (in the form of foreign aid and imported technologies) are undermined by the local culture—the culture which, at the end, defines the functioning scope of the bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are bound by their social identities, which offer them greater security and solace than their administrative positions. Administrative positions in this context become the means of social mobility. The political system in India, although resting on the assumption of a neutralized bureaucracy, fails to protect the bureaucrats from the pulls and pushes of the social system. It eventually becomes a counterproductive organization.




Figure 11.2 Environmental bureaucracy in (a) India, (b) Hong Kong, and (c) the United States.



In fact, the Indian environmental bureaucracy conflicts with the interests of the political system, while maintaining a harmonious relationship with the social system. Global forces also have a role to play. They influence the political system by changing the political agenda (the United Nations Conference on Human Environment tilted the agenda in favor of environmental issues); however, they are incapable of penetrating the social system. Since the penetrative capabilities of the political system are inept, the eventual effect of the global system (which tries to influence the administrative system through the political system) is minimal. New laws are passed, new programs are enacted, but the same practices continue.

The Hong Kong case is the direct opposite to the Indian case. The Hong Kong bureaucracy shows the greatest degree of vulnerability to the global system. Economic growth through international trade and competition is clearly the top priority of the territory. This priority is the driving force behind the political system, and the political system is in full harmony with the global system. We have observed that in India the lines of communication between the political system and the global system were, at best, blurred as a result of the overarching role of the social system. In the case of Hong Kong, the reverse is true. Similar to Indians, Hong Kong people are also bound by countless social traditions and rituals. However, this does not hamper the functioning of the political system and consequently the administrative system. Interestingly, the global forces are unable to penetrate the social system of Hong Kong (just as we observed in India); however, unlike in India, the “unpenetrated” social system does not become a stumbling block for the effective functioning of the political system.

The Hong Kong bureaucracy thus functions in a context which is global (Figure 11.2b). Its role is to support the political system so it can effectively steer the economy in the global system. Particularly because the political system is itself subservient to the global system, the task of the bureaucracy is to see that the system of Hong Kong remains competitive and in harmony with the global system. It is due to this special demand that the environmental bureaucracy in Hong Kong appears less regulatory and more consensus building than other bureaucracies in our study.

The Weberian characteristics of bureaucracy—clear lines of authority and neutrality—are most carefully preserved in Hong Kong. This is essential to maintain coordination. Local regulators are reluctant to define and shape policies even when the flexibility to do so exists (Khaton, 1992). Very little tension and frustration seem to appear in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, top level bureaucrats, who in Hong Kong are the decision makers, function within the parameters of the global economy. While they may realize the need for environmental protection, they are unlikely to engage in promoting it unless other competitors in the international arena also do so. It would not be surprising to see Hong Kong turn into a champion of the environmental cause if this would benefit its position in the international market. It is capable of reorienting its economy to international shifts. Such a shift would be painfully slow for India to make.

Unlike the Indian and the Hong Kong bureaucracies, the American bureaucracy is most easily penetrated by the political system. While the global role of the United States is undisputed, this does not, to a great extent, affect the bureaucracy. With a few exceptions, environmental politics in the United States is very much a local game fought in the local arena with local interests. In fact, global and social forces are absorbed by the political system, which ultimately defines the functioning scope of the bureaucracy (see Figure 11.2c).

Separation of power, an important precondition of presidential regimes, puts the American bureaucracy under the service of more than one master. Since a great proportion of interpretive power is vested in the bureaucracy, it becomes a ground for direct lobbying by interest groups. More often than not, intense lobbying fragments the bureaucracy. Over the years, it leads to an organization that is relatively independent and yet is undesirably fragmented. The independence

of the bureaucracy results from an apparent lack of cohesiveness within the political system (in parliamentary systems, cohesiveness is automatic). The fragmentation of the bureaucracy arises from the high level of professionalism within its own ranks.

Overall, the political system in the United States makes it largely impossible for the environmental bureaucracy to be anything other than regulatory. Moreover, the political arrangements require that its regulatory powers be closely scrutinized. A fear of too much administrative discretion is shared by all parties concerned—the executive branch, Congress, the judiciary, and the public. They also dread bureaucratic professionalism, for such is again a source of independence and authority. Binding the environmental bureaucracy with hammer clauses and scientific norms is a sign of mistrust and apprehension.

Thus, our study shows that a different context exists for each of the three bureaucracies: the Indian functions in a social setting, Hong Kong's in a global setting, and the American in a political setting. Their unique settings are hardly matters of choice: on the contrary, the three systems are captives of their history, culture, and forced priorities. While the three bureaucracies face the same monumental task—that of making their economic growth environmental friendly—they each must rely on different mechanisms to alter the status quo. In India, the primary need is to develop a harmonious relationship between the social and the political system. This means a far more sweeping agenda for change than has been identified so far. In Hong Kong, the factors are global and economic. The strategy there must be to strengthen the hands of the supportive bureaucracy rather than introduce a regulatory bureaucracy, because regulations are self-defeating for the territory. In the United States, the factors are political, and efforts must be made to find a harmonious political setting for the environmental bureaucracy.

From a general point of view, this study suggests that the positing of bureaucracy as a dependent variable is useful. Since bureaucracy does not exist in a vacuum, the space around it must be as carefully examined as the bureaucracy itself. A global and comparative approach will help us build new generalizations and, at the same time, will help us better understand our own problems and settings.

## References

- Agarwal, A. and Narain, S., *The State of India's Environment, 1999: The Citizen's Fifth Report*, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1999.
- Barrett, B.F.D. and Therivel, R., *Environmental Policy and Impact Assessment in Japan*, Routledge, London, 1991.
- Bidwell, R., 15 Years of progress: Environmental institution building in Hong Kong, in *Pollution in the Urban Environment* (M.W.H. Chan et al., eds.), POLNET, Hong Kong, 1988.
- Brickman, R., Jasanoff, S., and Ilgen, T., *Controlling Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States*, Cornell, Ithaca, NY, 1985.
- Caldwell, L.K., *In Defense of the Earth: International Protection of the Biosphere*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1972.
- Clarke, J.N. and McCool, D., *Staking out the Terrain: Power Differentials among Natural Resource Management Agencies*, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1985.
- Downey, M.J., Law and control of Hong Kong environment, *Hong Kong Engineer* 15:17–23, 1987.
- Dwivedi, O.P. and Jain, R.B., *India's Administrative State*, Gitanjali, New Delhi, 1985.
- Dwivedi, O.P. and Tiwari, B.N., *Environmental Crisis and Hinduism*, Gitanjali, New Delhi, 1987.
- Enloe, C., *The Politics of Pollution in a Comparative Perspective: Ecology and Power in Four Nations*, David McKay, New York, 1975.
- Environmental Protection Agency, 2006. <http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm>

- Environmental Protection Department, 2005. <http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english>
- Fernandes, W. and Kulkarni, S., *A New Forest Policy: People's Rights and Environmental Needs*, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1983.
- Garcia-Zamor, J.-C. and Khator, R., eds., *Public Administration in the Global Village*, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1994.
- Goodman, D. and Redclift, M., eds., *Environment and Development in Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, England, 1991.
- Guimaraes, Roberto P., *The Ecopolitics of Development in the Third World: Politics and Environment in Brazil*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1991.
- Harris, P., *Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics*, MacMillan, Hong Kong, 1988.
- HKPC, *Annual Report*, Hong Kong Productivity Council, Hong Kong, 1989.
- Horowitz, D.L., Is there a third world policy process? *Policy Sciences* 22:197–212, 1989.
- Jain, R.B., Reverse discrimination: A dilemma in quest for social justice and equal opportunity, *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, January–March 1981.
- Jones, C.O., *Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1975.
- Kamieniecki, S. and Sanasarian, E., Conducting comparative research on environmental policy, *Natural Resources Journal* 30:321–329, 1990.
- Kraft, M. and Vig, N.J., Environmental policy from the seventies to the nineties: Continuity and change, in *Environmental Policy in the 1990s* (N.J. Vig and M.E. Kraft, eds.), Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C., 1990.
- Kelley, D.K.S. and Wescott, R., *The Economic Superpowers and the Environment: The United States, the Soviet Union and Japan*, W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA, 1976.
- Kelman, S., *Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.
- Khator, R., *Forests: The People and the Government*, National Book Organization, New Delhi, 1989.
- Khator, R., Bureaucracy, environmentalism, and industrial policy in Hong Kong, in *Bureaucracy in the Third World* (H.K. Asmerom, H. Hoppe, and R.B. Jain, eds.), Free Press, the Netherlands, 1990.
- Khator, R., *Environment, Development, and Politics in India*, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1991.
- Khator, R., State autonomy and environmental challenge in India, *The Political Chronicle*, November–December, 1992.
- Khator, R., Ng, K., and Chan, H.S., Environmental management and street-level regulators: A cultural trap? *Public Administration and Development* 12:387–397, 1992.
- Knoepfel, P., et al., Comparing environmental policies: Different styles, similar content, in *Comparative Policy Research: Learning from Experience* (M. Dierkes, H. Weiler, and A. Berthoin, eds.), St. Martin Press, New York, 1987.
- Lalvani, G.H., Law and pollution control, in *India's Environment: Crises and Responses* (J. Bandopadhyay et al., eds.), Natraj, Dehradun, 1985.
- Lam, K.C., Consultative mechanisms for environmental legislation in Hong Kong, *Green Productivity* December:14–23, 1987.
- Lehman, H., The political economy of comparative environmental policy, *Policy Studies Journal* 20:719–732, 1992.
- Lester, J.P., *Environmental Politics and Policy*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1989.
- Lundqvist, L.J., *The Hare and Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1980.
- Ministry of Environment and Forests, *Annual Report*, Government of India, New Delhi, 2004–2005.
- Office of Management and Budget, 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/epa.html>
- Puri, K.K., Environment pollution: Policies and programmes, in *Environment Management in India* (R.K. Saprú, ed.), Ashish, New Delhi, 1987.

- Rabe, B., *Fragmentation and Integration in State Environmental Management*, The Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1986.
- Rabushka, A., *Value for Motley: The Hong Kong Budgetary Process*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA, 1976.
- Reich, M.R., Mobilizing for environmental policy in Italy and Japan, *Comparative Politics* 16:379–402, 1984.
- Reich, M.R. and Bowonder, B., Environmental policy in India: Strategies for better implementation, *Policy Studies Journal* 20:643–661, 1992.
- Riggs, F.W., Bureaucracy: A profound puzzle for presidentialism, in *Handbook on Bureaucracy* (A. Farazmand, ed.), Marcel Dekker, New York, 1994.
- Rosenbaum, W.A., The bureaucracy and environmental policy, in *Environmental Politics and Policy* (J.P. Lester, ed.), Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1989.
- Siegel, R. and Weinberg, L., *Comparing Public Policies: United States, Soviet Union, Europe*, Dorsey, Homewood, IL, 1977.
- Solesbury, S., Issues and innovations in environmental policy in Britain, West Germany, and California, *Policy Analysis* 2:1–38, 1976.
- Varandani, G., Judicial approach to environmental pollution, in *Environmental Management in India* (R.K. Sapru, ed.), Ashish, New Delhi, 1987.
- Vogel, D., *National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1986.



## Chapter 12

---

# The Role of Efficiency in Bureaucratic Study

---

Hindy Lauer Schachter

### CONTENTS

	12.1	Frederick Taylor and Scientific Management.....	240
1	2.2	Administrative Principles .....	241
	12.3	Municipal Reform Literature .....	242
	12.3.1	Linking Principles and Municipal Reform .....	243
	12.4	Critique of the Principles Literature .....	244
12	.5	Efficiency/Responsiveness/Equity Trade-Offs .....	245
	12.5.1	New Public Administration.....	245
12	.6	Critical Theory.....	246
12	.7	The New Public Service.....	248
1	2.8	Conclusions.....	248
		References .....	250

Efficiency, conventionally defined in terms of optimizing output/input or benefit/cost, has always been a key criterion in evaluating public and private bureaucracies (e.g., see Downs and Larkey, 1986; Blau and Meyer, 1987; Wilson, 1989). Weber (1946) argues that bureaucracies are a crucial aspect of modern life because their organizational characteristics such as specialization and hierarchy engender greater efficiency than other organizational forms. Considerable organizational theory literature centers on designing units to maximize efficiency.

Public administration textbooks (e.g., Gordon, 1986, p. 45; Rosenbloom, 1989, pp. 15–16) sometimes describe a classical era where efficiency was the principal criterion used to evaluate bureaucratic performance. This period begins with Frederick Taylor's work on scientific management

(1895, 1947a,b), encompasses the municipal reform and early twentieth-century governmental reorganization literature, and is supposed to close with Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick's (1937) *Papers on the Science of Administration*. Its seeming reliance on a monochromatic conceptual perspective is contrasted with modern concern with bureaucratic responsiveness, equity, and efficiency with inevitable trade-offs among these variables precluding optimal performance on all counts (Wilson, 1973). For some analysts, the new, more variegated perspective means less keenness for efficiency at least in the short run (Frederickson, 1980).

Contemporary arguments against attempts to maximize efficiency can be interpreted either as an increase in analytic sophistication or as an under-reliance on a concept that really explains what people want from bureaucracies. Knowledge of historical use of efficiency as a paradigmatic concept is necessary to make a choice. It is important to know how earlier scholars conceptualized the construct—whether as a stand-alone goal or in relation to other values such as responsiveness. In particular, we should want to know whether they posited relationships between efficiency and other values that did not involve trade-offs but rather where high output/input was seen as a prerequisite to responsiveness or equity.

This chapter analyzes some of the ways in which efficiency has been used as a conceptual underpinning to bureaucratic study. The thrust of the argument is that the classical era actually contains two approaches to understanding efficiency, one primarily managerial and the other political. The first literature, which stretches from Taylor to Gulick and Urwick, examines the internal mechanisms of public and private organizations with an eye toward increasing output/input. The second, written by turn-of-the-century political Progressives, focuses on ways to improve efficiency by strengthening the links between bureaucrats and their stakeholders. This literature anticipates and deflects many of the modern concerns about relating efficiency to responsiveness and equity. It provides a socially responsive dimension to the efficiency concept. The issue then becomes how modern analysts can appropriate its insights to expand the usefulness of efficiency in bureaucratic study.

The first three sections of this chapter provide an overview of the classical era. The first identifies how Frederick Taylor's work inaugurated a concern for organizational efficiency. The second examines the main tenets of the principles of management literature. The third explores the role of efficiency in municipal reform writings.

Two challenges to this early work are then examined. The first challenge, exemplified by the writings of Herbert Simon (1947), critiques specific approaches to optimizing efficiency. The second, proposed by "new" public administration and by critical theory among others, challenges the importance of efficiency itself.

The final section of this chapter discusses the impact of these critiques on contemporary bureaucratic management. The major thrust of this section is to use insights from the municipal reform literature to propose a revitalized way of conceptualizing efficiency that answers some of the problems raised by modern critics of the efficiency concept.

## 12.1 Frederick Taylor and Scientific Management

The turn-of-the-century engineer and management consultant Frederick Taylor is often credited with inaugurating both business and scholarly concerns with bureaucratic efficiency (e.g., Wren, 1979). Taylor (1895) delivered his first paper at a National American Society of Mechanical Engineers meeting, a forum where managers had been discussing productivity improvement for at least nine years (e.g., Metcalfe, 1886; Towne, 1886). The decisive innovation of his contribution was to argue

that organizations could optimize output/input by creating a work science applicable to even the most routine tasks.

For Taylor (1947a, p. 21), the art of management required knowing what an organization or unit should do and then meeting this goal in the best and cheapest way. The effective manager creates information, applying new data to solve old problems, particularly through time study, where engineers deconstruct work into elementary components and analyze the time it takes to do each under varying contingencies.

Taylor was an early proponent of the idea that a new approach to studying work required a more specialized organizational structure, particularly the development of a planning department (Taylor, 1947a, pp. 94–148). He argued that organizations should leave the military form of command and create functional hierarchies where each worker received orders and help from multiple supervisors, each with a separate expertise and function. Examples of functional supervisors are the gang boss who supervises work until the material is in the machine, the speed boss who takes over during an operation, the inspector who checks quality, and the repair boss who keeps the machines in running order.

Taylor's ideas were extensively debated in the first two decades of the twentieth century with hundreds of articles published on his work in Europe and America. Almost everyone writing on efficiency credited his ideas as an influence although Taylor did not always agree with the strategies proposed by many of his contemporaries who said that they wanted to maximize efficiency (Schachter, 1989).

The most well-known literature that emerged from the drive to create new information involved an attempt to systematize internal principles of management to improve efficiency in all organizations, public or private. With demand for efficiency spilling over from the business to the public sector (e.g., Weber, 1919), a second (somewhat less cited) literature appeared centering on the relationship between increasing output/input and a renaissance in citizen activity. This second literature is somewhat more parochial, concentrating only on American public agencies, but it offers links between efficiency and other valued goals. Each literature will be examined in turn.

## 12.2 Administrative Principles

The literature on internal principles includes writers from the public and private spheres and several Western nations. On demographic variables, Emerson (1912a,b), Henri Fayol (1937, 1949), Luther Gulick (1937), and Lyndall Urwick (1938, 1944) compose a good cross section of principles proponents. Emerson and Fayol came from the business world. Urwick had a background as an army officer. Gulick managed and wrote about public agencies. While Emerson and Gulick were Americans, Fayol was French, and Urwick came from Great Britain.

To these writers, such background differences would be inconsequential because their concern lay in finding organizational similarities across the boundaries of nation and company type. Efficiency was the paramount goal for all organizations regardless of any other purpose they might have. Indeed, Emerson (1912a, p. 373) went so far as to say, "The ideal of the... Efficiency Principles is waste elimination.... The mere purpose for which waste is to be eliminated is not important."

A key belief was that the same structural principles would enhance public and private efficiency in all cultures. Fayol (1937, p. 101) wrote, "All undertakings require planning, organization, command, coordination and control, and... all must observe the same general principles. We are no longer confronted with several administrative sciences but with one alone, which can be applied equally well to public and to private affairs."



While these writers differed on the exact number of principles one could derive from the science of administration, three issues they all saw as important were division of labor, authority, and span of control. All four authors posit that specialization increases efficiency because it makes better use of the varying skills of different workers and eliminates the time lost when people turn from one job to the next. Gulick (1937, pp. 9–10) writes, “The efficiency of a group working together is directly related to the homogeneity of the work they are performing.” Urwick (1944, p. 48) calls specialization “the way of progress in human organisation.”

Because specialization requires coordination, bureaucracies create hierarchies to manage work and amalgamate specialized tasks. All four writers insist that the authority of each person on the chain of command be commensurate with responsibility. Top management must define responsibility precisely and allocate enough authority to accomplish each task.

In an interlocking hierarchy reaching from the chief executive to entry-level workers, unity of command is crucial. Fayol (1949) and Gulick (1937) explicitly criticize Taylor’s advocacy of functional supervision because this violates the principle of one command locus for a given worker.

The principles literature also posits the need for each manager to have a relatively tight span of control, that is, a small number of people under his or her direct supervision. Gulick (1937) argues that the best span will vary, depending on the executive, the time required to complete the task and the spatial arrangement of the enterprise. Urwick (1938, p. 8) adds numbers to the relationship, asserting that no manager can supervise more than five or six people whose work interlocks.

One difference that does appear among the four authors is their relative sophistication in apprehending the difficulties in applying these principles to specific cases. Urwick gives the most unconditional loyalty to the principles. Urwick (1944, p. 9) even argues that going against them amounts to an antisocial act in the same sense as forgery or murder. At the other end of the continuum, Gulick explicitly notes the difficulties involved in applying the principles to various contingencies (e.g., 1937, p. 8). He even cautions that structural change alone may prove insufficient to produce effective operations (Gulick 1937, p. 37). (For a discussion of this aspect of Gulick’s thought, see Hammond, 1990.) Because of his recognition of nuance, Gulick’s work serves as a bridge between the classical era and some of the modern critics.

## 12.3 Municipal Reform Literature

While the principles literature concentrates on establishing correct internal structures for public and private bureaucracies, the municipal reform literature uses the drive to efficiency as a way of stimulating greater citizen interest in government. William H. Allen, Henry Bruere, and Frederick Cleveland, all associated with New York’s Bureau of Municipal Research, argue that collecting new management data to improve efficiency in local agencies can change the relations of governors and governed. Their search for greater output/input is not simply a plea to clean more streets; its importance lies in the fact that citizens will play a larger role in guiding government action when additional data are collected and made available to show them what works and what does not. It is part of an attempt to get both a more assertive and a more democratic government.

New York’s Bureau of Municipal Research, established in 1906, was a privately funded organization that was often critical of local government (Dahlberg, 1966; Schachter, 1989, 1997; Kahn, 1997). Its director, William Allen (1907), was a stalwart proponent of increasing output/input, but for him the most important ingredient of efficiency was the data collection on which it was based. Communities wanted certain accomplishments in areas such as education. In a traditional system, citizens had little information on current or optimal school performance and thus could not interact effectively with executives, legislatures, and administrators and get responsive government (Allen, 1912). Only

when agencies began to collect needed data could the relations between governed and governors change. The new information would allow people to critique governments that did not give them what they wanted.

Allen (1949/1950, p. 525) once objected to a state law that exempted New York City from filing certain reports. His complaint was “That’s as undemocratic as can be. It’s against efficiency.” Contemporary writers might say the law aided efficiency by allowing bureaucrats to concentrate on task fulfillment, but for Allen, efficiency was inextricably linked with information exchange.

Cleveland also saw information as the key to more responsive legislatures (1912) and active citizens (1913). His writing laments the waste of money in cities run by grafters and bosses (1915) and blames the problem on the paucity of scientific information on municipal work. The people want high output/input but will not be able to get it without more data on how much cities should spend to reach certain levels of lighting or street paving.

Bruere joined Allen and Cleveland in seeing efficiency as important because it helps meet want satisfaction. He observed (1912b) that building a new school at least cost is not very useful if the location is one that the community does not desire. A police department’s efficiency has to be directed to the purposes for which the community erected it (Bureau of City Betterment, 1906, p. 3). Bruere (1912a) explicitly differentiates his use of the efficiency concept from that of private-sector engineers. Construction engineers may consider New York’s East River bridges quite efficient but he labels them inefficient because they were not designed to meet the needs of the mass transit population.

The Bureau writers relate efficiency to social equity because the poor were the ones most likely to suffer in its absence (e.g., Allen, 1907, p. vii); slum dwellers had the most to lose from waste in public health care or education. It would be difficult to overemphasize the indignation at class hypocrisy that pervades this literature. At one point, Allen (1907, pp. 198–199) says that readers should ask themselves, “Am I doing things that would be considered crimes or misdemeanors if done by residents of the slums? Am I indifferent to wrongs committed by the government? Am I infinitely more interested in suppressing flagrant vice than in preventing flagrant injustice?”

A key difference between the principles and municipal reform literatures is that the former assumes efficiency is a stand-alone bureaucratic goal and concentrates on internal changes to promote it. The latter regards efficiency as a strategy to promote the goal of bureaucratic responsiveness and concentrates on explaining how such promotion aids equity and citizen participation.

### ***12.3.1 Linking Principles and Municipal Reform***

Some highly regarded public administration literature of the twenties and thirties relies on both the principles and municipal reform traditions. White’s (1926) public administration textbook begins by considering efficiency in relation to political goals. The author notes that the immediate objective of public administration is efficient use of resources but the broader goal is to perform the functions of the state itself (e.g., maintain order, secure justice). It is in that context that White places heavy emphasis on how to structure units to increase efficiency.

Pendleton Herring (1936) writes that a democratic state requires efficiency to accommodate the needs of the community. Efficient administrators try to eliminate friction between themselves and the community so that they can readily learn what they must accomplish.

Marshall Dimock (1936) argues that while many people define the concept as a synonym for economy, he insists that true efficiency means helping others to secure the optimum results that are possible with given resources. To implement social programs in the way that helps the most people, administrators must learn the general principles of management such as unity of

command. But this is done simply as a strategy. Dimock (1937, p. 39) notes, “We do not want efficiency for its own sake; we want it for the sake of our democratic form of government.”

The wisdom of this literature is that bureaucracies are efficient for a purpose. The principles are a tactic to aid what is itself only a strategy.

## 12.4 Critique of the Principles Literature

The earliest critiques of the efficiency concept concentrate on demonstrating problems with the principles without attacking the importance of efficiency itself. The most influential of such critiques is Herbert Simon’s *Administrative Behavior* (1947). (For an account of its impact on textbooks, see Dunn, 1988.) Simon is squarely in the tradition of those who accept efficiency as the guiding criterion in bureaucratic design; like the principles’ authors, he accepts that efficiency is completely neutral in regard to which goals are to be attained. His protest is simply against regarding the principles as immutable guides in concrete situations.

The principles literature offers to tell practicing executives how to maximize output/input, and Simon argues that the advice is not very useful on a case-by-case basis. Division of labor is a key precept in the principles literature, but the manager’s problem is not only whether to specialize but also how to decide the basis for dividing labor. The principles do not say whether dividing by function, place, process, or client is preferable.

In addition, the principles conflict with each other. If unity of command means that only one person can give orders to a particular worker, then it is incompatible with specialization because a worker may need advice from different experts. Span of control conflicts with keeping to a minimum the number of hierarchical levels through which information must pass before a decision maker acts on it. When all workers in a health department report to one person, that executive has a large span of control; if the agency appoints assistant managers for some clinics, then people may complain of red tape as it takes a long time for information to move through the newly created layers (Simon, 1947, p. 27).

Simon did not urge managers to forgo the principles entirely but rather to take a more tentative approach to structural questions. He was not the first to urge a tentative stance—both Gulick and Dimock (1938) did this in the thirties—but his book became a standard text in public-administration courses and a rallying cry for people who wanted to change the field (Augier and March, 2001). After his work appeared, many writers took a less dogmatic tack to structural analyses. For example, the fourth edition of White’s (1955, pp. 20–21) public administration textbook adds to his usual introduction that managers may not always know the one best way of designing organizations.

Since 1947, the principles have been undermined from many angles. Motivation theorists (e.g., Herzberg et al., 1959) now question the relationship between specialization and efficiency. They argue that challenging assignments encompassing a whole task stimulate at least some workers to better performance. This argument has led private and public organizations to implement job enlargement and enrichment. In the first reform, companies amalgamate routine tasks that were once rigidly divided. In job enrichment, organizations add planning and control functions to an employee’s work.

A need for flexibility causes some organizations in volatile environments to forsake rigid hierarchies and unity of command. These organizations implement matrix teams where employees are simultaneously members of a functional department and a project team (Griffin, 2002, pp. 370–373). The argument is even made (Landau, 1969) that early attempts to prevent duplication

may have hurt efficiency because redundancy can aid reliability as in a conversation where people repeat words to prevent misunderstandings.

The principles literature tried to present an easy path to efficiency. The work of Simon and others convinced managers that the road to high output/input was more difficult to traverse.

## 12.5 Efficiency/Responsiveness/Equity Trade-Offs

By the 1960s, some theorists began to question the importance of high output/input itself. They argued that inevitable trade-offs exist between efficient administration and responsive and equitable government. Some early proponents of this view were associated with the “new” public administration movement. As we will see later, this view also appears in Denhardt’s (2000) proposal for a public administration paradigm oriented toward service.

### 12.5.1 *New Public Administration*

The early assault on efficiency itself is identified with the “new” public administration of the late sixties and seventies (Marini, 1971; Waldo, 1971a); the equity concerns of this literature also appear in the works of contemporaneous economists advocating a stakeholder view of corporate responsibility. Participants in these literatures cast themselves as rebels and announce that efficiency should not necessarily be the foremost organizational goal.

The most popular approach is to stress that agency activity is a zero-sum game with inevitable trade-offs between efficiency and other values. Frederickson (1980) asserts that the contest is between high output/input and responsiveness to the poor; although Frederickson sees efficiency as a value with some usefulness (1976), he prefers greater deference to the wishes of low-income communities.

White (1969, p. 35) casts the struggle as between efficiency and client freedom, arguing, “The degree of efficiency... is simply a lower-level framing of the question of how much freedom the client wishes or may have to yield in the name of the general order.” For White, the efficiency criterion causes bureaucracies to husband resources and choose how much to invest in a given case; he prefers a client-centered organization with an unequivocal mandate to help people—even hopeless cases.

Economist Okun (1975) sees a trade-off between efficiency and equal rights. To achieve maximum output/input, organizations must concentrate resources and authority in a few hands, but this leads to inequity because the central players have better access to legal advice and more forums to disseminate their views. No blanket solution to the dilemma exists because some disparity in income will always be necessary in our sociopolitical system.

The trade-off metaphor is not the only one offered for reconsidering the worth of maximizing output/input. Goodin and Wilenski (1984) assert that efficiency is not a stand-alone goal but simply an instrumental means to obtain want satisfaction. They see this interpretation as a stronger check on efficiency than the trade-off metaphor where no theoretical reason exists to prefer responsiveness or client freedom. In Goodin and Wilenski’s scenario, efficiency (a surface principle) has to yield to want satisfaction (a meta-principle that gives it meaning). Goodin and Wilenski (1984, p. 513) argue that bureaucracies must override the need for efficiency if people want particular arrangements that make decision making “less efficient in some sense.”

The new public administration writers share two characteristics. First, like so many of their predecessors from Taylor on, they combine scholarship with a call to action. They want improvement as well as understanding. Second, they tend to see their concern for responsiveness and want satisfaction as a challenge to traditional theory. They make scant reference to the municipal reform literature and its analogous concerns.

Perhaps because these writers do not grapple with earlier attempts to relate efficiency and responsiveness, their critique is somewhat amorphous. It is not clear whether these analysts are actually against high doses of efficiency or simply regret the uses for which bureaucrats invoke high output/input as an icon. One problem seems to be that these writers have a limited view as to where efficiency might be a pertinent concept. They envision high output/input as a variable in allocating goods and services but not in distributing chances to participate. If we tie the concept to want satisfaction, however, and we find that a considerable portion of a community wants more opportunity to participate in some public agency activity, then a key administrative question becomes how to implement a system that offers such opportunities with maximum efficiency. If a community wants to increase social equity, then the task is to do this efficiently; surely, we prefer to spend \$2,000,000 and raise equity by X than to spend \$6,000,000 and change the equity ratio by  $1/3X$ .

Savage (1971) is one of the few new public administration writers to see that output/input questions are actually crucial to the social agenda. He argues that the problem with contemporary bureaucracies is that they do not ameliorate social justice efficiently.

This is the position of the municipal reform literature. The Bureau writers considered efficiency a prerequisite to responsiveness and equity, not a trade-off with them. The old writers would have agreed with Goodin and Wilenski's argument about want satisfaction, but they would have envisioned a broader notion of the wants that organizations should satisfy efficiently. For example, Goodin and Wilenski (1984, p. 514) argue that efficiency and equity clash in job training programs; it is more cost effective to train middle class people, but equity considerations may cause a community to work with the truly disadvantaged. The municipal reformers would reply that if a community wants job training for the poor, then the key question becomes how to implement such programs efficiently. If the public wants training for the disadvantaged, opening programs for middle class people can never be efficient, just as the most skillfully constructed bridges are inefficient if they do not meet the needs of mass transit riders. For the municipal reformers, high benefits or least cost gains the respected name of efficiency only in the service of responsive action. The municipal reform literature celebrates efficiency because it holds high output/input to be a prerequisite for realizing the value of responsiveness. On the issue of efficiency, the new public administration and its allies might have engaged the older literature in dialogue.

## 12.6 Critical Theory

The most radical attack on output/input comes from critical theory which sees the analytic deference given efficiency as a way of preserving existing power relations. Critical theorists stress that every bureaucracy consists of a controlling entity and subordinates; the powerful select goals for the organization and define actions as rational if they help meet those objectives (Denhardt, 1981; Fischer and Sirianni, 1984; Fischer, 1990). Traditional bureaucratic studies focus on the quest for better performance, neglecting the tension created when lower-level employees do not consider goal attainment rational in terms of their own interests.

Denhardt (1981, p. 43) uses critical theory to argue that concern with efficiency leads scholars to neglect the inner lives of the workers—their search for meaning—and to concentrate “on the outer world of behavior, performance and accomplishment.” He asserts that a critical focus means reprioritizing scholarly interest toward processes that favor individual growth rather than efficient production. For him, the central question “*is no longer how the individual may contribute to the efficient operation of the system, but how the individual may transcend the system*” (Denhardt, 1981, p. 131, emphasis in original).

A focus on people’s need to find meaning through work does not necessarily place critical theory out of alignment with other writing on bureaucracies. The bulk of the postwar motivation literature puts great stock on increasing autonomy and responsibility throughout the chain of command. Critical theorists are not even the first to assign innate importance to the psychological state of individual bureaucrats. As early as 1936, Dimock argued that employee satisfaction was a good in its own right.

Critical theory is at odds with earlier work for two other reasons. First, from Taylor on, previous writers always assumed that the interests of organizations and workers were (or through technique could be made) compatible. Critical theory assumes that interests are opposed; structures of organized actions make legitimate, uncoerced discourse between workers and executives difficult to achieve. Critical theory emphasizes the elitist character of modern bureaucracies.

Second, critical theory is one of several attempts beginning in the 1970s and 1980s to make inner life a pivot of organizational analysis and to define organizations as something more than instruments for task accomplishment. Other attempts include White and McSwain’s (1983) transformational theory which concerns individuals liberating themselves from their psychic prisons and Hummel (1994). The writers mentioned in the early sections of this chapter (Taylor, the principles exponents, the municipal reformers, Simon, etc.) did not emphasize consciousness at the expense of concrete objectives.

This may mean that traditional theory neglected a key aspect of agency life. But problems emerge in using the search for personal meaning as an ultimate criterion. Over time, no person can ever be certain of his or her own inner feelings much less those of a comrade; emotions constantly shift, an insight used brilliantly by Dostoevsky in creating fictional characters with the ring of truth. Arendt (1963, p. 91) puts the matter clearly in noting that

not only is the human heart a place of darkness which, with certainty, no human eye can, penetrate; the qualities of the heart need darkness and protection against the light of the public to grow and to remain what they are meant to be, innermost motives which are not for public display. However deeply heartfelt a motive may be, once it is brought out and exposed for public inspection it becomes an object of suspicion rather than insight... unlike deeds and words which are meant to appear... the motives behind such deeds and words are destroyed in their essence through appearance.

Trading insights about personal growth is often laced with hypocrisy. Ultimately, we must validate a person’s assertions of having found meaning by examining that person’s deeds; subjective feelings are measured against outcomes. John Jones can scream that he has found his inner soul until he is blue in the face, but if he treats clients and fellow bureaucrats exactly as he did before the inner breakthrough, who cares? Indeed, if Clerk Jones works with welfare clients or the homeless or the terminally ill, to put his consciousness rather than their services at the center of analysis, it is to care more for the relatively privileged member of the relationship. The rationale for doing that has to focus on future action. The scholar relates concern for the bureaucrat’s psyche to a

belief that an agency that fosters legitimate internal discourse provides better services or that an organization that builds barriers to internal communication will not know how to have legitimate discourse with citizens.

Analysis of alienation is important for understanding what happens in organizations, but primarily so if it links up with how consciousness affects action relating to substantive governmental aims. In 1977, Denhardt cautioned that scholars did not know whether the new approach would prove useful in enhancing actions relating to public service, but it seemed that much might be gained in pursuing it. In 1985, Forester argued that critical theory had practical implications for planning departments; its focus on distorted communication helped administrators anticipate and correct for effective design review and implement more democratic planning. Matters are handled more economically because open information exchange reduces unnecessary disruption of the planning process. By 1993, Forester argued that critical theory ought to show how public policies alter the structural conditions of social action, the actual social interactions of affected people, the conditions of citizens' recourse to discourses with administrators, and the public's capacity to challenge claims to truth and justice.

For scholars who are not themselves critical theorists, interest in this approach can be sustained by the belief that its psychological insights relate to service delivery, that less alienated entry-level personnel perform their tasks in a preferable way, or that an organization that engages the agendas of its entry-level workers will be more responsive to the public-at-large. For such analysts, critical theory is important precisely because its arguments suggest new approaches to old questions about efficiency; the emphasis is on using insights from this approach to help individuals contribute better service.

## 12.7 The New Public Service

At the start of the new millennium, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) articulated a vision of public management which focuses on the administrator's responsibility to serve and empower citizens. This attractive model is a response to Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) reinventing government model with its emphasis on markets and customers. The new public service model values citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship. It insists that the public interest is the aim not the by-product of administration and that public workers serve citizens rather than customers. It encourages extensive, broad-based dialogue between administrators and citizens.

Denhardt and Denhardt say that the perspective that undergirds their new public service model is that in contrast to managerial calls for greater efficiency, they want greater responsiveness. Thus, while they mention critical theory as one root for their ideas, their model is also heir to much of the new public administration's thinking that perceives efficiency as a trade-off with more desirable qualities. While they do say that efficiency "should not be lost" (p. 557), they do not accept the assumption that efficiency is necessary to maximize other valued criteria. They want efficiency placed in the context of democracy and the public interest. The question then becomes how the placement should be construed, as a series of trade-offs or with efficiency in the role of a necessary tactical aid to achieve desirable values?

## 12.8 Conclusions

The quest for more efficient organizations has been a staple of bureaucratic study throughout the century. Looking for an easy path to efficiency, some of the earlier writers tried to enunciate immutable principles of bureaucratic structure. Today, writers on public and private organizations stress that no one structural ideal exists; the most useful patterns depend on circumstances. Managers

are taught to take a contingency approach to structure; they appreciate that appropriate design depends on many variables. Traditional bureaucratic characteristics such as specialization and hierarchy may be useful in one instance, dysfunctional in the next.

Since the late sixties, the worth of efficiency itself has come under fire from people with concerns for responsiveness and equity. The conflict is articulated most vividly in public-sector writing but it also appears in debates about how to make business more socially responsive. People with a broad concept of corporate performance want to judge private bureaucracies on their impact on customers, employees, and neighbors as well as on shareholder profits. Some people say it may even be right to see less output/input in the short run to further responsiveness to outside parties, but generally even those who take a broad view of corporate performance stress that socially responsible companies should not lose in the profit ratings over long periods (e.g., the discussion in Griffin, 2002, pp. 111–118).

These corporate innovators face a dilemma that appears in any assault on efficiency; it is difficult to disregard high output/input as a value in practice. Waldo (1971b) notes that even people who criticize efficiency are not so blunt as to say that they prefer inefficiency.

Indeed, Dwight Waldo's career is a case in point. In *The Administrative State* (1948), he cautions against considering efficiency as an ultimate value. But by 1986, he notes, "[I]n the beginning I came at efficiency with the instincts or biases of the humanist. . . . A long the way, so to speak, I had second thoughts. . . . I concluded that considerations of efficiency were relevant to the attainment of liberal or humane values" (Brown and Stillman, 1986). Efficiency is a criterion in programs to increase civil rights, feed the hungry, or house the poor.

One way of dealing with this trade-off dilemma is to make it explicit at the definition level that actions are inefficient unless they are responsive to a relevant public. In a 1912 article, William Prendergast, New York City's Progressive comptroller, explicitly rejected "results/expenditures" as a definition for efficiency. He preferred defining the concept as doing what the public wants done as well as possible at least expense. While this definition begs the question of defining "public" or saying how its wants are measured, it does announce that efficient action requires responsiveness—a relationship that the municipal reformers recognized.

In similar fashion, a Progressive-era report on the administration of justice defines inefficiency as inadequacy to meet the purpose for which the public established a justice system or to achieve what the public expects of it (Eliot et al., 1914, p. 5). This definition seems to say that efficiency only exists when an agency is responsive to citizens, a different approach from Emerson (1912a,b) or Simon's (1947) contention that efficiency can exist in relation to any goal. That the report presents its definition without embellishment suggests that at least some people in the Progressive era were used to relating efficiency and responsiveness.

Modern use of an expanded definition would link the concepts of output/input and responsiveness in the public and private sectors. It would make explicit that "efficiency" is not a synonym for "least cost" and that the word has no meaning in relation to projects that do not meet a relevant public's wants. Indeed, efficient action may require greater costs if this leads to even larger benefit ratios. Gulick (1966) notes that the BMR's call for efficiency resulted in better social programs that eventually cost the taxpayer more money. In 1914, the New York BMR conducted a study of Springfield, Massachusetts' health department for a sister BMR in Springfield. The report says that efficiency does not mean spending less; the investigators congratulate Springfield "on the liberality of its appropriations" (Springfield Bureau of Municipal Research, 1914, p. 9).

To denigrate efficiency is to turn away from a value that common sense tells us is crucial to all endeavors. More useful for bureaucratic analysts is to identify the range of responsive outcomes for a given organization or unit and to be explicit about what efficiency calculations can and cannot be made for each.



The conventional wisdom assumes that efficiency is easier to measure than other values. However, ease of calculation only attends such measurements for production of goods. In other cases, analysts may actually find it easier to calculate equity rather than output/input. For example, it is easier to calculate whether a school system has spent the same amount of resources to imbue each child with an appreciation of art than to know how much genuine appreciation it gets per dollar of expenditure.

The difficulty of measuring output/input in “soft” areas leads analysts to restrict efficiency calculations to a sparse number of goals. This, in turn, yields a perception that efficiency is irrelevant to the satisfaction of other wants. Managers who produce goods consider output/input in planning their strategies and tactics. When promoting other goals—such as citizen participation or political accountability—managers do not subject their idealism to rigorous appraisal of what a public gets for a given expenditure.

Once the full list of desired outcomes is associated with efficiency, discussion can begin on how to measure cost/benefit outside the provision of goods and how to calculate maximum output/input for securing honesty, say, or accountability. Present-day analysts calculate how much energy a railroad gets from the expenditure of X dollars on various fuels. Why not discuss how much honesty we are likely to get from the work done by passing a code of ethics or putting restrictions on the ability of public servants to take gifts from those with whom they work? Even if the original calculations are crude, the attempt indicates that the analyst is aware of the full range of outcomes that the public wants from a given bureaucracy. The approach also suggests that simply writing an ethics code or restricting gifts is not enough; the important matter is to learn how such innovations influence the incidence of honest behavior.

Using an expanded definition may open a Pandora’s box of problems in defining relevant public, but it also leads analysts to consider output/input in relation to a host of genuine wants. By doing this, it enhances the value of the efficiency concept. Such an approach shows that efficiency remains a useful construct to a socially informed study of bureaucracies as it constitutes an aid to understanding even in those cases where profit or delivery of tangible goods and services are not the only benefits people seek from organizations.

## References

- Allen, W., *Efficient Democracy*, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1907.
- Allen, W., How may a community learn its unmet school needs? Paper Presented to the National Education Association, Division of Superintendence, St. Louis, MO, 1912.
- Allen, W., Reminiscences, vol. 4, Unpublished manuscript in Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York, 1949/1950.
- Arendt, H., *On Revolution*, Viking, New York, 1963.
- Augier, M. and March, J., Remembering Herbert Simon, *Public Administration Review*, 61(4):396–402 (2001).
- Blau, P. and Meyer, M., *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*, 3rd ed., Random House, New York, 1987.
- Brown, B. and Stillman, R. II, *A Search for Public Administration: The Ideas and Career of Dwight Waldo*, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 1986.
- Bruere, H., Efficiency in city government, *Annals*, 41:1–22 (1912a).
- Bruere, H., *The New City Government*, D. Appleton, New York, 1912b.
- Bureau of City Betterment, *The Police Problem in New York City*, Citizens Union, New York, 1906.
- Cleveland, F., The application of scientific management to the activities of the state, Paper Presented at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 1912.

- Cleveland, F., *Organized Democracy*, Longmans, Green, NY, 1913.
- Cleveland, F., *Chapters on Municipal Administration and Accounting*, Longmans, Green, NY, 1915.
- Dahlberg, J., *The New York Bureau of Municipal Research*, New York University Press, New York, 1966.
- Denhardt, R., The continuing saga of the new public administration, *Administration and Society*, 9(2): 253–261 (1977).
- Denhardt, R., *In the Shadow of Organization*, The Regents Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1981.
- Denhardt, R. and Denhardt, J.V., The new public service: Serving rather than steering, *Public Administration Review*, 60(6):549–559 (2000).
- Dimock, M., The meaning and scope of public administration, in *The Frontiers of Public Administration* (J. Gaus, L. White, and M. Dimock, eds.), pp. 1–12, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1936.
- Dimock, M., The study of administration, *American Political Science Review*, XXXI(1):28–40 (1937).
- Dimock, M., Administration as a science, *National Municipal Review*, XXVII(4):265–266, 288 (1938).
- Downs, G. and Larkey, P., *The Search for Government Efficiency*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1986.
- Dunn, D., The impact of *administrative behavior* on public administration textbooks, *Public Administration Quarterly*, 12:369–384 (1988).
- Eliot, C. et al., *Preliminary Report on Efficiency in the Administration of Justice*, National Economic League, Boston, MA, 1914.
- Emerson, H., *Efficiency as a Basis for Operation and Wages*, Engineering Magazine Press, New York, 1912a.
- Emerson, H., *Twelve Principles of Efficiency*, Engineering Magazine Press, New York, 1912b.
- Fayol, H., The administrative theory in the state, in *Papers on the Science of Administration* (L. Gulick and L. Urwick, eds.), pp. 101–114, Institute of Public Administration, New York, 1937.
- Fayol, H., *General and Industrial Management* (C. Storrs, trans.), Sir Isaac Pittman, London, 1949.
- Fischer, F., *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise*, Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1990.
- Fischer, F. and Sirianni, C., eds., *Critical Studies in Organization and Bureaucracy*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1984.
- Forester, J., *Critical Theory, Public Policy and Planning Practice*, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1993.
- Forester, J., ed., *Critical Theory and Public Life*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985.
- Frederickson, H.G., The lineage of new public administration, *Administration and Society*, 8(2):149–174 (1976).
- Frederickson, H.G., *New Public Administration*, University of Alabama Press, University, AL, 1980.
- Goodin, R. and Wilenski, P., Beyond efficiency: The logical underpinnings of administrative principles, *Public Administration Review*, 44(6):512–517 (1984).
- Gordon, G., *Public Administration in America*, 3rd ed., St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
- Griffin, R., *Management*, 7th ed., Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 2002.
- Gulick, L., Notes on the theory of organization, in *Papers on the Science of Administration* (L. Gulick and L. Urwick, eds.), pp. 1–46, Institute of Public Administration, New York, 1937.
- Gulick, L., Foreword, in *The New York Bureau of Municipal Research* (by J. Dahlberg), pp. v–viii, New York University Press, New York, 1966.
- Gulick, L. and Urwick, L., eds., *Papers on the Science of Administration*, Institute of Public Administration, New York, 1937.
- Hammond, T., In defense of Luther Gulick's "notes on the theory of organization," *Public Administration*, 68(2):143–173 (1990).
- Herring, P., *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, Russell & Russell, New York, 1936.
- Hertzberg, F., Mausner, B., and Synderman, B., *The Motivation to Work*, 2nd ed., Wiley, New York, 1959.
- Hummel, R., *The Bureaucratic Experience*, 4th ed., St. Martin's Press, New York, 1994.
- Kahn, J., *Budgeting Democracy: State Building and Citizenship in America, 1890–1928*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997.
- Landau, M., Redundancy, rationality and the problem of duplication and overlap, *Public Administration Review*, 29:346–358 (1969).

- Marini, F., ed., *Towards a New Public Administration*, Chandler, Scranton, PA, 1971.
- Metcalfe, H., The shop order system of accounts, *American Society of Mechanical Engineers Transactions*, 7:440–448 (1886).
- Okun, A., *Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff*, Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1975.
- Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T., *Reinventing Government*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1992.
- Prendergast, W., Efficiency through accounting, *Annals*, 41:43–56 (1912).
- Rosenbloom, D., *Public Administration: Understanding Management, Politics, and Law in the Public Sector*, 2nd ed., Random House, New York, 1989.
- Savage, P., Contemporary public administration: The changing environment and agenda, in *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence* (D. Waldo, ed.), pp. 43–58, Chandler, Scranton, PA, 1971.
- Schachter, H.L., *Frederick Taylor and the Public Administration Community: A Reevaluation*, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1989.
- Schachter, H.L., *Reinventing Government or Reinventing Ourselves: The Role of Citizen Owners in Making a Better Government*, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1997.
- Simon, H., *Administrative Behavior*, Free Press, New York, 1947.
- Springfield Bureau of Municipal Research, *The Organization and Administration of the Health Department of Springfield, Mass.*, Springfield Bureau of Municipal Research, Springfield, MA, 1914.
- Taylor, F., A piece-rate system being a step towards partial solution of the labor problem, *American Society of Mechanical Engineers Transactions*, 76:856–883 (1895).
- Taylor, F., *Shop Management*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947a.
- Taylor, F., *The Principles of Scientific Management*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947b.
- Towne, H., The engineer as an economist, *American Society of Mechanical Engineers Transactions*, 7:428–432 (1886).
- Urwick, L., *Scientific Principles and Organizations*, American Management Association, New York, 1938.
- Urwick, L., *The Elements of Administration*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1944.
- Waldo, D., *The Administrative State*, Ronald Press, New York, 1948.
- Waldo, D., ed., *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence*, Chandler, Scranton, PA, 1971a.
- Waldo, D., Some thoughts on alternatives, dilemmas and paradoxes in a time of turbulence, in *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence* (D. Waldo, ed.), pp. 257–269, Chandler, Scranton, PA, 1971b.
- Weber, G., *Organized Efforts for the Improvement of Methods of Administration in the United States*, D. Appleton, New York, 1919.
- Weber, M., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans.), Oxford University Press, New York, 1946.
- White, L., *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, Macmillan, New York, 1926.
- White, L., *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, 4th ed., Macmillan, New York, 1955.
- White, O. Jr., The dialectical organization: An alternative to bureaucracy, *Public Administration Review*, 29(1):32–42 (1969).
- White, O. Jr. and McSwain, C., Transformational theory and organizational analysis, in *Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research* (G. Morgan, ed.), pp. 292–305, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA, 1983.
- Wilson, J., The bureaucracy problem, in *Urban Politics and Public Policy* (S. David and P. Peterson, eds.), pp. 27–34, Praeger, New York, 1973.
- Wilson, J., *Bureaucracies: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, Basic Books, New York, 1989.
- Wren, D., *The Evolution of Management Thought*, 2nd ed., Wiley, New York, 1979.

## *Chapter 13*

---

# **Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness, Response, and the Politics Administration Dichotomy**

---

Michael J. Brennan and Steven G. Koven

### **CONTENTS**

1	3.1	Introduction .....	254
	13.2	Hurricane Katrina and the Readiness of New Orleans .....	254
13	.2.1	The Storm.....	254
	13.2.2	Hurricane Studies and Preparedness.....	256
	13.2.3	Critics of the Hurricane Response .....	258
	13.3	Katrina the Politics Administration Dichotomy.....	260
13	.3.1	The Dichotomy, Representation and Neutral Competence .....	260
	13.3.2	FEMA Director Brown .....	262
	1	3.3.2.1 Brown's Background.....	262
		13.3.2.2 Brown's Behavior at Time of Hurricane .....	263
1	3.4	Conclusion.....	264
		References .....	266

## 13.1 Introduction

Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Louisiana and Mississippi coast on August 29, 2005. It was the latest of several significant weather related events to impact the Southeastern United States since 2004. In the fall of that year, four major hurricanes made landfall in the region including Hurricane Ivan which made landfall along the Alabama coast in September and cost an estimated \$14 billion due to damage and over 50 deaths (The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2006).

When Katrina made landfall along the Gulf coast, the storm had sustained winds of 145 mph and measured approximately 400 miles across (Hearing Charter: NOAA Hurricane Forecasting, 2005, 3). The damage and destruction through Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in the aftermath of Katrina were extensive and widespread covering approximately 90,000 sq. mi. (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2005, Testimony of Norman J. Rabkin, 1).

In each of these events, the federal government had a major role in coordinating relief efforts with state and local officials. The size and scope of the devastation in the aftermath of Katrina required a massive coordinated effort. A number of factors compounded the ability to mount an effective response. This chapter discusses the state of hurricane preparedness in New Orleans as well as the perennial conflict between the ethos of neutral competence and that of political responsiveness. It argues that elected leaders have discretion in their appointment power and that they are entitled to make appointments that they believe will further their broad vision of governance. However, this chapter utilizes Hurricane Katrina as a case study in order to illustrate the danger political patronage poses to effective governance. It concludes that a proper balance must be struck between competence (people with the aptitude to carry out responsibilities entrusted to them) and the ability of elected leaders to implement policies that reflect the wishes of the majority. This balance between neutral competence and political responsiveness lies at the heart of the politics–administration dichotomy enunciated by Woodrow Wilson in 1887. Prior to elaborating upon the inherent tension between these competing mandates, the storm itself and the city's preparedness for such an eventuality are discussed.

## 13.2 Hurricane Katrina and the Readiness of New Orleans

### 13.2.1 *The Storm*

Hurricane Katrina was only the third most powerful storm of the season, behind Hurricane Wilma and Hurricane Rita; however, its impact on the Gulf Coast was devastating to people and property. Katrina first made landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north of Miami, Florida, on August 25, 2005 before moving into the Gulf of Mexico and strengthened to a formidable Category 5 hurricane with maximum winds of 175 mph. Rapid intensification occurred during the first 24 hours after entering the Gulf of Mexico due in part to the storm's movement over warm sea temperatures. On August 27, the storm was upgraded to Category 3 intensity. A second period of rapid intensification led to Katrina strengthening to a Category 5 storm by August 28. Katrina reached its peak with maximum sustained winds of 175 mph and gusts of 215 mph. At the time, Hurricane Katrina was the fourth most intense Atlantic Basin hurricane on record; however, later in the year, Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Wilma would surpass Katrina in intensity.

Hurricane Katrina weakened as it approached land, making its second landfall on the morning of August 29 near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana, with 125 mph winds. It is estimated that hurricane-force winds extended outward 120 miles from the center. The storm made its way up the eastern Louisiana coastline, affecting most communities in Plaquemines, St. Bernard Parish, and Slidell in St. Tammany Parish. As Katrina moved diagonally over Mississippi, high winds cut a swath of damage that affected almost the entire state. Storm surges smashed the entire Mississippi Gulf Coast, including towns in Mississippi such as Bay St. Louis, Gulfport, and Biloxi.

The sheer physical size of Katrina caused devastation far from the eye. Major damage occurred on August 29 as the hurricane's storm surge breached the levee system that protected New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River. Most of the city was flooded mainly by water from the lake. Damage inflicted from the hurricane made Katrina the costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States and the deadliest since the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane.

Katrina's large storm surge despite its Category 3 velocity was attributed to its quick weakening from its previous Category 5 and Category 4 strength. The storm surge was largely produced from its Category 5 intensity. Following landfall, Katrina weakened, losing hurricane strength near Jackson, Mississippi, and was downgraded to a tropical depression near Clarksville, Tennessee. Katrina continued to affect the central United States as it moved into the eastern Great Lakes region. Katrina's last known position was over southeast Quebec and northern New Brunswick where it produced between 1.97 and 6.69 in. of rain in 12 h as well as wind gusts between 31 and 61 mph (Hurricane Katrina, 2006).

The official combined (direct and indirect) death toll is the fourth or fifth highest in U.S. history (behind the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, the Okeechobee Hurricane of 1928, the 1893 Sea Islands Hurricane, and possibly the 1893 Chenier Caminanda Hurricane) (Hurricane Katrina, 2006). As of January 4, 2006 the confirmed death toll stood at 1 386, from Louisiana (1077), Mississippi (231), Ohio (2), Kentucky (1), and among evacuees (57). Direct deaths indicate those caused by the direct effects of the winds, flooding, or storm surge or oceanic effects. Indirect deaths relate to accidents including car accidents, fires, and health issues. Aside from the reported deaths approximately 5 000 New Orleans residents were unaccounted for after the hurricane (Hurricane Katrina, 2006).

On September 3, Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff described the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as "probably the worst catastrophe, or set of catastrophes" in the country's history. More than 1.5 million people were displaced with damage estimates ranging from \$40 to \$120 billion, at least double the damage caused by Andrew, previously the most expensive hurricane. The devastation left in the aftermath of Katrina was widespread covering approximately 90,000 sq. mi. in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

Storm surge is usually the most significant factor in the loss of life during hurricanes (Committee on Science, 2005, 4). In Katrina, this was clearly the case. Numerous factors contributed to the size of the storm surge following Katrina including: the strength of the winds at landfall, the size of the storm's eye, and the speed at which the storm made landfall. By almost any measure, Hurricane Katrina qualified as a monster storm with hurricane force winds extending 125 miles from the center; compared to an extension from the center of only 50 miles when Camille made landfall near New Orleans in 1969. Katrina's eye was 32 miles across, more than three times the size of a typical hurricane with Katrina's velocity (Farrington, 2005). While Hurricane Katrina was large by historical standards, it should not be shocking that a major storm could someday reach landfall near or at the city of New Orleans. The city's preparation for the inevitable therefore becomes a question of interest.

### **13.2.2 Hurricane Studies and Preparedness**

The federal government has tried to control floods since the early 1800s. Policies have evolved over time, usually in response to a specific disaster. For example, a major flood in 1850 in the lower Mississippi basin prompted an approach centering on levees or earthen embankments designed to keep water in check. Several decades of construction ensued, producing a levee system that extended from Cairo, Illinois, to the Mississippi delta.

Following the great floods of 1927, the Flood Control Act of 1928 was passed supplementing the levee system with structural measures such as reservoirs, channel improvements, and floodways, which divert spillover from the main channel. Also introduced were fuse-plug levees, which were built lower than the general levee system in order to siphon water out of the main channel at selected points. The Flood Control Acts of 1936 and 1938, which followed major floods from 1935 through 1937, continued to support these structural measures. A series of Flood Control Acts were passed by Congress and in 1968, both the Federal Insurance Administration and the National Flood Insurance Programs were created. These programs encouraged communities to explore nonstructural approaches to flood management, such as land use planning and flood-proofing of buildings (Hauber and Michener, 2006).

The city of New Orleans had an existing Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, and funding was provided for levee construction. The Flood Control Act of 1965 included the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project, a plan intended to protect the city from future floods. At an initial cost of \$85 million, this project was estimated to take 13 years to complete; however, it was plagued by delays, cost overruns, legal challenges, local opposition, environmental concerns, and other issues (U.S. GAO, 2005, Testimony of Anu Mittal). The project was never completed as intended and suffered from underfunding (Carter, 2005, 5; U.S. GAO, 2005, Testimony of Anu Mittal, 2). Between 1996 and 2005, funding declined from annual appropriations of \$13.4 million to \$5.7 million. Despite warnings from the U.S. Corps of Engineers about the need to invest in aging infrastructure and a backlog of new construction projects, total federal outlays for projects like the levee systems in New Orleans dropped considerably (Carter, 2005, 5). Faced with difficult budget choices, both Republican and Democratic administrations ignored the threat of a Category 4 or 5 hurricane. It appeared that short-term expediency prevailed over long-term preparedness as government leaders hoped that the dreaded Category 4 or 5 storms would not occur on their watch and they could divert the preparedness funding to other projects of greater perceived value.

Prior to Katrina, in 2002, studies were conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers to examine the possibility of strengthening the levee and canal system in New Orleans to protect against a Category 4 or 5 storm. Estimated costs to improve the levee system to protect against a Category 5 storm were at least \$2.5 billion. Corps engineers projected it would take 10-20 years to complete the upgrades. Congress, in the FY 2005 budget appropriated \$100,000 of the requested \$8 million to study the feasibility of the project (Carter, 2005, 5-6). In hindsight, the \$2.5 billion protection would have been money well-spent as the eventual cost of Katrina will dwarf this sum.

In April 2005, the state of Louisiana enacted the current edition of its Emergency Operations Plan. This plan serves as a basic outline for agencies and departments at the state level to develop working plans to respond to various types of disasters (Emergency Operations Plan, Section I, 2005, 1). The Emergency Operations Plan is also designed to work in conjunction with the National Response Plan and with local Parish Emergency plans such as was in practice in the city of New Orleans.

Mock exercises and computer models also forecast the disaster. In July 2004, federal, state, and local officials as well as leaders from volunteer organizations participated in the Hurricane Pam Exercise, the name designated to a mock Category 3 hurricane making a direct hit on New Orleans (Glasser and Grunwald, 2005, A1). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana State University (LSU) Hurricane Center, and other state and local officials estimated the impact of a fictitious Hurricane Pam with sustained winds of 120 mph and up to 20 in. of rain in New Orleans. Under this scenario, more than 1 million residents were evacuated from the city and over 500,000 buildings were destroyed (Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, 2004). In reality, the storm surge from the Category 5 storm that developed in the Gulf of Mexico exacted significantly more damage than the estimates from the Hurricane Pam Exercise.

Results of the exercise concluded that a hurricane like Pam would require about 1000 shelters to be open for 100 days. A plan called for the state of Louisiana to supply the shelters for the first 3–5 days after which the federal government and other resources would be needed to replenish supplies. The plan also provided for search and rescue of stranded residents (Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, 2004). Officials anticipated that 300,000 people would remain trapped in the city if a storm of the exercise's size hit the area (LSU Researchers, 2005).

Federal officials who took part in the exercise were keenly aware of the possible consequences of such a scenario. An LSU report following the exercise indicated that the White House was informed of the possible damage from storm surge that could result. A second exercise was planned for the summer of 2005, although media reports indicate that funding was not provided (Glasser and Grunwald, 2005, A1; LSU Researchers, 2005).

Although there were differences between the simulation Pam and the actual Katrina, the results were quite similar. Hurricane Pam and other simulation prepared by the LSU Hurricane center predicted that a slow moving Category 3 hurricane approaching from the South or Southeast would push water from the Gulf of Mexico into the Mississippi Sound, Lake Pontchartrain, and other surrounding bodies of water. If this water topped the levees and canals, the city would flood. The levees would then trap the water in the city (Would New Orleans Really Flood? n.d.). Flooding occurred in New Orleans not only from this topping off but from actual breaks in three major levees.

The calamity should not have been unexpected. The levee and floodwall system in New Orleans was in fact only designed to protect the city against a fast moving Category 3 storm (Carter, 2005, 1). A study conducted by a team of Louisiana investigators charged that New Orleans was a disaster waiting to happen because of a significant flaw in levee design by the Army Corps of Engineers. The investigative group (known as Team Louisiana) concluded that sheet piles, the interlocking sheets of steel that are driven into soil to anchor the levees and prevent water from flowing underneath them, were too shallow. Sheet piles reached only 10 ft. below sea level in some spots despite the fact that Army Corp of Engineer documents called for a depth of 17½ ft. Designs formulated after the storm called for sheet piles to be driven to a depth of 51–65 ft. The Corp of Engineers confirmed that pilings went down only 10 ft., however, noted that piling depth was only one factor contributing to the levee breaks. The findings of the Louisiana Team mirrored the conclusions of outside experts that the levee that failed at the 17th Street Canal was built with too little regard for the weakness of the soil under the canal banks. Similar conditions contributed to the two other major levee breaches (Schwartz and Drew, 2005).

Despite sophisticated modeling that largely predicted the disaster and widespread planning, government officials seemed to be completely unprepared for the situation. For example, in 2004, the New Orleans police department produced an elaborate hurricane plan and issued it to all its commanders. The hurricane plan, however, stayed on the bookshelves at New Orleans and many



officers did not even know it existed. When the storm hit, hundreds of police patrol cars were in low garages or highway overpasses. As a result, about one quarter of the city's patrol cars were either flooded or stranded. Radio antennas were destroyed, the police department's primary radio system did not function, the armory and jail were under water, the exchange that handled the New Orleans cell phone area code was inoperative, and many of the existing police cars were either running out of gas or had flat tires from running over debris (Baum, 2006). The American media displayed pictures of desperate people sitting on roof tops, surrounded by water, holding up hand written signs that pleaded for help. Criticism came from all domains of the political spectrum.

### **13.2.3 Critics of the Hurricane Response**

As the images of Katrina victims appeared on television, Americans asked how such a calamity could occur. Blame was heaped on the professional planners as well as state, city, and federal officials who seemed to be incapable of addressing a disaster of such magnitude. Few focused on the fact that warnings had been ignored and that the seeds of the city's destruction had been in place for decades.

The erosion of land, growth of New Orleans, and insufficient funding to update and expand the levee system all contributed to the catastrophe that fell on the city. An analysis done in the mid-1980s indicated that at that time, erosion of barrier lands and continued commercial development would strain the system and may lead to failures in existing hurricane remedies (Carter, 2005, 3). Barrier Islands and coastal wetlands served as a natural buffer to help insulate the inner coast areas. Through a continuous and natural process, these coastal regions eroded over time. Human intervention, in the name of economic development also exacerbated the danger of a hurricane. Since 1930, coastal wetlands that once separated New Orleans from the Gulf of Mexico have decreased by 400,000 acres (Van Heerden, n.d., 1).

Clearly, officials at all levels of government were aware of the potential for devastation. As the *Times-Picayune*, the New Orleans newspaper, reported on September 2, 2005, emergency managers, hurricane experts, and officials at the Army Corps of Engineers were all aware that New Orleans was unprepared for a large Category 4 or 5 storm (A8). Despite recommendations from the Army Corps of Engineers and dire predictions based on simulations and exercises, officials at the federal, state, and local level failed to take action to prevent the catastrophe that ensued. While politicians sought to shift the blame to the officials at other levels of government, mistakes were made at the federal, state, and local level. These mistakes were a result of insufficient coordination in the immediate hours before Katrina made landfall and failure to follow existing plans as designed.

The chaos and confusion evident in the aftermath of the hurricane suggests inept handling of the response to Katrina. Some failures may be traced to incompetent leadership. Critics have charged that officials like former Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) Director Michael Brown, a Bush Administration political appointee, were unqualified for the responsibility they were given. Confusion was evident even before the hurricane made landfall. Internal e-mails were sent to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, presented as exhibits in an October 20, 2005 Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee hearing on Hurricane Katrina depicted an unorganized and unprepared response at the federal level. For example, local medical officials expressed concern to the FEMA that oxygen was in short supply. Requests had been made to FEMA but as of Sunday, August 28 at a time when thousands of motorists were clogging the roadways trying to leave the city, a new supply of oxygen was yet to arrive (U.S. Senate, 2005).

In addition, responders were unable to make it to New Orleans before the hurricane made landfall. FEMA officials expressed great anxiety that if teams would not make it to New Orleans before the storm reached the city, they would be unable to get in before Tuesday, August 30, and that it would be too late to help some survivors who were unable to make it to safety (U.S. Senate, 2005). There were also concerns that state and local officials were not prepared and that FEMA would be held responsible for real and perceived incompetence (U.S. Senate, 2005).

Two days prior to the storm making landfall near New Orleans, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco requested that President Bush declare a state of emergency. Following procedures outlined in Section 501 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (2000, 65), Bush authorized the DHS to coordinate efforts with state and local officials. At this point, FEMA may begin efforts to provide a unified response. In addition to freeing up federal dollars, the declaration allowed the DHS to position resources and personnel in the region in advance. By Sunday, August 27, FEMA had moved 2.7 million L of water, 1.3 million meals ready to eat, and 17 million pounds of ice near the area for distribution as soon as the storm passed (Glasser and Grunwald, 2005, A10). Although supplies were in the area, for some reason, they were not delivered effectively. It seems that government officials were not able to competently manage the situation on the ground.

Managerial failures focused upon the actions of FEMA Director Michael Brown. Three days after being replaced as Katrina relief director and reassigned to Washington D.C., Brown resigned as director of FEMA. During his tenure as director of FEMA, Brown managed the federal response to more than 164 declared disasters including 4 hurricanes that made landfall in Florida and Alabama in 2004 (Brown, (n.d.), Biography). However, his response to the Katrina disaster raised questions about his competence.

Under the threat of an impending hurricane making landfall Brown was not able to manage for unplanned circumstances or adapt to the changing conditions on the ground. For example, instead of calling for extra personnel early, knowing the intensity of the storm and the limited steps taken by local officials, it was not until after the storm hit, that he requested for additional personnel. In a memo to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff dated August 29, Brown (personal communication, August 29, 2005) requested 1000 workers within 48 h and 2000 within 7 days. According to the memo, these workers would arrive in the disaster area only after first participating in community relations training in Maryland, Georgia, or Florida. Rather than focusing on getting emergency personnel to the site as soon as possible Brown felt it was important that these first responders attend trainings designed to portray the proper image of federal emergency workers (Brown, n.d., 2). A professional administrator, with significant experience in emergency management may have had a better understanding of the situation and made different decisions, or at least, would have been able to more quickly adapt to the conditions on the ground.

The limited experience of Brown (a political appointee) may have also curtailed his ability to provide the leadership necessary to manage a disaster of such proportions and to coordinate efforts of state and local officials. Despite warnings from the director of the National Hurricane Center, Max Mayfield, to the Governor of Louisiana and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin about the potential devastation Katrina could bring, no mandatory evacuation orders were issued for the city until the morning of Sunday, August 28, just 20 h before the storm made landfall and far short of the 24–72 h recommended in the New Orleans emergency management plan (City of New Orleans, n.d.). Stronger leadership may have led to better coordination, a key role of FEMA in disasters. Brown admits his inability to coordinate federal, state, and local efforts in his testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives on September 27, 2005 (Hearing before the House Select Bipartisan Committee, 2005).

Transportation was available that could have helped people leave the city. It has been widely reported that Amtrak offered to transport several hundred people out of the city. Buses that could have been used to evacuate those unable to leave on their own, sat in parking lots and were lost in the ensuing flood. The use of public transportation was discussed in the New Orleans Plan which calls for the city to provide transportation to those who are unable to leave on their own, however, the specifics of the plan were not implemented (City of New Orleans, n.d.).

A stronger federal presence may have been able to mitigate implementation failures. More professional administration at FEMA might have been better prepared to manage the consequences of the hurricane. Brown remained at the eye of the hurricane of criticism that was aimed at FEMA. Despite media reports that evacuees had taken shelter in the New Orleans Convention Center, FEMA Director Brown first said he was unaware anyone was in the center, then later said FEMA was aware of the situation but could not get relief to the victims (Kirkpatrick, et al., 2005, 1).

A firestorm was quickly created through the media about the perceived insensitivity of Director Brown and his inability to inspire confidence as well as his ability to deal with the disaster. Criticism revolved around his background, his knowledge about disaster relief, and the depth of his concern for disaster victims. Before long, the political appointee Brown was reassigned and his oversight of FEMA's day-to-day operations in New Orleans was given to Vice Admiral Thad Allen, the Coast Guard's chief of staff. A quintessential career bureaucrat, Allen's impressive resume included more than 30 years in the Coast Guard. He was one of the youngest officers to rise to the rank of admiral, the son of a chief petty officer in the Coast Guard, a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, a recipient of a master's degree in Public Administration from George Washington University, and a master of science degree from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

## 13.3 Katrina the Politics Administration Dichotomy

### 13.3.1 *The Dichotomy, Representation and Neutral Competence*

The politics administration dichotomy was first introduced to the United States by Woodrow Wilson and centered on the role of the public administrator in terms of the competing demands for efficiency and political responsiveness (Wilson, [1887] 1992). Wilson believed that as the size and expanse of government grew, it needed a science of administration to provide a professional understanding of the proper role and function of the government. Under the framework of the politics administration dichotomy, administration and technical application of laws are under the domain of professional career administrators who are separate and neutral from the pressures of politics. His 1887 proposal called for those two spheres to remain distinct.

The proper role of the administrator had been a central concern of German and French scholars even before Wilson wrote his seminal article (Martin, 1988, 631). Wilson stated that there needed to be a "science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its dutifulness." With its poisonous city governments, crooked state administration, and corruption in Washington, America was not seen as the exemplar of good administration. Government efficiency was viewed by Wilson as "a foreign science" that was "grounded in histories of foreign systems, in the lessons of foreign revolutions" (Wilson, [1887] 1992, 13).

Wilson unambiguously stated that “administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics” and that while “politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.” Furthermore, Wilson recognized that the value of efficiency in government was promoted by French and German professors who resided in highly centralized forms of government. He stated that if public administration is to be employed in the highly decentralized United States, it must be “Americanized” by getting “the bureaucratic fever out of its veins” and inhaling the freer “American air.” Hoping to adapt the “good” of government efficiency without the “bad” of centralized power, Wilson stated “if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my republican spots. He may serve his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well as he serves his. . . . We can thus scrutinize the anatomy of foreign governments without fear of getting any of their diseases into our veins” (Wilson, [1887] 1992, 23).

Under Wilson’s approach, questions related to administration are by definition not political questions. This leads to the establishment of a neutral competence to administer government agencies and programs. In his writings, the German scholar Max Weber also supported the idea of separating politics from administration in order to gain greater efficiency. In Weber’s view, politicians give direction to policy, while bureaucrats impartially administer a set of laws. Whereas politicians passionately express values, neutral bureaucrats are to be impersonal in the imposition of rules (Fry and Nigro, 1996). It is through the impersonal, passionless application of rules that neutral competence flows.

The idea of neutral competence was a reaction to the spoils system that evolved after the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. In accordance with an ethos of spoils, as political parties gained power, they rewarded their followers by appointing them to special office, or by supporting their election into any number of local offices from dog catcher to Mayor. A rationale for the spoils system posited that change in office that occurred as a consequence of appointments by elected officials was desirable and served as a check against the discretion of entrenched bureaucratic elites (Goodnow, 1900, 110). Patronage has been a staple of American politics from the days of Andrew Jackson to New York’s Tammany Hall, and remains in place today. The question that arose in the aftermath of Katrina is not so much that of whether patronage should exist but the societal costs of patronage and the proper balance between the competing ethics of spoils versus that of neutral competence. Reaction to perceived incompetence and corruption of appointed officials is not new. At the height of the “machine era” of American politics powerful bosses who were more interested in pursuing their own interests than the interests of good governance prevailed. This problem at virtually all levels of government raised concerns about incompetence and stimulated efforts to reign in the appointment power of elected officials (Kaufman, 1956, 1060).

An alternative paradigm to that of spoils emerged based on the concept of a neutral competence. This model sought to separate politics from the administration through civil service reforms such as the Civil Service Act of 1883. The 1883 Act (also known as the Pendleton Act) sought to establish trust in public office by allowing nonpartisan administrators to execute the functions of government. Reforms aimed at increasing the efficiency of government continued into the twentieth century. Both the Hatch Act (1939) and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 were responses to perceived abuses of the federal government. The 1939 Act forbid federal executive employees from participating in and contributing to any presidential or congressional election campaign. It imposed stiff penalties on any person who used political influence on federal officeholders. The 1978 Act created the Senior Executive Service (SES) allowing for a group of leaders who possess well-honed executive skills and shared a broad perspective of government. The SES was designed to create a corps of executives selected based on their qualifications thereby reinforcing the

concept of competence in government. Members of the SES served in key positions just below the top Presidential appointees.

Despite these reforms, tensions between political and the administrative values continue to exist. For example, Ronald Reagan was criticized for excessive use of political appointees and for using political appointees to do end runs around the professional level staff. Critics assert that the intent of the Reagan administration was to implement policies at the agency level consistent with their political philosophy (Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg, 1995, 265). Reagan entered office under the premise that government was not the solution for problems, in many cases, it was the problem. In efforts to reform the government to make it more efficient and responsive, Reagan slashed budgets and reduced the size of program staff (Ingraham, 1995, 90). Others like George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton have also used political appointees to repay political debts (Ingraham, Thompson, and Eisenberg, 1995, 264, 269).

The use of political appointees is consistent with the idea that under the mandate of representativeness, elected leaders have a right to appoint officials whose views are consistent with those of the citizenry. This can help prevent the establishment of entrenched elites and facilitate the likelihood that the people will interface with government officials somewhat reflective of their beliefs. Fear of nonrepresentative rulers has a long tradition in American politics. For example, James Madison wrote in *Federalist No. 39* that those who administer government should be chosen from the society at large, not from a favored class (Madison, 1961, 280–281). An extension of this principle would allow the elected officials the freedom to appoint officials who share their constituents' goals. It is clear that George W. Bush did not abandon the practice of appointing political allies to high level government positions. Consistent with the ethos of representativeness, large campaign contributors as well as ideological soul mates were appointed to sensitive government positions. FEMA Director Michael D. Brown, with his thin experience in emergency management and his strong political connections, represents the quintessential political appointee. The limitations of such appointees unfortunately were clear for all of America to see in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

### **13.3.2 FEMA Director Brown**

#### *13.3.2.1 Brown's Background*

After Hurricane Katrina, FEMA Director Michael D. Brown became a poster child for the incompetence of political appointees. Numerous accounts cast serious doubt on his truthfulness and ability to manage. For example, his biography posted on the FEMA Web site reveals that he served as an assistant city manager in Edmond, Oklahoma, with emergency services oversight. When questioned about Brown's position, however, a public relations representative from Edmond stated that Brown had no authority over other employees and was more like an intern between 1975 and 1978 when he was also a student at Central State University (later renamed University of Central Oklahoma). A legal Web site provided by lawyers or their offices lists him as the recipient of "Outstanding Political Science Professor" recognition at Central State University (Brown later claimed that this was an error but he was named the outstanding political science senior at Central State). The Web site also claimed that Brown was director of a nursing home in Edmond, Oklahoma; however, Brown later asserted that he never made this claim (Fonda and Healy, 2005).

Brown received his law degree (J.D.) from Oklahoma City University's School of Law in 1981 (the school was accredited by the American Bar Association but not by the Association of American Law Schools at the time). In the 1980s, he lived in Enid, Oklahoma, practicing law, and working for

an attorney who later described him as “not serious and somewhat shallow.” (Michael D. Brown, 2006). Of the 37 lawyers in Jones’s firm, Brown was one of the two let go when Jones and his partners decided to split up the firm. He ran for Congress in 1988 against a Democratic incumbent and lost against his better funded opponent by a 122,763 votes to 45,199 margin.

Immediately prior to joining FEMA, Brown was the Judges and Stewards Commissioner for the International Arabian Horse Association (IAHA), serving in this capacity from 1989–2001. After numerous lawsuits were filed against the organization over disciplinary actions Brown resigned. Some members of the IAHA felt that Brown showed an imperious attitude while heading the organization, and nicknamed him “The Czar.” Others felt that the lawsuits led to IAHA becoming financially depleted and ultimately it was forced to merge with the Arabian Horse Registry of America (Brown, 2006).

Brown joined FEMA as General Council after George W. Bush inaugurated it in January 2001. He was the first person hired by his long-time friend, then FEMA director Joe Allbaugh. Allbaugh named Brown his acting deputy director in September 2001, President Bush formally nominated him as deputy director on March 22, 2002, and he was later confirmed by the Senate. When Allbaugh left government, President Bush nominated Brown for the directorship and Brown was sworn in to his position on April 15, 2003. Allbaugh was Bush’s chief of staff when he was Governor of Texas, and the National Campaign Manager for Bush’s 2000 election campaign. He has been described as one of Bush’s most trusted aides, along with Karl Rove and Karen Hughes.

### 13.3.2.2 *Brown’s Behavior at Time of Hurricane*

Faults with Brown’s management were well documented in the media. Among the more egregious of Brown’s actions include the following:

- On August 29, 2005, 5 h after the hurricane hit land, Brown made his first request for Homeland Security rescue workers. He requested that rescue workers should to be deployed at the disaster area only after 2 days of training. Brown instructed fire and rescue departments outside of the affected areas to refrain from providing trucks or emergency workers without a direct appeal from state or local governments. The intent of this was to avoid coordination problems and the accusation of overstepping federal authority. Regarding how he might be perceived on television giving interviews about the disaster, he stated in an e-mail to a coworker that, “I am a fashion god.” In another e-mail, he discussed whether he should roll up his shirt sleeves to look better in photographs.
- On August 31, Marty Bahomonde, FEMA’s only employee in New Orleans when Katrina struck on August 29, e-mailed Brown stating, “Sir, I know that you know the situation is past critical. Here some things you might not know. Hotels are kicking people out, thousands gathering in the streets with no food or water. Hundreds still being rescued from homes. The dying patients at the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) tent being medivac. Estimates are many will die within hours. Evacuation in process. Plans developing for dome evacuation but hotel situation adding to the problem. We are out of food and running out of water at the dome, plans in works to address the critical need.” In a response that probably would not encourage Woodrow Wilson’s vision of scientific and efficient management, Brown responded, “Thanks for the update. Anything specific I need to do or tweak?”

- On the same day he received the e-mail from Marty Bahomonde, Brown's press secretary, Sharon Worthy, wrote that "it is very important that time is allowed for Mr. Brown to eat dinner. Given [*sic*] that Baton Rouge is back to normal, restaurants are getting busy. He needs much more than [*sic*] 20 or 30 min. We now have traffic to encounter to get to and from a location of his choice [*sic*], followed by wait service from the restaurant staff, eating, etc."
- On September 1, 2005, Brown told Paula Zahn of Cables News Network (CNN) that he was unaware that New Orleans' officials had housed thousands of evacuees, who ran out of food and water, in the Convention Center. Major news outlets had been reporting on this for at least a day.
- On September 2, 2005, Mayor of Chicago Richard M. Daley stated that he pledged firefighters, police officers, health department workers, and other resources on behalf of the city, but was only asked to send one tank truck.
- An e-mail offering critical medical equipment went unanswered for 4 days (Brown, 2006).

These actions represent a few of the commonly cited transgressions by government officials who were in positions of responsibility regarding the response to the hurricane. It appears from the historical review that FEMA Director Brown actually hindered and delayed rescue efforts. Furthermore, he seemed quite detached from the problems on the ground merely asking if there was "anything specific he needed to do," overly concerned about his appearance, and was unaware of where evacuees were being housed. Surely, this picture is at odds with Woodrow Wilson's image of the need for government leaders who are grounded in "scientific administration."

On September 7, 2005, Coast Guard Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Thad W. Allen was named Brown's deputy and given operational control of search-and-rescue and recovery efforts. Perhaps this was the beginning of the end for the political appointee and recognition that a career professional would be better suited to carry out the high profile responsibilities of the hurricane response. On September 9, 2005, the head of the DHS, Michael Chertoff relieved Brown of all on-site relief duties along the Gulf Coast. Brown was officially replaced by Allen, however, he remained Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response and complained that he was being made a scapegoat by the press. On September 12, 2005, Brown announced his resignation as director of FEMA. Chertoff granted Brown two 30-day contract extensions. He continued to receive his \$148,000 annual salary until November 2, when he left in the middle of the second 30-day extension.

Perhaps, the greatest liability of Brown was the fact that he became the butt of jokes for popular comedians. For example, late night comedian David Letterman quipped that "Michael Brown has opened up his own private disaster agency. That's like Robert Blake opening up a marriage counseling facility." Jon Stewart stated, "No word yet on Mr. Brown's future plans, though sources say he does want to spend more time doing nothing for his family." Jay Leno noted, "This is very exciting, you may have heard today President Bush announced a plan to put a man on Mars—the head of FEMA" Damning references also came from elected leaders. For example, the president of Jefferson Parish near New Orleans pleaded for Brown's replacement stating, "Take whatever idiot they have at the top of whatever agency and give me a better idiot. Give me a caring idiot. Give me a sensitive idiot. Just don't give me the same idiot" (Kurtzman, 2006; Associated Press, 2005).

## 13.4 Conclusion

American governance has traditionally been marked by a long-standing conflict between the ethos of spoils (responding to popular elections by appointing supporters) and the ethos of

competence. As a supporter of progressive reforms such as the Civil Service System, Woodrow Wilson actively promoted the view that corruption and inefficiency in government should be ameliorated. He maintained that a clear dichotomy between the world of politics (dirty, wasteful, inefficient, enriching the powerful) and the world of administration (efficient, scientific, based on skill sets, impartial) should be established. This could lead to a better government, lower taxes, less corruption, and politics that delivered more goods and services for the same or lower levels of taxation.

This separation of politics from administration has been a hallmark of public administration with some academics supporting its continued relevance and others denying its value. The response to Hurricane Katrina brought to light a number of concerns related to the proper administration of government. First, while politics has always played a role in government appointments, the hurricane illustrated the potential dangers of placing people in positions beyond their capabilities.

The media quickly exposed FEMA Director Brown as someone who was out of his depth and an embarrassment to his friends. Bush would come to regret the statement he uttered on December 30. While on a visit to New Orleans in early September 2005, Bush stated to the director, "Brownie, you doing a heckuva job." A nonprofit group that monitors language use named this statement as the most memorable phrase of George W. Bush for 2005. It later became a punch line for countless jokes about the administration's handling of the hurricane. Ten days after Bush's statement, Brown resigned amid a public uproar (Spiegelman, 2006).

Secondly, it appears that the use of patronage appointments is still widespread. For example, a 2006 Palm Beach Post editorial castigated the Bush administration not only for appointing the "unqualified" Mike Brown to FEMA, but for other appointments as well. Other examples of Bush administration "cronyism" included appointing Dick Cheney to conduct a nationwide search for a vice presidential candidate and then selecting Cheney himself for the job, trying to promote his personal attorney, Harriet Miers, to the Supreme Court, and appointing Julie L. Myers (niece of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers) to head the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division of the Homeland Security Department. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement unit had oversight over about 20,000 federal employees and a budget of about \$4 billion. It was asserted that Ms. Myers had no significant experience in law enforcement or management. President Bush used a recess appointment to hire Ms. Myers, avoiding what would have been a contentious debate in the Senate (Moffett, 2006).

Finally, the hurricane seems to have reminded the general public that there is a legitimate role for government in American society, that competence in carrying out official responsibilities is better than incompetence, that excessive cronyism can cause political embarrassment, and that neutral competence and knowing how to do one's job should be valued. The hurricane demonstrated a lack of competence in government can cost lives and efficiencies derived from good government practices can save lives.

In theory, through the "science" of administration, effective government policies and proper public sector behavior can be developed. There is concern that while in theory government can be effective, it is highly constrained by the contemporary desire to appoint political associates to high level positions. These officials often act as a dead weight on agencies. Their costs are bearable as long as political appointees are not faced with responsibilities of any magnitude. Once faced with such responsibilities, however, inadequacies are quickly exposed. Simply stated, the professional administrator trained in the science of administration with extensive experience is better prepared to serve the people than political appointees who secure their position on the basis of loyalty or campaign contributions.



## References

- Associated Press. (2005). FEMA Director Bears the Brunt of Katrina. Retrieved January 16, 2006, from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9244682>
- Baum, D. (2006, January 9). Deluged. *The New Yorker*, pp. 50–63.
- Brown, M. D. (n.d.). Biography of Michael D. Brown, Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness and Response. Retrieved October 21, 2005, from <http://www.fema.gov/about/bios/brown.shtml>
- Carter, N. T. (2005, September 6). *New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection*, CRS Code RS22238. Retrieved October 23, 2005, from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22238.pdf>
- City of New Orleans. (n.d.) *City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan*. Retrieved October 12, 2005, from <http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Components/Interactives/News/US/Katrina/docs/City%20Of%20New%20Orleans%20Emergency%20Preparedness%20-%20Hurricanes.pdf>
- Committee on Science, House of Representatives. 109th Cong. (2005, October 7) (testimony of Brigadier General (ret.) David L. Johnson [U.S. Air Force, Ret.]). Retrieved October 23, 2005 from <http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full05/oct%207/testimony.pdf>
- Emergency Operations Plan. (2005). State of Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. New Orleans Hurricane Impact Study. Retrieved October 26, 2005, from <http://www.loep.state.la.us/plans/eopindex.htm>
- Farrington, B. (2005, October 8), Surveyors Map Katrina's Storm Surge, *Associated Press*. Retrieved October 22, 2005, from <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=1195020>
- Fonda, D. and Healy, R. (2005, September 8). How Reliable is Brown's Resume? *Time*. Retrieved January 12, 2006, from <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1103003,00.html>
- Glasser, S. B. and Grunwald, M. (2005, September 11). The Steady Buildup to a City's Chaos. *Washington Post*. Retrieved October 15, 2005 from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/10>
- Goodnow, F. J. (1967). *Politics and Administration: A Study in Government* (Reissued). New York: Russell & Russell.
- Hauber, R. and Michener, W. (2006). Natural flood control. Retrieved January 10, 2006, from <http://www.issues.org/issues/15.1/haeube.htm>
- Hearing before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong., (2005, September 27) (testimony of Michael D. Brown). Retrieved October 23, 2005, from [http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/09\\_27\\_05/brown092705.pdf](http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/09_27_05/brown092705.pdf)
- Hearing Charter: NOAA Hurricane Forecasting. Committee on Science, House of Representatives, 109th Cong. (2005, October 7). Retrieved October 23, 2005, from <http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full05/oct%207/Katrina%20hearing%20charter%20final%20october.pdf>
- Hurricane, K. (2006). Retrieved January 9, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane\\_Katrina](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina)
- Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes (2004, July 23). *FEMA News Release*. Retrieved October 14, 2005, from <http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=13051>
- Ingraham, P. W. (1995). *The Foundation of Merit Public Service in American Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ingraham, P. W., Thompson, J. R., and Eisenberg, E. F. (1995, May). Political management strategies and political/career relationships: Where are we now in the federal government. *Public Administration Review*, 35(3):263–272.
- Kaufman, H. (1956, December) Emerging conflicts in the doctrines of public administration. *The American Political Science Review*, 50(4):1057–1073.
- Kirkpatrick, D. D., Shane, S., and Stevenson, R. W. (2005, September 15). Ex-FEMA Chief tells of Frustration and Chaos. *New York Times*, A1, A23. Retrieved January 21, 2006, from Lexis-Nexis Academic database.

- Kurtzman, D. (2006). Late-Night Jokes About the Botched Response to Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved January 16, 2006, from <http://politicalhumor.about.com/od/hurricanekatrina/a/katrinajokes.htm>
- LSU Researchers Assist State Agencies with Hurricane Response Plans. (2005, Summer). *LSU Highlights*. Retrieved October 25, 2005, from <http://www.lsu.edu/highlights/052/pam.html>
- Madison, J. (1961). #39: Republicanism, nationalism, federalism. In Benjamin F. Wright (Ed), *The Federalist: Famous Papers on the Principles of American Government* (pp. 280–286). New York: MetroBooks.
- Martin, D. W. (1988, March/April). The fading legacy of Woodrow Wilson. *Public Administration Review*, 58(2): 631–636.
- Michael, D. B. (2006). From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved January 13, 2006, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael\\_D.\\_Brown](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_D._Brown)
- Moffett, D. (2006). Opinion, At Recess, President Horses Around. Retrieved January 13, 2006, from <http://www.palmbeachpost.com/opinion/content/opinion/epaper/2006/01/08>
- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2006, January 1). *Billion Dollar Weather Disaster 1980–2005*. Retrieved January 23, 2006, from <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/img/reports/billion/billionz-2005-1.pdf>
- Robert, T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 103–390, § 5191a, Sec. 501 (2000, October 30).
- Schwartz, J. and Drew, C. (2005, December 1). Levee break blamed on design flaw. *Louisville Courier Journal*, A3.
- Spiegelman. President Bush's 'Brownie' Quote Wings Award. Retrieved January 16, 2006, from <http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyID>
- U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2005, September 28). *Testimony of Anu Mittal before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives*. (Publication No. GAO-05-1050T). Retrieved October 13, 2005, from Government Accountability Office Online via <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf>
- U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2005, September 28). *Testimony of Norman J. Rabkin before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives*. (Publication No. GAO-05-1053T). Retrieved October 20, 2005, from Government Accountability Office Online via <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051053t.pdf>
- U.S. Senate, Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. (2005, October 20). *Exhibits from Hearing on Hurricane Katrina*. Retrieved October 21, 2005 from [http://hsgac.senate.gov/\\_files/102005HrgExhibits.pdf](http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/102005HrgExhibits.pdf)
- Van Heerden, I. L. (n.d.). *Coastal Land Loss: Hurricanes and New Orleans*. LSU Hurricane Center, Baton Rouge, LA. Center for the study of Public Health Impact of Hurricanes, LSU Hurricane Center. Retrieved October 15, 2005 from <http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/Adobe%20files%20for%20webpage/Coastal%20Land%20Loss%20-%20Hurricanes%20and%20New%20Orleans.pdf>
- Wilson, W. (1992). The Study of Administration, *Political Science Quarterly*, 56(4):481–506, 1887, in J. Shafritz and A. Hyde, *Classics of Public Administration*, Third Ed. Brooks Cole Publishers, Pacific Grove, CA.
- Would New Orleans Really Flood In A Major Hurricane? How is that Possible. (n.d.). New Orleans Hurricane Impact Study retrieved October 26, 2005, from <http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/convert%20to%20tables/Would%20New%20Orleans%20Really%20Floodtf.htm>



## Chapter 14

---

# Exit Surveys: Are They Worth the Effort?

---

Carole L. Jurkiewicz, Robert A. Giacalone,  
and Stephen B. Knouse

### CONTENTS

	14.1	Exit Surveys: Are They Worth the Effort? .....	269
1	4.2	EIS .....	270
	14.2.1	Problems with EIS.....	270
	14.3	Assessing the Effectiveness of EIS.....	271
1	4.4	Conclusion.....	276
		References .....	276

### 14.1 Exit Surveys: Are They Worth the Effort?

Employees can be the best source of information regarding how well organizations are performing, providing frontline reports of the effectiveness of operations, policies, leadership, and culture (Drost, O'Brien, and Marsh, 1987). In fact, employee feedback is essential to organizations seeking to maximize efficacy and efficiency (Nisbett and Rosh, 1980; Langley, 1989). While a strong relationship has been established between receiving employee feedback and departmental/agency effectiveness (Reilly, Brown, Blood, and Malatesta, 1981; Walsh, Ashford, and Hill, 1985; Young and Post, 1993), few organizations actually solicit or even welcome such information (Fottler, Hernandez, and Joiner, 1994). This is usually a consequence of either a lack of formal mechanisms

to do so or reticence on the part of employees to speak openly (Glaser, 1984; Krackhardt and Porter, 1985; Jackall, 1988; Jurkiewicz, 2000). Facilitating this feedback is important in making appropriate resource allocation decisions (March, 1994), and in maximizing the contributions of human resources to the organization (Fitz-enz, 2000). However, the method by which this information is obtained is equally important if the organization is to place confidence in its results (Daft and Lengel, 1984; Daft, Lengel, and Trevino, 1987; Webster and Trevino, 1995).

The public sector has traditionally relied upon job satisfaction surveys for employee feedback (Edwards, Thomas, Rosenfeld, and Booth-Kewley, 1997). One key problem with this approach is that the organization tends to selectively ask only those questions that reinforce their view of organizational functioning (Jussim, 1986; Walsh, 1988; Miller and Lawson, 1989). Having committed themselves to a particular path of action, many administrators are resistant to consider information that challenges the validity of their efforts (Wicker, 1969). Alternatively, they may rely on anecdotal information such as low turnover rates, performance appraisals, or interdepartmental comparisons to conclude all is well with their unit when this may not be the case (Jurkiewicz, Knouse, and Giacalone, 2001). It is commonplace for administrators to measure only what they believe than they can measure, rather than what they *should* measure (Festinger, 1957; Etzioni, 1964). An alternative source of information that sidesteps many of the aforementioned problems (Jurkiewicz et al., 2001) is the exit interview and survey (EIS).

## 14.2 EIS

The EIS is a widely used tool for gathering information from employees who are separating from the organization, and its aggregate responses are considered the most accurate unit of analysis in measuring HR effectiveness (Jurkiewicz, Knouse, and Giacalone, 2002). EIS data can be used for refining policies, recruitment and selection methods, working conditions, training programs, performance measurement, and organizational culture assessments (Drost et al., 1987). EIS is particularly appealing as a feedback instrument in that employees at this transitional stage of their organizational career are likely to be particularly candid about their perceptions of the organization (Giacalone, Knouse, and Montagliani, 1997). They have likely engaged in objective reflection about the organization (Garretson and Teel, 1982; Russel, 1991), and feel freer to speak without the prospect of retaliation which silences those still employed there (Hinrichs, 1975). Their insights are especially valuable given the research that suggests 92% of employees who leave an organization are those rated near to top on performance appraisals (McEvoy and Cascio, 1987; Gilbertson, 1998). It serves as well to demonstrate to the public the value of government expenditures and the responsiveness of governmental processes. The value of EIS as a tool for employee feedback is supported by research (e.g., Toulson and Smith, 1994; Giacalone, Knouse, and Pollard, 1999; Jurkiewicz et al., 2001), and is intuitively evident.

### 14.2.1 *Problems with EIS*

Good intentions and justifications aside, the EIS may still leave its various users dissatisfied. Perhaps the EIS asks the wrong questions, in the wrong way, or under the wrong circumstances to elicit usable, substantive results (Lefkowitz and Katz, 1969; Hinrichs, 1975; Woods and Macauley, 1987; Giacalone, Stuckey, and Beard, 1996). Even if the data are collected properly, concerns remain over

the utility of the results summaries, their timeliness, and to whom they are distributed. Closely monitoring user satisfaction will enhance the organization's ability to make informed decisions, ensure responsive use of its resources, and improve the EIS process itself.

There are a number of common problems with the EIS. Often the organization collects the data but does not use it (Garretson and Teal, 1982), wasting resources and the potential for substantive gains in efficiency. At other times, the organization may want to use the EIS data but the EIS administrators do not give feedback to the management, in a timely or understandable fashion (Hinrichs, 1975). Another problem may involve as to how respondents to the EIS feel they are treated. If respondents perceive that the organization does not care (e.g., information is collected but not used) or that the EIS is given in a hurried and trite manner (Zarandona and Camuso, 1985), they may not take the survey seriously. Further, if separating employees do not want to confront management, resent the organization, or feel that the EIS may be used as a retaliatory device, they may not be forthcoming. Finally, respondents may not be straightforward because they want to protect colleagues who are staying with the organization, or respondents may wish to keep their ties with the organization congenial (e.g., ask for a letter of recommendation or perhaps even rejoin the organization later) (Knouse, Beard, Pollard, and Giacalone, 1996; Giacalone, et al., 1997).

### **14.3 Assessing the Effectiveness of EIS**

It is recommended that organizations regularly assess EIS utility to internal clients in order to determine whether it is effective. There are two ways of assessing the effectiveness of the EIS: interview and survey. Interviews of exit survey data users, either individually or in focus groups, can gather data regarding utility, satisfaction levels, and opportunities for improvement. Because the greatest need for restructuring occurs in the first few iterations of an EIS instrument, the interview method is particularly useful. Interviews provide the opportunity to follow up on client feedback and get more specific information about the instrument's efficacy and deficits. Once the elementary problems are solved and the exit survey is fully operational (generally in 12–18 months), a survey assessment protocol can be used. At that time, refinements to the exit survey would likely have been implemented and much of the feedback data needed to make the exit survey fully functional would have been gathered. The survey protocol is less time-consuming and provides data that can more easily be measured and incorporated when the organization considers revisions to the EIS process.

This type of assessment is important to the long-term success and value of the EIS method. Literature on exit surveying and interviewing shows that lack of success is frequently attributable to deficient data monitoring and misunderstanding of data users' needs (Giacalone, 1993). This common problem makes the assessment and evaluation of the EIS essential, once it is fully operational (Edwards et al., 1997).

Assessment of the EIS can be directed to gauge effectiveness from two different perspectives. First is an assessment of the value of the data collected by the EIS. Does it provide valid and reliable data? Second is the evaluation of user satisfaction with the quality of information they are getting from the EIS (and associated reports generated by that data). A well-constructed EIS may achieve a structural level of quality without achieving user satisfaction. Thus, the assessment of user satisfaction must establish periodically whether the EIS is responsive to user needs (Jurkiewicz, et al., 2001).

Next, we present both an interview protocol and a survey format to assess the value of the EIS data and the satisfaction of EIS users (Table 14.1). In both instances, users are asked to rate the quality of the data, quality of the feedback reports, and how the managers are using the data. Additionally, respondents are asked to describe the value of EIS in terms of utility, cost savings, and flexibility. As configured in Table 14.2, the survey format allows for both closed-ended (in Part 1) and open-ended (in Part 2) questions.

The following instruments are designed for public organizations in assessing their exit surveys. The first addresses utility issues associated with exit surveys from an interview format, the second from a survey format. Although, the instruments are formatted for exit surveys, they would work equally well for exit interviews.

EIS developers must first familiarize themselves with the literature in order to set forth a usable EIS prototype in the initial iteration. The type of feedback received from these instruments can

**Table 14.1 Utility of Exit Survey Data Interview Protocol**

1.	How have you used exit survey data in the past year?
2.	Describe your initial plans to use exit survey data.
3.	Does the exit survey data serve your needs?
4.	Does the exit survey data provide you with comprehensive information? What content could the exit surveys include to better meet your needs?
5.	In the past year, how have you used exit survey data to improve your unit, identify/resolve problems, or identify/utilize opportunities?
6.	In the past year, how has exit survey data been ineffective in meeting your departmental needs?
7.	What specific changes in the past year have resulted from use of exit survey data?
8.	Can you give an estimate of how much time and/or money the exit survey data might have saved you? What is the basis of that estimate?
9.	Are there any performance records (e.g., accident rates, downtime, efficiency, production schedules, etc.) that might support your estimate?
10.	Does the exit survey provide you with the right type and amount of data to meet your data needs? If not, why not?
11.	How might the exit survey be changed so as to better meet your data needs?
12.	Are you aware of any other data sources that would be as effective as the exit survey?
13.	Can you identify other units that might be interested in using the exit survey? If so, please identify the unit and a contact person, if possible.
14.	Are you confident with the accuracy/credibility of the data the exit survey provides?
15.	Are you satisfied with the comprehensiveness of the exit survey reports?
16.	Are you satisfied with the timeliness of the exit survey reports?

**Table 14.1 (continued) Utility of Exit Survey Data Interview Protocol**

17.	Are you satisfied with the clarity of the exit survey-related reports?
18.	Are you satisfied with the organization of the exit survey-related reports?
19.	Are you satisfied with the helpfulness of staff in answering exit survey-related questions?
20.	Is there any additional information you would like to share regarding exit survey data?
21.	How important is the exit survey data to your department?
22.	Do you see any change in your data needs that could be met by revising the exit survey?
23.	For which of the following reasons are you using the exit surveys? (Check all that apply) <input type="checkbox"/> diagnosis of problem areas <input type="checkbox"/> ongoing monitoring <input type="checkbox"/> assessment of changing needs <input type="checkbox"/> tool for planning or forecasting <input type="checkbox"/> for use in recruitment data <input type="checkbox"/> data to help in personnel development

**Table 14.2 Utility of Exit Survey Data Satisfaction Survey**

<i>PART I</i>	
<i>Directions.</i> For each of the statements below, use the following scale:	
1. Not at all 2. Very little 3. Uncertain 4. Somewhat 5. Extremely well	
1.	To what extent does the exit survey data serve your needs?
2.	To what extent does the exit survey data provide you with comprehensive information? If not, what content could the exit surveys include to better meet your needs?
3.	In the past year, to what extent have you used exit survey data to improve your unit, identify/resolve problems, or identify/utilize opportunities?
4.	In the past year, to what extent has exit survey data been effective in helping serving your needs?
5.	To what extent do the exit surveys provide you with the right type and amount of data to meet your data needs?
6.	To what extent are you confident with the accuracy/credibility of the data the exit surveys provide?

*(continued)*



**Table 14.2 (continued) Utility of Exit Survey Data Satisfaction Survey**

7.	To what extent are you satisfied with the comprehensiveness of the exit survey reports?
8.	To what extent are you satisfied with the timeliness of the exit survey reports?
9.	To what extent are you satisfied with the clarity of the exit survey-related reports?
10.	To what extent are you satisfied with the organization of the exit survey-related reports?
11.	To what extent are you satisfied with the helpfulness of human resources staff in answering exit survey-related questions?
12.	To what extent is the exit survey data important to your unit?
13.	For each of the following, evaluate the extent to which you are using the exit survey data for this purpose? _____ diagnosis of problem areas _____ ongoing monitoring _____ assessment of changing needs _____ tool for planning or forecasting _____ for use in recruitment data _____ data to help in personnel development
<i>PART 2</i>	
<i>Directions.</i> Please provide additional information regarding your satisfaction with the exit survey process. Please be as detailed as possible in your answers.	
1.	Briefly describe how you have used exit survey data in the past year.
2.	Briefly describe how you initially planned to use exit survey data.
3.	What specific changes in the past year have been the direct result of exit survey data?
4.	Can you give an estimate of how much time and/or money the exit survey data might have saved you? What is the basis of that estimate?
5.	Are there any performance records (e.g., accident rates, downtime, efficiency, production schedules, etc.) that might support your estimate?
6.	How might the exit surveys be changed so as to better meet your data needs?
7.	Are there other data sources that would be as effective as the exit surveys?
8.	Can you identify other units that might be interested in using the exit surveys? If so, please identify the unit and a contact person, if possible.
9.	Overall, is there anything that you would like to mention regarding exit survey data?
10.	Do you see any change in your data needs that could be met by revising (or including new questions) the exit surveys?

then be helpful in formulating the proper development and execution of the EIS. The utility of information collected during exit interviews is a function of the caliber of the data gatherer (the interviewer or survey instrument), the technology used (paper and pencil, or computerized), the respondents' willingness to provide information, the level of trust the respondent has that such data will remain confidential, and the sample from which extrapolations are made (Giacalone, Elig, Ginexi, and Bright, 1995; Jurkiewicz et al., 2002). Equally important are the issues of methodological soundness, responsiveness to an organization's diagnostic and developmental needs, and the direct relation between data collection and employee development (see Giacalone, 1993 for a review).

Organizations seeking to use an EIS should clearly identify its purpose, anticipated problems, and opportunities in its development and administration. Its content should ideally be clearly predicated on needs that warrant its use. In identifying these needs, the organization should consider its utility for both primary and secondary purposes. Previous researchers (Giacalone, 1993; Giacalone et al., 1995) have noted the value of exit surveys in providing information for one or two distinct purposes: employee perceptions and personal catharsis.

When the EIS functions as an assessment of employee perceptions of the organization and its policies, the purpose is to allow information to flow more freely. For example, in the case of service provisions, who better to know or assess the decision-making ability, effective communication, and fair and equitable judgments than those directly involved in service provision? Such information can affect the ability of the organization to maximize efficiency and quality in service delivery.

When the EIS is used for personal reasons, its purpose is to benefit the exiting employee, not necessarily the organization. Asking exiting employees their perceptions of the organization can mitigate an otherwise disgruntled expert voice. As a former employee with presumably inside knowledge about the organization's workings, a disgruntled former employee's criticism of the organization is often considered credible by those outside the organization. By providing an outlet to legitimately voice these issues, with confidence that the opinions provided will be given serious consideration, the individual is less likely to seek an outlet for speaking his/her mind in the community (in the form of whistleblowing), where it can be potentially harmful to both the individual and the organization.

Regardless of whether the purpose is primary, secondary, or both, the following are some general recommendations on administration of the surveys evaluating EIS.

1. Consider third party administration

Users of the EIS may be more forthcoming about how well (or poorly) the instrument works if they are not responding directly to the administrators of the EIS. Rather, a third party such as a consultant, may be a more credible data gatherer (Jurkiewicz et al., 2001).

2. Consider a Web-based or computer survey

Users of the EIS may be more comfortable with a Web-based or computer EIS protocol (Giacalone, 1993). Users may then be able to complete the survey at their leisure. If the responses are entered directly in a database after completion, anonymity may be better preserved (Rosenfeld, Giacalone, Knouse, Doherty, Vincino, Kanter, and Greaves, 1991). In addition, a Web-based survey feeding directly into a database would eliminate the possibility of errors in coding the data, eliminate costs of data input, and allow for faster analyses of the results.

## 14.4 Conclusion

The question posed in this chapter is whether EIS is worth the effort. Do the benefits outweigh the various costs and problems? An effective EIS produces data of value to the various organizational functions, and satisfies the various user needs. Therefore, the EIS is most appropriately evaluated using these two criteria—data value and user satisfaction. Presented here are two methods that examine the dimensionality of data value and a number of user needs.

Although an EIS that is methodologically sound may satisfy the developer, it can still leave the user dissatisfied. A preemptive strike at user dissatisfaction should be taken in the development stage, where users can voice their needs and suggest ideas for developing the EIS. Users who have been involved in the development process are more often satisfied with the results. User input can make the difference between a merely adequate EIS and a truly helpful EIS, for the organization.

## References

- Daft, R.L. and Lengel, R.H. (1984). Information richness: A new approach to managerial behavior and organization design. In B.M. Staw & L.L. Cummings (eds.), *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 6 (pp. 191–233). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Daft, R.L., Lengel, R.H., and Trevino, L.K. (1987). Message equivocality, media selection, and manager performance: Implications for information systems. *MIS Quarterly*, 11(3), 355–368.
- Drost, D.A., O'Brien, F.P., and Marsh, S. (1987). Exit interviews: Master the possibilities. *Personnel Administrator*, 32(2), 104–110.
- Edwards, J.E., Thomas, M.D., Rosenfeld, P., and Booth-Kewley, S. (1997). *How to Conduct Organizational Surveys*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Etzioni, A. (1964). *Modern Organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Evans, J.R. and Lindsay, W.M. (2000). *The Management and Control of Quality*, 4th ed. Minneapolis: West.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Fitz-enz, J. (2000). *The ROI of Human Capital: Measuring the Economic Value of Employee Performance*. New York: AMACOM.
- Fotler, M.D., Hernandez, S.R., and Joiner, C.L. (1994). *Strategic Management of Human Resources*. Albany, New York: Delmar.
- Garretson, P. and Teel, K.S. (1982). The exit interview: Effective tool or meaningless gesture? *Personnel*, 4, 70–77.
- Gialalone, R.A. (1993). *A Critical Evaluation of the Army Career Transitions Survey: A Suggested Approach for Reformation* (SSP-TCN 93–300). Research Triangle Park, NC: Battelle.
- Gialalone, R.A., Elig, T.W., Ginexi, E.M., and Bright, A.J. (1995). The impact of identification and type of separation on measures of satisfaction and missing data in the exit survey process. *Military Psychology*, 7, 235–252.
- Gialalone, R.A., Knouse, S.B., and Montagliani, A. (1997). Motivation for and prevention of dishonest responding in exit interviews and surveys. *Journal of Psychology*, 131, 438–448.
- Gialalone, R.A., Knouse, S.B., and Pollard, H.G. (1999). Willingness to report unethical behavior in exit surveys. *Teaching Business Ethics*, 3, 309–321.
- Gialalone, R.A., Stuckey, L., and Beard, J.W. (1996). Conditions influencing biased responding in exit interviews and surveys. *Organizational Development Journal*, 14, 27–39.
- Gilbertson, D. (1998, February 1). Why do people quit their jobs? Because they can. *New York Times*, p. BU12.
- Glauser, M.J. (1984). Upward information flow in organizations: Review and conceptual analysis. *Human Relations*, 37(8), 613–643.

- Hinrichs, J.R. (1975). Measurement of reasons for resignation of professionals: Questionnaire versus company and consultant exit interviews. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 60, 530–532.
- Jackall, R. (1988). *Moral Mazes*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jurkiewicz, C.L. (2000). The trouble with ethics: Results of a national survey of healthcare executives. *HEC Forum*, 12.
- Jurkiewicz, C.L., Knouse, S.B., and Giacalone, R.A. (2001). When an employee leaves: The effectiveness of clinician exit interviews and surveys. *Clinical Leadership and Management Review*, 15(2), 81–84.
- Jurkiewicz, C.L., Knouse, S.B., and Giacalone, R.A. (2002). Are exit interviews and surveys really worth the time and effort? Calculating return on investment. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 22, 52–61.
- Jussim, L. (1986). Self-fulfilling prophecies: A theoretical and integrative review. *Psychological Review*, 93, 429–445.
- Knouse, S.B., Beard, J.W., Pollard, H.G., and Giacalone, R.A. (1996). Willingness to discuss exit interview topics: The impact of attitudes toward the supervisor and authority. *Journal of Psychology*, 130, 249–262.
- Krackhardt, D. and Porter, L.W. (1985). When friends leave: A structural analysis of the relationship between turnover and stayers' attitudes. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 30, 242–261.
- Langley, A. (1989). In search of rationality: The purposes behind the use of formal analysis in organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 34, 598–631.
- Lefkowitz, J. and Katz, M.L. (1969). Validity of exit interviews. *Personnel Psychology*, 22, 445–455.
- March, J.G. (1994). *A Primer on Decision Making*. New York: Free Press.
- McEvoy, G.M. and Cascio, W.F. (1987). Do good or poor performers leave? A meta-analysis of the relationship between performance and turnover. *Academy of Management Journal*, 30, 744–762.
- Miller, A.G. and Lawson, T. (1989). The effect of an informational option on the fundamental attribution error. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 15, 194–204.
- Nisbett, R. and Rosh, M. (1980). *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Reilly, R.R., Brown, B., Blood, M.R., and Malatesta, C.Z. (1981). The effects of realistic previews: A study and discussion of the literature. *Personnel Psychology*, 34, 823–834.
- Rosenfeld, P., Giacalone, R.A., Knouse, S.B., Doherty, L.M., Vincino, S.M., Kantor, J., and Greaves, J. (1991). Impression management, candor, and microcomputer-based organizational surveys: An individual differences approach. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 7, 23–32.
- Russel, J. (1991). Career development interventions in organizations. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 38, 237–287.
- Toulson, P. and Smith, M. (1994). The relationship between organizational climate and employee perceptions of personnel management practices. *Public Personnel Management*, 23(3), 453–468.
- Walsh, J.P. (1988). Selectivity and selective perception: An investigation of managers' belief structures and information processing. *Academy of Management Journal*, 31, 873–896.
- Walsh, J.P., Ashford, S.J., and Hill, T.E. (1985). Feedback obstruction: The influence of information environment on employee turnover intentions. *Human Relations*, 38, 23–46.
- Webster, J. and Trevino, L.K. (1995). Rational and social theories as complementary explanations of communication media choices: Two policy-capturing studies. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38, 1544–1572.
- Wicker, A.W. (1969). Attitude versus action: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects. *Journal of Social Issues*, 41–78.
- Woods, R.H. and Macaulay, J.F. (1987). Exit interviews: How to turn a file filler into a management tool. *Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly*, 28(3), 39.
- Young, M. and Post, J.E. (1993). Managing to communicate, communicating to manage: How leading companies communicate with employees. *Organizational Dynamics*, 22, 31–43.
- Zarandona, J.L. and Camuso, M.A. (1985). A study of exit interviews: Does the last word count? *Personnel*, 62, 47–48.



## Chapter 15

---

# Training Local Environmental Governance Leaders: A Case of International Cooperation

---

Itoko Suzuki\*

### CONTENTS

1	5.1	Introduction .....	279
	15.2	Project for Human Resources Development for Eco-Partnership Building in Local Governance .....	281
	15.3	Initial Training during 1999–2000 for the Africa–Asia Eco-Partnership Building Project .....	285
	15.4	Immediate Actions Followed and in Prospect .....	288
	15.5	In Retrospect: Temporary Summing Up .....	289
		Notes .....	290
		Bibliography .....	290

### 15.1 Introduction

“Eco-Partnership” is a concept addressed to facilitate urban environmental improvement in partnership with many actors in cities and has been designed for the improved solutions to urban

---

\* Dr. Itoko Suzuki is currently professor of public administration, Kobe Women’s University, and concurrently adjunct professor of international cooperation, Shizuoka University of Arts and Culture. She worked 30 years during 1969–2000 with the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs; last position held as Chief of Governance and Public Administration. During 2000–2006, she served as professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU).

environmental governance issues by the intergovernmental organization (i.e., United Nations [UN] in this case) and a local government (i.e., Tokyo Metropolitan Government). This concept has been created and used by these two entities that cooperated to work for the better local environmental governance. The 1992 Rio Summit and the 2002 Johannesburg Environment Conference of the United Nations reaffirmed the need for stronger partnership among governance actors in resolving the global and local environmental issues. A case of international cooperation for the big cities will highlight the challenges experienced in the process of a project implementation to build the intracity and intercity cooperation partnership with particular reference to the training of local environmental governance leaders in selected developing cities.

For implementing a variety of international environmental regimes, local authorities, particularly in big cities have become the major actors. The international community has recognized the need for their greater institutional capacity. In the past, a number of capacity building projects for the improvement of local governance have been developed by the international organizations including the UN as well as by the ODAs of several developed countries. However, the local governance capacity building has continued to be one of the major tasks of international cooperation agencies. Administrative and bureaucratic stagnation in most of the local governments in the world has been the cause of slow process of improvement of urban environment. Local government leaders have to create a breakthrough for changing this stagnation and the international cooperation agencies must address more effectively to bringing in such a breakthrough. The task has been considered imminent for the environmental causes, due to the current degree of degradation in air, water, soil, and the health of people, especially those living in big cities.

The role of local environmental governance leaders in big cities has thus been highlighted. Local administrative and bureaucratic bottlenecks must be eliminated. For the purpose, the incentives for the administrative and political leaders in governance of the big cities must be provided for them to embark on more vigorously the improvement of the local environmental governance. Nurturing of the government leaders and provision of incentives to them can be organized at least as in the opportunities for consulting and dialoging with counterparts of other cities which have similar problems. Joint learning with peers within and across the national borders was identified as positive opportunities for consultation and dialoguing for leaders of several big cities. These opportunities needed to serve as incentives and nurturing to the government leaders. Leadership training activities were thus organized to provide these opportunities to enhance policy knowledge, skills and technical resources, as well as for the morale enhancement of the local governance leaders. These training activities for the local environmental governance leaders were organized in the UN technical cooperation project to be conducted in a manner for them to dialogue and exchange technical knowledge and innovations. Peers' learning was designed by building partnerships among several big cities.

The author will provide an analysis on the concepts, methods, and the processes of training local environmental governance leaders organized in the international cooperation project which involved extensive partnership building and technical know-how exchange among the local environmental governance leaders. This case is an example of the efforts undertaken by the UN technical cooperation project together with several big cities of Asia and Africa. This chapter will document a process experienced and innovations of technical cooperation derived out of small experiments of building partnerships with leaders of several big cities of African and Asian regions, and reexamine the role of the international cooperation agency in the local environmental governance.

This chapter will first sort out some key assumptions and concepts used for this UN technical cooperation project. This chapter will then document the processes and methods of the international project formulation and the role played by the UN as an international cooperation agency for generating, if not a breakthrough, dynamism to the stagnant local environmental policy process in

several developing cities. No evaluation is being attempted to make in this chapter, if it was a real breakthrough or not. As of January 2006, the project is still at its initial stage due to the delayed start. The evaluation will take place after some concrete outcomes become visibly sustained as improved local environment.

## **15.2 Project for Human Resources Development for Eco-Partnership Building in Local Governance**

This international technical cooperation project, entitled “human resources development for eco-partnership building in local governance”<sup>1</sup> is a follow-up activity of the 1998 World Conference on Local Eco-partnership Building organized jointly by the UN and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.<sup>2</sup> At the end of the 1998 Eco-Partnership Tokyo Conference, a declaration<sup>3</sup> was issued by the participants including governors, mayors, senior environmental officials, NGO representatives, and eminent persons from over 88 big cities of the world. The declaration delineated the commitment of the participating cities to cultivate an ecosociety in partnership with citizens, civil society organizations, private sector businesses, and governmental institutions. The declaration emphasized the need to address the already serious challenges faced by cities related to waste management, air quality, water pollution, transportation, and energy use. These challenges became the areas to be tackled by the new follow-up project. The declaration also called for the UN to formulate new proposals for training aimed at nurturing, sensitizing, and transfer of know-how for local environmental governance leaders so that effective exchange of ideas for policies and technologies are organized for the improvement of local environmental problems.

By coincidence, at that time, another UN related conference was convened in Tokyo, that is, the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development (so-called TICAD II) in 1998, which affirmed that environmental management was essential for sustainable development and that African development could be benefited by the Asian experiences. These two events were therefore connected in identifying respective follow-up activities of these two separate conferences. Organizers of both events took advantage of the common information network available in the same host country of the two conferences, and cooperated to organize a follow-up project that would be beneficial for the required postconference activities. Eco-Partnership Building concept was connected to Africa–Asia Cooperation. Training, capacity building, and network building were the commonalities for both postconference activities. In this way, a new UN international cooperation project named Human Resources Development for Eco-partnership Building in Local Governance was formulated.

This new technical cooperation project has been predicated on the following experiences and conclusions derived out of these two conferences:

1. Big cities with the size of population that exceeds 1 million according to the UN studies have deteriorated their environmental conditions and urgently need help, particularly in Africa.
2. Asian cities have already initiated environmental improvement actions but still need more efforts; in the meantime Asian experiences are considered to be of help to the African cities, as South–South (Africa–Asia) technical cooperation or exchange has been found useful in other projects.
3. Governance leaders of big cities in both African and Asian regions tackling the local environmental issues need, and are willing, to learn more on solutions to the local environmental issues.



4. Local government leaders would appreciate learning from peers and would be more motivated to learn from peers across the city border or national borders. They have to be nurtured by peers' dialogue and consultation that involve technical know-how transfer.
5. Local environmental problems cannot be solved single handedly by local government alone. The solution requires participation of stakeholders within each city. Networking with other cities within and across the national or regional borders would facilitate more extensive partnership building that would be beneficial for knowledge and technical diffusion.
6. Such networking and partnership building can be facilitated by the international cooperation activities. The UN has been well situated in technical cooperation and network building.

However rough or unrefined these conclusions were, these notions encouraged the organizers and participants of 1998 UN Eco-Partnership Conference to create a new project. This new project included the following four common keyconcepts derived from the two conferences: (1) Imminent Responsibilities of the Big Cities to Tackle Environment Degradation; (2) Need for Strong Local Governance and Leadership for Managing Environmental and Urban Interdependence; (3) Eco-Partnership Building Serving Leadership Training; (4) UN Role as Focal Point of Inter-City Cooperation and Partnership Building. These concepts are briefly explained, as they became the founding concepts for organizing concrete activities for the new international cooperation project.

### **Key concept I: Imminent Responsibilities of the Big Cities to Tackle Environment Degradation**

Global environmental problems have been substantially caused by urban development, consumption patterns, transportation practices, and production systems that have consumed vast amounts of resources. Energy use and modern lifestyles of urban residents contributed heavily to the degradation of the broader environment. Concentration of population energizes the world's cities at the cost of their greenery, clean air, water, and other aspects of the natural environment; so far, CO<sub>2</sub> level resulted in 40 cm of the sea level increase causing the loss of land and lives of 400 million people or more. It is evident that the need to resolve urban environmental problems is critical for the cities and also for the very survival of the globe.<sup>3</sup>

UN statistics also indicated the forecasts that by 2005 more than half of earth's population would be living in cities; by 2020, urban population will reach 60%. Urbanization has been increasing rapidly, particularly after the middle of the twentieth century; the birth of mega cities was more extraordinary. In 1965, there were only 7 cities with a population of 5 million or more, and only one city exceeded 10 million. In 1995, there were 27 cities with a population of 5 or more million and 10 with 10 million or more. By the year 2015, it is estimated that 75 cities will have a population of 5 million or more and 22 cities exceeding a population of 10 million. It is for this reason why big cities are important to tackle the urban environmental issues of the globe. The targeted constituents of the new project must therefore be the leaders of big cities. The cities selected for this project were those of which population exceeded 1 million.

### **Key Concept II: Need for Strong Local Governance for Managing Environmental and Urban Interdependence**

To solve the so-called brown agenda such as water shortage, sewage, contamination, pollution, vehicle emissions, garbage disposal, toxic waste, public health, etc., municipalities are responsible for creating a favorable environment. Clearly the decisive factor in solving urban environmental

problems is the ability of urban governance systems to encompass and integrate all of the various entities and interests into necessary policies to solve the urban environmental problems. Particularly local governance of big cities must be enhanced in order to effectively deal with the metropolitan interdependence as well as environmental interdependence for forming integrated environmental policies.<sup>4</sup>

The improved local public administration of big cities requires better decentralization systems of public administration and coordination systems for local, regional, and central levels. Better local governance in big cities implies more dialogue and consultation of institutions existed in big cities. These requirements are seized in the notion of “metropolitan” or “big city” governance. In environmental interdependence, the magnitude of interdependence is much more than “metropolitan independence,” as the environmental issues are extremely intricate and interdependent, and influences the broader geographical areas, that is, globe as a whole. Decentralization and coordination for better local governance in these contexts became really urgent elements for tackling the issue of strong local environmental governance.

Using the human body as an analogy, an ecosystem (or society) must be equipped with mechanisms not only for expelling waste, but also for reusing substances by purifying them through metabolism. This nature system or natural ecosystem needs circular view for connecting various stages or points of actions similar to those in the municipal or urban interdependence. Establishing an ecosociety itself takes a concept of making city life system closer to nature recycling system that requires a circular approach of management, rather than conventional vertical controlling pattern of management. Circular approach can integrate various decentralized systems. Therefore, to rise up to the enormous challenge of establishing recycling systems of water, energy, and other resources available in a big city, local governance need to be reinvented. Local governments also need a broad-based policy vision and know-how, recognizing that one single action for change has a chain reaction.<sup>5</sup> This circular approach is the very framework of governance that seeks vigorous participation of all linking actors and one actor to cooperate with another in partnership.

For instance, the 1998 World Conference on Eco-Partnership reported a case of one German town concerning the storage, penetration, and usage of rainwater. This case gave a renewed thinking on how local government must be reinvented. This example touched upon the need even to change technical administrative regulation, systems of rewards and subsidies to enterprises (potential polluters otherwise), and considered to use the decentralized water storage systems, rather than massive or central system of water storage as advantageous. Above all, that attempt took cooperation of citizens, civic organizations, entrepreneurs, and government to establish such new decentralized systems of water retention in the town. Both local government or administration and citizens had to try to take advantage of the new technologies of decentralized water retention system, rather than mass water storage (e.g., water dam). The Conference learned that such decentralized system of rainwater retention could contribute to a reduction in the consumption of potable water, which can lead to reuse of water and ease the load of water waste system. The smaller and decentralized system reduces potential land seepage (by not creating a massive water dam), and at the end of the chain reactions, it would lead to stopping the urban climate change (environmental advantage), and to tax reduction (resident monetary advantage). One innovation can lead to circular effect that really enable a new cycle of ecosystem.

These circular effects of environmental innovations require holistic view in making policies on environment and in implementing these policies through various actors. Holistic view is meant to be the notion that various issues and actors can be viewed interdependently. Governance approach implies participation and partnership of multiple actors with appropriate sequence of actions (reduced, reused, recycled, etc.). The multiple natures of functional and geographical actors can

logically be well governed by taking into account the interdependence of those participating actors who can form partnership. No wonder Oran Young<sup>6</sup> was able to create a paradigm of global governance by way of analyzing the global environmental issues.

Managing such interdependence of actors and physical areas need strong leadership, as much as the complex environment affairs needs strong leadership to integrate necessary resources into policies. Leadership training has been concentrated for this reason in the postconference UN project.

### **Key Concept III: Eco-Partnership Building Serving Leadership Training**

Local public administration needs a breakthrough to shift their conventional mass consumption and mass production approach (such as creating a water dam) to a new, smaller, and decentralized system. Managers need to have innovative approach with a holistic vision to integrate all environmental issues, as one action to improve one environmental problem would have chain reactions to the solution of other environmental problems. Local public administrators need to empower other actors involved in the development of better reuse, and recycling systems at local and community levels, as much as they need to regulate the levels and patterns of production and consumption, and improve waste management in the big cities. So, local government leaders need to do a lot. As leaders of local governance, they need to be equipped with technical know-how, visions, and resources to govern well. They need help. They have to update policy knowledge constantly and the innovative approaches of governance. What should the international cooperation agencies do to help them? They need resources. They need to learn. At least the international cooperation agencies could provide opportunities for them to learn and for resource mobilization. Neither opportunities for their learning and resource mobilization including innovative approaches, networking skills, technologies, etc. nor the effective methods of organizing such opportunities have been sufficient.

It is not easy to secure the necessary collaboration, cooperation, or partnership within the national limits, between central and local governments, for political and other reasons. An inducement of networking from outside the city limits can be considered and the new project tried to induce network building from the transcity and transnational contexts, and even in transregional environment. Intracity cooperation among different actors may be difficult, and administrators want to learn how other cities are doing. Rather than intracity cooperation among stakeholders for which the ultimate local environmental governance project is aimed, initially the transcity and transnational and regional network building for know-how exchange and peers consultation or dialogue were planned. The incentive for the local government and administrative leaders was to get out of their daily work premises from time to time and study abroad by learning what their counterparts of other countries and cities were doing. Such learning is indeed an incentive for anyone, and networking with their counterparts by way of exchanging practices and know-how is a welcome method. Perhaps local administrators would find easier to do dialogue with friendly neighbors horizontally, rather than vertically with their central government bureaucrats of their own country. Also demonstrating their ability to do better than their counterparts in a highly visible competitive international setup could be an added incentive for government leaders of big cities in the time of globalization. Local governance leaders needed learning opportunities and resources for environmental governance.

With these assumptions, a number of interregional and transnational networking and partnership building activities among peers of governance leaders of the big cities were thus organized in the new project. Partnership building was conceived to be a means to transfer among the peer group of leaders of local governance in the participating big cities for their learning of the necessary governance policy making and technological innovations.

### **Key Concept IV: Focal Point Role of the United Nations for Intercity Cooperation and Partnership Building**

The UN as a focal point of the global governance or at least the premise of global dialogue has certainly been in the forefront to address the environmental concerns globally. The 1992 Rio Environmental Summit was attended by heads of states and hundreds of government officials and high-level specialists as well as all other actors in environmental governance. Since then, the UN and its specialized agencies have been implementing a number of initiatives geared from the UN conferences toward alleviating basic problems associated with environment concerns, including implementing agenda 21 and its local agenda 21 as well as managing new international environmental regimes.

The 1998 World Conference on Eco-Partnership Tokyo was one of the post-Rio follow-up activities of the UN. The UN as a comprehensive international cooperation agency can often be a focal point of multiple international cooperation actors and is suitably situated for combining various initiatives. As stated earlier, the outcome of the TICAD II, organized in November 1998 in Tokyo (jointly by the UN, several NGOs, and the Japanese Government), was reviewed by these organizers of the two conferences. Since these two world conferences identified to share the same concept, that is, the partnership building, the Africa–Asia partnership was combined with the Eco-Partnership for local governance leaders. Thus, a follow-up of these two events chose to undertake capacity building for solving local environmental issues, initially as leadership training. Local environmental government leaders of several developing big cities were identified to be trained. The UN and its technical cooperation agencies were able to tap necessary support of collaborating actors in the big cities for organizing the new project.

## **15.3 Initial Training during 1999–2000 for the Africa–Asia Eco-Partnership Building Project**

The capacity building of local environmental administrative leaders addresses, substantively, the issues of waste management, water resources, and urban transportation management, with slogans of “clean streets,” “clean water,” and “clean air,” all geared to make cities environmentally clean. The concept of south–south cooperation has been fully reflected in this capacity building project. African cities have conceivably relevant problems to those in Asia, and thus two regions can possibly cooperate in solving these problems by exchanging information of experiences and technological practices. Participating cities in the 1999–2000 organized in the initial phase of the new project were 18 (6 Asian cities including Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Marikina, and Tokyo, and 12 African cities including Accra, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg, Lagos, Nairobi, Mombassa, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kismey, Lilongwe, and Harare.) The targeted local environmental administrative leaders in the first phase of the project were governors, mayors, and senior environmental administrators in these cities. During a three-year project period, the project will train about 150 (50 in the first year). Emphasis of the project activities is placed on strengthening local governance and the leadership training by creating partnerships among the big cities of the Asian and African regions as stipulated in the declarations of the Eco-partnership Tokyo world Conference and of the TICAD II.<sup>7</sup>

Six events took place during the years 1999–2000 for the preparatory phase of this project in order to come up with the concrete plans of actions of collaborations among participating cities. These six events are listed below:

1. Leadership Development Programme for Africa–Asia Eco-Partnership organized during the UN Governance Conference (Manila, May–June 1999)
2. Africa–Asia Eco-Partnership Study Programme I (Bangkok, Thailand, July 1999)
3. Eco-Partnership Africa–Asia Leaders’ Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 1999)
4. Workshop on the Role of Municipalities in Building an Eco-Society in Africa (Mombassa, Kenya, October 1999)
5. Africa–Asia Eco-Partnership Study Programme II (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, November 1999)
6. Leadership Training and Green Poster Session (Tokyo, Japan, May 2000)

The first event was a meeting held in May 1999 and was entitled as the First Meeting of the Leadership Development Programme for Africa–Asia Eco-Partnership. The objectives of the meeting are listed below as they served as common objectives of all the subsequent events:

1. To assist building collaborations and in particular to organize network and match-making of specific technological exchange between African and Asian cities in developing ecosocieties in their respective cities
2. To assist the participating cities to organize sensitization program within the city to educate municipal administrative staff and citizens (city poster sessions to be organized in each participating city by schools or municipalities to promote concepts of “clean cities,” “clean streets,” “clean air,” or “clean water”)
3. To develop human resources of the participating cities including mayors or governors and environment directors as well as executives of relevant NGOs and private sector businesses to build eco-oriented cities by learning the waste disposal systems, recycling, cleaning systems, new systems for less consumption and less production, ecobusinesses, etc., particularly from lessons of experiences and practices of the participating cities.

Each activity included vigorous exchange among the heads and environment chiefs of the local governments of the participating cities, and of innovative ideas on the environment policies. Host cities for these events demonstrated practices and technologies of recycling, garbage collection, housing schemes on landfill, congestion relief, transportation systems, clean city campaigns, sensitization education for children, etc. Each host city was cooperated by the academic institutions, firms that invented new technologies of recycling, furnaces, landfill methods of collected refuse, etc. Each event also included poster campaigns for better earth or clean cities organized by primary schools and municipal governments.

Each event took a few days to one week maximum, as the local heads and their senior staff in environmental affairs were too busy to be away for a long time from their regular work at home. Since all people met a few times at least, by the time concrete partnership plans were formulated in the fifth event, a very cordial relationship among them or friendship was born toward the end of these activities. As a result, a favorable condition for partnership building was generated in the group of local governance leaders. Of course, this atmosphere, confidence generating or friendship building was the key for partnership building and this foundation was the real target for the organizers, apart from the awareness building among the leaders and exchange of policy practices and innovations.

Action plan making by the leaders for their own cities was not easy, as the environmental issues were not the priority of most of the participating cities. Host cities of all these events and the UN were allied to promote the awareness building of the host and participating cities by organizing the poster sessions of children in each participating city prior to or during each of the UN events

taking place. UN project provided minimum seed funds for the poster sessions to some cities where needed. The city-to-city competition of poster campaign was also instrumental in promoting citizen's awareness to local and global environmental issues. Organizers recommended to use simple key words for poster campaigns, such as clean water, clean air, or clean city, so that citizens and even children could easily understand. At the end of the first three meetings held in Tokyo in July 1999, a declaration of local environment governance leaders was issued to commit the participating cities to continue network building and to promote their urban environmental policies to be organized by the end of the first year of the project. The declaration was regarded by the organizers and participating cities as manifestation of the commitment.

During the fifth meeting of the six events held in November 1999 in Kuala Lumpur, very concrete partnership plans were drawn in close consultation among all participating cities. In this meeting, after having discussed extensively in this and previous meetings, the individual one to one consultations among interested mayors or governors, 22 city-to-city partnership plans were formulated; 14 Africa to Asia cooperation, and 8 Asia to Asia cooperation.

Most of these 22 partnership plans involve training of leaders and transfer of know-how and technologies to these cities in waste management, pollution control, human resource development, and overall management capacity building of the municipality. Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Marikina, and Tokyo agreed to provide training of administrative leaders and their environmental staff from other cities as well as dispatching experts to requesting cities. It was hoped that the city-to-city cooperation plans would pave the way for a more fruitful and long lasting collaborations among the participating cities. The Chart below indicates these 22 partnership plans including information on the brief content of the plans.

**Chart on the City-to-City Partnerships**

<i>Requesting City</i>	<i>Cooperating City</i>	<i>Type of Assistance (Details in the Attachment 1)</i>
Addis Ababa	Tokyo	Training (waste management)
	Kuala Lumpur	Training and dispatching experts (waste management)
	Bangkok	Training and study tour (waste management)
Dar es Salaam	Kuala Lumpur	Training and dispatching experts (air pollution, waste management)
	Tokyo	Information/training (air pollution, waste management, landfill)
Johannesburg	Tokyo	Waste management training
		Training on HRM
	Jakarta	Training/information on housing development
	Kuala Lumpur	Housing development training and information exchange
		Training and information exchange on waste management/human resource management

*(continued)*

(continued) **Chart on the City-to-City Partnerships**

<i>Requesting City</i>	<i>Cooperating City</i>	<i>Type of Assistance (Details in the Attachment 1)</i>
Lagos	Bangkok	Training and information exchange on waste management
	Kuala Lumpur	Training and sensitization on air pollution-Equipment
	Marikina	Training and equipment transfer for waste management
Nairobi	Tokyo	Experts/training/equipment on pollution control
	Marikina	Training/information exchange on bicycle tracks, clearing roadways
	Jakarta	Information exchange on clean air program, emissions, methods of controlling industrial zones, rivers, slum areas
Jakarta	Tokyo	Technical assistance on land reclamation method and environmental audit
	Bangkok	Technical assistance on 4 Rs/waste management and air pollution
	Kuala Lumpur	Information exchange and training on privatization
Marikina	Kuala Lumpur	Training on maintenance of parks, landscaping
	Phnom Penh	Training of experts on air pollution/sidewalk
	Tokyo	Training on waste management, drainage collection
Phnom Penh	Bangkok	Technical assistance on landfill/garage
	Kuala Lumpur	Training on solid waste management/ best practice information exchange

## 15.4 Immediate Actions Followed and in Prospect

For the implementation of these partnership plans, a size of fund of a multimillion U.S. dollars was deemed necessary. Not only funding, but various institutions also provided service support during the preparatory process of the project. For instance in Tokyo, where the 1998 Eco-Partnership Conference and a few preparatory events took place, a provisional committee for the implementation of the Africa-Asia Eco-Partnership project was launched in 2000 with the secretariat service from the Japan Foreign Diplomacy Association, a subsidiary organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The Committee organized in June 2000 in close cooperation with the UN and the UNDP, the sixth event listed above, namely the Africa-Asia Eco-Partnership Programme Workshop.

This workshop was the sixth event but served as a consultation meeting after the 22 concrete partnership plans were drafted in the fifth event held in Kuala Lumpur. This workshop included

policy training of environmental governance leaders of all the participating cities as well as the green poster campaign sessions held in the UN University hall. The workshop offered an opportunity for the African and Asian leaders (some governors, mayors, or environmental directors) of the 16 participating cities to make interim report of their own environmental policy formulation and implementation. Governor Ishihara of Tokyo, who had held once Environmental Minister of the Japanese central government, represented the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, a host city institution of the event. This Workshop was the end of the first phase of the Eco-Partnership Tokyo follow-up project and served for the preparation of the second phase of the project.

The second phase of the project was to be initiated with fund raising by UNDP so that the proposed 22 partnership plans as well as associated local action plans of each partner city can be promoted. UNDP conveyed its willingness in the sixth event, to raise necessary funds of about \$3 million. UNDP also announced that a management office of the proposed plans would be organized in the UNDP office in Kuala Lumpur. Additionally the UNDP representative in the sixth meeting announced that the South–South cooperation team of UNDP would mobilize resources of the developed countries to fund this over 3 million in the second phase. Some interruption and delay were experienced in the process, but as of January 2006, management of the project moved to the UNDP office in Kuala Lumpur, and the project manager was to be recruited as the proposed fund was reportedly secured. The aforementioned provisional committee in Tokyo is no longer very active as the project management was moved to UNDP. But the secretariat for the committee hosted in the Japan Foreign Diplomacy Association has been actively involved in the UNDP project in organizing training activities and technological transfers from Tokyo, so that the environment management technologies available in Tokyo can be tapped with the financial contribution from the grass roots fund of the Japanese embassies wherever available in the participating African and Asian cities.

## **15.5 In Retrospect: Temporary Summing Up**

The eco-partnership is envisioned to be a new social apparatus to promote a new culture and civilization for securing the limited earth resources and survival of humanity. So are the South–South cooperation, city-to-city cooperation, strengthening of local governance for managing interdependence, and leadership training for environmental governance. These new social apparatuses need to be vigorously engineered to be established. Partnership must be built-in for these apparatuses; governance leaders need incentives and need to be nurtured to be the real leaders bringing breakthroughs. International cooperation has to serve implementing initiatives to establish and sustain these apparatuses. While the partnership plans under this Eco-partnership have yet to be realized and monitored, it is encouraging to see a number of similar initiatives being developed in many cities, as a positive sign for local environmental governance. Eventually we need to evaluate these efforts, so that we can duplicate good ones, suspend wrong ones, and improve international cooperation activities better attuned to support and implement the new social apparatuses.

Local environmental governance and its associated schemes such as leadership training can be more vigorously promoted by the international cooperation institutions including the UN. Still the UN's role to facilitate and exchange partnership for big cities can be accentuated as a mediator, promoter, and advocator, thus soliciting needed initiatives, ideas, and funds for developing countries and cities. Delayed implementation of the second phase by the international cooperation agencies is expected to be caught up, by strengthened efforts of the concerned agencies and donors.



After the Rio Summit, more than a decade passed. We have seen a number of initiatives organized nationally, locally, and internationally. It is important now to document the results of these initiatives to draw lessons of experience, in order to further pursue the agenda 21 through effective practice of local environmental governance. All leaders of local environmental governance including those in big cities and in technical cooperation agencies can learn to do better by innovative technical cooperation activities that are constantly sought to be in progress.

## Notes

1. This title is used for the UN project and the publication to document the initial training process organized by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The project was shifted to the UNDP in 2000 with the project management office to be located in the UNDP Office in Kuala Lumpur.
2. Official title of the conference was The World Conference on International Cooperation of Cities and Citizens for Cultivating an Eco-Society. It was held in May 1998 jointly by the United Nations and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
3. Eco-Partnership Tokyo Declaration was issued at the end of the World Conference on May 29, 1998. The article 20 of the declaration is inviting the UN and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to formulate new proposals for human resources development programs, including workshops and training, aimed at building an Eco-Society as well as information and technology exchange program of innovative practices.
4. The themes of metropolitan interdependence, governance and leadership have been advocated in the UN, *Metropolitan Governance: Patterns and Leadership*, and (Report of a High Level Interregional Meeting, April 18–20, 1995, Quito, Ecuador).
5. Itoko Suzuki, Local governance for cultivating an eco-society, in the Report of the Working Group I for the Eco-Partnership Tokyo Conference, (CD-ROM), pp. 4–7, May 28, 1998.
6. Oran R. Young, ed., *Global Governance (2000) Is Drawing Insights From The Environmental Experience*.
7. Quoted from the UNDP (Global Project) Project Document, cover page drafted in September 1998 by the UN DESA; the final project document included the UNDP and other financial contributions of over \$3 million dollars (U.S.) as of 2003.

## Bibliography

- A. Farazmand, From government to governance: Moving into the 21st century, Issue Paper of the United Nations for the World Conference on Governance, Manila, Philippines, June 1999.
- I. Suzuki, Metropolitan governance: A new approach to decentralization and cooperation in large cities, EROPA, *New Trends in Public Administration for the Asia-Pacific Region; Decentralization*, Local Autonomy College, Tokyo, Japan, 1996.
- I. Suzuki, Local governance for cultivating an eco-society, in Working Group I on Establishing Regional Recycling systems for the World conference on International Cooperation of Cities and Citizens for Cultivating an Eco-Society organized jointly by the United Nations and Tokyo Metropolitan Government, in CD-ROM on *Eco-Partnership Tokyo*, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Tokyo, Japan, 1998.
- I. Suzuki, Reforming local governance: Kenya with special focus on Nairobi, EROPA, *Reforming Government: New Concepts and Practices in Local Public Administration*, EROPA Local Government Center, Tokyo, Japan, 1998.

- I. Suzuki, Innovations in leadership building for local environmental governance, in UNDP and ESCAP, Report of the Asia Pacific Forum on Environmental Governance and Sustainable Development (towards partnership building among parliamentarians, civil society organizations, private sector and government), held in United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, May 10–11, 2001, (organized by UNDP and ESCAP), UNDP Web site.
- United Nations, *Metropolitan Conference: Toward a New Urban Century* (Summary report on the World Conference, April 20–23, 1993, Tokyo, Japan), New York, United Nations, 1993.
- United Nations, *Metropolitan Governance: Patterns and Leadership*, (Report of a High Level Interregional Meeting, April 18–20, 1995, Quito, Ecuador), New York, United Nations, 1996.
- United Nations, *Eco-Partnership Tokyo: Cultivating an Eco-Society* (Executive summary report of the World Conference on International Cooperation of Cities and Citizens for cultivating an Eco-society, May 26–29, 1998, Tokyo, Japan), New York, United Nations, 1998.
- United Nations, *Human Resources Development for Eco-Partnership Building in Local Governance*, New York, 2002.
- O. R. Young, ed., *Global Governance: (Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience)*, MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 2000.



# Chapter 16

---

## Ethical Foundations\*

---

O. Glenn Stahl

### CONTENTS

16.1	Stimulus of the Profit Motive .....	294
16.2	Ethics and the Public Interest .....	295
16.3	The Double Standard .....	297
16.4	What Can Be Done about Ethical Performance.....	299
16.5	Concluding Observations on Ethics.....	300
	Notes .....	301

Problems of ethical attitudes and behavior in public service are not easily divorced from the society and culture in which the bureaucracy exists. This was notoriously true in American history and especially evident during the latter decades of the twentieth century.

Disdain by large portions of the population for matters governmental goes hand-in-hand with lower ethical standards in politics and public administration. The root of the condition, particularly in the United States, has been longtime exaggeration and exaltation of the profit motive in American culture. The drive for personal gain has been given too much credit for American economic success and has, in addition, handicapped objective consideration of ethical issues in both public and private sectors. A brief examination of this condition is in order as a background.

---

\* This essay is reproduced, with minor adaptations and by permission of the author and publisher, from Chapter VI, "The Ethical Dimension," in *Standing up for Government: Challenges for American Citizenship* by O. Glenn Stahl (New York: Vantage Press, 1990). The essay should be read with the understanding that it is a part of an intensive critique of recent American political leadership and of the failure of so many American citizens to appreciate their community-wide responsibility in a democracy and to express that responsibility adequately through the machinery of government, the only instrument they all have in common.

## 16.1 Stimulus of the Profit Motive

Profit in the form of monetary reward is not the only fuel that energizes the engines of modern life. The assumption that energetic and devoted people are motivated primarily by the desire for wealth has been one of the too-infrequently challenged canards for many, many years. From the standpoint of any relative evidence, it is a gross exaggeration, to say the least. On the basis of ample evidence, it is (to borrow a phrase from a 1930s president of the University of Wisconsin, Dr. Glenn Frank) “meretricious ballyhoo and demagogic claptrap.”

This rather limited motivation that is given so much weight by some economists and publicists is seldom analyzed for its implications for ethics or for its potential for abuse. Nor is it evaluated as a force in history or in the development of our own civilization. A look at the record suggests that, at the very minimum, it must be tempered by many substantial qualifications and reservations:

1. Every survey of employee attitudes in both industry and government that I have ever seen indicates that workers rank money well down the list of reasons they work at the jobs or for the employer with which they are involved. Admittedly these surveys do not often include top executives but rather focus on the rank-and-file workers, including many professionals and technical people, who develop the organization and are involved in its production or service.
2. If profit-making were the prime cause for human effort, then how do we explain the major advances and discoveries in history—up to this very day—that came from educational institutions, nonprofit organizations, dedicated scientists, and, not the least of these, governmental agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency? At this very moment, thousands of determined scientists and engineers are laboring intensively in remote government and semipublic establishments on health therapies, environmental issues, astronomical explorations, new product designs, and many other fascinating endeavors that will shape our future and those of our children. Few of them take the time to think about their remuneration, so long as they are not reduced to a state of deprivation.
3. If profit-making is such an indispensable element in our economy, then how do we explain the choices and the contentment of so many millions upon millions of workers all over the world engaged in charities, religious groups, overseas missions, health services, school teaching, research, civil services, military careers, and the like? Have we ever measured their happiness and job satisfaction against those who are stimulated only by the prospect of amassing wealth?
4. Profit may make a difference in many parts of the economy where there are few other criteria for success, but it has always had to be kept within bounds wherever it works; it is highly susceptible to abuse; and it discounts mankind’s most noble, less self-serving instincts too cavalierly. Profit is a delicate and dangerous force. Like the surgeon’s scalpel, it can be a boon when applied with skill and restraint, but in the wrong hands, it can be a lethal weapon. I am realistic enough to suspect that “wrong hands” are forever lurking in the shadows.
5. Profit, in any event, seldom motivates people down the line in any enterprise. As we have previously noted, success in creating a better product or providing a better service cannot often be attributed to the ambitions of financiers, stockholders, or even corporate executives—who generally are the only (or major) ones who stand to gain from profit margins. Business success is largely due to the creativity and hard work of those at lower and intermediate levels in the enterprise—who enjoy their work and do it for the satisfaction of performing at their best. Rarely would they expect to become owners or partners of the

business by doing their jobs well. They may aspire to promotion or bonus awards (and may deserve to), but such possibilities may be uncertain and are certainly beyond their personal control.

So, if profit is the principal driving force of economic behavior, how is it that so many persons responsible for success are content to work for a salary or wage?

6. The most negative aspect of the profit issue is the strong incentive it creates for unethical performance. The association between moneymaking and corruption is so striking to overlook. We have already seen that programs intended to help the less fortunate in our society—such as housing for low-income families—seem to be a prime target of greedy men and women. As one former careerist in the housing field has observed, reliance on real-estate developers to use government funds wisely for moderate-priced housing is inherently flawed, because the temptation is too great for private real estate magnates to make a killing by raking off exorbitant fees and other “cream” from the government subsidies. After many years of experience, he concludes that the only sure protection against this practice is to keep it out of the hands of developers and return to direct, government ownership for any housing built with public money.

Examples could, of course, be cited in many areas of activity where the pressure of the profit motive instigates corruption in the use of public funds.

7. Finally, a doubt about the superiority of the profit motive is found in the contrast between public or semipublic nonprofit operation and private operation of a service essential for modern urban existence. Three examples, each from a different period in our history, come to mind immediately:
  - Government operation of the nation’s railroads during World War I, when a first-rate instance of good public administration was demonstrated
  - The Tennessee Valley Authority’s electric-rate yardstick, beginning in the mid-1930s that easily outdistanced private electric utilities in providing electric power, brought rates down all over the country, and made the famous Manhattan Project possible for building the atomic bomb during World War II (when otherwise there would have been a power shortage)
  - The phenomenal success of the Public Television network (nonprofit and partially funded by government) that has shown America what good television can be like and has shamed commercial networks into improving the quality of their programming

The public yardstick has often served as a brake on too much dependence on the profit-making sector.

All of these reservations about the pervasiveness and benevolent power of the profit motive in many segments of society suggest ethical implications. We need to examine the contrasts in this respect between the public and private spheres.

## 16.2 Ethics and the Public Interest

Sensitivity to the public interest is the most fundamental ethical obligation of the public official and the one most often lacking among novices or venal men and women, especially those appointed for partisan reasons to key posts. The ideal public servant, of which there are many, is one who thinks in terms of the general welfare, the overall good, and the long-range effect an action might have.

He resists the temptation to respond just to the group or individual pressing a case before him; he must, first of all, be well enough informed to be aware of other interests and to make certain that all interests are taken into consideration in any decision making. It was more than 40 years ago that a distinguished Federal official and scholar declared in a classic book on ethics that “virtuous performance” requires “attempting to inject some increased allowance for the more public interest and some increased concern for those citizens not immediately present or heard.”<sup>1</sup> The advice is as relevant today as then.

To the average citizen, ethical performance in public positions means merely avoidance of overt corruption involving money—such as the acceptance of bribes in return for dispensing some favor or for exemption from some requirement or penalty, or some action that advances the official’s own financial interest. These are indeed breaches of the public trust, as emphasized on various past occasions.

But this is not all there is to standing up for the public interest. There are policy issues, too, that invoke ethical considerations. And they are often more significant (and more elusive or harder to identify) than the money-related kinds of violations. Dwelling, only on the financial corruption, misses some even more common, subtle, and serious ethical flaws in political and administrative behavior.

Chances are that men and women in public life are more likely to succumb to their prejudices, ideologies, and limited perspectives than they are to the prospect of monetary gain, dangerous as the latter may be. One member of Congress, a thoughtful and public-minded veteran of 24 years in the House of Representatives who has had much responsibility on issues of ethics, confessed that when he was a young idealistic newcomer “I had the Idea that public decisions which deny decent shelter to today’s poor and steal from the living standards of tomorrow’s families in order to continue the fiction that wealthy people are overtaxed are at least as unethical as ... [some of the personal and financial peccadilloes of which his colleagues or nominees for cabinet posts were then being accused].”<sup>2</sup>

In other words, a person’s wrong-headed or self-centered prejudices or misconceptions are the source of “public-interest corruption” as distinguished from money-related crimes. Another much-respected member of Congress, Claude D. Pepper, has been quoted as explaining (some years before his death in 1989 at age 88) that his philosophy “rejects the notion that those who are underprivileged have earned their fate, that hard work inexorably leads to success,” Pepper held that

the health, economic security, and—to the degree possible—happiness of its people is a proper concern of government. It acknowledges the value—indeed the necessity—of individual worth and effort. But it diverges sharply from conservatism by recognizing what should be clear to all: that in a complex twentieth-century free society, no one and nothing is big enough, powerful enough and universal enough to make life bearable for the masses of its citizens.<sup>3</sup>

To be sure, relatively selfless people of goodwill can differ over the means and methods for government to sustain the “general welfare,” as the Constitution ordains; this is the everyday stuff of politics and public policy debates. But the extremes of these positions, such as witnessed during the Reagan years, are as immoral as they are unwise. And it is interesting that this kind of immorality seems to go hand-in-hand with overt financial corruption—probably because the fountainhead of both kinds of evil are the old-fashioned human failings of greed and acquisitiveness.

Society loses plenty from bribery and financial manipulation, but it loses even more from extremism and just plain irresponsibility for our fellow man's welfare, for man's inhumanity to man. The old English rhyme puts it well:

The law locks up both man and woman  
 Who steals the goose from off the common,  
 Yet lets the greater felon loose  
 Who steals the common from the goose.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to financial and policy corruption, there is “the corruption of incompetence,” as one former Federal official once expressed it. Irresponsibility, in the choice of presidential appointees on down to selection methods within the career service, is a profound constraint on virtuous public administration. Two of the most devastating evils of the Reagan administration were the astounding low caliber of so many political appointees and the partly successful efforts to subvert the merit system of employment in the career service. It is a disgusting blot on the American escutcheon that, by the spring of 1988, 113 senior Federal appointees, including some agency heads and deputies, had to be indicted or otherwise forced to resign for legal or ethical violations. And there were scores more about whom suspicions were raised.

### 16.3 The Double Standard

There is a failure on the part of the general public to appreciate that a public service cannot rise very far above the level of its environment and that it derives most of its temptations for wrongdoing from that environment. Perhaps this explains why the overwhelming proportion of mischief in government stems from temporary political appointees, from the outside and almost never from the millions of career people who have had the discipline and motivation of public service built in to their experience. Perhaps it also explains the striking and unfortunate contrast between what the public expects of government officials and what it expects of those engaged in private pursuits.

Informed and fair-minded persons will surely concede that we demand higher standards of conduct from public servants than we do from businessmen. Except in nonprofit organizations and a few other pursuits, there seems to be little opportunity outside of government for practice in the rigorous objectivity and impartiality required of government workers. In practically all commercial and industrial enterprises the principals can buy and sell where they wish, can play favorites without fear of punishment, can disclose or conceal information on their operations largely as they please, can accept gifts without question of impropriety, and need seldom worry about “conflicts of interest.” (In those occasional instances when they must consider such constraints, it is almost invariably the result of a law against it, an act of government.) Obviously, when any of the activities just cited are committed by public servants, we are shocked, if not enraged, at such behavior—even though it may be commonplace in the business world.

The incongruity is evident when we consider the marked difference in moral behavior within and outside government service. First of all, there is a clear relation with motivation. Many persons are attracted to government in the first place—just as they are to religious pursuits, charitable causes, and other service-oriented endeavors—by a genuine zeal for identification with a larger good than some narrow economic, sectional, or self-serving interest. In addition, when the facts are examined, we unquestionably find more people dedicated to the broad public interest within



the public service than we do outside. A finding expressed well by a Senate Subcommittee on Ethical Standards more than 40 years ago is remarkably relevant today:

We... believe that the ethical standards of public officials are probably higher than those prevailing in business and other walks of life. On this point... there was persuasive testimony from men of experience in both Government and business and from observers of both. Public officials apparently are more conscious of the problem of moral standards. The resentment which public officials sometimes show when subjected to public criticism may be explained in part by their awareness of the fact that some of their critics would be even more vulnerable to criticism if the same standards were applied.<sup>5</sup>

One might add that similar findings by leaders with experience both in and out of government have been reported repeatedly year after year.

The point bears repeating; so much depends on what motivates people. The contrast in ideals between public functions and some private-sector work can be quite marked. Can one imagine a stock speculator on Wall Street being concerned with national park development? A corporate takeover financier in promotion of the public health? A real-estate manipulator in the conservation of forests, in wildlife management, in the explorations of soil scientists? These may be examples of the extremes, but they are very real contrasts in motivation. Can there be any doubt about which activities benefit mankind and which prey upon it?

In the last analysis, society as a whole must bear the responsibility for ethical conduct in public affairs. Those who complain of corruption but busy themselves with seeking special benefits not available to the general public are the basic corruptors. The relentless pressure of special, single-issue, or parochial interests, and conflicts over symbols instead of substance in public debate are hardly indicators that we have arrived at a stage meriting the appellation “the good society.”

Whenever the medical doctor mistakes his own prosperity as synonymous with the status of the public health, whenever an association of manufacturers resists legislation for the general welfare of workers or consumers, whenever the labor leader places the sanctity of his union structure ahead of protection of all citizens, whenever a veterans’ organization exploits patriotism for class legislation, and whenever the voter views his representative to Congress as an errand boy, as a channel to get favors or special consideration, we fall short of the goal of the highest public ethics. A wise senator many years ago made an insightful forecast: “Until the citizen’s own moral code prevents him from debasing himself by procuring corruption of public servants, the problem of corruption and morality in public life will remain very real and earnest.”<sup>6</sup>

Americans must learn this elementary truth—that the onus for good government is not just on those in public employment, but it is on every citizen. I suggest that such learning begin in public schools.

A self-indulging society that glorifies the amassing of obscene private wealth, to the exclusion of other values, and is obsessed with protecting its wealthiest citizens from the heaviest taxation does not set the best example. Also, a society is not morally worthy in the highest sense if it undervalues its service-minded members—its teachers, its police, its scientists, its civil servants—because they do not worship at the altar of moneymaking.

To some persons whose prime ambition is to get rich, it is apparently inconceivable that there can be others who are so deeply involved in some field of work, so fascinated with some challenging endeavor, and so dedicated to a achievement in whatever they do that monetary rewards are far down on the list of their lifetime aspirations. There is a surprising concentration of such

work-oriented people in the public service—more than in any other sector of society. It is this kind of motivation that is more readily converted into serving the public interest than are motivations centered on rewards. As I have insisted before, this statement does not say that only a few work-centered, other-oriented individuals enter into the ranks of private organizations. They are everywhere. But I do contend that there is a different attitude among the bulk of professional and ministerial careerists throughout government from that found elsewhere. It is certainly among the reasons I am so completely skeptical of the moves toward privatization.

## 16.4 What Can Be Done about Ethical Performance

I am not one to advocate more laws or penalties regarding ethical conduct. In fact, I think some of the books miss the mark and create too legalistic an atmosphere for the problem rather than developing a philosophical base for attention to the public interest, stimulating an awareness of it, and focusing on such concepts as policy ethics and competence ethics.

Following are a few approaches that could move us in this direction. Some are important because of their indirect impact on moral performance, although they serve other purposes as well.

1. We need more emphasis and support for the career service. It is a very fundamental imperative for an ethical environment. A proud public servant is a good public servant. Efforts should be directed toward building and maintaining that pride.
2. Coincident with this objective is making better use of the career service, with all its expertise, institutional memory, and discipline in serving the public interest. The concept of a responsive bureaucracy was reduced during the Reagan years to one of a submissive bureaucracy. Many of the policy missteps and moral lapses at that time could have been avoided if career people had been given a chance to participate. Not only were alternatives or warnings by careerists ignored, but also for the most part they were suppressed. Knowledgeable professionals were often kept in the dark, with work planning frequently confined to woefully unqualified amateurs. An open, healthy exchange between inside experts who safeguard institutional memory and integrity and outside appointees who ostensibly represent a president's overall policy is absolutely essential both to effective government and ethical government. Moreover, the art as well as the science of governance demands assimilation of all relevant points of view before final decisions are made. Multiple participation in decision-making is the only rational methodology in public administration.
3. Less stress on ethics as such and more emphasis on selection of personnel would help reach the fundamental problem of wrongly motivated people. This applies both to promoting the quality of presidential and other political appointments and to fostering rigorous application of merit principles for entry and advancement in the career service.
4. A good deal of awakening has already occurred to the inadequacy of rules relating to individual financial holdings and restrictions on employment subsequent to government service. For example, requiring appointees to divest themselves of corporate stock or real estate before entering on public job focuses too much on the appearance or prospect of wrongdoing without taking into account the impact on recruiting or retaining the best candidates. Likewise, too mechanistic or legalistic limitations on employment after leaving government may create impossible situations for professionals who might not be able to pursue their lifelong expertise at all outside government if they so desire. This also dissuades competent people from accepting public employment.

It would be naive to remove all penalties for misdeeds that might grow out of too cozy a relationship between outside financial interests and public policy-makers or to lift all restrictions on the “revolving-door” mentality that pervaded the Reagan administration. But some of the more absurd and badly drawn proscriptions require modification, lest recruitment of qualified people be severely handicapped.

A more sensible emphasis might be on machinery (a) to investigate more fully in advance a candidate’s personal history and sense of ethical behavior; (b) to provide for continuous review, by multitempered panels of experts inside government, of conditions that lend themselves to wrongdoing; and (c) to make ethical performance a major ingredient of executive training for both career and noncareer appointees. This may cost a little more in government personnel operations, but it would pay for itself a thousand times over,

5. Since so much depends on the ethical climate outside government, we cannot overlook the importance of building more understanding of the political world and more civic consciousness among the general population.
6. Because of its direct relationship to morality in government, more insistent attention must be given to reform of the ways in which political campaigns for office are financed, including both the presidency and the Congress. Studies and programs of the public-interest organization Common Cause are one of the best sources for enlightenment and action on this subject. Ultimate success in removing the strong connection between campaign gifts and decisions by elected officials, in my judgment, will not come until we provide a neutral and nonpartisan financial source for conducting campaigns. It is well known that lavish gifts to political campaigns provide the contributor with access to members of Congress and the Executive Branch that is not so easily available to other citizens. The spillover effect from a congressional office to a cabinet member or other key official is obvious. The system itself is corrupt. The ultimate solution is public financing for all campaigns, but with stringent controls on spending limits for any one candidate and restrictions on the number of candidates for any one office. In my judgment, it would be worth the extra cost to government, even if it means more taxes, but it is nowhere near as expensive as the current loss to all citizens in the unwarranted influence procured by political action committees, corporations, and wealthy individuals. It is not only the best way to insulate government from corruption but the only way ultimately to ensure the democratic process, under which all voters have equal access.

## 16.5 Concluding Observations on Ethics

The foregoing ideas are no panacea. Matters of ethics are too complex and human frailties are too pervasive for anyone to expect that his/her prescriptions will bring us to the millennium. But we have to try.

In an unpublished statement made in January 1987, retired General of the Army Andrew J. Goodpaster summed up the scope of unethical performance in the government in this way: “When poorly qualified people are given office, when weak institutional procedures and organizational designs are permitted to exist, when decisions reflect ideologies rather than objective evaluation, trust and confidence... must suffer.” In his judgment, corruption is not just the use of public office to make a fortune for oneself or others. It covers a much broader field, says Goodpaster: “It remains one of the highest duties of national leadership—and of national leaders—to inspire and nurture the growth of public trust—to the end that those who receive it work ever

harder to deserve it, and those who grant it do so ever more generously and willingly in order that our country may be best served.”

I cannot help but contrast this true patriot’s conception with that of some of our recent political leadership, such as parlaying the prestige of the presidency itself into munificent lecture fees. Referring to former President Reagan’s \$2 million deal to play master of ceremonies for a Japanese company’s week-long arts festival, columnist William Safire commented: “For a former president with a hot agent and no sense of sleaze, the profit opportunities are endless.” And, when a free-wheeling owner of a recently seized savings-and-loan institution was asked if his generous campaign contributions bought him influence with key politicians he replied: “I want to say in the most forceful way I can, I certainly hope so.”<sup>7</sup>

The contrast between sensitivity to the public trust and a complete absence of it is not only sad, but it is also alarming.

The comments in this essay are not to disparage good work and good people in the private sector of the American economy but to counteract the reverse psychology—the short sighted, senseless, ill-informed, and sometimes diabolical propaganda to curtail government, to deprecate it, and to cripple it, all in the name of an ideology that foolishly maintains that all of mankind’s success and future welfare depends on the unfettered profit motivation.

It just is not so.

## Notes

1. Paul H. Appleby, *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, LA 1952, p. 176.
2. David R. Obey, A democrat from Wisconsin, as quoted by Haynes Johnson, “Is Congress Misjudged?” *The Washington Post*, May 26, 1989, p. A2.
3. As quoted: Ray Stephens, “Recalling Pepper,” *American Association of Retired Persons Bulletin*, June–August 1989, p. 14.
4. Anonymous: From Edward Polls Cheyney, *Social and Industrial History of England*, 1901, Introduction.
5. U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Ethical Standards, *Ethical Standards in Government*, 82nd Congress, 1st session, 1951, p. 12.
6. Sen. Estes Kefauver, Democrat from Tennessee, In *Ethical Standards in American Public Life*, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1952, p. 7.
7. Both the statements of Mr. Safire and of the savings and loan owner (Charles H. Keating) cited in this paragraph, appeared in separate boxes on pages 41 and 42, respectively, in *Common Cause Magazine*, July/August 1989.



## *Chapter 17*

---

# **Public Service Ethics and Professionalism: A Primer for Public Officials**

---

Ali Farazmand\*

### **CONTENTS**

17.1 Introduction.....	304
17.2 Crisis in the Public Service Image.....	305
17.3 Administrative Ethics Movement.....	306
17.4 Professionalism and Administrative Ethics .....	309
17.5 Guardians of the Public Trust.....	310
17.5.1 Misrepresentation of the Public Interest.....	311
17.5.2 Corruption.....	311
17.5.3 Subversion.....	311
17.6 Achieving Accountability.....	313
17.6.1 Managerial/Organizational.....	313
17.6.2 Political Means .....	313
17.6.3 Legal Approach .....	314
17.6.4 Cultural Approach.....	314
17.6.5 Ethics Institutional Approach.....	315
17.7 Guiding Principles in Public Service Ethics .....	315
17.8 Issues in Administrative Ethics .....	317
References .....	318

---

\* Revised and updated from the paper originally prepared for and presented at the United Nations Conference on Public Administration, New York, 1997.

## 17.1 Introduction

Public service represents one of the oldest, if not the oldest, noblest, and most widespread and celebrated values in the history of humankind. In fact, civilization and public service and administration are intimately related one reinforcing and contributing to the other. In traditional societies of the East and West, little distinction was made between voluntary service for the good of the community and remunerated work performed on a professional contractual basis. A fusion of the roles of government and governed, direct participation in the affairs of the state, and the growth, in this manner, of a political culture and of administrative skills were favored by conditions of relative stability and the presence of a leisured class imbued with a strong commitment to the polity's well-being. This situation, however, was transformed with the emergence of vast multinational kingdoms and empires from early Iran and Egypt to Persia, China, and Rome.

Ancient civilizations were the birthplaces of public service and administration. This was particularly the case in early Iran (in Susa and Elam) from 6000 BC on to Egypt, Sumer, and Babylon, and subsequently, the first World-State Achaemenid Persian Empire, to China and Rome. The historically large-scale public-works projects of underground irrigation systems (Iranian Elamite invention), canals, and waterways such as the Suez Canal and Atusa Canal, as well as the gigantic Royal Palace Compound of Persepolis, the largest project of the history under the Persian Empire, the Pyramids in Egypt, and the Great Wall of China are a few examples of massive public service and administration employing hundreds of thousands of workers, artisans, experts, and professionals. Additionally, public bureaucracy was a highly esteemed institution of government and administration in Persia; indeed, Persian bureaucracy is historically well known for its high efficiency and effectiveness, a bureaucracy that was second to none in history, with Persians as exemplar administrators with numerous innovations and inventions, such as their introduction of modern check-book systems in financial management, fixed and variable taxation systems, monetary and fiscal policy innovations, legal and transportation systems such as postal services (the Pony Express, the Persian invention under Cyrus the Great), etc. If public service and administration was valued in the ancient time, why is it in trouble now in the twenty-first century? Many problems contribute to the answer to this question beyond the limited space of this short chapter.

In modern times, the rise of the administrative state, from the nineteenth century onward, also led to a vast expansion of the public service. It has been accompanied by bureaucratization which, as Max Weber observed, profoundly revolutionized organizational structures and values. Ironically, those values have lately come into conflict with the long-cherished claims of democratic citizenship and participative government. Professionalization of the public service has changed the nature of public organizations by deeply implanting the instrumental rationality that has dominated societies around the globe. This dominance, however, has been more pronounced in the Western countries than in developing nations.

Rationalism and positivism have been part of Western cultures for over 200 years, whereas normative values and growing rationality are still dominant in most developing countries. However, globalization and cultural convergence, on the one hand, and counterpressures from below against this rampant instrumental rationality, on the other, are changing this situation. The result has been a clash of major values underlying the administrative and political values around the world.

The rise of mixed economies after World War II and decolonization gave a boost to the administrative state. Eventually, however, the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics resulted in a reconsideration of societal, organizational, and economic principles. As the dominant economic system, capitalism appears to have risen to the top, with the United States and some European States as leaders in this new global environment.

Capitalist ideology advances the supremacy of the marketplace, together with the benefits of private enterprise and administrative rationality. However, this new trend has been accompanied by pressures from below from citizens who seek empowerment, smaller government, less governmental intrusion into their private lives, and democratization of the policy process. The result has been a clash of citizenship values, on the one hand, and the professional administrative values, on the other. Consequently, public service has been badly damaged in terms of institutional capacity, quality of performance, and public image. Resolving this conflict requires the reconciliation of administrative and citizenship ethics.

## 17.2 Crisis in the Public Service Image

It is through integration of these conflicting values that the image of the public service can be revived and enhanced. This chapter addresses this and other issues for discussion and policy recommendations. First, a number of factors contributing to the decline of the image of the public service are discussed. Then, several perspectives are presented on administrative ethics. This is followed by a discussion on professionalization in the public service and its implications on public service ethics. Subsequently, a discussion on public administrators as guardians of the public trust is presented. Finally, some guiding ethical principles are outlined, followed by an annex with some ethical issues, whose policy implications could be explored and debated.

Many factors have contributed to the rise and expansion of the modern administrative state. Over the years, the role of government has grown dramatically. It soon became the engine of national growth, of private sector development, of the provision of public services, and of the protection of individual rights. Professionalization of the public service has been a common feature of both capitalism and socialism.

In capitalist countries, mixed economies arose, blurring the boundaries between the two sectors. The values of the public and private sectors also merged to an extent. Still, public service values and commitment remained strong. These professional administrative values displaced those of the earlier political machine systems characterized by patronage, personal favoritism, and spoils, which prevailed in many countries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—thus, the professionalization of the civil service that followed resulted in the separation of administration from politics to produce “good government,” and “good or efficient administration.” The politics–administration dichotomy was a dominant philosophy of the administrative state and of the public service. However, despite the improvements in public service delivery that it provided, it also introduced another dilemma in the form of the dichotomy of politics and administration. However, the dichotomy confused more than helped in the growth of public service and administration, especially with regard to ethics and integrity.

The dichotomy put professional administrators in a position of vulnerability, enjoining them to abstain from public policy-making, and not to engage in activities in the domain of politics, however defined. The democratic values of responsiveness, responsibility, and accountability became major political values, which were perceived to be in conflict with the administrative values of professionalism, efficiency, and effectiveness. Consequently, the administrative state and the public service came under attack from an array of crusaders for democracy. These antipublic service, antibureaucracy, and antigovernment forces have had ideological, political, social, and economic underpinnings, whose exploration is beyond the scope of this short chapter. A severe decline in the public service followed in terms of both institutional capacity and the image it presented in the United States and around the world. The result has been a major crisis of public service professionalism, ethics, and integrity.



### 17.3 Administrative Ethics Movement

Rampant political jobbery and economic corruption have provided much of the impetus for the development of modern public administration and the professionalization of the civil service. Thus, in the United States of America, the 1883 Civil Service Reform Act “actually was the full equivalent of a constitutional amendment, even though there was no way to describe it as such” (Thayer, 1997). And according to Frederickson (1993), “The contemporary government ethics movement appears to have essentially the same purpose as the reform movement a century ago—to reduce government corruption.” Never before have ethics been so important. The significance of ethics in governance and the public service is high for several reasons. First, the level of corruption in government has increased dramatically. Public officials—mostly political—taking bribes is a pervasive phenomenon around the world, and the business sector is a major conduit for this practice. Small and big “scams” have resulted in the conviction of numerous officials.

Corruption has been a pervasive and enduring public issue. Second, increasingly, “people do not equivocate on government corruption. It is wrong and they are against it.” Third, government corruption is a policy issue with strong “carrying capacity.” It has reached saturation level. Fourth, matters of government ethics are being increasingly institutionalized. Fifth, ethics cut across all policy fields: business, medical, social service, insurance, social security, the military, economic, scientific, etc. By violating ethical and integrity standards, everything goes into the direction of corruption: What comes in mind these days are many that include Blackwater and Haliburton in Iraq, Enron, and other corruption activities of “very high level” officials that include New York State Governor Spitzer’s sex scandal with prostitutes, and shall we say more, not to mention the Highest level Lying and Deception by the most powerful person in the world, the U.S. President George W. Bush, to go unilaterally to war of invasion—invading and destroying another sovereign country, Iraq, on false claims, causing total destruction of that country, killing almost a million people, and destroying the lives of millions more and grabbing its oil-rich resources.

Even more threatening has been Bush’s horrible declaration of possible World War III and threatening the entire world peace by threatening to invade Iran, the ancient land of civilization, culture, art, architecture, science and technology, and yes, rich in oil and other resources, a country that since its revolution in 1979, toppled a puppet government of the United States and established an independent system of government governed by the will of its people determined to stay independent of foreign domination and to develop rapidly in all areas, including nuclear technology for peaceful reasons. Any government or political leader of the third-world country engaged in any such activity of threatening world peace would have been toppled by invasion and brought to international court of trial—remember Milasovic of Yugoslavia?—but George W. Bush and Cheney–Rumsfeld team have easily escaped international prosecution for their war criminal actions that have caused the death of millions of people, with many wounded and homeless, including thousands of American soldiers. Where has been accountability and human rights integrity in the twenty-first century? Are we going back to the dark ages of brutality and barbarism, a jungle in which only the big and powerful rule and violate the rules they themselves help institute? If that is the case, then there should be no false claims of “democracy and human rights,” as these words mean nothing when violated by the same big powers. Ethics and integrity are the key victims of modern public administration, which has now been transformed into “administration of the public, of citizens and noncitizens,” it is a new world of administration for social control and corporate hegemony.

The growing global concern for administrative ethics has been manifest in at least three areas: academia, legislation, and institution building. Judicial aspects have also been reflected in cases

reaching the courts and the decisions rendered. Considerable research and writing on administrative ethics have appeared in the form of scholarly books published during the past 20 years. Ethics has become a required part of Masters of Public Administration (MPA) curricula across the world, and a major part of the debate in public service and administration. Books and journal articles have proliferated across the globe. But, has ethics become internalized in public service and administration officials, actors, policy-makers, and administrators? The answer is not clear yet, as the need for constant education in ethics at all levels is becoming more urgent in the age of corporate globalization with increasing opportunities for corruption and unethical behaviors.

Institutional and legislative concerns for ethics have been expressed in many organizational and legal measures adopted to combat corruption, safeguard the integrity of public service, and promote professional conduct based on sound ethical grounds. Almost all public organizations and associations of public service appear to have adopted codes of ethics. Institutional arrangements, such as offices to prevent or control unethical conduct, appear everywhere; it is a global phenomenon.

Eight major themes and perspectives appear to have emerged in recent publications on administrative ethics and accountability, which are as follows:

1. *Citizenship and democratic theory*, with an emphasis on the renewal of civic virtue. This theme views public servants as virtuous citizens and as guardians of community interests. Virtuous citizenship is important for democratic governance and administration. Loyalty to democratic values, responsiveness, responsibility, and moral conduct are virtues of democratic citizenship. Civility, tolerance, respect for equality and for citizens' rights, as well as obligations are key values in democratic citizenship.
2. *Virtue ethics*, with an emphasis on good character in public service and administration. It is an extension of the first perspective. Character is the focus of study and practice in administrative ethics: the most critical problem is the scarcity of men and women of good character in positions of leadership—whether public, private, educational, or religious. For too long, the management orthodoxy has taken the proposition that good systems will produce good people, as axiomatic. However, it is clear that a just society depends more on the moral trustworthiness of its citizens and leaders than on structures and systems. Costly ethical failures of organizational leaders have caused irreparable damage to public trust and to societal interests. As a personal attribute, virtue is a character trait that inclines us toward ethical conduct. Ethics has ancient origins. Ethical education was a major component of educational system in ancient Persia, where education and training for public servants, leaders, and bureaucrats was highly important and ethics and justice administration made up a key component of preparing for personal and professional or career life—Persians valued virtuous characters in personal and public lives very highly, as it was a hallmark of their educational system from the very early age of preschool system—childhood (see Chapter 2).

According to Aristotle, moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence its name *ethike* is a derivative of *ethos* (habit). From this, it also follows that none of the moral virtues arise in us by nature. Therefore, to Aristotle and all those following this perspective, administrative ethics are cognitive and learnt values. But the social environment in which public administrators operate affects the cognitive values acquired or learned. Contemporary writers commonly associate the quest for excellence with the practice of virtue. This perspective has significant implications for modern public administration, in that virtuous administrators can be trained and developed through ethical precept for public service. Therefore, unethical behavior may be considered as a form of corruption, for corruption is the absence of civic virtue.

3. *Constitutional tradition*, insisting on the public officials' ethical obligation to uphold such major values enshrined in constitutions as freedom, liberty, equality, due process, justice, etc. This perspective also values efficiency in the measure that the ethical and political values of democracy are upheld. It is as central to the theme of public interest as procedural versus substantive justice and seeks to maximize the salutary influence of personal interest and to control the adverse effects of popular passions. Upholding the principles and values of the constitution is considered the most important approach to the study and practice of ethics in public administration (Rohr, 1989).
4. *Ethics as education*, with an emphasis on the study of ethics in the public administration curriculum and training public servants for an honorable career. This perspective has a grounding on the educational development of public administrators and highlights the community service. Ethics through education can transform officials by molding their attitudes, behavior, and perception of others. However, it is through self-development that social administrative ethics are also promoted. Ethics as education is both external learning and internalization of moral values.
5. *The organizational context of ethics*, with a focus on efficiency and effectiveness as well as on the normative values of fairness, justice, and moral conduct: organizations and their members must not only be moral where it is efficient to do so, they must be efficient only where it is moral to do so. Efficiency at any cost is not acceptable, but efficiency with moral and ethical conduct is imperative. Organizational structures reflect value choices and ethical commitments made by those who design organizations. They not only protect ethical values such as fairness, justice, honesty, accountability, and respect for rights, but may also impede them through built-in bureau pathologies. Structures and procedures may be viewed as mechanisms for pursuing ethical outcomes. Procedural justice is considered as a way to deal with the arbitrariness, tyranny, and injustice that may arise in the exercise of administrative discretion. Thus, discretion should be checked by means of judicial and other institutions. In public administration, a clash between ethics and organizational culture may occur. Critics argue that bureaucratic culture corrupts society through lack of human-centered norms. The manipulative role of power holders degenerates into a system of totalitarianism, in which organizational ethical values are compromised.
6. *Philosophical theory and perspectives*, with a focus on rejecting positivism and postpositivist perspectives in public administration. Rejecting the neutrality argument, this perspective highlights the public servants' active role in upholding and promoting agreed-upon values of the "community as public interests." Administrative ethics, therefore, identify professionalism with active moral conduct. The role of professionalism and of professional administrators is emphasized in administrative ethics, regardless of partisan or dominant elite interests.
7. *Ethics as consequence or utilitarianism*, with a focus on the outcome of conduct and behavior in public administration, is also an extension of the philosophical perspective. In a major break with classical thought, Machiavelli argued in *The Prince* that acts should be judged as good or bad depending on their consequences, rather than on their intentions or the characteristics of their actors. Following this line of argument, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) wrote in *Utilitarianism* that "All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action it seems natural to pursue must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. To be good, actions must be means to something admitted to be good, ...such as health or pleasure."
8. *Ethics as principle*, with an emphasis on categorical imperatives in which an absolute "right" versus wrong is pursued. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) approached the question of ethics

from a very different angle than Machiavelli or Mill. Kant outlines his categorical imperative as the ultimate basis for ethical action or inaction. Behaviors are either wrong or right, ethical or unethical, nothing in between. For example, lying is wrong in an absolute term and there is no such thing as situational ethics. His philosophy calls for a perfect society based on ethical and moral “principles” that must be observed under all circumstances. This perspective, which is also philosophical, resonates the ancient Persian “ethical doctrine” in public service, administration, and governance, which heavily stressed on the categorical principles of right versus wrong, good versus evil, justice and fairness, telling “truth,” and considered “lying” as not only disgraceful and admonishing but also against law and seriously punishable as a crime. However, the Persians considered exceptional circumstance, such as unintentional lying, or lying to save lives or community or family interests, while judging a person in violation of the ethical doctrine and reduced the severity of punishments, given the person had clear prior records (see Chapter 2). The ethical doctrine was highly emphasized in Persian educational systems to prepare leadership for public service and administration throughout the vast “global empire of Persia.” For more detailed information, see Cooper (2001) and Farazmand (2002).

## 17.4 Professionalism and Administrative Ethics

From these theoretical perspectives, one can discern implications on modern public administration in which rationality-based organizational and normative values converge with virtuous citizenship.

Max Weber once observed that the modern state administration would be bureaucratized everywhere. Both capitalist and socialist States and their administrative systems have gone through bureaucratization and professionalization. Professionalization of public administration has been characterized by an adherence to merit system, to task specialization, to systems of checks and balances, and to the organizational values of efficiency, economy, and effectiveness achieved. It is also exemplified by the adherence to professional standards, values, criteria, and ethics, rather than political or other criteria.

Thus, generally speaking, the professionalization of public administration and the administrative state presents two contrasting perspectives: professionalization introduces task performance, efficiency, effectiveness, objectivity, integrity, identity, and cohesion. It also serves as a bulwark against political corruption and other substandard behaviors in the public service. Its value as a corrective measure has been recognized. However, the clash between professional civil service values, on the one hand, and the political values of responsiveness, responsibility, and accountability to citizens, on the other, has been a major source of tension between professional career bureaucrats and politicians, elected or appointed. The conflict between professional and political values has captured much of the recent literature in public administration and political science around the globe. Are they really contradictory or complementary?

Two opposing perspectives prevail on this question. The one against professional discretion and participation in policy-making asserts that such participation is undemocratic because non-elected, appointed bureaucrats cannot be held accountable to members of the electorate. This perspective also contends that democratic values of responsiveness and responsibility are lost, as professional bureaucrats play a part in policy decisions. It is increasingly difficult not to hold professional experts accountable, since only they understand the minutiae of the knowledge they possess. The counterargument for professional values asserts that professional standards serve the broad public interest. Therefore, they are responsive to societal needs. Accountability is achieved through

organizational, professional, and personal mechanisms of checks and balances. In addition, legislative, judicial, and other means of oversight are also exercised over them.

A third theoretical approach consists of combining professional and democratic values in the public service. Thus, to be a sound administrator, it is not only essential to perform with high ethical values and promote efficiency and effectiveness, but also with responsiveness, responsibility, and fairness or justice. Discretion must be exercised not only under multiple systems of checks and balances, but also with personal and professional integrity and prudence (practical wisdom). Therefore, to be a professional is not enough. One must also be a responsible and responsive administrator. This requires ethical education and training at all levels.

Professional public administrators may be seen as the guardians of the administrative state. They provide stability and continuity in governance, even in the midst of paralyzing political crises, upheavals, and revolutions. It is an established fact that bureaucracy has survived political changes for more than three millennia. Public administrators play an active role in the formulation of public policies. But their impact on the pace, style, tone, and quality of policy implementation is immense. They may be viewed as guardians of the public trust.

However, to many concerned citizens, experts, and political authorities around the world, this assertion also raises a very fundamental question. Who then guards the guardians? This is also a central issue in public management. As Victor Thompson noted sometime ago, the increasing specialization of subordinate employees has created a severe imbalance between formal hierarchical authority and the responsibility of high-level administrative elites, on the one hand, and their actual capacity to manage, on the other. Yet, this general concern has now been reversed since the 1980s as sweeping privatization and outsourcing, corporatization, marketization, and the New Public Management (NPM) have replaced government bureaucracy and public administrators—though not entirely, as bureaucracy cannot be replaced and is needed to serve those institutional arrangements—and caused major new problems of accountability, ethical conduct, and corruption as well as equity and fairness in public service and administration worldwide.

Accountability in the public service is very important, because there are many aspects of administrative work that are open to corruption and subversion of the public interest. At the same time, there are aspects of professionalism that make it difficult to attain an acceptable level of accountability. The difficulty in attaining administrative accountability makes administrative ethics particularly important. Ethics is a form of self-discipline, an inner check on the conduct of public servants, and it must be internalized to appear in ethical behavior. Yet, there are external mechanisms of ethical control of administration—ethics code, institutional reports and requirements, etc.—that if observed can work effectively against unethical conducts. Accountability is also an organizational and political concern. It touches on issues of liability as well as ethical matters. To deal with these two issues of worldwide concern, it is worth considering the question of why some public administrators abuse their trust and act in ways considered to be contrary to the public interest and in violation of the public trust. For more on this see, Farazmand (2002).

## 17.5 Guardians of the Public Trust

Generally speaking, there are three categories of factors that may impel public administrators to violate the public trust. These are misrepresentation of the public interest, corruption, and subversion (Rosenbloom, 1995). But we must include politically appointed officials as public administrators occupying key strategic positions in this discussion, as they are the ones with access to key information and contact with potential sources of corruption in an environment highly influenced or dominated by corporate elites, especially in the age of corporate globalization.

### **17.5.1 Misrepresentation of the Public Interest**

Several factors at work shape public servants' concepts of the public interest. Most of the high-ranking administrative appointees are drawn disproportionately from upper and upper middle-class backgrounds. This makes the bureaucracy socially unrepresentative. The social and economic class basis of the civil service is critical because it colors perceptions of how people live, what their problems are, and what they want and need.

Excessive specialization is yet another source of misrepresentation of the public interest. Professional public administrators—like those who perform specialized functions—may develop a narrow outlook concerning the public interest, by either exaggerating the importance of what they do or by downgrading the work of others. Professional lawyers, medical doctors, and scientists are examples of this. Critics have even argued that bureaucracies and bureaucrats tend to develop bureau ideologies that frequently distort their view of public needs. This is because all officials exhibit relatively strong loyalty to the organization controlling their job security, prospects, and promotion.

Lastly, misrepresentation may flow from close relationships of public organizations with particular clientele: health, agriculture, the environment, and urban development are cases in point. Public administrators working in such agencies may mistakenly consider the interest groups with which they deal to be truly representative of the population as a whole. The concept of “iron triangles” refers to a phenomenon that has become pervasive in the United States and many other nations. Among the most powerful iron triangles found in the realm of public policy is the military–industrial complex (MIC). In a typical iron triangle, an informal alliance is formed among interest groups, administrative/bureaucratic elites, and legislative committee members (political elites). It functions outside the formal structure and process of the bureaucracy and government, with no records taken or references made. The business, bureaucratic, and political elites dominate the policy process, producing tunnel vision and a corresponding lack of transparency and accountability in the transaction of public business.

### **17.5.2 Corruption**

Corruption may be viewed as betrayal of the public trust, and is a worldwide phenomenon. It has contributed to the current crisis in the public service image. However, it is beyond the scope of this short chapter to discuss its many dimensions, causes, and consequences. Suffice it to say that definitions of corruption vary from culture to culture. What is legal and legitimate in the United States—for example, lobbying—may be considered corrupt in other cultures. There are numerous forms of corruption, including bribery and kickbacks, which have become institutionalized in some political regimes. Other forms of corruption have become so pervasive as to be virtually accepted as normal, including nepotism, favoritism, patronage, and the selling or exchange of office for personal gain. Corruption tarnishes the image of the public service and delegitimizes the role of government: in all its forms it violates the public trust and civilized values. The pervasiveness of corruption in the public service makes it imperative to develop ways to guard the guardians.

### **17.5.3 Subversion**

Subversion is another reason why public administrators need to be watched and controlled. Public administrators may engage in subversive activities for a variety of reasons: extreme discontent or fear of job loss, resort to clandestine activities in cooperation with antigovernment forces or organizations, corruption, and so on.

**Obstacles to Guard the Guardians**

Important though it is, the task of guarding the guardians presents a number of problems:

1. *Special expertise and information.* Public administrators are often experts at what they do. The expertise and specialized information they possess puts them in an advantageous position, which is not matched by outsiders, especially common citizens, but even politicians. This technical, specialized expertise and information is often the basis of administrative and organizational decisions, and often beyond the ability of outsiders and those charged with oversight to fathom.
2. *Full-time status.* Simply stated, the full-time status of public administrators makes it difficult for outsiders, who have many other things to do, to hold them accountable. Administrators are involved in details and are often good at what they do. Politicians and common citizens do not have the time and expertise to match such status.
3. *Job security and other protections.* Most public administrators enjoy job security, and any adverse organizational action against them is subject to due process, civil-service protection procedures, and so on. Although job security has been eroded during the last 25 years or so, it is still a source of protection against arbitrary dismissals and disciplinary actions. Discipline and dismissals are difficult, though not impossible. Many small and petty administrative infractions can over time lead to a significant adverse impact on public service image and credibility, as well as on organizational productivity, performance, and service quality.
4. *The law of countercontrol.* According to Anthony Downs (1967), it takes a bureaucracy to control another bureaucracy. The law of countercontrol has several manifestations in different parts of the world. It leads to duplication, waste, and the proliferation of bureaucratic organizations for control purposes, a practice that obscures the cardinal purpose of public service, which is to serve the citizens and to protect their interest in an efficient and effective manner.
5. *Coordination problems.* Such problems make accountability difficult for many reasons. For example, separation of powers in the United States between the Executive, Congress, and Judiciary has been a source of difficulties in securing accountability (Rosenbloom, 1993). Analogous examples may be found elsewhere in the world. It is often difficult to hold an agency or administrator accountable, when many organizations and officials are involved in implementation without proper coordination and control.
6. *Fragmentation of organizational functions and structures.* This is another obstacle in securing administrative accountability. Fragmentation and overlapping functions and responsibilities cause confusion. Accountability is lost because no one seems to be responsible, where everyone is responsible. Blames are shifted from one source to another. Organizational structure often require duplication and redundancy, both of which can provide unhappy bureaucrats—both public and private sectors—adequate defensive mechanisms to hide behind rules and procedures when resisting change, implementation, or even desiring to alter the outcome of undesired policy or issues in the implementation process.
7. *The large size and scope of public administration.* Almost everywhere in the world, the size, missions, and scope of public administration are extremely broad. Often the structures, rules, procedures, and the number of employees employed complicate the task of holding public administrators accountable. Complexity is a function of size, scope, and structural features of organizational activities. The more complex an organization, the more difficult it is to hold the administrators accountable in the performance. Complexity is also complicated by the challenges of rapid globalization, turbulence in world politics, and chaotic nonlinear events that shake the world with surprises.

Yet, despite these major obstacles, a number of means have been used to secure accountability in public service and thus to guard the guardians. Codes of professional ethics and education constitute two broad categories. A complementary approach encompasses political, legal, cultural, and other institutional arrangements, which are explored in the subsequent section, but nothing replaces a thorough ethical educational system incorporated in the curricula from the early age on, and especially through preparation for public service and administration.

## **17.6 Achieving Accountability**

Administrative accountability in the public service can be achieved through a number of formal means. These are institutionalized mechanisms through which checks and balances are expected to work.

### **17.6.1 Managerial/Organizational**

This approach is applied worldwide and is a universal means of achieving accountability in all kinds of organizations. It has several major tenets or values that cut across all organizations and the prevailing culture in societies. These universal organizational values or principles are efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and control. The first three are values of instrumental rationality, while the fourth is both a normative and a rational imperative of organizational accountability. Organizational unity is important for the maximization of these values, and several means are used to secure it.

First, hierarchy, authority, and responsibility need to be clearly defined and assigned. Overlapping functions should be reduced; lines of hierarchical authority should be clear and comprehensive. Multiple agency heads/leadership tend to divide subordinates' loyalties and to obscure responsibility.

Subordination is also necessary for organizational unity, effectiveness, and accountability. Insubordination is seldom tolerated and is punishable by dismissal. Lastly, the span of control is an effective means of organizational accountability. Essentially, a part of the orthodox, classical management and organization theory, a narrow span of control has been viewed as an important principle of organizational accountability.

Organizational loyalty is expected of all members and is assured in many ways: these include socialization into the organizational milieu; occupational specialization makes it difficult for employees to find equivalent positions elsewhere, and dependence on organizations, through pension schemes or indeed conflict-of-interest regulations close the revolving door. Countries such as the United States have legislative regulations that tend to be comprehensive on these matters. Formal disciplinary systems enforce accountability and subordination. They are designed to identify the types of proper conduct and to prevent abuse of agency authority and property.

Formal disciplinary systems have often been criticized as largely ineffective. Public accountability should seek to enforce much higher standards of behavior, an approach that is professional and legal or constitutional in nature. Audits are strong deterrents to corruption or other abuses of public trust. Audits can also be internal or external, and it may be desirable to employ external as well as internal audits. In many public organizations, both are required.

### **17.6.2 Political Means**

The political approach takes a different road in stressing the need to develop an external means of accountability in public administration. This is frequently done through political control of



personnel systems by using patronage appointments. However, other important means are also applied effectively and are familiar to most systems:

1. Legislative oversight, which can be achieved by means of legislative requirement for the ratification of the appointment of agency heads, legislative investigations, and auditing.
2. Budgetary control, which means the power of the purse, an extremely important legislative check on executive power.
3. Rotation in office to reduce the risk of misrepresentation of public interest, amassment of power, or empire-building by key administrators. This is an ancient personnel practice going back to Persia and Rome. Its utility is recognized for a number of reasons around the world. The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act of the United States created the Senior Executive Service to enable the federal civil servants to move from one agency to another. Political executives are routinely rotated from office to office, or out of office, when a new political boss arrives.
4. Representation and public participation as a means of broadening the composition of public service and encouraging diversity, which may bring administrative values closer to the general public, thus reflecting citizens' perspectives and preferences.
5. Whistleblowing is a widely known practice, with its benefits and costs. The use of hot lines and other confidential channels may be safer for public administrators, protecting them from reprisals. Leaks to the press, exposure to the public and the media, reporting to higher authority, resignation in protest, and exposure are some means of whistleblowing. Some countries have passed legislation protecting whistleblowers, but in reality, it is a risky practice, as whistleblowers are often demonized, character assassinated, and attached to scandals to keep them silenced.
6. "Sunshine laws," which require open public dealings as important means of securing accountability and proper conduct of public officials. Today, most American states and local governments have adopted some forms of sunshine laws. Sunshine laws are useful mechanisms for transparency, but they tend to become facades as the actors in the process often streamline issues and decisions before they are brought in on the agenda or to the open meetings.
7. Conflict of interest, which is similar to the organizational and managerial approach. However, conflict of interests is very pervasive everywhere and its eradication is a monumental task not everyone can carry. People with influence in high offices often tend to form informal alliances with key individuals and business sectors that benefit lawmakers, administrators, and a lot more. Conflict of interests benefit individuals with connections to businesses carrying out government contracting jobs; they are directly or indirectly related to officials who benefit from such government contracts and business deals.

### **17.6.3 Legal Approach**

This is a judicial approach to administrative accountability. Administrative liability is one issue; another is a strong and personally internalized incentive to protect the constitutional rights of individual citizens.

### **17.6.4 Cultural Approach**

This is another means of achieving accountability in public service. It requires inclusion of significant ethical components in the educational curricula for children and adults. Ethical education can be

carried out through religious and secular institutions. Religious institutions and values can be used as major guiding principles in public service conduct. For example, in Islam, like in other religions, there is a high value attached to being a public servant and to proper behavior in personal and public life.

### 17.6.5 Ethics Institutional Approach

A number of institutions can be created and empowered to promote and enforce ethical behavior and accountability. For example, programs for whistleblowing, ethics hot lines, ethics boards and commissions, ethics education programs for elected, politically appointed, and administrative officials, agency ethics officers, financial and conflict-of-interest disclosure systems, and professional codes of ethics are typically found in modern governments. Australia, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, India, and many developing countries have most or all of these institutions in place.

## 17.7 Guiding Principles in Public Service Ethics

Administrative ethics has been enhanced by professionalization in the administrative state. While public service ethics and accountability remain major concerns, the incidence of corruption and unethical behavior is mostly found to be on the political side of the public service. Political executives are often at the apex of public organizations and, as elites, they tend to be key players in most scandals. Professionalism in public administration has helped in curbing political corruption around the world.

Acting as guardians of the public trust, professional administrators are in a central position to revive and enhance the image of the public service. This is a major challenge, which entails conscious effort of advocacy and enforcement. The following paragraphs present a list of principles that can guide public administrators in promoting the above goals. These principles or precepts are identified as do's and don'ts.

*Ethical education.* Ethical education is a must and should be part of all educational systems at all levels. However, education and training in administrative ethics are most essential for public service careers anywhere in the world. They must include both personal and administrative ethics. Civic virtues, virtuous citizenship, respect for others, protection of individual rights, and other ethical values should be internalized by public servants. Advice to top executives should also include the following: Set the example and tone for the entire organization by emphasizing education and training in ethics, by thinking and behaving ethically. On the other hand, advice to public employees should include the following: Educate yourself with ethical and moral principles and act ethically; do not compromise on principles; disobey unconstitutional, immoral, illegal, and unethical orders and expose them through the appropriate channels; and find appropriate ways to do it.

*Preservation of professional and personal integrity.* Professional values should prevail over organizational or personal orders of superiors deemed questionable. Responsible professionalism is an essential component of administrative behavior. This requires self-regulation, knowledge, self-control, a degree of autonomy and personal independence, and subordination of private interests to the public interest and public trust. Yet, strict observance to professional

interests can and do conflict, sometimes, conflict with broad public interests, a problem that must be avoided when faced, as broad public interests are superior to narrow-based professional interests, and this requires prudence.

*Prudence.* The exercise of prudence, which means practical wisdom, was emphasized by three great Persian philosophers and thinkers of the Middle Ages—Farabi, Ibn-e-Cina, and Nizam-ul-Mulk. Every society has its own thinkers of this caliber. Prudence requires self-controlled, discretionary decisions based on knowledge, expertise, and ethical judgment on particular situations.

*Public spirit.* Private interests should be subordinate to public, community interests. In making decisions or acting as an administrator, think of the public trust and citizens' interests first, and then think of yourself. Develop civic virtue, act virtuously, and promote virtuous citizenship by being a virtuous citizen and acting as a virtuous administrator.

*Avoid and prevent problems causing public service crises.* Some of these problems are beyond one's control as an administrator, but those values and factors that deter public service corruption and compromise should be adhered to. A responsible, prudent, and virtuous public administrator should not only try to avoid getting into or causing corruption and crises in public service, but should also try to do everything possible to prevent them—in the spirit of serving public interests.

*Be a responsible administrator.* Act with restraint, discretion, and freedom. Be an example to others. If you cannot continue to perform your duties properly, resign and expose those who make it impossible for you to perform ethically and professionally, or blow the whistle and report wrongdoings to the right sources for corrections. However, it is a tight rope that must be walked very carefully, as it is common to see a genuine whistleblower charged with wrongdoing and pay the price—it must be done with consultation and maximum care, because you as an administrator also have obligations to yourself and your family.

*Promote the common good.* Devote your time, expertise, and knowledge in building community values and defending the rights of the poor as well as the affluent. It is the public interest and trust that you must serve at all times with integrity. Breaching such principle will lead you to more unethical violations and corruption—maintain your integrity regardless of the situation.

*Be competent and fair.* Competence comes with training, skills development, and knowledge. It is extremely important to apply competence with fairness, equity, and justice in administrative positions. Efficiency and effectiveness are important organizational and managerial values, but they must be blended with fairness, equity, and justice. It is this blend of ethical and professional values that makes professional ethics in public administration possible and desirable.

*Follow and enforce the professional code of ethics.* Codes of ethics in public administration are written and unwritten collections or systems of laws, rules, regulations, and norms that guide public service conduct. They are statements of ideals, canons of action consonant with those ideals, and binding means of enforcing behavior within the boundaries established by the code. Opponents of codes of ethics argue that one should resist moralizing everything, that rigid codification of right or wrong is dysfunctional, and that bureaucratic neutrality considers it immoral to pass moral judgments on public organizations. Proponents of codes of ethics cite the objectivity and the positive value added through code of ethics enforcement. Some codes of ethics carry sanctions for unethical behaviors, while others are more aspirational or guides to public servants.

*Establish and affirm professional identity* as a public servant, as a professional, as a keeper of public trust, and as an ethical person. Resist all forms of corruption and temptations to unethical behaviors.

*Avoid unethical dilemmas* as much as possible but, if caught in the middle, seek advice and exercise prudence. Most ethical dilemmas can be handled with prudence.

*Act morally and ethically* with a sound character and responsible judgment. Value and promote the image of the public service.

*Combat corruption* at any level and at all times. Establish and use commissions of inquiry, wage war on indiscipline, and show moral leadership. Also, use scholarly research and the confidential approaches mentioned earlier.

*Develop and internalize a sense of total quality management (TQM).* Promote the idea of doing things right the first time and prevent the costly error of duplicating or repeating poor quality work. Do not cheat on your work, internalize work ethics, and develop a sense of motivation for public interest and self-actualization.

*View citizens as valued human beings* and as community members, not merely as consumers or customers in the marketplace. Discourage an overly biased corporate ideology, which seeks only profits and tends to promote corruption and unethical behavior to gain more profits. Markets are not alternatives to public service. Rather, sound governance, public service, and responsible citizenship are sine qua non of a business-friendly environment, the smooth operation of markets, effective democracy, and social peace.

## 17.8 Issues in Administrative Ethics

Public administrators face significant ethical issues on a daily basis. Some of these issues are strictly organizational, while others are broader societal issues concerning ethics and accountability. Both categories need to be reviewed by public administrators using ethical principles as their guide. The following is a list intended to generate discussion at the meeting:

- Recruitment and selection
- Employee drug screening and ethics
- Alcoholism
- Disciplinary action/termination
- Salaries, wages, and benefits packages
- Discrimination on any basis
- Downsizing
- Who should go first under cutback programs?
- Sexual harassment in the workplace
- Workforce diversity
- Right to strike
- Political activities of public employees
- Organizational changes affecting employees
- Employee fitness programs
- Censorship
- Private use of employee time and expertise
- Patronage versus merit systems
- Whistleblowing
- Future employability of employees
- Private conduct versus public conduct
- Conflicts between political and career appointees

Covering for the boss  
Hierarchical orders  
Conflict of interests  
Bribery and small scams  
Influence wielding  
Nepotism and patronage  
Ethics of privatization  
Outsourcing and contracting  
Morale and productivity  
Politicization of the civil service  
Merit-system erosion  
Use of public property for private use  
Race, color, convictions, gender, national origins, and ethnic identity  
Fairness, equity, justice, efficiency, and effectiveness  
Lying for the boss  
Following unconstitutional and unethical orders from top

## References

- Farazmand, A. (2002) Administrative ethics and professional competence: Accountability and performance under globalization, *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 68(1): 127–143.
- Frederickson, G. (1993) *Ethics and Public Administration* (New York: M.E. Sharpe).
- Rohr, J. (1989) *Ethics for Bureaucrats* (New York: Marcel Dekker).
- Rosenbloom, D. (1995) *Public Administration and the Public Sector: Understanding Management, Law, and Politics*, 4th edn. (New York: McGraw-Hill).
- Thayer, F. (1997) The US civil service: 1883–1993 (R.I.P.), in A. Farazmand, ed., *Modern Systems of Government: Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians*, pp. 95–124 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage).

---

**BUREAUCRACY AND**

**BUREAUCRATIC**

**POLITICS IN THE AMERICAS**

---

**IV**



## Chapter 18

---

# The American President as a Bureaucratic Leader

---

Robert E. Dewhirst

### CONTENTS

1	8.1	Introduction.....	321
18	.2	The President's Personal Bureaucracy .....	322
18	.3	The President Confronts the Executive Branch .....	324
1	8.4	Conclusions.....	326
		Further Reading.....	326

### 18.1 Introduction

As the chief executive of the nation's government, America's president heads two bureaucracies. The first is a comparatively small one more personally accountable to him. The second is the large federal bureaucracy whose members can be subjected to constant pressures, not only from the White House but from countless interests throughout the political system.

*Constitutional and legal anchors:* Article II of the Constitution assigns "executive power" to the president and directs the government's chief executive to "...take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Seeking to help the president accomplish this task, the Constitution authorizes the chief executive to "...require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments."

In the many years following the writing of those somewhat ambiguous phrases in the late eighteenth century, acts of Congress, tradition, and ambitious presidents have all worked to give a



meaning to the second article of the Constitution. With the dawning of the twenty-first century, the collective results of these efforts have been to expand the administrative powers of the president far beyond the vague guidelines listed in the Constitution. Yet, ironically, while modern presidents have more formal powers over the executive branch than ever before, they commonly have become frustrated by what they view as an insufficient array of powers with which to achieve their administrative goals.

The size of the federal bureaucracy, and the subsequent complexity of its relationship with the president, has grown at an uneven pace throughout American history. From its origins in the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century, the federal bureaucracy remained relatively small. The federal workforce tended to be focused on such areas as the postal service, Army and Navy, the judiciary, and customs officials, for example. Presidents normally dealt with limited foreign affairs and military concerns while domestic policy making and politics tended to be centered in state and local governments.

Not surprisingly, during this time the president's personal bureaucracy remained small to virtually nonexistent. George Washington's "White House staff" was one person, his executive secretary. By Abraham Lincoln's administration, the president's staff had doubled to two people. Throughout the rest of the century and into the early decades of the twentieth century, the White House staff grew slowly, if at all. President Calvin Coolidge was even known to have answered the White House telephone himself.

However, President Franklin Roosevelt abandoned that tradition as he literally reinvented the presidency. Roosevelt redirected public attention and the locus of power to the national government, in general, and the presidency, in particular. The president needed a large staff to help him attack serious domestic problems stemming from the Great Depression. Subsequently, with the advent of World War II, the president needed additional help to lead the nation in achieving foreign relations and military goals. The "modern presidency" had begun, and the office and the chief executive's relationships with his personal and extended bureaucracies would never be the same.

## 18.2 The President's Personal Bureaucracy

The modern president's personal bureaucracy grew steadily during and in the administrations following Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. The growth stemmed from active presidents responding to a growing list of serious foreign and domestic issues. Passing laws or adopting new administrative rules often were the legal vehicles for making such changes.

The major event in the early years of these changes was the creation of the Executive Office of the President. Congress authorized creating this structure in 1939 in response to the recommendation of an elite committee of public administration professors chaired by Louis Brownlow. The committee's famous recommendation that "The President needs help" provided the initial model and impetus for the subsequent rapid expansion of the president's executive office staff. By the twenty-first century, presidents had about 2000 persons working for them, with the number varying somewhat from one president to the next and how staff assignments were accounted.

*White House staff:* About 500 persons work most directly for the president. They give personal, political, and policy advice to the president. Most work in offices located either in the West Wing of the White House or in the Old Executive Office building across the street or in the nearby New Executive Office building. They perform such tasks for the president as writing speeches, managing his calendar, doing advance work prior to a presidential visit, providing legal advice, or representing

the president to the Washington press corps. Most presidents bring their staffs with them from similar assignments during the campaign trail or while the president occupied a previous office, such as senator or governor. Presidents demand a staff who are loyal and that they believe they can trust. Indeed, staff errors can damage a president politically.

*Policy advisors:* The president's personal bureaucracy features an array of offices providing expert policy advice, three of which often have attracted widespread public attention. Leaders of these organizations are appointed by the president, and commonly attract considerable public attention, both inside and outside the Washington governing community. The National Security Council (NSC) was created by the National Security Act of 1947 to provide national security advice to the president. The NSC has a large staff, led by the president's national security advisor, seeking to help the president manage national security policies. Use of the NSC has largely depended upon the management style, policy goals, and the nature of the times confronting the administration. Eisenhower opted to hold formal meetings following a set agenda with the staff regularly producing lengthy studies of pressing issues. Kennedy and Johnson detested such long meetings and valued the NSC more for the work of its large staff.

Some of the president's national security advisors, such as Henry Kissinger for Nixon, McGeorge Bundy for Kennedy, or Walt Rostow for Johnson, became prominent and highly influential advisors to the presidents they served. This largely stemmed from presidents increasingly wanting to center all major national security-making powers within the White House. Such actions fueled a continuing power struggle between the national security advisor on one hand with the State Department and Pentagon on the other end. Those cabinet secretaries and their department leaders mounted delaying actions or overtly resisted what they viewed as an invasion of their rightful jurisdictions by ambitious NSC advisors and the presidents they served.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) features about 500 career civil service technicians directed to help the president attain his federal budget goals. Franklin Roosevelt shifted the Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury Department to the White House to help him prepare his budgetary recommendations for Congress. Presidents set the taxing and spending policy goals and assigned the OMB staff the task of developing the details of implementing a proposal to implement the goals.

In 1970, President Nixon renamed the agency to the OMB while expanding its duties to include auditing and analyzing department implementation of federal programs. Such actions by Nixon and Reagan politicized the OMB by mandating the office to help the president pressure federal agencies and departments to implement programs in accord with administration policies. The pinnacle of this technique was attained in the Reagan administration through the efforts of his OMB director, David Stockman, who sought to help sell the president's policies to the public and members of Congress. Stockman personally was involved in the details of the president's efforts to cut taxes, reduce all domestic spending, and increase military spending by \$1.8 trillion. Although not to this extent, subsequent administrations have politicized the OMB to help achieve administration budgetary goals.

A second major component of what has been termed the president's "economic subpresidency" is the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). Composed of three persons nominated by the president and ratified by the Senate, the CEA provides economic advice to the president and helps sell the administration's economic policies to Congress and the public. The focus of attention has largely been on the CEA chair, normally a nationally prominent economist. The chair oversees the council and a staff of nearly 40 professional and clerical personnel. The CEA prepares and presents the annual *Economic Report of the President* to Congress. The CEA and its chair play as large a role in the administration's economic policy making as the president will allow. The group is only

authorized to give advice and lacks any command powers. Democratic presidents have tended to appoint Keynesian economists, while Republican presidents have tended to have monetarist or classical conservative economists in the CEA.

In addition, presidents have tended either to reorganize or to add on to their policy advisor ranks in response to meeting the challenges arising during their term of office. Hence, the number and size of such offices have varied from one administration to the next. For example, the current trend toward a growing American interdependence in a global economy strongly suggests an expanded role for the office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

*Presidential management styles:* Modern presidents have tended to manage the federal bureaucracy within one of three styles, depending upon the president's distinctive personality, work habits, and policy goals. One style has been termed "formalistic" because it has a well-defined division of organization and duties, and operates under the close daily supervision of a chief of staff. While Eisenhower best personified this approach, Nixon implemented a version of it as well. The "competitive" style was best exemplified by Franklin Roosevelt. This approach values developing new policies and emphasizes the flow of information directly to the president. Roosevelt sought numerous views and encouraged debate, often heated conflict, among his advisors. He then assessed the relative merits of the competing claims and arrived at a policy decision. This approach proved to be extremely demanding on the president's time and energy. A final approach has been called a "collegial" system, wherein the president formed groups to develop solutions to problems and make recommendations to the president for his final consideration. Kennedy, particularly during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, best exemplified this approach.

In sum, any version of these approaches could be termed the "correct" way for a president to manage his bureaucracy. Ideally, the style should be one in which the president operates most comfortably and efficiently with final judgment based on the degree of success or failure of the president's decision (see Johnson, 1974).

### 18.3 The President Confronts the Executive Branch

Presidents head an executive branch composed of about 2.7 million civilian employees and 1.5 million armed-force personnel. These personnel are scattered among 15 cabinet departments and numerous executive agencies and bureaus operating independent of cabinet member control. Perhaps most important for modern presidents, all but a few personnel in these departments and agencies gained and hold their positions through the civil service system. Hence, these members of the bureaucracy are relatively permanent with careers predating most presidents and continuing well past when the president leaves the White House. This status has tended to insulate members of the federal bureaucracy from most Oval Office pressures. Hence, members of the civilian and military bureaucracies often were thought to have an outlook that "I was here long before this president arrived at the Oval Office and I'll be here long after the president leaves town."

*The president's cabinet:* Cabinet secretaries lead each of the 15 major departments of the federal government. Nominated by the president and ratified by the Senate, cabinet secretaries have no constitutional or legal standing and serve at the pleasure of the president. They have as much influence in the Oval Office as the president desires. Duties of cabinet secretaries serving during the modern presidency have tended to be to manage the daily operation of their department and give policy-making advice to the president, particularly if it is sought by the White House. However, throughout the era of the modern presidency, the clear trend has been for the making of major

policy decisions to be done in the White House, with cabinet secretaries playing either an advisory or even more peripheral role. Decision-making concerning minor issues has tended to remain with cabinet secretaries. Indeed, because of these and other factors, most cabinet secretaries tend to resign before the end of the president's term of office.

Further complicating the president's relationship with the federal bureaucracy has been the development of additional layers of the bureaucracy, as cabinet secretaries have been supported by deputy secretaries, undersecretaries, and deputy undersecretaries.

The president's cabinet often has been thought in terms of an "inner" cabinet and an "outer" cabinet, whose efforts are supplemented by "cabinet-level" presidential appointments. Inner cabinet secretaries are those whose jurisdictions tend to have the highest policy-making priorities and are traditionally the most politically sensitive. Hence, these secretaries have tended to enjoy the closest confidence of the president and have the most frequent personal access to the Oval Office. These secretaries most often are the heads of the State, Defense, Treasury departments, and the Attorney General. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the secretary of the newly created Department of Homeland Security has been widely considered to have been included in the ranks of the inner cabinet.

Outer department secretaries tend to head more narrowly focused and less politically volatile policy-making areas, and have been more likely to develop close ties to outside interest groups. These include the secretaries of the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs. Other cabinet-level positions have included the U.S. Trade Representative, American Ambassador to the United Nations, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator.

*Presidential efforts to control the federal bureaucracy:* Recent presidents have sought to increase the tools with which they attempt to control the implementation of bureaucratic policy making. This often has been a tedious and exasperating task for presidents who often have abandoned their efforts in exhausted defeat.

Presidents have the power to nominate, subject to Senate ratification, about 3000 "political" appointments throughout the executive branch. This endeavor has been loaded with obstacles for presidents. First, they have to identify the people they believe can best help them meet the president's policy goals. Then they need to win the Senate's approval of the person selected. Subsequently, the new person has to have sufficient political skills to win the trust and cooperation of the senior members of the federal civil service, who often have policy views independent of or even contrary to those of the president. Adding to the president's concerns has been that there normally is a high turnover rate among political appointees disillusioned and frustrated with their inability to accomplish what they had sought out to do initially.

On the other hand, presidents have, with a few restrictions, the power to remove—or "fire"—federal officials. At times this has ignited a major political controversy, such as when Reagan in 1981 fired more than 11,000 striking members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization.

Presidents also have sought to control the federal bureaucracy by using such administrative tools as reorganization or altering budget allocations. Modern presidents such as Johnson, Nixon, and Carter each reorganized parts of the federal bureaucracy without leaving any lasting legacy of significantly affecting the implementation of policies. On the other hand, Congress and interest groups have frequently blocked or significantly altered presidential efforts to control the budget and spending of federal agencies. In addition, more dramatic presidential efforts at reallocating administrative budget priorities have been overwhelmed by powerful political traditions of making incremental changes to annual budget allocations.

Some of the most recent and controversial efforts presidents have made to try to control the implementation of bureaucratic policy making have been through their formal powers as chief executive. Presidents such as Clinton and Reagan have issued executive orders and presidential memoranda to try to assure that their policy goals were met. Presidents also have issued national security directives concerning implementing foreign policies, proclamations, instructions for implementing policies, and interpretations of the intent of Congress when passing laws. Most recently, George W. Bush issued “signing statements” at the time he signed bills into law, explaining how he intended to implement policies or programs developed by the law. Although this was a practice commonly enjoyed by his predecessors, this president used the signing statements to announce that he would order the bureaucracy to ignore implementing the key parts of the programs established by the bill he was signing.

These tools are unilateral efforts to manage directly the bureaucracy’s daily implementation of programs. Presidents simply have published a written command to have something either done or ceased to be done.

## 18.4 Conclusions

Modern presidents have been much more successful at controlling their personal bureaucracies than they have been at dominating the overall federal bureaucracy. The federal bureaucracy is large, complex, and greatly influenced by powerful forces—such as Congress and interest groups—largely outside the president’s control. Perhaps the path to their greatest success lies in identifying policy areas in which they personally share objectives with the dominant forces within each of the government agencies.

Critics have said it is ironic that modern presidents have tended to be victimized by their campaign rhetoric seeking to win the White House. Presidential candidates of both major parties have been known to campaign for votes by promising to “clean up the mess in Washington,” by making vast changes to the status quo and attacking “government waste.” Such assertions predict that the new president will indeed be in charge of the federal bureaucracy, a promise that they quickly learn is hollow once they have entered the Oval Office.

## Further Reading

- Campbell, C. *Managing the Presidency: Carter, Reagan, and the Search for Executive Harmony*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986.
- Cooper, P.J. *By Order of the Executive*, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
- Durant, R.F. *The Administrative Presidency Revisited*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.
- Hecl, H. *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977.
- Johnson, R.T. *Managing the White House*, New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
- Lewis, D.E. *Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- Light, P.C. *Thickening Government*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995.
- Mayer, K.R. *With the Stroke of a Pen, Executive Orders and Presidential Power*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Nathan, R.P. *The Administrative Presidency*, New York: Wiley, 1983.
- Pfiffner, J. *The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running*, Chicago, IL: Dorsey Press, 1988.
- Waterman, R.W. *Presidential Influence and the Administrative State*, Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1989.

## Chapter 19

---

# The Globalization of Public Budgeting in the United States

---

Patrick Fisher and David C. Nice

### CONTENTS

19.1 Growing Partisan and Ideological Conflict .....	328
19.2 International Influences on Budgetary Decisions .....	330
19.3 Economic Development Programs .....	331
19.4 Budgetary Instability, Rebudgeting, and Uncertainty .....	332
19.5 Political Difficulties in Taxation.....	334
19.6 Some Concluding Thoughts.....	335
References .....	335

Budgetary decisions affect public bureaucracies in many important ways. If agencies lack adequate funding, they will be less able to accomplish their objectives. The morale of a agency employees may suffer if they fail to receive salary increases or if many positions are left unfilled due to hiring freezes. Facilities and equipment that need to be replaced may remain in service because there is no money to replace them; inadequate funding for maintenance may cause premature deterioration of facilities and equipment. If budgetary decisions are subject to repeated revision, agency personnel may fear that a new initiative or an ongoing program may be undercut by the withdrawal of funds that were previously approved. Moreover, the budget's value as an instrument of democratic accountability is reduced if a budget is adopted amid great fanfare, but is later revised in ways that are not very visible to the public.

At the risk of some oversimplification, much of the early literature on public budgeting in the United States, depicted it as working reasonably well, apart from the lack of revenue available

in some jurisdictions and some concerns about pork barrel spending. Budgetary decisions were made rather smoothly and predictably, and once budgets were decided, they were implemented in a reasonably smooth and predictable fashion. This was in marked contrast to budgeting in some other countries, where prolonged conflict over budgetary decisions sometimes occurred and where budgets were often subject to major revisions after a doption. Although public budgeting was sometimes used to stabilize the U.S. economy, public budgets were not depicted as regularly being used to shape the future development of the economy, in marked contrast to governmental economic planning and economic development policies in some other countries. Moreover, American budgeting was primarily depicted as a domestic process rather than one that was subject to strong international influences.

In more recent years, scholars and other observers have considerably revised the dominant characterization of public budgeting in the United States. Levels of political conflict have risen considerably in national, state, and local government budgeting, and much of that conflict has followed ideological and partisan lines. The national government and some states have had considerable difficulty in making budgetary decisions according to a regular timetable, and once budgetary decisions are made, they are subject to later revision that may be due to errors in forecasting revenues or spending, or political maneuvering, with people who are unhappy with the original decision trying to modify it. Especially since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a number of observers have also noted the importance of international influences on U.S. budgeting; similar, though less dramatic awareness of international influences surfaced in the aftermath of the 1970s oil shocks and the later discussion on the so-called peace dividend after the end of the Cold War.

We believe that these developments can be usefully characterized as the globalization of American public budgeting. Globalization has a number of different meanings, but for our purposes, two facets of globalization have particular relevance. First, globalization involves a variety of forces and relationships that transcend national boundaries (Tarzi, 1999; Fortanier and Maher, 2001) and may cause different political systems to behave in relatively similar ways, although different systems may respond to those forces in different ways (see Marsh, 1999). Second, globalization may mean that decisions made in one country grow increasingly subject to economic or political forces that primarily arise in other countries—possibly just one other country or region (see Thompson, 1999).

## 19.1 Growing Partisan and Ideological Conflict

One noteworthy development in American public budgeting is the growing partisan and ideological conflict in the budget process. The early literature on American public budgeting often depicted it as having only limited partisan or ideological conflict. Decision makers tried (with varying degrees of success) to minimize the role of overt programmatic issues when working on the budget, and the major parties were too diverse internally to maintain much party unity on budgetary issues. Legislative committees dealing with financial matters tried to achieve bipartisan unity in order to maximize the committees' influence on floor decisions and sometimes operated behind closed doors, in part to reduce the danger of members playing to external audiences. Old budgetary decisions were rarely reexamined in a thorough fashion, in part because of fears that reopening old questions would produce too much disagreement but also because it risked overloading officials with too many options (see Dye, 1966; Sharkansky, 1968; Crecine, 1969; Wildavsky, 1974). American public budgeting seemed dull in contrast to the livelier ideological and partisan dynamics sometimes found in other countries.

**Table 19.1 Percentage of Members within Each Party Voting in Favor of Congressional Budget Resolutions, 1994–1997**

	<i>House</i>		<i>Senate</i>	
	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>
1994	96	0	96	0
1995	95	0	93	5
1996	3	100	7	100
1997	3	98	0	100

*Source:* Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Congressional Quarterly, various volumes. Washington, D.C.

Since the late 1960s, however, the degree of partisan and ideological conflict in American public budgeting has increased significantly. Although members of Congress have often tried to achieve some degree of bipartisan agreement on budgetary matters (Ellwood, 1984), the process has grown highly partisan in recent years. Votes on congressional budget resolutions during the 1990s, reveal the extent of that development (see Table 19.1).

The growing partisan and ideological conflict has been reflected in more than just roll call voting. Tempers have flared on the floor of Congress and in committee and subcommittee meetings. Accusations of deception, unreasonableness, bad faith, and failing to deliver on promises have flown back and forth between Republicans and Democrats in Congress and between the White House and opposition party members in Congress. The most spectacular example of the heightened conflict occurred in the winter of 1995–1996, when a budgetary confrontation between the Clinton Administration and congressional Republicans led to several partial government shutdowns.

These developments reflect, in part, the growing ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans, and the related decline in the number of congressional moderates in either party. Those changes are in part an outgrowth of regional shifts in party strength, with the southern wing of the Democratic Party growing smaller and less conservative and the northeastern wing of the Republican Party, a traditional source of moderate Republican strength, declining as well. Democratic and Republican electoral constituencies have become increasingly different from one another on a number of public policy questions, and the political activists in each party have quite different policy views than do their counterparts in the other party (Fisher, 1999).

In a related vein, the social class bases of the two major parties have become more distinctive in recent years, with poorer people leaning in a more Democratic direction and wealthier people leaning in a more Republican direction. While the party bases continue to overlap to a significant degree, they are more differentiated by social class, than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s (Stonecash, 2000). Not surprisingly, the combination of class differences and differing policy beliefs leads to differing views regarding budgetary priorities. Exit polls from the 2000 presidential election, found that people who wanted tax cuts to be a high priority tended to vote for President Bush, while people who were more concerned about prescription drug benefits, education, or social security tended to vote for Vice-President Gore (Gallup Exit Poll, November 7, 2000).

In addition, the increasing number of interest groups active in national politics has meant growing pressures on members to satisfy or appear to support group positions that sometimes pull Republicans and Democrats in different directions. Reforms that have opened up committee deliberations to the press and public have increased opportunities for groups to press their



demands on members, and have increased incentives for members to play to those divergent groups. The erosion of congressional norms that previously encouraged politeness, specialization, and self-restraint has added to the level of tension. Slow and erratic revenue growth, coupled with the rising cost of entitlement programs, has made accommodating competing demands very difficult (Maraniss and Weisskopf, 1996; Dodd and Oppenheimer, 2001: Chapters 1, 2, 11, and 12; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2001: Chapters 4 and 5).

Similar changes have occurred at the state level. State parties have become more polarized in a number of states, and the level and volume of interest group activity have risen significantly. Legislative norms that previously encouraged courtesy and self-restraint have eroded, and the rising cost of some programs, particularly Medicaid, has made finding additional funds for new programs or expanding old programs difficult. The typical state government is also a major funding source for local government programs; so many local budget conflicts eventually find their way to the state capitals. State budgetary conflicts, in turn, spill over into local budgeting. These dynamics often produce a high level of partisan and ideological conflict in state budgetary decisions, a trend that is reinforced by budget reforms, that have placed greater emphasis on programmatic goals and accomplishments since the 1950s and, therefore, pressed decision makers to focus more attention on values and priorities (Lee, 1997; Rosenthal, 1998: Chapters 3, 5, and 6; Nice, 2002: p. 97).

## 19.2 International Influences on Budgetary Decisions

Much of the early literature on public budgeting in the United States emphasized internal influences on budgetary decisions. Budgets reflected the beliefs and strategies of elected officials and career administrators, previous budgetary commitments, public expectations, interest group demands, established decision rules, and budgetary procedures. Factors outside of the United States were not traditionally seen as major factors in budgetary decision making (e.g., see Dye, 1966; Campbell and Sachs, 1967; Wildavsky, 1974; for some early work that did note the relevance of international factors, see Mosher and Poland, 1964; Sharkansky, 1968: Chapter V).

Events since the late 1960s have helped produce a greater awareness of the importance of international influences on budgetary decisions in the United States. Critics blamed the combination of high spending for the Vietnam War and rising domestic spending for the round of inflation that emerged in the 1970s. The oil shocks of the 1970s resulted in rising unemployment and high inflation at the same time, and fluctuations in world oil markets have produced considerable prosperity in oil-producing states and localities in some years and painful economic slumps in other years. Most recently, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, coupled with an already-soft U.S. economy and a slump in the U.S. stock market, have contributed to the revenue slumps that are affecting all levels of government and raising the prospect of painful budgetary decisions, especially in many states and localities (Stein, 1994; *Aftershocks to Local Budgets*, 2001; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2001; Broder, 2002; Lester, 2002: pp. 303–304). Pressures to increase funding for various domestic security programs are also being felt by all levels of government, but assessing the long-term impact of those pressures is difficult at this point. Although some of these international dynamics were recognized as early as the 1940s with efforts to bring nations together to discuss worldwide economic issues (Kreinin, 1995; Gilpin, 2000), many observers are placing more emphasis on international budgetary dynamics in recent years, than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s.

Another development that has received some attention on the national level but has generated considerable interest in a number of states and communities is the prospect of job and investment

dynamics that are related to the global economy. The gloomy side of those dynamics is the loss of jobs and investment as companies close down production facilities in the United States and shift those operations overseas or because foreign companies offer stronger competition to U.S. firms. The more positive possibility is the creation of jobs and increased investment, because companies based overseas open production facilities in the United States, invest in American firms in order to help them modernize, or buy products or services from U.S. firms. These dynamics have helped stimulate greater state and local government interest in economic development programs, a point to which we now turn.

### **19.3 Economic Development Programs**

The political culture of the United States has traditionally included a considerable element of skepticism regarding the advisability of governmental involvement in the economy. During the Great Depression, many (but not all) Americans came to accept the premise that the government might appropriately work to stabilize the economy, just as many people earlier supported the governmental improvements in roads, harbors, and other facilities of great importance to the economy, as well as governmental involvement in education. Even so, many Americans have remained doubtful that government should play a very important role in shaping the future of the economy. Governments in other countries could and did get involved in economic planning or economic development initiatives (Makkolo, 1983; Marsh, 1999), but proposals to have similar programs in the United States traditionally received a barrage of withering criticism.

In recent years, however, many state and local governments have become actively involved in economic development programs. Strictly speaking, some of these programs have existed for a considerable number of years, but the activity has become more public and more accepted, although controversies regarding a number of programs have erupted from time to time. Not all of the economic development programs directly involve government budgeting, but all of them are relevant to budgeting in one or more ways (Iannone, 1994; Bartik, 1996; Saiz and Clarke, 1999).

Some of the oldest economic development programs focus on improving infrastructure, in hopes of attracting or retaining businesses. A better harbor, canal, railroad line, highway, or airport, might tip the balance in favor of one community rather than another. Some production processes require large amounts of water or electricity; many firms, especially in the service sector, are interested in the quality of the communications system. Preservation of existing infrastructure may spur public acquisition of a previously private facility; a number of state and local governments have become owners of railroads in precisely this way since the 1950s (Nice, 1997). A major problem for poorer jurisdictions is that major infrastructure improvements are often very costly; in addition, the cost of the improvements may outweigh the value of the business activity attracted or retained.

Another type of economic development program involves a relatively direct subsidy to a business in order to attract it to the state or locality, keep it from relocating or closing, or encourage expansion. The subsidy may take the form of a tax reduction or postponement, credit assistance, or an outright grant to a firm (the last option is not legal in some jurisdictions). Slightly less direct subsidies include public support for training employees and assistance in assembling and clearing parcels of land, especially in built-up areas. Some of these subsidies have provoked considerable controversy, including some high-profile battles over sports facilities, which critics contend, do not produce many benefits for the broader community (Saiz and Clarke, 1999: p. 485). Other critics worry that subsidy programs may degenerate into bidding wars among competing jurisdictions,

with large subsidies being granted to large, profitable firms based on their political and economic clout while smaller firms are overlooked.

Another approach to promoting economic development focuses on regulatory policies. A business may be offered more lenient environmental laws, looser business regulations, or policies that discourage the formation of labor unions. These economic development programs have the advantage of being relatively inexpensive, at least in the short run, but the longer-term consequences may include environmental damage or worker injuries that generate costs for the governments involved.

One of the less controversial approaches to economic development is the adoption of public relations initiatives in order to promote tourism, sales of important state or local products and services overseas, or to attract foreign investment. Many state and local officials have participated in overseas trade missions in recent years, and all of the states and many localities have tourism programs that range from television and magazine advertisements and brochures to Internet sites that list major attractions and provide links to accommodations, restaurants, and other businesses in the area. Many of these initiatives are comparatively inexpensive, and sometimes businesses that expect to benefit may be willing to pay for some of the costs.

Although, interest in state and local economic development programs has remained high, they have a rather mixed record of achievement. Several studies have found that economic development programs have relatively weak or inconsistent effects on economic performance (see Dye, 1990; Saiz and Clarke, 1999). Some of the inconsistency may reflect the fact that assistance programs are sometimes adopted to attract new businesses but may also be adopted to help existing firms that are in financial difficulty. In some cases, business leaders may select a particular location and then press the state and local governments in the area for assistance that does not actually affect their locational decision. Programs that appear to succeed are often copied, a tendency that will tend to dilute the effects of those programs. The inducements offered by an economic development program may be far outweighed by more fundamental economic considerations. Given that the condition of the economy is a powerful influence on budgeting at all levels of government, but especially at the local level (see Dye, 1966; Campbell and Sachs, 1967), economic development programs are highly likely to retain their appeal, and not just outside the United States.

## 19.4 Budgetary Instability, Rebudgeting, and Uncertainty

In his influential book on budgeting in a variety of countries, Aaron Wildavsky (1986, Chapter 5) observed that budgeting in poor countries often includes a high degree of instability. Revenue and spending projections are prone to errors from a host of sources, from deliberate misrepresentation and inadequate record keeping to volatile commodity markets, unanticipated shifts in currency exchange rates, weather changes that affect harvests, and fluctuating interest rates, which are particularly important for poor countries with heavy debt burdens. Poverty also makes those errors more difficult to manage; there is typically little or no economic cushion to soften the impact of errors, in contrast to more prosperous countries, where a modest revenue shortfall may be managed by postponing some expenditures (whether in the public sector or the private sector) that would be regarded as luxuries in poorer countries (though governments and wealthy individuals in poorer countries may expend funds for luxuries as well).

Adhering to a budget plan for any length of time will often be very difficult in that environment, and the difficulty may be compounded by political instability within the country or in neighboring countries. Budgets will be revised over and over again as revenues fall below

(or, more happily, rise above) projected levels, as the costs of some programs exceed expectations, or as groups unhappy with earlier decisions press for their revision. Administrators may try to spend or commit money as rapidly as possible because they fear that uncommitted funds may be taken away with little or no advance warning.

In a number of respects, budgeting in the United States displays a significant amount of instability. First, budgets are often revised after adoption. Unexpected needs may lead executives to reprogram funds or to transfer them from one appropriations account to another; the latter method of revision often requires some form of legislative approval. Presidents may impound funds that have been appropriated by Congress, a practice that provoked great controversy during the Nixon administration. Many of the nation's governors have the authority to impose spending reductions, often subject to some form of regulation, and a variety of administrative controls may be used to restrain spending. A hiring freeze may leave an agency unable to spend some of its salary funds; denial of approval for equipment purchases or a major agency project may also trim spending. Funding for a particular agency or program may be increased with a supplemental appropriation. People who are unhappy with features of the original budget may press for modifications in it, after it has been adopted. In most years, the combined effects of all of these changes will not be very large, relatively to the size of the overall budget, but the effects on individual agencies and programs may be considerable (Nice, 2002: Chapter 7).

Another important aspect of budgetary instability and unpredictability is the recurring tendency of Congress and the president to fail to complete action on budgetary legislation by the beginning of the new fiscal year. The extent of conflict and the complexity of the federal budget combine to make prompt action extremely difficult, and the national government often begins a new fiscal year with one or more spending bills still unfinished (Schick and LoStracco, 2000: pp. 195–201). Some agencies have gone for several years in a row without having a regular appropriations bill adopted for them. These delays provide additional uncertainty for state and local officials as well. The federal government provides more than \$200 billion per year as financial aid to state and local governments, and delays in completion of national budgetary legislation can leave state and local officials unsure regarding a significant share of their revenue. Even after the spending bills are adopted, later federal budgetary revisions can leave states and localities with lower revenues than they anticipated. Local reliance on state aid can mean similar difficulties if a state's budget is revised after adoption.

Yet another facet of budgetary instability is the frequent modification of budgetary rules and procedures. This phenomenon has been studied most at the national level; the federal government has adopted a host of budgetary reforms since the early 1970s. Some of these reforms have stemmed from a number of concerns; the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, grew out of congressional concerns about presidential impoundment, growing mistrust of the budgetary information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (itself reorganized only a few years earlier), complaints that Congress devoted too little attention to overall budget policy, and the recurring failure of the White House and Congress to finish the work on budgetary legislation by the beginning of the new fiscal year. Recurring federal budget deficits led to a series of reforms, from efforts to produce a balanced budget automatically to the short-lived experiment with giving the president enhanced rescission authority (sometimes called a *line item veto*). The Supreme Court put an end to the experiment, when it declared the enhanced rescission authority to be unconstitutional (Schick and LoStracco, 2000: Chapters 2, 6, and 7; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2001: Chapters 4 through 6; Nice, 2002: Chapters 6 and 11).

Changes in budgetary rules and procedures have also occurred in state and local governments. Some of the most dramatic of these changes have been adopted by the voters, who have sometimes

approved new tax policies (often trying to limit various types of taxes, especially property taxes) at the ballot box. State revenue systems have been drastically changed over the last century, with growing emphasis on sales taxes, income taxes, and fees of many kinds. Many states have also adopted lotteries and/or taxes on gambling, in hopes of raising revenues less painfully and, in some cases, raising revenues from nonresidents. Many states and localities, along with the national government, have experimented with different budgetary formats, with a long-term trend toward placing more emphasis on agency activities and the results of agency programs. These changes have, in turn, produced changes in governmental auditing and accounting, with greater attention being devoted to agency performance, rather than the more traditional focus on whether spending was in accordance with legislative guidelines (Lee, 1997).

Instability is not necessarily a bad thing. In a changing environment, governments may need to change in order to adapt to new conditions. Changing a poor decision may lead to improvement, and complex problems do not always yield to the first remedy applied to them. Large amounts of budgetary instability, however, can mean that agencies have a very difficult time assessing what they will be able to do and how soon they will be able to do it.

## 19.5 Political Difficulties in Taxation

Many recent discussions of the global economy emphasize the belief that capital is increasingly mobile, and that wealthy individuals and corporations may migrate from place to place in search of greater opportunities. State and especially local government officials in the United States have long been concerned about the possibility that wealthy people and businesses might leave if they do not believe that their interests are being adequately protected. These concerns are also being felt by national officials.

One development that appears consistent with this concern is the decline in personal income tax rates in a number of countries, with declines in the higher tax brackets being particularly noticeable. The declines have not been equally substantial in all countries, and the declines in the United States have been more dramatic than in some other countries, but the pattern is widely distributed (see Table 19.2).

**Table 19.2 Changes in Personal Income Tax Rates, 1975–1989**

Country	Maximum Rate (%)		Minimum Rate (%)	
	1975	1989	1975	1989
Australia	65	49	20	24
Canada	47	29	9	17
France	60	57	5	5
Germany	56	53	22	19
Italy	72	50	10	10
Japan	75	50	10	10
Sweden	56	42	7	5
The United Kingdom	83	40	35	25
The United States	70	33	14	15

Source: Kay, J.A., *Econ. J.*, 100, 18, 1990.

Note that the declines in the top bracket rates have been proportionally much larger than the drops, if any, in the bottom bracket rates. Three countries left the same tax rate in the lowest bracket, and three others, including the United States, increased the rate applied to people in the lowest bracket. Comparing rates across countries or over time is a perilous enterprise because definitions of taxable income may vary, but there appears to be a trend toward shifting tax burdens from the wealthy to the less affluent (Peters, 1991).

In the American case, that trend has been reinforced by the gradual shift away from taxing corporate income and a gradual increase in the proportion of revenues coming from social insurance taxes, which tend to be regressive. Bear in mind, however, that the federal revenue system in the United States remains distinctly different from what is found in many other industrial and postindustrial democracies. The United States has no broadly based, national consumption tax, although proposals to adopt one have been discussed on a number of occasions. One important group that opposes a national consumption tax is that of many state officials, who fear that their ability to generate revenue from sales taxes would be endangered by a federal consumption tax. Proposals for a national consumption tax also strike a sensitive nerve among businesses that sell merchandise to people in other states. Many of those transactions escape state sales taxation, even if the states where both the business and the customer are located have sales taxes in force.

## 19.6 Some Concluding Thoughts

In a number of significant respects, budgetary dynamics that have often been associated with budgeting in other countries are found in budgeting in the United States, in recent years. Partisan and ideological conflict have grown since the 1950s, and budgets are substantially affected by international forces, including economic fluctuations in other countries, changing prices of various commodities, international capital mobility, civil wars, wars between other countries, and global terrorism. Government budgeting has shown a considerable amount of instability and uncertainty in recent years, although spending levels for many programs show considerable continuity from one year to the next. Many states and localities are substantially involved in economic development programs, although questions regarding the effectiveness of those programs persist.

Globalization has not made American public budgeting identical to budgeting in other western democracies, however. Military spending in the United States remains proportionally high relative to what is found in a number of other countries, and the United States has yet to adopt a policy to assure that all people have reasonable access to health care. Spending on prisons in the United States is relatively high, a reflection of the large prison population in the United States. Globalization does not necessarily produce identical outcomes in all countries.

## References

- "Aftershocks to Local Budgets." 2001. *Governing* (November), p. 76.
- Bartik, T. 1996. Strategies for economic development, in J. R. Aronson and E. Schwartz, eds., *Management Policies in Local Government Finance*, 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: International City/County Managers Association, pp. 287–312.
- Broder, D. 2002. States in fiscal crisis. *Washington Post National Weekly Edition* (May 27–June 2), p. 4.
- Campbell, A. and S. Sachs. 1967. *Metropolitan Area: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems*. New York: Free Press.
- Crecine, J. 1969. *Governmental Problem Solving*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

- Dodd, L. and B. Oppenheimer, eds. 2001. *Congress Reconsidered*, 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
- Dye, T. 1966. *Politics, Economics, and the Public*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
- Dye, T. 1990. *American Federalism*. Lexington, MA: Lexington.
- Ellwood, J. 1984. Budget reforms and interchamber relations, in W. T. Wander, F. T. Herbert, and G. Copeland, eds., *Congressional Budgeting*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins.
- Fisher, P. 1999. The prominence of partisanship in the congressional budget process. *Party Politics* 5: 225–236.
- Fortanier, F. and M. Maher. 2001. Foreign direct investment and sustainable development. *Financial Market Trends* 79: 107–130.
- Gallup Exit Poll. November 7, 2000.
- Garlannone, D. 1994. Economic development, in J. Banovetz, D. Dolan, and J. Swain, eds., *Managing Small Cities and Counties: A Practical Guide*. Washington, D.C.: International City/County Managers Association, pp. 81–102.
- Gilpin, R. 2000. *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kay, J. A. 1990. Tax policy: A survey. *The Economic Journal* 100: 18–75.
- Kreinin, M. 1995. *International Economics*, 7th ed. Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press.
- Lee, R. 1997. A quarter century of state budgeting practices. *Public Administration Review* 57: 133–140.
- Lester, W. 2002. State income tax revenues dropped by 15 percent. *Moscow (ID)-Pullman Daily News* (June 4), p. 4A.
- Makkolo, P. 1983. National development through budgeting, in J. Rabin and T. Lynch, eds., *Handbook on Public Budgeting and Financial Management*. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 125–160.
- Maraniss, D. and M. Weisskopf. 1996. *Tell Newt to Shut Up!* New York: Touchstone.
- Marsh, I. 1999. The state and the economy: Opinion formation and collaboration as facets of economic management. *Political Studies* XLVII: 837–856.
- Moshier, F. and O. Poland. 1964. *The Costs of American Government*. New York: Dodd, Mead.
- Nice, D. 1997. Public ownership of railroads in the United States. *Transportation Quarterly* 51: 23–30.
- Nice, D. 2002. *Public Budgeting*. Stamford, CT: Wadsworth.
- Peters, B. G. 1991. *The Politics of Taxation*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Rosenthal, A. 1998. *The Decline of Representative Democracy*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
- Saiz, M. and S. Clarke. 1999. Economic development and infrastructure policy, in V. Gray, R. Hanson, and H. Jacob, eds., *Politics in the American States*, 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, pp. 474–505.
- Schick, A. and F. LoStracco. 2000. *The Federal Budget*, revised ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
- Sharkansky, I. 1968. *Spending in the American States*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Stein, H. 1994. *Presidential Economics*, 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
- Stoncash, J. 2000. *Class and Party in American Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Tarzi, S. 1999. Financial globalization and national macroeconomic policies: Managerial challenges to the nation-state. *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 24: 141–161.
- Thompson, G. 1999. Introduction: Situating globalization. *International Social Science Journal* 51: 139–152.
- Wildavsky, A. 1974. *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 2nd ed. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Wildavsky, A. 1986. *Budgeting*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Wildavsky, A. and N. Caiden. 2001. *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 4th ed. New York: Longman.

## *Chapter 20*

---

# **The Wright Brothers’ Contract: Lessons in Ambiguity and Bureaucracy**

---

Robert E. Lloyd\*

### **CONTENTS**

20.1 I ntroduction .....	338
20.2 O erview.....	338
20.3 Acquisition Planning and Contracting Lead-Times.....	339
20.4 Budgeting and Funding .....	339
20.5 Publicizing and Seeking Competition .....	340
20.6 Solicitation Preparation and Issuance .....	341
20.7 Bid Opening and Evaluation .....	343
20.8 C ontract Award.....	343
20.9 Monitoring Contractor Performance and Dealing with Delays .....	345
20.10 Contract Payment and Incentives .....	346
20.11 Termination and Bonds .....	347
20.12 C onclusion.....	347
References .....	348

---

\* The views are solely the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government.



## 20.1 Introduction

The history of aviation has inspired a wide range of reactions, from trepidation (Mosher, 2003) to poetry (Ferlinghetti, 2001). This history also provides insight into government contracting as it is practiced in public bureaucracies today. The U.S. Army's 1908 aircraft contract with the Wright brothers is widely regarded as a masterpiece of public procurement. It is touted as a successful example of efficient contracting (Nagle, 1999, p. 486; Anderson, 2003, p. 38) and the effective use of performance incentives (Edwards, 2002, p. 1). Analysts, with the exception of Edwards (2002), have generally failed to examine the document and the procedures leading to its formation with a critical eye.

Far from being a model of public procurement excellence, the Wright brothers' contract contains a familiar range of problems that plague modern contracting officials. In addition to the unusual process that led to its award, the contract features difficult wording, lack of funding availability, rigid inspection, restrictive clauses, delayed performance, and other complications. Borrowing from Howe's (1985) technique, this chapter identifies the Wright brothers' government contract as an object lesson in ambiguity and bureaucracy, as well as a harbinger of tensions to come in public procurement.

## 20.2 Overview

The buying process has been described in terms ranging from sacrifice theory (Miller, 1998) to post-modern deconstruction (Lloyd, 1996a; Miller and Simmons, 1998). The methods used to award government contracts have often been derided by commentators who specifically compare today's public procurement in an unfavorable light to that of the Wright brothers' era. For example, Anderson (2003, p. 38) refers to the earlier period wistfully as the "halcyon days" of public procurement. In contrast, the 1900 page Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2004) now governs the activities of Federal contracting professionals, including the Army. Some argue that this level of control is excessive and induces rule-bound behavior (Kelman, 1990), while others see virtue in these rules and regard them as ones necessary to protect the public interest (Schooner, 2001).

As chronicled by Edwards (2002) and Nagle (1999), and summarized below (quotations are from Edwards), the lengthy and extraordinary process leading to the Wright brothers' delivery of a working aircraft to the Army began years earlier with their first powered flight on December 17, 1903 at Kill Devil Hill in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. The following discussion traces this contract through the typical sequence of actions taken in most public procurements in a chronological fashion. The Federal government now has a series of competency-based blueprints documenting the skills used to publicize, solicit, award, and administer public contracts (U.S. Federal Acquisition Institute, 2003), that is, how contracting is supposed to be done. This basic process is paralleled in state and local governments, where the American Bar Association's (1979) promulgation of a model procurement code identified a standard set of procedures, and various jurisdictions have adopted them in whole or in part (see State of Arizona, 2004). Public procurement practices followed in the present day are also surprisingly similar to the 11-step process outlined in a state and local government procurement treatise from 1919 (Thomas, 1919, p. 69).

The existence of formal, detailed bureaucratic procedures should not be looked upon as a distinctly American phenomenon. The World Trade Organization's Agreement on Government Procurement has established an equivalent regime outside the United States that is now subscribed to by 29 nations (Arrowsmith, 2003, p. 439). Consequently, the lessons described here may have

resonance on a global scale. By using this overall framework against a backdrop of the current procedures followed by the modern counterparts of the Wright brothers and their government contracting partners, lessons can be learned by contemporary practitioners and scholars from this much-vaunted contract.

### **20.3 Acquisition Planning and Contracting Lead-Times**

As will be demonstrated below, the Wright brothers' contract was not the product of a careful, deliberate acquisition planning process by the government for acquiring new technology. In addition, the entire contract placement process can be viewed as having taken over three years since the initial letter sent by the Wrights proposing the contract (January 18, 1905) to the date of contract signature (February 10, 1908). It can also be viewed as having taken only 49 days from the date the solicitation was issued (December 23, 1907) to contract signature. Even today, there are those who consider contracting lead-times as beginning only upon approval of a valid, funded specification. Programmatically, however, the process arguably begins when the idea for the contract arises. The calculation of procurement lead-times for planning purposes can be as ambiguous today as it was a century ago.

Further, the second page of the contract indicates that an additional, higher level approval was required for the contract to be valid. This consumed an additional 18 days after award (nearly 50% of the time allowed for submission of bids), as the Chief Signal Officer of the Army signed as "approved" on February 28, 1908. It is not uncommon for higher level approvals to be mandatory for contracts of varying dollar amounts or programmatic importance. For example, in U.S. local government, the current rules for the city of Houston, Texas (2004) require that the city council approve all contracts over \$25,000, while approval by the board of supervisors or commissioners for procurements over \$100,000 is required in Maricopa County, Arizona (2004) and over \$200,000 in Broward County, Florida (2004).

The Wright brothers' contract did not set any speed records for processing time, by anyone's definition. It can even be regarded as somewhat slow in processing, especially since it has been demonstrated that a Federal contract can legally be awarded to day under the existing body of regulations in a matter of hours, if it is of genuine urgency (Lloyd, 1996b).

### **20.4 Budgeting and Funding**

Edwards (2002) describes how in 1906 the Wright brothers received a patent for their aircraft, in early 1907 they signed a contract for foreign distribution, and in March 1907 a congressman became interested and wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt about the matter. Despite a later President's now-famous admonition of only 20 years earlier regarding politics and administration (Wilson, 1887, 1997, p. 20), political influence indeed played a role in the contracting process for the Wright brothers. On May 11, 1907, the board wrote to the Wrights asking for more information, and on May 22 they offered the board an aircraft for \$100,000 that would fly at 50 km/h for 50 km.

An Army officer then noticed the Wright brothers' work and wrote to the board to encourage it to express interest in the airplane. Lacking sufficient funds, the board learned that the Wrights were willing to take less money, and the brothers met with the board on November 25 and December 5, 1907, offering a price of \$25,000. The board had only \$10,000 for buying an aircraft, but it

knew that additional funds were available “by drawing on an emergency fund left over from the Spanish-American War,” so a project that otherwise might have died still had life due, at least in part, to a bureaucratic procedure well known in public procurement: hunting for multiple funding streams.

Article XI of the eventual contract contains what has regrettably become a mainstay of U.S. government contracts: a nonavailability of funds clause. The current FAR 52.232-18 and -19 continue this tradition of awarding contracts with a disclaimer that the contract is not effective until Congress appropriates funding. The lack of funding and the need to find multiple sources of money should seem familiar to public administrators of the twenty-first century facing lean budgets, where the need for “revenue diversification” has spanned both Federal and local levels (McCue, 1993). Public procurement professionals who are asked in the twenty-first century to issue solicitations without a funding commitment and award contracts subject to availability of funds may perhaps take comfort in knowing that their troubles are not really new, and they are continuing a long bureaucratic tradition.

## 20.5 Publicizing and Seeking Competition

The Wright brothers’ contract was not the product of a carefully defined government need, articulated fairly by public announcement, free of political influence, and subject to full and open competition from the start. Instead, on January 18, 1905, the Wright brothers submitted an unsolicited proposal for a “flying machine of a type fitted for practical use” to the War Department through their congressman, who forwarded it to the Secretary of War, Taft, on January 21. The secretary sent the proposals to the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, which replied to the congressman on January 24. Although the speed with which correspondence moved in a bureaucracy that possessed no computers may be impressive, this unsolicited proposal met the same fate that most such proposals have since that time: it was rejected.

The Federal Government today has a procedure in place (FAR Subpart 15.6) to handle unsolicited proposals, but it specifically states that a “valid unsolicited proposal must...[b]e prepared without Government supervision, endorsement, direction, or direct Government involvement” (FAR 15.603(c)). Judged by today’s standards, the Wright brothers’ proposal was improperly submitted. The history of this contract also illustrates the way in which political influence can work, in this case from the standpoint of the private sector seeking public sector business by “going to the top.”

Undeterred, the brothers again wrote to the Secretary of War on October 9, 1905, referring to their earlier unsolicited proposal as “an informal offer” and requesting reconsideration. The letter hinted, not too subtly, that the brothers might sell their aircraft to a foreign nation, but they were “willing to take contracts” from the War Department for it. The public procurement professional working now will recognize this negotiation tactic and likely frown upon it.

Major General Bates of the board promptly replied one week later telling the Wrights that, before any contract could be considered, they would have to provide a cost estimate, delivery date, and drawings. On October 19, the brothers responded, saying that they would need to know the board’s specifications before a proposal could be submitted. The board met on October 24 and decided not to “formulate any requirements for the performance of a flying machine or take any further action on the subject until a machine is produced.” Thus ended the first of two attempts at obtaining a contract without competition via an unsolicited proposal.

The process until this point would seem improper to most public procurement practitioners in contemporary government. The entire process took place without public notice or written solicitation

of what was to be purchased. Today, the procedure would be prohibited by FAR Subpart 5.2, which requires a public notice of upcoming contracting opportunities in the interest of promoting competition in contracting. The Wrights' second attempt at using an unsolicited proposal process 2 years later also failed when the board determined that competition would have to be sought. Interestingly, the board sent the draft specifications to the Wrights for comment before the solicitation was issued in December 1907. Although today's public procurement at the Federal level encourages early contact with industry during the acquisition planning process (FAR 15.201), it is not envisioned that a single firm will be selected for this review process. Rather, the private sector as a whole is to be allowed to participate as the contracting agency determines its needs.

## 20.6 Solicitation Preparation and Issuance

On December 23, 1907, the Signal Corps issued Specification No. 486, "Advertisement and Specification for a Heavier-than-Air Flying Machine" requiring delivery of a machine capable of carrying two people flying at 40 miles/h with sufficient fuel to travel 125 miles. Proposals were due on February 1, 1908, thereby allowing over a month for preparation and submission of bids, although the Army may have been mindful of the impact of the traditional holiday season when calculating a reasonable response time. The time frame allowed in 1907–1908 is consistent with current Federal regulations mandating a 30-day period for sealed bid solicitations (FAR 14.202-1(a)). Although Federal law enacted during the procurement reform movement of the 1990s (such as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act; see Kelman, 2002) now allows agencies to provide a shorter response time when buying commercial items (FAR 5.203(a) and (c)), the standard for noncommercial items remains 30 days. Since the Army intended to buy an existing aircraft rather than to engage in a research and development effort, had the Wright brothers' contract been awarded in recent times, a shorter amount of time might have been allowed.

The solicitation document that the Wrights responded to followed more or less the standard procedure now known as sealed bidding (described in FAR Part 14). The "specification" issued by the Army for the aircraft itself is actually the public advertisement and solicitation document, not just the description of requirements that the machine would have to meet. Today, the "specification" would be called an invitation for bids, although the procurement process used has some features of both the sealed bid and negotiated methods of procurement. For example, paragraph 1f of the specification states: "Plans received will not be shown to other bidders." This approach resembles that found in public procurement now when the negotiated or competitive proposals method is chosen (see FAR 15.306(e)), so perhaps the ambiguities discussed below were intentional.

Use of the term "specification" (which ordinarily denotes the technical description of the work to be performed) to mean "solicitation" (including the terms and conditions for submitting bids, etc.) is still common in construction contracts due to the fact that the specification is usually the longest part of such solicitation documents. The combination of both advertisement and solicitation into one document is also a feature of contemporary public procurement at the Federal level. As a result of the streamlined regulations for buying commercial items enacted in the 1990s, it is now possible to issue a single document, a "combined synopsis/solicitation" on the FedBizOpps web site (<http://www.fedbizopps.gov>) rather than an initial advertisement followed later by a separate solicitation document (FAR 12.603).

Specification Number 486 is one page long, printed on legal size paper, and deals primarily with the description of the machine being sought, but it also includes various procurement provisions on familiar topics. It asked for "sealed proposals," yet these are actually bids, since the Army was following

what was essentially a sealed-bidding procedure. Still, the specification used the terms “bidders,” “quotations,” and “proposals” all in the same sentence in paragraph 4, so precision in terminology was not a feature of the Wright brothers’ contract. The specification requested bids in duplicate and stated that the Army reserved the right to reject any and all proposals, a provision that remains in effect even today (found at FAR 52.212-1(g), 52.214-10(b), and 52.215-1(f)). The Army eventually relied on this authority to complete this procurement because it had to reject 39 of the 41 proposals received.

The specification also asked dealers to identify the manufacturer, a feature of public contracts that remains in place today to a limited degree. For small business set-asides (where competition is reserved for small businesses only), the winning small business must now generally provide the product of itself or another small business (FAR 19.502-2(c)) in the interest of seeing that the set-aside process is not used as a cover for buying from large businesses. Also, paragraph 11 of the General Requirements of the specification addresses patent issues in this context, to ensure that any machine provided would be accompanied by evidence of a patent or license for the machine’s use. The specification then included a requirement for a trial flight at Fort Myer, Virginia and inspection by the government, as reviewed below.

The inspection clause in the first part of the “advertisement and specification” notably refers to the right to “inspect any and all processes of manufacture” and is supplemented by a paragraph (5) under General Requirements that states “This test subject [sic] to such additional details as the Chief Signal Officer of the Army may prescribe at the time.” In recent years, the Department of Defense has, in response to contractor complaints, sought to reduce the level of “in-process” inspection in an effort to reduce the administrative burden of defense contracts. Judged by today’s standards, the specification might raise some eyebrows, but the broad right of inspection remains in the standard FAR inspection clause (52.246-2(c)): “The Government has the right to inspect and test all supplies called for by the contract, to the extent practicable, at all places and times, including the period of manufacture....”

The specification includes 10 paragraphs describing the desired machine, including the requirement that it “be capable of being assembled and put in operating condition in about one hour.” The wording of the technical aspects of the specification is surprisingly flexible on more than just the assembly time, expressing the Army’s wishes in terms such as “quickly and easily assembled,” with a starter that is “simple and transportable” and navigation such that it can be “steered in all directions without difficulty.” The machine was required to “permit of a safe descent” and “be sufficiently simple in its construction and operation to permit an intelligent man to become proficient in its use within a reasonable amount of time” (General Requirements, paragraphs 8–10).

As will be discussed later, the pros and cons of strict wording in contracts have produced considerable debate over the years. Most recently, a new technique has been developed, the “Statement of Objectives” (SOO) concept, in which the government issues only a brief statement of its goals, and the private sector responds with a detailed description of how it will accomplish the objectives (U.S. Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 2004). The SOO approach can be viewed, to a certain degree, as a return to the Army’s early twentieth century procedure, in which the bidders were asked to provide the particulars and drawings of proposed flying machines. It may also be the case that, given the infant state of the aviation industry in 1907, the Army simply lacked the technical or bureaucratic expertise needed to create a lengthier specification.

Paragraph 11 of the General Requirements of the solicitation governed patents and established the policy that the Army was not interested in an aircraft development effort. Instead, the Signal Corps wanted a machine that had already been produced, or, as noted by Edwards (2002), was the so-called nondevelopmental item in today’s parlance. The Army stated that it did not intend to purchase the patent rights. The same technique is available today when buying items produced at private expense (in FAR 27.302(b)), to encourage private sector innovation.

The final paragraph of the solicitation states that it is up to the bidders to state how much time they will need to deliver the machine “after receipt of order” (paragraph 13). Even the delivery time was open to suggestion, perhaps because the Army was aware of the vagaries of the aircraft manufacturing business at the time. (FAR 52.211-8 and -9 today allow for flexibility in delivery dates somewhat like the Wright brothers’ contract, but to avoid the uncertainty as to when an order was received by the contractor, the FAR clauses refer to the contract award date rather than date of order receipt as the basis for determining delivery times.) The solicitation document was then issued, but not signed, by James Allen, Brigadier General, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, on December 23, 1907. Similarly, solicitations issued by the U.S. government to this day are not signed (see FAR Part 53, Standard Forms 33, 1442, and 1449); only the contract is signed.

## 20.7 Bid Opening and Evaluation

Edwards (2002) comments that the Army’s intent was to use the public solicitation as, in effect, a fig leaf for what was expected to be a noncompetitive acquisition producing only one response. Nevertheless, on February 1, 1908, no fewer than 41 bids were received and opened, and the Wright brothers’ price of \$25,000 was not the lowest. Most of the bids were rejected for failure to provide a bid bond or for other inadequacies, leaving three bidders, one of whom withdrew his admittedly unreasonably priced bid (\$1000). Augustus Herring was left as the low bidder at \$20,000 and offered to subcontract with the Wrights, but they refused. The Army then found enough money to fund two contracts, and so began the first military aircraft contract with the Wright brothers.

Nagle (1999, p. 257) cites the first aircraft procurement process as an example of the power of competitive contracting to produce lower prices, as the Wrights’ original price of \$100,000 was reduced to one-fourth of their previous proposal. Edwards (2002) argues to the contrary, complaining that “[t]he contract was competitively awarded in name only.” In addition, the contract can be cited as an example of the limitations of the sealed bidding method of public procurement. Instead of being compelled to award two contracts in order to get to the desired or “best” firm, if the contract were being handled today, it would most likely employ the negotiated method of acquisition that allows tradeoffs between price and technical features (FAR 15.101-1) and could have resulted in a single award to the Wrights. Despite the many flexibilities available to the Army in the early twentieth century, on this point, modern public procurement has a decided advantage.

## 20.8 Contract Award

On February 10, 1908, Captain Charles S. Wallace of the U.S. Army Signal Corps and Orville Wright signed a contract for “Wilbur and Orville Wright, trading as Wright Brothers” of Dayton, Ohio to manufacture and deliver “One (1) heavier-than-air flying machine, in accordance with Signal Corps Specification No. 486, dated December 23, 1907” for the sum of \$25,000. It was designated Order No. 3619.

In Nagle’s view (1999, p. 486), today’s government contracts suffer greatly in comparison to the document signed by Orville Wright: “The Wright brothers’ simple three-and-one-half page contract is today as much a museum piece as one of Whitney’s muskets. Contracts now incorporate, by reference, numerous specifications, clauses, and other requirements. One attorney took all the specifications included by reference in a government contract and had a stack six feet high.”

Excessive length of public contracts is not necessarily an irrational product of bureaucracy. Inclusion of burdensome terms and conditions is not new. Thomas (1919, p. 120) reported that

in the early twentieth century, it was common for American cities to require dealers providing supplies under city government contracts to submit with their invoices an affidavit stating that no city officials benefited from the transaction. A similar feature, prohibiting members of Congress from benefiting from contracts awarded by Federal agencies (the so-called Officials not to Benefit clause) has been part of the Federal contracting landscape since 1808 (41 U.S.C. 22, Revised Statutes Sec. 3741, 1877; derived from Act of April 21, 1808, 2 Stat. 484). This legal restriction is also included in the Wright brothers' contract at Article X, as analyzed below. In legal terms at least, politics is to be separate from administration, but the formal prohibition does not exclude the sort of informal influence that actually occurs. In this case, it would be hard to prove that any tangible or documented benefit accrued to any congressman. The benefit eventually accrued to the contractor, but not as a direct result of Congressional action.

McCue et al. (2003) regard the conundrum of controlling fraud while reducing red tape as a fundamental problem in public procurement. Lee (1990) notes that the size of a contract is more the product of trying to control unknowns that may occur in the future during contract performance than it is to generate red tape. Many of the clauses now found in public contracts are the result of legislation and regulatory attempts to prevent the mistakes and abuses of the past. Yet as long ago as 1919, there has been a debate about the advantages and disadvantages of definiteness in public contracts (Thomas, 1919, pp. 153–159). Advantages include avoiding unbalanced bidding occurring when firms take different views of what the government purchaser wants and benefits to private industry from knowing the certainty of terms and conditions of the work. Disadvantages may be excessive burdens placed on bidders/contractors, difficulties in ensuring compliance with contract terms, and the familiar charge of “red tape” abuses.

A tour through the actual text of the Wright brothers' contract itself can be illuminating for those who now practice public procurement. The first two “Articles” (now referred to in the FAR as clauses) list the required item and delivery terms in one sentence each, although even such brief statements do not appear without such bureaucratic or legalistic terms as “in conformity with,” “hereunto attached,” “do covenant and agree,” “herein contracted for,” and “specified therefor, as follows, viz.”

Article III of the contract invokes the longstanding right of the government to inspect each item delivered under the contract before accepting it, a clause first suggested by George Washington in 1781 (Nagle, 1999, p. 48) and now found in Part 52 of the FAR. The Wrights' contract states that nonconforming items may be rejected, and the Chief Signal Officer is listed as the ultimate decision-making authority, implying that appeals as to rejected items might be taken to that higher level. No formal right of appeal exists in today's standard inspection clause (see FAR 52.246-2, Inspection of Supplies—Fixed Price), which is to the government's advantage.

Article V of the contract is not completed, but if it had been, it would have provided alternate pricing for late deliveries. Such a technique might be useful in today's government contracts where it is desirable to fix in advance the price for delayed goods, as an alternative to liquidated damages (fixed amount per day of delay; see FAR 11.502). The latter are more difficult to calculate than simply including a line item in the contract stating the price for delivery of supplies at different times. In Article VI, the contract deals with failure by the contractor to perform by providing that the buyer may purchase from another source and charge the excess costs of reprocurement to the defaulting contractor. The right to charge these costs remains in effect today, enshrined in each FAR clause governing termination for default (see, e.g., FAR 52.249-8(b)), although the modern-day clauses are much longer than the single, albeit lengthy, sentence that appears in the Wright brothers' contract.

In Article VII, the contract states that until final acceptance occurs, no previous acceptance of work is valid for purposes of waiving defects found. This sort of inspection process is likewise

found in today's FAR in the standard inspection clauses (such as 52.246-2). Article VIII is a "hold harmless" clause regarding patents, also a single sentence that encapsulates the basic principles now found in the longer FAR clause (52.227-3, Patent Indemnity). Article IX prohibits the transfer of the contract by the contractor to another party, which is now found in the Prohibition on Assignment of Claims clause (FAR 52.232-24), although contemporary practitioners may include a different clause allowing assignment to another.

In Article X appears the curious feature known as the "Officials not to Benefit" clause mentioned earlier. In addition to prohibiting any member of Congress or the military from being "admitted to any share or part of this contract, or to any benefit which may arise therefrom," the clause has a footnote clarifying its application to this contract. The footnote states that if the contract is made with a corporation "for its general benefit," then the prohibition on Congressional benefit does not apply. The footnote then refers to "Section 3740, Revised Statutes" (dating from February 27, 1877), which provided this exception for "any incorporated entity" if the contract is awarded on its behalf. The rationale for the corporate exemption may have its origins in contracting activities that occurred during the Civil War. A contract for muskets was alleged to have involved improper dealing by a Senator, in which a prospective contractor offered the Senator a "commission" for working on the firm's behalf to promote its products. The investigatory panel that was later convened to examine the matter dismissed the charges because the contract was not in the Senator's name, but rather in the musket firm's name, and so the rationale was lost; it was executed solely for the firm's use and benefit. In this case, the Senator's fee was not tied to a specific contract, but was more of a general retainer to assist the contractor.

The Commission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores went on to chastise the Senator, however, with the following question: "If we understand the theory of our government aright, the influence which a member of Congress, as such, exercises over the administration of the departments is as much public property as is his vote in the Capitol. While the latter is so carefully protected from being brought into conflict with his personal interest, why is not the former entitled to the same guardianship?" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1862, p. 6). The commissioners easily saw through the artifice of saying that because a congressman's name is not on the contract, he or she had no benefit from it. As we see from the Wright brothers' contract through the present day, public administrators must contend with political influence in the contracting arena, and the Wright brothers' experience was hardly a pristine case of apolitical contracting.

Article XI concludes the Wrights' contract with a statement that the Chief Signal Officer must approve the award. As noted above, this approval occurred 18 days after the date of the contract, thereby begging the question as to the real effective date of the contract (February 10 or 28, 1908). The contract was then signed by a total of four witnesses, two each for the Army and the contractor. Fortunately, the rule requiring such witnesses has long since disappeared from U.S. Federal contracting as an unnecessary relic of our bureaucratic past.

## **20.9 Monitoring Contractor Performance and Dealing with Delays**

Normally, public contracts must be administered by the contracting agency to be effective in ensuring proper performance. Often, contracts require a considerable amount of post-award effort to bring a public project to fruition. This was especially true in the case of the Wright brothers. The basic contract allowed over six months' delivery time, as the airplane was to be delivered by August 28, 1908, according to the solicitation, although the cover page of the contract bearing



Order No. 3619, required delivery “within 200 days from receipt of order,” which was nearly the same. They delivered their product before the required delivery date, on August 20. The contract then required the completion of at least one trial (also referred to in the contract as a test) flight for speed and one for endurance (Specification No. 486, paragraphs 4 through 7).

Edwards (2002) has pointed out that the contract is ambiguous as to how much time was allowed for the flight trials. The contract specification states that the tests must be completed within 30 days “from the date of delivery.” In Article II, however, the contract states that “complete delivery shall be made on or before August 28, 1908.” The plane was delivered on August 20. The standard rule of government contract interpretation (the doctrine of “*contra proferentem*” noted by Keyes, 2000, pp. 497–507) goes against the drafter of the contract in the case of ambiguous terms. In this case, the issue was not resolved, in part because on September 17, 1908, the airplane was destroyed due to mechanical failure during a test that killed an Army passenger and injured Orville Wright. As a result, the contractor did not complete the required tests within 30 days from either August 20 or August 28. One suspects that, if push had come to shove, the Army would have allowed for the more lenient interpretation, especially in light of the amount of time that had already been consumed.

The Army then gave the contractor an extension until June 28, 1909, even though, as Edwards (2002) notes, the firm was in default and had no basis to argue for an excusable delay. An excusable delay presumably would have been allowed, and is still allowed to this day by the standard FAR clauses, but only “if the failure arises from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor” (FAR 52.249-14). Although a time extension of over nine months may seem excessive, there were no other working airplanes available, and Augustus Herring’s contract was likewise extended. This development illustrates a key defect in any public or private contracting system on the issue of contractor default. If a contractor fails to perform, but no other supplier is readily available as a replacement, any threat of default termination is likely to be unconvincing, and the government must simply endure further delay.

The brothers asked for and were granted an additional extension until July 28, 1909, and successfully passed the required endurance test on July 27. They were unable to pass the speed test in time, however, so they were given a further extension that enabled them to meet the contract’s speed requirements on July 30. The Army gave its formal acceptance on August 2. The contract thus produced a working airplane, but many months late.

## 20.10 Contract Payment and Incentives

The Wright brothers’ contract in Article IV lists the price to be paid as \$25,000. Those familiar with the various dollar thresholds now pervasive in Federal contracting may find this number to coincide with the rule in FAR 5.202 today requiring public notice of contracting opportunities, but this is purely a coincidence, as the dollar threshold around the time of the Wright brothers was \$500 (Procurement Associates, 1998, p. A-1-3). This Article then states that payment to the contractor for successful completion will be made “as soon as practicable after acceptance,” a much looser standard than the statutorily-required 30-day payment due date and penalty for late payment established by the Prompt Payment Act (see FAR clause 52.232-25). While the Army’s contract on this point was, in one sense, more flexible than current procedures, actual payment practices may not have been more effective than today’s if the Army was unable to pay within 30 days.

Because the contract provided for additional payments for speed attained greater than 40 miles/h, and the plane flew at over 42 miles/h, the Wrights received a \$5000 bonus provided for

in the contract. It is this sort of use of bonuses and penalties (paragraph 4 of the specification states that payment could have been as low as 60% of the contract price, if the plane had flown at only 36 miles/h) that has captured the attention of modern public procurement officials. Although, as Edwards notes (2002), this particular contract was not an example of a performance-based service contract (it was for a supply, not a service) and there is no evidence that the bonuses and penalties actually affected how the Wrights approached the job, current regulations authorize a similar sort of incentive structure in the hopes of promoting better performance in contracts for services (FAR 37.601, 37.602-4).

## 20.11 Termination and Bonds

The solicitation required a 10% bond in the form of a certified check from each bidder. The purpose of this bid guarantee is normally to ensure that the contractor will not try to withdraw its bid during the time period after the public bid opening (revealing the prices of the competitors) and before contract award. Paragraph 12 of the General Requirements section of the “specification” again mixes terms by asking “bidders” to furnish a bond (certified check) with their “proposal,” referring to “Army Regulations” on this subject without further specificity. This paragraph states that at time of contract award, the bid guarantees will be returned to the losing bidders, but the winning bidder will be required to furnish a bond equal to the price stated for the desired speed (40 miles/h). In other words, as is practiced today in sealed bidding, all bidders had to furnish a 10% bid bond, and after award the winner had to provide a 100% performance bond to ensure that the contract would be completed. Both bid guarantees and performance bonds (prescribed by FAR 28.101) remain common for Federal sealed bid solicitations, but primarily for construction rather than supplies.

In Edwards’ (2002) description of the eventual failure of Augustus Herring to perform, he cites another source for his statement that Herring forfeited his \$2,000 bond for failure to perform. In actuality, it was the \$20,000 performance bond that should have been at issue, not the \$2,000 bid bond. What happened to the check is unclear. Regrettably, the standard rule for Federal agencies is that checks may not simply be cashed and the funds consumed for other needs; checks must be deposited in the Treasury (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993; 31 U.S.C. 3302(b), dating back to Section 3617 of the Revised Statutes of 1878). As a result, it is unlikely that the Army would ever have been able to use the forfeited money.

## 20.12 Conclusion

A three or four-page government contract may seem a rarity in today’s public procurement. Nevertheless, recent trends toward streamlining the acquisition of commercial items and elimination of unnecessary contract clauses and procedures (described in Part 12 of the FAR) have sought to return public procurement to the sort of abbreviated contract form discussed in this chapter. Yet, the Wright brothers’ contract should not necessarily be held up as a model to be emulated, at least in terms of process. Defects in the source selection methodology applicable to Army procurement of the time forced the contracting agency to resort to multiple awards simply to avoid failure. Some of the contract’s features may be useful, such as the payment structure, but the procedure leading up to its award can hardly be cited as a stellar example of “how to do public procurement right.” In some ways, considering the modern flexibilities in the use of negotiated contracting

and price-technical tradeoffs, the system in place today is, ironically, superior to that practiced a century ago.

An alternative view of this episode in history is that, despite its faults, the contracting process did, in fact, produce its intended outcome: a working military aircraft. It may have been delivered inexcusably late, it may not have followed the most transparent process that others should emulate, and it even cost a life along the way, but the end result was clearly what was contracted for. Today's project managers who rely so much on contractor support to deliver needed Federal services will see parallels here that may resemble the dilemmas of contemporary bureaucracy in trying to complete projects on time.

Edwards (2002) sums up his analysis of the Wright brothers' contract in light of today's performance-based contracting initiative by saying that it "has no bearing on the challenges that agencies must confront today when trying to implement performance-based service contracting." Nonetheless, the story of this contract does have useful lessons for employees working in the field of public procurement at the present time. Perhaps the most important of these lessons is that history-making public procurement may be clouded by ambiguity that becomes apparent only from a careful reading of the contract and the events leading to its formation and administration.

## References

- American Bar Association (ABA). (1979). *Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments*. Chicago, IL: ABA.
- Anderson, W. (2003). Comparative analysis of intellectual property issues relating to the acquisition of commercial and noncommercial items by the federal government. *Public Contract Law Journal*, 33:1, 37–61.
- Arrowsmith, S. (2003). *Government Procurement in the WTO*. New York: Kluwer Law International.
- Broward County, Florida. (2004). *Administrative Code*, Chapter 21, Section 21.31, Award, <http://livepublish.municode.com/23/lpext.dll/Infobase24/1/16d0/180e/183a?f=templates&fn=document-frame.htm&q=procurement%20award%20approval%20board&x=Simple&2.0#LPHit1>
- City of Houston (2004). Solicitations. *Learn How to do Business with the City of Houston*. Houston, TX: Strategic Purchasing Division, <http://www.faspd.ci.houston.tx.us/solicitations.htm>
- Edwards, V. (2002). The true story of the Wright brothers' contract. *Where in Federal Contracting?* (Wifcon Internet web site), <http://www.wifcon.com/analwright.htm>
- Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). (2004). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, <http://www.acqnet.gov>
- Ferlinghetti, L. (2001). *History of the Airplane*. San Francisco, CA: City Lights (broadside), <http://www.citylights.com/beat/LF/CLLFhstair.htm>
- Howe, S. (1985). *My Emily Dickinson*. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books.
- Kelman, S. (2002). Remaking federal procurement. *Visions of Governance in the 21st Century Program*. Harvard, Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper No. 3, <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~skelman.academic.ksgh/pubs.htm>
- Kelman, S. (1990). *Procurement and Public Management: Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Keyes, W. (2000). *Government Contracts in a Nutshell*. St. Paul, MN: West Group.
- Lee, C. (1990). Consequences of constrained governance: A comparative analysis of DoD jet fuel contracting. PhD dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA.
- Lloyd, R. (1996a). Deconstructing government contracts. *National Contract Management Association World Congress Proceedings*. Arlington, TX: National Contract Management Association, pp. 927–945.
- Lloyd, R. (1996b). Urgent contracting: A roadmap for contracting officers. *Contract Management*, 21–25.

- Maricopa County, Arizona. (2004). *Procurement Questions and Answers*, <http://www.maricopa.gov/materials/help/procure-help.asp#awards>
- McCue, C. (1993). Local government revenue diversification: A portfolio analysis and evaluation, in T. Lynch and L. Martin, eds., *Handbook of Comparative Public Budgeting and Financial Management*. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 133–148.
- McCue, C., Buffington, K., and Howell, A. (2003). The Fraud/Red tape dilemma in public procurement: A study of U.S. State and local government. Draft: IPSESA Symposium: Author.
- Miller, D. (1998). *A Theory of Shopping*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Miller, H. and Simmons, J. (1998). The irony of privatization. *Administration & Society*, 30(5), 513–532.
- Mosher, A. (2003). He flew as a pioneer; I fly in a panic. *Washington Post*, B3.
- Nagle, J. (1999). *A History of Government Contracting*. Washington, D.C.: George Washington University Press.
- Procurement Associates, Inc. (1998). *Government Prime Contracts and Subcontracts Service*, Vol. I. Covina, CA: Procurement Associates.
- Schooner, S. (2001). Fear of oversight: The fundamental failure of businesslike government. *American University Law Review*, 50(3), 627–724, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=283369](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=283369)
- State of Arizona (2004). *Procurement Code*. Phoenix: Department of Administration, <http://sporas.ad.state.az.us/PoliciesDocuments/index.htm>
- Thomas, A. (1919). *Principles of Government Purchasing*. New York: D. Appleton.
- U.S. Army Signal Corps. (1908). Order Number 3619. Available in part on Internet web site [http://www.paperlessarchives.com/wright\\_brothers\\_papers.html](http://www.paperlessarchives.com/wright_brothers_papers.html), originally downloaded in full from <http://www.b-26marauderarchive.org/>
- U.S. Federal Acquisition Institute. (2003). *Contract Specialist Training Blueprints*. Washington, DC: General Services Administration, <http://www.fai.gov/contract.htm>
- U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). (1993). *Policy and Procedures Manual*, Title 7: Fiscal Guidance, Chapter 5: Collections, Section 5.3. Washington, D.C.: GAO.
- U.S. Office of Federal Procurement Policy. (2004). Seven steps to performance-based services acquisition. Washington, D.C.: Office of Management and Budget, <http://www.arnet.gov/Library/OFPP/BestPractices/pbsc/home.html>
- U.S. House of Representatives. (1862). *Interest of Members of Congress in Government Contracts*. 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Ex. Doc. No. 151.
- Wilson, W. (1887). The study of administration, in J. Shafritz and A. Hyde, eds., *Classics of Public Administration*, 4th ed. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1997.



## *Chapter 21*

---

# **At the Intersection of Bureaucracy, Democracy, and the Media: The Effective Agency Spokesperson**

---

Mordecai Lee

### **CONTENTS**

2	1.1	Context .....	351
2	1.2	Overview .....	352
21	.3	Effectiveness As a Performance Standard.....	353
21	.4	Effectiveness from the Media's Perspective.....	354
21	.5	Conflicting Constituency: The Agency.....	357
	21.6	Resolving Constituency Conflicts: PIO Professionalism .....	358
		References .....	359

### **21.1 Context**

At the close of the first decade of the twenty-first century, bureaucracy found itself in what could be called a geometrical dilemma. Bureaucracy is an inherently hierarchical and pyramidal entity that needs to adapt to what Friedman (2006) calls a flat world. This contemporary paradox can be seen as the modern manifestation of the traditional problem of democracy relying on an inherently nondemocratic bureaucracy to organize the delivery of public goods and services (Blau and Meyer, 1993).

Bureaucracy's placement in the public sector has always meant that it operates in a fishbowl. Yet, the twenty-first century has redesigned the fishbowl to put unprecedented pressures on public administration (Roberts, 2006). Demands by the news media, advocacy organizations, politicians, legislative auditors, and reformers constantly push the envelope for greater transparency, increased freedom of information, more openness in drafting of policies and regulations, enhanced whistleblower protections (and, subtly, encouragement of it), and expanded citizen involvement in agency decision-making. Simultaneously—if not hypocritically—those same social forces often push for greater privacy protections regarding agency data and personal information.

A bureaucracy has many different ways it can respond to these contemporary pressures for increased external communications, including specialized training for its staff, development of policies, pursuit of alternative channels to reach the public, use of e-government technology to interact with the citizenry directly, public reporting and specialized operations during crises and disasters (Lee, 2007, 2008a,b).

Still, the in-house professional who faces the greatest pressures to communicate on a daily basis is the agency's spokesperson. This person is the voice and face of the agency on a daily, even hourly, basis in dealing with the news media in all of its varied twenty-first century manifestations: daily newspapers, wire services, specialized publications and magazines, cable news channels, TV networks, and radio reporters, along with bloggers and Web sites. The agency spokesperson is at the crucial and important intersection of bureaucracy and democracy, trying to serve several clamoring and, sometimes, contradictory stakeholders. But, surprisingly, "Few positions in government are as misunderstood as the public information official" (Willis-Kistler, 2003, p. 15).

## 21.2 Overview

As presented in the first section of this book, bureaucracy's antecedents extend to the early Middle Eastern and Mediterranean societies. By Biblical times, bureaucracy was an essential component of advanced civilizations (Lee, 2002a). Yet, it was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the parallel emergence of mass democracy and the independent daily newspaper, that a new reality of public administration set in (Starr, 2004, pp. 395–402). Government agencies were expected to engage in symmetrical two-way communications with the citizenry-at-large (Grunig, 1997). Outward, they needed to be explaining, advertising, reporting, promoting, encouraging, and interpreting. Simultaneously, inward, they sought to be initiating, listening, responding, adjusting, changing, and terminating. This was public relations in the plainest and best meaning of the term, before the initials PR took on the manipulative, insincere, and superficial meaning of contemporary usage. Such public relations programs were sometimes conducted indirectly via the news media and sometimes through direct contact with the public-at-large. Either way, modern bureaucracy needed to learn how to engage in public relations. The nexus for bureaucratic PR is the agency spokesperson and his/her home base in the agency's public information office.

The subtlety and nuance involved in the practice of the public information profession is illustrated by a story told of Robert McCloskey, the near legendary spokesman for the U.S. State Department in the 1970s:

McCloskey has three distinct ways of saying, "I would not speculate": spoken without accent, it means the department doesn't know for sure; emphasis on the "I" means "I wouldn't but you may—and with some assurance"; accent on "speculate" indicates that the questioner's premise is probably wrong. (Crisis Spokesman, 1970)

McCloskey himself, after retirement, acknowledged one technique of his mastery of the profession: “After a while, an official’s *gesture* may be all that a reporter needs to confirm a lead” (1990, p. 117, emphasis added).

This chapter presents the role of, and best practices for, government public information officers (PIOs) as identified from research by academicians and practitioners. This has been a somewhat neglected subject in public administration, an odd omission given that the central tenet of the discipline is that management in the public sector is inherently different from the business sector. One key aspect of that difference is a news media that is a Constitutionally based instrument of democracy with government managers having an absolute obligation to cooperate with it. Virtually total transparency is the premise imposed on American public administration. This is a wholly different dynamic than that faced by executives in the corporate or nonprofit sectors (Lee, 2002b). Furthermore, using the prism of bureaucratic politics, the conduct of external communications is a vital aspect of any public agency’s struggle for survival, stability, and security.

(Note to the reader: If only for variety in the text, the terms spokesperson and PIO are used as synonyms in this chapter, even though they are slightly different.)

### 21.3 Effectiveness As a Performance Standard

As academic disciplines, public administration and public relations have paid attention to the role of government public relations (in contradistinction to media relations by elected officials) sporadically (Lee, 1998). Book-length and major contributions from academicians and independent researchers that focused in whole or in part on the broad subject of external communications in the public sector have included McCamy (1939), Mosher (1941), Pimlott (1972 [1951]), Lindsey (1956), Rubin (1958), Rourke (1961), Nimmo (1964), Hiebert and Spitzer (1968), Dunn (1969), Chittick (1970), Sigal (1973), Helm et al. (1981), Schachter (1983), Hess (1984), Morgan (1986), Garnett (1992), and Graber (2003). This broader literature naturally includes some attention to the work of PIOs.

Academic literature that focuses more directly on spokespersons in public administration is sparser, largely limited to articles in refereed journals. Some of it is quite dated. Major examples include Stephens (1981), Dunwoody and Ryan (1983), Fletcher and Soucy (1983), Swartz (1983), and Motschall and Cao (2002). This author has surveyed spokespersons for local governments to document their roles and work (Lee, 2001a), examined the film image of government PIOs (Lee, 2001b), identified strategies by government agencies for dealing with new trends in media coverage (Lee, 1999), and presented a comprehensive typology of the purposes of public relations in public administration (Lee, 2000).

Paralleling the academic literature, personal memoirs by PIOs working for administrative (rather than elected) officials constitute a significant, if anecdotal, ground-level view of the difficulties of speaking for a bureaucracy. While there is a relatively plentiful literature of spokespersons for elected officials, such from former White House press secretaries, that category of spokespersonship must necessarily be excluded from this inquiry. The extant literature of senior PIOs in public administration has included books by two former Assistant Secretaries of State for Public Affairs (Barrett, 1953; Berding, 1962), a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Goulding, 1970), the U.S. government spokesman in Saigon during the early years of the Vietnam war (Mecklin, 1965), an Army PIO (Oldfield, 1956), the Deputy Commissioner of Public Affairs of the New York City Police Department (Daley, 1978) and a guidebook from an association of PIOs (Krey, 2000). A non-U.S. source is the memoir of the Chief Information Officer of the British Ministry of Supply (Williams-Thompson, 1951). Some contemporary examples of articles by practitioners have been authored by the official State Department spokesman (a position



sometimes separated from the role of Assistant Secretary for public affairs) (McCloskey, 1990), a housing agency spokeswoman (Arnette, 1995), a health and human services PIO (Denning, 1997), the PIO for the Los Angeles Fire Department (Ruda, 1998), the spokesman for the Maryland Fire Marshall (Gosnell, 2000), an FBI communications trainer (Staszak, 2001), the PIO of a California city (Willis-Kistler, 2003) and a public affairs officer for the American reconstruction agency in Iraq (Krohn, 2004). A non-U.S. source was written by the PIO for an international organization in post-Communist Eastern Europe (Édes, 2000). Earlier articles and published lectures by practitioners, now mostly of historical value, include a Marine Corps publicity specialist (Proctor, 1920), two more Assistant Secretaries of State for Public Affairs (Manning, 1966; Carter, 1984), a Foreign Service Officer (Zorthian, 1971), PIOs of two state social service agencies (Courter, 1974; Goldstein, 1981) and the head of an association of federal PIOs (Brown, 1976).

What lessons can be learned from this relatively modest academic and practitioner literature? A consistent theme is the contemporary focus of public administration and public relations on organizational effectiveness (Wise, 2002–2003). The performance standard of effectiveness helps identify the Holy Grail of successfully connecting bureaucracy with democracy in general and to the news media in particular. The components of effectiveness are those that relate to the multiple—and usually conflicting—perspectives of the news media, the agency head, the agency’s staff and, finally, the profession’s own code of standards.

Defining the effectiveness the spokesperson for a bureaucracy, of course, is a reflection of who is making the observation. Certainly, where you stand depends on where you sit. Reporters are seeking a spokesperson who is well-informed, truthful, volunteers information, helpful, willing to act as a fact finder, and has unlimited access to the highest level of officials in the agency. On the other hand, the head of the agency may want the spokesperson to advance his/her short-term career interests such as providing positive publicity and suppressing negative coverage. Meanwhile, the careerists in the agency may want the PIO to emphasize or downgrade issues that will advance the long-term interests of the agency itself, which may or may not correlate with the short-term interests of the appointed head of the agency. Finally, the spokesperson has his/her own professional standards and ethics, derived from a conception of an accountable public administration that serves the citizenry, the public interest, and democracy. Yet, this professional code of conduct may at times conflict with the tugs and pulls of other constituencies.

These cross-cutting currents suggest that a PIO works in an unusually precarious environment in public administration. They also raise the question of what or where spokespersons consider themselves to be? Are they loyal members of a bureaucracy? Paid by a bureaucracy, but loyal to the professional standards of journalism? Or somewhere in-between?

## 21.4 Effectiveness from the Media’s Perspective

Reflecting on his two years as the State Department’s spokesman and acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Nicholas Burns identified three key factors that the media used to measure the effectiveness of a bureaucracy’s spokesman:

- Credibility: “he or she must speak, and be seen to speak, clearly and authoritatively” for the agency.
- Knowledge: “Always try to be better prepared than the press corps.”
- Responsiveness: “understand the often Byzantine nature of the modern press corps” (Burns, 1996, pp. 10–11).

When possessing this trifecta, a bureaucracy's PIO can be effective in the eyes of the news media. If Burns had lacked even one of the three it would have been fatal, because reporters would quickly turn against him. For example, if Burns had been credible and informed, but he did not cater to the technical needs of reporters (such as deadlines and connectivity) to do their jobs, then his effectiveness would have sharply dropped.

More crucially, in a different incomplete combination of the trifecta, Burns could have been well informed and responsive, but he would not have had the respect of journalists covering the agency if they perceived a lack of credibility when speaking on behalf of the department's senior leadership. In this kind of situation, it was not enough for reporters to know that Burns was fully informed of developments within the State Department. For them to trust him, they needed to have the confidence that the information he was dispensing was not only technically accurate, but credible. For example, if Burns had said, "The Secretary has no plans to meet today with the Governor of California," but then the two met the next day as perhaps had been previously arranged, then Burns would have lost his credibility. While he had been literally correct in what he said, he was misleading by parsing the meaning of his words to be misleading. If he claimed that he was providing all the information that had been given to him, then he would be implicitly confessing to not being truly in the know. The prompt response from reporters would be, "In that case, give us someone who is."

Even though the professional role the spokesperson is playing is, strictly speaking, only that of an amplifier and conveyer of information, but because it was coming from Burns the reporters gauged the credibility of the information on Burns' own authority and reputation. The press corps wants someone who is an objective conveyer of information and does not add spin; does not withhold information, lie, deceive, or mislead; withstands intra-agency pressures to withhold information; and, when needed, acts as a reporter and fact finder within the agency to be sure he/she knows what is really going on.

Credibility and knowledge are gained when the spokesperson has the confidence and trust of the senior leaders of the agency. When that happens, then the PIO knows what the agency head is thinking about or leaning toward, long before a matter is ready to become public. He/she is included in preliminary policy decisions and trusted to be discreet about such information. The spokesperson is well informed of the agency head's activities and preferences, even if that information cannot be released to the media. The PIO is always kept in the know, if only for background purposes, and is trusted to use his/her best judgment and skills not to share such information inadvertently with the press. There are several indicators of credibility and knowledgeable-ness, measures used by reporters and outside observers to identify how close the spokesperson actually is to the head of the agency, and in turn, how "in the know" the spokesperson is.

*Access:* How much personal and direct access does the spokesperson have to the boss? How frequently do they see each other? Can the PIO see the agency head on very short notice, leaving it up to the spokesperson to decide whether the topic is important enough to bring up, even interrupt a meeting?

*Physical proximity:* How close is the PIO's office to that of the agency head? Is it within earshot, at least on the same floor? Or, is it outside hailing distance, even on a different floor of the agency's headquarters building? For example, during the Nixon administration, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey had the title of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, clearly hierarchically a subordinate to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. However, McCloskey's office was on the seventh floor of Foggy Bottom (a nickname for the State Department's headquarters in Washington, District of Columbia, in a low-lying neighborhood near the Potomac River that

often was shrouded in fog), near the office of the Secretary, while McCloskey's bureaucratic superior, the Assistant Secretary, was one floor below with all the other assistant secretaries.

Invited to daily senior staff meetings: Is the spokesperson a regular attendee of the start-of-the-day senior staff meeting? While these sessions cover mostly routine business, they are vital for keeping the PIO aware of the diurnal agenda that all subunits of the agency are working on. For example, when Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense during the Reagan administration, the department's spokesperson was a regular participant in the secretary's 8:00 a.m. daily staff meeting (Weinberger, 2001, p. 290). Or, perhaps the spokesperson is only invited during media crises?

*Participates in policy discussions:* Besides the morning staff meeting, is the spokesperson routinely invited to major policy-making meetings? At a minimum, such participation should be as a non-observer, so that the PIO will be well informed about agency developments. Signals of stronger standing in the agency would be if at such meetings the spokesperson would be asked to evaluate the potential public relations and media relations aspects of the idea or invited to suggest revisions to the nascent policy to improve probable external reaction.

*Title:* In a bureaucracy, a person's power is not constant. Rather, it depends on exactly how much the superior wants the staffer to have. The successful spokesperson needs to have the full backing and support of the agency head, which can only emanate from a personal relationship of trust. No formal title can obscure or overcome the lack of this personal relationship. Formal titles cannot confer power in organizations the way a personal relationship can.

Certainly, a formal title has some importance in any bureaucracy, especially in hierarchy-sensitive organizations, such as the military. The title can confer some amount of bureaucratic clout to the spokesperson when he/she engages in in-house politics. For example, there have been proposals that all federal cabinet departments have an assistant secretary for public affairs, a position that at the time of writing (2009) about half the departments had. The argument is that the title strengthens the hand of the spokesperson in occasional battles with lower ranked program officials for releasing information. However, this emphasis on titles can be misguided. An assistant secretary is not automatically a powerful person, rather only as powerful as the secretary would want.

When a PIO has, and is also perceived to have, credibility and knowledge, then the journalists covering the agency can themselves develop a relationship of trust with the spokesperson. They would concede to themselves that even if they were to prowl the corridors of the agency headquarters building or pound the pavement for external sources they would not be likely to get any more key information than already provided by the spokesperson. When that perception is achieved, then the phrase used by all cautious PIOs, "to the best of my knowledge," becomes synonymous with "here's the maximum amount of information you'll be able to get one way or the other." (McCloskey used the phrase, "I am informed," to signal to the press the opposite meaning.)

The third factor that Burns listed for an effective PIO was responsiveness to the media. This means that the spokesperson can see the world through the eyes of the press corps and thereby know what reporters need to be able to do their job. Whether a former journalist or not, the PIO can identify enough with the journalistic profession to be understanding of the sine qua non of being a media correspondent. Some components of responsiveness overlap with the preceding discussion of credibility and knowledge, while others relate more to the technical, physical, and professional needs of the news media to be able to do its work. Regarding the latter category, from journalists' perspective, the ideal PIO demonstrates responsiveness by being helpful and of assistance to them; understanding and acting on their different needs, interests, deadlines, timing, technical infrastructure, and span of attention of the disparate press corps; and by not taking

personally the adversarial tone of reporters' inquiries, not becoming defensive or insulted, and not carrying a grudge.

As soon as the media senses that the spokesperson is no longer fulfilling Burns' three factors of credibility, knowledge, and responsiveness, they will then treat the PIO in an increasingly hostile manner and demand access to someone who is effective and has the power to fulfill Burns' typology. This usually means the head of the agency. Hence, the rational and pragmatic agency head does well to evaluate the consequences of keeping the agency's spokesperson uninformed and ineffective, for this inevitably leads to having to cope directly with the press which can be, among other things, an extremely time-consuming activity.

## 21.5 Conflicting Constituency: The Agency

Based on the preceding discussion, the PIO would simply need to have a self-identification with the press and work at accomplishing effectiveness from its perspective. Some press officers indeed have the philosophy that their role is exclusively to serve the press, even though they are on the organization's payroll.

However, the difficulties inherent in being an effective spokesperson immediately become clear when identifying the other constituencies that the PIO must work with. While reporters might be the most vocal publicly about what they want, the interests of internal stakeholders often conflict with, or are diametrically opposed to, those of the press corps. In-house constituencies include the agency head and the agency staff. They have their own conflicting interests that can lead them to wonder about the spokesperson, "Whose side are you on?" In this multiplayer game, all participants are trying to decide who is friend and who is foe—for today's policy issue.

What the media wants to know might be precisely what the agency does not want it to know. Conversely, a press release extolling the successes of the agency or activities of its CEO might prompt a ho-hum reaction from the media. Reporters want to focus on what is new, controversial, and unprecedented. They want to pry the secrets of the organization out of it. Simultaneously, public administrators often want to focus on such matters as the agency's performance, the continuity and expansion of its programs, indicators of accomplishment, and lowering expectations relating to modest experiments with alternate approaches. Journalists want to talk about people, whether victims or heroes, and who gets the credit or the blame. On the other hand, the agency wants to talk about the organization, its teamwork, and cooperation. Reporters and bureaucrats can be ships passing in the night.

In some circumstances, an agency official might leak some confidential information on a proposed policy as a trial balloon or as a way to generate opposition. Whatever the motive, the leaking official has interests at odds from the agency's PIO. State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey, in criticizing leaking, articulated the benefits of relying on the PIO to present policy developments. Official spokespersons, he wrote,

work hard to prevent leaks, partly out of self-interest (because they want to be the recognized authoritative voice) but, more important, also because they believe that the public interest is best served on-the-record, where policy can gain the respect that comes with clarity and consistency. (1990, p. 119)

The inherent conflict-filled environment of the PIO had been identified early by researchers. Beginning in the 1960s, the academic and practitioner literature has been consistent and replete with efforts to describe the conflicting constituencies of the spokesperson, including:

- An intermediary and go-between who tries to balance conflicting needs and requirements (Nimmo, 1964, pp. 24–25)
- “in an administrative no-man’s land ... not quite trusted by either the public or the agency” (Moss, 1968, p. 30)
- “a step-child of the bureaucracy” (Cutlip, 1976, p. 15)
- In a relationship with reporters as “allies and adversaries” simultaneously (Morgan, 1978, p. 34)
- A mediator between the media and the agency (Dunwoody and Ryan, 1983)
- on the margin, between journalist and agency (Swartz, 1983)
- A boundary spanner (Fletcher and Soucy, 1983)
- “in the bureaucracy but not truly of it” (Hess, 1984, p. 37)
- “are expected to be all things to all people” (Willis-Kistler, 2003, p. 15)

Therefore, hypothetically, an alternative scenario to the PIO who chooses to concentrate solely on being effective with the media could be to resolve the issue of trust by focusing exclusively on loyalty to the agency head or to the agency as an organization. After all, the citizenry pays his/her salary. If selecting this path, the PIO is a promoter, advocate, and publicist for the organization. But, a spokesperson cannot simply resolve any dilemmas regarding a proper role by asserting loyalty solely to the organization whose name appears on one’s pay check (let alone deal with the concomitant loss of effectiveness with reporters). Since the PIO deals constantly with the press, it is inevitable that people within the agency view him/her as being tainted by this. When trying to respond to a request for information held by an agency staffer, the reflexive answer might be, “You and *your* press corps can go to hell.”

These kinds of conflicts can arise in the daily work of a bureaucracy. The agency head, probably a political appointee, is there for only a few years and may have career ambitions that are different from the careerists in the agency (Peters, 1988, p. 147). Coverage that benefits the agency head may not be welcome by the civil servants. When the PIO successfully blunts the impact of negative coverage, the benefits might accrue only to the agency head and not to the careerists. The conflicting interests of the CEO and organizational staff can manifest themselves when the latter want to hold information closely and when asked by the PIO for information might respond, “*Why* do you want to know?” In those situations, information is, indeed, power. Yet, when the agency head has to intervene too often with staff to release information to the spokesperson, the CEO’s own political capital can become depleted, leading the agency head to wonder if the PIO is more trouble than is worth.

Hence, the spokesperson must accept the inevitable tugs and pulls of being a person with a foot in two (or three) different camps, each sometimes the adversary of the other(s). This adversarial relationship is often described in combat metaphors, such as entering a battle zone, being on the firing line, or “surviving” a media gaggle. These, of course, are extreme examples that occur only in some situations. They are useful because they help identify the important elements of the environment that a PIO works in, whether those factors are on the surface at any given moment or not. However, it is also important to emphasize that many of the daily contacts with the press on the outside and agency staff on the inside are routine and without conflicting pressures. Cooperation is more common in day-to-day interactions that the spokesperson has with the media, on one hand, and agency staff on the other.

## 21.6 Resolving Constituency Conflicts: PIO Professionalism

Given the built-in conflicts of public spokespersonship, the literature has identified some best practices for navigating the minefield located at the intersection of bureaucracy, democracy, and the

news media. Most important, one needs to transcend the parochial demands for loyalty, whether coming from the media, the agency head, or the agency staff. A spokesperson can define his/her loyalty to the public interest and democracy itself. Using this as a permanent professional North Star, the actions and decisions of the PIO might, in any particular instance, be viewed as pro-media and antiagency or the opposite.

How can a spokesperson's commitment to professional standards as the resolution to constituency conflicts be operationalized? Research has identified several practices that strengthen the professionalism of public agency spokespersons. The spokesperson:

- Has full responsibility and authority for all public communications of the agency
- Has budget control over all information activities
- Views self as an agent of the public
- Depending on circumstances, is a direct source of information to the media or the facilitator of information by connecting a reporter to the appropriate agency official
- Shows willingness to act as the conscience of the agency, an ever-present goad and reminder of the agency's public role and civic responsibilities
- Shows willingness to act as a gadfly, calling managerial attention to sources of actual and potential criticism affecting the agency
- Serves as a feedback loop from the public to the agency, making sure that important outside information is brought to the attention and consideration of the decision-maker

A great deal of empirical research still needs to be done regarding the work of PIOs. As is clear from this synthesis, the literature has too few contemporary contributions, whether from academic or practitioner authors. In the meantime, until additional theoretical and applied research is published, the last word appropriately belongs to a statement of professional values developed by six practitioners in the 1990s. They zeroed in on the conflicting constituencies and pressures that face the public spokesperson. In that context, they suggested a professional's orientation as a way out of the morass of contradictory loyalties that occurs at the intersection of bureaucracy, democracy, and the news media:

While they [PIOs] must satisfy their current masters, they also are duty bound to always keep the public interest, however defined, as their overriding obligation and concern. In the final analysis, allegiance to the national or public interest is the full measure of their performance and professionalism. (Avery et al., 1996, p. 175)

## References

- Arnette, S.U. (1995). Improving your agency's image. *Journal of Homosocial and Community Development*, 52(2), 38–41.
- Avery, G.D., Bedrosian, J.M., Brucchi, S.J., Dennis, L.B., Keane, J.F., and Koch, G. (1996). Public affairs in the public sector. In L.B. Dennis (ed.), *Practical Public Affairs in an Era of Change: A Communications Guide for Business, Government, and College*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America for Public Relations Society of America, pp. 169–185.
- Barrett, E.W. (1953). *Truth is Our Weapon*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.
- Berding, A. (1962). *Foreign Affairs and You! How American Foreign Policy is Made and What it Means to You*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Blau, P.M. and Meyer, M.W. (1993 [1987]). *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Brown, D.H. (1976). Information officers and reporters: Friends or foes? *Public Relations Review*, 2(2), 29–38.

- Burns, N. (1996). Talking to the world about American foreign policy. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 1(4), 10–14.
- Carter, H. III (1984). *Whose News is It?* Manhattan, KS: Kansas State University.
- Chittick, W.O. (1970). *State Department, Press, and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
- Courter, E.M. (1974). Putting the resident pollyanna to work. *Public Welfare*, 32, 53–56.
- Crisis Spokesman (1970, October 5). *Newsweek*, 76(14), 106.
- Cutlip, S.M. (1976). Public relations in the government. *Public Relations Review*, 2(2), 5–28.
- Daley, R. (1978 [1973]). *Target Blue: An Insider's View of the N.Y.P.D.* New York: Dell.
- Denning, S. (1997). Toward an end to fear and loathing of the news: Making the media work for you. *The Agenda* (newsletter of the Section on Health and Human Services Administration of the American Society for Public Administration), 4(2), 4.
- Dunn, D.D. (1969). *Public Officials and the Press*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Dunwoody, S. and Ryan, M. (1983). Public information persons as mediators between scientists and journalists. *Journalism Quarterly*, 60, 647–656.
- Édes, B.W. (2000). The role of government information officers. *Journal of Government Information*, 23, 455–469.
- Fletcher, J.E. and Soucy, P.E. (1983). Army public affairs officer as perceived by press and by military colleagues. *Journalism Quarterly*, 60, 93–97, 204.
- Friedman, T.L. (2006). *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (updated and expanded edition). New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
- Garnett, J.L. (1992). *Communicating for Results in Government: A Strategic Approach for Public Managers*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Goldstein, S. (1981). Hi, I'm from government and I want to help you. *Public Relations Journal*, 37(10), 22–24.
- Gosnell, A.R. (2000). Maximizing media coverage. *Fire Engineering*, 153(5), 93–94.
- Goulding, P.G. (1970). *Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Graber, D.A. (2003). *The Power of Communication: Managing Information in Public Organizations*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Grunig, J.E. (1997). Public relations management in government and business. In J.L. Garnett and A. Kouzmin (eds.), *Handbook of Administrative Communication*. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 241–283.
- Helm, L.M., Hiebert, R.E., Naver, M.R., and Rabin, K. (eds.) (1981). *Informing the Public: A Public Affairs Handbook*. New York: Longman.
- Hess, S. (1984). *The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Hiebert, R.E. and Spitzer, C.E. (eds.) (1968). *The Voice of Government*. New York: John Wiley.
- Krey, D. (ed.) (2000). *Delivering the Message: A Resource Guide for Public Information Officials*, 2nd ed. Sacramento, CA: California Association of Public Information Officials.
- Krohn, C.A. (2004). Confessions of a P.A.O. *Columbia Journalism Review*, 42(6), 35–39.
- Lee, M. (1998). Public relations in public administration: A disappearing act in public administration education. *Public Relations Review*, 24, 509–520.
- Lee, M. (1999). Reporters and bureaucrats: Public relations counter-strategies by public administrators in an era of media disinterest in government. *Public Relations Review*, 25, 451–463.
- Lee, M. (2000). Public information in government organizations: A review and curriculum outline of external relations in public administration. *Public Administration and Management*, 5, 183–214. Retrieved February 2009, from <http://www.spaef.com/file.php?id=314>
- Lee, M. (2001a). The agency spokesperson: Connecting public administration and the media. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 25, 101–130.
- Lee, M. (2001b). The image of the government flack: Movie depictions of public relations in public administration. *Public Relations Review*, 27, 297–315.

- Lee, M. (2002a). Bureaucracy in the Hebrew Bible: A neglected source of public administration history. *Public Voices*, 5, 79–88.
- Lee, M. (2002b). Intersectoral differences in public affairs: The duty of public reporting in public administration. *Journal of Public Affairs*, 2(2), 33–43.
- Lee, M. (2007). Globalization and media coverage of public administration. In A. Farazmand and J. Pinkowski (eds.), *Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis, pp. 153–164.
- Lee, M. (2008a). Media relations and external communications during a disaster. In J. Pinkowski (ed.), *Disaster Management Handbook*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis, pp. 387–399.
- Lee, M. (ed.) (2008b). *Government Public Relations: A Reader*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis.
- Lindsey, R. (1956). *This HIGH Name: Public Relations and the U.S. Marine Corps*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Manning, R.J. (1966). Journalism and foreign affairs. In G. Gross (ed.), *The Responsibility of the Press*. New York: Fleet Publishing, pp. 184–198.
- McCamy, J.L. (1939). *Government Publicity: Its Practice in Federal Administration*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCloskey, R.J. (1990). The care and handling of leaks. In S. Serfaty (ed.), *The Media and Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin's, pp. 109–120.
- Mecklin, J. (1965). *Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Morgan, D. (1978). *The Capitol Press Corps: Newsman and the Governing of New York State*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Morgan, D. (1986). *The Flacks of Washington: Government Information and the Public Agenda*. New York: Greenwood.
- Mosher, W.E. (chairman) (1941). *Public Relations of Public Personnel Agencies: A Report Submitted to the Civil Service Assembly by the Committee on Public Relations of Public Personnel Agencies*. Chicago: Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada.
- Moss, J.E. (1968). Future problems and prospects. In R.E. Hiebert and C.E. Spitzer (eds.), *The Voice of Government*. New York: John Wiley, pp. 27–36.
- Motschall, M. and Cao, L. (2002). An analysis of the public relations role of the police public information officer. *Police Quarterly*, 5, 152–180.
- Nimmo, D. D. (1964). *Newsgathering in Washington: A Study in Political Communication*. New York: Atherton.
- Oldfield, B. (1956). *Never a Shot in Anger*. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce.
- Peters, B.G. (1988). *Comparing Public Bureaucracies: Problems of Theory and Method*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Pimlott, J.A.R. (1972 [1951]). *Public Relations and American Democracy*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat.
- Proctor, C.B. (1920). First Marine Corps Publicity Bureau. *Recruiters' Bulletin*, 6(8), 5–6.
- Roberts, A. (2006). *Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rourke, F.E. (1961). *Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Rubin, B. (1958). *Public Relations and the Empire State: A Case Study of New York State Administration, 1943–1954*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Ruda, S.J. (1998). The PIO: A position with infinite boundaries. *Fire Engineering*, 151(12), 61–63.
- Schachter, H.L. (1983). *Public Agency Communication: Theory and Practice*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Sigal, L.V. (1973). *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
- Starr, P. (2004). *The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications*. New York: Basic Books.
- Staszak, D. (2001). Media trends and the public information officer. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 70(3), 10–13.



- Stephens, L.F. (1981). Professionalism of a army public affairs personnel. *Public Relations Review*, 7(2), 43–56.
- Swartz, J.E. (1983). On the margin: Between journalist and publicist. *Public Relations Review*, 9(3), 11–23.
- Weinberger, C.W. (2001). *In the Arena: A Memoir of the 20th Century*. Washington, DC: Regnery.
- Williams-Thompson, R. (1951). *Was I Really Necessary?* London: World's Press News.
- Willis-Kistler, P. (2003). The public information professional increases public awareness and understanding. *Western City*, 79(9), 15–18, 54.
- Wise, K. (2002–2003). Linking public relations processes and organizational effectiveness at a state health department. *Journal of Health and Human Services Administration*, 25, 497–525.
- Zorthian, B. (1971). A press relations doctrine for the Foreign Service. *Foreign Service Journal*, 48(2), 20–23, 55–56.

## *Chapter 22*

---

# **Evolution and Revolution: Enduring Patterns and the Transformation of Latin American Bureaucracy**

---

Jack W. Hopkins\*

### **CONTENTS**

2	2.1	Introduction .....	364
2	2.2	Colonial Legacy .....	364
2	2.3	Evolutionary Change .....	366
2	2.4	Revolutionary Change .....	368
2	2.4.1	Cuba .....	368
2	2.4.2	Chile .....	371
2	2.4.3	Nicaragua .....	372
2	2.5	Policy Implications .....	374
2	2.6	Conclusions .....	375
		References .....	376

---

\* The author is deceased; material revised and updated by the Editor.

## 22.1 Introduction

In longevity, Latin American bureaucracy has few peers in the Western world. The public administration systems of Latin America have endured, as the quincentennial celebration reminded us, for over half a millennium. In that 500-year history, Latin American bureaucracy coped with the exploration and conquest of the Americas, survived the sweeping revolutions and movements for independence, endured the struggles of nation building, provided the foundation for economic and social development, and adapted to or was radically transformed by modern revolutions in the twentieth century.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the long history of Latin American bureaucracy from its colonial origins to the recent revolutionary changes in Cuba and Nicaragua with the objective of identifying common elements and persistent characteristics. The relative permanence of public administration systems in Latin America since the early 1500s suggests that patterns of behavior set during the colonial era have been influential on later developments. Thus, it is important to trace the evolution of public administration and bureaucracy since its colonial origins.

## 22.2 Colonial Legacy

The great longevity of Spanish colonial administration in America—over 300 years—suggests that the patterns established then would leave a significant imprint on public administration and government in Latin America. A similar impact resulted from Portuguese colonial administration in Brazil, although several political events modified the effects in that case. In both situations, however, it is highly likely that the character and form of colonial administration was formative of later developments throughout the region.

Spanish colonial administration characteristically divided authority and responsibility; the system was predicated on a deep distrust of initiative by colonial officials in the Americas. Thus, the Crown prescribed a rigid administrative hierarchy and a variety of overlapping features were built in to control the system.

The legal framework of colonial administration in America derived from the Laws of the Indies which extended down to the minutest detail. Virtually no aspect of political, economic, or social life escaped the coverage of the Laws of the Indies. The sheer volume of proscriptions proved overwhelming to colonial officials and the Crown's subjects alike; overlapping laws and duplication resulted in considerable confusion about the application and pertinency of laws and regulations.

The situation was further complicated by the great distance between colonial administrators in the New World and the Crown and court in Spain and Portugal. That separation, along with the complexity of the laws themselves, fostered an attitude of noncompliance or, at best, minimal compliance on the part of colonial officials. Conscious evasion at times, but also the impossibility of complete compliance and fidelity, was the cause. Thus, the frequently used formula *Obedezco pero no cumplo* became a useful administrative device for pledging obedience while not complying with directives from the Crown and the Council of the Indies in Spain.

Fairly rapidly, in spite of the vast extension of the Spanish empire in America, the Crown developed complex and elaborate controls over its colonies in the New World. Very early in the sixteenth century, the *Casa de Contratación* was established to oversee commerce and trade, and in 1524, the *Consejo de Indias* was set up with administrative, legislative, and judicial authority over the colonies.

As these functions and organizations developed, they exercised a supreme oversight on behalf of the Crown, and in practice the administrative, legislative, and judicial functions were melded

without regard for separation. Similarly, although the Crown's personal representative, the viceroy, theoretically possessed all power in his domain, in practice he was undercut or bypassed on occasion by other institutions, notably the *audiencia*. This body functioned as a high judicial organ and a court of appeals and it could communicate independently with the Council of the Indies. In addition, the *audiencia* frequently took on administrative and military authority. In fact, the viceroys and the *audiencia* evolved so that they partially checked each other.

The territorial extent, distance, and complexity of the empire presented problems of control from the start. As the colonial system matured, administration became more institutionalized; the bureaucratic devices to control the empire became more cumbersome as checks and balances were sought by the Crown.

One of the most important control devices was the *residencia*, adopted from the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. The *residencia* consisted of a comprehensive audit of a colonial official after his term of office was completed. The official was required to remain at his post until the examination was concluded. A similar inspection was the *visita* or *visitación*, which could come at any time. These institutions were intended to maintain the Crown's control over the far-flung empire in America and to rein in the sometimes strong personalities of the viceroys and other colonial officials.

Because the Laws of the Indies were extraordinarily complex and detailed, and because of the centralized nature of the colonial system, administration became ponderous and tedious. The paternalistic system demanded frequent and extremely detailed reports from officials at all levels; these dealt with the minutest aspects of government. The cardinal virtues were order and orthodoxy, and eventually the incredible weight of law and regulation practically immobilized the colonial empire. Bureaucratic requirements smothered local initiative and the empire staggered under the burden.

Although the Crown attempted to reform and modernize the cumbersome structure, its efforts were too late to resuscitate it. The *intendente* system, applied first in the mid 1700s in Cuba, was a belated attempt to bring further control over revenues. The practical effect was to add greater centralization to an empire already choking on control.

Other factors exerted stronger influence toward the eventual disintegration of the system. The sale of public offices by the Crown only encouraged a cynical, materialistic attitude among officials. Sale of offices led to sale of the functions of government, including justice, so that graft, bribery, and wholesale corruption became endemic to the colonial system of administration. The absence of any form of representative or democratic government that might have served to introduce countervailing controls into the system allowed such practices and styles to continue to the end of the empire. The colonial system was a frail foundation for the development of visible public administration after independence.

The Portuguese colonial system in the New World was, in general, far less rigidly controlled than the Spanish. Portugal's colonial arrangements in Brazil were more haphazard and casual than Spain's elsewhere, and only after 1580 (when Philip II took over Portugal) did the Portuguese system take on characteristics from the Spanish empire. After Portugal threw off Spanish control in 1640, an attempt to organize administration in Brazil was developed. Its ultimate effect, however, was to encourage localism in Brazil as a result of the great land grants made to *donatarios* who exercised virtually feudalistic power over their domains.

As in the Spanish colonies, the Portuguese system left the way open for widespread corruption in colonial officials in spite of attempts at reform. The positive effect of the looser Portuguese system of administration, however, was to create a less rapid form of government with local foundations that could respond more effectively after independence.

## 22.3 Evolutionary Change

The disintegration of the Spanish empire in the Americas left a great political void; national organizations, public institutions, and local governing experience were lacking. There was no strong foundation for viable public administration anywhere in the region. Much the same situation existed in Brazil in spite of the role of the *donatarios* in providing the basis for at least the rudiments of local government. Further, the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, after Napoleon's invasion of Portugal, smoothed the way to independence. Upon King João's return to Portugal in 1820, his Pedro remained in Rio, and in 1822 declared Brazil's independence. The country's transition to self-rule was thus moderate and nonviolent and the development of a public administration system was spared the wrenching changes that affected the rest of Latin America.

For most of the newly independent states of Latin America, the transition to independence was characterized by intense competition among local elites in regard to the form of the new governments, in terms of both philosophy and structure. Much of the philosophical debate occurred between liberal and conservative groups over such questions as the role of the Church. But fundamental disagreements over the matter of hierarchy versus individual rights continued to occupy many of the new nations. Likewise, political structure proved difficult to resolve in several countries: the conflict over centralized versus federal government influenced the nature of public administration systems. As Graham (1987a:89) points out, in most of the new states, a conscious attempt was made to bring about a definitive break with Hispanic institutions. Except in Brazil, local elites searched for institutional models in other countries. Various political, structural, and administrative arrangements were borrowed as organizational concepts for the new states.

Generally, the unitary state form from French experience was the dominant form throughout most of Latin America; this was accompanied by a central administrative apparatus that steadily evolved to more complex, structurally differentiated systems as the societies developed (Wright, 1970). But in much of Latin America, a continuing discrepancy between forms and political realities plague governments as they attempt to implement public policies. As Graham (1987b:94) observes, "bureaucratic complexity at the center does not necessarily imply extensive and well-developed administration farther afield."

Neither do bureaucratic complexity, differentiation, or high levels of training assure effective implementation of public policy. On the contrary, these characteristics may lead to overbureaucratized organizations that suffer premature rigor mortis. In the two revolutionary societies examined below, Cuba and Nicaragua, truly monumental programs have been carried out effectively with the barest minimum of technically trained professionals. Although the Cuban state apparatus has committed several grievous errors in program planning and implementation, at the same time many of its achievements are extraordinary.

It is entirely possible that Guerreiro-Ramos (1970:24–25) may be correct in suggesting that "the intimate association of the bureaucracy with the values and cultures of middle classes is a drawback to the development process . . . . The poor, in advanced nations, the masses in the peripheral countries are unable to get their needs perceived and satisfied by the existing bureaucratic structures." As suggested in another article (Hopkins, 1971:357), the distinctive cultural traditions and social environment of the Latin American bureaucracy place far more serious barriers in the path of development toward more client orientation and toward broader participatory systems of administration. It is likely that the effectiveness of social intervention by the public bureaucracies under these conditions will vary accordingly.

Recruitment patterns in Latin American bureaucracies, especially in the more industrialized countries (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico particularly), also show greater

specialization. Increasing numbers of *técnicos* (technical specialists) were employed in government agencies and ministries as more specialized and technical functions were undertaken by the states. But, as in many less developed countries, problems of coordination and control arose in part because of the shortage of administrative specialists, and the shortage was not being filled by Latin American universities and institutes (Wright, 1970:6–7).

A related problem stems from the formalistic nature of civil service codes which, theoretically, emphasize merit as the principal criterion in personnel recruitment, selection, remuneration, and tenure decisions. But, as Wright (1970:9) observes, “Although achievement standards increasingly have been honored in the selection of bureaucratic personnel, they often coexist with criteria of nepotism, friendship, and, most commonly, political affiliation.” In Brazil, the *panelinha* serves as a mutual aid grouping of individual in a particular interest area and promotes group interests in the bureaucracy (Leeds, 1964; Daland, 1968).

However true this may be as a generalization, there is good reason to doubt the conventional wisdom about complete turnover of senior personnel whenever the presidency changes. Empirical studies in several countries, including Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru, indicate rather that the more common phenomenon is either brief interruption of service or transfer from one ministry to another. The evidence suggests that Latin American bureaucrats tend to be survivors and that their careers, if not completely orderly and stable, are at least long.

Cleaves (1974) notes that “Chilean presidents have had little difficulty gaining the bureaucracy’s allegiance. Almost all middle and upper administrative posts are spoils of the new government. Though protected from summary dismissal and salary cuts, the displaced administrators from the previous regime are delegated minor tasks in which they lose almost all influence.”

In Guatemala, during the regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951–1954), the intellectuals and liberals who held top administrative posts under Juan José Arévalo (1945–1951) were replaced by members of the Communist party and militant rural organizers. Organizations were staffed with “political reliable recruits.” Major changes in the allocation of public resources followed. The government of Carlos Castillo Armas (1954–1957) maintained most of the new social programs and retained most of the new groups in the bureaucracy, even though often at lower levels (Weaver, 1971).

Many studies of bureaucracy and public administration in Latin America conclude that certain characteristics appear to be persistent despite constant reform efforts. Among the frequently cited characteristics are excessive centralization of authority, supervisory instability, legalism, inadequate communication, and incomplete staff management. Weaver’s (1973:359) summary observation on the Guatemalan bureaucracy during a period of social change is typical: “Everything rises to the top; the top does not delegate and thus cannot fix responsibility: the operational level exercises effective control by refusing to take action; patrons protect; subordinates express deference and rectitude; compliance, and performance, is the standard for evaluation.”

Sloan (1984:248) describes the Latin American bureaucracies as characterized by “*personalismo*, nepotism, job insecurity, high turnover, lack of expertise, inadequate use of expertise when it exists, overcentralization of authority, formalism, stultifying legalism, lack of coordination, and corruption.”

In effect, what Weaver termed “premodern procedures” seem to be intransigent in much of Latin American bureaucracy. The constant search for a codified basis for administrative action serves mainly to trap the public administration system in inaction and delay. Tuohy (1973) found similar characteristics in Mexico. Even major reform efforts have, in general, affected the situation only moderately. In Peru, for example, the long-running reform program of the National Office for Public Administration Reform and Training (ONRAP) tended to provide services that

were “pedestrian, narrow-gauge, and specific, and because its recommendations were typically standardized remedies they were rejected frequently by the recipient” (Hopkins, 1973:129). At times, reform efforts foundered because they received weak or lukewarm political support, as in Venezuela (Groves, 1967). To avoid the problem of diffuse, systemwide reform efforts, Thurber (1966) saw the “islands of development” strategy as the most effective approach to development administration. That strategy focuses on the identification of elements of strength and potential in a society and then concentration in them of resources and efforts for planned change. The strategy appears to have yielded best results in situations where a more professional approach to problem solving already existed, as in ministries of public health.

Graham (1968) found in Brazil that a basic cause of the lack of success was the failure “to come to terms with the conflict emerging between individual values and the new norms which had been forcibly applied to the administrative systems” (Graham, 1968:191). Simple imposition of foreign norms, concepts, and techniques frequently was not sufficient to change administrative behavior.

Serious stresses on the public administration system in Latin America have resulted from what Graham (1987a:96–98) refers to as the “myth of state supremacy.” For much of the mid-1900s, promoters of economic development argued for stronger national governments which would have the technical and administrative capacity to plan and direct the development process. This included not only various centralized staff agencies for budgeting and planning but also a vast decentralized structure made up of a variety of government enterprises, corporations, institutes, credit and development banks, and other institutions in a loosely articulated “independent public subsector” (as it is termed in Peru). This sector was typically allocated a very large portion of the national budget, often without centralized budget control.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, a widespread reaction to the apparent inefficiencies of the public bureaucracy and the independent public subsector has led to efforts to reduce the dominant role of the state in economic planning, direction, and control. All over the region (even in Cuba), private initiative and market concepts are being employed more fully. A deliberate effort to reduce the size and scope of the public sector began in many countries (Hopkins, 1996).

## 22.4 Revolutionary Change

Several situations in widely separated countries allow us to assess the impact of revolutionary change on public administration systems of Latin America. The most prominent cases in point are Cuba after 1959, Chile during the government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973), and Nicaragua following the Sandinista revolution of 1979. In each of these three states, the established system underwent radical alterations that took different forms. It will be instructive to examine the three cases in order to evaluate the extent to which seemingly impervious systems were affected by these radical pressures.

### 22.4.1 Cuba

Typical of many revolutionary societies, Cuba struggled after the revolution of 1959 with the problems of constructing a reliable apparatus to manage the affairs of state. Many of the early postrevolution officials were poorly prepared for public administration careers; many came from socioeconomic groups with little or no management experience. To fill the void left when large numbers of the trained bureaucratic personnel fled Cuba after 1959, untrained people were thrust into responsible administrative position.

Not surprisingly, one of the most important criteria for selecting bureaucratic personnel was political reliability. Leaders of the revolutionary movement were forced to emphasize reliability when they faced (alleged) sabotage by hostile administrators during the early years of the revolutionary government (Petras, 1970). As in Maoist China, stronger emphasis was put on political purity than on technical competence; the Maoist alternative, “politics takes command,” had many analogies in early revolutionary Cuba (Whyte, 1973). Thus, some of the normal sources of bureaucratic efficiency were sacrificed for greater political reliability. Several years were to pass before sufficient administrators who were both technically trained and politically reliable began to come from Cuban universities and training institutes.

Partly because of the mass exodus of trained administrators, and partly because of rapid rotation of competent people from one position to another to meet critical needs, the majority of bureaucrats in the early years were generalists with limited specialized competence (Petras, 1970:17).

Petras (1970:17) describes the “ambulating bureaucrat” as the characteristic feature of the Cuban bureaucracy. Much of this resulted from the early overwhelming load of immediate problems and tasks that befell the revolutionary government. The ambulatory bureaucrat is “constantly on the move attempting to locate problems and to solve them on the spot...? Most bureaucratic activity focuses on specific problems encountered in specific areas.” This ad hoc approach to problem solving, however, contributed little to the building of institutional capability in the regular bureaucracy and, indeed, may have complicated institution building. The Cubans refer to this style as *por la libre*, typified by Fidel Castro’s own free-wheeling decision-making (Harris, 1992:78). By the early 1970s, a sort of “democratic centralism” had evolved as part of the gradual institutionalization, but there was always the tendency for this approach to become bureaucratic centralism, and exactly this often occurred. The economic crisis of the late 1960s and the “rectification process” led to the adoption of new organizational principles which were intended to promote democratic centralism and to strengthen the role of the new professionals in the bureaucracy (Fitzgerald, 1990:60–61).

Institution building, in many respects, poses one of the most perplexing problems of revolutionary societies. Transforming social and political revolutionaries into competent technicians and administrators who will serve the now-stable administration is extraordinarily difficult. Typically, many serious mistakes are committed before a new cadre of leaders becomes available. Even now, 40 years after the revolution, many problems of administration remain.

The inadequate cadre of trained administrators was only one of the problems. Complicating the task of building an effective state apparatus was the rapid collectivization of economic activities in Cuba after 1959. By 1968, virtually 100% of industry, construction, transportation, retail trade, wholesale and foreign trade, banking, and education was collectivized (Mesa-Lago, 1970:204). The administrative burden that faced the underdeveloped bureaucracy was enormous. Serious errors in state planning resulted as the inexperienced personnel attempted to cope with the new challenges. In another respect, the dominant power and personality cult that surrounded Fidel Castro was contrary to the whole process of institution building or institutionalization of the revolution. Orderly and consistent policy making by the bureaucracy was interrupted constantly by the ad hoc decisions of the “Maximum Leader” himself.

The revolution had established its credibility early with the popular sector by a series of steps and policies: agrarian reform, defiance of the United States (including defeat of the Bays of Pigs invasion), rent reductions, wage increases, and others. But undermining that credibility was increasing economic stringency, brought to a head by the eventual loss of Soviet support in the 1980s. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuban policy making was characterized by fits and starts that seriously complicated effective institution building. Battles among the



ruling elite, the struggle to define Cuba's international role, and disagreement over the appropriate economic model for Cuba made the task of institutionalizing the revolution difficult. A host of specialized agencies and organizations emerged, but often without rational connection with the formal bureaucracy. Juan del Aguila describes the result as a "veritable bureaucratic anarchy" (Aguila, p. 80). In the mid-1980s, Castro declared that the revolution had lost its way, and he attacked practices and institutions that undermined the revolution, including profiteering, *empleomania* (overstaffing), and the complaisant bureaucracy (Padula, 1993, pp. 30–31). Castro's attacks on "bureaucratism" and the privileged position of bureaucratic officials have been a constant in Cuban politics. Many of the problems, as Juan del Aguila observes, stemmed from the regime's "sacrificing economic rationality to political considerations and social mobilization" (Aguila, 1984:48). Power was concentrated in the revolutionary elite and the developmental model depended on appeals to sacrifice and obedience. As time passed, clearer lines of responsibility were gradually established among the various administrative and state organs. But the process of institutionalization has not reached the stage where a differentiated bureaucracy can exert substantial influence on major decisions.

Despite substantial opening of certain economic sectors, particularly tourism and mining, to foreign investment, the Cuban economy is still essentially a planned economy and state enterprises continue to dominate. Limited market reforms in the early 1990s, such as free farmers' markets and "dollarization," have not changed that reality. Virtually all final decisions are still made at the top level by party and central planning officials, despite the stated intention to decentralize management for more local, grassroots control. Habel (1991:74) observes that in several parts of the state apparatus, "it is the cadres' long training received in the Soviet Union that is dominant." Whether such training fits the current challenges confronting Cuba remains highly problematic. "The Cuban leadership is searching for a middle way to avoid the pitfalls of bureaucratic planning, on the one hand, and the damaging effects of market reforms, on the other" (Habel, 1991:167).

Harris (1992:85–86) sees the selection of cadres (the directive leadership of the bureaucracy) to be a critical and necessary element for the democratization of the basic organizational structures, and as yet, selection of directive cadres is under the control of the top leadership. Since 1970, however, the increasing output of training institutes and schools has produced large numbers of better-trained "new professionals" who are slowly replacing some of the old cadres in the bureaucracy, though not without resistance (Fitzgerald, 1990:Ch. 5).

Despite all the "rectification" efforts, the Cuban government continues to be plagued by various forms of bureaucratic centralism. This may take the form of undue interference or usurpation by high-level officials in the decisions that have been delegated to lower-level officials or by higher officials' bypassing worker participation in preparing and implementing plans (Fitzgerald, 1990: Ch. 6). The old habits stemming from the highly centralized decision-making that was characteristic of the earlier period have been hard to break, even with the intensified rectification efforts and reemphasis on moral incentives that began in 1986. Whether Cuba will be able to achieve a higher level of democratic centralism, given the enormous challenges facing the regime as the 40th anniversary of the revolution approached, remains very problematic.

Editor's update, 2008: Cuba has experienced a few changes since the first edition of this publication. Some degree of small privatization has taken place to allow small enterprises to grow within the state-controlled economic management system, and the bureaucracy has continued the leading role. In early 2008, the Revolution's leader, President Fidel Castro—after a long surgery recovery process—resigned from presidency and the National Assembly of Cuba elected his brother—the Revolution's coleader—Raul Castro as the new President of Cuba. Known for his broadening the participative role of citizens and expanding the coadministrative role of people in the economic

management of the country, it is expected that Raul Castro's government policies will provide continuity and changes to the system in Cuban governance and administrative systems.

### 22.4.2 *Chile*

The free election of Socialist candidate Salvador Allende to the presidency of Chile in 1970 may be classified as revolutionary because Allende was "firmly committed to fundamental transformation of his country's existing socioeconomic order" (Valenzuela, 1978:41). He rapidly moved to attempt to enact and implement his social and economic program which included income redistribution, expansion of government programs and services, state control of key industries, and extension of land reform.

Unfortunately, Allende's attempt to radically transform class and property relations in Chile was forced to contend with "a highly polarized society with strong centrifugal tendencies," and his initiatives "were blocked in the rambling bureaucracy and questioned by the courts, the Contraloria, and the Congress" (Valenzuela, 1978:59–60). By its very nature, the Chilean bureaucracy was difficult to control and direct into new paths of development. As Cleaves (1974:1) observes, Allende found it necessary to depend somewhat more on unions, political parties, and paramilitary groups to promote his political program. Although the national government was highly centralized geographically in Santiago, a large part of the bureaucracy was composed of "institutionally decentralized" agencies. Before 1970, some 35% of the budget of the national government went to the decentralized agencies which had responsibility for the regulation of vast areas of Chilean society. The directorates of these agencies were made up in large part of representatives of various interest groups in Chile. Recruitment for government agencies relied heavily on political patronage so that a very informal political system operated within and alongside an ostensibly formal civil service (Parrish, 1971). The difficulty of controlling the bureaucracy was aggravated by the policy of the Central Bank in bypassing normal budgetary procedures and lending large amounts of funds to nationalized industries as well as to other government agencies. As Valenzuela (1978:64) observes, "The already cumbersome and decentralized Chilean public sector became more and more unmanageable." The critical weakness of the Allende government was that it was a minority presidency (Allende received 36.2% of the vote in 1970) and the Congress was dominated by Christian Democrats and the Right. To control the coalition system, it was necessary to share government patronage with each party organization by means of a complex quota system. At all levels, from ministers down to the lowest officials, "elaborate schemes were instituted to divide up public employment and responsibility" (Valenzuela, 1978:65).

In the process, the Allende government suffered seriously in its effectiveness and its ability to assert control. Party cleavages at every level complicated the task of implementing change. Valenzuela (1978:56–66) points out how the fractionalization of parties and the politics of quotas and political appointments caused the loss of governmental authority. Orders from managers who belonged to other parties were simply ignored by workers and frequently party meetings were necessary to resolve the impasse.

These problems only reinforced the tendencies of the Chilean state bureaucracy toward decentralization and autonomy of sectors. The government increasingly lost a sense of clear direction, and Allende's control of many officials and programs was severely restricted. Traditional decision-making institutions lost much of their authority over policies and programs; the system faced collapse. "In time mobilization would get out of hand, but it was the countermobilization of those who felt threatened in a system which lost authority which finally contributed to the breakdown of Chilean democracy" (Valenzuela, 1978:107). "The surprise," Cleaves (1974:321) concludes, "was that Allende, the politician, did not reach a compromise with his opponents (as had his

predecessors with theirs) in time to avert a total rejection of his policy accomplishments and the reigning political system.”

Editor's update, 2008: Chile has since the publication of the first edition of this book returned to democracy by ending the long tenure of Pinochet infamous dictatorship and is now led by a democratically elected President Dr. Michelle Bachelet, a former prisoner under Pinochet dictatorship and daughter of the former General Bachelet under Allende, also killed by Pinochet. The new government of Chile has slowly and gently tried to restore the trust of people and engage them in governance process by promoting participation and grassroots organizations that share part of government administration by authority and responsibility, has continued the private sector role in the economy by embracing a globalized free market agreements with the United States and other nations, but has dramatically changed the social welfare functions of the state to promote social justice and income gap reduction. She, from the beginning, appointed 10 women as 50% of her cabinet members and ordered a hiring quota of 50% nationwide to promote public sector employment of women. Certainly, the state under Bachelet has been used instrumentally to promote gender and income inequalities. But, being highly committed to globalization of corporate capitalism, it is not clear how the Bachelet government is going to deal with the deep contradictions of corporate globalization and reduce the 20%–25% of the country's people living under absolute poverty line. This is a big challenge that can ultimately test her ambition of a populist president running on a socialist—sort of—policies while serving the interests of corporate globalization. Can she strike a lasting balance? Further studies are needed to document the new administration changes in Chile.

### 22.4.3 *Nicaragua*

Following the Sandinista victory in 1979, the new government acted with alacrity to quickly create or reorganize a different state apparatus. In some cases, where the overthrown Somoza regime had simply neglected certain social services, the challenge was to construct virtually from the ground up an apparatus for handling newly established state services. That was a daunting task, as Vanden and Prevost (1993:1) observe:

When it took power in July 1979, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua did not have any well-developed theory of Marxist democracy on which to draw. Nor did it have fully democratic models on which to base its praxis or on which it could rely for support, sustenance, and encouragement to develop its own democratic Marxism. There were few real-world examples and little support from actual nation states to develop a democratic form of socialism, and even fewer to do so within the specific historic conditions in Nicaragua.

In general, the Sandinista approach to system changes included three major elements: widespread consultation, mass participation, and decentralization. That the Sandinista revolution at base was a popular insurrection favored the development of the first two elements, particularly the participative approach. At the same time, the authoritarian traditions of Nicaragua and its long periods of dictatorial rule ill-equipped the country for rapid democratization. Much of the tension that followed the revolution stemmed from the inherent internal strains between the vanguard Sandinista party (the FSLN), the party that wished to lead the revolutionary transformation of Nicaragua, and its own ideals for democratizing the political system, that is, moving toward pluralism. Two of the fundamental principles of the FSLN, as presented to the people by Carlos Fonseca in the “Historic Principles” were, first, political pluralism and second, popular participation and mobilization (Wright, 1995:78–79). As Vanden and Prevost (1993:6) point out, “The Sandinistas

hoped to break with the old authoritarian [and bureaucratized] Marxism that had dominated the movement in and outside of Latin America.” The real problem in Nicaragua was how to construct a democratic system within socialism. The paradox was that the FSLN, fearful of possible reversion to the sham democracy of *somocista* Nicaragua, kept substantial power for itself.

Previous neglect of social services such as health, education, and welfare programs left a great void of qualified professionals as well as the requisite bureaucratic structure to administer such functions. Thus, the Sandinista government faced an enormous need for personnel committed to the revolution’s goals. This demanded massive mobilization and popular participation, much of which was promoted from below rather than being imposed from above. The result, as Graham (1987a:20) notes, was “the interjection of considerable pragmatism as people learned administration by doing and responded to the demands articulated from below.” “What was most distinctive about the Nicaraguan case,” Graham (1987a:18) observes, “was the extent to which the revolutionary government had been able to create a very different state apparatus in a relatively short period of time.” Indeed, one of the most fundamental characteristics of the new system was the real participation of common people at the local level. Accordingly, a network of neighborhood organizations developed throughout the country: the Sandinista Defense Committees; AMNLAE (the women’s organization); UNAG, the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers; new labor organizations; and the popular church was encouraged.

Extensive consultation with citizens was carried out in the *Consulta Nacional* with the objective of determining popular attitudes and appropriate structures for the public sector. Thus, an enormous number of people became involved in the process at the grassroots level; much of the initiative came from citizens taking upon themselves the burden of insuring that basic social services were available and accessible. In the process, the very nature of government was changed. However, when the state resumed jurisdiction, this informal citizen participation led to some conflicts with the formal procedures of government (Graham, 1987a:20).

The regionalization and decentralization of the Nicaraguan state apparatus were complicated by debates over the appropriate roles for state and party. In the final analysis, the Sandinista leadership rejected the model of parallel state and party organizations from Soviet and East European Experience. Instead, the choice was a fusion of state and party roles through dual responsibilities; in this way, the system provided for better articulation between party, state, and society (Graham, 1987a:28–29).

Regionalization in Nicaragua resulted principally from central government leadership; there was no strong regional pressure, except from the eastern region, for such changes. Regionalization was seen as a measure to make the newly expanded state apparatus more efficient and to strengthen the municipalities. The regional governments were seen as a means to provide decentralized support to the municipalities throughout the country. Wilson describes the Nicaraguan regionalization as an outstanding example of “participatory, bottom-up planning.” In the planning system in Nicaragua, grassroots participation was not nearly as evident as in the development of the social services functions or in the municipalities where resource allocation is “highly participatory.” Nevertheless, some ministries did encourage public meetings and workshops at the zonal level (Wilson, 1987:50–54).

In post-1979 Nicaragua, the distinguishing characteristic of public administration was the grassroots organization that developed outside the formal state apparatus. This factor provided the spark and the dynamism that made government work under difficult conditions. As Graham (1987a:31) observes, the mass mobilization created “a new, younger generation of self-taught, activist administrators who were learning to develop a pragmatic, flexible response to the groups closest at hand.”

The first free elections after the 1979 revolution were conducted in 1984 and the government was reorganized after the elections. Although its basic structure remained much the same, the president, because of the state of emergency stemming from the contra war, assumed greater power than normal. Because of the war, the system hardly had a good opportunity to prove itself before the next elections of 1990, which ended Sandinista rule.

As a general phenomenon, the Sandinista revolution and its subsequent impact on Nicaraguan public administration are highly significant. So much of Latin American administration and bureaucratic norms has been emulative of other systems. But in Nicaragua, indigenous solutions were sought and developed. What was in the making between 1979 and 1986 was a new state apparatus and, consequently, the initiation for the first time in Latin American experience of an administrative system that was drawing its strength from national experiments rather than from models taken from abroad, be they capitalist or socialist (Graham, 1987a:36).

The new government of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, committed to neoliberal economic reform and backed by the United States and other capitalist governments, faced both a fractious legislature and a rebellious popular sector. As a result, Chamorro increasingly turned to executive power as a means of bypassing the legislature and reorganizing the government. What residues of the revolutionary transformation will persist after the new administration, elected in 1996, remains to be seen.

Editor's update, 2008: Nicaragua has since 2007 changed with the new presidential election bringing the old Sandanista leader Daniel Ortega, who has brought major changes to governance through mass mobilization, public participation, and involvement of grassroots organizations in public management of the economy. Social organizations of grassroots people have sprung up again, just like the old Sandanista revolutionary time. However, Ortega has become more careful this time of not pursuing sweeping policies to keep a balance among various forces of change and continuity and to keep tensions at lower levels. His administration has succeeded in reversing many of the Chamorro government policies based on neoliberal strategies dictated from Washington DC and London; instead, his political and economic alliances have been with countries like Venezuela, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Iran, and other nonallied countries in hope of promoting self-confidence and self-assertive postures toward the dominating global powers such as the United States and Western Europe.

The bureaucracy and administrative system has become more diffused with decentralization and public participation in governance of the system that is committed to justice, self-determination, and struggle for independence from imperialism of the North. A week after assuming office, President Ortega while touring the shanty towns in Managua with the visiting Iranian president Ahmadinejad stated to the press that "...the revolutions of Iran and Nicaragua are almost twin revolutions...since both revolutions are about justice, liberty, self-determination, and the struggle against imperialism" (Hauser, 2007). Case study data are needed to document changes under the second Sandanista government in the new century.

## 22.5 Policy Implications

The crucial test of any public bureaucracy comes from its capacity to formulate and implement policies effectively. Faced with the myriad, pressing tasks of economic growth, distribution, and development, Latin American bureaucracies struggle under a nearly impossible burden. Cultural expectations that favor government intervention are well established in Latin America, and governments have long exerted a major role in deciding who gets what, when, and how. But the dynamics

of managing growth, increasing participation, and development have all but overwhelmed the public administration systems. Sloan (1984:247) observes:

The ability of the government to control this volatile situation is further reduced by the low degree of legitimacy commanded by so many Latin American political systems. Because of this lack of legitimacy, and the political instability that inevitably follows, each social sector demands special protection, special administrative representation, special funds, earmarked taxes, constitutional provisions, and so forth, to assure that, whatever happens politically or economically, their particular social sector will maintain its benefits and security. No group has faith in the honesty, impartiality, and efficiency of the government. These attitudes then contribute to the inability, of the state to rationalize distributive policies in some overall development plan.

The general experience thus far suggests that more indigenous solutions, perhaps deriving from relatively abrupt changes, are more likely to cope effectively with the urgent problems of development than are imported models. Yet, under even the best conditions, the weight of the past, economic imperatives, demands for broader participation, and pressures for more equitable distribution combine to confront governments of Latin America with enormously difficult policy choices. The public bureaucracies, in general, are ill-equipped to handle the task.

## 22.6 Conclusions

The infinite variety of bureaucratic types in Latin America complicates the difficulty of broad generalizations on the theme. The need for a “broadly integrative work to coherently and systematically relate and test an array of hypotheses” (Hopkins, 1973:134) remains unfulfilled. Although an increasing number of discrete, idiographic studies are available on individual countries, public administration systems, and specific bureaucratic organizations, comprehensive integration of such studies has not been attempted. Perhaps that is an unrealistic goal for the social sciences.

The title of this chapter suggests the concluding generalization. After over 300 years of colonial rule and some 175 years of independent government, the enduring patterns of bureaucracy in Latin America persist except for the few cases where thoroughgoing political and social revolution have occurred. Even in those instances, much of the characteristic core, in terms of bureaucratic style, remains. The tenacity of those features, given the long history of attempted reform, governmental turnovers, foreign influences, and directed attempts at exogenous change, is truly remarkable. The bureaucracies appear to have deeply absorbed and internalized certain characteristics of colonial administration as well as cardinal features of the culture, and these have, in effect, served to transmute attempts at change in a peculiar Latin American mold.

Editor’s Note: Yet, one must be careful of looking at changes in revolutionary societies like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Chile as our looking “lenses” are tinted by preferences and biases of capitalism organized and controlled by corporate power structures as well as governments that claim pluralist democracy but are run by elitist plutocracy and tolerates—in fact promotes—tyranny and dictatorship in developing and less developed countries for strategic economic and political-military reasons to serve their own national corporate interests.

## References

- del Aguila, J.M. *Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution*. Westview, Boulder, CO, 1984.
- Booth, J.A. *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution*. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1985.
- Cleaves, P.S. *Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974.
- Daland, R.T. Development administration and the Brazilian political system. *Western Political Quarterly*, 21(June): 331 (1968).
- Fitzgerald, F.T. *Managing Socialism: From Old Cadres to New Professionals in Revolutionary Cuba*. Praeger, Westport, CT, 1990.
- Graham, L.S. *Civil Service Reform in Brazil: Principles Versus Practice*. University of Texas Press, Austin, 1968.
- Graham, L.S. The impact of the revolution on the state apparatus. In *Nicaragua: Profiles of the Revolutionary Public Sector* (M. Conroy, ed.). Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1987a.
- Graham, L.S. Independence and nation building in Latin America. In *Latin America: Perspectives on a Region* (J.W. Hopkins, ed.). Holmes & Meier, New York, 1987b.
- Groves, R.T. Administrative reform and the politics of reform: the case of Venezuela. *Public Administration Review*, 27: 436–445 (1967).
- Guerreiro-Ramos, A. The new ignorance and the future of public administration in Latin America. LADAC paper, April 1970.
- Habel, J. *Cuba: The Revolution in Peril*. Verso, London 1991.
- Harris, R.L. Bureaucracy versus democracy in contemporary Cuba: An assessment of thirty years of organizational development. In *Cuba in Transition: Crisis and Transformation*. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1992.
- Hauser, K., Nicaragua Iran, Union Invencible, *BBC Mundo*, June 2007.
- Hopkins, J.W. Dialectical organizations in developing systems: Barriers in the Latin American case. *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 3: 357 (1971).
- Hopkins, J.W. Contemporary research on public administration and bureaucracies in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 9(Spring): 134 (1973).
- Hopkins, J.W. Public enterprise management in Latin America. In *Public Enterprise Management: International Case Studies* (A. Farazmand, ed.). Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1996.
- Leeds, A. Brazilian careers and social structure: an evolutionary model and case history. *American Anthropologist*, 66(December): 1337 (1964).
- Mesa-Lago, C. Ideological radicalization and economic policy in Cuba. *Studies in Comparative Economic Development*, 5(10): 204 (1970).
- Padula, A. Cuban socialism: thirty years of controversy. In *Conflict and Change in Cuba* (E.A. Baloyra and J.A. Morris, eds.). University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1993.
- Parrish, C.J. Bureaucracy, democracy, and development: some considerations based on the Chilean case. LADAC Occasional Papers, Series 2, No. 1. University of Texas, Institute of Latin American Studies, Austin, 1971.
- Petras, J.F. Formulating and implementing public policy in a revolutionary setting: The case of Cuba. LADAC paper, April 1970.
- Sloan, J.W. *Public Policy in Latin America: A Comparative Survey*. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 1984.
- Thurber, C.E. Islands of development: a political and social approach to administration in Latin America. LADAC paper, 1966.
- Tuohy, W.S. Centralism and political elite behavior in Mexico. In *Development Administration in Latin America* (C.E. Thurber and L.S. Graham, eds.). Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1973.
- Valenzuela, A. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978.

- Vanden, H.E. and Prevost, G. *Democracy and Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1993.
- Weaver, J.L. Bureaucracy during a period of social change: The Guatemalan case. LADAC Occasional Papers, Series 2, No. 2, 1971.
- Weaver, J.L. Bureaucracy during a period of social change: the case of Guatemala. In *Development Administration in Latin America* (C.E. Thurber and L.S. Graham, eds.). Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1973.
- Whyte, M.K. Bureaucracy and modernization in China: the Maoist critique. *American Sociological Review*, 38(April): 149–163 (1973).
- Wilson, P.A. A comparative evaluation of regionalization and decentralization. In *Nicaragua: Profiles of the Revolutionary Public Sector* (M. Conroy, ed.). Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1987.
- Wright, B.E. *Theory in the Practice of the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Ohio University Center for International Studies, Latin American Studies No. 24, Athens, 1995.
- Wright, F.J. Bureaucracy and political development: an application of Almond and Powell to Latin America. University of Arizona, Institute of Government Research, Research Series No. 3, Tucson, 1970.





---

**BUREAUCRATIC  
POLITICS IN EUROPE**

---



**V**



## Chapter 23

---

# Running the Bureaucratic State: Administration in France

---

David Wilsford

### CONTENTS

23.1 Introduction.....	381
23.2 Sources of the French Administration.....	382
23.3 Revisionist Views of the French Administration .....	383
23.4 Overarching Unity of the French Administration .....	384
23.5 Patterns of Policy Making in the French Administrative State .....	387
23.6 Conclusion: The French Administration is Strong but also Vulnerable .....	390
Notes .....	392
References .....	393

### 23.1 Introduction

In all advanced Western democracies, bureaucratic expertise influences policy making in several important ways. First, because of the specialized skills that they bring to the job through their training or their long tenure in office, bureaucrats are able to give advice that channels the thinking of political officials about the viability of options and alternatives and about what constitutes a problem in the first place. Important political decisions about problems, options, and alternatives are thereby shaped. Second, carrying out the specific tasks that serve to implement policy depends upon the capacities of bureaucratic organizations. Third, more than ever, in a complex and technical world, political decisions about policy—decisions that depend on the building of at least temporary coalitions of widely diverse politicians and other policy actors—are characterized by vagueness and generality. The open space of politically approved policies must then be filled in by

specific details that are the bureaucracy's responsibility to generate. Bureaucratic discretion in the implementation of public policy is consequently often very great (see Nadel and Rourke, 1975).

In France, I will argue in this chapter, these characteristics assume their fullest forms. First, the advice that French high functionaries give to political officials tends to carry more weight due to the more specialized and homogeneous training that they receive in the *grandes écoles* and the legitimacy afforded this specialized training process by French society. Political officials in France who are recipients of expert bureaucratic advice are also more likely to be receptive to it, in the sense that many of these political officials are themselves issued from the same *grandes écoles* and have been members of the same *grands corps*. Of course, ideological and other political differences in France are extremely important. But in certain crucial areas, such as the legitimacy and extent of state intervention in the economy and the society, important consensus characterizes the thinking of high civil servants and politicians from all sides. Finally, vast domains of public policy in France are autonomously regulated by bureaucratic decree. Curiously, however, this powerful administration also exhibits an important weakness; it is particularly vulnerable to direct action or forms of extreme protest that occur outside of normal politics.<sup>1</sup>

## 23.2 Sources of the French Administration

The rise of modern French administration begins in the Middle Ages and continues through the Renaissance with the Crown's struggles to subdue and control from the core a periphery that was often rebellious and always remote. The "intendants" were early agents of this administration. They were sent out from the center to the periphery to rule in the name of the Crown. These intendants were early precursors to today's prefects.

The Crown's activities also gave rise to the growth of early bureaucracy and centralization—in the armies, in finance, and in an array of interventionist techniques such as grants of monopoly, credits, and subsidies that were used to push nascent industries in the directions the Crown saw fit. As Tocqueville argued, the Revolution and Napoleon's subsequent rule by no means razed the administrative edifice. Rather, the centralization of the administration was furthered. Napoleon, moreover, established the first *grande école*—Polytechnique—to provide him with the technical corps necessary to his vast projects. Napoleon also took the rationality of the Enlightenment, which has always informed the outlook of French administration, to new heights through the Code Napoléon, the metric system, and numerous administrative innovations (Vedel, 1966).

The cadre of *hauts fonctionnaires*, or high civil servants, serves as the focal point of the French administrative system. They are the several hundred or so highly trained experts in engineering, law, and administrative science who work in constant association with the top politicians who head the ministries and compose the government (sometimes through their service in ministerial *cabinets*, the top personal staffs of the ministers). These *hauts fonctionnaires* also head the ministerial line agencies (called *directions*). They often come from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, and we will see subsequently that they have been trained in highly specialized fields in a small number of elite state graduate schools (called *grandes écoles*). Common background and common training give the *hauts fonctionnaires* a common vision of the role of the state, the capacities of its administration, and the problems and options that they face. It informs their view of what constitutes legitimate demands on the state and of what constitutes legitimate action for the state.

At the system level, crucial features distinguish the French administration from its American counterpart. The first difference is in the conception of public interest that drives high civil servants. The French are idealist whereas the Americans are realists. Of course, in France there is much bureaucratic play that clearly seeks the self-interested, sometimes highly politicized goals of the

actors involved. The politicization of the bureaucracy is another common theme. But much more than its American counterpart, the French bureaucratic corps see itself as—and society sees it as—the enlightened interpreter of the *volonté générale*.

This bureaucratic mission means that French high functionaries feel that they act with the authority to perform a special duty. This duty involves the constant definition and defense of the general interest in the face of all those who would assert particular or partisan interests contrary to the interests of the whole, or of France. This sense of mission is not unlike the preaching, teaching, and proselytizing of a religious order. The order in French bureaucratic politics is the *grand corps*. Its training grounds are the *grandes écoles*. The mission gives high functionaries in France the perception that the state has an interest that is both definable and defensible. It also shapes their understanding of where interests lie, which of these are compatible with the state's interest, and what types of conduct by decision makers and outside groups are appropriate to this administrative–political universe:

The ideology which justifies (the monopoly of the state) is that of the general interest. The (French) administration has in effect succeeded in taking over the general interest for itself. No one can incarnate the general interest in the place of the administration except perhaps the political power at the very top. Legitimacy is always on the side of the administration. Individuals, groups, collectivities, and political representatives—with the exception of those who are part of the government, and even then—are always suspected of partiality. Thanks to this ideology, the administration can impose its vocabulary, its own mode of reasoning, and its competence on the rest of society (Crozier, 1974:24; 1963).

A second difference is in the structure of the bureaucratic corps in France. The *grandes écoles* feed into the *grand corps* and form an administrative technocracy that is much more cohesive in its values and norms than its American counterpart. Two *grandes écoles* dominate the education of future high functionaries—and not incidentally that of future high executives and scientists in French industry—and they feed into a limited number of top corps. The *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* trains those who enter the *Inspection des Finances*, the *Conseil d'Etat*, and the *Cour des Comptes*. “Polytechnique” trains those who will join the *Corps des Mines* or *Ponts et Chaussées*. Both schools emphasize a curriculum of rational science, the one administrative science, the other natural and engineering science, which orients problem solving toward activist interventionism and a belief in the value of systematic analysis and the powers of reason and intelligence in confronting problems of all kinds (Bodiguel and Quermonne, 1983).<sup>2</sup> This “corps phenomenon” in France is characterized by an insular separation from the outside world (especially from civil society, and even, sometimes, from duly elected politicians), a maintenance of prestige through a strict limiting of numbers, a cultivation of an attitude of special privilege and duty, and a profound internalization of an ideology of public service in the general interest (Birnbuam, 1978:70–73).

Emphatically, however, neither its training nor its specialization means that the high civil service constitutes a homogeneous, single-minded corps. Nor do high civil servants hold to a narrow range of political opinion, although there does often tend to be some preponderance toward conservatism. Yet, in comparison to the United States, or any other country with a fragmented, dispersed bureaucracy, the significance of the French administration to the choices of the French state and the policies it undertakes, as well as to its patterns of interaction with all segments of society, is clear.

### 23.3 Revisionist Views of the French Administration

Naturally, the reality of the French administration often departs from the image and ideology it fosters. From inside the ministries, in particular, one cannot fail to be impressed with the battles that rage between agencies, between *hauts fonctionnaires*, between politicians and civil servants,

between Matignon (the prime minister's office) and the Elysée (the president's). The penetration of administration by politics and politicians and the penetration of politics by administrative technocrats are important problems that have been treated extensively (Baecque and Quermonne, 1982), although seldom resolved fully. The autonomy of the administration from politics is another important problem. Pointing out bureaucratic dependency, division, and internal conflict is often played up as revisionist analysis, and there is merit in it. But surely such features of modern bureaucratic and political life can be taken as common to practically all administrations and to practically all (democratic) political systems.

The ideal typical Rousseauian view of the strong state emphasizes the state's proper independence and autonomy in defining and defending the general will. This view is supported by the dominance of a highly sophisticated juridical tradition in French administrative science. This tradition places great emphasis on the study of formal rules and procedures. One influential critic of the conventional view of the French state, Suleiman (1974), argued, however, that this view was misleading and that the scholarly emphasis on the study of formal rules and procedures was misplaced. For Suleiman, the "sacrosanct state" constituted neither a good description of French administration nor a good prescription. Suleiman showed that the French administration was not homogeneous or nonpartisan, but rather was made up of cross-cutting, conflicting interests. *Hauts fonctionnaires* are not impartial servants of infallible, uniform legal structure. Their views and goals conflict across ministries and directions (the line agencies), between "directions" and ministerial "cabinets" (the top personal staffs of the ministers), and between *grands corps*. One locus of constant combat, for example, lies between the finance and other ministries.

The permeability of the French administration to outside interests is another way of looking at unified versus heterogeneous state structures in France and has also proven influential as a critique of the Rousseauian–Colbert view. Maynaud (1957) and Ehrmann (1957) argued that technocrats split between horizontal and vertical administrations and between the finance ministry and all others. The problem cuts two ways: First, does the technocrat deal from a superior position with underfinanced and poorly (technically) trained interest groups? Does this harm the representative capacities of the administration? Second, do interest-group pressures and *pantouflage* (or the "slipping back and forth" between high bureaucratic and high private-sector positions) cloud the technocrats' vision of the general will or public interest? In other words, are high civil servants captured by the very interests they are supposed to administer?<sup>3</sup>

## 23.4 Overarching Unity of the French Administration

This debate over technocracy characterized much of the French economic planning process throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Ellul (1964) was one particularly influential critic of the supposed fusion—and collusion—of public and private interest in one technocracy.<sup>4</sup> Despite all of these important lines of criticism, however, the French administration is unified in crucial overarching respects. We have seen that it is unified in its training, in its schools, in its perception of rational professionalism, in its view of the world, and in its role in defining and defending *la volonté générale* and the public interest of France. "I want to create a corporation not to Jesuits who have their sovereign in Rome," wrote Napoleon, "but of Jesuits who have no other ambition than that of being useful and no other interest but the public interest" (Lozère, 1833:163, cited in Suleiman, 1978:97). Explaining the mission for which the *Ecole Nationale de l'Administration* was established, Debré wrote in 1946:

The training—one need not hide this—also has a moral objective. It is not one of the missions of the school to play politics or to impose a particular doctrine. But the school must teach its future civil servants “*le sens de l’Etat*,” it must make them understand the responsibilities of the Administration, make them taste the grandeur and accept the servitudes of the métier (1946:24–25).

Suleiman (1977) has argued, to be sure, that the French administration is less technocratic than its reputation. Rather, the *grands corps* prize general skills instead of technical specialization. Polyvalence is essential. The well-trained *haut fonctionnaire* is one who can grasp rapidly the essentials of any problem. They are also able, therefore, to move from sector to sector. Suleiman calls them “generalists of technique.” In fact, the skills of the *haut fonctionnaire* are administrative ones. The generalists of technique form an administrative technocracy that directs other technocracies. These high administrators naturally conflict over questions of turf but they are surprisingly cohesive on questions of policy and in their modes of analysis and accepted routines of problem solving. They are also solidary in maintaining what is for them a mutually beneficial administrative system. As Bon and Burnier (1971:107) argued:

The technocrat fixes the goals and the means of the technician’s work. He is in a position to effect a synthesis of the results obtained, to choose between different options, and to define priorities. Nine times out of ten, he is incapable of taking the place of any of the technicians whose skill he relies on. The technocratic culture is not a technical culture. It integrates the principal results of administrative, financial, industrial, and other techniques in order to be able to utilize them as a factor in policy making.

Or, as one entering class at Polytechnique was told: “The scientific training you receive will not give you the knowledge in any branch that the specialists have, but it will give you the aptitudes and the methods such as to allow you to be on top of everything.”

Perhaps a telling indication of the French administration’s importance in the society, economy, and in politics is that “administration” is normally spelled with a capital letter when referring to the state civil service, even when occurring in the middle of a sentence. *Toujours est-il, bien entendu, que c’est la faute de l’Administration.*<sup>5</sup> These overarching sources of unity—and of objects of blame—contrast directly with the extreme fragmentation of the American administration.

Further, the doctrine of the administration in France regarding the search for the public interest pushes civil servants to greater activism than their American counterparts who, if anything, are lulled into inactivity by the American realist conception of the public interest as arising from an interplay of all affected interests. Consequently, the major prescription for bureaucratic behavior in the United States is to give everyone a fair hearing (Nadel and Rourke, 1975:414ff.). The French are far more informed by the idealist model wherein the public interest reposes in a higher law or higher state. This is close to Rousseau’s *volonté générale* as opposed to *les volontés particulières*. The whole of the *volonté générale* is always greater than the sum of *les volontés particulières*. High administrators are admonished to assess the public interest and pursue it independently of factions, groups, or even well-meaning but ill-informed politicians. The problem of accountability that arises is partially resolved through informal internal controls on bureaucratic behavior. For example, no matter how lofty the bureaucrat’s perception of his role, he will always be tied in part to his perceptions of public opinion and important social and political demands. Internalized values and professional norms also serve in part to check bureaucratic behavior. In France, these are based upon the highly developed rational educational process. But of course, these methods are imperfect at best.



In clear contrast to the *grands corps* of France, there is no cohesive, uniform elite that governs in the United States. The French elite is held together not in the absence of disputes within its various segments but by overarching social and educational homogeneity (Birnbuam, 1978). Day-to-day consensus of individual French decision makers is very, very far from perfect, but for the big picture—what a society's goals and responsibilities—those who make up the French elite are strikingly uniform in their view of what constitutes proper tasks for the state and proper demands from civil society. This consensus extends to the properness of methods used to communicate demands from society to the state.

*Le droit administratif* in France, the *hauts fonctionnaires*, and their *grandes écoles* clearly constitute a powerful ensemble of discipline, science, doctrine, and profession. Future high-ranking civil servants go through a rigorous and highly developed training and socialization process in a limited number of advanced state schools [such as Ecole National de Administration (ENA) or Polytechnique]. Entrance is strictly limited and rigidly controlled through competitive examination. In administrative sciences, the number of classic texts is great, their codification advanced, their sophistication remarkable, and their authors illustrious.<sup>6</sup>

Some will argue that important cracks are appearing in the once overarching French reliance on centralization and state intervention, which has characterized the French administration at least since the fourteenth century (Nef, 1957). Two recent examples provide compelling but far from sufficient evidence for this proposition. The first is the measures for decentralizing certain areas of local governance from pairs and the prefects to individual localities undertaken by the socialist governments from 1981 to 1984. There is no doubt that some important decisions formerly reserved to the central authorities may now be made by municipal and regional councils as well as some—but limited—raising of revenues. But these decision areas are still rather narrow, the all-important raising of revenues is also limited, and, perhaps most important, it is still too early to assess the long-term effects of these changes.

Second, the whole philosophy of privatization and deregulation that the 1986 Chirac government borrowed from Thatcher and Reagan seriously questions the traditional French reliance on state intervention and overarching control of the economy and society. Again, it is far too early to assess the long-term effects of the privatization of such large firms as Saint-Gobain, the banks, or the television network TF1 or the deregulation of currency exchange, the stock market, and investment. In particular, insofar as these changes may redound to the detriment of the French economy in future cyclical downturns, support for them may dwindle rapidly. In any case, Chirac's interpretation of his March 16, 1986 election victory as a mandate for change in these areas was a grave misinterpretation of what the electorate knew very well it was doing, that is, voting against socialists rather than for conservatives. In any case, Mitterand's socialist governments from 1983 to 1986 had already turned from an all-encompassing reliance on state intervention and state control for the solution to vexing economic and social problems to a liberalization and withdrawing of the state from many domains, ranging from currency regulation to enterprise management to social welfare programs (Wilsford, 1988b).

Reliance on the state in the face of vexing problems was often embodied in the mechanism of public ownership of enterprises and important industrial sectors such as mining, steel, or shipbuilding. That the French have been "taking the state back out" is indisputable. This movement probably comes about as a result of a 10-year *conjuncture de crise économique* in which the French economy performed poorly and state intervention was seldom successful in turning industries or firms around, much less making them more internationally competitive. In fact, the French state has realized that its traditional interventionist techniques do not always work, and it has moved "just as actively" toward withdrawing from areas that it previously controlled closely or permitting, under supervision, more liberty than before.

Although perhaps few French would think in this way, state intervention of a different sort will probably prove to have been crucial in a long-term economic turnaround. Especially important has been the cutting of vast subsidies to the traditional “smokestack” industries that had been draining the public treasure for many years. Mining, steel, and shipbuilding suffered in particular. Economic crisis and international interdependence sometimes give the state increased leverage or opportunities over entrenched groups, even while serving as important constraints on what the state can do internationally and domestically. All of this suggests that the degree to which a state intervenes and the different methods it uses—ownership, regulation, laissez-faire—are variables that may, precisely, vary from one period to another, given the tools and traditions at the disposal of the state and given the circumstances involved at any one time.

In addition to persistent and consistent activism, the French state is characterized by one final feature of overarching unity, the finance ministry. The *Inspection des Finances* is one of the most prestigious and most powerful of any of the *grands corps*. “Any time even a single franc is involved, the guys from the finance ministry always have something to say about it,” complained one high civil servant from another ministry. Even groups recognize that insofar as public expenditures or public revenues may be involved in programs of interest to them, the finance ministry will always have to be consulted. More often than not, the views of finance prevail over those of other ministries in cases of conflict.

## 23.5 Patterns of Policy Making in the French Administrative State

In France, the state’s relations with many groups from civil society have long exhibited certain characteristics associated with what American political science currently calls neocorporatism. Neocorporatism as a modern version of corporatism is a way of actively arranging the representation of interests in civil society to the state. Neocorporatism differs from traditional corporatism, however, in permitting, even prescribing, much liberty to civil society and in denying vigorously the historical totalitarianism of many corporatist regimes such as Mussolini’s Italy or Hitler’s Germany. In neocorporatism, the number of groups granted official representative status is limited, and these are also given privileges by the state over their interest sectors. But the freedom of any other group to form or to act politically is not affected (Schmitter, 1974).

Indeed, in France, it is the state that determines who is a legitimate partner in the search for the public interest. The French state therefore formally recognizes and confers official status upon many groups and it often subsidizes their activities with both money grants and nonmonetary benefits such as equipment and office space. There are of course many reasons that the state favors a host of interest groups. It does so in part to ensure their cooperation in the implementation of policies, in part because of the pervasive ideology of national solidarity. This ideology holds that the state should help groups to organize members and pursue goals by providing resources to the groups. The state, in this view, is a facilitator of the public good. The state’s role here is not unlike the tradition of the German state and the importance it places on the state’s responsibilities for keeping essential social partnerships healthy. Bériot (1985) estimates that two-thirds of all groups in France receive outside financial support. Eighty percent of this support comes in the form of subsidies from the national and local government. The French state also has withdrawn subsidies from groups—ranging from medical associations to labor unions—whose activities it did not like. The prevalence and active management of subsidies to groups, as a tool for structuring the representation of interest sectors, is a particularly corporatist aspect of the relations between groups and the French state.

The French state also actively seeks to institutionalize its relations with groups, another characteristic compatible with and essential to neocorporatism. “Structure” is a concept important to understanding the French administrative spirit. It goes far toward explaining the French approach to power and organization, and an emphasis on problem solving with *structures* is found among French groups generally. *Les structures* are made up of rules and people who use the rules to manage specific tasks and the demands of other people. In France, very little can be done outside of a *structure*. *Il faut créer de nouvelles structures* to resolve such and such a problem. *On va créer une structure* to respond to such and such a demand. In its own way, the spirit of French administration and organization is very activist, but never ad hoc. Routine and formal capacity are prized; spontaneity is not. Further, French administrators need interlocutors to participate in these structures. Without them, curiously, a dialogue is not possible. Without dialogue, solidarity and openness are clearly shown to be fake.

But neocorporatism is not an entirely accurate characterization of a pattern of relationships that gives so much to the state and so little to the groups, as is so frequently the case in the French political system. Indeed, the state needs the cooperation of some groups for the smooth implementation of various public policies. But in France, the state has been able to structure the channels of influence in such a way that it can often choose to hear what it wishes to hear. This dominance of the French state over interests is based, first, in the strong, relatively unified character of its administration and, second, in the fragmentation of many important interest sectors. Thus, while the strong state necessary to the arranging of neocorporatism does obtain in France, it is of equally primary importance that there are very few peak associations in France. An innate fragmentation—both ideological and nonideological—characterizes many interest sectors, from the medical professions to industrial workers. Moreover, through its ability to designate more than one group as simultaneously representative of the interests of any one sector, the French state ensures that competing groups will in effect cancel each other out. This strategy is often used by the French state when its interests so dictate.

The French state’s powers and the organizational fragmentation of interests enable the administration to “consult” different interests as policy is formulated, giving the appearance of substantive input into decision making, commonly referred to as “concertation.” Francois Bloch-Lainé, one of the most respected high civil servants of the postwar French administration, gave a classic and encompassing definition of concertation as applied to the economy: “It is a pattern of relations in which representatives of the state and representatives from firms and groups meet in an organized, ongoing fashion to exchange information, assess performance compared to forecasts, and make decisions together or formulate advice for the government” (Bloch-Lainé, 1964).

But the consultation implied by *concertation* is often superficial, for it enables the state to simultaneously find support for its own view while ignoring or diffusing opposition. Indisputably, both substantive and symbolic consultation occur. Substantive consultation occurs especially when it serves the state’s interests—and it does so in a host of areas. But symbolic consultation assumes greater importance in French policy making than in many other advanced democracies.

Typically, the process of *concertation* is initiated by a high-level civil servant or by a minister by sending a series of *notes d’orientations*, or preliminary proposals, to various groups that are likely to be concerned by the measures that are envisioned. These will serve as the texts for negotiations over the specifics of these measures. These *notes d’orientations* constitute the first phase of *concertation*. The administration expects its interlocutors to study these texts and then—in a second phase of *concertation*—come together with it to discuss differences and shortcomings before final publication of the relevant decrees in the *Journal officiel*. This second phase begins with written evaluations of the preliminary proposals by the groups. Formal meetings then take place between *hauts fonctionnaires* and group representatives to hammer out common ground, or a *synthèse globale*.

Often, of course, groups oppose reforms sought by the administration. Consultation meetings then sometimes break off, are rescheduled, and canceled again numerous times. Reforms are then frequently decreed and implemented anyway. Groups often pursue studied variations of cooperation in this consultation process. A strategy some groups adopt is to “never leave a seat at the [consultation] table empty.” These groups recognize that their input is often meaningless but argue that the administration is so important to them that they cannot afford to bypass any opportunity, however symbolic, for contact. A second strategy is to “leave the seat empty as an express sign of protest.” Some groups that adopt this strategy out of frustration often then come back to the table subsequently, recognizing the validity of the first argument. A third strategy is to attend the consultation meeting in order to walk out noisily in protest once the meeting is convened.

In France, ministers and bureaucrats enjoy great discretion in deciding whom to consult and who to listen to among the consulted. The French state structures interest-group activity and policy outcomes by opening or closing policy making arenas to different participants. One interest-group leader complained that too often formal consultation is just that formal but not substantive. This leader cited the example of discussing a proposed measure in a ministerial committee meeting and then seeing the final text of the measure printed the next day in the *Journal officiel* (Wilson, 1983:900). According to another leader: “Of course, we and other[s] were invited to the ministry. But in the end, and even during the discussions, the outcome was clear. The government had already made up its mind and ‘listened’ only to those groups which shared the government position.” Access does not necessarily equal influence. Consultation is often nothing more than a symbolic benefit to the groups.

Suleiman’s respondents (1974:333ff.) argued that consultation served an informative and persuasive function—from the administration to interest groups: “My job is to explain and to inform. . . . Contacts [with interest groups] are necessary. But I think I can say that we always manage to have our view prevail,” argued one director. Another reported: “We reveal only as much as we think it is necessary to reveal.” Thus, Suleiman argued that one important function of consultation was the opportunity it gives the administration to present interest groups with *faits accomplis*, that is, decisions it has made before consultation.

Consultation tends, therefore, to occur late in the administrative decision-making process in contrast to the American practice of early consultation as proposals are formulated (Chubb, 1983). Suleiman (1974:335–336) described a typical policy process. The preparation of texts, whether laws, decrees, or reforms, begins in secrecy within a small administrative group. Gradually, the initial group seeks the agreement and cooperation of other groups within the ministry and then from other ministries. Once a final text is agreed upon by the administration, interest groups are approached and informed of the proposed policy. A closed approach is essential, one director reported to Suleiman, “because otherwise there will be opposition over every provision and the text will never get drawn up” (1974:335–336). Another director commented, “We ask for [‘interest groups’] advice only after we have a completely prepared text. And we do this just to make sure that we haven’t made some colossal error” (1974:336).

The emphasis on “texts” is another common feature of the French administrative process. In France, high civil servants often deal with groups’ opposition by pointing to the “text.” This conveniently removes direct responsibility from the civil servant for he or she merely “administers” (*gérer* in French) a text that has previously been duly negotiated and approved. *On gère les textes* in the French administrative vocabulary. This approach neatly cuts other avenues of possible recourse to the groups.

Consequently, in the face of the French administration’s high-handedness, direct action assumes great importance in the relations between many organized interests and the French state. Direct action—such as walkouts, boycotts, demonstrations, or strikes—is quite common to

French interest-group activities while it is relatively absent from a more open system such as the American. Even such supposedly pacific groups as physicians or hospital interns are quite willing to exit traditional political channels and engage in demonstrations and strikes. The frequent resort to various forms of direct action indicates the highly reactive posture that the French state forces upon organized groups. In the United States, strikes and other forms of direct actions are rare because groups can almost always exploit the dispersed structure of the American state.<sup>7</sup>

Some direct action in France seems relatively minor, particularly if it takes the form of a simple walkout from a meeting or speech. Other direct action, such as strikes or demonstrations, sometimes assumes great importance. Nuisance activities such as walkouts enhance the polemic style of French politics and cut off avenues for political and negotiating dialogue. Some groups may register appeals with the Council of State protesting administrative rulings, but judicial avenues in France are seldom very productive. Certainly they are not in the short term, for even if the Council of State were to agree with the appeal, the point is often moot as its case backlog runs anywhere from 3 to 5 years. Boycotts are therefore frequently used to express opposition to administrative requirements or reforms. Sometimes these boycotts are extraordinarily effective in an administrative system that prides itself on the symbolism of participation and consultation. That symbolism is an important source of legitimacy for what is in fact a relatively closed and often heavy-handed administration.

The effectiveness of demonstrations and strikes depends on many variables, among which are cohesiveness of the movement and how widespread its support is. Groups ranging all the way from students to physicians in France have undertaken both successful and unsuccessful demonstrations and strikes. They have occurred under both conservative and socialist rule. They have been used throughout the Fourth and the Fifth Republics.

## 23.6 Conclusion: The French Administration is Strong but also Vulnerable

The French state's structure gives civil servants and their political leaders certain advantages in day-to-day decision making that severely handicap outside groups like students, teachers, physicians, workers, or many others who are concerned (Wilsford, 1988a). For example, in France, the government controls the legislative process through its proposal and decree powers. This government is headed by a strong executive. The government alone determines the legislative agenda and gives approval to bureaucratic decrees. The legislature is very weak. Above all, we have seen throughout this chapter that the French state is also aided by its elite bureaucratic corps. Its members are trained in the best higher educational institutions—the *grandes écoles*—at state expense. Most top officials—both from the left and from the right—are graduates of these schools and started their careers in the bureaucratic corps. Finally, the French judicial system is very weak. It does not provide alternative avenues of protest for those who disagree with laws or administrative rulings as the American court system does. Limited judicial access and limited judicial powers give the state greater autonomy in its relations with civil society. And of course, the state sometimes abuses this autonomy. For example, Malik Oussékine, a French student, was severely beaten by state police during the Latin Quarter demonstrations of December 1986. He later died from those injuries. Or André Dogué, a physician, was also beaten by riot police during an otherwise peaceful demonstration of medical associations at the Invalides in 1980.

Despite the recent “minimal” state fad in France (Sorman, 1984), bureaucrats, politicians, and interest-group leaders share a common view on the role of the state, its mission, and its options.

This chapter has argued that this tradition of state power underpins an active, interventionist state which does not hesitate to use its strategic position to structure interest representation in either pluralist or corporatist ways. The French state recognizes groups, thus sanctioning them. But it may also withdraw recognition. The state, too, subsidizes many groups. These funds provide the crucial resources for offices, personnel, equipment, and research, all indispensable to organizing and articulating interests. The state may also withdraw subsidies—it has done so in the past—making organization and articulation of interests more difficult. State authorities in France also enjoy great discretion in deciding whom to consult and who to listen to among the consulted. The state may do all of these things to open and close policy making arenas. The French state orchestrates policy making far more than its American counterpart. With relative ease, the French state may induce wider participation (pluralism) by involving more interest groups. Or it may constrain participation in policy making (neocorporatism) by closing out interest groups.

Because outside input into administrative decision making tends to occur late in the French policy-making process, in contrast to the American pattern of early consultation with concerned groups as proposals are formulated, warning signals of possible or probable opposition and violence are often ignored. The closed policy-making process in France avoids the problems of opposition and delay, but it is also dangerously vulnerable to protest. Paradoxically, the strong French state is sometimes weak indeed.

In comparative perspective, the French state and its administration could be compared to other states and their administrations along two dimensions. The first dimension is one of permeability of the state to many diverse interests coming from civil society and ranges from extreme openness to extreme closedness. Along this variable, the French state is less permeable to interest-group pressures than other democratic states such as the United States, Britain, Germany, or Sweden. France is probably similar in this respect to Japan. The French state is more permeable, however, to group pressures than a host of nondemocratic states, ranging from Chile to Russia.

The second dimension of useful comparison is that of the capacity of the state to execute its will. The success of the state in imposing innovations and reforms on recalcitrant groups from civil society is one of the best tests of the state's strength. The French state could be considered stronger according to this criterion than the United States, Britain, or Germany, perhaps equally as strong as Japan and clearly weaker than Russia. We have noted one important weakness of the French state, however, that comes out of its strength—the vulnerability to extreme forms of protest.

In important ways, the strong state tradition in France that we have explored in this chapter is similar to the tradition of Americanism that Hartz (1955) identified in the United States. They both serve as overriding factors of consensus in otherwise extremely plural societies. The French state's ideology protects the state's interests. These are sometimes perceived as those of functionaries or as those of privileged groups in the economy or the society. But just as often, or perhaps more often, the state's interests are "perceived" as the amalgam or distillation of the interests of all, the community, the whole of which is France. This whole is far greater than its parts. The state ideology protects the role of the functionary and it protects the centralization of the system. But it does not protect political institutions such as those that make up the regime type. To the contrary, the regime type is highly vulnerable in France to passing crises and humors. A succession of political regime changes ranging across all types litters the landscape of France's political history.

Indeed, there is such high politicization over issues and between political parties in France, charged by an all encompassing and violent polemic, that it is difficult for the institutions of a political regime type to become anchored solidly in French political culture. There has never been a political consensus in France, which, like Americanism in the United States, could serve to bind elements together in agreement over the modalities and institutions of governance and change.

In France, the strong state bound a fractious society together. The strong state itself was all that warring elements could agree upon, each hoping it would serve its own purposes. There has been in France, perhaps, an “administrative consensus.”

The overall relations between society and the state in France are characterized by what may be termed state-dominated pluralism. The state itself is administratively dominated. In a system of extreme pluralism of groups, the focal point of both policy-making and interest-group activity is found in the bureaucratic departments. This gives the French state, through its bureaucratic institutions, more capability for control over interest-group activity than is founding the “neutral” state of American pluralist theory wherein policy outcomes are sometimes characterized as the “sum of vectors” pushing in upon the state from society.

Of course, in state-dominated pluralism, the state and its structures are by no means homogenous. Despite the tone of this chapter, the “strong” state is of course by no means all-powerful. Centers of power compete within the vast French bureaucracy. Perhaps some groups can play opposing centers of power off one another, thus enhancing their own maneuverability in the bureaucratic universe. But we have also noted that the finance ministry is an important source of uniformity in this universe. Finally, even when the French state seems all-powerful, it will not necessarily make the right decisions as a consequence. Sometimes it will and sometimes it will not. The strength of the state cannot protect it from errors of judgment.

The French state is strong in part because it eliminates much access to alternative arenas of policy making and influence such as powerful legislature or judiciary. When groups cannot play conflictual interests within the bureaucracy against each other, they have little other recourse but to exit the political system altogether. This feature points to the French state’s high vulnerability to direct action—walkouts, boycotts, demonstrations, and strikes—and other forms of sometimes violent protest. The state in state-dominated pluralism is more effective at policy making than its American pluralist counterpart, although it may not necessarily be more right and it is clearly ineffective at absorbing protest.

## Notes

1. All translations from the French are mine; all unattributed quotations in this chapter come from personal interviews.
2. This driving, overarching ethos of the French administration comes through even in the most causal reading of Baecque and Quermonne (1982), Gournay (1978), Quermonne (1983), and Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), even as each of them addresses the forces of fragmentation and conflict that weaken and cast suspicion on the administrative mission.
3. Ehrmann and Maynaud engaged in a detailed exchange about these questions in a series of scholarly articles and books that lasted until at least 1963. The two citations here are among the earliest examples in this exchange. Space does not permit us to consider others.
4. Gilpin (1968) describes the appeal of French political leaders and *hauts fonctionnaires* to technique and scientific reasoning in defense of controversial projects such as the nuclear *force de frappe*, the Concorde supersonic transport plane, or uranium enrichment plants (see also Hall, 1986:176–180).
5. Translation: Of course, you know, it is the bureaucracy’s fault.
6. For a small but revealing sample, one has simply to thumb through Rigaud and Delcros (1984), Braibant (1984), Gournay (1978), or the incomparable and unsurpassed Vedel (1966).
7. Kitschelt (1986) also suggests the systematic structuring of interest-group activities as a function of political “opportunity structures” facing the groups. Looked at this way, the French political system and the predominant role it assigns to the administration offer the groups few opportunities for meaningful input inside the normal administrative process. By contrast, American groups are offered an array of varied opportunities to penetrate the administrative–political system.

## References

- Bériot, L. *Le Bazar de la solidarité*. J.-C. Lattès, Paris, 1985.
- Birnabuum, P. *La class dirigeante française*. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1978.
- Bloch-Lainé, F. *A la recherche d'une économie concertée*, 3rd ed. Editions de l'Épargne, Paris, 1964.
- Bodiguel, J.-L. and Quermonne, J.-L. *La haute fonction publique sous la Ve République*. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1983.
- Bon, F. and Burnier, M.-A. *Les Nouveaux intellectuels*. Editions Cujas, Paris, 1971.
- Braibant, G. *Le droit administratif français*. Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques et Dalloz, Paris, 1984.
- Chubb, J. *Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1983.
- Crozier, M. *Le phénomène bureaucratique*. Seuil, Paris, 1963.
- Crozier, M. La centralization. In *Où va l'administration française?* (M. Crozier, ed.). Editions d'Organisations, Paris, 1974.
- Debré, M. *Réforme de la fonction publique*. Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1946.
- Ehrmann, H.W. *Organized Business in France*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1957.
- Ellul, J. *The Technological Society*. Knopf, New York, 1964.
- Gilpin, R. *France in the Age of the Scientific State*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1968.
- Gournay, B. *Introduction à la science administrative*. Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1978.
- Hall, P.A. *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1986.
- Hartz, L. *The Liberal Tradition in America*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1955.
- Kitschelt, Political opportunity structures and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. *British Journal of Political Science* 16, 1986.
- Lozère, P. *Opinions de Napoléon*. Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1833.
- Maynaud, J. Les groupes d'intérêt et l'administration en France. *Revue Française de science politique* 7(3):588, 1957.
- Nadel, M.Y. and Rourke, F.E. Bureaucracies. In *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds.). Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1975.
- Nef, J. *Industry and Government in France and England 1540–1640*. Great Seal Books, Ithaca, NY, 1957.
- Quermonne, J.-L. *Le gouvernement de la France sous la ve République*, 2nd ed. Dalloz, Paris, 1983.
- Rigaud, J. and Delcros, X. *Les Institutions administratives françaises: Les structures*. Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques et Dalloz, Paris, 1984.
- Schmitter, P. Still the century of corporatism? *Review of Politics*, 1974.
- Sorman, G. *La solution libérale*. Grasset, Paris, 1984.
- Suleiman, E.N. *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy: The Administrative Elite in France*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1974.
- Suleiman, E.N. The myth of technical expertise: Selection, organization and leadership. *Comparative Politics* 10:137–158, 1977.
- Suleiman, E.N. Higher education in France: A two-track system. *West European Politics* 1:97–114, 1978.
- Vedel, G. *Traité de science administrative*. Mouton, Paris, 1966.
- Wilsford, D. Tactical advantages versus administrative heterogeneity: The strengths and the limits of the French state. *Comparative Political Studies* 21:1, 1988a.
- Wilsford, D. The private/public paradox: Privatization as an instrument of state control in France. Presented to the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1988b.
- Wilson, F.L. French interest group Politics: Pluralist or neocorporatist? *American Political Science Review*, 77:485–487, 1983.





## Chapter 24

---

# Greek Bureaucracy and Public Administration: The Persistent Failure of Reform

---

Constantine P. Danopoulos and Andrew C. Danopoulos

### CONTENTS

24.	1	Introduction.....	395
24.2		History of Bureaucratic Reform.....	397
	24.2.1	Birth and Growth of Bureaucracy in Greece: The Early Years .....	397
24.	2.2	Transition Period .....	398
24	.2.3	The Postwar Years .....	399
	24.3	Analyzing the Failure to Reform.....	401
24.	3.1	Societal Considerations .....	401
24.	3.2	Individual Perceptions.....	402
24.	3.3	Institutional Imperatives .....	403
	24.4	A Parting Word .....	404
		References .....	404

### 24.1 Introduction

Administrative reform, that is, “the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance” (Caiden, 1969:1), has been a much talked about subject by Greek political leaders of almost all ideological dispositions for many decades. In his 1952 *Report on the Greek Economic*

*Problem*, the minister of finance Kyriakos Varvaressos bluntly stated that “we must not expect any real improvement in the country’s situation, as long as we do not deal with the fundamental problem of the inadequacy of its administrative machine” (cited in Argyriades, 1968:345). Fifteen or so years later, George Papadopoulos (1968), head of the military regime (1967–1974), referred to Greece’s bureaucracy as “an unbridled organ that has all but ceased being servant of the public.” A similar line was struck by the conservative Constantine Karamanlis, head of the civilian government that succeeded the fallen Junta, who stated that one of his government’s major goals would be to modernize the nation’s administrative system by strengthening its “moral,” “human,” “material,” and “structural” bases (Shinn, 1985:238). The socialists under Andreas Papandreou in their 1981 pre-election literature identified favoritism and excessive centralization as the main culprits of administrative inadequacy and promised to place bureaucratic reform high on their list of priorities (Pasok, 1981:103–105). Finally, the conservatives under Costas Karamanlis (nephew of the former) returned to power in 2004 and decided to up the rhetorical ante promising “to reestablish the state.”

A number of reform efforts have been undertaken since the early 1950s and even before to streamline and professionalize Greece’s administrative apparatus and to improve its effectiveness and capacity for innovation. The latter can be defined as “the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes and products or services,” and is considered a salient characteristic of modern bureaucratic organizations (Thompson, 1969:5). By all accounts these efforts have not come to fruition and Greece’s bureaucracy possesses few of the characteristics associated with developed or rationalist administration, that is, organizational complexity, high degree of specialization and professionalism, political neutrality, accountability to the legitimate authorities of the state, and responsiveness to the needs of the citizenry (Heady, 1979:168–170). In 1985, Apostolos Lazaris, the socialists’ minister responsible for the bureaucracy, expressing government as well as public disaffection with resistance to reform, referred to the nation’s administrative apparatus as “that eternal problem” and characterized the relations between the public and the bureaucracy as those between “opponents” (Athens News Agency, 1985). A public opinion survey conducted in November 1998 revealed that despite numerous reform efforts, “inefficiency and corruption” continue to pervade “every aspect of the state machinery” (Odyssey, 1998:20). Citing a 1989 report by an American research institute, which viewed the Greek civil service rife with “favoritism, red tape, and dilatoriness,” David H. Close asserts that nation’s bureaucracy “had the worst reputation in the EEC for obstructionism, inefficiency and corruption” (Close, 2002:180).

More recent data shows that the situation remains unchanged. The Comparative Corruption Index published yearly by *Transparency International* ranks Greece consistently low. The index ranks countries on a scale of 0–10 (0 most corrupt, 10 most clean). A score of less than 5 is considered corrupt. In 2007, for example, Greece scored 4.6—a position virtually identical since 2000 (Transparency International, 2007). The World Bank’s 2007 “Doing Business 2008” report offers an equally critical assessment. Out of the 175 countries included in the survey, Greece ranks 109 as far as difficulty in starting up new enterprises is concerned. Establishing a new business in the country requires 15 bureaucratic procedures and takes 38 days, as opposed to 2 steps and 2 days in top ranking Australia. The report asserts: “Cumbersome entry procedures are associated with more corruption. Each procedure is a point of contact—an opportunity to exact a bribe. Burdensome regulations do not increase the quality of products, make work safer or reduce pollution. Instead, they constrain investment; push more people into the informal economy; increase consumer prices; and fuel corruption” (World Bank, 2008:8). The 2007–2008 *Global Competitiveness Index* of the World Economic Forum confirms the negative impact the weak bureaucracy has on the nation’s economy. The report shows that Greece’s competitiveness ranking dropped by four places, from 61 in 2006 to 65 in 2007 (World Economic Forum, 2008).

This chapter will seek to outline the various efforts of administrative reform in Greece, and to identify and analyze the reasons for the failure of those efforts.

## 24.2 History of Bureaucratic Reform

The emergence and evolution of the modern state has been attributed to a response to the function of socioeconomic developments such as societal growth, complexity, industrialization, urbanization, and the corresponding demands for public services. Richard Rose attributes the growth and expansion of the modern state and its many social groups and organizations in terms of three categories of functions: defining, such as tax collection, administration of justice, defense, and foreign affairs, without which the state would cease to exist; resource mobilization, denoting state assistance to key economic structures within a society as industry, agriculture, and transportation; and social programs aimed at providing direct benefits to citizens, otherwise known as distribution or redistribution of wealth (cited in Peters, 1978:17). Modern bureaucratic structures are at the very heart of the modern state. Indeed, as Marx (1963) clearly demonstrates, it would be unreal to perceive any type of national development in which the bureaucracy would not be playing a leading role. Underscoring the importance of modern administration Krislov (1974:40–41) states: “Bureaucracies are the late bloomers of modern political structure. They grew silently in the underbrush—seldom noticed, little analyzed.... They are not loved and not respected, but rather tolerated and depended on.” It is therefore no accident that the source of modern bureaucracies, at least in the European context, can be traced to the emergence of nationalism and the growth of the centralized, monarchical, absolutist state and its successors over the last four centuries.

### 24.2.1 Birth and Growth of Bureaucracy in Greece: The Early Years

Greek politics and bureaucracy were based on European prototypes adopted on a wholesale basis by the nation’s political leadership, beginning with the late 1820s when the country came into existence as a semi-independent entity. Early attempts to forge a modern French-modeled bureaucratic structure in Greece failed. The new country possessed all the characteristics of a traditional agrarian society, and its independence was only marginal. The Ottoman Empire—from which Greece gained independence following a protracted struggle—was a corporatist entity. The only contact between the subject people and the Muslim authorities came when the latter came to either collect taxes or draft people for compulsory and unpaid labor. These much-detested practices encouraged individualism, localism, and the existence of brigandage. Subject people distrusted authority and instead sought the protection of local primates and chieftains—practices that continued in the decades following independence.

As though parochialism and distrust were not enough, the new nation faced other insurmountable difficulties. Its small size, rocky terrain, lack of an economic infrastructure, a largely illiterate population, and an economy based on subsistence farming were some of the many ills that plagued it. To these one must add the overwhelming influence of the “great powers,” the early adoption of parliamentary institutions, and the conflict between the indigenous and Europeanized elites. The administrative apparatus, which was established, was a highly centralized structure based on “a wholesale and indiscriminate adoption of foreign prototypes,” especially France’s (Diamandouros, 1972:300). Little regard was paid to the differences in culture, economic and social disparities, and historical experiences. Thus, Greece’s bureaucracy during the years

following independence “did not reflect sufficiently the nature of the Greek society” (Argyriades, 1965:298). The civil service became the dumping ground which accommodated thousands who could not find employment in the desperately poor economy and a source of patronage offered by politicians to their constituents in exchange for political support. Absence of a tenure system, low pay, and lack of prestige sufficed to keep the elites away from the ranks of the bureaucracy, all of which rendered the civil servants pawns in the hands of their elected patrons. Legg and Roberts (1997:167) are correct when they observe that “the Greek bureaucracy could not control the political sector; it was instead used by the political elites.”

By the 1870s, the bulk of the country’s budget was utilized to keep up a huge, highly centralized, and grossly ineffective bureaucracy (Dertilis, 1977:138–140; Mouzelis, 1978:37). From the outside, Greece’s administrative structure gave the appearance of modern organization, when in reality it possessed none of the characteristics associated with rationalist administrative institutions.

### 24.2.2 *Transition Period*

The 1880s ushered Greece into a new period. A new generation of leaders emerged more aware of the need to modernize the country’s archaic economic infrastructure. A devastating vine disease in France allowed Greek current exports to rise dramatically, becoming a lucrative source of foreign exchange. To this should also be added the international crisis, which forced financiers to turn the Greece and other Balkan countries to invest their capital. The modernizing-oriented Tricoupis administration took advantage of these and began laying the groundwork for an economic infrastructure. Though subsequent reduction in current sales and withdrawal of foreign capital caused the failure of these development efforts, they nonetheless generated an urge for social and economic change.

The reform-minded Tricoupis administration sought to revamp the nation’s administrative apparatus. He established a mechanism to punish and even expel civil servants guilty of graft and other unethical practices; forbade the transfer of bureaucrats from one ministry, bureau, or office to another before they had met promotion requirements; tied promotion to the level of education; and mandated an examination as prerequisite to employment in the civil service. But the prime minister’s reform effort to neutralize and reorganize the bureaucracy failed due to the same clientelistic and cultural traits which carried over into the new era. Tricoupis’ political rivals abolished all relevant legislation when they took power some years later (Argyriades, 1968:343–344).

The rise to power of still a new generation of leaders in the 1910s, headed by Eleftherios Venizelos, and the emergence of a small but energetic entrepreneurial class gave development a shot in the arm. As a result of World War I, in which Greece participated, the size of the country increased as did its productive population and gross national product. Greece had entered a transition period which, in spite of the reverses in the early to mid-1920s and late 1930s, the devastation of World War II, and the civil war that followed, continued at a slow but steady pace. American economic and military assistance, beginning in 1947, ushered Greece into a period of healthy economic growth, excessive urbanization, and dramatic increases in per capita income, literacy, and consumption rates.

New effort was undertaken by Venizelos in the 1910s and 1920s and by succeeding governments to revamp the nation’s bureaucracy without overwhelming success. A series of laws were passed in the 1910s designed to modernize Greece’s administrative apparatus which included the

introduction of a tenure system aimed at neutralizing the civil service and other reforms in many ways similar to those introduced earlier by Tricoupis. Additional safeguards were introduced in 1951, through the introduction of a Civil Service Code, which created a permanent commission responsible for overseeing all facets of administration including recruitment, promotion, retirement, grading, pay, discipline, rights, and duties of administrative personnel (Argyriades, 1965:299).

In spite of these efforts, the clientelistic practices continued unabated. The bureaucracy grew in numbers and consumed an ever larger slice of the national budget. Legg (1977:291) observes that “the growth of bureaucracy was unrelated to necessity [and] the proportion of state employees to the population as a whole was startling compared to the far more advanced European democracies.” The majority of these civil servants possessed little training and many could not read and write. Munkman (1958:261), an employee of the American economic mission to Greece, characterized the Greek administrative apparatus as “inefficient and archaic” with “a lot of dead wood” in its ranks.

### **24.2.3 *The Postwar Years***

Although some token efforts were made in the 1950s, the poor reputation of the bureaucracy and nepotism on the part of the governing conservative political forces, which stuffed the civil service with people considered safe, extremely detailed laws, and remoteness from the masses created a “paralyzing effect” and encouraged the “shelving of responsibility.” Greece’s administrative machine, Langrod (1964:33) concluded, “represents a mosaic of not quite coordinated components isolated from one another, and each consisting of a separate fortress, firmly entrenched against any extraneous attempts at reform.” In other words, progress toward industrialization does not necessarily bring about a corresponding emergence of bureaucratic development.

On Langrod’s recommendations, the George Papandreou (1964–1965) government proceeded to adopt a series of reforms aimed at improving Greece’s administrative apparatus. These included greater emphasis on technical and administrative training, trimming out unnecessary personnel, and decentralization. But when the military took over in 1967, it moved quickly to scrape these steps, most of which had not been fully implemented, denouncing them as Communist inspired. The new rulers denounced the bureaucracy’s ineffectiveness, attacked on the corrupt and canvassing practices of the politicians, and made administrative reform—along with economic development, educational reform, the creation of a harmonious and balanced society, and the development of a healthy political life—their five modernizing objectives. But the colonel’s nepotistic practices, repression, threats of dismissal, failure to issue clear directives, failure to respond to the needs and recommendations of the civil service, and the planting of informants in the ranks of the civil service rendered the bureaucracy a passive observant. The military rulers were even less successful in their efforts to transform and modernize the nation’s administrative apparatus than their predecessors (Danopoulos, 1988).

Following the restoration of civilian rule, the conservative Karamanlis and Rallis cabinets (1974–1981) made some feeble attempts of their own, to be followed by a more ambitious efforts by the succeeding socialist governments of Andreas Papandreou (1981–1989). Papandreou’s administrative reform legislation contained many of the proposals made by his father’s government in the mid-1960s, with additional ones as well. The socialists concentrated their effort toward establishing “a more open [civil service] system concerning recruitment, appointments, transfers, and

promotions” (Shinn, 1985:238). In addition, a uniform salary scale grading and rating system, decentralization, and other measures were proposed aimed at reducing the bureaucracies heavy-handedness and increase its responsiveness to public needs. The latter included simplification of procedures and establishment of a bureau of public grievances aimed at discouraging the shelving of responsibility and improving interagency communication and coordination. Finally, a School of Public Administration was established in 1985, based on the British and French models, to train high civil servants as well as prospective ones by offering “practical knowledge” in place of “theoretical knowledge” offered by existing university curricula (Athens New Agency, 1985). When the conservatives came back to power in 1990, they passed a new and “comprehensive law on administrative reform” (Sotiropoulos, 1993:43).

Pasok’s return to power in 1993 and the replacement of the ailing Papandreou by the modernist Costas Simitis set the stage for another wave of administrative reforms. Under pressure from the European Union (EU), the new socialist leader announced on November 1, 1996, that “modernization of public administration [constituted] a top priority issue” in his reform agenda (Bulletin, 1996:2). The main thrust of Simitis’ efforts aims to improve the bureaucracy’s capacity to respond “to the needs of the public.” Toward this goal, the government adopted a two-track policy. One, to upgrade autonomy and responsibility so that ministries will no longer be in the business of merely “issuing certificates, but drafting and implementing policy.” The prime minister hoped to establish a “one-stop shop” allowing the citizen to deal with one single servant “for a variety of administrative issues, such as applying for a pension, or getting a driver’s licence, rather than visiting of services to collect taxes” (Bulletin, 1998:2). The other would improve the technical and technological skills of civil servants so that they can respond to the needs of the citizenry. To help insure performance, the government decided that “civil servants must be evaluated, and set forth a set of “performance indices” (Bulletin, 1998:2). Finally, to assist citizens air their grievances, Simitis set up an ombudsman’s office and appointed Nikiforos Diamandouros, one of Greece’s most distinguished social scientists, to head the office. The ombudsman’s task is to “help restore the balance between the individual and the state” (Gilson, 1998:20).

Though anemic, these steps were in the right direction. The return of the conservatives in 2004 has been marked by reversals and return to clientelistic practices reminiscent of earlier decades. The much touted “reestablishment of the state” rhetoric was quickly abandoned in favor of the less ambitious “reform.” Hiring procedures have been altered to give preference to candidates with the “correct” political orientation. The personal interview, largely a subjective criterion, is given an inordinate amount of weight at the expense of written tests and other criteria. Despite promises to streamline the bureaucracy and strengthen its professionalism and efficiency, conservative rule is increasingly associated with scandals, inefficiency, and administrative incompetence.

There is little doubt that, despite efforts, the Greek bureaucracy’s efficiency, responsiveness, efficacy, and innovative capabilities have shown marginal improvement at best. Public dissatisfaction is at an all-time high. Fallen prey to the same insidious habits, and responding to the necessity to pay back political debts and place their own people in key posts after decades of conservative rule, the socialists followed many of the old nepotistic practices that they had so vehemently denounced while in opposition. According to sources cited by Sotiropoulos, “In November 1985 there were approximately 224,000 more employees working for the wider public sector than in December 1980.” In the first two years following their return to power in 1991, the New Democracy government added 60,000 more civil servants (1993:44). Despite the fact that the Simitis government managed to arrest the rate of growth, the total number of public employees (full-time and part-time) in 2004 was approximately 600,000. The number has gone up by at least 50,000 since the conservatives took power. This means that about 28%–29% of the total

workforce are employed by the government sector, giving Greece the dubious distinction of having one of the world's largest bureaucracies in proportion to the country's total population of less than 11 million inhabitants.

## 24.3 Analyzing the Failure to Reform

Greek political leaders of all ideological dispositions, although blaming each other, agree that the bureaucracy remains the single most important impediment in the country's path toward development. Public opinion polls consistently confirm this and express concern regarding Greece's ability to compete effectively within the EU.

By all accounts, the performance of Greek public administration has been and continues to be less than "satisficing," which March and Simon (1958:40) define as attaining a satisfactory degree of performance within given conditions. In spite of many efforts to reform, Greece's administrative apparatus displays most of the characteristics associated with the bureaucracies of developing or changing societies which include: imitative rather than indigenous patterns of public administration, deficiency in skilled manpower, emphasis on orientations that are other than productive, widespread discrepancy between form and reality, and a measure of generous operational autonomy (Heady, 1979:271–275). Why have attempts to bring about a developed bureaucratic machine capable of innovation not produced the anticipated results?

Bureaucracies are social organizations consisting of individual members of the society. Individual attitudes influence societal behavior, but societal norms, factors, and adaptations also impact on individual behavior (Armstrong, 1973:15–23). Societal organizations, including bureaucracies, in turn, are influenced by societal or ecological and individual factors, as well as internal dynamics and organizational norms present in all organizational settings. Though interrelated, societal, individual, and organizational norms and attitudes can be held responsible for the consistent failure of administrative reform in Greece. Let us examine each one separately.

### 24.3.1 *Societal Considerations*

There is widespread agreement in the literature that general societal dimensions, historical antecedents, and the political culture of a society explain that society's "orientation" toward administration and affect the attitudes, behavior, norms, and characteristics of its bureaucratic structure. For societal outlooks, particularly a country's political culture, "either support or potentially undermine the effectiveness of administrative structures" (Peters, 1978:41) and may also help or undermine reform efforts (Caiden, 1969:168–190).

These so-called ecological factors have a telling impact on the degree of "acceptability" a bureaucracy enjoys and the potential utility of reform. Acceptability and other key organizational imperatives such as willingness on the part of the public to accept bureaucratic impersonality and universality of rules have been used as a basis to array political cultures along a continuum from underdeveloped to rationalist or modern. The greater the degree of acceptance and rule universality the more developed a culture, and vice versa (Riggs, 1966:225–255). Similarly, the more developed a society, the higher the level of professionalization, and vice versa. A political system and its political culture pass through a process of development from traditional to transition before reaching an advanced stage referred to as developed. This process, and especially the transition phase of it, constitutes the norm in the so-called developing or changing societies of the third world (Riggs, 1964).



The traditional society (which nowadays exists only in a few isolated parts of the world) is characterized by a scriptural, minimal urbanization, low mobility, lack of education, subsistence agrarian economy, parochial political culture, low empathy, and a political system that performs very few functions (Palmer, 1985:44–45). Administration, to the extent it exists, performs minimal functions such as to collect taxes and enlist people for compulsory and unpaid labor. Nonprofessional criteria as kinship and patronage, as opposed to achievement, discipline, and ability are used as bases for appointment, promotion, and advancement.

In contrast, transitional societies are characterized by weak political institutions, lack of regime legitimacy, weak civil society, fragmented social organizations, unevenly developed economies, individualism, and ethnic and class cleavages. Developing societies seek simultaneously to develop economic infrastructures, differentiate their economies, and meet the rising expectations of their people—all with poor and often overstretched resources. The bureaucratic structures of these societies—which by and large tend to be replicas of prototypes in developed countries—are called upon to accomplish these monumental tasks.

Lacking expertise and other ingredients associated with modern bureaucratic organizations, the administrative structures of these states are further handicapped by lack of rule universality and acceptability of administration. Taking their cues from the social milieu, the bureaucracies of developing societies are permeated by formalism, lack of public service ethos, apparent rationality in the pattern of organization, and general reliance on traditional criteria of decision making. Bureaucratic rules provide only a point of departure for bargaining and negotiation in all public-civil service relations (Riggs, 1964:200–202). In other words, societal dimensions in traditional as well as developing societies are permeated by an environment where reform is talked about, but the objective conditions for implementation are not exactly present. Society is not prepared to accept reform any more than the bureaucracy, especially if reform means changes in existing norms and limitations in the lives of the citizenry.

The genesis, evolution, and character of administration in Greece till to day from the late 1820s, when the country became independent, exemplify the traditional transition scheme outlined above. The first 50 years of independence seem to correspond with the traditional phase of socio-political administrative culture. The decades from 1880 onward portray a process of transition characterized by a substantial enlargement of the role of the state in the economic and social life of the country. The transition phase is still going on. Historical antecedents, lack of an indigenous bureaucratic culture, economic difficulties, geographical factors, foreign interference, and cultural attitudes, to name only some, can be said to have influenced Greek political culture. Sotiropoulos (1993:51) is on the mark when he observes the country's civil society is weak, and attributes it to the fact that "voluntary associations are sparse and social organizations are sanctioned by the state." These are responsible for the low degree of acceptability of bureaucracy and universality of rules, and in turn contributed to the consistent failure of administrative reform in Greece.

### **24.3.2 Individual Perceptions**

Closely connected with the above are individual attitudes and behavior. Taking cues from the lack of civil society, Adamantia Pollis advances the Greek "concept of self" and analyzes its political and societal implications. Unlike in the West, where the concept of individualism explains a person's place and his relatedness to others and to society, in the Greek context individualism, Pollis (1965:31–32) argues, is "irrelevant" and individual relatedness is determined by membership

in groupings such as family, village, and local church. Values such as justice, equality, fairness, and uniform laws are highly regarded in the West, and their application is carried out independent of personal relationships. In Greece, on the other hand, subjectivity and partiality are more important than objectivity and impartiality. As a result the individual suspects political authority, is reserved and cautious in his dealings with government, and takes actions designed to evade state policies, laws, and regulations. The administrative apparatus, being part of the state, is viewed in the same manner (Diamandouros, 1983:45).

Greece's formalistic, rigid, and in many ways anachronistic educational system reinforces these attitudes. Until the socialist government pushed through a series of forms, educational curricula emphasized memorization as opposed to understanding and critical interpretation, theoretical but not practical and technical knowledge, conformity and no innovation, and abstract perfection in the place of rational and step-by-step problem-solving approach. These, and especially the latter, lead to an all-or-nothing notion that somehow there is a magic and perfect solution to every problem. Absence of critical thinking, on the other hand, propagates easy acceptance of plans (especially foreign-born ones) designed to remedy such problems. But when they do not produce magic and instant results, such plans are abandoned as quickly as they were adopted. With such individual attitudes prevailing, it should come as no surprise that administrative reform in Greece has had a very difficult time.

### **24.3.3 Institutional Imperatives**

Being products of this environment, Greek civil servants are not immune to societal and individual norms and behavior patterns. However, there are additional institutional or organizational dimensions that also impede reform. Social organizations, including bureaucracies, carve out their own territory and create their own environment. Set procedures, continuity, and avoidance of controversy and exposure are very much part of organizational life. Reform often means disruption of existing patterns of conduct, uncertainty, dislocation, scrutiny, and pressure to learn new roles and modes of conduct. As a result, civil servants usually "emerge as emotional defenders of a given order of things [and] do not drift naturally into the camp of change" (Marx, 1963:87-94). Greek bureaucrats are no exception to these organizational imperatives.

Caiden (1969:144-156) identifies four methods of introducing and implementing administrative reform: (1) imposed through political revolution; (2) introduced to remedy organizational rigidity (reform from within); (3) through the legal system; and (4) through changes in attitudes. The history of administrative reform in Greece indicates that, with the possible and partial exception of Venizelos' efforts which could be said to be generated by the 1909 military coup, all attempts to revamp the nation's administrative apparatus have taken the legal route. Various governments adopted West European prototypes and/or sketched out plans with little input from the civil servants themselves. The low prestige and acceptance of bureaucracies, coupled with lack of sophisticated management, knowledge and training, extremely detailed regulations, fear of reprisals, and absence of group consciousness in the civil service have relegated the Greek bureaucracy to a passive and often apathetic observer in discussions, debates, and plans aimed at administrative reform. But for reform measures to be relevant and to succeed, those directly affected (bureaucrats) must have a hand in their planning and execution. "The struggle for reform," Caiden (1969:183) observes, "can not be clothed in ideological garb or carried out by national sentiment. Administrative reform is a personal matter between people who have to work together all day and every day and carry on whether the reforms are successful or not."

## 24.4 A Parting Word

The consistent failure of administrative reform in Greece should not be considered an aberration. For “even in the most favorable circumstances reform is a tricky business” (Caiden, 1969:186) and, as the preceding discussion reveals, conditions in Greece have been less than favorable. Societal, individual, and institutional dimensions have mitigated against the success of reform, as have frequent and often abrupt governmental changes and lack of political will to fully implement such measures. But at the end, lasting reform “cannot depend on the superiority of power or the coercion of nonbelievers. Ultimately, those who resist reforms have to be won over in spirit as well as in body” (Caiden, 1969:154), which is easier said than done.

In recent years, many commentators have expressed the fear that membership in the EU will eventually lead to loss of national identity, language, and “Greekness.” It would be a heavenly gift if contemporary Greeks resisted cultural, linguistic, and ethnic assimilation, but availed themselves to the technological, managerial, and administrative know-how their more developed European partners can offer. Membership in the EU may give Greeks the opportunity to become acquainted and absorb national administrative cultures, techniques, and modes of conduct and slowly adapt rather than copy them in a wholesale and indiscriminate manner as was the case in the past. In the end, successful administrative reform in Greece may ultimately be based on foreign-born prototypes that failed so dismally in the past. Only time will tell.

## References

- Argyriades, D.C. (1965). Some aspects of civil service reorganization in Greece. *International Review of Administrative Service*, 314:297–309.
- Argyriades, D.C. (1968). The ecology of Greek administration: some factors affecting the development of the Greek civil service. In J.C. Peristiany (ed.), *Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology*, 339–349. The Hague: Mouton.
- Armstrong, J.A. (1973). *The European Administrative Elite*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Athens News Agency. (1985). Interview with Apostolos Lazaris, Minister of State (Feb. 5). *Bulletin*. (1996). Simitis announces public administration reforms. (Nov. 2):1–2.
- Bulletin*. (1998). PM attends session targeting reform of public administration. (Dec. 3):1–2.
- Caiden, G.E. (1969). *Administrative Reform*. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
- Close, D.H. (2002). *Greece Since 1945*. London: Longman/Pearson Education.
- Danopoulos, C.P. (1988). The military and bureaucracy in Greece 1967–1974. *Public Administration and Development*, 8(2):219–231.
- Dertilis, G. (1977). *Koinonikos Me taschimatismos Kai Stratiotiki Epekevasi, 1890–1909*. Athens, Greece: Exandas.
- Diamandouros, P.N. (1972). The formation of the modern Greek state: 1821–1828. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, New York.
- Diamandouros, P.N. (1983). Greek political culture in transition: historical origins, evolution, current trends. In R. Clogg (ed.), *Greece in the 1890s*. London: Macmillan.
- Gilson, G. (1998). Greece’s new ombudsman: the people’s champion. *Odyssey* (Nov./Dec.):20.
- Heady, F. (1979). *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, 2nd ed. New York: Marcel Dekker.
- Krislov, S. (1974). *Representative Bureaucracy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Langrod, G. (1964). *Reorganization of Public Administration in Greece*. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- Legg, K.R. (1977). The nature of the modern Greek state. In J.T.A. Koumoulides (ed.), *Greece in Transition*. London: Zeno Booksellers and Publishers.

- Legg, K.R. and Roberts, J.M. (1997). *Modern Greece: A Civilization on the Periphery*. Boulder, CO: West-View Press.
- March, J.G. and Simon, H. (1958). *Organizations*. New York: Wiley.
- Marx, F.M. (1963). The higher civil service as an action group in Western political development. In J. LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, pp. 62–95. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mouzelis, N. (1978). *Neo-Elliniki Koinonia: Opseis Ipanaptyxis*. Athens, GA: Exandas.
- Munkman, C.A. (1958). *American Aid to Greece—A Report on the First Ten Years*. New York: Praeger.
- Palmer, M. (1985). *Dilemmas of Political Development*, 3rd ed. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers.
- Papadopoulos, G. (1968). *To Pistevo Mas*, vol 1. Athens, GA: Government Printing Office.
- Pasok, (1981). *Diakyrixi Kyvernitikis Drastirioutitas—Symvoleo me ton Lao*. Athens, GA: Panellinio Socialistiko Kinima.
- Peters, B.G. (1978). *The Politics of Bureaucracy—A Comparative Perspective*. New York: Longman.
- Pollis, A. (1965). Political Implications of the modern Greek concept of self. *British Journal of Sociology*, XVI:29–47.
- Riggs, F.W. (1964). *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Riggs, F.W. (1966). Administrative development: An elusive concept. In J.D. Montgomery and W.J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development—Politics, Administration and Change*, pp. 225–256. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Shinn, R.S. (1985). *Government and Politics, Greece: A Country Study*, 223–286. Washington, DC: American University.
- Sotiropoulos, D.A. (1993). A crossroads with feet of clay: the state in post-authoritarian Greece. In H.J. Psomiades and S.B. Thomadaki (eds.), *Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order*, pp. 43–56. New York: Pella.
- Thompson, V.A. (1969). *Bureaucracy and Innovation*. University, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Transparency International* (2007). Corruption Perceptions Index.
- World Bank* (2008). *Doing Business 2008: Greece and Other Countries*.
- World Economic Forum* (2008). *Global Competitiveness Index, 2007–2008*.



---

**BUREAUCRATIC  
POLITICS IN ASIA  
AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

---

**VI**



## Chapter 25

---

# Globalization, Decentralization, and Public Entrepreneurship: Reorienting Bureaucracy in the People's Republic of China

---

Peter H. Koehn

### CONTENTS

25.1	Reorienting Bureaucracy in the PRC.....	410
25.1.1	Global Market-Oriented Bureaucracy.....	410
25.1.1.1	WTO and Increased Foreign Investment .....	412
25.1.1.2	Transnational Behavioral Competence.....	412
25.1.1.3	Employment Aspirations.....	412
2	5.1.2 Decentralized Bureaucracy.....	413
	25.1.2.1 Decentralization and Productive Ventures.....	414
	25.1.2.2 Decentralization and Trade and Commerce .....	415
	25.1.2.3 Decentralization and Fiscal Relations.....	416
	25.1.2.4 Decentralization and Labor Mobility .....	418
	25.1.2.5 Decentralization: Overall Directions .....	419
	25.1.3 Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy.....	420
	25.1.3.1 Types and Scope of Public Entrepreneurship .....	421
	25.1.3.2 Public Entrepreneurship: Earnings as Incentives.....	422



	25.1.3.3	Negative Consequences of the Emphasis on Public Entrepreneurship .....	423
2	5.2	Conclusion.....	424
N		otes .....	424
R		eferences.....	428

Bureaucracy in China has a rich and varied history. Upon its classical and Maoist legacies (see Harding, 1981; Chow, 2002:10–11, 368), the reopening of the China Mainland under Deng Xiao-ping invited the synergetic superimposition of a new wave of externally inspired and indigenous initiatives. Market-based globalization, decentralization, and public entrepreneurship constitute defining components of China's latest bureaucratic transformation.

## 25.1 Reorienting Bureaucracy in the PRC

In 1992, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992:2) found entrepreneurial U.S. public institutions emerging “slowly, quietly, far from the public spotlight ....” They referred to this phenomenon as “reinventing government,” and subtitled their book on the subject *How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. At least three of the shifts that Osborne and Gaebler focused on in their book lie at the core of China's profound late-twentieth century bureaucratic reorientation. These three transformations—market-oriented government, decentralized government, and enterprising government—present useful analytic wedges for understanding the reorientation of public bureaucracy in the People's Republic of China (PRC) (also see Ferlie et al., 1996:10–15).<sup>1</sup>

### 25.1.1 Global Market-Oriented Bureaucracy

Over the past several decades, China has been involved in an unprecedented move from central planning to a “socialist market economy” (Shi, 1998:6–7). The market-oriented transformation of state policy culminated in China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). On December 10, 2001, the PRC formally became the 143rd Member of the WTO (see Ferris and Zhang, 2002:431n). Accession to WTO placed China firmly in the grip of globalization (for details, see Cheong and Yee, 2003).<sup>2</sup> Suddenly, China finds itself as the world's most popular destination for foreign direct investment (Gallagher, 2005:1–2).

Among central government leaders in the PRC, a new consensus emerged that “China must enter the world economy through the WTO, and that market forces must expand” (Zweig, 2001:247; Chow, 2002:305). Has the radical shift from an isolationist Maoist outlook to a global market-based vision permeated the public bureaucracy? Reports on the national government bureaucracy suggest that widespread global and market-driven commitments have spearheaded China's remarkable economic growth (see, for instance, Walder, 1995:267–268). Through preparation for and participation in international conferences and negotiations, growing numbers of central ministry personnel have been socialized to accept international standards and operating procedures (Economy, 1998:265–283; Ross, 1998:835; Kent, 2002:357–359; Koehn, 2002b:246, 251). Through interface with foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and overseas (particularly overseas Chinese) investors (see Zweig, 2002:13), many national public administrators have become enamored with global economic integration.<sup>3</sup>

Less is known about the extent of bureaucratic reorientation at subnational levels in the PRC, where managers possess expansive connections and are largely responsible for the implementation of reform initiatives (Oi, 1995:1140; Zweig, 1999b). In contemporary China, “the role of local officials is central to the process of growth and change even in those areas that emphasize private enterprise” (Walder, 1995:264, 267–268; Walder and Oi, 1999:20; Sanyal and Guvenli, 2000:131). In light of their added obligations for implementing WTO-compliance measures, moreover, China’s subnational managers are expected to perform crucial roles in the postaccession era (see Duckett, 2001:33; Koehn, 2002c:399–400). While other responses (e.g., among those adversely affected by unprotected global competition) also will affect the extent of China’s postaccession integration into the global economy (see, for instance Solinger, 2002: 4–7, 25), the state’s receptivity to additional foreign business activity depends in large measure on the actions and reactions, and prevailing orientations, of local-level managers—whether they be partners/coworkers in joint ventures or subnational officials responsible for issuing local rules, regulations, licenses, required permissions, concessions, or benefits/favors (also see Sanyal and Guvenli, 2000:122).

Thus, “more attention needs to be paid to lower levels of the state in the development process ...” (Duckett, 2001:33). In this chapter, I draw upon the data collected in a 1997/1998 study of orientations held by 426 managers and future managers in Shanghai—China’s leading industrial city.<sup>4</sup> On the whole, the Shanghai study results corroborate David Zweig’s (1995:255) conclusions regarding the presence of strong local-level support for global interactions, and suggest that subnational officials and local enterprise managers will continue to be “market-oriented actors” (Walder, 1995:295). However, interesting and potentially important differences also exist in subnational bureaucratic dispositions toward global market challenges and opportunities. The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on age-based differences, with a particular reference to the “open-door” generation (also see Koehn, 2002a:118–119, 2002c:416–417).

At the time of survey administration, 43% of the participants in the Shanghai study were 30 years of age or younger.<sup>5</sup> Most of the others were in the 31–40 and 41–50 age groups (26% each), with a handful (18, or 4.2%) between 50 and 60. There is a reason to expect that managers in the 18–30 age group will relate in different ways to globalization, decentralization, and public entrepreneurship. In terms of socialization experiences, the formative years for this group were infused by China’s opening to the outside world and its dramatic shift under Deng Xiao-ping from a command to a market-oriented economy (also see Shi, 1999a:9–10). While a majority (57%) of the study participants in the 31–60 age group reported a career-disrupting Cultural Revolution experience (e.g., being sent to the countryside), only 1% of the 18–30 age group had been personally affected by the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, managers in the older age group were roughly twice as likely to be members or candidates for membership in the Chinese Communist Party in comparison with the “open-door generation” of managers and future managers (82% and 40%, respectively), while those aged 18–30 were twice as likely as the others to report intermediate or advanced English-language proficiency (59% versus 29%).

In this section, we consider several orientations of interest in terms of bureaucratic outlooks on issues related to China’s global market integration. In particular, we will explore the extent to which the open-door generation of Shanghai managers possess a different orientation toward globalization in comparison with their older colleagues. In this analysis, we first discuss dispositions toward foreign investment in China. This is followed by consideration of orientations regarding the importance of developing transnational competence among Chinese managers and of aspirations to pursue career opportunities with foreign-invested firms.

### 25.1.1.1 *WTO and Increased Foreign Investment*

Roughly 90% of these subnational managers favored placing priority on China's membership in the WTO. At the same time, only 56% of the study participants disagreed with the statement that "foreign investment in China should be *discouraged* by government policies." An even smaller proportion of the surveyed managers (18%) judged increased foreign investment as likely to be helpful in overcoming the specific constraints faced by their firm or agency. These findings suggest that the extent of favorable attitudes toward China's involvement in the global economy diminishes as managers shift their basis of evaluation from the general (China's position in the world) to the national economic interest and finally, to the level of their own organization's competitive situation.

Although the perspectives of younger and older managers on WTO accession and on China's foreign-investment policy did not differ substantially, the open-door generation proved to be much more favorably disposed regarding the value of increased foreign investment for their particular work context. Participants in the Shanghai study aged 18–30 were nearly three times more likely than those in the 31–60 age group were to rate additional foreign capital as an important factor in helping to overcome the obstacles that constrained their organization's performance (29% and 10%, respectively).

### 25.1.1.2 *Transnational Behavioral Competence*

With one notable exception, participants in the 1997/1998 Shanghai study evidenced broad-based support for key policy reforms and attendant sociopolitical measures that are required in the implementation phase of China's accession to WTO (see Zhao, 1999:218; Koehn, 2002c:408–409, 415–417). The exception is the lack of appreciation expressed by these managers and future managers for China's need to develop an interculturally competent workforce. In addition to basic education and technical/managerial skills, China's workforce must develop transnational competence<sup>6</sup> in order to participate effectively in the contemporary global economy (Koehn, 2007:255–263). However, only one-third of the study participants judged overcoming lack of intercultural competence, including skills in intercultural communication (see Howell, 1991:131; Ngai and Koehn, 1998:49–50), to be important for China's continued economic development.

The younger (aged 18–30) Shanghai managers proved only slightly more likely than the others did to foresee the value of enhanced transnational competence (35% versus 31% among those who were 31–60 years of age). Moreover, 30% of those aged 18–30 (versus only 19% of the older group) judged lack of intercultural competence to be "not important" as a challenge facing China.<sup>7</sup> The lack of substantially greater appreciation for the importance of transnational competence among the open-door generation of subnational bureaucrats as China opens its economy further and engages more extensively in transcontinental trade and investment, suggests that weaknesses in this area are likely to continue to constrain the effectiveness of Chinese participants in global and domestic economic transactions.

### 25.1.1.3 *Employment Aspirations*

In postaccession China, the demand for qualified managers far exceeds the supply. The inclinations reported by the Shanghai participants reveal surging interest in careers with foreign-affiliated

entities and widespread preference for the kinds of incentives that give foreign-invested firms a competitive hiring and retention advantage over domestic organizations.

Only 29 participants in the Shanghai study (7.5% of the total) worked for foreign joint ventures and only 12 respondents (3.1%) worked at wholly foreign-owned companies at the time of the survey. When asked about the type of organization they most would like to work for in their future career, however, the responses reveal a shift in employment aspirations among these subnational managers. Forty respondents (11% of the total) indicated that they aspired to work for a foreign joint venture and 51 study participants (14%) chose the wholly foreign firm as their preferred future employer (also see Whiteley et al., 2000:48). The shift in career aspirations is most pronounced among the open-door generation. Managers and students who were 18–30 years of age proved considerably more likely to prefer careers with foreign joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned firms than older managers did (32% and 17%, respectively). Furthermore, the younger age group was much more likely than those in the older age group were to indicate that they most preferred to work outside the China mainland—particularly in Western Europe or North America—in the future (35% versus 18%).

From the perspective of FIEs in the Mainland that must attract qualified Chinese managers, the employment-aspirations findings of this study, especially those reported by younger managers and future managers, are quite promising (also see Guthrie, 1999:201). Conversely, these findings are not encouraging for the PRC government agencies and state enterprises that increasingly face direct competition for talented managers from foreign companies and joint ventures with foreign partners (see Nie et al., 2002:372–373). A sizeable minority of the highly educated and talented managers we surveyed are likely to be receptive to recruitment campaigns by new and expanding foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign firms.

Among other changes, China's accession to the WTO opens the door further for foreign direct investment in the Mainland economy. Increased foreign corporate competition, in turn, is likely to spur internal administrative reorientation. The next sections analyze the impact on China's bureaucracy of two particularly interesting reforms: decentralization and accelerated incentives for public entrepreneurship.

### **25.1.2 Decentralized Bureaucracy**

In China's reform era, provincial and subprovincial units of government have acquired their own spheres of authority and means to exercise power. The devolution of powers from the center to multiple levels of subnational government<sup>8</sup> mainly is based on documents formulated by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council. In China, "central-local power is not divided in a clear-cut way; the relations between the two, to a large degree, are not institutionalized; and informal rules and institutions ... play a[n] ... important role in the interaction between the center and the provinces" (Zheng, 2000:221).

Most importantly, China's "decentralization of power is not merely at the discretion of the central political authorities" (Montinola et al., 1995:52–53; also Zheng, 2006:39–41, 349). At the same time that the central government and the CCP retained ultimate authority,<sup>9</sup> they increasingly are forced to recognize the de facto discretionary powers of local government officials, to legitimate subnational policy initiatives, and to decentralize economic decision making because (1) without the cooperation of provincial governments and leaders "the center cannot accomplish much" (Zheng, 2000:220–223, 227–228); (2) both the national government and localities have become dependent on the benefits of decentralization for continued growth of the economy, regime legitimacy, and meeting

operating expenses (Bickford, 1994:473; Montinola et al., 1995: 53, 73; Li, 1998:292, 297, 299; Goldman and MacFarquhar, 1999:25; Xia, 2000:181, 204; Zheng, 2006:349–350); and (3) subnational discretion has been strengthened by an explosion of domestic and transnational ties and partnerships with nonstate actors (see Koehn and Yin, 2002:xi–xxxv; Zweig, 2002:17, 36–37, 162, 251–252, 274).<sup>10</sup>

One can distinguish two basic types of decentralization in China: “administrative decentralization whereby powers are devolved to lower levels of administration (local governments and/or local branches of central agencies) and economic decentralization whereby powers of planning, coordination and management are devolved from administrative units at any level to enterprises” (White, 1991:215). In the 1980s and 1990s, China experienced a dramatic transformation from a command economy under direct state control to a socialist market economy where the center relies on indirect levers of intervention (Cheung, 1998:148–150; Goldman and MacFarquhar, 1999:6; Chow, 2002:50). The decentralization of authority over economic policies from central to local governments and to state-owned enterprises, has constituted one of the most important aspects of China’s reform effort (Montinola et al., 1995:61; Zheng, 2006:364–365).

Decentralization in China is neither uniform in application nor consistent in direction. In China’s “fragmented authoritarian” political system (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988), institutional relations are constantly shifting; ambiguity and variability are widespread (Zheng, 2006:382). In most respects, moreover, public administrators at different levels exert influence over each other in interdependent and synergistic rather than zero-sum, top-down or bottom-up, relationships (Li, 1998:297; Xia, 2000:3; Manning, 2002:92–93). One finds centralization superimposed upon decentralization, the withdrawal of national institutions from certain provincial affairs and their selective reinsertion in others (Zheng, 2006:367–370), and dual vertical and horizontal lines of authority and channels of communication. The fragmentation of administrative authority is apparent in the prevailing system of dual subordination, whereby national ministries at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy supervise lower-level departments at provincial and subprovincial levels at the same time that subnational administrative units are controlled by and dependent upon their respective local governments and party officials (Alford and Shen, 1998:415–416). Consequently, “administrative communications are channeled from top to bottom (vertically, in lines) and also from governments to their departments (horizontally, in pieces)” (Manion, 2003:455). In addition, the Civil Service Law approved by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 2005 tightened the CCP’s control over public administrators at all levels (Chan and Suizhou, 2007:384, 389–395).<sup>11</sup>

The next sections explore the reorientation of China’s bureaucracy by focusing on changes in economic-policy roles as a result of decentralization initiatives (also see Orban et al. 2003). Four roles are selected for illustrative purposes: involvement in productive ventures, trade and commerce, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and regulation of labor mobility.

### 25.1.2.1 *Decentralization and Productive Ventures*

China’s economic decentralization thrust subnational entities to the forefront of state involvement in productive operations (Xia, 2000:97). The transfer of control over state enterprises from the center to subnational governments has transformed the economic landscape in China. By 1998, local governments controlled a majority of all state assets linked to industrial and commercial enterprises (Lou, 2000:242). By the end of 1999, “among 520 major state firms, 94 firms were

managed by the central government, and more than 420 state firms were managed by provincial governments” (Li, 2000:10).

The expanded output and productivity of public firms have been particularly striking at the county, township, and village levels (Walder, 1995:276). Increasingly, at the city level, firms are operating with separate budgets. The managers of municipal government bureaus are withdrawing from the day-to-day administrative decisions of their enterprises, and are concentrating on the financial-risk analysis and feasibility planning required for major investment decisions along with hiring/firing, inspection, monitoring, and regulation (Walder, 1995:287, 289; Guthrie, 1999:32–33, 41, 200).

### 25.1.2.2 *Decentralization and Trade and Commerce*

Administrative bodies found at the central government level and among local governments from province through county, share important trade and commerce responsibilities. These include the bureau of business administration (responsible for market orders), the bureau of pricing (oversees local price policy, approves price increases of some products, and monitors market prices)<sup>12</sup> (see Wong et al., 1995:122; Lu, 1996:36), and the bureau of foreign trade (in charge of foreign investment, import and export). Reform initiatives have transferred responsibility for important trade and commerce decisions to local governments. For instance, the Ministry of Trade delegated authority to issue export licenses to provincial bureaus of foreign trade, and the center allowed special economic zones to waive import duties on materials processed for export (see Chow, 2002:295). In the 1990s, moreover, some local governments “authorized foreign retailers [e.g., Carrefour] to expand their operations far beyond the restrictive parameters established by the national regulations” (Lardy, 2002:149).

As a result of their shared power over economic decision making and economic policy execution with the central government and their power to operate local state-owned enterprises, subnational entities have been able to engage in local protectionism. The protectionism encouraged by decentralization has resulted in the erection of barriers to domestic free trade—particularly of high-profit-margin manufactured goods and raw materials in short supply—and has hindered the establishment of a uniform market economy. For instance, seven provinces established automotive-assembly plants as their primary industry (Xia, 2000:92), and at least one provincial government reportedly “instructed its automobile registration department to refuse to issue license plates to unauthorized automobiles produced outside the province” (Montinola et al., 1995:65–66, 53, 73–75; also see Lardy, 2002:148–150).<sup>13</sup>

The changing distribution of central–local responsibilities, incentives, and risks with respect to foreign investment and trade is particularly instructive. Decentralization of authority to establish foreign trade corporations (FTCs) and to approve and benefit from multi-million-dollar foreign-investment projects has empowered local governments—particularly in special economic zones, coastal open cities, and development zones—to become the driving force behind the Mainland’s phenomenal export-led growth (Montinola et al., 1995:62–63; Shirk, 1996:197–198, 203, 205; Zhan, 1997:5; Xia, 2000:200).<sup>14</sup> Rewards included entitlement to retain from 25% to 100% of foreign-exchange earnings (Howell, 1991:128). In coastal China, in particular, “the transnational alliance between local ruling authorities and foreign investors” has helped to transform central–local relations by strengthening the subnational level (Zweig, 1995:254–255, 268).

Opportunities for subnational government involvement in joint ventures with foreign investors have increased following China’s admission to the WTO. In accordance with the agree-

ment on WTO accession reached by the United States and China on November 15, 1999, “major services, communication, insurance, the foreign exchange of Chinese currency, legal practice, accounting, consultation on taxes and management, architecture, engineering, city planning, hospitals, computer services, hotel and travel service” have been opened to foreign participation (Tang, 2000:120). China’s post accession reforms empower local governments to approve foreign investments in services, road transportation, commerce, travel, hospitals, scientific research, and education. Moreover, foreign investors now are allowed to register directly with the local bureau of business administration like domestic investors do and, then, to deliver their certification to the committee on foreign trade for approval (Tang, 2000:120–122).<sup>15</sup>

### 25.1.2.3 *Decentralization and Fiscal Relations*

In China, taxes are divided into distinct local, central, and shared categories. Exclusive revenue sources for the central government include tariffs, excise taxes on cigarettes and alcohol (see Wong et al., 1995:91), and income tax and profits from the state enterprises managed by the central government. Exclusive local government revenue sources are the business tax, income tax and profits from state firms managed by local governments, individual income tax, tax on use of urban land, urban maintenance and development tax, contract tax, agriculture tax, and tax on the use of cultivated land (Xiang, 1994:117–118). While these taxes are designated as local, the central government still sets the rates and base of all taxes (Wong et al., 1995:84; Wang, 1997:807).<sup>16</sup> The 1994 fiscal reform required that the tax exemptions issued by local governments must be approved by the State Council. This greatly restricted the discretionary power of subnational governments (Wang, 1997:803–806). However, the 1994 reform did not affect the “extrabudgetary funds” that provide local governments with substantial resources that are “utterly beyond central budgetary control” (Wang, 1997:808, 814–815; Walder, 1995:280).

The 1994 reform also centralized the collection of shared taxes (Wang, 1997:803; Zheng, 2006:369).<sup>17</sup> Moreover, sharing ratios became standardized and applied to all provinces. They no longer are subject to intergovernmental negotiations (Wang, 1997:802). For instance, the central government takes 75% of the value-added tax (VAT) and local governments receive 25%. Later, the center decided to retain 97% of the stamp tax on securities exchanges on the grounds that the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are national in scope.

Table 25.1 shows that local governments greatly expanded their share of national revenue from 1953 to 1998. Nevertheless, their more recent share (just over half) is down considerably from the 87% secured during the peak year of 1977 and the 78% received in 1993 just prior to the reform (see, however, Wang, 1997:809). The figures in Table 25.1 also confirm the fluid nature of revenue collection in the PRC. The proportion received by the center and by subnational entities has shifted dramatically over time. The central government, for instance, secured 83% of all revenues in 1953, just 13% in 1977, 41% by 1984, only 22% in 1993, and 56% in 1994. From 1995 onward, moreover, the national total increased by 100 billion yuan or more each year.

On the expenditure side, the local government proportion also increased dramatically in the last half of the twentieth century. From about one-quarter in 1953, local government expenditures rose until they accounted for over two-thirds of the national total by 1990. They remained at this level, or slightly higher, throughout the 1990s (see Table 25.2).<sup>18</sup> Since the State Council ultimately controls aggregate spending through the power to approve the consolidated national budget, and the Ministry of Finance issues detailed regulations that limit and guide local expenditures (Wong et al., 1995:83–84), this situation can be attributed, in part, to the center’s tendency to shift

**Table 25.1 Central and Local Revenues and Their Proportion of National Revenue**

Year	Absolute Amount (in Billion Yuan)		Proportion Natl Revenue (%)		
	Nation	Central	Local	Central	Local
1953	21,324	17,702	3,622	83.0	17.0
1958	37,962	30,526	7,436	80.4	19.6
1966	55,871	19,649	36,222	35.2	64.8
1977	87,446	11,385	76,061	13.0	87.0
1980	115,993	28,445	87,548	24.5	75.5
1984	164,286	66,547	97,739	40.5	59.5
1990	293,710	99,242	194,468	33.8	66.2
1991	314,948	93,825	221,123	29.8	70.2
1992	348,337	97,951	250,386	28.1	71.9
1993	434,895	95,751	339,144	22.0	78.0
1994	521,810	290,650	231,160	55.7	44.3
1995	624,220	325,662	298,558	52.2	47.8
1996	740,799	366,107	374,692	49.4	50.6
1997	865,114	422,692	442,422	48.9	51.1
1998	987,595	489,200	498,395	49.5	50.5

Source: Lou, J. (ed.), *Financial Statistics of New China in 50 Years*, Economics Press, Beijing, 2000, 79–80.

responsibilities downward in the absence of laws assigning specific expenditure obligations to different levels of government (Wong et al., 1995:114–115, 122–123; Wang, 1997:806).

Multiple and complex transfers of funds occur among different levels of government in China.<sup>19</sup> The 1994 reform did not effectively address the issue of resource transfers between the center and the rich and poor provinces (see Wong et al., 1995:127–128; West and Wong, 1995:81–82). Decisions regarding which provinces secure transfers, and the amount involved, are still made in ad hoc, top-down fashion in the absence of formally established rules (Wang, 1997:807–808). As a result of decentralization reforms and “the dwindling ability of the central budget to play a redistributive role..., local governments [are] almost entirely dependent on their own tax bases to finance government and investment.” This situation has required that local governments become deeply involved in entrepreneurial activities, and has resulted in “growing regional disparities in service provision” (Wong et al., 1995:128; Park et al., 1996:777; Becquelin, 2002:10–12).



**Table 25.2 Central and Local Expenditures and Their Proportion of National Expenditure**

Year	Absolute Amount (in Billion Yuan)		Proportion Natl Revenue (%)		
	Nation	Central	Local	Central	Local
1953	21,921	16,205	5,716	73.9	26.1
1958	40,036	17,722	22,314	44.3	55.7
1966	53,765	33,911	19,854	63.1	36.9
1977	84,353	39,370	44,983	46.7	53.3
1980	122,883	66,681	56,202	54.3	45.7
1984	170,102	89,333	80,769	52.5	47.5
1990	308,359	100,447	207,912	32.6	67.4
1991	338,662	109,081	229,581	32.2	67.8
1992	374,220	117,044	257,176	31.3	68.7
1993	464,230	131,206	333,024	28.3	71.7
1994	579,262	175,443	403,819	30.3	69.7
1995	682,372	199,539	482,833	29.2	70.8
1996	793,755	215,127	578,628	27.1	72.9
1997	923,356	252,250	670,106	27.4	72.6
1998	1079,818	312,560	767,258	28.9	71.1

Source: Lou, J. (ed.), *Financial Statistics of New China in 50 Years*, Economics Press, Beijing, 2000, 157–158.

#### 25.1.2.4 Decentralization and Labor Mobility

China's "floating population" of rural migrants residing legally and without documentation in urban centers is variously estimated at between 50 and 100 million (see Solinger, 1999b:17–23). In China, local governments are primarily responsible for regulating population movements. They have attempted both to influence labor migration through the power to issue "blue chop" hukou (resident registration) and temporary resident-registration papers (L. Wong, 1994; Solinger, 1999b), and to restrict the entrance of migrants without papers (Eckholm, 2000:A10). The blue chop of resident registration can be issued by the police stations of towns, townships, counties, and cities, to investors and professionals who originally are not permanent residents of the locality, and the temporary paper can be issued to skilled and nonskilled workers who do not hold permanent residency in the city or town. Many rural–urban migrants without *hukou* have formed service-providing nonstate communities of their own in the face of their ineligibility for public medical, educational, housing, and welfare benefits (Solinger, 1999a:233–239; 1999b:249–275).

As state restrictions on labor movement have been relaxed,<sup>20</sup> local governments have assumed increasing responsibility for dealing with the effects of unemployment and labor mobility. In recent years, China's largest cities commonly have experienced 8%–9% unemployment rates—largely due to streamlining of the state industrial structure (Tang, 2000:280). In response, local governments have organized “reemployment engineering” by providing the unemployed with relief funds, training, and job-placement recommendations. In addition, municipal governments have established (and manage) professional or worker markets in cities such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing, and Guangzhou. In these “markets,” which primarily cater to professionals, “enterprises and laborers select each other for their own needs in order to form the best combination between capital and labor” (Liu and Dai, 1991:832). At the same time, some cities have barred migrants from holding certain jobs (Eckholm, 2000:A10).

### 25.1.2.5 Decentralization: Overall Directions

In addition to the aspects of the economic policy discussed, Chinese local governments also are responsible for the enforcement of environmental-protection regulations,<sup>21</sup> family planning, elementary and secondary education, public safety, social welfare,<sup>22</sup> urban land allocation, community and religious affairs, health, and sports.<sup>23</sup> Generally speaking, Chinese local governments (with the exception of a few cities such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing, and Dalian) have not strictly enforced environmental regulations because they view such action as antithetical to the goal of economic development and because of financial ties to offending local enterprises (see, for instance, Rosenthal, 2000:A11). However, the burden on the nature of China's huge population (over 1.3 billion people) has become so heavy that environmental protection is increasingly recognized as a local government function that needs to be treated equally with development of China's economy (see Koehn, 2008).<sup>24</sup>

As a result of the shifts in functional responsibility from the center to local levels, many people “feel that the *direct* impact of the central government on their lives has declined” while the impact of municipal government has increased (Shi, 1999b:149–150). Furthermore, the open-door-generation participants in the Shanghai management study proved considerably more likely *not* to agree that the “central government exercises greater control over China's economy than local governments do” in comparison with the older (aged 31–60) managers. Nearly half (46%) of those aged 18–30 perceived subnational entities as currently performing economic roles of greater or equal influence than those exercised by the center, while only one quarter (26%) of the participating managers aged 31–60 shared this views.

Nevertheless, decentralization in China has not been uniform in scope or effect. Some subnational jurisdictions have been favored by economic reforms; others have not. Consequently, local governments in the China Mainland have not presented a united front vis-à-vis the center (Xia, 2000:204). In terms of future directions, it is revealing that in certain relatively advantaged provinces where the decentralization process has progressed further, many officials prefer work at a level of government that offers greater autonomy and financial rewards relative to higher levels. In Guangdong Province, for instance, “township officials do not want to be promoted to the county level, municipal officials do not want to be promoted to the provincial level, and provincial officials do not want to be promoted to the central government” (Montinola et al., 1995:70).

Although decentralization and centralization are likely to continue to oscillate in China, recentralization will be complicated by resistance from entrenched subnational administrators who are inclined and positioned to defend their new economic-management roles and privileges

(Howell, 1991:139) and by the center's incapacity to monitor the Mainland's exploding market economy (Montinola et al., 1995:70). The interesting question in terms of future developments is in which market-based direction the subnational entities in China are headed: the local developmental state, which supports enterprises with infrastructure<sup>25</sup> and favorable conditions, or the local entrepreneurial state, which is directly involved in profit and risk taking through investments in productive economic activity (see Blecher, 1991:267–268; Duckett, 2001:30). Following the transformation from a command economy to a socialist market economy, some local governments are gradually shifting their major function from direct involvement in the local economy to ensuring the construction and maintenance of local infrastructure that will facilitate enterprise production and bring about improved living conditions for the citizens (see Zhou et al., 2001:3, 7–8).<sup>26</sup> The increased emphasis on construction is reflected in the growth of the Shanghai Municipal Government's expenditures on infrastructural investment from 784 million yuan in 1981, to 41.3 billion yuan in 1997 (Shanghai Municipality, 1998:98).<sup>27</sup> While there is evidence of a shift toward developmental roles, subnational governments remain preoccupied with income-earning activities. Moreover, in terms of future prospects, it is noteworthy that a majority of the open-door-generation managers in the Shanghai study (53%) versus only 38% of the older generation of managers did *not* support the statement that China's municipal governments "should focus on city planning, infrastructure development, and environmental protection rather than on management of the economy."

### 25.1.3 *Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy*

According to Milton Eisman (1991:41), "public entrepreneurship includes activating unutilized resources, inspiring and supporting nonroutine behavior," and "initiating and facilitating action that would otherwise not occur." Public entrepreneurs innovate, invest in new opportunities, accept risks and challenges, and generate new combinations of materials, resources, and personnel. The entrepreneur is not only capable of perceiving valuable opportunities, but also succeeds in leveraging the resources required to realize them (Luke, 1995:150; Bernier and Haffsi, 2007:498). Most fundamentally, therefore, the energies of the public entrepreneur and the enterprising government agency are focused on earning rather than spending money (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992:20). In this effort, they are often advantaged by privileged access to the resources and strategic information available to the state at the same time that they are encumbered by political and community obligations that transcend enterprise considerations (see Oi, 1995:1139; Gore, 1998:100–102, 107; Duckett, 2001:32).

The emergence of entrepreneurial bureaucracy in the PRC is arguably the most dramatic bureaucratic transformation in the twentieth century. Since 1979, civilian and military personnel at all levels have been expected to be entrepreneurial in order to mobilize sufficient financial resources to provide public services and to introduce new programs. By 1997, for instance, higher-education institutions typically "were expected to raise funds to cover over half of their total expenditures" (Cheng, 1997:4).

Decentralization facilitated China's bureaucratic transformation by allowing local government officials to carve out entrepreneurial roles. Most responded enthusiastically; for instance, by kick-starting rural industrial production through village and township enterprises (see Oi, 1995:1147, 1135–1136).<sup>28</sup> This section explores this third dimension of bureaucratic reorientation in China by referring to the types and scope of public-entrepreneurship practice, the role of entrepreneurial earnings as performance incentives, and negative consequences of the emphasis on income generation.

### 25.1.3.1 Types and Scope of Public Entrepreneurship

With the erosion of state revenues and the attendant “severe fiscal squeeze,” along with pressures to reduce government personnel, public administrators in China turned to entrepreneurship, or “business fever,” out of necessity (Bickford, 1994:462; J. Wong, 1994:6–7; Naughton, 1996:316).<sup>29</sup> For instance, Lam Tao-chiu and James Perry reported in 2001 that “an official in a medium-sized city in Guangdong Province stated that his bureau’s annual administrative expenses were close to one million  *yuan*, but the budgetary appropriation was ... less than one-third of that. He has to secure the difference either from the revenue-generating activities of the bureau itself or from the service organizations under it” (p. 30).<sup>30</sup>

Public entrepreneurs in China have responded to the revenue imperative by pursuing diverse types of resource-mobilizing activities. Some agencies directly raise revenue for their own use via informal levies (J. Wong, 1994:6) or user fees for services rendered. One lucrative illustration of the latter method is the income secured by the Examination Centre, a central government service organization under the Ministry of Personnel, as a result of its monopoly over examinations establishing professional and technical qualifications (Lam and Perry, 2001:30–31).<sup>31</sup> Units of the People’s Liberation Army sell their labor on construction projects, rent military vehicles for civilian use, operate hotels and hospitals, sell technology-transfer contracts, and speculate in currency futures (Bickford, 1994:466, 468). At the municipal level, the Guangzhou Research Institute of Environmental Science, a service organization of the Guangzhou Environmental Protection Bureau, derived more than half of its 1996 budget from environmental-impact-assessment and environmental-planning services provided for governments and developers in other cities, and from research projects conducted for foreign environmental organizations (Lo et al., 2001:45, 53–54). The Shanghai Environmental Publicity and Education Center derives nearly 20% of its budget from property rental (Lo et al., 2001:47).

However, the preferred form of bureaucratic entrepreneurship in China has been the extrabudgetary state enterprise. Since their start-up capital “comes from the extrabudgetary funds of the relevant departments,” such government-linked companies<sup>32</sup> are placed off-budget. This facilitates tax reduction and tax exemption by governments at all levels, which, in turn, allows the retention of more resources for loan repayment to, profit sharing with, and fund extraction by, the supervising department (Bickford, 1994:463; Oi, 1995:1140; Naughton, 1996:316; Li, 1998:188–189). In addition to appointing managers who possess profit-maximizing promise and who are granted considerable autonomy,<sup>33</sup> subnational governments typically use a corporatist strategy that pools resources and debts. This allows for the redistribution of income “among different sectors and enterprises within the local corporate state.” For instance, “like a large corporation, villages and townships may use the profits of their richer enterprises to see poorer ones through a downturn in the market or to start new enterprises from the profits of the more prosperous ones” (Oi, 1995:1140–1141).

Within two decades, the scope of public entrepreneurship in the PRC mushroomed dramatically at all levels of government. Government-linked enterprises include powerful, diversified multiprovincial and even multinational companies (J. Wong, 1994:7). Provincial governments run factories to raise income for schools (Wong et al., 1995:129). Service organizations reporting to municipal government agencies have set up numerous businesses to conduct commercial, profit-making activities (Lo et al., 2001:42–49; also see Duckett, 2001:26). Chinese universities have become major players in the market economy (Cheng, 1997:5). In 1997, for instance, Fudan University in Shanghai operated 33 small and mid-sized companies, including joint ventures with the U.S., Japanese, Hong Kong, and overseas

Chinese investors, mostly (80%) managed by faculty from a variety of academic departments. Total annual profits from these enterprises amounted to roughly 45 billion yuan, of which 20 billion was used to support Fudan University's higher-education budget.<sup>34</sup>

The government agency with the most far-reaching business undertakings is likely to be the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA owns and operates over 10,000 national enterprises that service the military's daily needs, thousands of collective enterprises run by individual military units at every level down to local regiments and by relatives of work units, and some 200 joint ventures with domestic and foreign partners. In the late 1980s, the PLA "set up its first transnational corporation, the Sanjiu Enterprise Group." By 1992, the corporation consisted of 34 enterprises with subsidiaries in Germany, the United States, and four other countries. Thomas Bickford estimated that the PLA secured the annual income from its diverse enterprises in the range of 3–6 billion dollars, while its official budget (1992) was 6.7 billion dollars. In light of the vast scope of the PLA's business undertakings, he concludes that "an entire generation of officers and enlisted men is being socialized into the workings of the market" (Bickford, 1994:460–461, 466–467, 469, 472).

### 25.1.3.2 *Public Entrepreneurship: Earnings as Incentives*

In his analysis of "market communism" in China, Lance Gore (1998:83) points out that "by turning into partial market players who mix political clout with market opportunities, a crop of bureaucratic entrepreneurs has emerged from the ranks of the cadre class, and played a key role in propelling spectacular economic growth." By 1998, for instance, a majority (53%) of the 410 reporting participants in the Shanghai management study agreed with the statement "I prefer entrepreneurship (including risk, competition, and potentially high payoff) to economic security."<sup>35</sup> Remarkably, entrepreneurial orientations proved to be more widespread among more experienced managers than among the open-door generation. On the whole, 62% of the former versus 42% of the latter preferred entrepreneurship over security.<sup>36</sup>

The rapid entrepreneurial reorientation of China's command-driven communist bureaucracy constitutes one of the most dramatic transformations in the history of public management. What accounts for the speed and scope of this transformation? The shaping influences are numerous and complex and monetary incentives are certainly among them. New opportunities to retain earnings at the subnational government and individual levels merit special attention in this connection.

Although some of the personnel occupying bureaucratic positions at the turn of the century were the same individuals who held office in the late Maoist period, the incentives "embedded in the institutions that shape the actions of officials" had changed (Oi, 1995:1136). Under Mao Tse-tung:

the constraints of the state plan and Maoist fiscal system provided localities with little inducement to generate additional revenues. Localities were required to turn over all or most of the revenues generated within the locality to the upper levels, which in return provided budget allocations for expenditures. What surplus remained within the locality was subject to higher-level approval before use (Oi, 1995:1136).

In post-Maoist China, by contrast, economic decentralization has meant that "if investments are made wisely, local governments can meet expenses, keep a portion of the extra tax revenues ... and

enjoy larger amounts of extra-budgetary non-tax revenues.”<sup>37</sup> Extrabudgetary income streams, including the collection of fees from enterprises in excess of formal tax obligations, are particularly valued because they offer discretionary funds for further local government entrepreneurial activity (Huang, 1990:450; Oi, 1995:1141; Wong et al., 1995:129–130; Xia, 2000:88)<sup>38</sup> and for rewarding administrative personnel.<sup>39</sup> By allowing their firms to retain some of their profits and to operate with independent budgets or accounting systems, governments have expanded the economic freedom of public enterprises and their performance incentives (Guthrie, 1999:33).<sup>40</sup> At all levels and divisions<sup>41</sup> of government, China has succeeded in turning public managers into entrepreneurs by adopting principles consistent with Osborne and Gaebler’s admonitions (1992:209) that “if managers cannot keep any of their earnings, they are not likely to pursue them. If managers’ budgets are supplied regardless of whether their departments earn anything, they are not likely to spend time trying to make money.”

For the individual bureaucratic agent as well as the subnational unit of government, the opportunity to share surplus revenues has provided an important performance-based incentive (Oi, 1995:1137). In his study of management-training centers in Hefei (Anhui Province) and Changzhou (Jiangsu Province), for instance, David Zweig (2000:222) found that market-oriented, entrepreneurial activities emerged once the organizations linked their institutional and employee income streams to upgrades in productivity and profitability. In terms of individual motivation to engage in bureaucratic entrepreneurship, the key has been delegating control over earnings to the work-unit level (see Gore, 1998:97). At most major Chinese universities, for instance, virtually every academic college/department engages in its own fund raising, deposits the revenues generated in its own private “bank,” and determines how such monies are allocated.<sup>42</sup>

The available evidence suggests that Chinese managers have pumped the overwhelming proportion of retained earnings into bonuses (Huang, 1990:447; Lo et al., 2001:46, 49). This tendency confirms that China’s bureaucratic entrepreneurialism “is primarily aimed at distribution, not at capital accumulation” and remains sensitive to the social pressures and needs that exist within public organizations, particularly at the work-unit level.<sup>43</sup> Until recently, the prevalence of these values has limited salary differentials in domestic organizations and often led to across-the-board bonus awards.<sup>44</sup>

Whether local entrepreneurial state initiatives in China are sustained or short-lived will depend, in large measure, on the dispositions of the open-door generation of public managers (also see Gore, 1998:97; Duckett, 2001:30). The monetary-incentive findings of the Shanghai management study are suggestive in this regard. About 84% of the participants aged 18–30 in 1997/1998 viewed “high salary and bonuses” as personally important workplace considerations, and 30% indicated that these incentives were *very* important to them.<sup>45</sup>

### 25.1.3.3 *Negative Consequences of the Emphasis on Public Entrepreneurship*

Along with contributions to entrepreneurial behavior, an emphasis on bureaucratic earning has been associated with negative trade-offs in public-administration settings (see Koehn, 1996:130–133). China is not an exception in this regard. The linkage of government agency and business activity has resulted in unfair competition and conflicts of interest (see Lo et al., 2001:55). Poor areas that possess few, if any, opportunities for local revenue mobilization are unable to invest in development, and to provide the quantity and quality of public goods and services available to residents of wealthier subnational jurisdictions (Park et al., 1996:752, 776; Cheng, 1997:9–10; Duckett,

2001:32). Other serious problems attributable, in part, to the emphasis on material gain over public concerns include corruption and loss of societal respect for public administration (see Bickford, 1994:473; Zweig, 1999a).

In China, as elsewhere, one of the most troubling consequences of emphasizing entrepreneurship in the public sector is the tendency to deflect attention and energy from pressing human-service-delivery needs and to compromise other important organizational goals. Goal displacement takes several forms. In Tianjin, Jane Duckett found that many of the enterprises initiated by municipal and submunicipal departments conducted business that was unrelated to their parent department's mission. For instance, some public-property departments "set up trade companies and one had opened a large department store" (Duckett, 2001:26). Public-service organizations throughout the Mainland have been increasingly "forced to orient themselves toward earning revenue instead of providing indispensable public and social services" (Lam and Perry, 2001:32). Income-generating activities consume the bulk of the public entrepreneur's time and energy. As a consequence of preoccupation with resource mobilization, public managers strive to minimize the demands of their assigned state responsibilities, and cut support for the service activities of other government agencies (see, for instance, Lo et al., 2001:46, 49). Within the PLA as well, "too many military personnel are taking time away from their regular duties to make money in or for the enterprises." For instance, "one military medical school was running 72 enterprises at one point with the result that very little time was left over for teaching" (Bickford, 1994:470).

## 25.2 Conclusion

China's public bureaucracy experienced a dramatic reorientation in the final two decades of the twentieth century. To a considerable extent, Chinese bureaucracy today is global-market-oriented, decentralized, and enterprising. In particular, China's local government officials have proven to be innovative and adaptable entrepreneurs who have succeeded in employing the levers of economic decentralization to generate remarkable economic growth. Their success shows that "privatization is not the only way to stimulate economic growth" (Oi, 1995:1148).

Although this bureaucratic transformation has been uneven and accompanied by serious negative consequences, the local entrepreneurial state was deeply entrenched in China at the start of the new millennium. Future policy-implementation directions over the next quarter century will be shaped in large measure by the values and actions of China's open-door generation of public bureaucrats. The Shanghai study findings suggest that, in comparison with those aged over 30 at the time, the open-door age group is more likely to be favorably disposed toward the introduction of foreign capital, to be no more appreciative of the importance of enhanced transnational competence for China's managers, to be more inclined to prefer careers with foreign joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned firms, to be more accepting of active subnational involvement in economic-policy management, to be more attracted by high salaries and bonuses as incentives, to be less likely to prefer entrepreneurship with risk over economic security.

## Notes

1. For critical perspectives on these elements of the "new public management" reform model, see Minogue (2001b: 20–21, 28, 38); Minogue (2001a:1, 6, 8).
2. See the discussion on alternative meanings of globalization as it relates to public administration found in Farazmand (1999a:511–512). On the disabling effects of globalization and privatization, see Farazmand (1999a: 514–518); Farazmand (1999b:557–559).

3. Margaret Pearson (1999:225) suggests that central ministry bureaucrats who work closely with counterparts at multilateral institutions “tend to be particularly supportive of extensive integration” (also see Ross, 1999:189). Nevertheless, other observers point to the need for “intensive training” in order to “increase the personal and political capacity ... to accept and accommodate China’s WTO commitments ...” (Ferris and Zhang, 2002:458). On the WTO-training classes conducted by the Ministry of Personnel, see Lardy (2002:141).
4. For details regarding the study method and participant backgrounds, see Koehn (2002c:401–405).
5. Only 5 of the 183 respondents in this age group were 20 years of age or younger (1.2% of the total sample).
6. For a detailed conceptualization of the analytic, emotional, creative, communicative, and functional components of transnational competence, see Koehn and Rosenau (2002:109–115); also see Adler and Bartholomew (1992:52–56).
7. Half of the 31–60 age group (and 35% of the younger managers) selected the “neither important nor not important” response ( $N = 414$ ).
8. For useful illustrations of subnational government bodies and the structure of local government, see White (1991:219–220) and Wong et al. (1995:82–83).
9. Including authority to legitimize local government policy initiatives, appointment and dismissal powers, and the capacity to establish the constraining/facilitating institutional context—that is, “to define the parameters of the central-local relationship” (Zheng, 2000:217–219, 225, 229; Li, 1998:3, 290; Xia, 2000:212–213).
10. David Zweig (2002:227) concludes that “the China case shows that domestic and global interests, particularly local communities and new corporate organizations that benefit from transnational linkages, can undermine even strong authoritarian states.”
11. In Shanghai, for instance, “the organizational department of the CCP is completely merged with the Ministry of Personnel, which controls the job assignments and promotions of all state bureaucrats, regardless of whether they are CCP members or not” (Gore, 1998:89; also see Tong, et al., 1999:196–197).
12. Most goods are now exchanged in the open market. However, the state controls prices for less than 20% of all retail, agricultural, and capital sales (Zweig, 1999a:64).
13. Zheng (2000:220) maintains that “local protectionism exists at early stages of economic reforms, but with the deepening of decentralization, it is constrained.” Post-WTO accession pressures and common interest in avoiding costly duplicative investments led nine southeastern provinces and two special administrative regions to form the Pan-Pearl River Delta Regional Cooperation and Development Forum in 2004 (Bradsher, 2004).
14. By the early 1990s, “almost all counties and most towns in the coastal region had established their own FTCs” (Zhao, 1998:56).
15. Ferris and Zhang (2002:455) suggest that, in addition, “the Chinese government might want to consider legal reforms aimed at providing local governments with authority to further international cooperation without the national government’s direct involvement” by granting them flexibility “to deal with legal and policy development issues using input from the international community.”
16. The limits of central government control over tax collection can be seen in its retreat, in the face of strong opposition from local authorities, from enforcing a law passed in 1996 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress that forbids provincial and municipal governments from levying local highway-maintenance fees (Korski, 1997:10).
17. Nevertheless, “local tax bureaus enjoyed tax collection priorities over the branches of the national tax bureau.” Consequently, local governments still manage to manipulate the collection of shared taxes (Wang, 1997:814).
18. Bureaucratic expansion is responsible, in part, for rising local government expenditures (Wong et al., 1995:120–122).
19. Provincial governments “have substantial power to set revenue-sharing rules within their regions” (see Wong et al., 1995:95, 99).
20. Some large municipalities no longer enforce the *hukou* system (Li, 2001). The easing of household-registration transfers also constitutes one of the principal incentives used to “entice migrants from poorer regions to move to border areas ...,” principally in the West (Becquelin, 2002:15).



21. Subnational officials possess the “authority to relax compliance schedules and to allow exemptions in view of local conditions ...” (McElroy and Nielsen, 1997:234).
22. As state-enterprise reforms progress, local government authorities, including those in rural areas, increasingly are expected to assume responsibility for local public-welfare services previously provided by enterprises (see White, 1991:217; Yu, 1997:8; Zweig, 1999a:67).
23. Formally, economic development, public safety, and family planning are regarded as the most important functions of Chinese local governments. The heads of local committees of the CCP and local administrative organs are supposed to be dismissed from their posts if their superiors are dissatisfied with the performance of one of these three functions in the localities (China, Central Committee of CCP and State Council, 1996:1).
24. According to Elizabeth Economy (2004:117–119), “when the mayor is environmentally proactive, income levels are high, and the city is tightly integrated into the international community, environmental protection has evidenced substantial progress over the past decade.”
25. Jean Oi (1995:1148) suggests that infrastructural supports should include market information and technology.
26. I am grateful to Chen Xiaoyuan for assistance with this discussion.
27. There are three ways in which the Chinese local governments initiate local infrastructure projects. First, local state-owned enterprises can construct or manage local infrastructure (such as water supply, power, and gas) under the supervision of local governments. The second way is that local governments maintain ownership of local infrastructure, but lease operational responsibility (under their supervision) to joint ventures or the private sector. Examples include city buses, ferries, and parking lots. The third way is that the local infrastructure is controlled and managed by joint ventures or private firms under local government supervision. Examples include taxis, long-distance buses, and beeper stations.
28. Economic success also brings ranking subnational officials promotions and other desired rewards (Landry, 2004).
29. Moreover, in contrast to the situation in Maoist China, “with the reforms local governments have to bear the *risks* as well as enjoy the benefits that come with entrepreneurship” (Oi, 1995:1137; also see Guthrie, 1999:33; Duckett, 2001:28).
30. By the mid-1980s, to cite another example, the salaries of 500 of the 660 employees in the Xuzhou Municipality’s finance departments came from the off-budget, primarily industry-generated funds of township governments (Wong et al., 1995:130).
31. Similarly, the Anhui Management and Development Centre secures funds from organizing overseas business trips designed to help state-owned enterprises locate joint-venture partners, and from the pre-trip training courses it offers for managers (Zweig, 2000:222).
32. John Wong (1994:5–6) distinguishes two types of government-linked companies. The first type is the commercial operation initiated by a government department. In Kunming, for instance, the Department of Public Health “set up a medical supply company for the hospitals in the city and the Tax Bureau set up a company to help clients process tax returns.” In the second type, a senior official establishes a new business. An example is the large Southern Pharmaceutical Company in Shenzhen headed by the local CCP Secretary.
33. On relations between Party Committees/Secretary and professional enterprise managers (as well as cross-appointments), see Oi (1995:1136, 1139); Guthrie (1999:38); Saich (1991:161–165); Hendrischke (1994:151).
34. In comparison, the annual allocation to Fudan University from the State Education Commission amounted to 100 billion yuan. Fudan also maintained a separate corporation to manage its many investments in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Interview conducted by the author with Jiang Gao Xing, Director, Office of School-operated Factories, Fudan University, 9 July 1997. According to Director Jiang, Fudan University’s most lucrative market is for a rapid weight-reduction product developed by a chemistry professor.

While Nanjing Normal University raised 20% of its total annual expenditures from enterprise profits (including two petrochemical factories) in 1997, Hubei Normal University reportedly had not yet authorized such activity (discussion at the Workshop on Private Fund Raising held at the Fifth

International Conference on Chinese Education, August 18, 1997, The Chinese University of Hong Kong). Beginning in 1995, Nanjing University established joint ventures with enterprises, usually at the county level, for training purposes. For instance, the University's International Business School and Tongtru Information Industry Group Company, Ltd., jointly set up the Tongtru School. Nanjing University also operated businesses in the fields of biochemistry, refined chemicals, computers, and special materials (jewels) that generated total output of 182 million yuan and a profit of 40 million yuan in 1996. Zhigang Wang, Deputy Director, Council for Development, Nanjing University, e-mail to the author, September 8, 1997. A number of universities engaged in the development of computer software and hardware systems for sale on the local market—including Shenzhen University, which in 1994 lost a suit brought by Microsoft against its Reflective Material Factory for producing the "MICROSOFT" hologram widely encountered on counterfeit software (see Cheung, 1998:117; Baark, 2001:120–121). The Anhui Management Development Centre also participates in a joint-venture software firm and operates a printing company (Zweig, 2000:222). The 1991 budget for Shenzhen University (data provided the author by Michael Agelasto from his unpublished research project) shows total expenditures of 25,574 million yuan and income from four separate sources: (1) the Shenzhen (state) education fund (21,490 million yuan); (2) revenue from tuition and rents (2,356 million); (3) profits remitted by university enterprises (0.9 million); and (4) funds from departments (1,755 million). The Shenzhen University enterprises recording the largest profits in 1992 were (in order of profit generated) the Experimental Foreign Trade Company, the Culture and Scientific Technology Company, and the Architectural Design Institute.

35. Sixteen percent strongly agreed with the statement.
36. Only 32% of the study participants aged 31–60 disagreed with the statement. Among those aged 18–30, 45% disagreed. The others neither agreed nor disagreed ( $N = 408$ ). These findings raise questions about the conclusions based on qualitative interviews with far fewer municipal and submunicipal officials that “younger officials are more readily adopting a dynamic, pro-market style of work” (see Duckett, 2001:30).
37. At the same time, there are penalties for poor investment decisions—including reductions in the local government's operating budget and loss of bonuses (Oi, 1995:1137–1138; also see Lo et al., 2001:53).
38. However, as West and Wong (1995:81) point out, the downward transfer of increased responsibilities and reduced revenues has forced rural local governments in poor regions that possess limited or no capacity to tap extrabudgetary resources to “cut back on basic services and/or resort to levying *ad hoc* [and unpopular] fees and taxes on farm households.” Similarly, PLA units “in remote and poor regions of China have few business opportunities with which to improve their standard of living ...” (Bickford, 1994:473).
39. In the case of the PLA, for instance, “much of the income from military enterprises goes to improving the food and living standards of officers and soldiers” (Bickford, 1994:469; also see Lo et al., 2001:49).
40. In 1991, for instance, only 900,000 of the 4.15 million yuan in profits earned by its enterprises was returned to Shenzhen University (data provided the author by Michael Agelasto from his unpublished research project).
41. For instance, in 1992/1993, Jane Duckett (2001:28, 33) found that individual municipal and submunicipal *departments* in Tianjin generated and retained profits for themselves “rather than for local or central government.”
42. For instance, funds generated for the College of English Language and Literature at Shanghai International Studies University from teaching evening courses for adults, were allocated to holiday bonuses for faculty and for computer purchases (interviews conducted by the author with He Shao-xiong, Dean of the College, December 14, 1996 and July 8, 1997. At Nanjing Normal University in 1997, every department deposited its extrabudgetary earnings in an account that the central administration had no control over and no knowledge regarding how much it contained. While the university desired greater control and accountability in connection with these funds, it recognized that budget autonomy provided much of the basis for individual performance incentives (Liu Chan-shi, President's Office, Nanjing Normal University, presentation at the Workshop on Private Fund Raising held at the Fifth

- International Conference on Chinese Education, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 18, 1997).
43. Lance Gore (1998:125, 110–113) found intense pressure on entrepreneurial managers to compare and match up with peer units. “Although all work units are not equally endowed with resources,” he notes, “the impulse is the same everywhere: to accrue to their own members as many benefits as the highest-paying peer unit.” In general however, this sense of social responsibility does not extend to migrant workers (see Solinger, 1999b:207–240).
  44. On the expansion and distribution of the bonus system, see Jackson (1992:169–180). Easterby-Smith, et al. (1995:47) report “signs that bonus systems are stretching internal differentials much more than before” (also see Fisher and Yuan, 1998:519, 521; “China’s SOE Managers Get More Pay,” *Xinhua News Agency*, March 11, 2001; Tong, et al., 1999:199).
  45. By contrast, only 68% of the Shanghai managers aged 31–60 rated high salary and bonuses as important (19% as very important).

## References

- Adler, N.J. and Bartholomew, S. 1992. Managing globally competent people. *Academy of Management Executive* 6(3):52–65.
- Alford, W.P. and Shen, Y. 1998. The limits of the law in addressing China’s environmental dilemma. In M.B. McElroy, C.P. Nielsen, and P. Lydon (eds.), *Energizing China: Reconciling Environmental Protection and Economic Growth*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 405–429.
- Baark, E. 2001. Technology and entrepreneurship in China: Commercialization reforms in the science and technology sector. *Policy Studies Review* 18(1) (Spring):112–129.
- Becquelin, N. 2002. Who benefits: Regional disparities and the campaign to ‘develop the west.’ *China Rights Forum* (3):10–15, 27.
- Bernier, L. and Hafsi, T. 2007. The changing nature of public entrepreneurship. *Public Administration Review* 67(3):488–503.
- Bickford, T.J. 1994. The Chinese military and its business operations: The PLA as entrepreneur. *Asian Survey* 34(5) (May):460–474.
- Blecher, M. 1991. Developmental state, entrepreneurial state: The political economy of socialist reform in Xijiu municipality and Guanghan county. In *The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: The Road to Crisis*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 265–291.
- Bradsher, K. 2004. Chinese provinces form regional economic bloc: Beijing backs move to lower barriers. *New York Times*, June 2, W1, W7.
- Chan, H.S. and Suizhou, E.L. 2007. Civil service law in the People’s Republic of China: A return to cadre personnel management. *Public Administration Review* 67(3) (May/June):383–398.
- Cheng, K. 1997. A decade’s reform in China’s education: Social consequences and implications for research. Paper presented at the 5th Conference on Chinese Education for the 21st Century, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, August 13–19.
- Cheong, C. and Yee, C.H. 2003. *Handbook on China’s WTO Accession and Its Impacts*. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific.
- Cheung, G.C.K. 1998. *Market Liberalism: American Foreign Policy toward China*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- China, Central Committee of CCP and State Council. 1996. Resolution of the central committee of the CCP and State Council on public safety. *Liberation Daily*, March 1, 1.
- Chow, G.C. 2002. *China’s Economic Transformation*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Duckett, J. 2001. Bureaucrats in business, Chinese-style: The lessons of market reform and state entrepreneurialism in the People’s Republic of China. *World Development* 29(1) (January):23–37.

- Easterby-Smith, M., Malina, D., and Yuan, L. 1995. How culture-sensitive is HRM? A comparative analysis of practice in Chinese and UK companies. *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 6(1) (February):31–59.
- Economy, E.C. 1998. China's environmental diplomacy. In S.S. Kim (ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 265–282.
- Economy, E.C. 2004. *The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Eckholm, E. 2000. China's controls on rural workers stir some rarely seen heated opposition. *New York Times*, March 10, A10.
- Esman, M.J. 1991. *Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and Strategies*. Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Farazmand, A. 1999a. Globalization and public administration. *Public Administration Review* 59 (6) (November/December):509–522.
- Farazmand, A. 1999b. Privatization or reform: Public enterprise management in transition. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 65(4):551–567.
- Ferlie, E., Ashburner, L., Fitzgerald, L., and Pettigrew, A. 1996. *The New Public Management in Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferris, R.J. and Zhang, H. 2002. The challenges of reforming an environmental legal culture: Assessing the status quo and looking at post-WTO accession challenges for the People's Republic of China. *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 14(3) (September):429–460.
- Fisher, C.D. and Yuan, A.X. 1998. What motivates employees? A comparison of U.S. and Chinese responses. *International Journal of Human Resource Management* 9(3):516–528.
- Gallagher, M.E. 2005. *Contagious Capitalism: Globalization and the Politics of Labor in China*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gore, L.L.P. 1998. *Market Communism: The Institutional Foundation of China's Post-Mao Hyper-Growth*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Goldman, M. and MacFarquhar, R. 1999. Dynamic economy, declining party state. In M. Goldman and R. MacFarquhar (eds.), *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 3–29.
- Guthrie, D. 1999. *Dragon in a Three-piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Harding, H. 1981. *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949–1976*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hendrichske, H. 1994. Expertocracy and professionalism. In D.S. Goodman and B. Hooper (eds.), *China's Quiet Revolution: New Interactions between State and Society*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 144–161.
- Howell, J. 1991. The impact of the open door policy on the Chinese state. In G. White (ed.), *The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 119–146.
- Huang, Y. 1990. Web of interests and patterns of behavior of Chinese local economic bureaucracies during reforms. *China Quarterly* 123 (September):431–458.
- Jackson, S. 1992. *Chinese Enterprise Management Reforms in Economic Perspective*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Kent, A. 2002. China's international socialization: The role of international organizations. *Global Governance* 8(3):343–364.
- Koehn, P.H. 1996. Practical low-budget programming: Initiatives and Cautions for International Higher-education Management in the era of public entrepreneurship. *International Education Forum* 16 (2) (Fall):121–134.
- Koehn, P.H. 2002a. Reformist orientations among middle managers in China: The case of Shanghai. In A. Farazmand (ed.), *Administrative Reform in Developing Nations*. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 105–121.

- Koehn, P.H. 2002b. The role of cross-nationally competent Chinese-Americans in environmental-interdependence challenges: Potential and prospects. In P.H. Koehn and X. Yin (eds.), *The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.–China Relations: Transnational Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 235–283.
- Koehn, P.H. 2002c. The Shanghai outlook on WTO: Local bureaucrats and accession-related reforms. *Pacific Affairs* 75(3):399–417.
- Koehn, P.H. 2007. Peaceful and sustainable development? Middle-management entrepreneurship and transnational competence in China. *East Asia* 24(3) (Fall):251–263.
- Koehn, P.H. 2008. Underneath Kyoto: Emerging subnational government initiatives and incipient issue-bundling opportunities in China and the United States. *Global Environmental Politics* 8(1) (February):53–77.
- Koehn, P.H. and Yin, X. 2002. Chinese American transnationalism and U.S.–China Relations: Presence and promise for the trans-pacific century. In P.H. Koehn and X. Yin (eds.), *The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.–China Relations*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. xi–xl.
- Koehn, P.H. and Rosenau, J.N. 2002. Transnational competence in an emergent epoch. *International Studies Perspectives* 3 (May):105–127.
- Korski, T. 1997. Drive against higher taxes hits roadblock. *South China Morning Post*, November 3, 1997, 10.
- Lam, T. and Perry, J.L. 2001. Service organizations in China: Reforms and institutional constraints. *Policy Studies Review* 18(1) (Spring):15–35.
- Landry, P. 2004. The CCP's formal and informal channels of political control of municipal elites in post-Deng China. Paper presented at the State of Contemporary China Conference, Universities Services Center for China Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, January 6–7.
- Lardy, N.R. 2002. *Integrating China into the Global Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Li, C. 2001. Policies not in line with WTO to go. *South China Morning Post*, November 15.
- Li, J. 2000. How to manage the assets and accounts of state firms. *People's Daily*, October, 16, 10.
- Li, L.C. 1998. *Centre and Provinces: China 1978–1993*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lieberthal, K. and Oksenberg, M. 1988. *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Liu, G. and Dai, Y. 1991. *Not Loose Reality and Achievement of Looseness: Administration of the Macroeconomy under the Double Economic System*. Shanghai: People's Press of Shanghai.
- Lo, C.W.-H., Lo, J.M.-K., and Cheung, K.-C. 2001. Institutional reform in environmental governance system of the People's Republic of China: Service organizations as an alternative for administrative enhancement. *Policy Studies Review* 18(1) (Spring):36–58.
- Lou, J. (ed.). 2000. *Financial Statistics of New China in 50 Years*. Beijing: Economics Press.
- Lu, Y. 1996. *Management Decision-Making in Chinese Enterprises*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Luke, D.F. 1995. Building indigenous entrepreneurial capacity: Trends and issues. In S. Rashid and D.F. Luke (eds.), *Development Management in Africa: Toward Dynamism, Empowerment, and Entrepreneurship*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 149–171.
- McElroy, M.B. and Nielsen, C.P. 1997. Energy, agriculture, and the environment: Prospects for Sino-American cooperation. In E. Vogel (ed.), *Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 217–253.
- Manion, M. 2003. Politics in China. In G.A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell, K. Strom, and R.J. Dalton (eds.), *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 7th edn. New York: Longman, pp. 425–467.
- Manning, R.A. 2002. *The Asian Energy Factor: Myths and Dilemmas of Energy, Security and the Pacific Future*. New York: Palgrave.
- Minogue, M. 2001a. The internationalization of new public management. In W. McCourt and M. Minogue (eds.), *The Internationalization of Public Management: Reinventing the Third World State*. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, pp. 1–19.
- Minogue, M. 2001b. Should flawed models of public management be exported? Issues and practices. In W. McCourt and M. Minogue (eds.), *The Internationalization of Public Management: Reinventing the Third World State*. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, pp. 20–43.

- Montinola, G., Qian, Y., and Weingast, B.R. 1995. Federalism, Chinese style: The political basis for success in China. *World Politics* 48 (October):50–81.
- Naughton, B. 1996. *Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ngai, P.B. and Koehn, P.H. 1998. Cross-cultural management: The pitfalls of unspoken signals. *World Executive's Digest* (January):49–50.
- Nie, W., Hopkins, W.E., and Hopkins, S.A. 2002. Gender-based perceptions of equity in China's state-owned enterprises. *Thunderbird International Business Review* 44(3) (May–June):353–377.
- Oi, J.C. 1995. The role of the local state in China's transitional economy. *China Quarterly* 144 (December):1132–1149.
- Orban, E., Koehn, P.H., and Chen, X. 2003. Great power decentralization and the management of global/local economic policy and relations: Lessons in fluidity from the People's Republic of China. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 69(2) (June):235–258.
- Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. 1992. *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Park, A., Rozelle, S., Wong, C., and Ren, C. 1996. Distributional consequences of reforming local public finance in China. *China Quarterly* 147 (September):751–778.
- Pearson, M.M. 1999. The major multilateral institutions engage China. In A.I. Johnston and R.S. Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*. London: Routledge, pp. 207–234.
- Rosenthal, E. 2000. Pollution victims start to fight back in China. *New York Times*, May 16, A1, A11.
- Ross, L. 1998. China: Environmental protection, domestic policy trends, patterns of participation in regimes and compliance with international norms. *China Quarterly* 156 (December):809–835.
- Ross, R.S. 1999. Engagement in US China policy. In A.I. Johnston and R.S. Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*. London: Routledge, pp. 176–205.
- Saich, T. 1991. Much ado about nothing: Party reform in the 1980s. In G. White (ed.), *The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 149–174.
- Sanyal, R.N. and Guvenli, T. 2000. Relations between multinational firms and host governments: The experience of American-owned firms in China. *International Business Review* 9(1):119–134.
- Shanghai Municipality. 1998. *Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai*. Shanghai: Statistics Bureau.
- Shi, T. 1999a. *Generational Differences in Political Attitudes and Political Behaviour in China*. Singapore: World Scientific and Singapore University Press.
- Shi, T. 1999b. Mass political behavior in Beijing. In M. Goldman and R. MacFarquhar (eds.), *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 145–169.
- Shi, Z. 1998. Review and experience of economic structure reform in China. In O. Suliman (ed.), *China's Transition to a Socialist Market Economy*. Westport, CT: Quorum Books, pp. 3–20.
- Shirk, S.L. 1996. Internationalization and China's economic reforms. In R.O. Keohane and H.V. Milner (eds.), *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186–206.
- Solinger, D.J. 1999a. China's floating population. In M. Goldman and R. MacFarquhar (eds.), *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 220–240.
- Solinger, D.J. 1999b. *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Solinger, D.J. 2002. WTO entry: Will China's workers benefit from this 'win-win' deal? *China Rights Forum* 1 (April):4–7, 25.
- Tang, M. (ed.). 2000. *Study of WTO and the System of Local Administration*. Shanghai: People's Press of Shanghai.
- Tong, C.H., Straussman, J.D., and Broadnax, W.D. 1999. Civil service reform in the People's Republic of China: Case studies of early implementation. *Public Administration and Development* 19(3):193–206.
- Walder, A.G. 1995. Local governments as industrial firms: An organizational analysis of China's transitional economy. *American Journal of Sociology* 101(2) (September):263–301.

- Walder, A.G. and Oi, J.C. 1999. Property rights in the Chinese Economy: Contours of the process of change. In J.C. Oi and A.G. Walder (eds.), *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Wang, S. 1997. China's 1994 fiscal reform. *Asian Survey* 37(9) (September):801–817.
- West, L.A. and Wong, C.P.W. 1995. Fiscal decentralization and growing regional disparities in rural China: Some evidence in the provision of social services. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 11(4):70–84.
- White, G. 1991. Basic-level local government and economic reform in urban China. In G. White (ed.), *The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: The Road to Crisis*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 215–242.
- Whiteley, A., Cheung, S., and Quan, Z.S. 2000. *Human Resource Strategies in China*. Singapore: World Scientific.
- Wong, J. 1994. Power and market in mainland China: The danger of increasing government in business. *Issues & Studies* 30(1):1–12.
- Wong, L. 1994. China's urban migrants: The public policy challenge. *Pacific Affairs* 67(3):335–355.
- Wong, C.P.W., Heady, C., and Woo, W.T. 1995. *Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People's Republic of China*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Xia, M. 2000. *The Dual Developmental State: Development Strategy and Institutional Arrangements for China's Transition*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Xiang, H. (ed.). 1994. *The Reform of the Financial System of China*. Beijing: Chinese Finance and Economy Press.
- Yu, X. 1997. Social security system taking hold nationwide. *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 8.
- Zhan, L. 1997. Shenzhen good example of capital-raising. *China Daily*, May 6, 5.
- Zhao, H. 1999. Sino-U.S. economic relations a cross time and space. In P.H. Koehn and J.Y.S. Cheng (eds.), *The Outlook for U.S.–China Relations Following the 1997–1998 Summits: Chinese and American Perspectives on Security, Trade, and Cultural Exchange*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 207–225.
- Zhao, W. 1998. China's WTO accession: Commitments and prospects. *Journal of World Trade* 32(2):51–75.
- Zheng, Y. 2000. Institutionalizing de facto federalism in post-Deng China. In H. Tien and Y. Chu (eds.), *China Under Jiang Zemin*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 215–231.
- Zheng, Y. 2006. *De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local Relations*. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific.
- Zhou, H., Sperling, D., Delucchi, M., and Salon, D. 2001. *Transportation in Developing Countries: Greenhouse Gas Scenarios for Shanghai, China*. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.
- Zweig, D. 1995. 'Developmental communities' on China's coast: The impact of trade, investment, and transnational alliances. *Comparative Politics* 27(3) (April):253–274.
- Zweig, D. 1999a. Undemocratic capitalism: China and the limits of economism. *National Interest* 56 (Summer):63–73.
- Zweig, D. 1999b. Will China liberalize? Unpublished manuscript in the author's possession.
- Zweig, D. 2000. Foreign aid, domestic institutions and entrepreneurship: Fashioning management training centres in China. *Pacific Affairs* 73(2) (Summer):209–231.
- Zweig, D. 2001. China's stalled 'fifth wave': Zhu Rongji's reform package of 1998–2000. *Asian Survey* 41(2) (March/April):231–247.
- Zweig, D. 2002. *Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

## *Chapter 26*

---

# **Coping with Enhanced Administration: Estimating the Effectiveness of Public Service Training in Hong Kong**

---

Lina Vyas

### **CONTENTS**

2	6.1	Introduction.....	434
26.2		The Theory.....	434
	26.3	Hong Kong Civil Service: A Profile.....	435
26.	4	The Challenge.....	436
26.	5	The Research.....	437
26.	6	Constraint: Diversifications in the Training Needs of Different Departments .....	438
26.	7	Effectiveness of Training.....	439
	26.7.1	Respondents' Evaluation of the Current Training.....	439
2	6.8	Discussion.....	443
	26.8.1	Evaluation of Training.....	444
	26.8.2	Training and Transfer of Learning .....	444
	26.8.3	Adequate Matching of Training Package to Trainees' Requirements .....	445
	26.8.4	Ability of Trainer to Provide and Trainees to Grasp .....	445
	26.8.5	Conducting Pre- and Posttraining Tests and Change in Performance of Trainees after Training.....	446



	26.8.6 Amendment of Training Package Based on Evaluation Results .....	446
2	6.9 Conclusion .....	447
	References .....	447

## 26.1 Introduction

Evaluation appears to be the unsurpassed method to use if one desires to enhance the training effectiveness in a relatively short period of time. This is because evaluation helps in getting feedback from the very customers. Customer here refers to the participants themselves and the organization they serve. Frequently, it is interpreted that training is effective if the participants are contented and have enjoyed it. However, in reality, the more challenging issue is whether the training achieved the organization's objectives. Lack of training program evaluation is greater noticed in the public sector, and is perhaps the least developed aspect of the training practice in government training institutes. Budgetary limitations and concentration on outcome are progressively forcing establishments to validate the effectiveness of their investments. Futuristic government departments regard training as a valued investment to be monitored.

The current chapter examines the effectiveness of training delivered by the public service training institute in Hong Kong. The dawn of new public management has brought with it a number of changes that affect the compilation and approach of public services. The emphasis on performance of training institutes and the satisfaction of their customers has become even more crucial. The most customary approach of evaluating the performance of public agencies is to obtain the attitude of the consumers (trainees) who have attended a particular training. The public service training institute conducts different levels of evaluation involving the participation of its clients, i.e., the trainees and the organization they serve, to evaluate the effectiveness which would lead in improvising enhanced administration.

## 26.2 The Theory

Evaluation is intimately linked with departmental objectives, standards, and competency profiles. Government departments are determined to find straightforward, economical, yet reliable ways of quantifying the consequences of their investments. The final component of a systematic training process is evaluation of training efforts to determine whether the training delivered accomplishes the stated objectives. Evaluation provides feedback about whether performance deficiencies are being corrected, attitudes changed, or behavior altered. It allows training and development staff to identify areas which could be strengthened. It provides data for assessing the cost-effectiveness of training. In short, evaluation enables the effectiveness of an investment in training, provides feedback to the trainer, enables improvements to be made, indicates the extent to which objectives are met and whether any further training needs remain.

One of the chief researchers in this area is Donald L. Kirkpatrick. In his book, *Evaluation of Training Programs*, he broke down the evaluation phase into four levels (Table 26.1).

The first level of evaluation, which is referred to as *reaction*, addresses how participants feel about the training. The evaluation at this stage is done directly after the training and is the most preferred method of evaluation. The reaction of trainees is unswervingly associated to customer satisfaction and program accomplishment. Most of the time, it is just a simple questionnaire that enquires about the state of training, trainer, and such.

**Table 26.1 Logical Step in Evaluation**

<i>Level</i>	<i>Question</i>
Reaction	Were the learners pleased with the program?
Learning	What was learned from the program?
Behavior	Did the learners change their behaviors based on what they learnt?
Results	Did the change in behavior positively affect the organization?

*Source:* Adapted from Kirkpatrick, D.L., Evaluation of training in Craig, In *Training and Development Handbook*, eds. L. Robert and L.R. Bittel, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967.

The second level of evaluation, *learning*, determines if participants acquired the desired knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes identified in the training objectives. In order for the training program to be successful, attitudes must change, knowledge must strengthen, and skills must intensify. The most popular method at this stage is the use of test or some kind of examination which can enumerate the increase with the aid of a pre- and posttraining questionnaire.

The third level of evaluation, which relates to change in *behavior*, addresses the change in the participants' behaviors, which resulted from the acquisition of skills through training. Assistance and support from the organizational environment are significant if the learned skills are to be transferred back to the job.

Level four, which focuses the *results*, tries to identify the effect of learning on the organization. This level of evaluation investigates the impact of participation in the training program in the departmental performance of the organization. Hamblin and Whitelaw have extended Kirkpatrick's work by including a *level five* assessment as well. The fifth level, which is the *ultimate* level, questions if the training has affected the ultimate well being of the organization, for example, in terms of profitability or survival (Reid and Barrington, 1996, p. 257).

All training suppliers must first establish that the training program does have optimistic consequences. The most expected questions asked in evaluation of training are, "Has learning taken place?", "If so in which areas?", and "Will the new knowledge be applicable to the job?" Although most of the training providers are against the fact, it has to be accepted that the validation of training is either ignored or approached in an unimpressive or unprofessional manner (Buckley and Caple, 2000, p. 182).

### 26.3 Hong Kong Civil Service: A Profile

Training and development began receiving attention and recognition in Hong Kong civil service since the late 1940s when the government's localization policy was founded on the recommendation of the then Salaries Commission which suggested that civil service should be composed of local people as far as possible (Burns, 1988, p. 119). To put this policy into practice, it was important that the local people be trained with sufficient competence so that they could take up the job of managing the public service into their own hands. Against this background, many departments began to run training schemes and courses for their staff and, in particular, induction courses were given to the local recruits to provide them with a general introduction to the Government

machinery and basic vocational training. At that time there was no central institute or coordination for all the civil service training. Training programs were very primitive in nature and were designed only to meet individual departments' specific short-term needs.

In 1961, a Central Training Unit was established under the then Establishment Branch (now the Civil Service Bureau [CSB]). The unit was renamed as Government Training Division in 1967 and was tasked to centrally provide and coordinate civil service training for the purposes of implementing the localization policy and maintaining efficiency in service (Burns, 1988, p. 120). In the following years, the demand for services, provided by the division, increased steadily as more and more departments recognized the importance of training their staff on vocational, language, or management skills. The services provided by the division had therefore been expanded and diversified and its day-to-day operations has increasingly become independent though it still looked upon the CSB for policy guidance. In recognition of its semiautonomous status, the division was renamed as Civil Service Training Centre (CSTC) in 1980.

Training of Hong Kong civil servants was placed under the jurisdiction of the Senior Staff Course Centre (SSCC) and the CSTC before the organization of the Civil Service Training and Development Institute (CSTDI) in 1996. These agencies were responsible for the bulk training-related activities in the public sector, and were combined in the early 1996 to establish a centrally coordinated CSTDI (Huque et al., 1998, p. 59). The aim of this institute is to provide training and development programs and services for improving the performance of civil servants in Hong Kong. The institute has initiated various programs for preparing the Hong Kong civil servants for the new environment (Huque et al., 1998, p. 64). It advises the central and departmental human resource development and provides training and development. The institute is staffed by a group of professional trainers (CSTDI, 1998, p. 6). The training officers and experts assess the training needs, after which the training and development plan is developed and an appropriate training method is selected. The publications of the institute state that it updates itself with the changing environment and changing needs of its clients. CSTDI's mission is to help drive central policy initiatives through training and development, to facilitate and advise on central and departmental human resource development and to pioneer and disseminate the best in training and development (CSTDI, 1999, p. 8).

A director heads the CSTDI and is assisted by an assistant director and an assistant principal training officer. There are seven operational units: administration, senior management development, China studies, English and communication, advisory services, management, and general grades (<http://www.info.gov.hk/cstdi/Ehtml/engindex.htm>). The institute has a strength of 167 members, including 79 training officers, 4 staff tutors, and 16 executive officers secondment. In addition, the CSTDI has training officers posted to other departments. At present, 33 training officers are posted to 11 departments. CSTDI advisory board is chaired by the secretary for the civil service and comprises heads of departments, heads of the Human Resource Management (HRM) function in private enterprises, and academics in the HRM and public sector management fields (<http://www.info.gov.hk/cstdi/Ehtml/engindex.htm>).

## 26.4 The Challenge

Evaluation is just an instrument and not a conclusive means to effective training. The effectiveness of training is very difficult to measure; nevertheless, it is essential to identify and

measure the relevance and importance of training. The public service training institute looks upon evaluation techniques as an important means to measure the effectiveness of the training delivered by them. A four-level measure was identified by the trainers to measure the satisfaction level for the customized courses provided by public service training institute, i.e., keeping to agreed objectives; elevating staff's skill level; enhancing staff performance; and contributing to organization development.

<i>Presented Evaluation System</i>	<i>Desirable Evaluation System</i>
Mainly assessment of reactions and learning. Sometimes behavior level practiced.	Assessment of performance on the job and competency for future organizational requirements. Measuring results essential.
Main beneficiaries of information are training institutes and client departments.	Benefits of information should be diffused throughout organizations.
Linked to training course objectives which are either general or tailor-made.	Linked to anticipated future needs.
Process and result-oriented.	Greater result-oriented and future-oriented application.
Driver: Customer-oriented training delivery.	Driver: Improvement of results (relevance) and anticipating future competencies/ requirements.

If the effectiveness of the training packages is properly assessed, it helps in making decisions relating to the continuation of the program, improvement of the existing or future programs, and allocation of training resources. In Hong Kong, the institute mainly focuses on the reaction and learning level of evaluation. Certain training programs go to check the behavioral level as well. The trainees and the departments sending their representatives for training are the ultimate customers of the training institute, and their voice and suggestions are crucial.

## 26.5 The Research

In Hong Kong, questionnaires were mailed and distributed to 500 trainees who were identified as potential subjects in fields relevant to the study. Questionnaires were also sent to 50 trainers at the training institute (CSTDI). Of these, 287 (57.4%) questionnaires were returned by the trainees and 30 (60%) by the trainers. The subjects chosen as trainers were the current full-time and part-time trainers. Some of the invited trainers were also selected. For the trainees, government officials of different grades and ranks, belonging to various departments in the government were approached, keeping in mind that they had experienced and had been a part of some of the training activities conducted by the CSTDI (Table 26.2).

Later, interviews with nine full-time and part-time trainers were accomplished. Twenty-one interviews were conducted with the trainees.

**Table 26.2 Profile of the Respondents in Hong Kong**

<i>Trainees</i>	<i>Number of Respondents, 287</i>	<i>Trainers</i>	<i>Number of Respondents, 30</i>
<b>Position</b>			
Administrative officers	5	Chief training officer	13
Executive officers	110	Training officer	11
Junior staff	85	Manager	2
Clerical grade	35	Executive officer	2
Land registration officer	4	Invited part-time trainers	2
Assistant	25		
Accounts officer	21		
Manager	2		
<b>Educational qualification</b>			
High school	55	High school	—
Bachelors degree	129	Bachelors degree	6
Masters degree	49	Masters degree	11
PhD	—	PhD	—
Specialization	54	Specialization	13
<b>Age classification</b>			
20–30 years	103	20–30 years	—
30–40 years	136	30–40 years	8
40–50 years	32	40–50 years	20
50–60 years	16	50–60 years	2
Above 60	—	Above 60	—

## 26.6 Constrain: Diversifications in the Training Needs of Different Departments

Training of civil servants is important as it upgrades personnel according to changing needs. These institutes are responsible for providing strategic guidance on training and development to various government departments. It must be admitted that there is no substitute for on-the-job training or learning as no amount of institutional training would give a civil servant the real feel of his/her job and method of getting it done. However, considering the accelerated pace of development of knowledge and its application to different sectors of administration, on-the-job

training cannot be quite effective. Executive development programs and management development are thus instituted at different stages during the career of a civil servant apart from the initial training. Generally, training activities cover the areas of management, language, information technology, and other refresher courses.

The public service training institute provides training to the government officials from different departments, but at times the training is inappropriate and inadequate in meeting the requirements of the trainees. Each department has specific job requirements and diverse needs that cannot be addressed by the training provided by the institute, as the training provided is more generalized. To address this problem, the public service training institute provides more customized and tailor-made courses for the attendees.

The mandate of the different agencies and departments in the government are very different and their area of responsibility, too, differs. They are required to provide service to different parts of the community. However, the civil service is generally considered homogenous or a super organization, but actually it is not so. It is critically important to identify specific needs of the different departments based on their requirement. However, as gathered from the information acquired at the interviews, currently this is not regularly being done.

Position titles of the government employees might be similar in different government departments but the natures of the jobs differ. Job activities in general should not be looked upon but each department should be treated as a unique case. However, the trainers at the public service training institute claim that they take much care while grouping the individuals from different departments together. Their background is carefully studied and moreover, the institute provides more general courses like language, management, and IT, so that they cater to the needs of most departments.

## **26.7 Effectiveness of Training**

### ***26.7.1 Respondents' Evaluation of the Current Training***

The objective of training in Hong Kong Civil Services is “to enable civil servants to acquire the necessary knowledge, skills, and attitude to meet operational requirements and changing circumstances and to assist grade/departmental managers in realizing career development plans of individual officers and succession plans of grades/departments” (CSTDI, 1996, p. 1). At the operational level, departments/grades have to supplement the above-mentioned general direction of training policy with their own departmental training policies to suit their specific needs and operational requirements. Hence, taking the above into consideration, the ownership of human resource training and development rests with the individual departments and grades themselves while the CSB and its executive branch, CSTDI, continue to give advice to them for the implementation and execution of their training programs. The institute provides both regular and customized courses; advisory services; and other services and products including self-learning packages, Learning Resource Centre and Cyber Learning Centre.

A training effectiveness evaluation system helps predict the likelihood that the training contained within the training was effective, make modification to the existing training so as to increase its effectiveness, and develop training that produces an observable change in the learners' behavior and attitude. Training effectiveness in this study was measured using three training outcomes: trainees' evaluation, course performance, and transfer of techniques. A four-level measure was identified by the trainers to measure the satisfaction level for the customized courses

provided by CSTDI, i.e., keeping to agreed objectives; elevating staff's skill level; enhancing staff performance; and contributing to organization development. The interviewee trainers and trainees identified and appreciated a few areas in which the institute excels. These areas included vast variety of training programs and packages available; provision for providing customized courses; cost-effectiveness of self-learning packages such as Cyber learning and also the relaxed learning environment, both inside and outside classrooms. They also praised the quality of the training programs, including the format used, such as experience sharing among civil servants from different departments and guest speakers from the private sector. However, some areas were also pointed out which required improvement and amendment. The junior respondents complained that there was an insufficient supply of courses, mainly language and management courses for people at their level. They felt that the institute mainly focused on people of senior ranks. However, sometimes training was irrelevant to them. Some respondents voiced that some courses could be pitched at a more in-depth level; and that the training administration, including nomination, rescheduling, training record, and charging system required more attention and revision. Some complained that there was inadequate allocation of self-learning packages. An invited trainer at CSTDI, commented, "It is very difficult to identify an effective way of measuring the effectiveness of training. The 'feel good' factor is quite misleading, as if the trainees have enjoyed the training, they will rate it positively but is it really having an impact on the people's behavior or attitude when they go back into their departments?" (Interview, August 6, 2001).

Training is highly beneficial and it does leave an impact on all the people attending it. However, it is essential that training is well structured and well managed. The organizations should not be reluctant in investing on training. Identification of the needs of the person/department and the right choice of training package that caters to and meets with the needs of the individual and the department are essential.

As observed, the institute as a central training agency attempts to make it a point to focus on all the functions and activities to be undertaken by a training institute. It provides the attendees with a choice of teaching, conducts research, and provides consultation services to their customers.

As presented in Table 26.3 a large number of trainees give a neutral opinion on whether the training at the institute is effective. A large number of trainees neither agree nor disagree on whether the training at the institute is effective. This shows that they are unable to assess the effectiveness of training. The effects of training on the development of attitude are best judged by the seniors who can observe the change and progress of the attendees. The institute has different levels of training evaluation. They conduct the end of course evaluation, which is the "happy sheet." If the trainer impresses the trainees, the course receives a positive grading. Every person, while assessing the performance at this level, is trying to be naive or nice and even though they do not think that it is useful to them, they give good rating. A trainer admitted that a few years ago, the training providers were not concerned about whether the training acquired within the classroom can be transferred to the workplace. But now, the second and third levels of evaluation are being conducted. The institute sends out an evaluation form to the supervisors or seniors to assess the performance of the trainees after receiving the training. Amendments and changes on the existing programs are made on the bases of the assessment of the different departments. Nevertheless, quite a large number of attendees have agreed that the training at the institute is effective. It is interesting to note that only a small minority of trainees have strongly agreed or strongly disagreed on the effectiveness of training provided by the institute. It can be seen in Table 26.3 that most of the respondents have chosen a safe option while ranking the effectiveness of training. They are neutral regarding most of the questions.

**Table 26.3 Trainees' Evaluation on the Effectiveness of CSTDI Training Programs**

<i>Sl No.</i>	<i>Trainees' Perception</i>	<i>Strongly Agree 1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Strongly Disagree 5</i>	<i>No Comment 6</i>
1	Programs can fulfill requirements of your present job	20	41	213	12	—	1
2	Adequate training is provided for performing on the job	2	27	41	205	6	6
3	Training at the institute establishes a positive training environment	15	144	119	4	—	5
4	The training keeps you informed of the latest developments in your special field	7	29	223	17	6	5
5	Training helps you to adjust to the changing circumstances	8	25	120	121	2	11
6	Training programs are modified on the basis of evaluation	15	213	30	11	1	17

A large majority of the respondents disagreed that the institute provide trainees with adequate training as demanded at work. However, as stated earlier, work is so diversified that the training programs can by no means be 100% adequate. The institute majors in providing service-related courses, but cannot meet the individual expectations of all the employees. As observed, the institute cannot keep pace with the rapid change and the rate of change is much greater than what they can cope with. The individual departments identify the change and request the institute to cater to this change and by the time the package is developed, new demands creep up. Thus, simply keeping up-to-date is a major problem of the institute.

A mixed response was received on whether the trainees feel that the knowledge/skills acquired by the training are greatly applied to the employees' present job. However, the training institutes cannot address the individual or departmental needs as they have a variety of people from different departments attending the same courses.

CSTDI is the central training agency in Hong Kong whose main aim is upgrading human ability to cope with constant changes. The mission of the institute, as stated in the publications, is to promote and facilitate learning in the civil service for performance improvement. Providing courses in diverse areas meeting the training needs of civil servants at large has always been one of their most significant undertakings (CSTDI Prospectus, 2000, p. 6). The institute provides various central training programs, tailor-made training programs, and consultancy services for various departments. However, as seen in Table 26.4, none of the trainers strongly support the fact that training programs at the institute are initiated for preparing civil servants for the changing



**Table 26.4 Trainers' Evaluation on the Effectiveness of CSTDI Training Programs**

<i>Sl No.</i>	<i>Trainers' Perception</i>	<i>Strongly Agree 1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Strongly Disagree 5</i>	<i>No Comment 6</i>
1	Training can fulfill requirement of trainees' present jobs	1	14	8	6	—	1
2	Adequate training is provided for performing on the job	—	13	6	6	3	2
3	Training at the institute establishes a positive training environment	4	13	4	8	1	—
4	Training helps to adjust to the changing environment	—	16	4	6	2	2
5	Training institutes assess the adequacy of their training from time to time	1	12	7	8	—	2
6	The institute provides quality service and training	1	15	6	4	4	—
7	The knowledge/skill is greatly applied to present job	1	10	8	10	—	1
8	Training programs are modified by the institute based on the results of the training evaluation	1	11	12	2	2	2

environment. Majority of trainers supported this statement. Six trainers disagreed and two trainers even strongly disagreed that the institute is preparing the trainees for change. This is a reason for concern. Trainers should confidentially assess the institute as competent, i.e., if the work is carried out as claimed in the publications.

Majority of the trainers agreed that the institute provides quality service and training to the trainees. A chief training officer informed that quality service was on the institute's top agenda. Nevertheless sometimes, the quality of the service was questioned. She claimed that there was no mechanism to correlate training provided by the institute to different services provided by individual departments because there were a whole lot of factors that affected the quality rather than just the training provided. The training providers try to provide people with the necessary skills along with knowledge concerned with improving their own existing skills. It is unusual to find four trainers strongly not supporting the quality of service provided. It is normally presumed that all the service providers always guarantee the quality of the service they provide.

It can be seen from Tables 26.3 and 26.4, that both the trainers and the trainees agree that the institute employs evaluation techniques to improve performance. However, 40% of the trainers neither agree nor disagree that the programs are modified based on the results of the evaluation. Nevertheless, 36.7% of respondent trainers believe that training evaluations are seriously considered as a means to modify training packages. It is very interesting to note that only 3.3% of trainers strongly agree on this claim whereas 6.6% of trainers disagree and another 6.6% strongly disagree. Training evaluation at the institute is considered to be a means of anticipating training needs and is a means of having the voice of the client heard. The clients spend time and effort to seriously evaluate the programs but are the response put to valid use by the institute? There is no evidence to prove or support this statement.

## **26.8 Discussion**

The concluding and the most significant stage of training, i.e., effectiveness of training are no doubt difficult to measure; nevertheless, it is essential to identify and measure the relevance and importance of training. The public service training institute regards evaluation techniques as a means to measure the effectiveness of their training programs. Evaluation is the most important way of measuring the effectiveness of any training program; however, other factors linked to the evaluation procedure must also be considered but are often overlooked. Transfer of learning, ability of the trainer to deliver and trainees to absorb, ability of the institute and the trainers to recognize the needs and properly address them, results of pre- and posttraining tests, adequate matching of training package to trainees' requirements also have an influence on the effectiveness of training. If the effectiveness of the training packages is properly assessed, it helps in making decisions relating to the continuation of the program, improvement of the existing or future programs, and allocation of training resources.

All the institutes that impart training conduct evaluation, though the approaches and levels vary. Nevertheless, the validation and accuracy of evaluation process is always uncertain. Changes based on evaluation result are not disclosed to the trainees and their client departments. Thus, the evaluator rarely takes the evaluation procedure seriously and is often influenced by the personality of the trainer and the training methods and techniques adopted by him. The third and fourth levels of evaluation receive limited response from the clients and thus, an actual measure of the effectiveness of such training institutes, relying solely on the evaluation, cannot be conducted appropriately.

### **26.8.1 Evaluation of Training**

After the delivery of training, it is important that the assessment of the total value of a training program, training system, or training course in both value- and cost-effective terms is conducted. Evaluation is concerned with the overall benefit of the complete training program and its implementation and not just the achievement of the laid-down objectives of the training course. It includes all the precourse action, the postcourse action, and the postcourse implementation of the learning by the learner back at work.

The public service training institute in Hong Kong practices the first three levels of evaluation.\* The end of course evaluation, i.e., the reaction level of evaluation is merely regarded as that “happy sheet” and should seldom be given much importance. Normally, the institute receives high grades during such evaluations. It has been disclosed by some of the trainees that the trainers tell them about the importance of this evaluation and thus indirectly take the sympathy of the trainees telling them something about the importance and significance of the evaluation to them and their future career. The public service training institute, in the second level, assesses the acquisition of knowledge at the end of the course. They test and find out the knowledge, skills, or attitudes the participant has learned from the training program. The second level of evaluation can sometimes be done right away, after the course, within the classroom. The trainees are given skill tests and if they are able to do that, it is some kind of an indication that the knowledge has really been acquired. For courses of longer duration, three levels of evaluation are conducted. Finally, the third level of evaluation, i.e., the behavior level of evaluation is conducted. The departments and also the participants themselves are sent questionnaires to assess the applicability of the training and the change in the participants’ attitude. The public service training institute, after a period of time, sends a questionnaire to the trainee or his/her supervisor asking for feedback on the performance of that particular trainee to see whether the effectiveness is really getting into the long-term side. It should be noted at this point that only some of the trainees interviewed had experienced the second level of evaluation and none had experienced the third level of evaluation.

### **26.8.2 Training and Transfer of Learning**

Training is a costly practice and hence its effectiveness integrates significance. Training cost can be calculated by adding up all the expenses involved in delivering training and the cost of absence of the trainees from their workplace. The benefits from training are more difficult to calculate. Training does not simply consist of attendance of courses, it is a multifarious activity that includes on-the-job training, study visits, management consultancy exercise, and action research. The transition from “learning” to “execution” and “application” is one of the most critical and most deserted segments of training-related problems. Training must be seen as a means to an end, and thus, should be judged on its outcome rather than purely on the training process. However, in most of the training organized at the training institute in Hong Kong, the problem of effective transfer of learning back at the work organizations is often not well considered by the training providers as well as the training receivers. “Positive transfer is often expected to happen automatically as an inevitable consequence of formal training processes” (Analoui, 1996, p. 1). This ignores the realities of the workplaces to which the trainee returns

---

\* Based on the interviews with trainers. However, the trainees informed that they rarely experience the second and third levels of evaluation.

after training, where the social, cultural, and management aspects of an organization may assist or obstruct transfer of learning.

Transfer of learning is one of the problems faced by the trainees from different backgrounds, attending training at the central training institute. This might be because the environment and resource endowment of the workplace may be different from the context of their learning. The training institutes must organize specially commissioned programs for particular departments where the trainers of the central training institute should visit the group of potential trainees for a better understanding of the potential for transfer of learning. Then, subsequent visits can further assist the process of transfer and also evaluate the effectiveness of the programs. However, this is possible only in case of specific and long programs.

For all training, especially for management and project planning (consultancy) training, there is a need for trainers to recognize and tackle the process of transfer of learning within the training course itself. Trainers can employ different techniques for this, including and involving participation, role plays, case studies, simulations, and action plans, and some programs can also include posttraining projects assigned to the trainees to be completed in their workplace. The actual workplace plays a determinant and decisive role in either making or breaking the objectives of training programs (Baldwin and Ford, 1988, p. 38). Transfer of learning is not an automatic process, but an issue to be addressed in the design of training programs.

### ***26.8.3 Adequate Matching of Training Package to Trainees' Requirements***

The effectiveness of the training depends on the relevance of the training package to the trainees' genuine needs. If the training addresses the needs of the attendee, he/she attains a high level of satisfaction and grades the training delivered as very effective, irrespective of the level of evaluation involved. However, another person attending the same package and who accomplishes little benefits due to wrong choice of training considers it to be irrelevant and ineffective.

It is also noticed that the government departments commit resources (time and money) without determining if training is the appropriate solution to the problem. A problem related to the employees' performance could be caused due to lack of skills or knowledge. In such cases, training is the solution. However, performance problems could be related to other factors as well, and in such cases, training could be termed as unproductive.

It was found that in Hong Kong, the trainees attend the training based on their availability instead of availability of training to address their needs. The employees from the different departments apply for training through their supervisors and thus the supervisors have a major role to play in allotting the training to the staff. The supervisors are sometimes partial and at times are unwilling to release the right person owing to heavy workload. The trainees attending courses to merely take a break from the daily work schedule sometimes evaluate training as effective and sometimes as highly unrelated. It basically depends on the mind frame of those people at that particular time. Such evaluations could be misleading.

### ***26.8.4 Ability of Trainer to Provide and Trainees to Grasp***

Proper coordination between the trainer and trainee is one of the most important factors to ensure effective training. It often happens that the course is well designed and relevant to the requirements of the trainees but still it does not reach the expectations of the clients. The trainer should

be able to deliver the content of training to his/her clients in a more efficient and effective manner. "Training the trainer" would help overcome such shortcomings. In Hong Kong, there are many invited and deputed trainers. These people are experts in their respective areas but probably not experts in delivering training. The deputed trainers certainly bring with them some real-life experiences and experiences from the field, but they are sometimes unable to train in an efficient manner. Thus, in spite of the course being effectively designed, it is not effectively delivered and results in being negatively evaluated.

### **26.8.5 *Conducting Pre- and Posttraining Tests and Change in Performance of Trainees after Training***

Each trainee and his/her employing department questions whether he/she performs more effectively and efficiently than before attending the training. Undoubtedly, the public service training institute has clear objectives, one level of evaluation, capable trainers, forward-looking learning atmosphere, and technology but do the trainees actually benefit from these training programs?

Conducting a pre-entry test for all the attendees to measure their standards and then later measuring their level after the training, which could be termed as post-entry test is an adequate method of evaluating the effectiveness of training. The public service training institute seldom conducts either of the tests.

Evaluation is the only tool for measuring effectiveness at the institute. However, at the public service training institute, serious evaluation has begun only now. The third level of evaluation ensures a possibility to monitor change in the performance of the trainees. It is quite selective in choosing the packages for which this level of evaluation is performed. The institute normally organizes extremely short courses from which much change in the performance cannot be expected. Nevertheless, the institute has a provision for such evaluation and requires more promotion and implementation of the same.

### **26.8.6 *Amendment of Training Package Based on Evaluation Results***

Although for several years trainers have made an attempt to evaluate their programs, until quite recently, there has not been a legitimate effort to use valid and reliable methods to conduct such evaluations. Furthermore, some trainers collect data for evaluation but do not analyze those data for trends or use them to improve existing training programs. Such an omission can be damaging, especially in light of the billions of dollars that have been spent and will continue to be spent annually on training efforts as a result of the demographic, economic, and technological changes.

In order to ensure that better services are provided to the trainees, it is essential to give due importance to the results of the evaluation, assess the consequences, and make further modifications in the training package. If an evaluation shows that the training program has fallen short of achieving its intended objectives, some modification in the program content and/or methods are usually recommended in order to make the training more effective. It was observed that the public service training institute focuses on the evaluation procedure; however, the changes based on recommendations have not been mentioned in the publications. The data collected shows mixed views from the trainees on whether the training is modified based on the results of the training evaluation. The participants were not confident on the validity of the evaluation results.

## 26.9 Conclusion

The trainers and the trainees comprehend the effectiveness of training differently. Since the expectation of the customers is very immense and diverse, the provider cannot entirely remain an imposing body, but has to execute the objectives of the institute and the demands of the customers at large.

Proper evaluation is the route to effective training. The institute does theoretically have provision for three levels of evaluation but they are not applicable for all the training courses. Some of the courses are subjected to only the first level of evaluation while some go on to the second and third levels. Moreover, the institutes do not disclose the ultimate outcome of the evaluation procedure. For effective performance, instead of simply evaluating the programs, the institutes should perform continuous training impact evaluation. Moreover, the information provided by evaluating the training packages is ambiguous and incomplete because it depends on the individual's subjective reporting. The practice of conducting follow-up interviews with the participants or their supervisors for more detailed information would be beneficial. This technique would incur higher costs but it ensures that important information is collected. The training institutes can randomly pick some participants and their supervisors to interview from each of the training delivered.

There is need for standardized evaluation procedure. Moreover, the emphasis requires to be focused on learning and results rather than training and the process. Transmission and deployment of learning at the workplace is most essential.

## References

- Analoui, F. (1996), A socio-technical framework for effective transfer of training, New Series Discussion Papers No. 70, Development and Project Planning Centre, University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire, U.K.
- Baldwin, T.T. and Ford, J.R. (1988), Transfer of training: A review and direction, *Personal Psychology* 41, 630–705.
- Buckley, R. and Caple, J. (2000), *The Theory and Practice of Training*. London: Kogan Page.
- Burns, J.P. (1988). The Chinese civil service system, In *The Hong Kong Civil Service and Its Future*, eds. I. Scott and J.P. Burns. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- CSTDI. (1996). *Civil Service Training and Development Institute Prospectus 1996*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- CSTDI. (1998). *Civil Service Training and Development Institute Prospectus 1998*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- CSTDI. (1999). *Civil Service Training and Development Institute Prospectus 1999*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- CSTDI. (2000). *Civil Service Training and Development Institute Prospectus 2000*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
- Huque, A.S., Lee, G.O.M., and Cheung, A.B.L. (1998) *The Civil Services in Hong Kong: Continuity and Change*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Kirkpatrick, D.L. (1967). Evaluation of training in Craig, In *Training and Development Handbook*, eds. L. Robert and L.R. Bittel. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Reid, A.M. and Barrington, H. (1996), *Training Interventions: Promoting Learning Opportunities*. London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.



## *Chapter 27*

---

# **Evaluation of Public Service Training in India: Providers, Consumers, and Outcome**

---

Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Lina Vyas

### **CONTENTS**

27.1 I ntroduction .....	450
27.2 The Evaluation of Performance of LBSNAA .....	451
27.3 Techniques of Training .....	451
27.4 E ffectiveness of Training .....	454
27.5 Need for Change and Response.....	457
27.6 Utility of Training.....	459
27.7 Perception of LBSNAA .....	460
27.8 Balancing the Views of Providers and Customers.....	461
Acknowledgment .....	462
Notes .....	462
References .....	463



## 27.1 Introduction

The advent of new public management has ushered in a number of changes that have had a profound impact on the production and delivery of public services. Among its many features, perhaps, the least controversial is the emphasis on performance of agencies and the satisfaction of their customers. The most common method of assessing the performance of public agencies is to seek the opinions of the consumers of a particular service. This arrangement has its merits, but it is now realized that “measurement is not a science but a negotiated craft” (Trosa, 1997, p. 244). Fountain (2001), however, pointed out that an overemphasis on customer satisfaction could obscure the fact that public organizations do not exist only for serving and ensuring the satisfaction of customers. Not only are there inherent difficulties in measuring services that are intangible in nature, but there are also important elements related to the operation of the system that may escape the framework and arrangements for evaluation.

In providing training for public officials, it is perhaps more important to aim for the satisfaction of the ordinary citizens with the performance of the government, rather than targeting to have a group of satisfied trainees. Some of the shortcomings identified by Fountain may be addressed by reconsidering the process of the assessment of performance. The receivers of training are naturally in a better position to make valuable inputs, but they are only one of the several stakeholders involved in the transaction. The providers of training or trainers also need to get involved in the process to provide a balanced view of the quality and impact of training offered to public officials. This chapter seeks to assess the performance of a public training agency in India on the basis of opinions obtained from both the consumers and providers of a service.

India, the largest and most influential state in South Asia, has a long tradition of relying on a central civil service that serves as one of the principal linking pins in the vast country composed of diverse regions and cultures. While the civil service in India is often subject to criticism for being driven by a conservative and colonial mind-set, there are efforts to prepare and train the huge army of bureaucrats for taking on the difficult task of administering the country that is making remarkable economic progress in the twenty-first century. The Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), the largest training institute for senior public service officials in India, plays a critical role in ensuring the constant training and upgrading of skills for the pool of senior employees in the public service. The central position of the LBSNAA and its input in the administrative system in the form of trained and competent public officials makes this training institute a critical player in the development of the country as well as the enhancement of capability of public officials.

Generally, the performance of training institutes is assessed in India on the basis of audits by the designated government agency and annual reports submitted by the institute to the government or parliament. The outcome of such evaluation is seldom made public, and the reports gather dust deep in the archives. The media often plays a useful role by highlighting the weaknesses and problems found, but these efforts are restricted to items that contain news value. The most common method is for training agencies to evaluate their performance by obtaining feedback from the consumers of training programs as they complete the courses and exit. This provides some indication of the success or otherwise of their efforts in providing training. However, the providers of the service or trainers are not usually required to evaluate their own performance or that of their organization, and thus their views on the value of their product and gap between expectation and outcome of their efforts are not known. It may be possible to refine the process of evaluation of training programs by getting both consumers and providers involved in the process.

The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an assessment of the nature, quality, and outcome of training provided by the LBSNAA based on two different points of view. The trainees can provide useful information on the skills and knowledge obtained from the programs and their utility in

improving performance on the job as well as helping them to adapt to the changing environment in the public service. Views of the trainees on the process of evaluation and the effectiveness of training will reveal useful insight on the feasibility, utility, adequacy, and level of performance of the LBSNAA. Opinions of the training providers will be compared and contrasted with those of the trainees. In this way, a balanced assessment of the performance will be made to accommodate the points of view of both consumers and providers of services. This method is expected to result in a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the training programs and help in developing recommendations for improving performance by agencies involved in providing training to public officials.

## **27.2 The Evaluation of Performance of LBSNAA**

LBSNAA is responsible for coordinating and conducting activities concerning the development and training of civil servants. The annual report of the academy states that “The effort of the Academy as a training institute is to help in creating a bureaucracy that commands respect by performance rather than through position. The Constitutional mandate for civil servants is interpreted as one that promotes empathy for the unprivileged, commitment to the unity and integrity of the nation; a promise to uphold integrity and impeccable character in a manner that they appear as role models for the large number of subordinates working with them and for the society at large; a respect for all castes, creeds, religion; and a professional competence that makes the battle against poverty eradication the ultimate objective of every civil servant” (LBSNAA, 1999). It is indeed difficult to design training programs that could cover such diverse areas.

LBSNAA provides training to the fresh recruits in the public service, in-service training, and induction training for state services to be inducted into the elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS). The major activities of LBSNAA are to develop and deliver training curricula, courses, techniques, and materials in areas common to employees in several ministries and departments.

Questionnaires were mailed and distributed to 450 trainees. They included officials of different grades and ranks in the Government of India who had attended courses at LBSNAA. Questionnaires were also sent to 50 respondents who were current and former trainers at LBSNAA. 252 (56%) questionnaires were returned by the trainees and 34 (68%) by the trainers. Table 27.1 provides an overview of the profile of the respondents.

Subsequently, interviews were conducted with 28 trainers and 43 trainees of LBSNAA. The trainees covered by this study belonged to different ranks and grades in various departments of the Government of India. Some were newly recruited IAS probationers while others were employed in senior posts in various departments. Trainers of various positions were selected in the sample and former trainers were included to make the process as comprehensive as possible.

## **27.3 Techniques of Training**

The LBSNAA claims that the conventional lecture method is complemented with several new methodologies and resulted in significant successes (LBSNAA, 1999). The lecture method is still widely used, and both in-house and guest speakers deliver lectures. Panel discussions promote exchange of views. Case studies, simulation exercises, seminars, moot courts, mock trials, writing practices, practical demonstrations, management games, film shows, problem-solving exercises, paper writing, group activities, and field visits reflect a wide array of methods for training.

As central training institutes do not aim at providing training service for specific departments, some courses are general in nature. At one point, trainees are asked to assess the training from the

**Table 27.1 Profile of Respondents**

<i>Trainees</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Trainers</i>	<i>Number</i>
<b>Rank</b>			
IAS officer probationers	163	Director of LBSNAA	1
State district magistrates	34	Joint director of LBSNAA	1
Additional collectors	25	Deputy director	13
Collector	18	Professor	4
Commissioner	4	Reader	3
Assistant commissioner	5	Language instructor	6
Joint director	1	Assistant lecturer	3
Director	2	Ex-trainers of LBSNAA	3
<b>Educational qualification</b>			
High school	—	High school	—
Bachelors degree	154	Bachelors degree	7
Masters degree	49	Masters degree	15
Doctoral degree	5	Doctoral degree	1
Specialists	44	Specialists	11
<b>Age</b>			
20–30 years	154	20–30 years	2
30–40 years	36	30–40 years	8
40–50 years	32	40–50 years	16
50–60 years	19	50–60 years	6
Over 60 years	11	Over 60 years	2

point of view of achievement of objectives and relevance. The course design depends largely upon the internal validation results of past courses and experiential wisdom of the faculty. The academy conducts in-service courses for officers of the IAS with service experience of 6–9 years, 10–16 years, and 17–20 years, respectively. It also conducts an induction program for state civil service officers after their induction into the IAS. All such courses are validated internally. Thus, the training imparted at the academy is not assessed on the basis of performance. Evaluation becomes meaningful if conducted by an outside agency.

An overwhelming number of trainees were unwilling to comment on the academy’s role in providing strategic guidance to training, but most of the trainers rated it positively. A large number of trainees felt modern methods were not used for training and that practical issues are not accorded due attention. But the trainers felt that practical issues are adequately covered.

None of the trainers strongly agreed with the statement that the academy places importance on modern training techniques. Low cost of delivering training through lectures makes it a popular method. Over the years, there has been a gradual shift in emphasis from the lecture mode of training to a more participative approach. This has made it easier for probationers to digest the training imparted and aids both the understanding process and development of skills. During the interviews, they supported the participatory approach strongly.

A large number of trainers thought that the LBSNAA focused more on practical rather than theoretical issues. District experience presentation sessions at LBSNAA are examples of practical inputs. They provide the trainees with knowledge of the workplace, exposing them to situations similar to those they are likely to face at work. Moreover, the case studies deal directly with the situations at the field level. The trainers themselves are deputed from the services and they bring with them examples from their jobs that are related to the real world.

Training in the use of computers is one of the prominent areas of activity in the academy. It is offered in most of the in-service and induction courses. The trainees come from various backgrounds, some with good computer skills and others with rudimentary knowledge of the same. Public officials are exposed to computers, their operation, and promotion of e-governance, and are encouraged to develop skills. The above information is based on the data presented in Tables 27.2 and 27.3.

**Table 27.2 Trainees’ Views on Training Techniques**

<i>Trainees’ Perception</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
LBSNAA provides strategic guidance on training	23	27	21	45	15	121
Programs are modified on the basis of evaluations	24	36	26	39	80	47
Training areas are directly related to your work	10	40	39	36	70	57
Modern methods are used in training	4	46	36	39	80	47
LBSNAA focuses on practical issues in training	20	30	87	—	106	9

**Table 27.3 Trainers' Views on Training Techniques**

<i>Trainers' Views</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
LBSNAA provides strategic guidance on training	6	17	8	1	1	1
Programs are modified on the basis of evaluations	2	5	10	15	1	1
Training areas are directly related to trainees' work	7	10	12	5	—	—
Modern training techniques are followed	—	11	7	9	6	1
LBSNAA focuses on practical issues in training	11	2	9	7	3	2

## 27.4 Effectiveness of Training

Training effectiveness may be assessed by considering the results of evaluation, performance of trainees, and their ability to transfer techniques to their jobs. LBSNAA is expected to prepare trainees for the changing environment. But most of the trainees did not think so. A large number of trainees strongly believed that the training at LBSNAA does not help public officials adjust to the changing environment. The trainees were disappointed at not getting the benefit of updating and upgrading knowledge and competence.<sup>1</sup> Most of the respondents felt that the academy uses the traditional approach to training. Reform and change are mentioned frequently in the documents of the institute but do not feature prominently in the design of courses. However, some trainees appreciated the changes made in the training programs to keep up with the changing environment.

Most of the trainees did not think that training programs at LBSNAA were designed to fulfill the present requirements of their jobs and organizations. Most of the trainers agreed on this point with the trainees. Such response from both consumers and providers reflect a serious weakness in the training programs. The trainees did not think that the training kept them informed of the latest developments in their specific fields.

LBSNAA enjoys monopoly in providing training services and faces no competition in this area. This has led to declining interest in the needs of the consumers of the service. The providers do not stay in touch with the consumer organizations to assess the performance of the trainees and their level of competence at work after completing training at LBSNAA.<sup>2</sup>

Both trainers and trainees agree that LBSNAA employs evaluation techniques to improve performance. While most of the trainees felt that the programs were not modified on the basis of evaluations, the trainers held the opposite view. There is some concern that feedback are collected but not acted upon.

Most of the trainees agreed that the training programs are flexible and can be altered during the training sessions based on needs and demands of the trainees. But it was difficult for them to state with confidence whether the programs are modified on the basis of evaluations. During the interviews, trainees admitted that regular feedback was obtained and the institute organized course review meetings where the trainees were free to express their views and comments. Counselor group meetings are organized every month to allow further scope for communication. The trainees felt that much of the training provided was not relevant to their work. They learn on the job and are able to perform their duties. Many officials attended training as an obligation or to get a break from the job. Some trainers believed the performance of the trainees was poor as they were compelled to join the training programs. Such arrangements do raise questions over the effectiveness of training.<sup>3</sup>

The trainees found little relevance of the skills and knowledge acquired from training to their current jobs (see Tables 27.4 and 27.5). But the trainers felt that training at LBSNAA helps the

**Table 27.4 Trainees’ Views on Effectiveness of Training**

<i>Trainees’ Perception</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
Programs can fulfill requirements of your present job	32	34	35	50	88	13
Adequate training is provided for performing on the job	19	24	27	61	104	17
Training helps to adjust to the changing circumstances	13	33	32	51	113	10
Training keeps you informed of latest developments	11	35	26	78	92	10
LBSNAA provides quality training	12	25	28	161	25	1
Acquired skill is applicable to current job	24	25	74	62	57	10
Evaluation is used to improve performance	26	119	49	24	18	16
Programs are modified on the basis of evaluations	24	36	26	39	80	47

**Table 27.5 Trainers' Views on Effectiveness of Training**

<i>Trainers' Views</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
Programs can fulfill requirement of trainees' present jobs	2	5	6	5	15	1
Adequate training is provided for performing on the job	9	4	12	1	4	4
Training helps to adjust to the changing environment	1	13	10	8	2	—
Training keeps trainees informed of latest developments	3	8	6	14	3	—
LBSNAA provides quality training	2	3	12	7	8	2
Acquired skill is applicable to present job	2	16	4	5	6	1
Evaluation is used to improve performance	3	10	16	4	1	—
Programs are modified on the basis of evaluations	2	15	10	5	1	1

trainees acquire skills required for this purpose. The trainees were not motivated and could not explain the perceived lack of relevance. However, some trainees believed that after receiving training and returning to work, they would be able to apply the knowledge and skills gained from training either directly or indirectly, though their expectations were higher. Some participants appreciated the training and said that they benefited from the training at LBSNAA. Some other respondents were positive that the new knowledge could be applied while others were unsure and foresaw difficulties in practical application. Some respondents admitted that they had not learned much from training because they usually fell asleep when the trainers started talking about theory or cited examples from other countries.

The respondents did not positively assess the effectiveness of training provided at the LBSNAA. As the trainees and the departments sending their representatives for training are the ultimate customers of the training institute, their expectations and satisfaction deserve consideration. However, some of the trainees pointed out that the result of training evaluation always tends to be positive and its reliability is therefore in doubt. They suggested that the most significant factor as the performance indicator of the institute should be the training outcome.

Views differ among the providers of training on the feedback and suggestions made by the trainees. They are willing to consider only the “valid” suggestions.<sup>4</sup> The trainers obtain feedback through informal communication with participants during session breaks and this allows a chance to consider the comments to modify the content of the programs.<sup>5</sup> It is difficult to measure the impact of training as it is too broad in coverage. The trainers do obtain feedback on the training provided but they are not in a position to assess the impact immediately. That can be done only after the officials try to apply the skills learned from training to their jobs.<sup>6</sup>

Other trainers prefer standardized training packages that are not very flexible.<sup>7</sup> Training at LBSNAA appears to be flexible, that is, it can be changed on the basis of the participants’ opinions. A problem could arise from the fact that the trainers assigned to the courses may not have expertise in the areas requested by the trainees, and the quality of training suffers. A training program without a proper plan cannot be properly evaluated.

Interesting observations were made as the providers were asked to assess their product. The director of LBSNAA suggested going beyond the central training institute and reforming the “entire government structure.”<sup>8</sup> A former trainer was in favor of replacing the simple evaluation system with continuous impact evaluation.<sup>9</sup> The heads of various departments could be requested to evaluate the performance of the officials after they had completed the training courses. The dissatisfaction with the process was evident in the comments of a trainee who suggested that feedback and suggestions should be collected from the trainees who had completed the courses before designing the training programs.<sup>10</sup>

Even the providers of training were unsure about the effectiveness of the programs at LBSNAA. This is significant and points to the need for establishing a system of rigorous evaluations which could inform departments whether training programs were achieving their objectives.

In most cases, even when the training delivery seemed to be efficient and effective, the evaluation remained somewhat incomplete. The training program has a follow-up arrangement to check the extent to which the trainees apply new knowledge and skills gained from training, but in practice, this follow up is not always carried out. LBSNAA uses only one level of evaluation, that is, end of course evaluation in which the participants comment on their experience and reactions to the training programs. This is the least expensive and common method of evaluation, but it only reveals the participants’ subjective views and does not reflect the level of their actual learning or the real impact of training.

Another aspect that deserves attention is the identity of the consumers of the services of LBSNAA. The director considers the citizens of India as the academy’s ultimate customers and the organizations directly related with the training activities as the immediate customers. The views of the ultimate customers are never solicited, and thus the outcome is not ideal in spite of the best efforts by LBSNAA.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the providers of training take a markedly different view in identifying the customers of the service.

## 27.5 Need for Change and Response

It is necessary for public agencies to prepare for anticipated and unanticipated changes so that they are equipped with an efficient workforce to face the challenge. The consumers and providers of training at LBSNAA had different views on the ability of the academy to anticipate and respond to future training needs (Tables 27.6 and 27.7).

A large number of trainees strongly disagree that LBSNAA successfully anticipates future training needs. Some trainees admitted that they had been prepared for future growth and



**Table 27.6 Trainees' Views on Anticipation of Future Training Needs**

<i>Trainees' Perception</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
Programs are future focused	27	27	18	59	99	22
Programs updated in response to changes	24	39	28	78	70	13
Programs helped us prepare for the future	31	69	37	35	51	29
Future training needs are identified	27	19	28	19	137	22

**Table 27.7 Trainers' Views on Anticipation of Future Training Needs**

<i>Trainers' Views</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
Programs are future focused	14	4	3	7	5	1
Programs updated in response to changes	13	3	9	3	2	4
Programs helped trainees prepare for the future	2	1	14	11	3	3
Future training needs are identified	6	14	1	3	9	1

advancement. They acquired new insight about their jobs that they were not aware of earlier. Several trainees thought that LBSNAA tried to strengthen its ability to adjust to the changing time, but the academy is not willing to undertake substantial reform. Minor adjustments were made to alter and modify the existing training programs, but this was not enough to prepare the officials for future changes.

The variation of response from the trainers suggests that they were either not willing to talk freely about the anticipation of future needs or were not aware of this critical issue. This reveals interesting differences in the points of view of providers and consumers of services. The providers feel that the services are achieving the objectives while the consumers think otherwise.

Changes in the government sometimes necessitate the alteration and revision of the training packages. As changes take place in the working environment, trainees demand to be trained in specific sets of skills and competence that will assist them to perform on their actual jobs. These changes compel training institutes to prepare for or even to anticipate these changes in order to provide public officials with the skills necessary to understand and operate under the changing political, economic, and technological demands of rapidly changing societies.

## 27.6 Utility of Training

The primary purpose of training is to prepare public officials to serve the government and also improve the employees' performance in their existing jobs. The overall objective is the improvement of the public services to accommodate, with varying degrees, job, employee, and organizational dimensions (United Nations, 1966, p p. 51–61). The trainers and trainees were asked whether the training programs at LBSNAA help attain improvements in their current job performance, improve effectiveness, and enhance capacities that lead to career development. Only a few public officials saw training as an opportunity to improve their skills to perform on their current job. A large number of the respondents perceived training as a way to improve their capacity to secure career advancement.

A large number of trainees felt that the training did not meet the requirements of their jobs. One trainee said that the training did not help to perform better in his current job. LBSNAA publicizes its emphasis on information technology, but there was no practical application of such skills due to a lack of the required infrastructure at his work place.<sup>12</sup> The respondents rated their respective agencies quite favorably in terms of supporting participation in training but did not think that trainees are given opportunities to apply the new skills after learning them at training courses. Another respondent explained the lack of practical aspect by pointing to the overemphasis on the theoretical approach of the training and commented that it was more suitable for pre-entry training. A large majority of the trainers believed that training is aimed at improving skills to perform on the present job. Approximately 15% identified improvement of the trainees' competence as an objective of training.

Many of the respondents did not think that training at LBSNAA improves the capacity of employees for career advancement. One trainer felt that LBSNAA aims to improve the officials' performance on the job and provides academic knowledge to familiarize them with new approaches that might be relevant to their jobs.<sup>13</sup> But another trainer disagreed and stated that improving skills for the current job might not necessarily improve organizational effectiveness.

A trainer claimed that training at LBSNAA aims at making the trainees aware of the changing environment and national and international issues rather than regional issues. He added that the regional and state training institutes were catering to specific areas related to individual departments, and the programs at LBSNAA seek to meet the training needs of the government as a whole.<sup>14</sup> Only one trainer strongly agreed that the programs help trainees adjust to the changing environment. However, 13 trainers agree that training helps to adapt to the changing environment.

Communication and coordination between the institute and departments were a matter of concern among the senior trainers. A trainer felt that the existing arrangements could be improved, but found it acceptable under the current circumstances. Due to the varied nature of functions, even officials in similar positions are required to perform different kinds of jobs. Thus, it was suggested to treat each department as a unique case and have it identify its requirements to assist LBSNAA. But since the units lacked qualified training specialists, they are only involved in collecting the training nomination forms and submitting them to the academy and have no role in need assessment.

The difference in the perception of trainees and trainers may be explained with reference to the nomination process for training at LBSNAA. The trainers favor the short-term orientation for improved job performance while the trainees favor long-term orientation for improved potential for career development. Public officials nominate themselves or get nominated by their supervisors for training programs, which may not always be relevant to their actual jobs. Several trainers stated that public officials attend training for improving their chances of getting promoted, instead of

acquiring new job-related skills. Thus, there is divergence of perception on the role of training between the consumers and providers of this service.

## 27.7 Perception of LBSNAA

After considering the content, techniques, and effectiveness of training, it is useful to review the overall perception of the consumers and providers. There has been a constant flow of trainees pouring in from various parts of the country and the academy has continued to provide this vital service over a long period of time (Tables 27.8 and 27.9).

A large number of trainees felt that the training programs at LBSNAA are not aimed at preparing the civil servants for meeting the demands of the changing times. They reported experiencing a substantial knowledge gap at the workplace in spite of attending training programs. But most of the trainers claimed that the programs helped trainees prepare for change. The trainees stated that they disappointed their supervisors who expected them to perform efficiently after going through training courses. They were dissatisfied for not receiving training in areas relating to office administration and report writing.

By contrast, a large number of trainers agreed that LBSNAA helps to develop the ability to adjust with the needs of the changing times. The trainers claimed that trainees are informed of the latest developments in their fields, and that programs are designed to help public officials deal with this need. Only one trainer disagreed strongly with this view. He pointed out the lack of infrastructure and facilities for covering the latest developments and dismissed the claim as unrealistic. In the absence of an external higher authority to monitor the training programs, there is little incentive to follow up this claim.<sup>15</sup> As an organization, LBSNAA is an attached office of the Ministry of Personnel, and the director reports to the secretary of the ministry. A summary of the academy's annual report is merged with the ministry's report, which is tabled in both houses of parliament.

**Table 27.8** Trainees' Perception of LBSNAA

<i>Trainees' Perception</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
LBSNAA staff are dedicated professionals	115	11	40	48	28	10
LBSNAA provides strategic guidance on training	23	27	21	45	15	121
Training at LBSNAA helps in career advancement	108	24	25	57	21	17
Training at LBSNAA promotes job enrichment	67	64	37	26	49	9

**Table 27.9 Trainers' Perception of LBSNAA**

<i>Trainers' Views</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i> 1	2	3	4	<i>Strongly Disagree</i> 5	<i>No Comment</i> 6
LBSNAA staff are dedicated professionals	10	11	8	3	2	—
LBSNAA provides strategic guidance on training	2	5	8	6	12	1
Training at LBSNAA helps in career development	12	4	5	1	7	6
Training at LBSNAA promotes job enrichment	8	17	4	5		

Furthermore, the trainees did not categorically agree or disagree with the suggestion that LBSNAA assesses the adequacy of their training from time to time. It seems that the trainees do not have access to such information and are unable to refer to past training as the academy does not have an effective system for documentation.

A large number of trainees strongly believed that relevant training would lead to career advancement. For them, training is a means for learning and advancing in their careers. This is the reason why most respondents expressed concern and wished that LBSNAA would seriously focus on changes that are faced in their workplace. They seek more emphasis on practical training which should be increasingly based on need.

Trainees also believe that they are sent to LBSNAA for job enrichment and expected to receive benefits from the training. Most of the trainers agreed that LBSNAA aims at job enrichment and claimed that efforts were being made to help the trainees receive as much benefit as possible from training. They pointed out the advantages of developing case studies on the basis of experience of the trainers and trainees. These were viewed as good cases that provided first-hand experience and were relevant to the trainees' work. Moreover, the trainees are exposed to work in the field where they learn to apply the art of administration but are not evaluated for career progression, and thus can afford to make mistakes while they learn.

## 27.8 Balancing the Views of Providers and Customers

The points of views of providers and consumers of public service training in India reveal interesting points. Usually, the providers of services in such situations are generally expected to be satisfied with their product since they are in a monopolistic and advantageous position. Senior public officials employed by the government of India have no choice to avoid attending training programs at LBSNAA. It should also be borne in mind that it is impossible to satisfy the consumers of such training programs as they have diverse perceptions, needs, and expectations, and that training programs are unable to cover each and every aspect of their demands. Let us reconsider some of the findings of this research.

Both trainers and trainees agree that programs are not modified on the basis of evaluations. They view the process of evaluation as a ritual that is followed as a requirement, without emphasizing the spirit that guides the process. Evaluations provide indications regarding the achievement of objectives, and the results should help in making improvements. This reveals that both the providers and consumers of the service are pointing toward the need to take evaluations seriously. Besides, the providers and consumers differ in their views regarding the updating of programs in response to changes. This could be the result of confusion over the criteria for assessing changes in the circumstances and updating of programs.

There is difference of opinion between providers and consumers regarding the modern methods of training. While the providers argue that the use of lectures constitutes an integral part of modern training methods, the consumers perceive the enhanced use of audiovisual devices as the indicators of modern training methods. Such differences are reflected in the views on the orientation of the training toward the future needs. The providers feel that adequate arrangements are in place for the consumers to deal with changes that may be encountered in the future, but the consumers disagree. Thus, there is a difference in the method in which the providers and consumers interpret future needs.

A similar divide exists between the two groups on the question of practical use of training. With their experience in training large numbers of consumers from markedly diverse geographical and functional areas, the providers prefer to emphasize generalist skills that could be applied to specific cases when the consumers return to their jobs. But the consumers are keen to learn job-specific skills that could be easier to apply. Thus, there is variation about the desired objectives of training programs offered by a central training institute.

The attempt to assess training programs based on the views of providers and consumers indicate variation in perception, expectation, and demands from the other stakeholders. Understandably, the providers are satisfied with several aspects of training but they are also aware of the weaknesses in the provision of services. This is an encouraging sign because it will contribute to continuous review and adjustments to training programs.

The consumers are critical to the survival of the central training institute. Thus, the providers have to give serious consideration to the views of the trainees. By using the points of view of both groups, the assessment of performance becomes more refined. It is understood that the needs and demands of the consumers are diverse and difficult to meet within the confines of discrete training programs. Participation of the providers in the evaluation process introduces a balanced dimension that could improve the product and have a positive impact on the training and performance of public officials.

## Acknowledgment

The authors are grateful to B. S. Baswan, director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, India, for his cooperation and valuable advice at different stages of conducting the study.

## Notes

1. Based on the interviews conducted on June 20, 2000. Names of the interviewees are withheld by request.
2. Interview with Mr. Subrahmanyam, deputy director of LBSNAA, June 21, 2000.
3. Interviews with several trainees were held over the months of June and July 2000.

4. Interview with Mr. Mishra, language trainer, LBSNAA, June 26, 2000.
5. Interview with Mr. Khan, a deputy director of LBSNAA, July 1, 2000.
6. Interview with Mr. Subrahmanyam, a deputy director of LBSNAA, June 21, 2000.
7. Interview with Mr. P. Singh, a former deputy director of LBSNAA, July 7, 2000.
8. Mr. Baswan, director of LBSNAA, was interviewed on June 25, 2000.
9. Interview with Mr. P. Singh, July 7, 2000.
10. The trainee, Mr. Kumar, was interviewed on June 23, 2000.
11. The director was interviewed on June 25, 2000.
12. The trainee was interviewed on June 24, 2000.
13. Interview with Ms. Mishra, deputy director and trainer at LBSNAA, July 1, 2000.
14. Interview with Mr. Khan, deputy director at LBSNAA, July 1, 2000.
15. The trainee was interviewed on June 23, 2000.

## References

- Fountain, J. 2001. Paradoxes of public sector customer service. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 14(1): 55–73.
- LBSNAA. 1999. Annual Report. Mussoorie, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration.
- Trosa, S. 1997. The era of post-managerialism? In *Managerialism: The Great Debate*, Considine, M. and Painter, M. (eds.). Melbourne, Melbourne University Press; pp. 241–254.
- United Nations. 1966. *Handbook of Training in Public Service*, New York, United Nations Publications.



## *Chapter 28*

---

# **Administrative Challenges of Population Policy: Lessons from China and India**

---

Paul C. Trogen and Lon S. Felker

### **CONTENTS**

28	.1	Introduction .....	466
2	8.1.1	The Population Problem .....	466
28	.1.2	Population Approaches .....	466
28	.1.3	Organizational Approaches.....	466
	28.2	Population Policy in Context .....	467
	28.2.1	Population Policy in India .....	468
	28.2.1.1	India's Population Problem.....	468
	28.2.1.2	Evolution of Policy .....	468
	28.2.2	Population Policy in China.....	473
28.2	.2.1	The Population Problem.....	473
	28.2.2.2	Evolution of Policy .....	474
	28.2.2.3	Reasons for Success .....	478
28.3		Conclusions and Wider International Implications .....	479
		References .....	480



## 28.1 Introduction

Population policies are difficult tests for young bureaucracies in developing countries for at least four reasons. First, population policies are relatively new, so there are few successful programs to emulate. Second, procreation is a very personal decision, so the legitimacy of government intervention in this arena is tenuous. Third, population policies are unpopular as they pit personal interests in having more children against public interest in limiting overall population growth. Fourth, to retain power, governments must spend scarce resources to alleviate suffering caused by overpopulation, leaving less to invest in development, which many believe is the best contraception.

### 28.1.1 *The Population Problem*

Over the last century, world population has grown from 1.7 billion to over 6 billion. Since 1920, most of that growth has occurred in underdeveloped countries (Bouvier and Bertrand, 1999:4). Eighty percent of the world's population now lives in less developed countries, and just two of these countries, China and India, together contain 40% of the world's population (Bouvier and Bertrand, 1999:10, 53). Since 1950, the population of the developing world more than doubled (Pritchett, 1994:1). Furthermore, in developing countries almost half of the population is below 17 years of age (Gillespie, 1984), which creates a demographic time bomb, as these children approach their own childbearing years. If all couples have only two children, the population will still grow 80%; and in most countries, couples must have at the maximum one child over the next 30 years to stabilize the population (Gillespie, 1984).

### 28.1.2 *Population Approaches*

The population problem is compounded by uncertainty about the most effective approach. The two main approaches are the *family planning gap* approach and the *desired children* approach. The family planning gap approach suggests that high fertility is the result of the inaccessibility and cost of contraceptives (Pritchett, 1994:1). If contraceptives are distributed, people will voluntarily use them to reduce births (Daugherty and Kammeyer, 1995:225). This “contraceptives are the best contraceptive” (Pritchett, 1994:2) approach is based on Western philosophical assumptions which stress individual freedom as the key to enlightened self-interest, which in turn coincides with the public interest (Gupte, 1984:183). Many developing countries, however, oppose this approach as a Western-driven agenda (Lee et al., 1998:949).

The second strategy, the desired children approach, holds that people tend to have the number of children they want subject to social, educational, cultural, and economic conditions (Pritchett, 1994:2). This approach assumes that development is the best contraception. One empirical study found that 90% of the differences in fertility between countries were accounted for by the differences in desired fertility (Pritchett, 1994:2).

While there is disagreement about which factor—unmet need for contraception or desired children—has a greater influence on fertility, it appears that there are at least two components of fertility: unwanted births and desired births. Contraception can reduce unwanted births, and development can reduce the number of desired births.

### 28.1.3 *Organizational Approaches*

The success of population policy hinges on the voluntary cooperation of millions of individuals. While population policies have occasionally used force, coercion has never been the primary means of obtaining cooperation, nor has its use been long-lived. Coercive actions of officials striving

to meet sterilization quotas in India, between 1975 and 1976, caused people to elude government officials, flee health workers (Acharya, 2001:27), riot (Gwatkin, 1979:47), and contributed to the election defeat of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1977. Coercive implementation of China's one-child policy in 1982–1983 led to unanticipated resistance, resulting in liberalization of the policy and the banning of coercion in 1984 (Greenhalgh, 1986:493).

Max Weber (1968) noted that while the state has a monopoly on coercion, domination is much more efficient. Domination is an exercise of power which is perceived to be legitimate, and entails a duty to obey. Weber identified two types of domination: the *coordination of interests*, which occurs in voluntary organizations such as religious and economic ones, and *domination by authority*, which occurs in nonvoluntary organizations such as legal and bureaucratic organizations. While Weber believed in three bases of authority—charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal—the overwhelming prevalence of rational-legal authority across modern nation-states reduces the usefulness of this typology today.

Chester Barnard also viewed authority as more efficient in obtaining voluntary cooperation (Barnard, 1938:164), and suggested authority was ceded. Barnard suggested four criteria necessary for a follower to consider a communication authoritative and assent to it: (1) it must be understood by the listener, (2) it must be in the interest of the organization, (3) it must be in the interest of the individual, and (4) it must be within the capability of the individual (Barnard, 1938:165). Four requirements for citizens to comply with population policy would be (1) the policy must be clearly communicated and understood by citizens, (2) citizens must believe that the policy is in the best interest of the nation, (3) citizens must believe that the policy is in their personal best interest, and (4) citizens must be able to act on the policy presumably through the availability of effective contraception. Interestingly, items three and four on the list represent the wanted children approach and unmet need approach, respectively and suggest that both might be necessary in Barnard's framework for voluntary cooperation.

Item two on Barnard's list foreshadowed a recent study that identified three organizational and political factors that contribute to strong family planning policy effort (Lee et al., 1998:949). The first two factors, the formation of profamily planning coalitions among dominant elites and the sharing of policy are important prerequisites in creating an impression consistent with Barnard's second criterion that the policy is in the best interest of the nation. Policy risk can also be shared over time (Lee et al., 1998:954) creating a gradual, deliberate policy. Lee et al. included an additional factor, institutional and financial stability, which when added to Barnard's first four criteria, gives us five criteria necessary for voluntary cooperation with population policies.

## 28.2 Population Policy in Context

Focusing on population programs in the two most populous countries, India and China, provides a comparative assessment of policies and their effectiveness. Additionally, policy evolution can be traced over time. In the late 1940s when India gained its independence and the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic, both countries shared similar demographic and economic characteristics (D'Monte, 1999:10) as well as serious pressures on their food supplies. Yet they followed almost opposite paths. India attempted to avert famine by the traditional family planning approach, relying on the Western assumption that if contraceptives are available, people will voluntarily limit family size. Mao, on the other hand, mistrusted the classic economics of Malthus and the Western agenda of family planning, and put much heavier emphasis on social development. China, therefore, attempted to harmonize population and food supply through socialist development.

## 28.2.1 *Population Policy in India*

### 28.2.1.1 *India's Population Problem*

India's population grew from 358 million in 1950 to 1 billion today, and it is poised to overtake China as the world's most populous nation (Bouvier and Bertrand, 1999:56). India has 15% of the earth's population on 2.2% of its land (Kangas, 1984:2), for a population density of 750 persons per square mile (Bauer, 1998). India's population doubles every 31 years (Kangas, 1984:2), making famine inevitable. A severe drought in 1965 reduced food production to its 1950 levels, causing deaths due to famine and necessitating heavy food imports (Cassen, 1978:213). India's population increase is a result of both a dramatic decrease in death rates combined with a stubbornly high birthrate. As two-fifths of its people are under 15, high future fertility rates are virtually certain (Suri, 1991:22–3).

### 28.2.1.2 *Evolution of Policy*

The British colonial administration had assumed no role in promoting population control (Simmons, 1971:77). The Health Survey and Development Committee of the colonial government warned in 1946 that health improvements and disease and famine control would cause a serious increase in population growth (Kangas, 1984:59).

After independence in 1947, the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, held that there was no population problem, just the aftereffects of colonial exploitation (Daugherty and Kammeyer, 1995:249). This prominent leader's opinion hamstrung future efforts to enunciate a clear population policy and to convince Indians that population control was in the national interest.

1. *First five-year plan: 1951–1956.* India initiated the world's first national family planning program in 1952 (Simmons, 1971:78; Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:265). As the first of its kind, there were no successful examples to follow (Simmons, 1971:78). Fully cognizant of the sensitivity and contentiousness of family planning, political leaders were wary of supporting it (Daugherty and Kammeyer, 1995:249). Most of the program's budget was channeled into safe activities, such as survey research on Indian attitudes about family planning and tests of the rhythm method (Mandelbaum, 1974:5; Kangas, 1984:60). During the first five-year plan (1951–1956), family planning did not include any family planning propaganda. Birth control advice was disseminated through existing medical facilities with the hope that couples would voluntarily seek information and supplies on their own initiative (Simmons, 1971:78; Kangas, 1984:60). Availability of effective contraception was also a problem. The program, placed under the Ministry of Health (Suri, 1991:31), was headed by the Health Minister Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, who, as an associate of Mahatma Gandhi, favored Gandhi's self-control emphasis (withdrawal or abstinence) as a policy (Kangas, 1984:60). Attempts to promote the rhythm method as the primary means of birth control were unsuccessful (Simmons, 1971:78; Cassen, 1978:145; Kangas, 1984:60). The first five-year plan specified family planning advice and supplies were to be offered, subject to the availability of personnel in hospitals and health agencies (Kangas, 1984:60). But a severe shortage of trained personnel (Cassen, 1978:145), inadequate resources, and competing responsibilities in the Ministry of Health restricted the program's mission to the surface facets of birth control (Suri, 1991:31). Only 21 rural and 126 urban family planning clinics were opened (Cassen, 1978:145), and only 21.5% of the allocated funds were actually spent (Simmons, 1971:97).

The population policy was politically safe but ineffective. In a democracy where officials must face reelection to retain office, the political incentives are more likely to reinforce the existing culture and institutions rather than change them. This clandestine population policy did not include any propaganda to modify existing attitudes on family size, and leaders did not champion it. No coalition of elites rallied behind the policy, and there was no risk sharing. Nehru's comments and the locus of the program under an overextended and not particularly sympathetic ministry suggested that elites themselves questioned whether the program was in the national interest. Despite Nehru's comments about development and the trappings of five-year plans, little was done to promote development which would reduce the incentives for large families. The program's reliance on the rhythm method failed to provide reliable contraception to those most in need. Organizational and budgetary stability was suspect due to the shortage of staff and the failure to spend the program's allocations.

2. *Second five-year plan: 1956–1961.* The second five-year plan made contraception more available to those desiring effective methods. Four hundred urban and 1030 rural family planning clinics were established. Other than the rhythm method, foam tablets, condoms, and male and female sterilization were offered (Simmons, 1971:78; Cassen, 1978:146). Staff shortages remained a major constraint (Cassen, 1978:146), and only 45.5% of the funds allocated were actually spent (Simmons, 1971:79). The 1961 census showed a worsening population problem, raising questions about the program's effectiveness (Simmons, 1971:78).
3. *Third five-year plan: 1961–1966.* The third five-year plan set a goal to stabilize population growth in a reasonable time (Cassen, 1978:146; Kangas, 1984:62). Although India's family program officially began in 1952, it was after 1963 that policy shifted from passively waiting for people to come to clinics to sending family planning extension workers to villages to distribute information and contraceptives. In an important step in extending the program's reach, extension workers tended to focus their efforts on contacting those most likely to accept family planning (Cassen, 1978:191), which left many people unreached. A survey in the State of Bihar suggests that 85% of the population was never contacted by a family planning worker (Cassen, 1978:192). Also, steps were made to increase people's ability to respond to family planning by using effective contraception. The central government offered to reimburse 100% of family planning costs to states, and all services were offered gratis (Cassen, 1978:146). In cities, all hospitals and maternity homes included family planning centers (Cassen, 1978:146). There was a large budget, and 92.1% of the allocated funds were actually spent (Simmons, 1971:79).
4. *Fourth five-year plan: 1966–1971, revised 1969–1974.* India's national population program did not really get going until 1966 (Kangas, 1984:64), after Nehru's death, when government expenditures increased substantially as influential officials finally realized how much population growth had hampered economic development (Mandelbaum, 1974:5). The droughts of 1965–1966 and 1966–1967 prompted planners to augment significantly the allocations for family planning (Simmons, 1971:178). The message was finally communicated. The number of extension workers operating out of clinics increased, as did the use of mass media. Posters featuring the smiling faces of a family of four and the words "Two or three children, stop" were displayed in cities and villages (Mandelbaum, 1974:6). Family planning messages were aired over All India Radio, making 80% of urban people and 70% of rural people aware of family planning (Mandelbaum, 1974:6–7). Condoms were distributed, and vasectomies were even performed at railway stations (Kangas, 1984:63). Some states could not construct family planning centers, or fill positions fast enough to spend all the allotted funds (Cassen, 1978:147).

Some organizational instability reappeared at this time with the adoption of population campaigns, which appeared to be “the” solution to the population problem but were rejected a short time later. A campaign to introduce the intrauterine device (IUD) began in 1966 with 900,000 inserted the first year, but acceptance fell off to below half a million per year by 1970 (Cassen, 1978:149). The IUD became unpopular, in part due to rumors that it would travel through the body to the heart or lungs (Cassen, 1978:154), and partly due to bleeding, discomfort, and fear combined with a low level of medical care in the country (Cassen, 1978:156–158). While in most of the world three-fifths of IUDs are still used two years after insertion, in India 60% were removed the first year, and 70% within 2 years (Cassen, 1978:154).

Vasectomies were another short-lived campaign. Before 1965, sterilizations had never reached half a million per year. An incentive payment was introduced in 1966, which, coinciding with a bad economy due to a drought, combined to encourage 1.8 million vasectomies in 1967–1968 (Cassen, 1978:160). Vasectomies became less popular, partly because acceptors were viewed as eunuchs and partly because of side effects which would have been easily treatable if acceptors had better nourishment and better access to medical care (Cassen, 1978:160–161). Rumors of people dying after the procedure, greatly reduced the number of acceptors (Cassen, 1978:61).

Vasectomy camps were the next short-lived campaign. They were first tried on a local level, and were quickly adopted a cross India. Vasectomy camps had several advantages: mass vasectomies made publicity campaigns cost effective, mass participation reduced fears among participants, the volume of procedures increased physician experience, and a high standard of hygiene was possible for a short period of time (Cassen, 1978:164). Participants were often paid cash and given food and gifts (Kangas, 1984:68–69). In 1971–1972 there was a peak of 3.1 million sterilizations (Cassen, 1978:163). The fee, however, also created an incentive for the old, the impotent, the unmarried, and those with sterile wives, to undergo vasectomies (Cassen, 1978:164). There was a negative publicity from 11 deaths due to tetanus after vasectomies in Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh, which may have been caused by a local practice of putting cow dung on incisions (Cassen, 1978:163–165). By 1974, the vasectomy camp model was abandoned, not only due to negative publicity (Cassen, 1978:163), but also due to concern about declining results (Kangas, 1984:71) and financial strains facing all government programs in the early 1970s (Cassen, 1978:163).

A more successful and permanent program was introduced in 1968 to distribute the domestically produced Nirodh (protection) condoms at subsidized prices (Mandelbaum, 1974:6; Kangas, 1984:87). By 1980, the Nirodh condoms were sold at 380,000 outlets, and sales grew from 16 million in 1968–1969 to 110 million in 1977–1978 (Kangas, 1984:87). Advertising provided sustained publicity for this program.

Although India’s population program began in 1952, it only really gained momentum in 1966. That momentum was dissipated by frequent changes in program direction as a series of “initially successful but ultimately destructive” strategies (Gwatkin, 1979:32) were quickly adopted and then soon abandoned. By the 1970s, family planning was criticized for rising costs and declining results (Cassen, 1978:148). Even the prime minister suggested there was no correlation between program efforts in a region and population growth (Mandelbaum, 1974:12). The revised five-year plan suggested that the goal was to reduce the birthrate from its 39 per thousand to 25 per thousand in 10 years, a goal which would need almost all fecund couples with wives over 25 years old to accept family planning (Simmons, 1971:89).

A major difference between India's poorly performing programs and similar successful contemporary programs in China was India's lack of investment in social development. Without social change, Indians continued to rely on large families, both as a source of cheap labor in family farms and businesses and as their only source of "insurance" in old age (Gillespie, 1984). It would be foolish for a poor farmer, with no old age security to risk having a small family (Mandelbaum, 1974:12). The prerequisites for voluntary acceptance of family planning were not present (Cassen, 1978:148). Even with contraception, people want more children than is compatible with society's welfare, because a decision to have a large family that is individually rational may be totally irrational for society's welfare (Mandelbaum, 1974:11). Indira Gandhi, in 1969, remarked:

Our own country, so marked by mass poverty, cannot leave it to individual motivation—because such motivation only comes after a certain level of literacy or economic betterment has already been reached (Mandelbaum, 1974:4).

India also suffered financial instability due to three years of poor crops and increased oil costs in 1973–1974 (Kangas, 1984:35). Public finance at all levels was impacted, and the population program was in crisis.

5. *The new population policy (1976)* was introduced as part of Prime Minister Gandhi's emergency rule. The policy addressed individual behavior. Minimum age for legal marriage for females was raised to 18, and 21 for males (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:266). Incentives for sterilization were raised and put on a graduated scale, offering 70 rupees to parents with four or more children, 100 rupees for parents with three children, and 150 rupees for parents with two children (Cassen, 1978:182; Kangas, 1984:73). Group incentives were also offered to rural councils, teachers, cooperatives, labor, youth, and women's groups to bring in referrals (Cassen, 1978:182). Government policy was clear that three children should be the limit, and government employees were expected to be models for others (Cassen, 1978:183–190). Sanjay Gandhi, acting as his mother's spokesperson and heir apparent, spoke frequently in favor of family planning, and the program got more space in the emergency-controlled press (Kangas, 1984:72). Given the imposed national solidarity during the emergency, the interests of the nation were identified more firmly than ever with family planning.

The policy's second part rearranged the incentives to state governments. Health policy in India, including family planning, is primarily a state responsibility (Kangas, 1984:27). The 1971 census statistics would dictate representation in Parliament, as well as federal disbursements, so states would lose neither power nor revenue by reducing their population (Cassen, 1978:182; Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:266). Eight percent of federal funds would also be allocated based on family planning performance (Kangas, 1984:73). State legislatures were permitted to pass legislation for compulsory sterilization, and incentive systems were encouraged to reward public employees who followed the small family norm and punish those who did not (Cassen, 1978:183; Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:266).

While never legislating compulsory measures, the central government created problems when targets were set at each administrative level with encouragement to maximize sterilizations without guidelines about permissible enforcement techniques (Cassen, 1978:190; Kangas, 1984:75). Gandhi's tight grip on the Congress party meant many state chief ministers owed her their positions (Gwatkin, 1979:36). All but three states raised their own targets, so while the national target was 4.3 million sterilizations, the combined state targets

totaled 8.6 million (Gwatkin, 1979:36, 40). Abuses and coercion became more rampant as job performance and prospects for advancement of government officials depended on the behavior of others (Cassen, 1978:185, 190). In Uttar Pradesh, teachers who failed to deliver their quota of volunteers had their salaries withheld (Cassen, 1978:185), and field workers were telegraphed by the state's chief secretary that if they failed to meet monthly targets, their salaries would be forfeited (Kangas, 1984:74).

A variety of incentives and disincentives were used in different states. In Andhra Pradesh, government employees accepting sterilization were given a raise (Kangas, 1984:73). In Uttar Pradesh, schoolteachers were expected to submit to sterilization after their third child (Cassen, 1978:184). Rajasthan required sterilization of new government employees after the third child (Kangas, 1984:74). In Himachal Pradesh, female employees with two children were ineligible for maternity leave (Kangas, 1984:73).

Several states introduced negative incentives to limit fertility of the general public (Kangas, 1984:72). In Bihar, public food rations were denied to families with three children (Kangas, 1984:73). Orissa granted government loans only to sterilized people or those with small families (Kangas, 1984:74). In Delhi, sterilization certificates were required for drivers' licenses, telephone connections, registration of children in school, and many other services (Cassen, 1978:184). Sterilization was no longer purely voluntary. Occasionally, a police official would raid villagers' houses and take men to vasectomy camps (Cassen, 1978:184). In Uttar, a Muslim village whose town council resisted the sterilization drive, all males aged over 25 were arrested. About 400 were forcibly sterilized in clinics (Gwatkin, 1979:46; Kangas, 1984:76).

The program produced 8.3 million sterilizations and raised the percentage of couples protected by contraception from 17.2% to 23.9%. The new population policy showed what could be accomplished by political will, an integrated approach where family planning became a part of every department's responsibility, and the use of informal political and administrative means to achieve a goal (Gwatkin, 1979:51). But this success came at a cost. The program created resentment which contributed to the loss of Congress Party's majority in Parliament to the Janta party in the 1977 elections and Mrs. Gandhi's unseating as prime minister (Gwatkin, 1979:49; Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:267).

6. *Janta government's sixth five-year plan (1978–1983)*. The new Janta government distanced itself from the population policy and its unpopular sterilizations. The department was renamed the Department of Family Welfare (Suri, 1991:31). The Janta government issued a policy stating, "Compulsion in the area of family welfare must be ruled out for all times to come" (Nortmann, 1978:278). Monetary incentives were retained, and vasectomy incentives were set at 100 rupees across the board, with 30 rupees to be retained by the state for surgical costs (Kangas, 1984:77). Acceptance levels fell to their 1973–1974 levels (Kangas, 1984:77). Sterilizations fell from almost a million per month at the end of the Gandhi administration to about 50,000 per month at the beginning of the Janta Party administration (Nortmann, 1978:277). Use of conventional contraceptives, mainly condoms, approached the emergency drive's peak level, but condom use fell from 110 million in 1977–1978 to 78 million in 1978–1979 (Kangas, 1984:87). Due to a backlash over vasectomies, most of the sterilizations performed in 1981 were tubectomies, yet these reached 2.3 million, which rivaled the number performed during the emergency campaign (Kangas, 1984:87).
7. *Gandhi returns*. Gandhi's Congress party regained control in 1980, but Gandhi was more cautious about family planning policy (Kangas, 1984:87). The top position of secretary of

the Family Welfare Department was unfilled for a part of 1981, later filled by someone with no prior experience in the field (Kangas, 1984:94; Suri, 1991:31). The 1981 census, however, showed the population had grown 25% in the last 10 years, to 700 million people, shattering the hope that the growth rate had peaked in the 1960s (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:268). Gandhi urged renewed efforts for family planning but acknowledged the issue was mired in partisan controversy (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:269). Budgetary allotments were still below that of the fifth five-year plan (Kangas, 1984:80). Assassination cut short Gandhi's political career in 1984.

8. *Current policy.* Secretary of the Department of Family Welfare, Amulya Ratna Nanda states there will be no coercion: "We are not promoting a one child or two child norm, but a small family norm" (Sharma, 2000:734). Health insurance became available to the poor only if they underwent sterilization after two children (Acharya, 2001:26). Quotas for family planning field workers, which began in 1966 (Gwatkin, 1979:33) and were officially dropped in 1996, reappeared as "expected levels of achievement" (Acharya, 2001:26).

The Indian family planning programs have been called a failure. Yet with an overall reduction in the number of births per woman, from about six to just over three (Bouvier and Bertrand, 1999:56), fewer than the average of four births per woman in the rest of the developing world, India compares favorably to other peer nations. A major problem is that large families are fully consistent with the desires of Indian parents (Simmons, 1971:171). Family planning program performance, with minor exceptions, demonstrates the potential of the family planning gap approach without the prerequisite social development. The strengths of the Indian population policy lie in it being known and widely perceived as in the nation's best interest. Contraceptives are widely available, and there is program stability with population policy continuing regardless of election results.

## 28.2.2 Population Policy in China

### 28.2.2.1 The Population Problem

China is the world's most populous country with approximately 1.2 billion people (Bouvier and Bertram, 1999:54). She has 22% of the world's population but only 7% of the earth's arable land (Gu, 1997:42). Despite China's geographic size, half of its land lies in mountains and deserts (Morrish, 1994:43), and only about 15% is suitable for farming. Until 1949, war, famine, and disease kept death rates near the birthrate, and the population was stable at 500 million (Gupte, 1984:178). The new regime brought improvements in basic health, disease control, and control of insects and vermin that spread disease, greatly reducing death rates (Cassen, 1978:306). The population grew 20 million a year for the next 10 years (Gupte, 1984:178). The largest famine in world history occurred in China, during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), when 30 million people died of famine during government efforts to shift resources to industry and collectivize agriculture (Aston et al., 1984:614, 625).

China's population policies have been more successful than India's. Today, the average Chinese woman has two children, compared to about six in 1970, and the current average of four in the rest of the developing world (Gu, 1997:41). China's population policies have been most successful when combining social development with contraception. Significantly lower fertility rates are obtained in urban China, where there is more social development, than in rural China. The rural birthrate per woman has never dropped below 2.5, while in the cities it has fallen as low as 1.2 (Tien et al., 1992:11). Hence China's emphasis on social development may be one important key to success.



### 28.2.2.2 *Evolution of Policy*

Mao gained victory over the Nationalists in 1949, shortly after India's independence from Great Britain in 1947. While family planning had a much lower priority than social change, some social changes (e.g., women's equality in the workplace) reduced the motivation for childbearing (Daugherty and Kammeyer, 1995:235). Mao pursued social change both as a corrective measure to past injustices and to consolidate his rule. Among the first social reforms was the Marriage Law of 1950, which raised legal marriage age for females to 18, and for males to 20. This was accompanied by a propaganda campaign promoting late marriage (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:246). The law's goal was to eliminate the unjust custom of marrying off or selling young daughters, yet it also had the potential to reduce fertility (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:246). Mao also elevated the status of women, both in liberated areas before 1949 and then across China in 1949, by integrating them into the labor force (Arnold and Liu, 1986:224; Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:246). This coincided with Mao's emphasis on development as the best policy.

Mao, like Nehru, did not support Western-style family planning. In 1949, he denied China had a population problem; under socialism, population growth would march hand in hand with economic development (Daugherty and Kammeyer, 1995:123). In an early speech, Mao said:

The absurd theory that increases of food cannot catch up with increases in population, put forth by such bourgeois economists as Malthus and company, has not only been refuted by Marxists in theory, but has also been overthrown in practice in the post-revolutionary Soviet Union and in the liberated China (Gupte, 1984:178).

Impressive agricultural results until 1957 probably reinforced this confidence (Aston et al., 1984:625). Mao said, "Every stomach comes with two hands attached," and the government encouraged births as a means to increase labor—the best way to increase production (Morrish, 1994:44). The People's Daily denounced birth control, "A way of slaughtering the Chinese people without drawing blood" and called people, "The most precious of all categories of capital" (Gupte, 1984:178). With conflicting messages between the population program and other official statements, citizens were uncertain whether family planning was in the best interest of the nation. Hence, little progress was made in family planning in China until 1971 (Kaufmann et al., 1989:708).

1. *China's first population campaign* began in 1954, following the 1953 census which reported a population of 600 million people (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1971:286; Gupte, 1984:179). By 1956 an intensive family planning program included distribution of contraceptives, educational programs on reproductive physiology, and a propaganda program extolling the virtues of small families (Tien, 1993). The program focused primarily in cities where only 20% of the people lived, as collectivization had priority in the countryside (Gupte, 1984:197). Nevertheless, the birthrate fell substantially (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:247). While the propaganda stated a clear enunciation of policy, Mao's contradictory statements and events to follow undermined citizen confidence that the policy was in the nation's best interest.
2. *Policy reversal during the Great Leap Forward.* The first population campaign was abandoned during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:247). In this period, opponents of population control won a temporary victory (Cassen, 1978:303). Proponents were denounced as rightists, purged from the party, dismissed from ministerial posts, and their policies repudiated (Gupte, 1984:179; Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:253).

- The Great Leap Forward attempted to realize Mao's vision of economic growth through labor and socialist enthusiasm. "Human investment" and increased effort led to building dams with shovels (Gupte, 1994:343), and rapid industrialization resulted through backyard steel production, which diverted labor from agriculture (Aston et al., 1984:625). Agriculture was collectivized (Aston et al., 1984:625). Overoptimistic targets and exaggerated reporting by local authorities led to a reduction in the land set aside for grain production and an increase in grain exports (Aston et al., 1984:629; Liew, 1997:42). To increase production, seedlings were planted too close together, leading to stunted growth and reduced output (Liew, 1997:42). In 1960, natural disasters to farmland were reported (Aston et al., 1984:630–631). The resultant famines cost 30 million lives (Aston et al., 1984:614). The famine also reduced the birthrate by at least a third compared to before the campaign (Tien et al., 1992:18–19), preventing an estimated 33 million births (Aston et al., 1984:614). A rapid increase in the birthrate resumed after the 1961 famine (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:247). Following the Great Leap Forward, Mao was replaced by Liu Shaoqi as Premier of the People's Republic of China, but Mao retained his leadership of the Communist Party (Aston et al., 1984:614).
3. *China's second population campaign* began in 1962 with a reinstatement of the previous family planning policies and programs (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:247). A central birth planning office was established (Chen and Kols, 1982).
  4. *Policy reversal under the Cultural Revolution*. In 1966, however, Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution to oust Liu Shaoqi and consolidate his control. Like most government activities, administration of the second population campaign and distribution of contraceptive supplies were interrupted (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:247). Red Guards sought to weed out antirevolutionary elements in society (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:253), and persecuted family planning cadres (Ma, 1996:265). Even talk of family planning was forbidden (Gupte, 1984:180). The cessation of the population campaigns during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution led to a decade without an effective population program and a baby boom in the 1960s. The fertility rate was 6.4 in 1965 (Economist, 1992:36). Liu Shaoqi was ousted as premier in 1970. Power struggles and frequent shifts in policy negated most of the criteria for authoritative population policy. Frequent changes in the family planning message created confusion as to what the party line was on family policy. Conflicting claims by competing factions also created uncertainty as to the right path for the nation. The interruption of programs and supplies violated Barnard's criterion that the individual must be capable of responding. The frequent changes in policy and leadership violated the criterion of organizational and financial stability. The only area of clear progress was that some of the social reforms indirectly reduced incentives to have a large family, such as an increase in the legal marriage age, and the integration of women into the labor force. In China, as in India, population programs in the first decade and a half met few of the criteria for effectiveness.
  5. *China's third population campaign began in 1971*. No well-organized birth limitation program emerged before 1971, due to political reasons (Kaufmann et al., 1989:708). In 1971, the "later-longer-fewer" campaign stressed three reproductive norms: *wan* ("later" as in later marriage), *xi* ("longer" as in longer spacing between children), and *shao* ("fewer" as in fewer total children) (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:247; Tien et al., 1992:8). Pressure was exerted to delay marriage until a couple reached their mid or late 20s, and in 1980, the legal marriage age was raised to 20 for females and 22 for males (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:247). Local birth planning officials pressured couples to have intervals of 3 years or longer between

births and to limit themselves to no more than two to three children (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:248). Two children were recommended for urbanites, three for rural couples (Kaufmann et al., 1989:708). Couples wanting a child had to request a planned birth card from their local family planning committees, which was necessary to obtain obstetric care (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:249). Abortions, sterilizations, and IUDs were provided free (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:249). There were incentives too. For example, couples undergoing surgical procedures to prevent future conceptions were offered paid vacations (Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986:249).

6. *One-child policy.* In the early 1970s, a project group used computerized population models and projected that China had to adopt a policy of a single child for each couple (Ma, 1996:265) to avert overpopulation. By 1980, it seemed population would grow to 1.4 billion by 2000, surpassing the country's ability to feed itself (Morrish, 1994:45). The problem was not people having more babies but more people having babies (Gupte, 1984:182). Reduction in child mortality due to improvements in basic health (the rural "barefoot doctors" for example), coupled with a cessation of population policies in the 1960s, created a large bulge in the population pyramid in the 1960s, and the potential for an equally large echo effect in the 1980s (Gu, 1997:42). In the 1970s, half the population was under 21 years of age (Daugherty and Kammeyer, 1995:239). With half a billion young people approaching their childbearing years, if each couple had only two children, a population explosion was imminent (Daugherty and Kammeyer, 1995:239). The birthrate had already dropped to its lowest recorded level before the one-child policy was announced (Tien et al., 1992:10), but even that would not be enough to prevent the population from exceeding the food supply. China was already importing between 15 and 20 million tons of grain to feed its people (Gupte, 1984:162).

Much policy variation existed over time and across jurisdictions. Variations over time will explain much of the variations across jurisdictions. The one-child policy progressed through three phases: (1) a restrictive policy with strong implementation, (2) a liberalized policy with relaxed implementation, and finally (3) a liberalized policy with stronger implementation (Greenhalgh et al., 1994:374).

The first phase was a restrictive policy with strong implementation. This policy was announced in 1979, and leniently enforced during 1980–1981 (Greenhalgh, 1986:491). In 1983, circulars appeared calling for mandatory IUD insertion for women with one child, abortions for unauthorized pregnancies, and sterilization for couples with two or more children (Greenhalgh, 1986:491). Strict application of the one-child policy and forceful implementation followed (Greenhalgh et al., 1994:374). National annual birth quotas were set and allocated to the provinces which assign responsibility to local governments to set the number of births permitted in each area (Li, 1995:563). Local officials, either heads of work units or village heads, select the families authorized to have a child (Li, 1995:563). A birth permit is not automatically granted to a new couple; to achieve targets, local authorities required people to wait until they get a permit (Li, 1995:568). Pregnancies outside the plan (without permits) must be terminated (Li, 1995:563). The birthrate dropped to 1.385 in 1984 (Ma, 1996:267), but there were unanticipated consequences. During 1982 and 1983, second births were forbidden except for extraordinary circumstances (Short and Zhai, 1998:374), and there were millions of mandatory abortions and sterilizations (Delfs, 1990:71). Abortion and sterilization campaigns led some couples, desperate for a son, to commit female infanticide (Greenhalgh, 1986:491). Unanticipated levels of resistance erupted; women illegally removed their IUDs or ran away to cities or the wilderness, to have children, and people

attacked family planning workers (Greenhalgh, 1986:508). With party legitimacy already at risk by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the policy was relaxed. In December 1983, Qiang Xinzhang was replaced by Wang Wei as Minister of the State Family Planning Commission (Greenhalgh, 1986:491).

The second phase was a liberalized policy with relaxed implementation. The release of Document 7 in 1984 signaled the reforms. First, it encouraged the development of local policies at the local level to suit local needs (Greenhalgh, 1986:493; Short and Zhai, 1998:374). Each of the 30 provinces developed its own family planning laws, each trying to meet five-year targets set by the Central Family Planning Commission (Sampson, 1989:28). The policy was liberalized to allow more rural couples, whose first child was a daughter, to have a second child (Greenhalgh et al., 1994:374) as long as their births were within the plan and did not jeopardize the goal of a population of 1.2 billion by the year 2000 (Greenhalgh, 1986:492). Revisions in the one-child policy in the second phase enabled those most in need of a second child to be permitted (Greenhalgh, 1986:507). This liberalization was likely due to a desire to stop female infanticide (Mosher, 2001:45) and to ease political strains at the local level (Greenhalgh, 1986:492). The birthrate, which was 13.85 per thousand under the strict policy in 1984, rose to 20.0 per thousand under the relaxed policy during 1986–1989 (Ma, 1996:267).

The second reform in the second phase of the one-child policy was to strengthen the cadre responsibility system (Greenhalgh, 1986:493) and hold local cadres accountable for successful implementation (Short and Zhai, 1998). Cadre responsibility systems spell out the rewards for success and penalties for failure (Greenhalgh, 1986, p.503). Document 7 prohibited “coercion and commandism,” which were never official policy but were used occasionally to meet unrealistic targets (Greenhalgh, 1986:493). Family planning cadres were to develop relationships with the people in their communities and understand their needs. Existing cadres deemed unsuited to family planning work were dismissed and replaced (Greenhalgh, 1986:503). Having multiple children was discouraged by levying fines and forcing families to repay the government for one-child subsidies paid earlier (Gu, 1997:42). Abortion and sterilization orders were enforced mainly through the threats of fines rather than force (Delfs, 1990:71).

A third reform during the second phase was the Information Management System (Greenhalgh, 1986:504). Periodic population campaigns were replaced by a continuous program with systematic monitoring of fertility to assure that targets were met (Greenhalgh, 1986:499), backed up by a new information management system. The Information Management System recorded the reproductive age of women, marriage, women who meet conditions for giving birth, pregnancy status, contraceptive used, distributed birth quotas, single child certificates, births, and deaths (Greenhalgh, 1986:504). One reporter’s visit to a Family Planning Service Station in Jiekuang Village Elementary School in Hunan Province provides a glimpse into how the system works (Lawrence, 1994:56). There, a chart on the wall had a record of the 160 women of childbearing age assigned to that station. Of 160, 125 were sterilized, 20 were using IUDs, 5 were infertile, and 4 were on the pill. One had a recent birth, and five had permits to have babies (Lawrence, 1994:56). Every 6 months, family planning workers performed ultrasounds on women using birth control to ascertain if the steel ring IUD was in proper position and to detect babies conceived outside the plan early enough to perform safe abortions (Lawrence, 1994:56). Any such woman lacking an allotted space in the official quota was expected to have an abortion (Lawrence, 1994:57).

The third phase of the one-child policy was a liberalized policy with stronger implementation. A white paper by the State Family Planning Commission, set on December 19, 2000 a population cap of 1.6 billion by 2050 and reiterated that targets and quotas were to be achieved by education and persuasion (Mosher, 2001:45). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee elevated population goals to the level of economic goals. Village cadres would also have their salaries docked for poor performance (Greenhalgh et al., 1994:389). Because birth planning is a major criterion for evaluating cadre job effectiveness, there has been some underreporting of recent births (Merli and Raferty, 2000:109).

7. *Future policy.* The one-child policy was never intended as a permanent measure (Gupte, 1984:182; Hesketh and Zhu, 1997:1687) but as an interim one to drastically reduce the fertility of one generation (Greenhalgh, 1986:508). However, there is evidence that many upwardly mobile urban Chinese women are adopting the one child or no child approach as a career strategy. Many such women are foregoing marriage—unthinkable in previous decades—in the interest of career advancement. Such trends and the growing reality of gender imbalance (surplus of males) are causing Chinese policy makers to rethink the one-child policy (Time International, 2001:18).

### 28.2.2.3 *Reasons for Success*

China accomplished a fertility transition in less than one generation and brought its birthrate in line with its death rate. China only had an effective population policy since 1971. Even before the one-child policy, the birthrate had fallen from 34 per thousand in 1970 to 18 per thousand in 1979, which is a fertility transition of unprecedented magnitude (Gupte, 1994:160). By 1990, the birthrate of 1.92 was below the replacement rate, and now stands at about 1.8 (Bouvier and Bertrand, 1999:54).

At the outset, China stressed social development ahead of population control. Social development reduces the incentives to have large families and resolves the conflict between individual and state. Lower fertility in cities, where development is more advanced, illustrates the role of social development in the effectiveness of policy. The one-child family remains an urban phenomenon, not emulated in rural areas (Gu, 1997:43). The fertility rate never fell below 2.5 in rural areas, but dropped to 1.2 in urban areas (Tien et al., 1992:11).

Western-style development is not necessary to change desired family size, just enough social development to reduce the incentive for large families. One example of such social development is old age insurance. In the underdeveloped world, one of the main incentives for large families is old age security (Gillespie, 1984; Arnold and Liu, 1986:226).

Differences in incentives in having large families, and hence fertility, can be traced to social insurance, which is provided to China's urban workers but not its rural peasants. Each Chinese has an official registration. Worker registrants draw wages or other allocations from the state, while peasant registrants depend on agriculture for subsistence (Li, 1995:564). Those with worker registration are guaranteed an old age pension, which is provided by the state through the work unit (Li, 1995:565). Although, some without worker registration may move to the city, most urban retirees are covered by pensions (Tien et al., 1992:21). This social safety net means urban Chinese do not depend on their children for retirement and have much higher compliance with China's one-child policy. Social and economic conditions in urban areas supported the desire for fewer children (Kaufmann et al., 1989:708).

Peasant registrants are not guaranteed old age pensions (Li, 1995:564). Childless elderly peasants are guaranteed a minimum standard of living called the five guarantees: food, clothing, medical care, housing, and burial expenses (Arnold and Liu, 1986:227). Rural retirees are the wards of their

own children (Tien et al., 1992:21), and the need for a son to care for parents in old age has been a limiting factor in the one-child policy (Arnold and Liu, 1986:221; Tien et al., 1992:21). Parents have children until they have a son. Economic reforms, which began in 1978, have accentuated the urban–rural differences by reducing the presence of the state and social guarantees in the countryside. These reforms dismantled collective farms and returned to the family farm-based economy, thus encouraging large families (Kaufmann et al., 1989:708) for both labor and old age security.

A survey in Hebei Province found substantial differences in compliance with the one-child policy between workers and peasants (Li, 1995). Ninety-seven percent of first births to workers had birth permits, compared to 84% of first births to peasants (Li, 1995:567). Over 49% of subsequent births to workers were with a permit, compared to only 9.9% for peasants (Li, 1995:568). Workers were more likely to abide by the permit system and less likely to have more than one child (13% of births), whereas peasant women tried and were able to evade the system (Li, 1995:568–9).

### **28.3 Conclusions and Wider International Implications**

Population policy is a demanding challenge for developing countries. The absence of successful models made experimentation necessary.

Compliance with population policy is largely voluntary. Although India and China may be cited as examples of countries for coercive policies, coercive methods were used for 2 years in both before they threatened to destabilize the regimes. In India, coercion contributed to the electoral defeat of Indira Gandhi's Congress Party. In China, unanticipated resistance led to a liberalization of the policy. Both India and China have experimented with market mechanisms. Positive incentives share with citizens some of the positive externalities of limiting family size, while fines and ineligibility for some government program make citizens share some of the negative externalities of exceeding desired family size. In time, the policies have shifted from positive to negative incentives. Different urban and rural fertility rates in China indicate that even with pervasive availability of birth control, people weigh the costs and benefits of having additional children, often still choosing to have them.

If compliance is voluntary, what factors determine the level of voluntary compliance? All the criteria suggested by Barnard (1938) and Lee et al., (1998) are influential. First, the policy must be clearly communicated and understood by the citizens. Population policies were not successful in either India or China, when not publicly promoted. Second, citizens must believe that the policy is in the national interest. When a broad coalition of leaders supported the policy and shared policy risk, fertility rates declined. When political conflict intensified in China before 1970 and in India before 1966 and after 1977, population policy became a divisive political issue and family planning could no longer be universally accepted as in the interests of the country. Third, citizens must believe that the policy is in their personal interest. In urban China, social developments such as old age security and inclusion of women into the labor force have created incentives for small families. India and rural China lack a high level of social development, and have higher birthrates than urban China. Fourth, citizens must be able to act on the policy, presumably through the availability of effective contraception. Periods when effective contraception was unavailable, including India's first five-year plan and the China's Cultural Revolution, saw higher fertility rates. Fifth, organizational and financial stability is important. Population policy is less effective in times of instability. Early policies were weak in both countries until the regimes became well established. Population policies were not introduced in China's countryside during collectivization, or across the country during the Great Leap or the Cultural Revolution. Surprisingly, stability after Mao's consolidation of power after the Cultural Revolution led to the effective Later-Longer-Fewer Campaign,

even though Mao was no champion of population control. In India, financial instability caused reevaluation of existing programs in the early 1970s, and electoral instability led to a reduction of family planning efforts beginning with the 1977 national election campaign. Over time, both India and China moved from temporary campaigns, which produced quick results but were soon discontinued, to long-term policies with continuous administration. China, wary of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, moved in a deliberate and systematic manner to curb population growth. The long-term success of the more draconian one-child policy in China, compared to the failure in Indira Gandhi's New Population Policy, signals a definite lesson. Firm policies, implemented in a gradual and consistent manner, can succeed if the preconditions are present, such as strong institutions and enough social development to reduce the incentive to have large families.

In India, a pattern emerges of limited success in family planning, dependence on voluntary adoption of family planning methods in slowing population growth, and an absence of development. Conflicts between individual interests to have large families and society's interest in limiting overpopulation limit voluntary acceptance. In a country where political leaders depend on elections to attain and retain power, there is little incentive to challenge the existing order or change the incentives to have children. China presents the other end of the continuum. Here, the effort to reduce population growth took a back seat to social development. Social development, such as the inclusion of women in the workforce, later marriages, old age insurance, and universal education have reduced the incentive to have large families, at least in China's cities. Such social changes to the existing social order, however positive, might have posed unacceptable political risks in a democracy. Yet development alone, without contraception, cannot harmonize population with food supply, as demonstrated by the famine during the Great Leap Forward. Barnard's criteria suggest that both contraception and development are necessary.

To the extent that developing nations foresee serious consequences in unrestricted population growth, both of these examples may prove relevant. So long as the announced policy is (1) clearly communicated, (2) perceived as in the best national interest, (3) appeals to citizens' personal interest, (4) within the capabilities of the average citizen, and (5) enjoys institutional and financial stability, then such policies have a reasonable chance of success.

## References

- Acharya, K. (2001). Sterilization in India. *Contemporary Review* 279 (1629), 26–28.
- Arnold, F. and Z. Liu. (1986). Sex preference, fertility, and family planning in China. *Population and Development Review* 19 (2), 221–246.
- Aston, B., K. Hill, A. Piazza, and R. Zeitz (1984). Famine in China. *Population and Development Review* 10 (4), 613–645.
- Barnard, C. I., (1938). *The Functions of the Executive*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bauer, P. (1998). Population growth: Disaster or blessing? *Independent Review* 3 (1), 67–77.
- Bouvier, L. F. and J. T. Bertrand. (1999). *World Population: Challenges for the 21st Century*. Santa Ana, CA: Seven Locks Press.
- Cassen, R. H. (1978). *India: Population, Economy and Society*. New York: Holmes & Meier, Publishers.
- Chen, P. C. and A. Kols. (1982). *Population and Birth Planning in the People's Republic of China*. Population Reports, J(25), j-601. Population Information Program. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University, Quoted in Kammeyer, Kenneth C W and Helen Ginn (1986) *An Introduction to Population*, 247. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
- Daugherty, H. G. and K. C. W. Kammeyer. (1995). *An Introduction to Population*, 2nd edn. New York: Guildford Press.
- Delfs, R. (1990). China's fertility factor. *World Press Review* 37 (11), 71.

- D'Monte, D. (1999). Democracy vs. plenty. *The New Leader* 82 (2), 10–11.
- Economist*. (1992). Growing and growing, 325 (7779), 36.
- Gillespie, R. (1984). *Introduction to Population and Survival: Five Challenges in Five Countries*, G. L. Kangas (ed.), New York: Praeger.
- Greenhalgh, S. (1986). Shifts in China's population policy, 1982–86: Views from the central, provincial and local levels. *Population and Development Review* 12 (3), 491–151.
- Greenhalgh, S., C. Zhu, and N. Li. (1994). Restraining population growth in three Chinese villages, 1988–93. *Population and Development Review* 20 (2), 365–395.
- Gu, B. (1997). China's population grows despite fertility decline. *Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy* 12 (2), 41–45.
- Gupte, P. (1984). *The Crowded Earth*, New York: W.W. Norton.
- Gwatkin, D. R. (1979). Political will and family planning: The implications of India's emergency experience. *Population and Development Review* 5 (1), 29–59.
- Hesketh, T. and W. X. Zhu (1997). The one child family policy: The good, the bad, and the ugly. *British Medical Journal* 314 (7095), 1685–1687.
- Kammeyer, K. C. W. and H. Ginn. (1986). *An Introduction to Population*. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
- Kaufmann, J. and Z. Zhang, X. Qiao, and Y. Zhang. (1989). Family planning and practice in China: A study of four rural counties. *Population and Development Review* 15 (4), 707–424.
- Kangas, G. L. (1984). *Population and Survival: Five Challenges in Five Countries*. New York: Praeger.
- Lawrence, S. V. (1994). Family planning at a price. *U.S. News* 117 (11), 56–57.
- Lee, K., L. Lush, G. Walt, and J. Cleland. (1998). Family planning policies and programmes in eight low-income countries: A comparative policy analysis. *Social Science and Medicine* 17 (7), 949–459.
- Li, J. (1995). China's one child policy: How well has it worked: A case study of Hebei Province, 1978–88. *Population and Development Review* 21 (3), 563–585.
- Liew, L. (1997). *The Chinese Economy in Transition: From Plan to Market*. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishers.
- Ma, J. (1996). 1.2 billion-retrospect and prospect of population in China. *International Social Science Journal* 48 (2), 261–268.
- Mandelbaum, D. G. (1974). *Human Fertility in India*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Merli, M. G. and A. E. Raferty (2000). Are births underreported in rural china? Manipulation of statistical records in response to China's population policies, *Demography* 37 (1), 109–126.
- Morrish, M. (1994). China struggles with the population equation. *Geographical Magazine* 66 (6), 43–45.
- Mosher, S. W. (2001). In China, family planning is still a government affair, *Insight on the News* 17 (10), 45.
- Nortmann, D. L. (1978). India's new birth rate target: an analysis. *Population and Development Review* 4 (2), 227–312.
- Pritchett, L. H. (1994). Desired fertility and the impact of population policies. *Population and Development Review* 20 (1), 1–55.
- Sampson, C. (1989). China to toughen its grip on birth control. *New Scientist* 121 (1650), 28.
- Sharma, D. C. (2000). Indian policy aims for stable population by 2045. *The Lancet* 355 (9205), 734.
- Short, S. E. and F. Zhai (1998) Looking locally at China's one-child policy. *Studies in Family Planning* 29 (4), 373–387.
- Simmons, G. B. (1971). *The Indian Investment in Family Planning*. New York: Population Council.
- Suri, K. B. (1991). Overpopulation in India and the Educational Imperative. *Social Service Review* 65 (1), 22–42.
- Tien, H. Y., T. Zhang, Y. Ping, J. Li, and Z. Liang. (1992). *Population Bulletin* 47 (1), 2–43.
- Tien, H. Y. (1993). *China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic 1949–1969*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Quoted in Kammeyer, K. C. W. and Daugherty, H. G. (1986) *An Introduction to Population*, 247. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
- Time International* (2001). China's Baby Bust: A dwindling birthrate and an aging populace force China to rethink its Family Planning Policy. 158 (4), 18–19.
- Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster Press.





## Chapter 29

---

# Big Businessmen at the Helm: The Politics of Conflict of Interest in Thailand

---

Bidhya Bowornwathana

### CONTENTS

2	9.1	Introduction.....	483
29	.2	A Conflict of Interest .....	484
29	.3	The Manipulation of Conflict of Interest Situations by Big Businessmen .....	485
29	.4	The Political Game: Tactics to Overrule Conflict of Interest Accusations .....	488
	29.4.1	First Tactic: The Legal Argument .....	488
	29.4.2	Second Tactic: Political Supremacy .....	489
29	.4.3	Third Tactic: Absolute Control of the State Machinery .....	489
	29.4.4	Fourth Tactic: Takeover of Accountability Mechanisms.....	490
	29.4.5	Fifth Tactic: Censorship of the Press .....	490
	29.4.6	Sixth Tactic: Distract Citizens from Conflict of Interest Issue.....	491
	29.5	Conclusion: Making Profit from Being in Government .....	492
		Notes .....	492

### 29.1 Introduction

What happens when a country is being run by a group of big businessmen? I shall argue that one possibility is for those businessmen in power to be accused of managing the country for the sake of their companies. Politics may become a means toward achieving a business end. The abuse of

public office for private gain or *corruption* is likely to be rampant at the top. The game of politics in government centers on the issue of *the conflict of interest*. The big businessmen will plead innocence by claiming that their management of the country has nothing to do with the growing wealth and asset accumulation of their companies. While those critical of the government will point out to the contrary by accusing the big businessmen in power of using their public office to facilitate their businesses. I shall call this phenomenon “the politics of conflict of interest.”<sup>1</sup>

This chapter proposes a way to conceptualize situations whereby big businessmen in power manage a country in the interest of their companies and for personal wealth. It is a study of the phenomenon of a conflict of interest, a new form of corruption, at the top level of government.<sup>2</sup> First, I shall systematize the concept of “the conflict of interest problem.” Second, I shall explain how big businessmen manipulate conflict of interest situation for personal gains. Third, I shall explain the tactics used by the big businessmen to overrule accusations about conflict of interest. Finally, I shall discuss how, within a political framework, success can be measured by the ability of the big businessmen to make personal gain and profit from running government. To substantiate my arguments, I shall draw examples mainly from the Thai polity under the Thaksin Government (2001–2006). The prime minister, many cabinet members, and their families were wealthy businessmen who owned large companies.<sup>3</sup>

## 29.2 A Conflict of Interest

What is the meaning of a “conflict of interest?” Conflict of interest is a form of graft or political corruption described as the acquisition of money, gain, or advantage by dishonest, unfair, or illegal means through the abuse of one’s public office.<sup>4</sup> In this chapter, conflict of interest refers to situations where the top executive encounters opportunities to use his public office for the sake of his own private gain. Private gains can take the form of economic or financial, psychological, social, and political gains. Conflicts of interest present dilemmas in which the top executive must choose between serving his own interest and the interest of the public. The existence of too many conflicts of interest incidents may jeopardize the public’s faith in the integrity of government leadership. In some societies, even the appearance of the conflict of interest must be avoided to maintain political popularity.

The study of conflict of interest is a very complicated one because of the difficulty involved in determining whether a particular conduct of the top executive constitutes a conflict of interest. In a pluralistic society, contradictory opinions exist as to the appropriateness of a conduct. There is no clear demarcation line between what is permissible and what is not permissible.

Let us consider two extreme visions. The first one assumes that we live in a society where no distinction is made between public and private spheres. The ruler takes as much wealth as he wishes from his position. Such a society is known as kleptocratic or “vampire” states.<sup>5</sup> “What belongs to the kingdom or empire also belongs to me.” At the other extreme, there may be societies where there is a clear distinction between public and private spheres. For example, democratic countries today make such a distinction. There is some understanding as to what kinds of conduct constitute a conflict of interest and what do not. Societies are assumed to have established sophisticated anticorruption institutions and laws. Every move of the top executive is watched. There is a comprehensive system of control based on surveillance, massive information gathering, auditing, and aggressive enforcement of anticorruption laws. In governance terms, it is a state where accountability, transparency, and openness of government are at their extreme. This vision is called panoptic.<sup>6</sup> The panoptic (or “goldfish in a crystal bowl”) state is the opposite of the kleptocratic or vampire state.

At present, there is no democratic polity that is completely kleptocratic or panoptic. The conflict of interest situation in countries today is more complicated. Along this vampire–goldfish or kleptocratic–panoptic continuum lies a large gray area or “contested terrain” of what constitutes conduct or conflict of interest.<sup>7</sup> The situation of conflict of interest of today’s polities is found within this contested terrain. For some polities, the unoccupied territory is wider than others. The two extremes are not desirable. In kleptocratic state, the leader owns the country. While in a panoptic state, too many corruption control laws covering all gray area has its own pathology such as decision-making delay, overcentralization, inadequate authority, defensive management, goal displacement, poor morale, and barriers to interorganizational cooperation.<sup>8</sup>

The issue of the conflict of interest becomes a problem when there is little or no consensus as to what constitutes an act of conflict of interest. This gray area opens the door for corrupted politicians to get away with the benefit of the doubt. The size and clarity of this gray area varies from country to country. In general, leaders in developed countries are closer to the goldfish state, while those leaders of the developing countries tend to have more opportunities to become “vampires.” But, there are always exceptions to this rather superficial generalization. More empirical research is needed in this area.

The conflict of interest problem can be worsened under the following circumstances. First, there is a large gray area or “contested terrain” regarding what is correct and what is wrong conduct. Moral and ethical standards are unknown, unclear, and controversial, leaving plenty of room for debate and maneuvering by the vampire leaders. This may be so despite the fact that countries may have legislation outlawing conflict of interest practices by the political executive. There may be loopholes in the legal framework and the process of indicting the top executive for conflict of interest charges is a long and uphill task. Furthermore, corruption conduct can be unethical and immoral without being illegal. Thus, the legal system does not cover all cases of conflict of interest. In a goldfish society, the political executive avoids even the appearance of corruption.

Second, there is no clear measurement of corruption and conflict of interest because their meaning changes through time. For example, in some societies, there is an increasing demand for higher standards of integrity for public office. What appears to be an acceptable practice today may be considered as a conflict of interest dilemma tomorrow. Third, after being in power for a while, cases of conflict of interest problems involving the top executive gradually accumulate. Though there may be disagreement on whether each particular case constitutes corruption, the fact that the cases multiply may erode the confidence of the public in the integrity of the top executive. Fourth, the top executive and his associates who assume power may have backgrounds that are conducive to corruption and conflict of interest situations. This is especially so in the case of businessmen-turned politicians. Can one expect a billionaire businessman who becomes prime minister to vigorously regulate his former companies in a straightforward manner? Will he try to weaken government agencies that compete with his companies? Will he use his power to facilitate his companies at the expense of others?

### 29.3 The Manipulation of Conflict of Interest Situations by Big Businessmen

Asking how big businessmen create situations of conflict of interest is like asking how they practice corruption. There are several ways by which big businessmen can create conflict of interest situations. I shall explain and provide examples from the Thai case.

**Situation 1: Policy Corruption.** The top executive and his cronies may launch policies which favor their businesses and companies or those of their families, relative, friends, and business

partners. Private economic interest takes precedence over public concerns. This is what Thailand is called an act of *policy corruption*. The Thaksin Government is accused of implementing economic and fiscal policies which support excessive public consumption to boost sales of their goods such as mobile phones.

An example of policy corruption is Thailand's decision to support the United States by sending troops to Iraq in 2003. In return, the U.S. Government gave Thailand the status of Special Non-NATO Ally which contains a provision that facilitates export license for commercial satellites. It is no coincidence that prime minister's Shin Corp. operated Thailand's largest satellites business, and neighboring countries such as Burma had shown interest in renting Shin Corp.'s satellites for commercial purposes.

**Situation 2: Nepotism.** The top executive may give preferential treatment to relatives and friends in hiring, promotion, transfer, and awarding public contracts. The word for this act is *nepotism and patronage*. After 5 years in office, Prime Minister Thaksin appointed many relatives, friends, and cronies to key positions in the government. For example, his cousin as the army chief, his wife's brother-in-law as the deputy police chief and member of anti-money laundering commission, his brother-in-law as the permanent secretary to the Ministry of Justice. He transferred the Police Chief to the Office of the Prime Minister for being unable to put a halt on Southern unrest. However, he did not transfer his cousin, the Army Chief. Instead, he transferred the Southern army-commander. Why did not he transfer the Southern police commander instead of the chief police?

**Situation 3: Bribery.** The top executive may receive illegal payoffs in exchange for his exercise of authority for special favors. There are several forms of payoffs: money, gift and entertainment, investment opportunity, sexual favors, campaign support, honorarium, run-of-the-mill favors. Favor need not be bestowed on the official personally, it may be given to a member of the official's family or friend or lover. For example, rumors were that Ramkhamhaeng University authorities were quite lenient to the son of the prime minister for being caught cheating in an exam because the government, in turn, was soft on the controversial issue of the elections of rector at that university.

**Situation 4: The very.** The top executive may misuse government property, do private work on the job, expropriate subordinates' labor for their private use, etc. He may make business deals for his company with the host government and foreign businessmen while paying a state visit abroad. While working in Government House, the Prime Minister may also be making key decisions for his companies. In this regard, he may order government officials to do some work for his family's companies.

**Situation 5: Inside Information.** The top executive may peddle with inside confidential information obtained in his capacity as head of government to make business gains. For example, the Thaksin government had plans to move all government offices from Bangkok to another province, Nakhon Nayok. The rumor was that the prime minister and several cabinet members had already purchased land around that area at a low price.

**Situation 6: Privatization.** State enterprise privatization policy creates conflict of interest situation when the policy seems to benefit the prime minister and his cronies far more so than the others. For example, family members of the top executive and his friends may be given the privilege of buying shares in large quantities at a below-market price before the general public. Under the Thaksin Government, privatization of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) resulted in PTT shares listed in the stock market ending up in the hands of ruling businessmen, and their families and cronies. Millions of PTT shares were allocated to "patrons" of finance companies and banks in charge

of PTT privatization. The patrons happened to be big businessmen in power and members of their families. The shares were sold in a few minutes, depriving citizens who waited in the line for hours of the right to buy them. Ruling businessmen got huge windfalls later on when the share price rose from the initial public offering of 35 to approximately 180 baht within a short period.<sup>9</sup> Another case, the on-going effort to privatize the Energy Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT), was overshadowed by fear that EGAT assets would end up being divided among a handful of wealthy families close to the prime minister and cabinet members: a repeat of the PTT episode.

**Situation 7: Government Procurement.** Government bids are usually won by companies owned by the families, friends, cronies, or business partners of the ruling businessmen. Business competitors have no chance. The project does not go to the best bidder. The top executive awards lucrative government contracts to a company in which he has an interest. Only friends of the prime minister can successfully bid for government projects especially those megaprojects such as construction of infrastructure, buying of military weapons, and acquisition of new airplanes for the national airlines. Inside information about conflict of interest involving government procurement is almost impossible to obtain.

Procurement is almost impossible to obtain. What we see is probably the tip of the iceberg. It is common for rumors to circulate that to win a government bid one has to pay a certain amount of under-the-table commission. For example, the rumor is that during Thaksin Government, the take was 15%. Payment, they claimed, was made to member of the families of the prime minister and cabinet members.

**Situation 8: The Sale of State Property.** The goal of the big businessmen is to amass as much wealth as possible. They ask the question, “what does the state own, and how can I move ownership of state property into my pocket.” For example, in Thailand, the state in the name of King owns land all over the country. Some land is allocated to peasants for cultivation with the condition that they cannot be sold. The Thaksin Government tried to change land laws to enable peasants to sell their land. Some fear this would result in the selling of low-price land for cash by the peasants to rich people. Those capitalists with a lot of money such as the prime minister and wealthy cabinet members would benefit and expand their land ownership throughout the country.

**Situation 9: Competing against Government.** Another type of conflict of interest occurs when big businessmen venture into new businesses that directly compete with the services provided by a government department or state enterprise. Thus, as the prime minister, you are supposed to manage government enterprises and public service organizations as best as you can. But as a businessman, you are looking for new business opportunities and investment. I shall give two examples. First, the Shin Corp. which was founded by former Prime Minister, Thaksin, and whose major shareholders were members of his family had launched a budget airline, Air Asia. Instead of instructing Thai Airlines, a state enterprise under the management of government, to venture into the budget airlines business, the prime minister had his Shin Corp. do it. Consequently, domestic and regional routes of Thai Airlines had to compete with the prime minister’s Budget Airlines.

Second, the 30 baht medical service program of the Thaksin Government had drained hospital reserves and caused the resignation of many physicians. At the same time, the Shin Corp. was buying up medium size private hospitals and had plans to create a regional hub for health care.

**Situation 10: Preferential Treatment and Double Standards.** This conflict of interest situation occurs because the government bureaucracy gives preferential treatment to companies belonging to the top executive and his cabinet members. For example, revenue officials find ways for companies of big businessmen in power to pay less tax. Customs authorities charge low import–export

fees from the companies belonging to the families of the prime minister and his cronies. Foreign affairs and commerce officials facilitate companies of politicians to do business abroad. All these preferential treatments gave businesses of influential politicians an edge over domestic and international competitors. In Thailand, we call this the phenomenon of double standards.

Another well-known case is the iTV saga. The founding principle of iTV is to provide viewers with neutral news coverage and educational programs in the spirit of democracy after the 1992 pro-democracy uprising. After Thaksin took power in 2001, Shin Corp. bought iTV shares and became the major shareholder. According to the original contract of 1995, the government allowed iTV to operate with the understanding that the channel would become a 24 h news and educational channel. After iTV was acquired by the giant telecom Shin Corp., the company management petitioned the arbitration panel to rule whether the Prime Minister Office had violated the contract by allowing UBC pay-TV channel and Channel 11 to advertise in a way that affected iTV financially. The arbitration panel ruled that the Office of the prime minister had violated the contract and should pay iTV 17 billion baht in compensation.

## 29.4 The Political Game: Tactics to Overrule Conflict of Interest Accusations

The politics of conflict of interest problem presents us with an interesting political game consisting of two opposite players. The first group consists of the top executive and his cabinet members who want to escape from conflict of interest accusations. They want to show that they are honest “goldfishes” in a crystal bowl. The other group or the accusers, on the other hand, want to pinpoint the existence of corruption and conflict of interest in order to publicize “the evil of the vampires.” To explain the political struggle between the two, I shall explain the tactics used by the ruling businessmen to get away with conflict of interest accusations. Six tactics are explained.

### 29.4.1 *First Tactic: The Legal Argument*

The most common tactic practiced by the top executive is to claim that he has nothing to do with the businesses of his family. He will point out that he has relinquished all his management positions in his family’s companies in accordance with the law. He does not own large amount of shares. Companies under his family business empire are mostly public corporation listed in stock market. He does not have any knowledge of the financial and investment activities of his former companies. However, it is hard to believe him, considering the fact that he was the person who set up and ran the companies until the law required him to relinquish those roles so that he can join politics. The truth is that though he does not own companies now, company ownership is in the hand of his wife, his son and daughters, his relatives, and business partners. It is hard to believe that he has nothing to do with the businesses of his family. The fact seems to speak for itself: the businesses of his family flourished through favorable government policies; his family’s companies won government procurement bids; government rules and regulations were revised and issued to support his family’s businesses, etc. All these positive factors happen in accordance with the law. The political executive has not violated any law, rules, and regulations. To accomplish this, one essential condition for the political executive is to have a strong team of legal experts to help him find loopholes in the legal and bureaucratic framework. In Thailand, we call a person who performs this function, in a sarcastic sense, “provider of legal services” (ni tit borekorn).

As a tactic to overrule accusations of conflict of interest, the legal argument is a powerful one. But it is hard to avoid the appearance of corruption once repeated corruption cases surface to confirm the use of government authority by the political executive for private gain. The famous phrase of the billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin was that he had to ask for money from his wife because he was so poor!

### **29.4.2 Second Tactic: Political Supremacy**

Another factor which helps the political executive to overrule corruption charges is “political supremacy.” Translated into the Thai political context, political supremacy means as follows. First, it means an overwhelming majority in parliament. The number of government seats in parliament should exceed the minimum requirement for the opposition to call a censure motion against the prime minister. Better still, the government party should have even more seats so that the opposition cannot call a censure motion against ministers. This explains why Prime Minister Thaksin announced that in the election of 2005 his government aimed to win more than 400 seats: the minimum number which would take away the right of the opposition to call a censure motion against a Minister. Second, political supremacy means that a government run by a single big political party is preferred over a coalition government. This explains why the prime minister had put political pressure on other political parties to dissolve and join his Thai Rak Thai party. Though a single political party government does not eliminate factional politics, it is better to have many cliques and factions in a single party than to have many political parties in government. Third, the use of money to lure politicians to join and stay with the prime minister’s Thai Rak Thai party became essential. Money politics and crony capitalism have become important parts of the quest for political supremacy. Fourth, political supremacy also implies that opposition parties are to be weakened by all possible means available to the prime minister, Head of the Thai Rak Thai party, and owner of a huge business empire.

### **29.4.3 Third Tactic: Absolute Control of the State Machinery**

The top executive wants to have absolute control of the state machine. Not only does he seek control over his ministries and departments, state enterprises, the police, the army, and independent organizations, but to play it safe, he should also exercise control over the judiciary, the parliament, and local governments. Becoming such an authoritarian figure will protect the political executive from corruption and conflict of interest charges. Ideally, all key positions in the state machine should be under his influence. The top executive must be able “to order them” (*sang dai*). Even the elected governor of Bangkok, should be “one of his men.”

Administrative reform is an instrument for the top executive to consolidate and take away power and authority from others such as minister and high-level bureaucrats into his hands. At the end, the prime minister emerges as the sole center of power in society. All government power will be concentrated in his hands. Every government official, central and local alike, all politicians both in cabinet and parliament will come under him. There is a monopoly of government power by one single authority. I called this process of power consolidation, *prime ministerialization*.<sup>10</sup> Reform ideas from new public management and governance abroad are diffused and decomposed into horrid hybrids to match the top executive’s ultimate goal of absolute control.<sup>11</sup> Thaksin’s model of government can be interpreted as a company model with him on top of the single hierarchy. As owner of the company, he should have absolute power to manage his company. Those below him are CEOs within their units who answer to him, the super CEO.<sup>12</sup>



Once the state machine is completely under his control, the top executive will use it to fend off corruption and conflict of interest charges. For example, if a newspaper is too critical, trouble may befall that newspaper. He may command the police to find ways to arrest or press charges against that newspaper. He may ask the revenue department to look into tax filing and payment of the company that runs that newspaper. He may order the anti-money laundering commission to investigate the arrest of the owner of that newspaper. He may ask his business empire and those of his cronies to withdraw funding support such as advertisement for that newspaper. He may ask the company's team of lawyers to sue that newspaper in court.

#### **29.4.4 Fourth Tactic: Takeover of Accountability Mechanisms**

The principles of democratic governance have called for the establishment of a system of accountability mechanisms.<sup>13</sup> The 1997 Constitution of Thailand mandated the establishment of new agencies that would foster governance qualities of government such as accountability, openness, transparency, citizen's power, and access to information. In this regard, several agencies were recently created such as an independent Senate, the administrative court, the national counter corruption commission, the ombudsman, the anti-money laundering commission, the national telecommunication commission, the human rights commission, etc.<sup>14</sup> It is very important that these new independent democratic agencies be free from government interference and influence. The Constitution of 1997 had bestowed the power to the Senate to appoint most of the members of accountability agencies. However, it became obvious that the Senate was not neutral, but increasingly under the influence of former Prime Minister Thaksin. The newly elected President of the Senate was known to have close ties with Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai party. Most members recently appointed by the Senate to serve on accountability commissions were known to be cronies of Thaksin. For example, the prime minister appointed his brother-in-law, the deputy police chief as a member of the anti-money laundering commission. Ironically, the former secretary-general of the national counter corruption commission was not chosen to become a member of the corruption commission because he was instrumental in bringing former Prime Minister Thaksin to stand trial over charges of concealing his assets by transferring some of them into his drivers' and maids' names. Members of the freedom of information commission appointed by the prime minister are also his cronies and bureaucratic subordinates. And the list goes on showing the close connection between former Prime Minister Thaksin and those appointed to accountability commissions.

As for nongovernmental organizations that perform the function of checking and balancing the use of power by the top executive, the prime minister and his government has tried to minimize and discredit their roles. Government critics, watchdogs, and whistleblowers were not welcomed, and all faced the prospect of retaliation by the state machine under Prime Minister Thaksin.

#### **29.4.5 Fifth Tactic: Censorship of the Press**

Naturally, ruling businessmen who create conflict of interest situations are uneasy with news reports and criticism of their corrupt conduct. They prefer that the press cover up the news. On the other hand, they also enjoy reading news reports about corruption accusations against the opposition party or previous governments. To be able to dictate the news, several strategies are adopted. First, the state machine, such as the police, the revenue department, and the anti-money laundering commission, are used to intimidate news reporters and press. Second, instructions are handed out to radio stations and TV stations belonging to the government to censor all criticisms

against the government. Third, the media is controlled through ownership. Since all five major TV channels were either owned by government or by the prime minister and his cabinet members, it is easy to control TV programs. Many radio stations also belong to the military, so, the prime minister can order them directly. Fourth, the government also cancels radio and TV programs that are critical of the prime minister and the government. Fifth, government supporters create propaganda TV programs that support and praise the prime minister and the government, and attack the opposition party. Sixth, the prime minister buys out TV companies such as the case of iTV being bought by Shin Corp. Some previous programs of iTV were critical of government. After the buyout, the programs were canceled, and the reporters involved were fired. Seventh, the prime minister had a team of legal experts who look at news report for grounds to file a legal suit. The prime minister adopts an iron-fist approach toward criticism from domestic and foreign news reports. Eighth, the prime minister and cabinet members frequently use the television and radio stations to publicize their accomplishments. Ninth, the government and their business empires threaten to withdraw advertisement support from TV and radio programs that do not say nice things about the government.

However, there is more freedom at the newsstand. Newspapers still report and criticize the government on corruption grounds. Conflict of interest situations are pointed out in editorial and critical columns of various newspapers. All this freedom of the press is accompanied by legal and verbal attacks from the prime minister and government supporters. For example, shares of the Nation Group were quietly being bought by families of a key minister who was also the secretary general of the Thai Rak Thai party. The assets of senior newsmen were investigated by the anti-money laundering commission. Through government intervention, the contract of The Nation News TV program was not extended by UBC which is the only cable TV in Bangkok.

#### **29.4.6 Sixth Tactic: Distract Citizens from Conflict of Interest Issue**

The last tactic is to distract citizen voters away from incidents of conflict of interest created by the ruling businessmen. The prime minister and his government have tried to create the impression among citizen voters that the government was helping them to have a better life. Citizens should be concerned with improving their economic well-being rather than play a role of a government critic. First, the government has launched populist programs (aoe athorn) one after another such as 30 baht help services program, the low-cost housing program, the low-cost notebook program, and the poverty eradication program. Second, the government has encouraged the public to spend money to buy consumer goods such as mobile phones, motorcycles, automobiles, etc. Third, the media has been used to propagate that the Thai economy is growing because of the policies of the government. Fourth, the government has taken control over the illegal underground lottery which had been a major social activity of the Thai community. Instead of abolishing underground lottery, the government monopolized the selling of underground lottery. The objective of the Thaksin Government was to generate income for the government, not to improve public morality. Fifth, the prime minister and his government have portrayed themselves as corruption-busters. This is an irony if we consider the conflict of interest situations created by the government. Sixth, there are TV programs such as The Government Puppet Show and the House Representatives Imitation Program (a program that brings persons who look like certain politicians into the show) which make fun of politics and, I believe, creates the impression that one should not be serious about politics. At the same time, TV talk shows that criticize government are banned or monitored.

## 29.5 Conclusion: Making Profit from Being in Government

In this political game of conflict of interest, how does one determine winners and losers? Ruling businessmen who are winners are those who are able to manage the country for the benefit of their companies. Several success indicators are as follows. First, the amount of profit made: For the political executive and his cronies, the best measurement of success is to answer the question: how much money and assets did I accumulate this year through the creation of conflict of interest situations? Did I make a huge profit from my shares at the stock market? Did my companies record huge profit? Has my business empire expanded both domestically and globally? Second, the refinement of tactics used to overrule accusations regarding conflict of interest. Success means that there is improvement in the moves to achieve political supremacy, absolute control of state mechanism, takeover of accountability mechanisms, censorship of media, and to distract voters from conflict of interest problem.

To conclude, this chapter has illustrated how a political framework can shed light on conflict of interest. What is good for the big businessmen may not be good for the country and citizens as a whole. Corruption is harmful to a nation's democracy, economic growth, and mankind. It tends to distort the allocation of economic benefits. It favors the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor and powerless. Corruption also leads to a less equitable income distribution. The new challenge of democratic governance is how to deal with conflict of the interest when big businessmen take the helm.

### Notes

1. For a political approach toward the understanding of Thai politics and bureaucracy, see Bidhya Bowornwathana, Thailand: The politics of reform of the secretariat of the prime minister. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 55(4) (December 1996), 55–63 and Bidhya Bowornwathana, Thailand: Bureaucracy under coalition governments. In John P. Burns and Bidhya Bowornwathana, eds., *Asian Civil Service Systems* (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2001).
2. For background literature on corruption, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Susan Roes-Ackerman, The political economy of corruption. In Kimberly Ann Elliot, ed., *Corruption and the Global Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), pp. 31–60; Frank Anechiarico and James B. Jacobs, *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); W. Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Raj Soopramanien, Kishor Uprety, *Combating Corruption: A Comparative Review of Selected Legal Aspects of State Practice and Major International Initiatives* (Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 1999); United Nations Development Programme, Corruption and Good Governance, Discussion Paper 3 (New York: UNDP, 1997), A Report prepared by Susan Rose-Ackerman; Jon S. T. Quah, *Curbing Corruption in Asia: A Comparative Study of Six Countries* (Singapore: International Publisher, 2003); Joseph Zimmerman, *Curbing Unethical Behavior in Government* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).
3. The phenomenon of big businessmen becoming top executives is common. A parallel example to Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin is Italy's former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. See Bidhya Bowornwathana, The super patron, state capture, conflict of interest, and business empires: Comparison of big businessman Thaksin and Berlusconi in power. *Paper Presented at the 20th IPSA (International Political Science Association) World Congress*, Fukuoka, Japan, July 8th–July 13th, 2006.
4. April Hejka-Ekins, Conflict of interest. In Jay M. Shafritz, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration*, Vol. 1 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 481–485.

5. Stanislaw A ndreski, Kleptocracy o r c orruption a s a s ystem o f g overnment. In Stanislaw A ndreski, *The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation* (New York: Atherton, 1968).
6. Frank Aneciarico and James B. Jacobs, *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 24–25.
7. Rosslyn Kleeman, Gray areas of federal ethics law, *The Bureaucrat*, Spring 1989, 7–11. In Peter Madsen and Jay M. Shafritz, eds., *Essentials of Government Ethics* (New York: Penguin Group, 1989).
8. Frank Aneciarico and James B. Jacobs, *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control makes Government Ineffective* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 173–185.
9. *The Bangkok Post*, February 2004, p. 12.
10. Bidhya Bowornwathana, Thaksin's model of government reform: Prime Ministerialisation through 'a country is my company' approach. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 12(1), 2004, 133–149.
11. Bidhya Bowornwathana, Putting new public management to good use: Autonomous public organizations in Thailand. In Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot, eds., *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), pp. 247–263; Bidhya Bowornwathana, Joined at the top and structural reform of Thai ministries: More government, not governance. In Mark Considine, ed., *Knowledge, Networks, and Joined-Up Government* (Melbourne: Centre for Public Policy, University of Melbourne, 2002); and Bidhya Bowornwathana, Hidden agendas in administrative reform in Thailand. *Paper Presented at the International Conference on "Governance in Asia: Cultural, Ethics, Institutional Reform and Policy Change."* Governance in Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong, December 5–7, 2002.
12. Ibid.
13. Bidhya Bowornwathana, Transforming bureaucracies for the 21st century: The new democratic governance paradigm. In Eric Otenyo and Nancy Lind, eds., *Comparative Public Administration: The Essential Readings* (The United Kingdom, Oxford: Elsevier, 2006).
14. Bidhya Bowornwathana, Governance reform in Thailand: Questionable assumptions, uncertain outcomes. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions*, 13(3), 2001; and Bidhya Bowornwathana, The politics of governance reform in Thailand. In Ali Farazmand, ed., *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2001), pp. 421–443.



## Chapter 30

---

# Sociopolitical Structure and Public Administration in India

---

R.B. Jain

### CONTENTS

30	.1	The Institutional Strategies .....	496
30	.2	The Indian Social Structure .....	499
30	.2.1	The Demographic Characteristics.....	499
3	0.2.1.1	The Caste System .....	510
	30.2.1.2	Impact of Religion.....	512
3	0.2.1.3	Bureaucratic Dysfunctionalism .....	512
	30.2.1.4	Secularism, Casteism, and Religious Values .....	513
	30.2.1.5	Authoritarian Character of Indian Bureaucracy: The Cultural Context.....	514
30	.2.1.6	The Linguistic Multiplicity.....	515
30	.2.1.7	The Social Classes: Urban/Rural Dichotomy.....	515
	30.2.1.8	Social Justice and Poverty-Alleviation .....	516
30.3		Policy of Industrial Development and Public Sector .....	518
	30.3.1	Social Structure and Small-Scale Industries.....	519
30.4		Toward Good Governance: Impact of Globalization and New Public Administration Movement.....	520
	30.4.1	Introducing NPM in the Governance of India.....	521
30	.5	Concluding Reflections.....	524
N	otes	.....	526

The interrelationship between the state and society has been an important theme in the evolution of political thought in the past half century. That the state is deeply embedded in society, and that societal variables do affect the autonomy and performance of the state, is now an accepted fact. Whether it is the system theorist, or the dependency theorists, or the ecologist interpreters of public administration, all seem to agree that in any society, interactions between the state, its sociopolitical structures, and its administrative framework ultimately determine its policy outcome. Such interactions not only help pattern societal preferences but also pave the way to political and administrative developments in the context of divisiveness within and between classes, ethnic and religious segments, interest groups, or linguistic differences. The literature on comparative public administration is replaced with the emphasis on interaction and interrelationship between an administrative system and its external environment and the impact of sociocultural values on bureaucratic behavior, the processes of political and administrative changes and vice versa.<sup>1</sup> While scholars have concentrated more on the study of the state's capacity to bring about socioeconomic change through the evolution of a pattern of political and administrative institutions, little attention has been paid to understanding the impact that the sociopolitical structures in any society make on their political or administrative development.

This chapter is concerned with an analysis of the sociopolitical structure in a complex and developing society, that of India, with a view to discern the interrelationships between its social and political structures, continuing policy changes and administrative development. The attempt is to show that although a highly heterogeneous and complex social system with traditional, diversified religious-cultural values creates enormous pressures on its public administration system, it does not necessarily stifle the administrative development. The need is to coordinate policy and administrative changes in a manner so as not only to respond to the growing socioeconomic compulsions of the society but also to enable its people to participate in the politico-administrative processes. Hopefully, such an analysis and similar findings in the context of other developed and developing societies would be helpful in building up a theory of societal context and administrative development.

### 30.1 The Institutional Strategies

India was one of the first of the British colonies to gain independence from the yoke of an imperial power. After attaining freedom in 1947, the challenge before the political leadership was to frame a well-conceived strategy of change, development, and nation-building and to forge instrumentalities thereof—both mobilizational and institutional. To attempt to achieve a modicum of economic and political development in the aftermath of partition, through a democratic political system, while undertaking at the same time the reconstruction of a hardened social structure—not only deeply rooted to the age-old traditions but also highly fragmented—was indeed a formidable task. The four basic objectives of socioeconomic and political development uppermost in the minds of political leaders at that time were (1) the creation of a stable democratic polity, (2) laying the foundations of a self-reliant economy for rapid growth, (3) attainment of social justice through the elimination of discrimination based on class, caste, sex, and religion and eradication of poverty, and (4) rebuilding of the dilapidated administrative structure to be able to withstand the pressures generated by the growing demands and aspirations of expectant masses.

The leadership in India responded by channelizing the processes of change through the creation of a state system based on Western liberal democratic ideology of freedom and equality, incorporating the parliamentary system of government, reconciling it with the concept of

economic planning, and reforming the administrative machinery to enable it to respond to the growing exigencies and requirements of a social system divided by a variety of sociocultural identities.

Although the framing of a new political set up with its institutions, structures, and the rules of the game has proved to be a matter of incalculable difficulty for many of the new nations of Asia and Africa, India presented a striking contrast. Not only was an elaborate state system created with speed but also the democratic structure it established was institutionalized in considerable details. This had been possible because of both antecedent agreement on fundamentals and continuing diffusion of these agreements in the generation that followed Independence. Even as early as 1928, the Motilal Nehru Committee had framed a complete draft spelling out the features of (free) India's polity. It recommended, among other things, a parliamentary form and federal structure of the government and an exhaustive list of fundamental rights. These recommendations found overwhelming support among the members of the Constituent Assembly in the late 1940s.

However, decision making on India's institutional strategy was not wholly a product of agreements that were reached during the national movement. The framers did consider the emerging framework a new. Certain occasions did come when the members of the Constituent Assembly ran into serious disagreements. But the debates were avoided at most opportunities. Viable compromises were sought on fundamental provisions such as the federal structure of the country; the importance of judiciary in interpreting the constitution and the role of "due process"; the question of a proper balance between personal liberties of the citizen and the integrity of the nation, between the right to property and the goal of social and economic development, between the need for centralization and the extent of decentralization to lower levels of the polity, between the right to equality and the question of special rights and privileges of minorities and tribal and religious groups<sup>2</sup>; and so on.

In order to prevent the country from falling into pieces, certain restraints on the power of some institutions and the freedom of individuals were introduced. For example, the Central Government was armed with effective powers against the constituent states. Similarly, preventive detention to strengthen the government's hands came to be accepted as a necessary provision despite its restrictions on the most fundamental rights of a democratic citizen. It was dubbed as a "necessary evil." Again, while defining the relationship between Parliament and the Courts, due consideration had to be given to the need to arm the state with powers to reduce social and economic disparities; consequently, "the due process" clause was modified to suit Indian conditions.<sup>3</sup> Efforts were also made to elicit the maximum consensus in order to lay down a strong foundation of a nation. What emerged, as a result, was a federal structure of parliamentary government with a cabinet form of executive at the national and state levels directed to liberal democratic goals of individual freedom and social justice in the fulfillment of which government was assigned a positive role. The institutional structure that came into being was essentially modernist in character but with important departures from the Western model designed to facilitate national integration and social assimilation.<sup>4</sup>

The Indian leadership, in fact, borrowed liberal philosophy and Indianized it according to the unfamiliar and unique Indian practices and attitudes. Grant of "special privileges" to the backward groups in society and the "Scheduled Castes and Tribes" was an innovation designed to help the economically and socially weaker sections of the community. Similarly, the linguistic diversity of the country was given constitutional propriety through the adoption of all the major regional languages as having a legal status. The system also provided for flexible methods of adaptation to the changing social needs and demands by making the amendment procedure relatively easy to effect. This was a deviation from the strictly orthodox federal practices.



A political system, though a subsystem of the society, is supposed to perform the overall and overriding function of looking after the society and managing it to the extent that this can be done at conscious, corporate level. It is necessary, therefore, that a maximum number of members of a society participate in the exercise of this function. Certain groups may be legally or actually deprived of the right to participate in the process while even many who have the right to participate may not choose to do so unless it be made mandatory for them. The extent of the formal right of participation in the political process which is concerned with the total whole, the actual facilitation of the exercise of such a right, and the actual exercise of the right, thus, may be taken as determining the degree of political development which a society has achieved when compared to other societies or to itself in a former stage. This particular aspect of making maximum possible opportunities available for free participation of people in public affairs was the one on which the edifice of a democratic system was built in India.

The arena of power in India has not been limited to a ruling oligarchy or an aristocracy of birth; it has increasingly spread to the society as a whole by drawing new sections into its ambit. This is what differentiates the Indian political system both from the European systems where, during the phase of rapid industrialization and social changes, political participation was confined to the upper classes of society and from the revolutionary experiments in both communist and noncommunist varieties where, barring intraparty feuds and military coups, political competition was generally not allowed to interfere with the process of development. In India, politics is neither suppressed nor confined to a small aristocracy. On the contrary, it provides the larger setting within which decision making in regard to social and economic development takes place.<sup>5</sup>

The launching of the new governmental setup and the inauguration of the Indian Republic in January 1950 did not complete the process of institutionalization. The emergence of further consensus on political system involved new developments in the institutional layout of the country and important modifications of the formal structure of authority. The creation of a National Planning Commission within the political structure was one among such developments directed toward the attainment of planned economic growth. The Commission was entrusted with the task of formulating "Five-Year Plans," enunciating social and economic priorities of the nation, and suggesting general model of economic development. The states were reorganized on linguistic cultural basis to integrate heterogeneous communities into a nation, yet at the same time given an opportunity to maintain and promote their own regional language and culture. The dream of achieving unity in diversity was actually sought to be fulfilled. The launching of the community development programs and the establishment of the Panchayati Raj institutions were other measures within the framework of Indian political process that were undertaken to secure democratic decentralization for the sake of social and economic development at the grassroot levels and germane to the processes of nation-building. A continuous process of administrative reform was initiated first through an assessment of the administrative machinery by some inside and outside observers and later through the creation of a number of specific committees and a high powered Reforms Commission to suggest the necessary administrative changes; such changes are being continuously monitored by a permanent Department of Administrative Reform.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the indigenous and foreign criticism, the story of Indian polity since independence has been one of remarkable stability. Except for a brief aberration of the emergency, ironically sanctioned by the constitution, between 1975 and 1977, the 62 years of independence have seen remarkable performance of democratic elections, reasonably well-working political and administrative institutions, and basic political stability.

## 30.2 The Indian Social Structure

Institutional strategies alone are not enough for conceiving a process of change, development, and nation-building. Social structures and environmental factors do affect the state and the administrative system, and hence the development of the polity. The significance of those factors multiplies all the more in a pluralist society of India where the nation shares loyalties with a variety of other sociocultural identities. These identities have contributed both to the process of its development as well as to its decay. While they have played a major mediating role between politics and society, translating group loyalties into focal points of political solidarity, at the same time they have given rise to a number of fissiparous and separatist tendencies within the political and administrative framework, weakening its overall capacity for development.

### 30.2.1 *The Demographic Characteristics*<sup>7</sup>

Among the many social variables that have affected the Indian administrative system, a tremendous growth in population, despite an aggressive and extensive family planning campaign has been the most crucial factor. From 251 million in 1921, India's population had more than doubled by 1971, reaching 540 million. The census of 1981 reported India's population at 685.48 million which is expected to exceed one thousand million by the end of the twentieth century at the present annual rate of increase of approximately 2.2%. The annual rate of population growth has increased from 1.1% between 1921 and 1931 to 2.2% between 1961 and 1971 and to an average of 2.4% between 1971 and 1981.

In the 1950s, the urban population in India rose from 61.9 to 77.8 million, an increase of 0.43% in the proportion of urban population to total population. By 1981, India's cities had grown by about 100 million people at an annual rate of increase of 3.8%. The census of 1971 placed urban population at about 24% of the total. The urban population stands now at 160 million. Cities such as New Delhi, Bombay, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, and Hyderabad have experienced population explosions over the period through 1981. The percentage of urban population as a whole has been consistently increasing. During the last 50 years, India, on an average, has been adding about 5–6 million people to its towns and cities and has now reached to more than 28% of the total. The number of metro-cities is 40, and 4 of the Indian cities—Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Chennai—are among the 30 largest in the world.

The Indian population, which according to the latest census of 2001 stands at more than one billion, is divided by religion, sex, language, caste, dress, and even by the food-habits. These divisions have been further compounded by the gap between the rich and the poor, the English-speaking elite and the vernacular mass, and the urban and the rural. In its diversity and continental size, India shares more of the characteristics of the European Community than the more integrated, multiethnic, and unified polities of the United States.<sup>8</sup> India contains all of the major world religions, it is subdivided into a myriad of castes, it has 18 official languages and a thousand dialects, and tribal tongues. Politically and administratively, these diverse groups are organized into 25 states (now 28 states after the creation of three more states in September 2000) and 7 union territories. The process of mobilization and social change in the last 40 years has heightened the sense of awareness of the political and administrative development. Whereas such factors have led to political and administrative decay in most developing societies, in India, these have provided potential for administrative reliance and growth.

As a result of the dramatic growth in the population and an increase in nationalization, a large segment of population became increasingly dependent upon certain services provided by the

government. Urbanization has been related to industrialism, and these combined with population growth have placed heavier demands on transportation, communication, financial utility, education, medical, health, and other services. Planning of population growth and development of adequate and appropriate human resources have put additional burden on the administrative system. "Government has become more intensively involved in regulating, planning, stimulating, and even undertaking directly economic and commercial activities in many significant areas. The government of India's commitment to the abolition of poverty through socialism and a variety of social services for minorities and the economically disadvantaged classes have further accelerated the demands on government apparatus, and has penetrated more and more sectors of the citizen's life. Citizens' increased dependence upon the activities and the initiative of the government in all spheres of life has further increased public employment."<sup>9</sup> Table 30.1 indicates clearly the growth of public employment at the central government level in India.

The expansion of government has brought in its trail an inevitable increase in bureaucracy and public employment at all levels of government, particularly at the lower levels of organization. Government employment has expanded not only because of the radical changes taking place in

**Table 30.1 Growth of Central Government Employment, 1953–1980**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Employment<sup>a</sup> (000)</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Employment<sup>a</sup> (000)</i>
1953	1561	1967	2746
1954	1613	1968	2793
1955	1692	1969	2807
1956	1792	1970	2851
1957	1839	1971	2921
1958	1914	1972	NA
1959	1989	1973	NA
1960	2025	1974	NA
1961	2094	1975	NA
1962	2156	1976	NA
1963	2349	1977	NA
1964	2536	1978	3477
1965	2637	1979	NA
1966	2710	1980	3678

*Source:* Dwivedi, O.P. and Jain, R.B., *India's Administrative State*, Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1985, p. 19. With permission.

*Note:* NA indicates figures not available.

<sup>a</sup> Includes regular and nonregular employees.

the nature and growth of government functions but also because of the fact that in a country, which cannot afford unemployment insurance, the creation of lower posts has often been used to placate the massive unrest of the educated unemployed youth, particularly at the levels of state administrations. All these developments have added to the cynicism and disenchantment that generally prevails in the public mind about the efficacy of the public management system as a whole.

Although overstaffing the public service imposes a financial burden on the state, undermines morale and presents a major obstacle to efficient management, and expanding regular government employment does not help to solve the shortage of productive employment opportunities in the economy, most developing countries do not find any other alternative to growing unrest due to unemployment. For short-term unemployment relief, temporary public works (or food-for-work programs) are preferable, both in terms of costs and returns. However, it results in indiscriminate additions to line agency payrolls that are likely to become permanent.<sup>10</sup>

Another characteristic of public employment in India is reflected in Table 30.2 which shows distribution of central government employees by ministries and departments during the growth decades of 1961–1980. During these 20 years, central governmental manpower increased from

**Table 30.2 Distribution and Growth of Central Government Employees<sup>a</sup> by Ministries and Departments, 1961, 1971, and 1980**

<i>Departments/Ministries</i>	<i>March 31, 1961</i>	<i>March 31, 1971</i>	<i>March 31, 1980</i>	<i>Growth 1961–1980 Numerical</i>	<i>%</i>
Agriculture & Irrigation	29,290	20,227	25,445	–3,845	—
Atomic Energy	4,417	14,492	23,292	18,875	422.2
Cabinet Secretariat	2,093	7,271	195 <sup>b</sup>	–1,898	90.68
Commerce & Civil Aviation	—	—	8,209	8,209	—
Communications	2,41,599	3,85,560	5,32,524	2,90,295	120.2
Defense (Civilian)	2,79,177	4,73,728	5,15,319	2,36,142	84.6
Education & Culture	4,830	11,966	8,776	3,946	81.63
Electronics	—	—	682	682	—
Energy	1,561	5,351	6,639	5,078	325.30
External Affairs	3,448	4,023	4,884	1,436	41.64
Finance	86,833	1,18,956	1,58,023	71,190	82.0
Health & Family Welfare	8,194	15,437	19,518	11,324	138.2
Home Affairs	29,357	77,759	2,37,207	2,07,850	708.0
Audit & Accounts	38,007	51,091	22,772	17,765	46.7

(continued)

**Table 30.2 (continued) Distribution and Growth of Central Government Employees<sup>a</sup> by Ministries and Departments, 1961, 1971, and 1980**

<i>Departments/Ministries</i>	<i>March 31, 1961</i>	<i>March 31, 1971</i>	<i>March 31, 1980</i>	<i>Growth 1961–1980 Numerical</i>	<i>%</i>
Industry	12,233	13,540	69,849	57,616	471.0
Information & Broadcasting	9,274	15,234	20,204	10,930	117.8
Labour	4,145	10,336	9,664	5,519	133.14
Law, Justice & Company Affairs	2,024	2,784	3,602	1,578	77.36
Petroleum and Chemicals	—	316	502	502	—
Planning	1,519	1,633	5,975	4,458	293.36
Railways	11,46,921	13,73,634	15,53,229	4,06,308	35.4
Rural Reconstruction	945	—	1,591	646	68.3
Shipping and Transport	10,293	5,536	5,769	–4,757	–46.2
Space	—	—	9,439	9,439	—
Steel Mines & Coal	6,299	10,294	11,911	5,612	89.1
Supply & Rehabilitation	15,874	14,257	14,402	–1,472	–9.3
Science & Technology	9,962	11,542	17,992	8,030	80.6
Tourism & Civil Aviation	10,742	14,684	17,570	6,828	83.6
Works & Housing	25,936	34,395	39,261	13,325	51.4
Social Welfare	—	1,049	578	578	—
Other departments	1,604	3,562	6,049	4,445	277.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,86,577</b>	<b>26,98,657</b>	<b>33,21,072</b>	<b>13,34,495</b>	<b>67.2</b>

*Source:* Compiled from the statistical data available from the reports of the various ministries/ departments of the Government of India. Dwivedi, O.P. and Jain, R.B., *India's Administrative State*, Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 28–29.

<sup>a</sup> Only regular employees included.

<sup>b</sup> In 1977, the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms was separated from the Cabinet Secretariat and merged with the Ministry of Home Affairs, reducing the number of employees.

1,986,577 (regular staff) in 1961 to 3,321,072 in 1980, a growth of 1,334,495 employees by 67.2%. The same trend is witnessed in Table 30.3 through 30.7.

The most dramatic growth was concentrated in four ministries (communications, which includes post office, telegraph, and telephones; civilian defence; home affairs; and railways) which accounted for 85.5% of the total increase. These four growth sectors reflect the conscious public

Table 30.3 Ministry/Department-Wise Filled Posts in Central Government and Union Territories by Groups as on March 31, 1994

Code	Ministry/Department	By Groups					Total
		A	B	C	D	Unclss	
<b>I. Central Government</b>							
40	Ministry of Agriculture	587	1,068	4,614	3,482	—	9,751
41	Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers	101	198	217	143	—	659
42	Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism	263	320	905	377	—	1,865
43	Ministry of Civil Sup. Con. Affairs & Pub. Distri.	63	175	194	159	—	591
44	Ministry of Coal	35	49	242	99	—	425
45	Ministry of Commerce	663	1,343	4,222	1,769	2	7,999
46	Ministry of Communications	5,404	22,117	4,87,563	1,65,430	—	6,80,514
48	Ministry of Environment and Forests	469	495	1,909	1,837	—	4,710
49	Ministry of External Affairs	728	1,885	2,138	805	2	5,558
50	Ministry of Finance	6,066	11,560	1,17,303	8,460	18,547	1,61,936
51	Ministry of Food	140	302	700	626	—	1,768
52	Ministry of Food Processing Industries	72	134	404	125	—	735
53	Ministry of Health and Family Welfare	2,606	1,069	11,327	7,771	1	22,774
54	Ministry of Home Affairs	6,714	9,378	4,56,321	41,949	88	5,14,450
55	Ministry of Human Resources and Development	549	1,221	3,195	7,472	—	12,437
56	Ministry of Industry	701	966	3,068	1,884	—	6,619

(continued)

**Table 30.3 (continued) Ministry/Department-Wise Filled Posts in Central Government and Union Territories by Groups as on March 31, 1994**

Code	Ministry/Department	By Groups						Total
		A	B	C	D	Unclass		
57	Ministry of I & B	2,862	6,997	20,107	8,449	2,012	40,427	
58	Ministry of Labour	1,353	742	3,795	2,244	2	8,136	
59	Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs	433	502	1,703	599	—	3,237	
60	Ministry of Mines	2,286	956	7,264	1,052	—	11,558	
61	Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources	141	75	153	80	—	449	
62	Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs	12	44	56	28	—	140	
63	Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions	3,380	4,662	1,168	—	—	7,194	
64	Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas	32	105	101	64	—	302	
65	Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation	280	594	4,654	397	—	5,925	
66	Ministry of Power	537	406	758	265	—	1,966	
67	Ministry of Railways	9,332	5,470	9,38,914	5,47,670	42	15,01,428	
68	Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment	192	511	783	509	—	1,995	
69	Ministry of Science and Technology	825	1,798	11,491	9,245	—	23,359	
70	Ministry of Steel	49	119	262	152	—	582	
71	Ministry of Surface Transport	1,081	796	17,738	29,651	—	49,266	

72	Ministry of Textiles	166	324	4,026	1,627	—	6,143
73	Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment	1,368	2,863	22,398	8,851	—	35,480
74	Ministry of Water Resources	1,351	1,564	6,945	4,387	—	14,247
75	Ministry of Welfare	117	250	413	238	—	1,018
76	Ministry of Defence	11,688	15,852	3,75,599	1,95,508	—	5,98,647
90	Department of Atomic Energy	2,937	2,257	11,203	4,083	—	20,480
91	Department of Electronics	404	408	472	242	—	1,526
93	Department of Space	4,928	2,886	6,377	1,454	—	15,645
100	Cabinet Secretariat	592	4,145	4,614	465	—	8,916
101	President's Secretariat	22	89	97	95	—	303
102	Prime Minister's Office	29	135	143	118	—	425
105	UPSC	130	424	735	450	—	1,739
106	Central Vigilance Commission	31	58	56	57	—	202
107	Election Commission of India	25	88	152	71	—	336
108	Planning Commission	1,272	1,891	1,164	571	—	4,898
112	Indian Audit and Accounts Service	2,221	12,665	49,468	6,060	—	70,414
113	Supreme Court	190	619	100	668	—	1,577
114	High Court of Delhi	101	117	591	—	—	809
Total-I		72,565	1,19,050	25,91,369	10,68,936	20,696	38,72,616

(continued)



**Table 30.3 (continued) Ministry/Department-Wise Filled Posts in Central Government and Union Territories by Groups as on March 31, 1994**

Code	Ministry/Department	By Groups					Total
		A	B	C	D	Unclass	
<b>II. Union Territories</b>							
12202	Delhi	1,903	9,904	74,705	7,567	—	94,079
12203	Andaman and Nicobar Islands	312	541	13,175	9,593	—	23,621
12204	Lakshadweep	54	206	2,840	1,480	—	4,580
12205	Dadra and Nagar Haveli	86	58	19,910	318	—	2,372
12206	Daman and Diu	87	96	1,857	647	—	2,687
12207	Pondicherry	1,071	592	14,006	7,436	—	23,105
Total-II		3,513	11,397	1,08,493	27,041	—	1,50,444
Grant total (I + II)		76,078	1,30,447	26,99,862	10,95,977	20,696	40,23,060

Source: Adopted from *Fifth Pay Commission Report, 1997*, p. 235.

Note: Statistical schedule received from ministries.

**Table 30.4** Distribution of Sanctioned and Filled Posts in Central Government and Union Territories by Groups as on March 31, 1994

Group	Sanctioned Posts (in Lakhs)			Filled Posts (in Lakhs)		
	Central Government	Union Territories	Total	Central Government	Union Territories	Total
Group "A" (% to total)	0.90 (2.2)	0.04 (2.4)	0.94 (2.2)	0.72 (1.9)	0.04 (2.7)	0.76 (1.9)
Group "B" (% to total)	1.36 (3.3)	0.12 (7.4)	1.48 (3.4)	1.19 (3.1)	0.11 (7.3)	1.30 (3.2)
Group "C" (% to total)	27.88 (66.8)	1.18 (72.4)	29.06 (67.0)	25.92 (66.9)	1.08 (72.0)	27.00 (67.1)
Group "D" (% to total)	11.39 (27.3)	0.29 (17.8)	11.68 (26.9)	10.69 (27.6)	0.27 (18.0)	10.96 (27.2)
Unclassified (% to total)	0.23 (0.6)	0.00 (0.0)	0.23 (0.5)	0.21 (0.5)	0.00 (0.0)	0.21 (0.5)
Total	41.76 (100.0)	1.63 (100.0)	43.39 (100.0)	38.73 (100.0)	1.50 (100.0)	40.23 (100.0)

Source: Adapted from *Fifth Pay Commission Report, 1997*, p. 228.

**Table 30.5 Trends in Distribution of Sanctioned Posts in Central Government by Group of Post**

Group	Group of Posts (in Lakhs)						Total
	A	B	C	D	Unclassified		
1957 (% to total)	0.10 (0.6)	0.19 (1.1)	7.29 (42.0)	9.78 (56.3)	NA		19.37 (100.0)
1971 (% to total)	0.34 (1.1)	0.46 (1.6)	15.45 (51.8)	13.38 (44.9)	0.19 (0.6)		29.82 (100.0)
1984 (% to total)	0.68 (1.8)	0.80 (2.1)	22.87 (60.4)	13.31 (35.1)	0.21 (0.6)		37.87 (100.0)
1994 (% to total)	0.90 (2.2)	1.36 (3.3)	27.88 (66.8)	11.39 (27.2)	0.23 (0.5)		41.76 (100.0)
<b>Increase in 1994 over 1957</b>							
(i) Absolute	0.80	1.17	20.59	1.61	0.23		24.39
(ii) Annual compound growth rate (%)	6.0	5.4	3.7	0.4	—		2.4

Source: Adapted from *Fifth Pay Commission Report, 1997*, p. 230.

**Table 30.6** Distribution of Sanctioned Posts in the Central Government by Groups and Major Departments

Group	Railways		Communications		Defence (Civilian)		Others		Total						
	1984	1994	Increase (absolute/%)	1984	1994	Increase (absolute/%)	1984	1994	Increase (absolute/%)	1984	1994				
A	7,228	9,591	1,363 (24.1)	3,625	8,381	4,756 (131.2)	11,653	15,900	4,247 (36.4)	44,963	55,791	10,828 (24.1)	67,969	89,663	21,694 (31.9)
B	3,560	5,664	2,104 (59.1)	9,870	23,772	13,902 (140.9)	8,847	18,116	9,269 (104.8)	57,775	87,906	30,131 (52.2)	80,052	1,35,458	55,406 (69.2)
C	8,14,357	9,51,112	1,36,755 (16.8)	5,40,990	5,58,552	17,562 (3.2)	3,41,906	4,11,919	70,013 (20.5)	5,89,576	8,66,148	2,76,572 (46.9)	22,86,829	27,87,731	5,00,902 (21.9)
D	6,79,046	5,79,385	-99,661 (-14.7)	1,24,682	1,62,944	38,262 (30.7)	3,61,066	2,26,878	-1,34,188 (-37.2)	1,66,085	1,70,341	4,256 (2.6)	13,30,879	11,39,545	-1,91,331 (-14.4)
Unclassified	NA	43	NA	4,368	0	NA	62	0	NA	16,890	23,166	NA	21,334	23,209	NA
Total	15,04,691	15,45,795	41,104 (2.7)	6,83,535	7,53,649	70,114 (10.3)	7,23,534	6,72,813	-50,721 (-7.0)	8,75,289	12,03,352	3,28,063 (37.5)	37,87,063	41,75,609	3,88,546 (10.3)

Source: Adapted from *Fifth Pay Commission Report, 1997*, p. 231.

Note: Data collected by Pay Commission.

**Table 30.7 Trends in Regular Employment in Central Government**

Year (as on 31st March)	Civilian Employees <sup>a</sup>		Defence Forces <sup>b</sup>				Total Central Govt. Employees
	Other than Defence	Defence	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total	
1971	22.25	4.74	8.30	0.30	1.06	9.66	36.65
1981	28.87	5.20	8.81	0.36	1.20	10.37	44.44
1991	32.87	5.26	9.89	0.51	1.40	11.89	50.02
<b>Annual Compound Growth Rate (%)</b>							
1971–1981	2.6	0.9	0.6	1.9	1.2	0.7	1.9
1981–1991	1.3	0.1	1.3	3.5	1.6	1.4	1.2

Source: Adapted from *Fifth Pay Commission Report*, p. 229.

<sup>a</sup> D.G.E. & T.

<sup>b</sup> Authorised strength as reported by Armed Forces Pay Cell.

policy decisions made by India to enhance services in these areas. Obviously, maintenance of law and order, along with transportation and communications, is a priority item for the government.

The expansion of public bureaucracy has been accompanied by a proliferation in the number of regulations, some of which are virtually impossible to administer and make the processing of transactions cumbersome. The expanding sphere of the role of governments has placed the bureaucracy in a monopolistic position and has enhanced the opportunities for greater administrative discretion. For example, during the first two decades of the post independence period, legislation output increased by more than three times compared to any period preceding the attainment of independence. During this period, about 600 statutes, including 21 constitutional amendments, more than 100 regulations, 100 president's acts, and 150 ordinances were enacted. In addition, an average of about 5 000 rules were being issued every year.<sup>11</sup> Executive regulations together with increased bureaucratic discretion provide opportunities and incentives for corruption since regulations governing access to goods and services can be exploited by civil servants in extracting "rents."<sup>12</sup> Thus, in many developing countries, public bureaucracies have become uncontrolled and unaccountable centers of power pursuing their own interests through the institutionalization of systematic extortion and bribery. Under conditions of uncertainty and with a government which acts as the nation's largest employer, producer, regulator, and even the consumer, both the public and civil servants have come to accept government inefficiency and ineffectiveness as part of the natural order of things.<sup>13</sup>

### 30.2.1.1 *The Caste System*

The social system in India is organized around caste structures and caste identities which are as old as the Indian civilization. The tribal, linguistic, religious, regional, and caste loyalties, the fundamental characteristics of the social infrastructure of the Indian society, have made a deep impact on the working of political and administrative system and have affected the processes of development.

Caste is undoubtedly an all-India phenomenon in the sense that there are everywhere hereditary endogamous groups which form a hierarchy. Caste, being the important organizational structure, has hampered developmental processes and proved to be the most important cause responsible for backwardness and economic inequality. In its original form, the system was associated with social hierarchy based on occupations but later on it became the negative feature of society when its basis became “birth” and not occupation. The caste system in India, as it has emerged, stratified the society socially, corrupted it politically, and weakened it economically.

After Independence, the caste system grew further; regionalism had taken the shape of caste consciousness and caste mobilization. “Politicization of caste system”<sup>14</sup> became the new trend in Indian politics. In the process, not only Hindus of upper class but the outcastes, the so-called untouchables, also came to play an important role. In order to ameliorate the conditions of this section of the society, the State in India devised the means of according special privileges to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and backward classes as these communities were described in the Constitution. These concessions were given to these communities for a limited transitional period only. But the measure became a long-term phenomenon. Even after 62 years of independence, these special concessions in the shape of reservations to political and administrative offices and educational institutions have not been withdrawn; they have rather increased day by day. While such output responses of the state system helped in initial development, and brought about the desired social change, at the same time they created additional tensions hampering the process of development. This wrong method for right purpose has not only widened the gap between the communities but has also led to the emergence of certain vested interests who are not ready to give up<sup>15</sup> these privileges even after their full nourishment. The lower castes dilemma is still there, and it has created further discontent and conflicts in the society. The “Son of the Soils” theory inherent in the “Mulki” rule in some states of India and the issue of reservation tend to aggravate caste animosities and generate social upheavals and violence as has been amply demonstrated by the disturbances that have recently occurred in Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. It needs to be made clear that the reservation system that is being resisted is not what has been conceded to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is the expanding base of reservations among the so-called backward castes that threatens to produce a backlash; the vested interest in backwardness that the system of reservation has created might further lead to a realignment of communities on lines that can only perpetuate the present division.

The phenomenon of “Mondalisation” after the Mondal Commission Report of 1990, promulgated by the then Prime Minister V. P. Singh in order to preserve his chair of Prime Ministership, has deepened the caste cleavages much further, with the division of classes into Backward Classes and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), specifying further reservation quotas for each of these categories in government employment. This has generated more divisions, friction, and clashes within the existing castes and communities as never before. The resurrection of Mondal II in 2006 by Arjun Singh, the present Minister of Human Resource Development, by proposing an additional 27% reservation of seats for the candidates from the OBCs in all the professional institutions like The Indian Institute of Management, Indian Institute of Technology, medical and professional colleges, central universities like the Delhi University and Jawaharlal Nehru University, and the jobs in both public and private sectors has once again revived the deep controversy, class divisions, and peaceful and violent agitations among students protesting against this move ostensibly only to garner the support of the large vote bank of the OBCs to strengthen the existing United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government at the Center led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.<sup>16</sup> Mondal II has only served to confirm the dominance of OBC and Dalit politics in India in the last decade.<sup>17</sup>

### 30.2.1.2 *Impact of Religion*

Apart from the caste system, another major social factor that affects political and administrative development is the religion. All the major religions of the world, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism are represented in India. The vast majority of population, almost 83%, are, however, Hindus while Muslims constitute 12% of the total population, the third-largest concentration of Muslims in the world. The major source of conflicts in the society has been between these two major and important religions—Hinduism and Islam. All other religions have no role practically except in small context, for instance, Christianity in Kerala or Eastern border areas and Sikhism in Punjab. The roots of the Hindu–Muslim resentment are deep and can be historically traced back to the Muslim period. During the last few centuries, however, the Hindus and Muslims had learned to live together and had shared in the development of social and cultural traditions. The political evolution of India under the British revived the old animosities which gave rise to alienation and hostility and the demand for a separate state of Pakistan. This issue paralyzed the nationalist struggle under Mahatma Gandhi. It resulted in a deep schism in Indian society leading to the division of the country and led to an outbreak of violence and bloodshed. From time to time, even after independence, such communal riots have frequently occurred in various parts of India. In recent past, the incidence of such events has again increased, putting great strains on the administrative system. Apart from the loss in terms of lives, communal riots cause widespread destruction of property and adversely affect economic activities. Communal tension of the Hindu–Muslim variety already has a long and sordid history. It has been further compounded by the developments in Punjab during the years between 1981–1990. These developments have injected into the situation the potential for a Hindu–Sikh confrontation which fortunately has not so far occurred. Because of the possibilities of such conflicts taking place in the societies, the administrative machinery has to keep itself in readiness to combat against the fanatic violence, terrorist activities, and mindless destruction of lives and property. This explains the growth in the number of paramilitary and police forces and other intelligence security agencies that have come to dominate the administrative system in India—the Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Force, the Industrial Security Force, the VIP Security Commandos, etc. These have not only created problems of deployment and administrative coordination but have also often been a cause of resentment and tensions between the central government and the governments of the states. The developmental capacities of the administration have certainly received some setback but have not been completely destroyed.

### 30.2.1.3 *Bureaucratic Dysfunctionalism*

Apart from the proliferation of law enforcement, social structure in India also tends to encourage bureaucratic dysfunctionalism.<sup>18</sup>

In a way, of course, the structural characteristics of Indian bureaucracy correspond to the Indian culture and the social milieu in which it operates. Complex as it is, the Indian culture itself is a product of the influences of flourishing folk cultures, the sub cultures of castes and classes, and the urban culture of an English-educated middle class. It is an amalgam of various traits, traditions, attitudes, and outlook that draws on the three dominant religions: Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. The coexistence of a large number of religious groups makes India unique. Thus, an understanding of the Indian bureaucracy must include a study of its symbolic relationship with the Indian culture. The importance of caste determines the social outlook in India. An official's behavior will, therefore, also be culturally determined. In spite of his participation

in a depersonalized system, his behavior must necessarily be culture bound or he risks social disapproval. This aspect of the problem was commented on some time ago by a noted scholar:

An administrative system influenced by such traditional Loyalties will tend toward an ascriptive rather than achievement-oriented pattern of recruitment. And that is why a person who asks favours from officers belonging to his caste does not consider his act unethical. Similarly when a government official “fixes” applications and licences in utter disregard to merit but in accordance with family and caste loyalties he is obeying a law of social conduct more ancient than that of the upstart state. Moreover, in any traditional society, the family forms the common interest group “par excellence”... Since family in this usage includes uncles, cousins, nephews, grandparents and other near and distant relatives, a great deal of pressure to “fix” jobs for them or to find some other source of income to support them is not uncommon... Moreover, these relatives ... would like to take advantage of his position in securing jobs, procuring permits, etc., while he is still influential. They do not consider the exploitation of relative’s official status as something bad or unethical.<sup>19</sup>

The orientation of officials in India is not merely banned upon personal, economic, and social conditions or caste but also on what is often termed “ethno-expansionism.” This involves the assumption that one’s own ways are per se superior to all other ways and that the circumstances one enjoys should be desired by all men. The concept of ethno-expansionism is of particular value to the analysis of the cultural content of Indian bureaucracy. When the upper castes assume bureaucratic office, their aim is not merely to expand their ranks through favoritism but also to invest their caste values with a quality that they consider will be acceptable to other groups, castes, and communities.

#### *30.2.1.4 Secularism, Casteism, and Religious Values*

Secularism has been a distinguished characteristic of India’s composite culture. As a policy of the Government after Independence, secularism, as Nehru conceived, was designed to safeguard the peace and security of the minorities, renunciation of revivalism and obscurantism of religion, and recognition of differences and nonconformities in socioreligious affairs. The state in India, as the Constitution provides, is neutral in matters of religion but provides opportunity for all the religions to flourish, subject to “public order, morality, and health.” Yet, religion has been a dominating factor and a force in the politico-administrative culture in India, despite the fact that the “new culture of science and technology has had a healthy impact of intermingling the different state religions”.<sup>20</sup>

The Indian culture, which has been a history of unity and synthesis, of reconciliation and growth, of harmony and assimilation, of fusion of old traditions and new values, has several contradictory forces within its fold. The forces of progress and regress have simultaneously worked on Indian culture. At the same time, it has been dominated by individualistic ethos, a stratified society, the theories of *dharma* and *karma*, the institutions of castes based on occupations, and the inequalities brought in the social system due to the caste hierarchy. All these cultural factors have not only been reflected in the political processes but also find their expression in the development of administrative policies. The most appropriate example of such a policy is the Reservation system in the public services in India and the preferential treatment to some of the specified communities



sanctioned by some of the constitutional provisions to which we have already referred. The kind of tensions and conflicts often leading to violence that these have created in the social fabric of the nation are too well known to be repeated. At the same time, such practices have brought dissensions in the administrative system. A number of developmental policies and programs of the government have even been influenced both in their conception and implementation through these cultural imperatives.<sup>21</sup> Not only the political processes have been affected by these forces but also in many cases, bureaucratic functionaries belonging to the so-called high castes have felt constrained to visit places inhabited by the so-called low caste citizenries in the course of their official dealings.<sup>22</sup>

### 30.2.1.5 *Authoritarian Character of Indian Bureaucracy: The Cultural Context*

Although the present traits of authoritarian behavior in the Indian bureaucracy have been traced to the British days of colonialism, when most Britishers, whatever their convictions about authority relations at home, showed a high degree of authoritarianism in their behavior toward the Indian subordinate, whether he was the despised clerk or the illiterate worker,<sup>23</sup> some other scholars have tried to examine the linkages between patterns of social relation and authority patterns in Indian organizations both governmental and nongovernmental. The available evidence on superior-subordinate relations in India indicates that the parental type in general, and the assertive superior in particular, dominates authority relations in Indian organizations. Many Indian top managements, particularly in the governmental hierarchies, are relatively authoritarian in their relationships with lower management and labor. Along with cases of paternalism, that is nurturance, this element of assertiveness in superior behavior is not only a characteristic of top-management but also a feature of all authority relations at all levels in any organization—governmental or nongovernmental.<sup>24</sup>

The linkage between the individual behavior in the organizations and the wider culture has also been sought to be explained through the concept of national character. “A man brings to his work attitudes and modes of behaviour which have evolved from his life experience.”<sup>25</sup> Thus, in India, it has been suggested that the expectation that a highly controlling superior has a positive effect on the presumed existence of a basic or a modal Hindu personality in which security for the individual is associated with dependence upon superiors. However, it seems likely that in a country like India with its great variety of regional, linguistic, caste, class, and religious differentiations, there are many national characters rather than a modal personality. Even if it is assumed that in complex societies, with their wide range of social differentiation, the family ties and early childhood experiences with authority are relatively uniform, the concept of national character tends to ignore the influence of other social relationships outside the period of early childhood which individuals enter into throughout their latency and adolescence periods and which are highly differentiated along the class, caste, and rural-urban dimensions.<sup>26</sup>

It has thus been argued that the administrative and management culture prevalent in India today reflects the family atmosphere and the way people live at home. India is a hierarchical society where the father has all the answers. Nobody can question him. This is also carried to the work environment where the boss is always right. The rigid nature of ties in the family is reflected in the controls that people adopt at the office where a countless number of forms having no substance are required to be filled in. The system does not tolerate flexibility. People are actually taught not to question but only to remember and to follow. This is the reason why many functionaries in administration tend to have low self-esteem vis-a-vis their superiors. The superior at work expects

loyalty not to the project but to himself. He actually goes ahead to destroy another person's self-esteem because that is how he can keep the status quo. That is why information in the Indian administrative system flows in one direction only. The junior person's views are invariably ignored. People, thus, tend to be docile and in awe of the hierarchical structure. Any one who takes on a different approach is termed as an odd ball. This is precisely the reason why it is often contended that the technology which is presently being inducted in India belongs to the 1990s while the country's administrative setup is still in the 1920s.<sup>27</sup>

### *30.2.1.6 The Linguistic Multiplicity*

Another element of social infrastructure, which has made inroads in the nation-building process in India and has affected public administration, is the linguistic multiplicity which is unique in many respects than in many other countries of the world like Canada, Belgium, Russian Federation and Switzerland. Their example is, however, irrelevant in understanding the language problem in India. According to the linguistic survey published in 1927, there were 179 languages and 544 dialects in the erstwhile Indian subcontinent which in 1981 grew into 1018 languages. Despite the multilingualism prevailing in India, the last phase of the Indian national struggle for independence witnessed the demand for one national language. But the emergence of a neat and acceptable formula of a single national language has not been an easy task. The state in India recognized the linguistic multiplicity when it accorded legal status to 14 languages of India listed in the Eighth Schedule of the constitutional document (later amended to include 15 languages) and recognized Hindi to be the national language. Such provisions, however, did not satisfy many leaders, especially in the Eastern and Southern part of the country. The politicians recognized, propagated, and exploited the economic importance of a language being the official one. It was argued that any section of the society belonging to the official language group was also able to capture most of the job opportunities in the country. This created strong subregional movements directed against the officially recognized national language. The language problem became a live political issue. Hindi became the scapegoat in the bigger politics of state autonomy. Many a time it led to violent outbreaks in the country and unprecedented acts of self immolation and the like. The linguistic configuration was thus responsible for the creation of more regional diversities and many more states as subunits of the political system, expanding the tendencies of the vast administrative machinery, leading to further drains on the already limited state resources and delays in the implementation of public policies. Linguistic differences have also prevented the growth of a consistent national policy on language and education. This has, in turn, led to the lowering of educational standards and a greater strain on human resource development.

### *30.2.1.7 The Social Classes: Urban/Rural Dichotomy*

As has been indicated earlier, the social structure in India consists of powerful status groups based on religion, casts, and language. Although a class system has also begun to emerge in India, it still remains tenuous. The slow process of industrialization and urbanization has led to a highly uneven pattern of class-growth. Status groups continue to cut across class lines. As a result, the development of class identities and political mobilization based upon class appeals has been securely inhibited.<sup>28</sup> India's urban-based class structure is small as compared to the rural society. The 15 million industrial workers in the organized sector of the economy make up only 10% of the total work force of 100 million. Of these, only 3%, or 5 million, work in large modern factories. The

industrial work force, moreover, is not only small, but also its portion of the total labor force has remained remarkably stable over the past several decades.

Rural India contains 76% of the population and some 70% of the labor force is engaged in agriculture. Despite the land reforms of late 1940s and early 1980s, the distribution of land ownership in rural India has been grossly unequal. In the early 1970s, over 96% of India's rural household owned less than 20 acres of land; 43% owned less than 5 acres; and 24% owned no land at all with the percentage of landless labor increasing. The disparities in land ownership are revealed in the fact that 10% of the rural families held 70% of the cultivable land.<sup>29</sup>

In comparison to this, the size of the urban population represents a consumer market larger than the entire European Community. These changes in the rural or urban population and the emerging class structure have meant the evolution of new administrative policies, strategies, and institutions. In the past 40 years, there has been a proliferation of a number of administrative institutions, authorities, and agencies both at the center as well as the states to cater to the strategies of integrated rural development and the needs of growing urban metropolises which are incredibly crowded and lacking in adequate housing, transportation, water, electricity, sewage, and sanitation facilities. The administrative strategies evolved have ranged from technological and scientific innovations in the field of agricultural production to the establishment of institutions of democratic decentralization, a host of specified agencies for regulating industrial development of large, medium, and small scale, and a host of institutions for providing a number of services for good urban life have come into operation. Because of a growing concern for environmental degradation, a number of regulatory agencies have come into being to protect the environment from further degradation, although with little success. All these developments have further meant a keen political competition among various segmented social groups and cultural communities based on language, religion, region, and caste, creating additional pressures on the administrative systems. The existence of a number of multifarious agencies with conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions have not only highlighted the problems of unified direction, control, and coordination but have also raised afresh the basic issue of centralization and decentralization and the relative autonomy of various units of administration.

### *30.2.1.8 Social Justice and Poverty-Alleviation*

Among the most important policy changes that have affected the Indian public administration has been the issue of social justice and alleviation of poverty. To what extent have the new strategies, institutions, and the new concepts of rural/urban development been able to realize the fundamental objective of alleviating poverty and achieving a modicum of social justice?

At the time of Independence, in 1947, the leaders of free India had thought that they would be able to achieve a just and equitable social and economic order in India in a short time and that poverty would be eliminated before too long. Fifty years later, the political economy of the country, at least in the sphere of social justice and poverty eradication, appears to have done badly. According to a World Bank report, a third of world's poor still live in India and 40% of India's population lives below a minimal poverty line. Over the 6th Plan period, according to Government of India's reports, there has been a drop of 11% in poverty which stands at 17%. The projected estimate in the drop of poverty ratio after the Seventh Plan period is another 11%, leading to 26% and will further drop to 5% by the end of the century. Poverty persists because neither economic growth nor targeted development spending has been big enough to help the truly poor. Another factor is that poverty is concentrated in the countryside and growth in the cities.

Both official and unofficial stadiums have found that subsidies of all kinds—not only agricultural inputs but also food, education, and medicine—go disproportionately to the better off. Even in the antipoverty programs, some 15.2% of the beneficiaries are the non-deserving, not counting the money squandered by the corrupt. One of the reasons of the persistence of this phenomenon is the excessive centralization in this administration of such programs and the non-involvement of people at the grassroot level in the implementation of such schemes. Although the green revolution has created pockets of rural prosperity, real farm incomes have stagnated for 30 years while nonagricultural incomes have more than doubled. One poverty expert has calculated that even if incomes were to grow at a speeded-up 1% a year, halving the poverty rate by trickle down alone would take 35 years.

The strategies of poverty eradication programs count on faster economic growth through technology-led second green revolution, a drop in the population growth rate, and redistribution. The budget in (1987–1988) had allocated 8% of the government spending amounting to approximately \$1.5 billion for antipoverty programs. Yet, these projects, which consist of mass employment schemes and the distribution of income producing assets such as buffaloes, serve only about 10 million families, a small fraction of the poor. On one reckoning it would take some \$5 million a year to employ all the employable rural poor and \$10 billion a year, more than half of government spending, to lift all the poor above the poverty line.<sup>30</sup> Since then, a number of new programs like National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes have been formulated to reduce the phenomenon of poverty among the rural masses.

Although it is true that social injustice has not grown and poverty has not increased since India became independent, at the same time there is no sufficient evidence that India has moved toward a more egalitarian or poverty-free society. Perhaps the objective of social justice might have been unrealistic, but as one scholar has put it, “The uneven distribution of economic power and benefits through manipulation of the polity has created major distortions and problems for the political economy. The issue doesn’t seem to pose any serious threat to the state and the administrative system. The poor do not press hard enough upon the state, which has been effectively under the control of an elite. Poverty at best remains only a moral problem of the Indian political economy. It pricks the sentiments and the conscience of the liberal middle class elite, but does not pose great political challenge to the state. After forty years of independence, social inequalities and poverty still remain the major blight on the nation’s political economy.”<sup>31</sup>

The compulsion of planned socioeconomic development has no doubt changed the pattern and complexion of the administration system from the British framework of a stable order to that of a system of continuous strain, both politically and administratively, “adopting *ad hoc*—and frequently unsuccessful remedies to a procession of deeper more intricate, and apparently less easily alleviated crises.”<sup>32</sup> The administrative system, to say the least, has been unsteady throughout India and at present is at its lowest ebb in efficiency and integrity. Commenting on this change in the temper and values of administration, a former official who has been a part of the administrative machinery both in preindependence and postindependence period has observed:

The British administration in India governed to a little and did not concern itself enough with changes in the social and the economic orders. Perhaps the Indian governments have governed too much. This may well have been inevitable, part of the temper of times, since India gained independence. When the idea of a welfare state was the generally accepted norm, India had also a great deal to make up to come abreast

with other nations of the world.... Where the life of the community, or at least its vital growth and development depends so heavily on the administrative machine, any inefficiency or erosion in standards has a snowballing influence and gathers speed in geometric progression. India has indeed been caught up in the problem of governing less but effectively, or taking in more ineffectively. Each difficulty, whether economic or social, has tended to produce more rather than less government but the country has by no means turned the corner towards ensuring reasonable standards of prolonged good management.<sup>33</sup>

### 30.3 Policy of Industrial Development and Public Sector

Another major policy issue confronting the government today is the issue of “liberalization” for industrial progress and the role of public sectors in India’s economic development. The policy of “mixed economy” adopted by the government in the spring of the Indian Republic has led to the establishment of almost 200 public sector projects at the central level and approximately 700 at the state level, each representing an investment worth approximately 25,000 million U.S. dollars. However, a majority of large number of these enterprises have failed to come up to the expectations. Many have incurred heavy and continuing losses and far from contributing to the resources available for development, many have become a drain on the public exchequer. One of the reasons for such a phenomenon has been attributed to the growth and persistence of bureaucratic culture rather than commercial culture in the management of these enterprises, backseat driving by the ministries leading to the constriction in the autonomy of managers of public sector enterprises which is so necessary for decision making, lack of manpower planning and training of the executives, and lack of development of marketing techniques. Some of these shortcomings were noticed at the very outset. The company form of public enterprise was thought of precisely to provide management autonomy. But while the “form” was there, the reality of “autonomy” was found missing.<sup>34</sup>

The government at present is trying to remove some of the unwarranted advantages which accrue to the public sector undertakings, “the most over fed part of an under nourished economy.” About half of the public sector plants are working at 75% of the capacity and more than a fifth at less than 20% of the capacity. Although policymakers have not yet openly advocated “privatization” as the possible remedy, public monopolies in such areas as oil refining, power-generation, and telecommunication equipment have been opened to private competition. Since the later years of the decade of 1990, private sector has become the main player in the development spheres, Government investments in the infrastructure sector of power, coal, oil, railways, roadways, port, transport, and communications, etc. would have to continue for some years to facilitate private and foreign investments in other manufacturing and service sectors. At the same time, it has also to ensure that the goods produced and services provided by the private sector are of declared quality and reasonably priced.

The policy of industrial controls and licensing were considered necessary in the early stages for fulfilling the objectives of planning and ensuring that the scarce resources were allocated to priority projects. The system which one economist calls “command capitalism” was originally intended to make India self-reliant, egalitarian, and labor-intensive. Although some measure of self-reliance was achieved at the cost of the other two objectives, it has led to the emergence of a parallel black market economy and corruption which far from promoting rational allocation of resource has only led to the growth of the luxury sector. It has been estimated that the “black” or “untaxed” money amounts to at least 20% of gross domestic product, with perhaps another 15% generated by smuggling.

The policy of delicensing has made little headway in neither bringing out technological developments and qualitative improvement in India's indigenous industrial products nor has it expanded the export market of locally produced high-tech, industrial electronic, and software products. The missing link in the economic policy has been the marketing of indigenous products abroad. The recent policies of tax-cut and delicensing have only meant relief to the rich without any lowering of price and improvement in quality or safeguarding of the consumers' interest, no wonder a majority of big business men have never been as happy as in the present regime, despite the unpopularity with some businessmen that the government might have earned, because of the highly publicized pursuit of highly placed tax-evaders. The Consumers Protection Act 1987 should have the necessary teeth to compel the big businessmen to think about the interest of the poor consumers.

### 30.3.1 Social Structure and Small-Scale Industries

India's industrial policy has been largely governed by the industrial policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 which had laid the pattern of industrial growth through a division of industrial sectors reserved exclusively under the public sector or those sectors which were left open for private investments and others where both the public and private sector could continue to expand. Notwithstanding these resolutions, the Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 aimed at promoting an economic federation with an equitable spread of investment and the dispersal of returns widely spread over small but growing institutions. Prompted by the growing number of small-scale entrepreneurs and the so-called bullock-capitalists who had emerged in the various progressive states in India,<sup>35</sup> the government had used indirect measures that have the effect of marginalizing private capitalism in class politics and making it dependent on the state. Government policies toward capital have promoted its involution, that is, the multiplication of smaller enterprises. The ideological justification was readily found in Mahatma Gandhi's "ideology of cottage and labour intensive industries by self-employed workers." Promoting small-scale industry in order to enhance employment, economic development, and competition has accelerated the propensities of India's small business and commercial classes.<sup>36</sup> The Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 gave a predominant place to small-scale sectors and widened the scope of such industries to include those having an investment from 1 million rupees to 2 million rupees. Since then, there had been a tremendous growth in the sector of small-scale industries as is clear from the following Table 30.8.

**Table 30.8 Growth of Small-Scale Industries**

S. No. Item	1977-1978	1978-1979	1979-1980	1980-1981
1. Number of units (thousands)	663	723	798	862
2. Production (rupees/millions)	1,40,000	1,57,900	1,90,600	2,80,800
3. Employment (thousands)	5,890	6,380	6,975	7,100
4. Exports (rupees/millions)	8,448	9,535	10,435	11,010

Source: Vepa, R.K., *Small Industry Development Programme*, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1983, p. 2. With permission.

A number of backward areas were identified for purposes of location of such industries. The Industries Development and Regulation Amendment Act of 1984 provides for reservation of certain selected items for exclusive production by small-scale sectors. As a result of such a shift in Indian industrial policy, a number of administrative institutions have come to be established at the central and state level. These organizations and agencies provide a comprehensive range of consultancy services and technical, managerial, and marketing assistance. A new form of organization known as Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation has also come into being in almost all the states with the National Small Industries Corporation as an apex body. Thus, the shift in industrial policy as a result of the emerging social and class-structure has prompted the establishment of new forms of administrative organizations in the administrative system. It is still too early to attempt an assessment of their efficacy as instruments of development. In the latest policy initiative (May 2006), the present Manmohan Singh Government is contemplating to establish special economic zones (SEZs), allowing several tax concessions and facilities for further industrial development and employment generation in more backward districts of the country.

### **30.4 Toward Good Governance: Impact of Globalization and New Public Administration Movement**

The decade of 1990s has been a decade of exceptional changes in the theory and practice of good governance. The changes in question have increasingly been treated under the rubric of “globalization,” a catchall phrase which emphasizes the emergence of a truly global economy and a shift toward “world capitalism,” signifying a movement toward a new era of both vastly more powerful and essentially different corporate forms and processes, which has in all societies affected the existing forms of governance and citizen identity. Three important movements that have made important strides during this decade in meeting the challenges of this transformation have been reinventing Government, the New Public Management (NPM) and a call for the downsizing of public bureaucracies.

Public Administration in India has not completely remained untouched by these global developments and has in various ways attempted to incorporate some of the precepts drawn from these movements. To what extent the administrative system in India has been successful in its efforts to modernize itself and utilize the lessons emanating from the experiences of other administrative systems undergoing transformation under the spell of one or the other of the above movements is a question which cannot be answered in one way or the other. However, it would be helpful to review what particular steps have been adopted in India for achieving some positive goals of these alternative precepts in public management and to analyze the emerging ethical concerns as a consequence thereof.

After attaining independence in 1947, India embarked on the experiment to constitute itself into a sovereign republic and modernize the state and its administration through the adoption of a “parliamentary democracy.” At that time, not many scholars and analysts in the world had believed that India will survive as a democratic nation negating John Stuart Mill’s contention that democracy is “next to impossible in multiethnic societies and completely ‘impossible in linguistically divided countries’” as well as Robert Dahl’s belief “that widespread poverty and illiteracy are a *nathe*ma to ‘stable democracy’—a concept that is supposedly linked with the level of socioeconomic development.”<sup>37</sup> However, these early forebodings and later predictions that “the odds are almost wholly against the survival of freedom and ... the issue is, in fact, whether any Indian state can survive at all”<sup>38</sup> have been proved wrong. India’s existence as a

democratic state since the last 60 years of its Independence has compelled scholars to evolve a new consociational interpretation of the survival of democracy in deeply divided societies.<sup>39</sup>

Over all these years, while evolving a consensual framework of a democratic government, the leadership in India has also from time to time attempted to devise strategies for good governance which is associated with an efficient and effective development-oriented, citizen-friendly, and responsive administration committed to improvement in quality of life of the people.

The Government of India has adopted policies of globalization, liberalization, and market economy in the wake of the serious economic crisis that enveloped the country by the middle of 1991. The crisis arose due to the economic consequences of upheavals in the erstwhile Russian Federation and East Europe—the effects of the Gulf War, the shifts in the global economic power balance, and the economic policies followed by the Union and the State Governments since the 1930s. The immediate reason was a serious balance of payments crisis owing to a steady decline in exports, negative growth rates in industry and agriculture, and 0.3% decline in the domestic production of crude oil. Among the long-term domestic factors contributing to high cost and low productivity were (1) the inadequate returns and continuing losses from the massive investments in the public sector undertakings and (2) economic populism resulting in increasing state subsidies, especially in fertilizers, writing off loans to farmers, and hidden payments incurred through lower tariff rates of state undertakings in power and transport sectors.

India's adoption of a program of globalization of market economy and competitiveness came after more than 6 months of negotiations with the World Bank, starting in January 1991. The package of reform measures announced by the then newly formed Narasimha Rao Government in July 1991 consisted of two separate economic policies: (1) a macroeconomic stabilization program (IMF inspired) essentially focusing on reducing the twin deficits on the balance of payment and the state budget and (2) a comprehensive program for structural change of the economy (World Bank inspired) in the fields of trade, industry, foreign investments, public sector, and the financial sector among others.<sup>40</sup>

“Globalization,” “competitiveness,” and “liberalization,” come to India as a booster and through the backdoor of “economic reforms.” The sanctity of economic reforms had been derived from it. It was argued that progress is taking place through globalization and economic reforms are the only means to join in this process. Hence, economic reforms are the only alternative for human security and India's future. Globalization as a phenomenon involves two different entities: (1) finance capital through multinational corporations and (2) new technologies such as computers and telecommunications. It was argued that the growth and internationalization of finance capital is good and desirable for projects because it promotes growth of technology. Globalization provides a useful means to develop technologies necessary for the production of goods and services that improve our well-being.

The post-1991 economic reforms were initially launched under compelling balance of payments crisis. At the same time, it was felt that by adopting market-oriented and globally competitive restructuring policies somewhat similar to those of Southeast Asian countries, the Indian economy could grow much faster and become more self-reliant in managing its balance of payments and could at the same time, speedily accelerate growth and reduce the level of poverty, thus contributing to human security including freedom from hunger, disease, ignorance, unemployment, and homelessness.

### **30.4.1 *Introducing NPM in the Governance of India***

During the late 1990s, under the impact of these developments, the Government of India felt the need to restructure and reorient the administrative system and to adopt a normative model of



*Good Management Approach* toward public administration. This was to include (a) a more strategic or result-oriented (efficiency, effectiveness, and service quality) orientation to decision making, (b) replacement of highly centralized organizational structures with decentralized management environment integrating with the new Panchayati Raj and Municipal Institutions where decisions on resource allocation and service delivery are taken close to the point of delivery, (c) flexibility to explore alternatives to direct public provision which might provide more cost-effective policy outcomes, (d) focusing attention on the matching of authority and responsibility as a key to improving performance, including mechanism of explicit performance contracting, (e) creating competitive environments within and between public service organizations, (f) strengthening of strategic capacities at the Center to steer government to respond to external changes and diverse interests quickly, flexibly, and at least costs, (g) greater accountability and transparency through requirements to report on results and their full costs, (h) service-wide budgeting and management systems to support and encourage these changes, (i) breaking the growing nexus of bureaucrats, politicians, and criminals to restore public confidence in public management system among the citizenry, (j) adapting to innovations and evolving suitable mechanism to eliminate corruption at both political and administrative levels and strengthen citizens' grievance redressal system, (k) downsizing of bureaucracy and improving the system of delivery at the cutting edge of administration by replacing the existing archaic bureaucratic procedures by absorbing some appropriate precepts inherent in the philosophy of New Public Management, (l) effectively utilizing the fruits of technical revolution and the Information Management system for an effective and quick public service delivery system, and (m) making improvements in the working atmosphere of the government institutions and offices to reflect a new work culture and a changed administrative behavior incorporating the principles of transparency, responsiveness, accountability, and participative and citizen-friendly management.

Simultaneously, the bureaucracy was to be revamped in terms of change in its orientation, behavior, and attitude. Instead of being the defender of the status quo, there has to be a realization that with the advent of globalization, liberalization, and privatization, it has to play a major role of a catalyst for change. Apart from the changes in the traditional values and norms of work culture, it has to demonstrate its willingness to accept new technical innovations and values of achievement and competition, equity and egalitarianism, and concern for broader collective social goals.

Despite certain steps in administrative reforms for good governance triggered by the GOI Ministers meetings in 1997, and a concerted movement toward e-governance, the reform efforts in terms of reorienting the behavior of public servants toward public welfare and introducing ethics in administration did not achieve much success. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission constituted in 2005 under the chairmanship of Veerappa Moily is now looking into this crucial aspect of introducing necessary changes for modernizing public administration.

The Government of India is now beset with a number of new ethical challenges arising out of the impact of globalization. Besides absorbing the values of participatory democracy, decentralization of authority and power, bureaucracy in India has not only to observe a modicum of transparency and concede an appropriate right of information to the people in its decision-making process (which has recently been attempted through the enactment of Right to Information Act in 2005) but has also to secure a balance between a rule-bound administration and an administration that can effectively and quickly deliver results, particularly in developmental and social welfare activities.

In order to combat the total lack of a notion of accountability and responsiveness on the part of government functionaries, both legislators and administrators, which has eroded the very

essence of a responsible government, the Government of India had in 1996 devised an “Action Plan for an Effective and Responsive Administration.” The Action Plan included initiatives in four specific areas:

(a) Making administration accountable and citizen-friendly, (b) ensuring transparency by introducing the Right to Information, (c) taking measures to cleanse and motivate public services, and (d) introduction of e-governance for greater openness, reduction of red-tape, and quick and convenient interaction of citizens with the government.<sup>41</sup>

Realizing that the secrecy and the lack of openness in official transactions, a colonial legacy which somehow persisted all through the five decades of India’s independence, were responsible for corruption in administration, apart from being contrary to the spirit of an accountable and democratic Government, the Government of India addressed itself to the problem of ensuring freedom of information to the public and amend such laws that stipulate necessary access of the public to information. As a result, a number of statutory schemes were formulated to amend various existing central and state legislations in order to improve the access of public to information from public offices through streamlining of internal procedures, computerization, and by setting up public facilitation counters in offices by the Government of India and the Governments of the constituent states of the Indian federation. Many of the State Governments of the Indian Federation have enacted the Right to Information Acts and the Union Government has also enacted a Central Right to Information Act in 2005.

One of the other measures adopted in many western countries to ensure transparency in the functioning of the government and to fight corruption and maladministration is the enactment of Public Interest Disclosure Acts, popularly called Whistle-blower Acts. The objective of such elements is to improve accountability in government and public sector organizations by encouraging people not to turn a blind eye to malpractice taking place in their organizations and to report the same to the appropriate authority in a confidential manner or by a public report. Although the Government of India has not been able to enact such an Act, but it has lately been quite concerned to protect the identity and person of such officials who have dared to come out openly to disclose administrative malpractices to the public. Such a law may soon become a reality as and when the Second ARC’s (Moily Commission’s) recommendations are implemented.

At the same time, in order to provide responsive interface between the citizen and the public services, the Government of India has directed ministries/departments and other agencies with public interface to formulate Citizen’s Charters, lay down time limits and standards for services, create avenues of citizens’ grievances redressal, and carry out independent scrutiny to ensure implementation of Charters. Simultaneous steps have been taken to introduce “e-governance” at every level of administration.

In the realm of public ethics, the Moily Commission has focused on the misuse of office and recommended for a new legislation—Corrupt Public Servants (Forfeiture of Property) Bill—so that the State confiscates ill-gotten wealth. It has also recommended for immediate implementation of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act. Apart from recommending a legislation to protect Whistle Blowers, by enacting a Whistle Blowers Act, ARC has suggested a new law to tackle serious economic offences involving Rs. 10 crore (approx. \$2.2 million) and more and setting of a Serious Frauds Office in Cabinet Secretariat with power to investigate and prosecute in order to discipline financial sector, capital, future and commodity markets, and IT sector. ARC also suggested a law on the lines of American False Commission Act so that a citizen can seek relief against fraudulent claims against the government. In judiciary, it is felt that a National Judicial Commission should lay down the code of conduct of Judges, including subordinate judges, recommend names

for SC and HC judges, even inquire into cases of misconduct, impose penalties, and recommend removal. A Supreme Court Judge should be designated as the Judicial Value Commissioner to enforce the code of conduct.<sup>42</sup>

### 30.5 Concluding Reflections

The foregoing analysis has sought to reflect upon the linkages between the sociopolitical structure, policy changes, and public administration in a complex developing society of India. It has outlined, although briefly, the kind of changes in administrative institutions, structures, style, and culture that have taken place in the country after independence. Many of these outcomes have been the direct consequences of the changing sociopolitical structures and the emerging cultural values in the society.

Although one can discuss specific administrative changes occurring at particular points of time due to certain sociopolitical exigencies, or sudden policy changes, the emerging pattern and style of public administration in India has been the product of the totality of the sociopolitical environment that has operated in the country so far.

The increased authority for “licensing” and “control and regulating,” particularly in the industrial sector, has opened large areas and umpteen opportunities for corruption, bribery, and affluence through ill-gotten wealth. Although at no time in the recent history of India, public ever believed that the administration was clean, nevertheless there were times when the extent of suspicion was very low. All through these years, and particularly in the later period, corruption has almost become the way of life. A sort of cynicism seems to prevail that one has got to live with it. In the process, the one section of society which has suffered immensely is the poor citizen. He is devoid of proper means through which he can let himself be heard or even put forward his complaint or grievance for any effective or speedy redressal. The record of central and state governments in the postindependence period on the question of providing services which are “sensitive, courteous and satisfying” has been, to say the least, dismal. Even with the vast bureaucracy, the treatment of the rank and file employees as compared to their high-ranked colleagues leaves much to be desired. The way they are huddled in dingy rooms overcrowded with dilapidated furniture, accumulated dust on files, cobwebs on the corners and cupboards, and no proper sanitary or water arrangements, all these and much more speak about the prevailing duality in the administrative architecture and culture in India.

The officers’ excessive dependence upon notations entered by the junior clerks on every file, the outdated administrative procedures and formalism, the excessive delay in forwarding an application and the infinite time taken for passing of the final order, the uncertainty in the application of rules or regulations but bending regulations for selective applications, the methods of flattery and encouraging subservience for obtaining service from the administrators, the lubrication required in the form of payment to powerful political or bureaucratic functionaries, the sight of an untidy, dirty, and unclean public office with dust, vermin, and betel leaves’ red stains have all become a part of administrative culture in India. Coupled with the excessive “secrecy” and “mystique,” such situations do not encourage any citizen even to attempt to seek what is legally due to him, thereby generating a sense of indifference, apathy, and resignation which results in preferring to employ the services of the so-called intermediaries on payment and get the work done rather than face the ordeal himself and get frustrated. In the government system of today’s India, the hallowed traditions of continuity, hierarchy based status, and distance-based authority have become so important that the overall work ethic is usually one of apathy and indifference. The performance is at the level of lowest common denominator. There is no concern for the common man,

his time, his difficulties, and his inconvenience in coming to the office again and again. The lower hierarchy of employees have become so insensitive and unresponsive toward their duties and work that it invokes no surprise at the hands of those at the other end of the public counter of officials' table. Finding any exceptions to the above listed norm brings an element of surprise. Despite the signs of a number of improvements in the redesigning of administrative structures and processes lately, because of the introduction of "e-governance," there has not been an attitudinal change in the mind-set of bureaucracy in India which is still dominated by old age colonial values of exercising administrative power rather than providing service to citizens.<sup>43</sup>

One of the crucial problems emerging out of the complex social structures and environmental factors has been the lack of proper coordination and control in the implementation of a number of decisions and policies at various levels of public administration. Due to the existence of a multiplicity of public agencies—judicial, state, and local and of different character (some autonomous, semiautonomous, and departmentally controlled) and simultaneously working in the same sector or area and/or for the same clientele as target groups—these agencies have often worked at cross purposes. The net effect has been that not only the administrative efforts have been counterproductive but also the citizen at large has suffered due to the utter confusion and the plurality of jurisdiction that overwhelms him in his dealings with the administration. Inadequate systems of "control and coordination" in the processes of policy formulation and implementation, a proper balance between the needs for a centralized uniform policy and decentralized implementation, an adequate system of rapid consultation and communication among the vertical hierarchies and horizontal authorities, and the creation of an effective delivery system to the different social and target groups are the emerging administrative imperatives borne out of the compulsions of a heterogeneous complex social system. Despite the creation of a number of specialized agencies like the Departments of Plan-Implementation or Coordination at the Center and State levels, this aspect of public administration has not visibly improved. There seems to be an impending necessity of new technological tools and administrative strategies if the capability of the system in this respect is to be improved substantially.

The preceding analysis of the interrelationships between the sociopolitical structure and administrative system in India may appear to be highly critical about the negative impacts created by these factors, but it is neither intended to undermine achievements and performance of the Indian administrative system nor to suggest that administrative performance and inefficiency are incompatible with a complex sociopolitical structure. The administration in India has been a fine machine, capable of rendering some excellent performance in the sphere of policymaking and implementation. It has, over the years, sustained the working of the most populous democracy with the largest politically conscious people anywhere in the world. It has been able to maintain its strength and achieve a strong industrial base for the nation through a system of planned development. There has been an absolute growth in terms of literacy, education, scientific and technical knowledge, and even relative prosperity. A modicum of balance between the conflicting demands, aspirations, and influences of different classes, castes, religious, and linguistic groups has sought to be achieved. The bureaucracy in India has responded well in times of crisis and particularly when it was given clearly defined objectives and unambiguous priorities. All these give a ray of hope for further improvement in the style and operations of the administrative system in India.

With the tremendous bounce in the economy (more than 8% annual growth in recent years of 2004–2007), increase in public employment, consumerism, growth of public and private enterprises, basic infrastructure, proliferation of administrative agencies and the enormous burden of public expenditure as a result of the growing socioeconomic demands made on the system, and the process of administrative development in India has been a continuous one. While the administrative system

has at times shown signs of strains due to constant pressures, largely generated by the weight of its own structure and continuous policy changes, the system has certainly acquired some resilience to withstand and bear such pressures. That the public administration in India has not disintegrated, despite a number of dysfunctionality, pathologies, and negative consequences of a growing bureaucratic apparatus, lends adequate support to our hypothesis that a complex sociopolitical structure in a developing society need not always inhibit the processes of administrative development.

## Notes

1. For a detailed discussion on the interpretation of the ecological aspects of public administration, see Ferral Heady (ed.), *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1984).
2. See Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1972), pp. 100–108
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. For a collection of essays on this subject, see John K. Pulparampil (ed.), *Indian Political System: A Reader in Continuity and Change* (New Delhi: N. V. Publications, 1976), pp. 452–453.
6. See, for example, the Reports of A.D. Gorwala and Paul H. Appleby on the Reform of Public Administration in India in the 1950s, and the various Reports of Administrative Reforms Commission in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For a detailed discussion on this topic see R.B. Jain, *Contemporary Issues in Indian Administration* (New Delhi: Vishal Publications, 1976), Chapter XII.
7. This section draws partly from the author's earlier Joint Study, see O.P. Dwivedi and R.B. Jain, *India's Administrative State* (New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing House, 1985).
8. See Robert A. Hardgrave Jr., and Stanley A. Kochanek, *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1986), p. 4.
9. Dwivedi and Jain, n. 7, pp. 16–17.
10. Seluck Ozgediz, *Managing the Public Service in Developing Countries: Issues and Prospects* (Washington, DC: World Bank, Staff Working Paper No. 583, 1983).
11. R.C.S. Sarkar, Role of government departments in the legislative process, *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, New Delhi, 21, (1968), 1.
12. A.O. Krueger, The political economy of rent seeking society, *The American Economic Review*, 64(3), (1974), 291–303.
13. David J. Gould and Jose A. Aonaro-Reyes, The effects of corruption on administrative performance: Illustrations from developing countries (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1983).
14. See Kothari, n. 2.
15. Ibid.
16. For details of this controversy and its implication, see the cover Story *India Today*, May 7–14, 2006.
17. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see *The Time of India*, May 14, 2006, p. 23: 1 & 8.
18. For a lengthier discussion on this topic, see R.B. Jain and O.P. Dwivedi, Administrative culture and bureaucratic values in India, Paper Presented at the 5th Conference on Public Policy and Administrative Studies, University of Guelph, Guelph, on April 22, 1988.
19. O.P. Dwivedi, Bureaucratic corruption in developing countries, *Asian Survey*, 7, (1967), 249.
20. Ramashray Roy, *Bureaucracy and Development: The Case Study of Indian Agriculture*, (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 1975).
21. B.P. Singh, Political culture and public administration in the national value system. The Indian scenario, *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 27 (October–December 1981), 1043–1054.
22. See Rajni Kothari, *Caste in Indian Politics* (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1971), and Hiriam Sharma, *The Politics of Inequality, Competition and Control in an Indian Village* (Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Co., 1979).
23. B.B. Misra, *Administrative History of India, 1854–1947* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1979).

24. Sudhir Kakar, Authority patterns and subordinate behaviour in Indian organizations, *Administrative Sciences Quarterly*, 16(3), (1971), 298–307.
25. Harry Levinson, *The Exceptional Executive* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 17–19.
26. Kakar, n. 24, p. 304.
27. See Sam Pitroda, Work culture kills self-esteem, *The Statesman* (New Delhi), January 19, 1988, p. 4.
28. Hardgrave and Kochanek, n. 8, p. 11. For a detailed analysis of the class structure in Indian society, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 26–35.
29. Hardgrave and Kochanek, n. 8, pp. 18–19.
30. For a detailed study of poverty in India, see Atul Kohli, *The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
31. V.A. Pai Panandiker, Preference for political stability, *The Hindustan Times*, August 22, 1987.
32. E.N. Mangat Rai, *Pattern of Administrative Development in Independent India* (London: University of London, 1976), p. 5.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
34. P.R. Dubhashi, Administrative reform: The current context, *Lecture at the Indian Institute of Public Administration*, 1985.
35. The term “bullock-capitalist” was coined by Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph to refer to small to medium-sized self-employed independent agricultural producers who displaced large landowners in the agrarian power-constellation and had turned small producers using labor-intensive technologies that promote employment. See Rudolph and Rudolph, n. 28, pp. 49–54.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
37. For a detailed discussion on these two aspects, see Arend Lijphart, The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation, *American Political Science Review*, 90(2), (June 1996), 258–268.
38. Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 338, quoted in *Ibid.*
39. Lijphart, n. 37.
40. For a comprehensive discussion on this topic, see R. B. Jain and Heinz Bongartz, *Structural Adjustment, Public Policy and Bureaucracy in Developing Societies: An Overview* (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1994).
41. R.B. Jain, *Corruption-Free Sustainable Development: Challenges and Strategies for Good Governance* (New Delhi: Mittal, 2004), pp. 31–33.
42. Second Administrative Reforms Commission 2007, also see *Times of India*, February 13, 2007, p. 1, col. 7, 8, 13, col. 1–2 and 1–7.
43. For details of how “e-governance” has impacted Indian Administration, see chapter in R. B. Jain (ed.), *Globalization & Good Governance: Pressures for Constructive Reforms* (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 2005). Also see Subhash Bhatnagar, *E Government: From Vision to Implementation* (New Delhi: Sage Publications 2004), M.P. Gupta, Prabhat Kumar, and Jaijit Bhattacharya, *Government on Line: Opportunities and Challenges* (New Delhi: Tata-McGraw Hill Publishing, 2004), pp. 197–211, and R.B. Jain, Opening government for public scrutiny: A critique of recent efforts to make governance in India more transparent and accountable, *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 52(3), July–September 2006, pp. 539–565.



## *Chapter 31*

---

# **Problems of Civil Service Reforms and Development in Bangladesh: Causes and Remedies**

---

M. Rafiqul Islam

### **CONTENTS**

3	1.1	Introduction.....	530
	31.2	Reasons for Civil Service Reforms in Bangladesh.....	530
	31.3	Major Civil Service Reforms in Bangladesh: Issues and Problems.....	532
	31.3.1	Civil Service Reforms during the Mujib Regime, 1972–1975 .....	532
	31.3.2	Civil Service Reforms and Developments during the Zia Regime, 1975–1981 .....	533
	31.3.3	Dilemmas of Reform and Development during the Ershad Regime, 1982–1990 .....	534
	31.3.4	Problems and Realities of Reform and Development Since 1991 .....	535
31	.4	The Failure of Civil Service Reforms in Bangladesh: Some Common Causes and Factors.....	536
	31.5	Some Remedial Measures for Future Reform .....	538
	31.6	Summary and Concluding Comments.....	539
		References .....	540



## 31.1 Introduction

Bangladesh is a South Asian developing nation that inherited an elitist and centralized administrative system (Khan, 1994), first from the British in 1947, and then from Pakistan in 1971. Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has experienced many political changes. While parliamentary democracy was introduced in 1972 as a system of governance, the democratic political system was first hindered in 1975 through the introduction of a single political party system when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of independent Bangladesh assumed dictatorial power by amending the Constitution. The democratic practice was further worsened by a number of coups and counter coups led by military generals (Ahmed, 1998; Islam, 2000). The military generals ruled for more than a decade and a half that lasted till 1990. While the political atmosphere changed in 1991 through the reintroduction of parliamentary democracy after overthrowing the military rule of Ershad in December 1990 (Islam, 2000, p. 3), the reform efforts for socioeconomic and political development in Bangladesh are still obstructed by bureaucratic resistance and lack of commitment and political integrity (Zafarullah, 2002), as well as noncooperation among the ruling party and the opposition political parties.

Although administrative reform in a developing country is often viewed as an essential instrument for promoting socioeconomic development of that country (Younis et al., 1992, p. 15; Farazmand, 2002, p. 6), the role of administrative reforms for development in Bangladesh has been paradoxical (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001). Since independence of Bangladesh in 1971, a number of reform efforts were made to bring about both structural and procedural changes in administration. However, most of the major reforms for development have failed due to political reasons and bureaucratic resistance (Khan, 2002, 1991; Zafarullah, 2002). An analysis of the reform efforts of different regimes in Bangladesh reveals that the slogans of administrative reforms for good governance or socioeconomic development in Bangladesh were much more political and rhetorical than a genuine result-oriented effort.

The main purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the problems of administrative reforms in Bangladesh and explore the possible remedial measures for removing the problems of civil service reforms in Bangladesh. The first section briefly analyzes the reasons for civil service reforms in Bangladesh. The second section of this chapter analyzes the issues and problems/dilemmas of the civil service reforms under different regimes of Bangladesh since independence. The third section makes an account of the general reasons for or causes of the failures of the major civil service reforms in Bangladesh based on a brief analysis of the previous reform efforts of different regimes and the sociopolitical and cultural realities in Bangladesh. The final section concludes with recommendations for remedying the fundamental problems of the civil service reforms in Bangladesh.

## 31.2 Reasons for Civil Service Reforms in Bangladesh

The causes of the civil service reforms in Bangladesh lie in several factors. The general purpose of the civil service reforms in Bangladesh has been to make structural and procedural changes in administration. It is essential to mention that the present structural and behavioral patterns of the civil service and public administration in Bangladesh are the by-products of the British colonial administration. Because of the British colonial rule in India lasting nearly two centuries, Bangladesh inherited the elitist and centralized administrative patterns from British India in 1947 through the division of Pakistan from India. Bangladesh, which became a part of Pakistan in 1947 upon Pakistan's independence from India, inherited similar elitist bureaucracy after her

independence from Pakistan in 1971 through a bloody war of liberation (Ahmed, 1986; Khan, 1991). Like their predecessors, the civil servants of Bangladesh are highly educated and enjoy high social status. Like the British Indian and Pakistani civil servants and due to their high social status and educational backgrounds, the civil servants of Bangladesh have tendencies to alienate themselves from the common masses (Khan, 1994; Zafarullah and Huque, 2001).

The civil servants of Bangladesh are also criticized for inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, lack of administrative accountability, and widespread corruption in administration (Anisuzzaman, 1985; Huque, 2001; Zafarullah and Huque, 2001; Zafarullah, 2002; Siddiquee, 2003). Frequent political intervention in public management, violation of rule of law and fundamental rights (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001), and nepotism and favoritism are some common features in the civil service of Bangladesh (Anisuzzaman, 1985; Huque, 2001). It goes without saying that the elitist and centralized bureaucratic system is a major stumbling block to the promotion of development and democratic ethos of public administration and government. The bureaucracy and public administrative system are not the exception of this reality. The centralized and elitist civil servants in Bangladesh have general tendencies to keep them alienated from the common public and maintain status quo by resisting any effort for change and innovation in the civil service (Ahmed, 1981; Zafarullah, 1987, 2002; Khan, 1991, 1994; Zafarullah and Huque, 2001). In fact, nonparticipation and noncooperation by the higher bureaucracy in government initiated development programs in the local level also manifest the elitist, noncooperative, and nonparticipative attitudes and behaviors of the higher-level civil servants in Bangladesh (see Khan and Zafarullah, 1982, pp. 180–181).

Needless to say, high managerial capacity and technical skills of employees help enhance employee performance and organizational productivity (Cogburn and Schneider, 2003). But, like the public employees of many developing countries, many civil servants of Bangladesh lack high management capacities and technical skills for improving the quality of service delivery and performance (Siddiquee, 2003). Another major problem of civil service in Bangladesh is widespread corruption in administration. As Ouma (1991) and Theobald (1990) argue that corruption cripples administrative capacity and hampers democracy by disrupting stability, national integrity, and draining scarce resources from the public. Hope (1996, p. 136) also argues that bureaucratic corruption augments the cost of governments for doing the business. However, a study by Aminuzzaman (1996) reveals that corruption is not only endemic in lower echelons of administration but also in higher levels of civil service in Bangladesh (pp. 13–27).

It is also essential to mention that the existing promotion system of Bangladesh civil service (BCS) is mostly biased that often favors the inefficient and incompetent civil servants, particularly certain cadres/groups of the civil servants. This faulty or defective civil service policy, in fact, overlooks the principles of merit by impeding the career development of the talented civil servants (government of Bangladesh [GOB], 1993). Furthermore, the performance appraisal system used in the civil service of Bangladesh is also defective as it follows the traditional annual confidential report (ACR), which is either subjective or irrelevant. Moreover, there is no sound wage and salary policy in the civil service of Bangladesh, which is also discriminatory, favoring mainly senior civil servants. The salary policy is so devoid of the principles of rationality that pay is not determined based on performance (Siddiquee, 2003).

Another major reason for administrative reform in Bangladesh is to ensure administrative accountability, because lack of accountability and responsiveness is also viewed as a problem of administrative development in Bangladesh. The major reason behind the problem of accountability and responsiveness is the absence of strong political leadership and political commitment in Bangladesh (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001, p. 1392; Zafarullah, 2002, p. 56). In actuality, there is

no strong administrative mechanism for ensuring administrative accountability and eliminating widespread corruption in Bangladesh. Factionalism and interest group conflicts among the civil servants also have been a grave problem in public administration in Bangladesh. Although interest group conflict is the common phenomenon in public administration of both developed and developing countries, interest group conflicts and factionalism in the BCS have posed a serious threat to politico-administrative development in Bangladesh (Mamoon and Ray, 1987; Zafarullah, 1987; Khan, 1991). A thorough analysis of the problems of major reform efforts in Bangladesh in the following section will help understand that reality. Although many other factors might warrant for reforming the civil service in Bangladesh, the problems discussed above are the major challenging issues that need to be properly addressed in reforming the civil service of Bangladesh. However, the following section analyzes the issues and problems of major civil service reforms of different regimes in Bangladesh.

### **31.3 Major Civil Service Reforms in Bangladesh: Issues and Problems**

#### ***31.3.1 Civil Service Reforms during the Mujib Regime, 1972–1975***

Soon after coming to power, the Awami League (AL) government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) made efforts to reform the colonial civil service system in Bangladesh, and appointed the Administrative Services and Reorganization Committee (ASRC) in 1972. The salient objectives and issues behind the appointment of the ASRC by the Mujib regime comprised the issues of combining all the civil services into a unified service; the determination of the principles of integration of the personnel of different services into the new structure and the determination of service structure based on seniority and job experiences; creation of sound recruitment policy in government services taking into account the educational background and recommendation of a comprehensive plan for administrative reorganization (GOB, 1973; Ahmed, 1981; Khan, 1994; Zafarullah, 2002).

Some of the major recommendations of the ASRC included democratization of administration through devolution of authority to elected local government and clear specification of the responsibility between the national and local government; creation of a single classless structure in the civil service; abolishing the elite cadres, creation of people-oriented decentralized civil service structure to ensure citizen participation and to safeguard the principle of democracy and socialism; and creation of integrated public personnel system emphasizing a rational selection process based on merit, seniority, and experience (Ahmed, 1981; Khan and Zafarullah, 1982; Khan, 1991, 1994, 2002; Zafarullah, 2002).

The Mujib regime appointed another reform committee named National Pay Commission (NPC) in 1973 intended to remove the inequality of pay among the civil servants of 10 grades (Ahmed, 1981). It needs to be mentioned that while the NPC recommendations were accepted in modified forms, some major recommendations regarding the pay scales of the middle and senior civil servants could not be implemented due to strong bureaucratic resistance, especially from the former Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and east Pakistan Civil Servants (EPCS), who demanded increase of their salaries and fringe benefits (Khan, 1994, pp. 153–154). On the other hand, the ASRC recommendations were totally rejected by the government. In fact, numerous factors were responsible for the rejection or nonimplementation of the ASRC recommendations or the partial implementation of the NPC recommendations.

Critics of the colonial administrative systems of Bangladesh argue that bureaucratic resistance was a major reason for the failure of the administrative reforms in Bangladesh (Zafarullah, 1987, 2002; Khan, 1994, 2002). Although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his AL party were inimical to the generalist civil servants, especially to the former CSPs or senior civil servants prior to the reform efforts, they became more and more dependent on those civil servants for the running of the governmental machinery (Khan, 1991, p. 89; Khan and Zafarullah, 1991, p. 655). In fact, Mujib's overdependence on the senior civil servants at the later part of his regime was due to economic depression and lack of political experience of the members of his Cabinet (Huque, 1985, p. 206; Zafarullah, 1987, p. 466). Khan (1991) and Zafarullah (1987), however, argue that the bureaucratic resistance to the reform efforts in Bangladesh during the Mujib regime was because of the lack of political commitment. The introduction of the single party system by abolishing the multiparty political system in 1975 also manifested lack of political commitment of the Mujib regime (Huque, 1985, p. 208).

### **31.3.2 *Civil Service Reforms and Developments during the Zia Regime, 1975–1981***

Like the military governments of many developing nations, the military government of Ziaur Rahman vowed to reform the civil service system of Bangladesh, and as a primary step of its promise to reform civil service the regime of Ziaur Rahman appointed a 12-member Pay and Services Commission (P&SC) (Ahmed, 1981; Khan, 1994; Zafarullah, 2002). The primary issues that became the focal points of the P&SC's recommendations included the creation of a unified and all-purpose cadre-oriented civil service system, creation of a merit-based recruitment and promotion system, removal of the existing impediments between the CSP and other services by introducing initial pay scales, and establishing a new cadre, consisting of the most talented and efficient officials of all functional cadres based on civil service examinations (Ahmed, 1981, pp. 50–51; Khan, 1994, p. 154; Zafarullah, and Huque, 2001, p. 1385). In the P&SC's recommendations, the civil service was classified both, horizontally based on functions and vertically based on positions, degree of responsibilities, and other job specifications (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001).

The partial implementation of the P&SC's recommendations played a major role in establishing merit as a fundamental means of recruitment and promotion in the civil service of Bangladesh. As a result of the implementation of the P&SC, BCS was created with 28 cadres of services that put an end to years of structural–functional disorder in public administration (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001, p. 1385). Although the reform effort during the Zia regime made a move to rationalize the public service recruitment and selection system replacing the capricious and unplanned civil service system of the Mujib regime through merit and open competition (Zafarullah, 1987, p. 472), the introduction of the Senior Services Pool (SSP) by the Zia regime mainly favored the generalist civil servants that indeed blocked the opportunities of other cadres, especially the technical and specialist civil servants, to reach the apex of the service (Siddiquee, 2003, p. 47). Furthermore, as a result of the P&SC's recommendations, the new scales of pay by the Zia regime further increased the disparity between the highest scales of pay and the lowest scales of pay, which also favored the higher civil servant of Bangladesh (Zafarullah, 1987, p. 471).

Although decentralized and participative administration is essential for democratization of administration and national development (World Bank, 1978; United Nations, 1980; Montgomery, 1988; Esmen, 1991), the implementation of the P&SC during the Zia regime did nothing to change the elitist and centralized pattern of civil service toward democratization of administration

and national development. The civil servants during the Zia regime, in fact, became more centralized and dominant than in the past during the Mujib regime. Rather, corruption and factionalism in the civil service also took new fashions during the Zia regime (Zafarullah, 1987).

### **31.3.3 *Dilemmas of Reform and Development during the Ershad Regime, 1982–1990***

Like its predecessor, the second military regime led by General Hussain Mohammad Ershad took initiatives to reform the civil service system in Bangladesh, and appointed a civil service commission called Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR) in 1983. Upon investigating the existing deficiencies and problems of the administrative system in Bangladesh, the committee identified voluminous drawbacks that were impediments to national development. The major problems of the existing civil service as identified by the committee included lack of people's participation in administration; absence of coordination of field services particularly at the thana level; lack of proper communication and access to government service; absence of appropriate, coherent, and uniform civil service policies regarding recruitment, promotion, and training of public service; decisions influenced by patronage or nepotism; lack of a sound and durable political process to provide proper, consistent, and integrated policies regarding public welfare; lack of coordination caused by vertical–functional departmentalism; fragile local government system due to lack of political direction; diminishing the traditional administrative and representative institutions at various levels of administration; and negligence by the political authority to devolve power to the local levels of government (GOB, 1982; Khan, 1994, pp. 156–157).

In order to remove the existing problems of administration, the CARR made a number of recommendations. The major recommendations made by the CARR included introduction of decentralized administration in each Zilla (district) and Upazilla (subdistricts) by establishing representative bodies with sufficient administrative staff, ensuring citizen participation in developmental and decision-making activities and local administration, adequate devolution of administrative judicial and financial powers at the district and subdistrict levels, and removal of influence of the central administration over the local administration (GOB, 1982, pp. 147–148; Khan, 2002, pp. 80–81).

Unlike the ASRC's recommendations, the CARR's recommendations were partially implemented by the Ershad regime. As a result, decentralized upazilla system was introduced in Bangladesh in 1983, which lasted until it was abolished by the democratically elected government of Khaleda Zia in 1991. Although Ershad introduced decentralized administration in each upazila (subdistrict) of Bangladesh, it was later clear that Ershad's rhetoric of decentralized reform was nothing more than a political game for strengthening and legitimizing his military government by achieving public support. In legitimizing and strengthening his government, Ershad nominated the candidates from his newly formed party called Janadal (People's Party) within 1 year of the introduction of the decentralized upazila system (Khan, 1994). In order to fulfill his political motive, Ershad also appointed the high-ranking military officers as the chairmen of the reform committees. Those high-ranking military officers including one who was member of Ershad's Cabinet indeed highly influenced the implementation of reform to serve the political desires of the military juntas (Khan, 1991, pp. 72–73).

Another problem of the decentralized administration during the Ershad regime was the reluctance of the senior civil servants to delegate authority to the local level of administration (Zafarullah, 2002). Although under the new system there was a provision of delegating power to the upazila chairmen (elected officials by local people), the upazila chairman in actuality enjoyed

limited power as the upazila parishad was controlled by the central government dominated by the senior civil servants. The overlooking of the ACR of the upazila chairmen on the local officials by the central government was an example of no substantial control over the local government by the elected head of the upazila parishad (Upazila chairmen) (Khan, 1991, pp. 76–77). Among other problems created by the newly introduced upazila system was the increase of corruption at the local levels of administration that impeded the national development in Bangladesh.

### **31.3.4 Problems and Realities of Reform and Development Since 1991**

The history of administrative reforms, after 1991, during the democratically elected regimes of Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina is neither significantly different from the previous regimes in Bangladesh, nor is it beyond criticisms. However, both the governments of Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina appointed reform committees in response to increasing pressures from international donor agencies, such as World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and International Monetary Funds (IMF) to promote better governance and transparency in administration in Bangladesh (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001, pp. 1390–1398; Siddiquee, 2003, p. 53). The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government of Khaleda Zia in its first spell of power appointed the Administrative Reorganization Committee (ARC) the responsibility of which was mainly confined to administrative reorganization and internal labor market of the civil service rather than emphasizing any behavioral or procedural changes in the civil service. Furthermore, the bureaucracy-laden committee was tinkering with time that took about 3 years to prepare a comprehensive report (Zafarullah, 2002, p. 63).

One major problem in Bangladeshi politics is lack of tolerance among the politicians. It has also been a convention or unwritten tradition in the political arena of Bangladesh to disrespect or even not to recognize the good deeds of the prior governments by their political opponents. The government of Sheikh Hasina after coming to power in 1996 disregarded the report of the ARC prepared during the Khaleda Zia regime. Instead, the government of Sheikh Hasina appointed another reform committee called Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001). The major recommendations of the PARC included red tape and delay in decision making in the ministries, assessment of the class-system in the civil service that impedes performance, voluntary retirement package, improvement of traffic systems, highway patrol, standard and quality of services in government organization, performance-based appraisal by the ministries/divisions, operation of citizen's charter codifying the rights of the citizens, building work improvement teams, and carrying out the campaigns of administrative reform in all public agencies (Ahmed, 1999).

Critics also argue that the PARC's reports had no fundamental difference from the ARC other than wasting time and resources examining things already dealt with by the international donor community (IDC) initiatives and the ARC. It is also argued that the PARC's recommendations showed ingenious measures without providing any appropriate strategy of resolving the deep-rooted problems of administrative reform in Bangladesh (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001). Moreover, the recommendations seemed to be so inconsistent and haphazard that it became a Herculean task to implement. The commission's inability to present the rationale behind the recommendation and to provide appropriate strategies for remedying the existing problems of civil service revealed this reality (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001; Zafarullah, 2002).

Furthermore, the response of the AL government for implementation of the recommendations had been very passive as there was no sign of sincerity in the AL government in applying

them. In fact, the lack of commitment of the political leadership and the bureaucratic resistance were so debatable that the questions about these issues could not even escape the press media. Although the BNP government under Khaleda Zia again came to power in 2001, the successful implementation of administrative reform for development still remains a perpetual problem in Bangladesh.

### **31.4 The Failure of Civil Service Reforms in Bangladesh: Some Common Causes and Factors**

There are a variety of reasons for the failure of the civil service reforms in Bangladesh. The failure of civil service reform in Bangladesh is in fact deep-rooted in the socioeconomic, political realities, and the bureaucratic intransigence in Bangladesh. The above discussion on the problems of major civil service reform efforts in different regimes of Bangladesh have provided some insights into understanding the complicated issues and dilemmas for the failure of civil service reform in this South Asian developing nation. This section, however, examines some complicated factors, which are directly or indirectly responsible for the failure of reform efforts in Bangladesh.

One way of understanding the causes of the failures of administrative reform in Bangladesh is to understand the political reality and the nature of dependence. Like many other developing nations, lack of strong commitment of the political leadership in Bangladesh has been considered as a major cause of the failure of major administrative reforms in Bangladesh. It has been noticed that since Bangladesh's independence in 1971 due to political underdevelopment and dependence of political leadership upon the generalist senior civil servants, many reform efforts have been thwarted not only in the initial stage, but also in the implementation phase. It also seems difficult to comprehend the cruel nature of dependence and political reality in Bangladesh, which have a significant influence on reforming the civil service in Bangladesh. Because of the irony of dependence and political reality, often the same political leadership can neither embark nor implement the policy reforms (Siddiquee, 2003). For instance, the Mujib government after coming to power in 1972, made efforts to reform the traditional bureaucratic patterns and administrative malpractice, and appointed the ASRC. But, due to his government's overdependence on the senior civil servants at the later stage of his power, Mujib became the victim of his own vision and rejected the recommendations of the ASRC (Khan, 2002).

The major reason for the dependence of Mujib's political leadership on bureaucracy was the technical knowledge of civil servants in running the government. In fact, due to excessive dependence of politicians on civil servants, the political leadership is neither capable of initiating any reform that affects the senior bureaucrats (Siddiquee, 2003) nor able to implement any reform after acceptance of the recommendations without cooperation of the bureaucracy. Although the bureaucracy's relations with the Mujib government were antagonistic and hostile, its relations with both the military regimes of Zia and Ershad were cooperative. In order to protect the regime's interest, Zia benefited the small minorities in the civil service, by protecting the interests of midlevel and senior generalist civil servants, through the introduction of the SSP in 1979 and cadre services (Khan, 2002, p. 83). Rather, Zia delayed taking any action on P&SC recommendations for 2 years that benefited the interests of the senior civil servants. Similarly, Ershad created many unnecessary posts for satisfying the senior civil and military bureaucrats (Khan, 1991).

Another factor behind the irony of politics of administrative reform and development in Bangladesh was the regime's invisible intents of seeking external legitimacy and donor supports (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001; Zafarullah, 2002; Siddiquee, 2003). Since Bangladesh is heavily

ily dependent on the international donor communities/agencies, such as World Bank, UNDP, IMF, for foreign assistance, donor agencies have an important influence on the internal policy of Bangladesh. As a matter of fact, the IDCs often impose conditions to the recipient countries like Bangladesh on foreign assistance. Some of the conditions of the IDCs on foreign aid in Bangladesh are small government, transparency, accountability and good governance, decentralization, professional training, and rationalizing promotion system (Zafarullah and Huque, 2001, p. 1396; Zafarullah, 2002; Siddiquee, 2003, p. 53). However, the reality of Bangladesh is that while the IDCs put pressure for initiating some reform, at the same time, the government in power encounters massive pressure from different interest groups against any plan that affects their interests. In fact, these diverse pressures from different polar groups often enforce the government in power to adopt a double standard policy, and balance between the donor conditions and the domestic political realities (Siddiquee, 2003), which, in fact, foils the actual intents of reform for development.

As mentioned earlier, bureaucratic resistance is an important reason for the failure of administrative reform in Bangladesh. Since bureaucracy is a very powerful force in Bangladesh like many third world countries, it thwarts any government effort to reform the administrative system that goes against its interests. A careful examination of the history of administrative reforms of different regimes in Bangladesh reveals that most of the reform efforts in Bangladesh could not be successful because of strong bureaucratic resistance (Maniruzzaman, 1979; Khan, 1991, Siddiquee, 2003). Khan in this respect argues, "Bureaucratic resistance to major administrative reforms in Bangladesh took two forms: outright opposition to those basic proposals which would adversely affect its interests and implementation of change-oriented proposals in such a manner as to totally negate the original intention of such proposals" (Khan, 1991, p. 82).

In fact, bureaucratic resistance to civil service reform can be understood in different perspectives. It is mentioned that during the Mujib regime, the ASRC recommendations were to tally rejected due to noncooperation of the senior civil servants. It is also noticed that due to bureaucratic resistance, the successive governments of Zia, Ershad, Khaleda Zia, and Hasina could not present a sound pay policy that could minimize the gulf of difference between the highest pay scale and the lowest pay scale (Zafarullah, 1987, 2002; Khan, 2002).

Another way of understanding the bureaucratic resistance to any change in administration is to understand the creation of unnecessary positions and the revival of the loyalty-based cadre services in Bangladesh (see Khan, 1991; Zafarullah and Huque, 2001). For instance, the senior civil servants who were the members of the National Implementation Committee for Administrative Reform/Reorganization (NICARR) during the Ershad regime have pressed the committee to create new posts for their cadres. The creation of SSP during the Zia regime is another example of bureaucratic resistance through retaining cadre-oriented loyalty in administration (Khan, 1991).

Institutional barrier is also a hindrance to successful implementation of administrative reform in many developing nations (Hope, 1996). Bangladesh is no exception to this reality. In Bangladesh situation, the institutional framework for implementing the reform is very weak. For example, although there was a provision in the Constitution for the creation of ombudsman to fight administrative corruption and maladministration, in fact, it is not working. Rather, the anticorruption bureau is also defective and often fails to submit reports and take necessary measure in a timely manner.

Finally, the socioeconomic and cultural realities of Bangladesh have also negative impacts upon the initiation and implementation of any reform efforts in Bangladesh. For example, the failure of administrative reform in Bangladesh during the Mujib regime was not only because of the bureaucratic or political reasons, but also due to the socioeconomic and cultural realities of the country. In fact, Mujib's overdependence at the later stage of his power on the bureaucracy was



precipitated by a number of socioeconomic factors, for instance, economic depression caused by famine, drought, inflation, political instability, and deterioration of law and order. Due to social and economic realities, Mujib's government became more and more dependent on the technically superior civil servants. Furthermore, lack of experience of the ministers and party corruption were also among many problems in Bangladesh, which had negative impacts on the civil service reform in Bangladesh (Huque, 1985; Zafarullah, 1987).

### 31.5 Some Remedial Measures for Future Reform

Despite numerous obstacles to administrative reform in Bangladesh, it is believed that like Singapore and some other developing nations (Quah, 1999), administrative reform in Bangladesh can produce successful results. One of the most important factors for remedying the existing problems of civil service in Bangladesh is to change the perceptions or attitudes of the civil servants toward people (Khan, 1994). In order to change the perceptions of the civil servants of Bangladesh toward their work environment and the people, it is important to create more training facilities for providing humanistic training to the civil servants. Creation of more opportunities for practical training is also important for enhancing the technical skills of the civil servants (Hope, 1996). The reformers should keep in mind that rather than emphasizing too much academic and theoretical aspects in training courses, more emphasis should be given on practical or realistic issues that would enable the government employees to enhance their technical, managerial, and problem-solving skills and capacities. Likewise, the training institutions including Bangladesh Public Administration Training Center (BPATC) should design the course materials and impart training to the civil servants in such a manner that the civil servants can enable themselves to improve their human relations and broaden their outlook about their work environment and the citizens that would help build trust and integrity within the civil service, and between and among the civil servants and the public (also see Denhardt, 2002).

Also essential for civil service reform in Bangladesh is the formulation of an appropriate strategy for reducing administrative corruption and ensuring accountability in the civil service of Bangladesh. In order to fight corruption in administration, an ombudsmanic system should be introduced not only at national level of the government but also at local levels of the government. The reform should also focus on developing relevant measures for holding the civil servants accountable to the citizen via elected representatives or officials of the parliament. Furthermore, strict supervisory measures can be adopted in order to control the work behavior of the civil servants, although it should not affect their private lives. Adherence to strict rules of laws, frequent auditing, and free access to government information for the public can also be useful means of regulating the activities of the civil servants in Bangladesh.

Other issues that should be emphasized in the future reforms in Bangladesh include performance-based evaluation in the civil service and abolition of district quota that affects merit-based recruitment and promotion system. However, women quota and quota for tribal people should still be retained in the civil service in order to maintain equity and social justice in the civil service since both groups are still underprivileged in Bangladesh. Retention of district quota in recruitment and promotion system in BCS, in fact, hampers the principle of merit system, because it encourages nepotism and patronage in recruitment and promotion in the civil service in Bangladesh (for more information, see Khan, 1991; GOB, 1993; Siddiquee, 2003).

It has been observed that the goals and objectives of the reform efforts and the methods or techniques of implementing the policy reforms are often unclear, ambiguous, and inconsistent in

Bangladesh. For example, the PARC's recommendations in the late 1990s were largely inconsistent and haphazard, and there was little link between the goals and objectives of the reform and the methods/strategies for attaining the goals of the policy reforms (*The Daily Star*, 2000; Zafarullah and Huque, 2001). Therefore, for any future reform effort to be successful, the goals and objectives should be clearly defined and achievable as stated in the reform. Furthermore, rather than being isolated in nature the reform should be comprehensive and integrative in that any improvement in the reform should be integrated to the increased efficiency in the entire administrative system (for more detail, see Hope, 1996).

Although the above measures are essential for a sound, transparent, responsible, responsive, and development-oriented civil service system in Bangladesh, it is not an easy task to successfully adopt these essential measures without a strong commitment of the political leadership. Therefore, the government in power must have an honest intention to successfully implement the reform policy. However, in order to create strong political commitment, it is essential for both the ruling and the opposition parties to establish a national consensus for bolstering national development in Bangladesh. Furthermore, both the ruling and opposition political parties should not throw political clay at each other for serving their political or party interests at the expense of the public interests.

Although political commitment is one of the most important ingredients of successfully initiating and implementing the reform efforts in a developing country like Bangladesh, political commitment alone is not the panacea for remedying the continuing problems of the civil service reforms in Bangladesh without lessening the mountainous socioeconomic problems of the country. Moreover, without a stable political condition and socioeconomic advancement, it is not easy to reduce the dependence of the political leadership on both the bureaucracy and the external donor agencies, which might have negative influences on the internal needs of administrative reforms for development.

## **31.6 Summary and Concluding Comments**

Since Bangladesh's independence, a variety of problems and issues provoked the successive governments of Bangladesh to initiate administrative reforms from time to time to bring about the structural, procedural, or behavioral changes in the civil service. Some of the voluminous problems that drew attention of the reformers in Bangladesh for reforming the civil service included elitist behavior of the civil servants, centralized administration, red tape, administrative corruption, lack of accountability, mystic of rules of law, mismanagement, lack of coordination, factionalism, and interest group conflict in administration (Ahmed, 1981; Khan and Zafarullah, 1982; Anisuzzaman, 1985; Zafarullah, 2002). The civil servants of Bangladesh also lack high managerial and technical skills for improving performance and service delivery. Furthermore, the promotion system of the civil service is mostly biased, which favors the incompetent and inefficient civil servants. Another problem of the existing civil service system in Bangladesh is that the performance appraisal system is also defective, as it uses the traditional ACR, which is mainly subjective and irrelevant (GOB, 1993; Siddiquee, 2003).

Although Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made an effort to remove the colonial bureaucratic patterns of Bangladesh by appointing the ASRC for bringing about socioeconomic transformation in Bangladesh, it became a backlash to his regime. Due to the regime's dependence on the bureaucracy it rejected the ASRC's recommendations for democratic and decentralized administration. While the Mujib government was inimical to the senior civil servants, the military regimes of Zia

and Ershad were more cooperative with the bureaucracy. While the Zia regime partially succeeded in introducing merit system in the civil service, the creation of the SSP by the Zia regime, in fact, favored a small group of senior generalist civil servants. Although Zia introduced the Gram Sarker (Village Government) by mobilizing the rural people for rural development in Bangladesh, his Gram Sarker was mainly the prototype of the Basic Democracy as introduced by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan in 1958, which favored a few rural elites in the country (Zaman, 1994). The Ershad regime, on the other hand, introduced the decentralized upazila system mainly to create support base in rural areas for legitimizing his military rule.

Although the successive governments of Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina appointed the ARC and the PARC, respectively, in response to the continuing pressures of the IDCs, the recommendations of both the committees became abortive due to lack of political commitment, bureaucratic resistance, and socioeconomic realities in Bangladesh. In light of the above discussion, it seems clear that most of the reform efforts in Bangladesh failed not only for political reasons and bureaucratic resistance but also for social and economic realities.

In conclusion, for any civil service reform to be successful, the reformers in Bangladesh should carefully take a number of remedial measures. First, there should be a sound and appropriate strategy for reducing administrative corruption in Bangladesh. Second, a strong supervisory technique can be adopted in order to enhance transparency in administration. Frequent auditing, free access to government can be relevant measures for holding the civil servants accountable. Third, a performance-based evaluation system should also be developed in civil service of Bangladesh. Replacement of district quota by merit is also essential in order to reduce political patronage or nepotism in recruitment and promotion of public employees, although the quota for underprivileged groups such as women and tribal people should be retained. Furthermore, the goals and objectives of reforms and the methods and/or techniques for implementing them should be clear and consistent. In fact, all the remedial measures cannot be successfully undertaken without a strong political commitment. In this regard, there must be a political consensus, tolerance, and mutual respect between the opposition and ruling political parties. Moreover, no reform should be hastily undertaken in the face of external pressures. Rather than influenced by external forces, reform should be initiated by the internal needs and demands of the citizens of Bangladesh.

Furthermore, rather than theoretical training, more practical and humanistic training should be imparted to the civil servants of Bangladesh in order to change their elitist and authoritarian behaviors. Another important issue that needs to be addressed in eliminating administrative corruption and/or remedying the obstacles to administrative reform is the increase of literacy rate in Bangladesh. In actuality, without high rate of literacy the socioeconomic condition of any country can be hardly improved. And without improving the socioeconomic conditions of the country, external dependence and bureaucratic resistance in reform and development seem to be a Herculean task to overcome in order to successfully initiate and implement any reform for development in Bangladesh.

## References

- Ahmed, E. (1981). *Development Administration in Bangladesh*. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Center for Administrative Studies.
- Ahmed, N. (1998, March). Reforming the parliament in Bangladesh: Structural constraints and political dilemmas. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 36, 68–69.
- Ahmed, S. (1999, October 29). PARC ponders its fate. *Daily Star*.

- Ahmed, S. G. (1986). *Public Personnel Administration in Bangladesh*. Dhaka, Bangladesh: University of Dhaka.
- Aminuzzaman, S. M. (1996). Accountability and promotion of ethics and standards of behavior of public bureaucracy in Bangladesh. *Asian Review of Public Administration*, 8 (1), 13–27.
- Anisuzzaman, M. (1985). Administrative culture in Bangladesh: The public-bureaucrat phenomenon. In M. M. Khan and S. A. Hussain (Eds.). *Bangladesh Studies: Politics, Administration, Rural Development and Foreign Policy*. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Center for Administrative Studies.
- Coggburn, J. D. and Schneider, S. K. (2003). The quality of management and government performance: An empirical analysis of the American states. *Public Administration Review*. 63 (2): 206–213.
- Denhardt, R. B. (2002). Trust as capacity: The role of integrity and responsiveness. *Public Organization Review*. 2 (1): 65–76.
- Esmán, M. J. (1991). *Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and Strategies*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Farazmand, A. (2002). Administrative reform and development: An introduction. In A. Farazmand (Ed.). *Administrative Reform in Developing Nations*. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 1–11.
- Government of Bangladesh (GOB). (1973, April). Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee, Part I: The services, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Government of Bangladesh (GOB). (1982). Report of the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Government of Bangladesh (GOB). (1993). Towards better government in Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Cabinet Division.
- Hope, S. K. R. (1996). *Development in the Third World: From Policy Failure to Policy Reform*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Huque, A. S. (1985). The politics of local government reform in rural Bangladesh. *Public Administration and Development*, 5 (3), 205–217.
- Huque, A. S. (2001, December). Governance and public management: The South Asian context. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 24 (12), 1289–1298.
- Islam, M. R. (2000, September). Social background characteristics of the legislators in Bangladesh: An empirical study of the fifth Jatiya Sangsad members. Master's thesis, Presented to the College of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN.
- Khan, M. M. (1991). *Politics of Administrative Reform: A Case Study of Bangladesh*. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House.
- Khan, M. M. (1994). Reform for decentralized development: Bangladesh's experiment with major administrative reforms/reorganization in the 1980s. In M. M. Khan and J. P. Thorp (Eds.). *Bangladesh: Society, Politics and Bureaucracy*. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Center for Administrative Studies, pp. 146–167.
- Khan, M. M. (2002). Resistance to administrative reforms in South Asian civil bureaucracies. In A. Farazmand (Ed.). *Administrative Reform in Developing Nation*. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 73–88.
- Khan, M. M. and Zafarullah, H. (1982). Public bureaucracy in Bangladesh. In K. K. Tummala (Ed.). *Administrative Systems Abroad*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, pp. 158–187.
- Khan, M. M. and Zafarullah, H. M. (1991). Politics of bureaucracy in Bangladesh. In A. Farazmand (Ed.). *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration*. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 651–661.
- Mamoon, M. and Ray, J. K. (1987). *Inside Bureaucracy, Bangladesh*. Bryan, TX: Jeeva Alternative Words.
- Maniruzzaman, T. (1979). Administrative reforms and politics within the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. *Journal of Commonwealth Comparative Politics*. 17 (1), 47–59.
- Montgomery, J. D. (1988). *Bureaucrats and People: Grassroots Participation in Third World Development*. Baltimore, London: John Hopkin's University.
- Ouma, O. A. (1991). Corruption in public policy and its impact on development: The case of Uganda since 1979. *Public Administration and Development*. 11 (5), 477–489.
- Quah, J. S. T. (1999). Corruption in Asian countries: Can it be minimized? *Public Administration Review*. 59 (6), 483–494.

- Siddiquee, N. A. (2003). Human resource management in Bangladesh civil service: Constraints and contradictions. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 26 (1), 35–60.
- Theobald, R. (1990). *Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan.
- United Nations. (1980). *Popular Participation in Decision-Making for Development*. New York: United Nations.
- World Bank. (1978, May). *Towards a Typology of Popular Participation, Policy Planning and Program Review development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Younis, T., Ibrahim, S. A. M., and McLean, M. A. (1992). Administrative development and reform in Turkey: A historical overview (Part I). *The International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 5 (1), 15–20.
- Zafarullah, H. (1987). Public administration in the first decade of Bangladesh: Some observations on trends and development. *Asian Survey*, 27, 459–476.
- Zafarullah, H. (2002). Administrative reform in Bangladesh: An unfinished agenda. In A. Farazmand (Ed.), *Administrative Reform in Developing Nation*. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 49–72.
- Zafarullah, H. and Huque, S. H. (2001). Public management for good governance: Reforms, regimes, and reality in Bangladesh. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 24 (12), 1379–1404.
- Zaman, M. Q. (1994). Ziaur Rahman: Leadership styles and mobilization of policies. In M. M. Khan and J. P. Thorp (Eds.), *Bangladesh: Society, Politics and Bureaucracy*. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Center for Administrative Studies, pp. 103–116.

---

**BUREAUCRACY AND  
BUREAUCRATIZATION,  
CHANGE AND REVOLUTION**

---

**VII**



## *Chapter 32*

---

# **Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization in Ancient and Modern Iran**

---

Ali Farazmand

### **CONTENTS**

3	2.1	Introduction .....	546
3	2.2	Historical Background.....	546
	32.3	Bureaucratization of Iran (1920s–1970s).....	549
32		.3.1 The Power Position of the Bureaucracy.....	549
32		.3.2 The Goals and Functions of the Bureaucracy .....	551
3		2.3.3 The Bureaucratic Elite .....	551
32	.4	The Revolution of 1978–1979 and the Bureaucracy .....	552
	32.5	Debureaucratization of Iran: 1979–1982 .....	553
		32.5.1 Institutionalization and Rebureaucratization: 1983 to the Present, with an Update since 2005.....	553
	32.6	Summary and Conclusion .....	559
R		References.....	561



## 32.1 Introduction

Iran has one of the longest traditions of bureaucracy and civilization in the world. Beginning around 8 000 years ago, Iranian bureaucracy grew first in the city-state of Susa (Shoush) and then as the major institution of governance and administration under the Elamite and Persian empires. It continued its influence as a dominant institution of governance and power through centuries under the Islamic Khalifate and the following Safavid empires, but began to decline during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The rise of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic state in modern Iran began in the 1920s. Therefore, bureaucracy has played a formidable role in modern Iranian society, politics, and economics, as it did during the ancient time. Bureaucratization is a political and administrative phenomenon, and it has an ancient origin, though the modern concepts of bureaucracy and bureaucratization are eighteenth-century concepts (Argyriades, 1991; Farazmand, 1989). According to Weber (1947), bureaucratization is a political phenomenon, and it is inevitable in modern society, for bureaucracy is a rational organization of modern administration and government. Its instrumentality is indispensable to rulers and governments around the world.

This chapter analyzes Iranian bureaucracy in modern time with reference to its ancient Persian Empire. First, a historical perspective on Iranian bureaucracy is given as the context. Then, the phenomenon of bureaucratization in Iran from the 1920s to the 1970s is discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the bureaucracy and the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979, with the changes that have taken place in the postrevolutionary bureaucracy in Iran. Finally, a conclusion is provided along with a brief comparative discussion of bureaucratization and debureaucratization in pre- and postrevolutionary Iran. This chapter is drawn primarily from my previous works as well as my forthcoming book on the history of Iranian bureaucracy and public administration (see Farazmand, 1982, 1989, 2001a,b; forthcoming), along with a number of select sources, some of which are cited in the text.

## 32.2 Historical Background

Bureaucracy has played a key role in Iranian society, politics, and administration for over 8000 years. The earliest experience of state tradition and administrative functions on a massive scale began around 6000 BC in Susa. As one of the oldest sites of an ancient civilization, Susa began political life first as a city-state and then as a rival power to Sumer in the Mesopotamia, then as the capital of one of the oldest empires of antiquity, Elam. Recent decades of archeological works have also discovered two major city-state civilizations—the Burned City in southeast Iran and Jirouft civilization in northwest Iran predating Mesopotamia—with elaborate administrative records that date back to over 5000 years (Farazmand, forthcoming). Bureaucracy under the long history of the federated Elamite Empire developed significantly and played a major role in the Iranian society and the empire (Cameron, 1968; Ghirshman, 1954; Mallowan, 1965).

The Elamite language—with a written alphabet developed simultaneously with that of the Sumerian—and the prosperous economy of the federal empire contributed considerably to the bureaucratic development of Iran. Subsequently, a growing class of professional bureaucrats emerged in ancient Iran. Susa was one of the key centers of both civilization and bureaucratic systems of government in the ancient world for a long time, even after the fall of the Elamite Empire to the Medes in 600 BC. Among the major administrative achievements of Elamite Iran were the development and management of a gigantic system of underground irrigation, *ganats*,

an Iranian invention that turned an arid country into an agricultural land; the invention and development of the written Elamite language and its extensive use in the bureaucracy, and the construction and maintenance of numerous public works and enterprises such as roads, bridges, cities, towns, communication centers, and economic/commercial centers (Cameron, 1968; Farazmand, 2001a,b; Ghirshman, 1954).

Bureaucracy was highly instrumental in the administration of the intergovernmental relations of the federal state of Elam for almost 2500 years. Indeed, the foundations of the bureaucracy and administrative state of the subsequent Persian Empire were laid under the Elamite Empire (Cameron, 1968; Farazmand, 2001a,b; Ghirshman, 1954).

The elevation of bureaucracy and bureaucrats under the powerful Median Empire, which conquered Assyria in 612 BC as well as many kingdoms eastward and was planning to annex Babylon, was another significant step toward the professionalization of the bureaucracy and its increased power in society. Bureaucracy flourished under the Medes, who were masters of statecraft, and Iranians began to gain a reputation as “excellent administrators.” The arrival of the Aryans, a young, energetic group of people of Indo-European origin, on the plateau during the second migration wave in the middle of the second millennium BC eventually changed the entire structure of Iranian civilization. They were also destined to change not only the political history of the Near East but world civilization by conquering the known world of antiquity in a single generation. They established an administrative system that was managerially efficient and politically effective, and their military power was second to none. Initially, the Medes crafted expertise in statehood through a well-disciplined and organized bureaucracy; then they transferred their achievements to their Persian cousins who, by conquering virtually the entire world of antiquity, established the first world-state empire of the Achaemenids under Cyrus the Great in 559 BC. The concept of “state” was for the first time adopted officially by the Aryans, who “turned that concept into a reality” (Ghirshman, 1954, p. 127). This was particularly true under the Achaemenid Empire of Persia.

The world-state Persian Empire of the Achaemenids inherited a rich legacy of effective and efficient administration with the professional bureaucracy of the Elamite and Medes. When Cyrus the Great subdued the Median Empire, he found an efficient bureaucracy and administration already established, experienced, and developed. But the empire Cyrus founded required a different organization (Ghirshman, 1954, p. 127). Bureaucracy in the Persian Empire formed one of the key pillars of governance and administration, along with the military organization, the royal court, and the nobility. The organization of the empire into 46 *satrapies*—vast territories with major kingdoms and nations—which stretched to India in the east and Egypt, Eastern Europe, and the Greek city-state islands in the west was one of its major innovations. Wherever the Persian army went, the bureaucracy followed and quickly established itself as an effective and efficient organization of administration and governance (Farazmand, forthcoming; Frye, 1975; Olmstead, 1948).

The Persian bureaucracy under the Achaemenids for over 230 years became highly professionalized, and bureaucrats enjoyed high prestige, power, and privileges in society throughout the empire. The administrative reforms of Darius the Great signified a new development in the direction of professionalization of Iranian bureaucracy and administration. Cyrus the Great was a genius military and political leader; his successor Darius was also a great administrator. Close attention to a sound economy and an efficient administrative system prompted him to reorganize and reform the legal, financial, communication, and managerial systems of the administration of his vast empire. It was a turning point in the administrative history of the Near East, and indeed in the ancient world. Bureaucracy was both large and further professionalized, with

numerous languages used in different parts of the empire, although the Elamite and Aramaic languages continued to play the key role in the system as the official languages of the bureaucracy, along with Old Persian as the language of the Court (Farazmand, forthcoming; Frye, 1975; Olmstead, 1948).

The subsequent fall of the empire to Alexander did not make the Persian bureaucracy weak. Indeed, it was totally adopted by the new occupiers, and the Persian administrative system continued. The later rise of the Parthian Empire with its decentralized system of administration was not favorable to the professionalized and centralized system of bureaucracy and administration of the earlier time, yet bureaucracy continued to flourish under the new system, which found powerful allies among the great nobles of the Seven Families, who actually governed the Parthian Empire for well over 400 years (240 BC–227 AD). Romans learnt a great deal from the Iranian bureaucracy during this period of both hostility and peaceful interaction (Farazmand, forthcoming; Frye, 1975; Olmstead, 1948).

Iranian bureaucracy was further perfected in the long period of the Sasanid Empire (227–651 AD), in which purification of the Persian culture, administration, and society was rigidly enforced. The bureaucracy regained the powerful position it had enjoyed before, and it found high status of both professionalization and power in society and politics. The Sasanid state in general and its bureaucracy became the models for many generations of empires and governments to follow. The Persian Sasanids perfected the art of statehood and bureaucratic administration, a professional legacy that has been inherited not only in modern Iran but in many other parts of the region (Eisenstadt, 1963; Farazmand, forthcoming; Frye, 1963, 1975; Olmstead, 1948).

After the fall of the Persian Empire to the conquering Islamic forces in the seventh century, the Persian bureaucracy continued to play a dominant role as the major institution of governance under the new empire. The conquering Bedouin Arabs adopted the entire Persian state and administrative system, for they lacked any of their own. Consequently, Persianization of the Islamic Empire—particularly of the Abbasid Khalifate—was a phenomenon of historical significance. This tradition of Persian administrative/bureaucratic hegemony continued during the Iranian Saljugh Empire that defeated the Byzantine Empire. The following Ottoman Empire, which subdued the Islamic Khalifate and ruled most of the Middle East, except Persia (Iran), and part of Eastern Europe for almost a millennium. The Ottomans too adopted the Persian bureaucratic system in their empire and made some changes in it with localized Turkish names as time passed (Farazmand, 2001b, forthcoming; Frye, 1963).

Persian bureaucracy emerged powerful once again during the sixteenth century under the powerful Safavid Empire, which revived the ancient Sasanid traditions of state, culture, and glory for over two centuries. The merit system so cherished earlier under the Persian Empire was reinforced, along with the religious and political criteria for selection and promotion, and the bureaucracy assumed huge responsibilities in implementing gigantic public works and managing large public enterprises producing numerous historical landmarks that have been towering the landscape of the country and attracting millions of tourists to Iran from all over the world (Savory, 1980).

However, Iranian bureaucracy fell into a declining path as instability and chaotic succession followed the Safavids. The short-lived centralized government and administration under Nader Shah, also known as the Napoleon of Asia, who defeated the aggressive Ottomans on the Western frontier and reintegrated the entire country and carried out a successful campaign of conquest to India in the eighteenth century, also did not have sufficient time to revitalize the able capacity of the Persian bureaucracy. The feudalistic system of monarchy under the decentralized and despotic 200-year regime of the Qajars was detrimental to the revival, development, and refinement of Iranian bureaucracy so rich in the past. While the West was emerging from the Middle Ages

and flourishing in economy and administration, Iran was struggling to maintain its integrity and existence; she was sandwiched between the main power contenders of Russia, Britain, and France throughout the nineteenth century. Despotism also weakened Iran internally. So, the bureaucracy declined, and efforts toward reform also failed in this period.

### 32.3 Bureaucratization of Iran (1920s–1970s)

The rise of the modern bureaucracy and the bureaucratic state in Iran began in the 1920s, after the fall of the Qajar dynasty through a military coup d'état by Colonel Reza Khan, who subsequently established the Pahlavi dynasty in 1924. A series of administrative reforms changed the structural system of the economy, politics, and administration. The bureaucracy was reorganized on two pillars: the ancient Persian bureaucratic and administrative system and the modern Western concepts of organization and management. A new civil service law was adopted, and significant reforms in the judiciary and the executive bureaucracy were implemented, all on a secular basis. Rural Iran was for the first time penetrated by the state and was bureaucratized to some extent through the establishment of the rural police or *gendarmérie*, an armed rural bureaucracy that reinforced the power of the local landed aristocracy or feudal landlords. In urban areas as well, the bureaucratization of society was pursued along with other measures that were taken to alter the Iranian economy and society, but the political system remained autocratic and dictatorial.

The second wave of bureaucratization in Iran began with the agrarian and administrative reforms of rural and urban areas in the 1960s. This period signified a turning point in the history of Iranian administrative and socioeconomic structures. Through the agrarian reform, with the three stages of land reform implementation into the 1970s, the semifeudal system of economy and society in rural Iran, where about 70% of the population lived, was transformed into a capitalistic system integrated with international capital. Capitalism in Iran flourished under the direct control of the autocratic state. This was accomplished through the bureaucratization of rural and urban Iran. State bureaucracy replaced the local independent feudal powers who had until the 1960s ruled the rural Iran (Bill, 1972; Farzmand, 1982, 1989, 2001b,c; Halliday, 1979).

#### 32.3.1 *The Power Position of the Bureaucracy*

The power position of the bureaucracy in Iran grew dramatically as the society became thoroughly bureaucratized. The bureaucratic state and the Pahlavi regime became the same. Following the CIA-led bloody military coup d'état of 1953 deposing the democratically elected government of Premier Mosaddegh and reinstalling the fleeing Shah to throne, Iranian polity experienced a bloody rise of extreme autocracy. To stabilize the country and transform its socioeconomic system integrated into the world capitalist system, the Shah with the advice of the Americans and other Western powers was forced to implement a number of reforms and to institutionalize the whole society. This was also the period of institution building—bureaucratization, capitalist reforms and corporate-market organizational development, and administrative laws and rules to facilitate regime rule—which the Western social scientists had prescribed as a strategic approach to national development in the third world (see, e.g., Huntington, 1968).

In Iran, the bureaucratic state became the institution of power and the only foundation of legitimacy of the regime. This was because the Shah was considered by most Iranians as an American Shah who did not represent the Iranian people and their aspirations for independence. Thus, the

regime relied almost solely on the bureaucratic state—military, security, and civilian. The regime and the bureaucratic state were identified with each other; a challenge to the state was considered a direct challenge to the regime and was not tolerated. Consequently, the power of the bureaucracy became pervasive in all spheres of Iranian life (Afkhani, 1985; Cottom, 1979; Farazmand, 1989; Razi, 1987).

The nature of the Iranian bureaucratic state of the time is well described by Fred Halliday (1979, p. 63), who explains it in terms of five characteristics: “It is capitalist, it is developing capitalist, it is dictatorial, it is a monarchic form of dictatorship, and it is in a certain sense dependent on the advanced capitalist countries... The state has become, to a considerable degree, dependent on the support it receives from the U.S. and other developed capitalist world generally.”

The Iranian bureaucracy was the central arm of the government and the Pahlavi regime, and it was by nature antiparticipatory, hegemonistic in behavior, dominant politically and culturally, and stifling in terms of human development, as it impeded Iranian individual effort to grow personally. The bureaucracy was also extremely elite-oriented and promoted extreme inequality, economically and socially. It was also extremely politicized and centralized. “Extreme centralization and politicization, however, appeared as the dominant factors—traits which helped the ‘White Revolution’ in its first decade and debilitated it in the second” (Afkhani, 1985, p. 58).

One of the most powerful bureaucracies of Iran during the 1960s and 1970s was the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), a gigantic organization in charge of agrarian/rural reforms. Emerging from the agrarian reforms of the White Revolution of the Shah in the early 1960s, MARD with its many affiliated agencies—some of which were huge in size and power themselves—was elevated to an extremely high position of prestige, power, and influence in administration, policy, and politics. During the 1960s and early 1970s, MARD was pervasive in all aspects of rural Iran and its leadership at both the central and the regional level acted as minikings throughout Iran. Even the governors-general of the provinces were not immune from the influence of this gigantic bureaucracy, which expanded its organizational domain well beyond its original scope of mission and activities. By the early 1970s, it was involved in comprehensive plans and projects, such as huge economic development zones or poles, regionalization of Iranian economy and agriculture, administration of rural and urban projects, assumption of huge enterprises in both agriculture and industry, and more. MARD district administrators also became so powerful in rural areas that they were characterized as minikings and system maintainers at the local levels.

The power of the bureaucracy, in general, and the MARD bureaucracy, in particular, was enhanced by many ways: through its discretion to dispense money through contracts and purchases; its establishment and maintenance of powerful alliances with private businesses, and its role as the facilitative institution through which the growing number of huge multinational corporations and agribusinesses operated in Iran. Other factors that added to the power of the bureaucracy included the lack of effective budgetary control over its operation, and lack of significant judicial control over its administration (in fact, the judiciary often reinforced bureaucratic power at the expense of the society and the people). Consequently, “payoffs to bureaucrats became a common way of influencing public policy and administrative behavior” (Farazmand, 1989, p. 42). The power of the bureaucracy was further enhanced by the lack of free news media. The notorious secret police, SAVAK, had absolute control over the media and of any form of free expression in Iran. Despite the pervasive power the bureaucracy and bureaucratic state exercised in Iran, it was by no means an autonomous state. It was subservient to the regime and to the Shah. The bureaucracy was dependent on the Shah, but dominated the rest of the society. The latter gave the bureaucratic state

partial autonomy: for as long as the bureaucracy did not pose a threat to the regime, it was left to act autonomously in relation to the rest of the society.

### **32.3.2 *The Goals and Functions of the Bureaucracy***

No distinction could be made between the goals and functions of the Iranian bureaucracy and those of the political system under the Pahlavi regime. The bureaucracy was the key instrument of system maintenance and regime enhancement, and no change could be made in the bureaucracy and administrative system without a significant alteration in the political system. The “organizational framework of Iranian politics hinged upon the bureaucracy” (Afkhani, 1985, p. 57).

Thus, the overriding goal of the bureaucracy was to enhance the Pahlavi regime and the personal interests of the Shah. Its second major goal was to enhance the process of capitalist development and capital accumulation in the interest of both the domestic big bourgeoisie and international capital. The third goal was to legitimize the social system of capitalism and its social relations in Iran. Still other goals included the formulation, development, and presentation of policies and programs to the Shah that would promote the preceding goals.

But, one of the most important goals of the bureaucracy was to enhance its own power and to dominate the society. In this regard, it was also successful: The degree of “formalism and bureaucratism was so pervasive that no political, economic, or social affairs of the country could be run without the exercise of bureaucratic power” (Farazmand, 1989, p. 45). Formalism allowed the regime and the state to announce policies and goals in vague and unclear ways, whereas the bureaucracy implemented or chose not to implement policies or decisions that were counter to the goals of the regime and to those of its own elite.

### **32.3.3 *The Bureaucratic Elite***

The bureaucracy was dominated by a highly powerful elite who were members of both political and economic elite circles at the national and regional levels. As a well-integrated Web system, the elite structure in Iranian prerevolutionary society was both complex and rigid. The complexity was a result of its diverse and differentiated components drawn from various segments of the society—military, political, social, economic, and administrative. The complexity enabled the regime to promote rivalry among the members of the elite at all levels—inner circle, general, and specific—and to divide and rule without much difficulty.

The inner circle constituted the top, strategic elite of all sectors involved; they were the backbone of the regime and their number was less than 1000, and indeed, by one account, about 400 (Bill, 1972). Next was the general elite, which included a larger membership from economic, political, social, administrative, and military strategic groups or families. Here, the so-called Thousand Families constituted the core, but the membership of the general elite was much larger. Members of the general elite often served in an interlocking Web or network of positions highly sensitive to the regime’s survival, maintenance, and enhancement.

The administrative or bureaucratic component of this general elite was also very powerful, along with the military and security components. The particular or specialized elites were found in different sectors or organizations, urban and rural. These were the key administrative officials who had specialized roles and functions. Finally, resembling the national general and inner circle elites, the local elites were also indispensable to the regime. Among all these elites, the bureaucratic elite was the integrating component; it provided the rigidity of the structure and, hence, was a formidable force for system integration and domination (Farazmand, 1989). Thus, the structural

complexity and rigidity of the Iranian elite provided the regime with the best combination of instrumentality of rule, governance, and control. The result was the elimination of any possibility of the rise of an independent elite capable of challenging the status quo and the regime. Since the real power was held by the royal family and the Shah, the Iranian political and economic elite was reduced to a “Second Stratum” (Zonis, 1971), lacking autonomy and independence. The regime monopolized all power and alienated all peoples of Iran, including the entire elite, both the strategic inner circle and the general elites. Consequently, dissatisfaction with and resentment toward the regime grew rapidly during the late 1960s and 1970s. And, when the regime’s challengers began organized activity, many members of the elites, including some administrators, joined them. This problem of regime legitimacy erosion was accentuated and aggravated during the revolution of 1978–1979, when many members of the political, administrative, bureaucratic, and economic elites also joined the antiregime challengers and revolutionaries (Farazmand, 1989; Razi, 1987).

The power of the bureaucratic elite was therefore crucial to the integration of the system and the regime in Iran for a long time, for, as an instrumental rationality, it provided the complexity and flexibility as well as the structural rigidity to deal with challengers. The bureaucracy and bureaucratization of Iran under the Shah were highly instrumental in maintaining the Pahlavi regime, in providing some legitimacy, in enhancing the regime and the Shah’s power, in promoting capitalism and capitalist development in rural and urban Iran, and in facilitating domestic and international capital accumulation in Iran. It was also instrumental in transforming rural Iran into a capitalistic system, and in replacing the rural feudal power of the landlords with the centralized power of the bureaucratic state. This resulted in significant repression of the rural people, widening the gap between rich and poor throughout Iran, and resulted in a displacement of more than 12 million rural people to urban areas, where they found their situation even worse than before. During the revolution of 1978–1979, these large numbers of rural migrants played a significant role by joining the antiregime demonstrators in the streets—they fueled the revolution.

## **32.4 The Revolution of 1978–1979 and the Bureaucracy**

The revolution of 1978–1979 in Iran was one of the most significant revolutions the world witnessed during the last three centuries. It was a general uprising in which all segments of all classes participated. Since the regime had alienated even its closest power elites, they also joined the antiregime movement. The result was a general uprising by almost all Iranians, which included a wide range of the opposition groups, none of which was able to bring down the regime alone. Consequently, all opposition groups and forces of the regime challengers from the left to the right, from the most secular to the most religious, were united by necessity together under the religious leadership of Ayatullah Khomeini, who had from the 1960s never stopped his opposition to the regime and never compromised with it. He gained the confidence of millions of Iranians who aspired to overthrow the regime but were not able to do it alone.

Therefore, the rise of the religious leadership in the Iranian revolution and the subsequent introduction of the Islamic Republic Government in Iran are the phenomena that are relatively unique in modern history. The survival and continuity of Iranian government under the new Islamic Republic have dashed many of the earlier hopes of the previous regime’s supporters as well as other contenders for power in postrevolutionary Iranian politics. Many have tried to bring the new regime down, but have failed to do so.

The revolution and the Islamic Republic government have impacted the Iranian bureaucracy in many ways. There have been significant changes in the bureaucracy and its behavior and structure. Generally, these effects may be characterized by the phenomena of debureaucratization, institutionalization, and rebureaucratization.

## **32.5 Debureaucratization of Iran: 1979–1982**

During the revolution, there was a general populist idea that the bureaucracy of the old regime was an oppressive machine and must be destroyed or totally reformed. There was also a popular attitude that the established bureaucracy must be ignored and decisions made spontaneously and implemented immediately. There was no patience with red tape, and popular actions prevailed throughout the revolution and for several years afterward.

Thus, the process of debureaucratization of Iran began in several ways. First, the bureaucratic elites were immediately replaced: some had already left the country, others were fired, and still others were forced to retire. Bureaucratic rules and regulations were bypassed by revolutionary committees in all organizations as well as in every neighborhood in rural and urban Iran. Employee councils replaced hierarchical authorities, and administrative action was guided by revolutionary and popular demands and decisions, which were implemented promptly. Religious, political, and revolutionary criteria established standards for administrative and managerial actions.

In rural and urban areas, thousands of local and regional revolutionary organizations sprung up during and after the revolution, staffed by volunteers from all occupations who provided then-services and expertise to promote justice, to help provide services to the poor, and to carry out major development projects and other public works, such as building highways, roads, bridges, hospitals, public baths, clinics, libraries, schools, colleges, and irrigation systems. Organizations such as the Reconstruction Crusaders, Housing Foundation, Land Distribution Committees, and War Refugees Foundation were among the most successful and popular bodies born during the revolution, which have operated in the antibureaucratic manner and have had a remarkable record of achievements in Iran.

The debureaucratization of Iran altered the structure of the bureaucracy by either taking over the old machinery and operating it in a revolutionary manner, or ignoring it altogether by creating new structures on an antibureaucratic basis. Democratization of workplace organizations in public, private, and nonprofit sectors was a major development. Hence, public bureaucracy was a major battleground for the employees' political and democratization activities.

Democratization and debureaucratization phenomena were not, however, without cost. A degree of anarchy and lack of organizational discipline also pervaded the bureaucracy. Structurally, several changes also took place in the bureaucracy through the newly enacted legislative mandates of the Parliament, which created an Administrative Justice Office and a Supreme Council of revolutionary representation and heavily politicized the administrative system in general. In short, the phenomenon of debureaucratization along with the Islamization of the Iranian administrative system during 1979–1982 had significant impacts on the bureaucracy and public administration in Iran.

### ***32.5.1 Institutionalization and Rebureaucratization: 1983 to the Present, with an Update since 2005***

The period since 1983 marked a major shift in the direction of moderation, a relaxation of radical positions in domestic and international affairs, and a standardization of social arrangements and governmental activities. The containment of terrorism and the military defeat of the



opposition groups from left to right, so characteristic of the first period, strengthened the trend toward institutionalization, stabilization, and long-term planning by the government. While religious ideology and Islamization of the society and the bureaucracy were emphasized, “unity of all Islamic groups and individual citizens” was called for all the time by the revolutionary leader Ayatullah Khomeini (quoted in Farazmand, 1991a, p. 758). The first Five Year Plan of the new government was ratified and adopted by the Parliament, which called for recruitment and return of thousands of professional experts for rebuilding the society and the administrative system. The merit system was given high value, but loyalty to the revolution and the Islamic government was of utmost importance in recruitment, selection, and maintenance of the work force. While nonreligious members of the bureaucracy were given some recognition, this was done only so long as they did not oppose the new regime. This new development was characteristic of all organizations in the public and private sectors, except the bona fide religious organizations.

The major changes that took place in the bureaucracy were structural, behavioral, and attitudinal in nature. Structurally, a gradual standardization, routinization, and bureaucratization replaced the previous debureaucratization. The bureaucracy was reorganized along more or less traditional bureaucratic lines, although spontaneity and Islamic requirements dominated the process and operation of the new system. Other major changes were the institutionalization and solidification of the religious representation as a special elite force of executive policy and political decision-makers at the top of each agency, ministry, organization, and foundation in the country. This new cadre of religious elites has acted as strategic patronage appointees in the bureaucratic agencies, where they have been performing the job of system and regime maintenance, regime enhancement, and coordination with other related agencies. They have provided effective organizational leadership, harmony, and stability to the new system of administration and the bureaucracy. As time has passed, their appreciation for merit and professionalism has grown significantly, and they have been highly open-minded and receptive to expert advice.

Another major development has been the institutionalization of many organizations, committees, and other types of administrative bodies with subsequent consolidation and reorganization. Consolidation of many organizations into large administrative bodies has been followed in some cases by a degree of bureaucratization and formalization of the administrative system. This has resulted in some satisfaction among bureaucrats who have gained some recognition, but to dissatisfaction and disenchantment among the clients and citizens who have to deal with the bureaucracy and find that a lot of the problems of the old bureaucracy have returned (see Farazmand, 1991b, Chapter 55, for details).

Still another change has affected the status of women in the workforce. Conflicting proposals and legislative mandates have affected educated women in the bureaucracy. Opposing calls for their service and simultaneous encouragement to them to take more time to raise their children and thus create jobs for men have been a source of anxiety for many female members of the bureaucracy. Reform legislation has given women more rights equal to those of men in many respects. Recent legislation seems to have been in the right direction, recognizing the realities of the place of women in the workforce and in various occupations in society.

Still another change relates to the control of bureaucracy and administration. Unlike in the past regime, under which there was no effective legislative and other means of control over the bureaucratic state (Binder, 1962; Farazmand, 1989; Zonis, 1971), significant oversight and control have been exercised over the bureaucracy and administrative system in postrevolutionary Iran. This oversight and control arise from the generally pluralistic nature of the Iranian polity, the media, the powerful Parliament, the independent judiciary, and a host of religious and political organizations throughout the society. The bureaucracy is controlled, but bureaucracy by nature

has many ways to protect itself and to escape control from outside. This is a commonly observed problem even in the most democratic and advanced societies.

Another major change in the bureaucracy has been a relative shrinking of its gigantic size. A number of public enterprises—nationalized industries and corporations—have been turned over to the private sector, and many others have been contracted out to the private sector. This has been a global trend, of course, and Iran has pursued this policy not only to attract foreign investment and credits, but also to promote managerial efficiency. The Eighth Administration under Khatami's Government took many privatization initiatives—with controversial results—to please the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank (WB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for membership. The fact is that it is hard to manage the huge Iranian bureaucracy efficiently, and the lack of sufficiently trained personnel and managerial cadre has made it very difficult for the government to manage the administrative system properly. The privatization trend, however, has taken a rather radically different and sweeping character in the Ninth Administration under the Ahmadinejad's presidency, with impacts and consequences yet to be determined in future studies, as explained below.

The trend toward institutionalization of revolutionary organization and rebureaucratization of the administrative system in postrevolutionary Iran has had a significant impact on citizens, on bureaucrats, and on the government in general. The citizens seem to have been a little disappointed to see many bureaucratic practices of the past return. Frustration over how to deal with the rules of the old bureaucratic machinery while talking and feeling revolutionary has been a major problem expressed by people. On the other hand, the relative revival of morale and motivation among bureaucrats has been a major source of improved performance in the organizations of the administration. Such improvements may be found mostly in professional lines of administration.

The government has been caught between the necessity for a stable and institutionalized system of administration managed with high efficiency, on the one hand, and response to popular revolutionary demands, on the other. The dilemma is to maintain high responsiveness to the revolutionary and equitability demands of the people, particularly the lower and middle class, on the one hand, and to manage the public's business of running a huge public sector with efficiency, on the other. This dilemma is still a source of problems that have not been resolved. Maintaining political and religious responsiveness and efficiency is a challenge for the new Islamic government in Iran, a challenge likely to continue for a long time.

On top of this dilemma is the forceful implementation of the Islamization policy of the bureaucracy and administrative system, as well as the other institutions of the government and society. Islamization of the bureaucracy began during the first stage of debureaucratization, but it seems to have been well established and will continue to characterize Iranian bureaucracy in the future. This is especially true since the election of Mahmood Ahmadinejad as the new president of Iran in 2005, a populist hard-core leader whose earlier service in the defensive war against Iraq in the 1980s gained him popular reputation among the Basijies, the massively mobilized forces with over 10 million trained membership. Ahmadinejad's government has a radical perspective regarding governance, administration, and preservation of the revolutionary gains. His 20-year long-term strategic vision of Iran as a rapidly developing nation advancing in every respect into one of the top 10 powerful industrialized economies in the world—economically, socially, technologically, medically, scientifically, and militarily—aims at turning Iran into a “model” nation for others to emulate in progress, advancement, governance, organization, and management.

Despite the 8 year war and tremendous economic and military boycott by the United States and other major industrialized nations of the West, Iran has managed to make remarkable progress in development programs, infrastructures, medicine and pharmaceutical products (e.g., its

revolutionary production of Iranian multiple sclerosis (MS) drug called Avax, and all herbal AIDS drug, Interferometric Modular Display (IMOD), that have hit the world markets), agriculture, science and technology, sports, and industrialization projects, as well as massive growth in educational and health programs. With a majority of its population under the age of 30 years, and with over 450 major universities (compared with 12 in prerevolutionary time) covering all over the country—reaching out to students wherever they are, including small towns and remote parts of the land—which enroll over 1.2 million higher education students on an annual basis, Iran is taking “leaping steps” toward industrialization with many capacities to export beyond self-sufficiency. A relatively isolated country after the revolution, Iran has now emerged as a major regional power with international influence, a major scene of many international scientific, political, and cultural conventions and global events, a major participant in the international community with arms reaching the Far East, Latin America, and Africa, as well as the entire Middle East. The latest U.S. National Intelligence Report of December 2, 2007—which has shocked the world by confirming Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, and repudiating George W. Bush’s persistent claim about Iran’s nuclear weapon program—has clearly acknowledged Iran’s advanced scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities, with more advancement in progress: “We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventuality to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so” (*The New York Times*, 2007). Iran has maintained all along that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes of energy and industrial development.

It is no exaggeration to say that if uninterrupted by war of invasion from the United States, Iran will soon reach many of its long-term strategic goals with prosperity before the expected time, and will become a formidable source of assistance—economically, technically, and scientifically—to many developing nations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the neighboring countries in the Middle East. Large-scale steps are already taken in this direction, and many ambitious projects are already in progress connecting Central Asia to the Persian Gulf (North–South corridor), and to Europe via Turkey and Russia, thus acting as a catalyst of East–West change and connections. With a trans-Asian railroad and oil pipeline from Iran to Pakistan, India, and China in the East, and to Kazakhstan and Belarus in Central Asia and Russia, and through Iraq and Syria, as well as a rapidly expanding maritime shipping capacity with a navy power structure equipped with self-produced submarines and combat ships, Iran is building large-scale bridges to the entire world, mostly with indigenous technical and engineering capacities that are beyond any outsiders’ ability to comprehend (Farazmand, 2007b).

The keys to these amazing successes have been self-determination, prudent foreign policy, an uncompromising position defending its legitimate rights, strategic thinking, self-reliance, and self-belief in being able to achieve what others have. Another key to this success is Iran’s rich resources—both human and natural—in no need for any international aid. Thus, Iran has become a growing international aid donor, especially to poor African countries, donating billions of dollars. Economic partnership building with countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East is rapidly growing, with mutual benefits, all despite the political and economic pressures from the United States and Western Europe against cooperation with Iran.

A central concern of all nations and their leaderships is the issue of organization and management of the economy and society. Can the bureaucracy be dependent on performing a gigantic number of projects toward massive development and advancement at such a rapid pace? The answer is no. Iranian bureaucracy, after the revolution, went through many structural changes—from early debureaucratization process with a simultaneous expansion of the public sector due to nationalization of former private enterprises, to the subsequent institutionalization and rebureaucratization of the 1990s.

With the election of the populist Ahmadinejad to presidency, there is little patience with the slow-moving bureaucracy. Several major developments are worth reporting since 2005.

First, the international economic policy of pursuing membership in the WTO is underway, and globalization is embraced with increased efforts toward competitiveness in regional and world markets, building industrialization capacity, and for the first time agricultural exports, along with engagements in diverse industrial and commercial partnership schemes across the oceans. However, globalization is carefully approached with the strategic policy of “resistance and adaptation” (see Farazmand, 2001b,c, for more details), demonstrating a strong independent foreign policy (Farazmand, 1999, 2007a).

Second, a fresh move toward debureaucratization has already begun. Aside from his fiery and principled international and foreign policies based on firmness and partnership building with the South countries, Ahmadinejad began a comprehensive tour to all provinces and their major cities nationwide immediately after his election, issuing executive orders and signing into law numerous development project authorizations, which were either already part of the overall legislatively approved development plans or seeking new legislative appropriations from the Parliament—and he got them. Blessed with a supportive legislative majority, he has been successful to push forward his short- and long-term plans and programs. Now, in his second round of presidential tours to all provinces and major cities, reports indicate that most of the first round development project promises have already been either “implemented or are in significant implementation progress.” These projects range from industrial infrastructure building, housing and urban development, education and health facilities, sport complexes, agricultural programs, export development capacities, small- and medium-sized economic development schemes, self-reliant and export-oriented manufacturing products, and many more.

Appropriation has been fast, and outlays have been provided in massive amounts, and coupled with large-scale and long-term economic and industrial capacity building, prompting even some of the most conservative international institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF to report at least 6% economic growth for Iran with an even better outlook for years to come. Almost every dollar and project implementation is being accounted for through national media and legislative oversight bodies, with shortcomings reported harshly and openly.

The regular bureaucracy is pushed aside with little patience for its process orientation. Actions have followed at provincial and local levels immediately after each and every presidential trip, followed by “teams of policy and administrative actions” composed of both local and national-level members to get into implementation, and with progress monitoring institutions to follow their works. As a result, parainstitutional arrangements have replaced the established bureaucracy on development management and act with expediency and efficiency at provincial levels and involve local and district governors and administrative bodies—both elected and appointed.

The third major change in the bureaucracy and administrative systems has since late 2006 been a drastic “decentralization” of planning and management functions of the long-standing and central agency of Plan and Budget Organization in charge of the planning and development programs for over half a century, reorganized in recent years to Management and Planning Organization (MPO) at provincial level, transferring the central agency functions of planning and public management to the level close to people. This decentralization has had many positive impacts, most notably charging local officials under provincial Governors’ supervision, officials who are familiar with local needs and problems to plan and manage more effectively and efficiently, but they have to also be in direct communication with the central agency for advice and technical assistance—an intergovernmental relations arrangement both vertically and horizontally with other provinces. Decentralization of this type is good and promotes creativity, capacity, and responsibility, but it might also promote local power elite dominance with potential politics of “localism,” a condition that encourages local influential people with power to cause corruption and discrimination, unless strong citizen-based democratic institutions are established to assure accountability and

oversight. This decentralization represents a major structural reform and reorganization of the administrative system, a move that is inspired by both top-down and bottom-up approaches to reform and change in the governance (see Farazmand, 2002, for more details).

The fourth major development of Ahmadinejad's administrative reorganization has been his "mobilization and direct engagement of citizens" in public management. This policy has further radicalized the administrative process, pushing aside the bureaucratic administration and supplanting or replacing it with direct citizens' involvement in large- and small-scale organizations, from the grassroots level all the way up. Elected local government councils in towns and villages are involved in oversight functions of administration in development projects as they affect their people. Citizen engagement is a dramatic "governance initiative" that may be viewed a populist and democratic mobilization and involvement in public administration, replacing or supplanting the bureaucracy (see Farazmand, 2004, 2007b, for more details). It is, nevertheless, a sound governance policy.

The fifth major change radically affecting the bureaucracy is the sweeping privatization of almost every public enterprise, government functions, and public institutions. This is a drastic development with far-reaching implications for public policy and public management, both theoretically and practically. Privatization was sweepingly pursued and was very controversial under the two-term president Mohammad Khatami. However, what has been sought after under the present policy drive is something different, far different. What Khatami did, could not touch the areas protected by the Article 44 of the Constitution that kept key industries and government functions under State control. As of late 2006, the only major obstacle to large-scale privatization was removed.

The Supreme Leader issued a state decree removing the obstacle by allowing the Article 44 of the Constitution to be put on national debate for economic and national development purposes. Scholarly and policy advocacy debates ensued and soon, the Article 44 was revised by the Supreme Leader as the highest authority of the Islamic Republic, and detailed discussions, ideas, and plans for large-scale privatization of virtually all government functions and key enterprise, except the most strategic industries deemed absolutely necessary to remain under direct state control, such as defense and intelligence areas. Subsequently, privatization programs with various schemes were introduced—outsourcing, contracting out, different forms of turning over public enterprises state functions—from production to service delivery—to private companies, self-governing organizations, and citizens, by selling or distributing the so-called justice shares to ordinary citizens in both urban and rural areas, shares that would yield interests in the stock markets and money markets and distributed to shareholders. In fact, the first such interest-earned distribution to over 40 million shareholders started in November 2007 and still continues as this manuscript is being revised.

This sweeping privatization is aimed to promote social and economic justice, to enhance a sense of citizen ownership of national assets by directly benefiting from its fruits or interests, to promote self-governance and self-organization among citizens, to engage citizens in national and local economic activities and development projects, and to promote economic growth and advancement by inviting domestic and international investments through various organizational and economic arrangements. This seems a revolutionary program if implemented effectively and without raising opportunities for corruptions, a problem difficult to avoid but possible to try. Such a revolutionary idea, if implemented properly and effectively, will avoid the state ownership and rising bureaucratic problems of a Soviet-system socialism while also preventing dominance of the economy and society by large corporate organizations in pursuit of capital accumulations for the few; it will help build a market-based socialism in which most citizens will own and directly benefit from such an economic enterprise of the country, with differential outcome of course.

The key questions on this process are many, but at least two are important to address in public management. One is the management capacity of those newly privatized organizations with common citizens as shareholders—who will manage them and how efficiency would be attained and maintained? The answer seems to be so far on the partnership building between state and private sector and nongovernmental organizations such as cooperatives. The second question is the scale of coordination among the network organizations that will have to operate along with the state bureaucracy, at the time diminished in size and scope, on the one hand, and the growing multitude of diverse networks of organizational arrangements that are growing at local, provincial, and national levels, on the other hand—how will they be coordinated and guided for national development and in connection to the international relations? The answer so far seems to have been the key role of the state as a guide and enabling institution that also oversees and helps all sectors to grow but maintains the “integrative” functions in the societal system, making sure all components and sectors are connected and operate purposefully. The state still remains strong but is freed from undue responsibilities.

Strategic capacity building in human capital is crucial to other areas of national capacity building for rapid national development, as the key integrating capacity system demands strategic human capital that would promote creativity, innovation, knowledge, and future-shaping activities; such strategic human–capital capacity is essential and needed (see Farazmand, 2007c, for more details) for a nation in a process of rapid change and development. Being aware of this fact, it seems that Iran is paying attention to this key requirement and is engaging the “young population” with opportunities to excel and contribute to the country’s strategic goal achievement—the number of Iran’s young population under the age of 26 years is incredibly large—over 40 million, perhaps the youngest among the world nations—and is spread across the proliferating universities, colleges, and state and private sector enterprises. The young population is a major force in reshaping Iran’s future; neglecting them will prove a regretful policy, but engaging them will yield very productive fruits. And the best way to engage them is not through the bureaucracy, but rather through an enabling environment, providing opportunities for self-governing and self-developing organizations supported by the state, and by the economic and social policies that promote employment, housing, education, and economic and scientific activities away from the congested Tehran and major cities and deep into the rural and small town areas of the vast land of Iran.

Studies are needed to assess the many aspects of these changes on the bureaucracy, both positive and negative, and this is a large-scale task beyond the scope of this short chapter.

## **32.6 Summary and Conclusion**

Iran has had one of the longest traditions of bureaucracy in the world. Born in the city-state of Susa about 8000 years ago and developed as an institution of the Elamite Empire during the fifth and first millennia, bureaucratization of the Iranian administrative system and professionalization of the bureaucracy reached their peak during the Median Empire as well as during the more than a millennium history of the world-state Persian Empire, with some exceptions under the Parthians. The fall of the empire to the Islamic conquerors in 651 AD did not end the rich Iranian traditions of bureaucracy, state, and administration. On the contrary, the Iranian bureaucracy and administrative system were adopted totally by the new rulers of Islam, and Persianization of the Islamic empire continued until the revival of the Iranian Saljugh Empire for 200 years, then, after a period of setback under Mongolian invasion, only to be strengthened further under the powerful Safavid Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Persian reputation for being excellent

administrators was maintained until the eighteenth century, especially till the nineteenth century when Persia experienced a political, military, and administrative decline and was subjected to the influence and interference of Britain, France, and Russia.

The rise of modern bureaucracy and bureaucratization of Iran began during the 1920s with the rise of the Pahlavi regime. Iranian bureaucracy was based on the two pillars of the ancient system and modern concepts of institutionalization and management borrowed from the West. The first wave of bureaucratization occurred in the 1920s under Reza Shah's reform programs. But, by far, the most comprehensive process of bureaucratization in Iran occurred during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Bureaucratization of Iran and the bureaucracy in this period were political and administrative phenomena aimed at three broad objectives: transforming the Iranian countryside from a semifeudal system of society and economy into capitalism and its social relations integrated with international capital; serving as the key instrument of capital accumulation and of facilitating capitalist development in Iran; acting as the key instrument of the bureaucratic state, providing the regime with a basis of legitimacy and rule, and working as an instrument of system maintenance and regime enhancement.

Bureaucratization of Iran meant more effective social control, repression, and displacement of the Iranian people. The powerful position of the bureaucracy and the bureaucratic elite permeated the society, and, since any challenge to the bureaucratic state was considered a challenge to the regime itself, the bureaucracy became the most repressive instrument of political, economic, and administrative domination in Iran. Since all powers were monopolized by the regime and the Shah, the second-stratum political and bureaucratic elites of Iran were also alienated.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 as a general uprising by almost all Iranians from all strata led to the fall of the Pahlavi regime and the long tradition of monarchy in Iran. Subsequently, the Iranian bureaucracy and administrative system experienced severe debureaucratization with significant positive and negative consequences. Survival, stabilization, and institutionalization of the postrevolutionary Iranian government under the Islamic Republic brought fundamental changes in the bureaucracy and the administrative system.

The impact of debureaucratization was followed by a process of effective institutionalization and consolidation of the governmental institutions, and by a gradual process of rebureaucratization. Although the goals of system maintenance and regime enhancement seem to have been achieved effectively by the new developments, the managerial efficiency of the gigantic public-sector bureaucracy has suffered. It seems that the remaining nonbureaucratic organizations of the revolutionary period have been more efficient and effective than the rebureaucratized ones.

This problem is now being attacked by the recent governmental policies of reprivatization, denationalization, and contracting out. These policies have serious consequences that cannot be ignored by a postrevolutionary government with the mission of representing and serving the oppressed and providing economic justice. While rebureaucratization appeared to have taken hold for a decade or so in the 1990s, the bureaucracy has been targeted again and a rapid debureaucratization continues as massive privatization recently started which is in full swing, covering almost all areas of the economy and state functions. Iran is far from being a bureaucratic state, and there are far more effective mechanisms of control over the bureaucracy than under the previous regime. The bureaucratization of prerevolutionary Iran and the dominance of the bureaucratic state under the Pahlavi regime were politically and administratively compatible with Weber's (1947) assertion of the role of bureaucracy in modern capitalist society, and of its role as a power instrument serving rulers, whether democratic or dictatorial. The repressive role of the bureaucracy in Iran was also a major contributor to the fall of the regime in 1978–1979.

The postrevolutionary bureaucracy of Iran has gone through major changes, but the current changes go far deeper in the structure of the administrative system, as comprehensive privatization

is being carried out under the new populist President Ahmadinejad, though the core of the bureaucracy is in place to steer. It would be a prudent policy to avoid bureaucratization, contain bureaucratism, and promote more participatory, antibureaucratic institutions and administrative bodies in society, rural and urban. It would also be a prudent policy to avoid growth of corporate capitalism dominated by domestic tycoons and transnational corporations that are only after their own profit interests and market dominance. What is needed is the growth of an enabling environment in which democratic values and self-management can have a chance to advance among the Iranian people in urban and rural areas, and at all levels. Such advancement is both essential and needed for a nation with ambitious but realistic strategic goals for a bright future as a rapidly industrializing and capacity-building country, and to become a model for many other countries in the world.

## References

- Afkhami, G. R. (1985). *The Iranian Revolution: Thanatos on a National Scale*. Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute.
- Argyriades, D. (1991). Bureaucracy and debureaucratization, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration* (A. Farazmand, ed.). New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 567–585.
- Bill, J. (1972). *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization*. Columbus, OH: Charles Merrill Press.
- Binder, L. (1962). *Political Development in a Changing Society*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Cameron, G. (1968). *History of Early Iran*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Cottam, R. (1979). *Nationalism in Iran*. Pittsburgh, CA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. (1963). *The Political Systems of Empires*. New York: The Free Press.
- Farazmand, A. (1982). Bureaucratic politics under the Shah: Development or system-maintenance? A study of administrative theory and behavior, PhD dissertation. Syracuse, NY: The Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
- Farazmand, A. (1989). *The State, Bureaucracy, and Revolution in Modern Iran: Agrarian Reforms and Regime Politics*. New York: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (1991a). Bureaucracy and revolution: The case of Iran, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration* (A. Farazmand, ed.). New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 755–767.
- Farazmand, A. (1991b). State tradition and public administration in Iran in ancient and contemporary perspectives, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration* (A. Farazmand, ed.). New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 255–270.
- Farazmand, A. (1999). Globalization and public administration. *Public Administration Review* 59 (6): 509–522.
- Farazmand, A. (2001a). Bureaucracy and revolution, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Administration* (A. Farazmand, ed.), 2nd edn., expanded, and revised. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 1077–1092.
- Farazmand, A. (2001b). State tradition and public administration in Iran: Ancient and contemporary perspectives, in *Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration* (A. Farazmand, ed.), 2nd edn., revised and expanded. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 535–550.
- Farazmand, A. (2001c). Globalization, the state, and public administration: A Theoretical analysis with policy implications for developmental states. *Public Organization Review* 1 (4)/December: 437–464.
- Farazmand, A. (2002). *Administrative Reform in Developing Nations*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (2004). *Sound Governance Policy and Administrative Innovations*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (2007a). Globalization: A theoretical analysis with implications for governance and public administration, in *Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration* (A. Farazmand and J. Pinkowski, eds.). Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, pp. 3–26.



- Farazmand, A. (2007b). The capacity to manage in the age of rapid change and globalization. *Iranian Journal of Management Sciences* 1 (1): 157–188.
- Farazmand, A. (2007). *Strategic Public Personnel Administration: Building and Managing Human Capital for the 21st Century*. Westport, CA: Praeger.
- Farazmand, A. (Forthcoming). *Public Administration in Persia (Iran): 10, 000 Years of Civilization, Bureaucracy, and Governance*—in progress.
- Frye, R. (1963). *The Heritage of Persia*. New York: The World Publishing Company.
- Frye, R. (1975). *The Golden Age of Persia*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Ghirshman, R. (1954). *Iran: From the Earliest Time to the Islamic Conquest*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Halliday, F. (1979). *Dictatorship and Development*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political Order in a Changing Society*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Mallowan, M. E. L. (1965). *Early Mesopotamia and Iran*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Olmstead, A. (1948). *History of the Persian Empire: The Achaemenid Period*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Razi, H. G. (1987). The nexus of legitimacy and performance: The lessons of the Iranian revolution, *Comparative Politics* 19: 453–469.
- Savory, R. (1980). *Iran Under the Safavids*. Cambridge, MA, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- The New York Times* (2007). Key judgments from a national intelligence estimate on Iran's nuclear activity, December 4, p. 1, 10A.
- Weber, M. (1947). *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (trans. A. M. Parsons and T. Parsons). New York: The Free Press.
- Zonis, M. (1971). *The Political Elite of Iran*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

## *Chapter 33*

---

# **Bureaucracy, Agrarian Reforms, and Regime Maintenance Politics: The Case of Prerevolutionary Iran**

---

Ali Farazmand

### **CONTENTS**

3	3.1	Introduction .....	564
33	.2	The Political and Socioeconomic Environments .....	564
33	.3	The Power Position of MARD .....	565
	33.4	Reforms of the 1960s and MARD .....	565
34	.4.1	The Politics of Reforms .....	566
	33.5	Achievements and Failures of MARD .....	567
	33.6	Management of Change, Development, and System Maintenance/Enhancement .....	567
	33.7	Bureaucracy and the Revolution .....	568
3	3.7.1	Regime Challenging .....	569
33	.7.2	The Revolution of 1978–1979 .....	569
3	3.7.3	Organizational/Structural Changes .....	570
	33.7.3.1	Status Quo (1979) .....	570
3	3.7.3.2	Debureaucratization (1979–1982) .....	570
3	3.7.3.3	Rebureaucratization .....	571
	33.7.4	Agrarian and Rural Policy .....	572

3	3.8	Conclusions.....	573
	33.9	Update on the 1990s.....	574
3	3.10	Postscript.....	575
		Notes.....	578
		References.....	579

### 33.1 Introduction

Public bureaucracies play significant roles in societies. As instruments of power, they are strong forces of rule to govern and to enhance regime maintenance [1], yet the political role of public bureaucracies has remained underresearched and, as scholars like Waldo and Riggs acknowledge, still very little is known about their political role [2,3].

This chapter examines the political and administrative roles of a large public bureaucracy—the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)—in Iran during the 1960s and the 1970s. It also examines some of the major impacts of the revolution of 1978–1979 on this bureaucracy and its politics and functions. The purpose is to explain how MARD helped maintain and enhance the Pahlavi regime under the Shah for a period, how it transformed the rural socioeconomic system of feudalism into capitalism, what impacts these roles had in Iranian society both politically and economically, what happened to MARD after the revolution of 1978–1979, and, finally, what changes have taken place in the postrevolutionary agrarian policy under the Islamic republic.

In the 1960s, MARD was crucial in implementing a number of agricultural and rural reforms, including land reform, and in changing the socioeconomic and politicoadministrative structures of rural Iran where about 75% of the nation’s population resided. MARD was also crucial to the survival and maintenance of the Pahlavi regime and in furthering its economic interests. Currently, it is instrumental in dealing with agricultural, developmental, and rural problems under the Islamic Republic.

This chapter is based on data and information collected for a dissertation case study conducted during 1980–1982 and a research paper during a 4 month visit to Iran in 1983 as well as more recent data collected since the late 1990s. Information included interviews (over 100) conducted with a number of officials and others in Iran and the United States, a large number of Iranian and U.S. government documents, and numerous scholarly works and other secondary materials. Finally, the personal observations and experiences of the author (POEA), as a former client of several agencies, a public administrator, and a researcher in Iran, are also incorporated.

### 33.2 The Political and Socioeconomic Environments

Formally, Iran was a constitutional monarchy until 1979; in reality, it was absolute monarchy, and the separation of power was a farce. The parliament was a rubber stamp and conformed to the Shah’s dictates [4–6]. The political elite was only a “second stratum” [7], translating the Shah’s dictates to the bureaucracy for implementation [7–8]. The Shah’s status became absolute during 1953 when a successful Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-led military coup returned him to the throne after a serious challenge led by the then popular premier, Dr. Mosaddegh. Several other challenges were suppressed after 1953 by the Pahlavi regime, and the Shah exercised absolute rule with the support of the United States and other allies [7,9–12].

Socioeconomically, rural Iran was predominantly feudal or semifeudal until the 1960s. The landed aristocracy, including the Shah's family, dominated the country. While 75% of the nation's population lived in rural areas, less than 0.3% owned and controlled the 50,000 villages of Iran. The biggest force was the Shah himself who owned more than 2000 of the best villages taken forcibly by his father, Reza Khan. Sharecropping was prevalent, and the peasants lived in a virtual serfdom [8,11,13–17]. The attitude of the peasantry toward the state was negative since they saw its organizations, especially its rural police (*Gendarmerie*), as instruments enforcing feudal power [5,14].

The politicoadministrative and managerial functions in rural Iran before the 1960s were carried out by the aristocracy's representatives and the administrative units controlled by the local elite. The Shah and his state had little, if any, direct control over these areas and their population [14,16]. After 1953, economic power in Iran was controlled by the royal family, international monopolies, and their agents. During the 1960s and 1970s, feudalism was transformed into a system of capitalism, which became an integral part of the international capital [8,11,13–17]. To preserve the regime, the Shah used strategies of coercion, reform, and cooptation in dealing with opposition and dissent [4,8]. MARD played a major role in accomplishing this and other objectives.

### 33.3 The Power Position of MARD

The power of MARD was enhanced by the wide discretion given to it by the regime. It was actively involved in policy and politics by (1) allocating resources in agricultural and rural areas, (2) policy formulation and presentation, (3) assuming more functions in competition with other public organizations, and (4) in technical expertise. MARD was the primary implementer of the policies and reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, aimed at restructuring rural Iran to serve the country and the regime economically and politically. This made it one of the most powerful bureaucratic institutions in the society. The Shah identified the regime with state power and tolerated no challenge to this power [5,8,18,19].

Members of the bureaucratic elite in Iran were also members of the political and economic elites and served in several powerful roles simultaneously [7,8,20]. They were "quasipoliticians" and "quasiadministrators" [21], who played "tri-active" roles in society: as administrators, as politicians, and as businessmen [9]. Additionally, field administrators of MARD were actually "the little kings" and "stability-maximizers" [11,22]. But Anthony Down's "climbers" and "conservers" [23] were found at all levels of the bureaucracy where they were actively involved in system transformation and regime enhancement during the reform period of the 1960s.

### 33.4 Reforms of the 1960s and MARD

After 1953, several factors forced the Shah to pursue socioeconomic reforms to broaden political support and buy regime legitimacy. They included the limited support of the aristocracy, the possibility of peasant rebellion against both the regime and the aristocracy, the nature of feudalism as an obstacle to economic development of capitalism, the need for state control over the rural areas for regime maintenance, and the pressures of the Kennedy administration for some reasons [11,13,24–27].

In 1962, the Shah declared the so-called White Revolution composed of 12 reform points, at the heart of which was land reform [28]. Implementation of the three stages of the land reform

took more than 10 years and was more conservative than revolutionary [8,20,24,29]. As Keddie stated, the reform represented “more regularization of the existing situation than any profound reform” [24]. There were many exclusions in the law and numerous bureaucratic obstacles. Mechanized and semimechanized lands, for example, were excluded. As a result, huge numbers of rural peasants were driven off their lands because the landlords either registered the lands as excluded or transferred them to their children. This process was supported by the MARD’s organizational inaction [8,30].

In 1972, when the government announced the completion of the reform, fewer than 10,000 of the 50,000 villages had been partially sold to the peasants. Land reform was followed by a number of rural and agricultural reform policies declared by the Shah during the early 1970s. The primary responsibility for implementing these reforms was given to MARD [6.8,11].

The Ministry of Agriculture was one of the smallest civilian bureaucracies until 1962. During the 1960s and 1970s, it grew in size, budget, and power so rapidly that it became one of the largest and most powerful bureaucracies in Iran.

### **33.4.1 The Politics of Reforms**

Over one-half of the 12 points of reform were directed at the peasants. The rationale and objectives were political, economic, and social. As stated in the law, land reform was aimed at abolishing the feudal system in rural Iran [28]. This involved a number of more specific objectives: (1) destroying the landed aristocracy, (2) creating a new class of allies for the regime and the Shah, (3) developing modern capitalist mechanisms in agricultural and rural areas, along the lines of the world capitalism, and (4) demonstrating to the world that Iran was “modern” and worthy of foreign aid and attention [16,17,20,22].

Strong evidence shows that the Shah’s main purpose was to gain massive peasant support (even temporarily) beyond the “small traditional ruling class” [17]. This was done by promising them land, silencing the urban intelligentsia who opposed both the regime and feudalism, and appointing some of the members of the intelligentsia as project officers, a step urged by the American government. All of these were intended to gain legitimacy and broaden the support for the regime among the peasants, workers, and the commercial–bureaucratic middle classes [17,20,27]. After 1953, the Shah’s only political support was the army and the royalists, and the rest of the population seemed to be against him; there was also a possibility of a peasant revolt [7,8,10].

The rationale was clearly stated by Premier Amini (who was favored by the Kennedy administration): “We must not allow the people’s anger to rise. It would sweep us all away, the Shah and the Aminis” [24]. The architect of the reforms, Amini’s minister of agriculture, Dr. Arsanjani, similarly said, “one can no longer continue with this system from the middle ages.... That has now confronted us with the choice of ‘red’ or ‘white’ revolution. If the country remains in its present situation, it will explode” [11]. Thus, the Shah declared a “white revolution” and received support from the peasantry at the state-organized Peasant Congress in January 1963 [17,31]. In this way, the reform programs served “system preservation” [23] and weakened the “opportunity for super-class challengers” [11].

Moreover, the reforms enhanced regime maintenance through the bureaucratization of Iran which extended the state control over rural areas and replaced the feudal power [8]. Finally, they furthered the economic interests of the Shah and his regime by establishing a capitalist economy monopolized and controlled by the royal family. But the power of the landed aristocracy was not eliminated; it was incorporated into the ruling class and became one of the major bases of the

regime and its state [6,8,29,32]. Such a transformation took several centuries in Europe [33], but there was no indigenous evolution from feudalism to capitalism in Iran and no agricultural or industrial revolution [14,34]. The result, instead, was a negative development and a loss in agricultural independence. By 1976, Iran had changed from a formerly self-sufficient agricultural nation into a large importer, dependent on food products by 80% [6,8,12].

### **33.5 Achievements and Failures of MARD**

Organizationally and politically, MARD was very effective in changing the socioeconomic structure of Iran and in system maintenance on the short run. In brief, the major organizational achievements of MARD included the abolishment of feudalism, the establishment and promotion of capitalism in rural areas, the bureaucratization of rural Iran, and the establishment of state power in those areas [6,8,20,32]. MARD also weakened the possibility of a peasant revolt.

On the negative side, MARD failed to replace the old, independent economic system with national economic system. MARD also failed to promote the agricultural sector; indeed, the self-sufficient (even exporting) agriculture of Iran was replaced by an 80% dependence on foreign imports. Basically, MARD accomplished in destroying Iran's indigenous agricultural system. The contribution of agriculture to the industrial sector and the GNP declined, and its surplus generation fell drastically [6,8,19,35,36]. Moreover, MARD failed to promote rural development; on the contrary, it promoted an exodus to major cities. This happened as a result of the rural displacement, partial and unequal implementation of reforms, bureaucratic corruption and repression, and the widening gap between rich and poor. These migrants (9 million) ultimately fueled the revolution in the streets in 1978–1979. Thus, while MARD played an effective role in enhancing regime maintenance, it planted the seeds of system destruction at the same time [4,6,8,19,20].

Most of the aforementioned failures should be attributed to the nature of the regime which called for reform “but sought preservation of the ongoing” political and economic relations [6,8,20].

### **33.6 Management of Change, Development, and System Maintenance/Enhancement**

Several characteristics explain the political strategy of the regime and the organizational behavior of the MARD in implementing reforms and in managing change during the 1960s and 1970s.

First, through organizational fragmentation and duplication, agricultural and rural reforms were implemented by several competing agencies and organizations, including the Ministry of the Interior. Some of these organizations (e.g., land reform, rural cooperatives, and natural resources) were created during the 1960s and consolidated with the Ministry of Agriculture in the mid-1970s to form MARD. This strategy prevented power concentration in a single agency. But it resulted in waste and duplication, which were encouraged by the political system, for they were functional to regime maintenance by providing employment and cooptation [6,8,11].

Second, organizational consolidation and further centralization were pursued forcefully in the 1970s. The purpose was to achieve more political coordination and tighten organizational control established through rural bureaucratization in the 1960s.

Third, through a regionalization process, MARD divided the country into agricultural regions (poles) crossing provincial lines. This created legal and authority conflicts as MARD assumed more

political and administrative functions within the regions (poles) and undermined the authority and power of the district, local, and provincial governors [8]. This policy process demonstrated the increasing organizational power of MARD in Iran and provided various mechanisms of control that facilitated state–corporate partnership strategies and regime maintenance/enhancement for the time being [8–11].

Fourth, most of the agricultural plans, programs, and projects were carried out and managed by public–private partnership strategies. MARD subsidized many such projects, including several large-scale agribusinesses (joint ventures with foreign firms), royal farm and agroindustrial corporations, rural development enterprises, etc. These strategies developed corporate capitalism in rural Iran [8,11].

Fifth, tremendous organizational growth took place in several ways and was facilitated by special authority granted to MARD by the regime. Highly educated technical and nontechnical personnel were recruited both from within the country and from abroad. MARD also hired a large number of college graduates for political reasons [37]. The budget of MARD also grew rapidly, making it a very attractive organization for careerists. It was also used for political cooptation to silence critical members of the professional intelligentsia [7,19]. Professionally, the organization developed to the highest level of technology and human resource training, and an increasing number of agricultural or technical colleges and institutions served it across the country.

Sixth, security clearance was a must for every recruit, compensation was attractive, and opportunities for corruption were available through purchases, contracts, and other sources. Organizational professionalization and politicization along with appointment of ambitious, politically loyal “climbers” to key positions were among the personnel and organizational approaches used by MARD. This provided a professionally and politically competent bureaucracy with tremendous amount of power [4,6,8,13,20].

Seventh, one of the 12 points of the reforms of the 1960s was the “administrative revolution,” but it was “forgotten” soon after its announcement. And, as Bill put it, “this revolution exist[ed] on paper only,” as done to that effect [20].

The administrative reform failed to materialize because the political system encouraged many bureaucratic pathologies such as corruption, duplication, overcentralization, red tape, and the like, all of which were functional to regime enhancement by providing means of employment, cooptation, and control [7,8,20]. The administrative reform also failed because it “was undertaken for its own sake” [38]. Another reason for failure was the negative public attitude toward the regime. As Cottam stated, “Any regime considered by its attentive public to be an American creation or at least a dependency, will be fundamentally fragile” [10]. An American adviser, Frank Sherwood, added, “We built roads to nowhere just to keep people busy and to have some legitimacy in paying them.” One of the major achievements of the reform was position classification, which, according to Sherwood, contributed “to organization rigidity and inflexibility” [39]. This facilitated political control and served regime maintenance.

Eighth, MARD was highly politicized by the following means: partisan political appointment, partisan activities, Shah-worshipping, ideology, and activities of the security organization (SAVAK) [8,40–42]. While these means of politicalization helped the regime maintenance process, they also helped sow the seeds for a challenge to the system.

### 33.7 Bureaucracy and the Revolution

Until the revolution of 1978–1979, several forms of regime challenging were carried out directly or indirectly by public employees.

### **33.7.1 Regime Challenging**

The regime challenging process evolved principally outside the bureaucracy, but it drew part of its forces from the middle and lower echelons of the bureaucracy during the violent months of the fall of 1978 and winter of 1979. As political repression intensified, these forces became more active. The majority of MARD personnel, like the members of other public organizations, joined the revolution [8,42]. Even some regime maintainers changed positions and took part in the process [8,42,43].

The majority of the regime challengers in the bureaucracy were professional and technical personnel—who were alienated from and frustrated by the system and the regime; the lower echelon bureaucrats and clerks—who had suffered the most in the bureaucracy; and the young college graduates—who were also part of the intelligentsia and critical of the system [5,20].

Regime challenging within the bureaucracy took several forms: (1) refusal to believe official statements; (2) whistle-blowing; (3) silent resistance; (4) rigorous application of merit system and opposition to favoritism, patronage, and discrimination in administrative behavior [5,20]; (5) noncooperation [42]; (6) disobedience by experienced senior bureaucrats; (7) adherence to religious laws, especially by the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini who was seen by most Iranians as a noncompromising leader opposing the regime; and (8) strikes which became the most effective means of regime challenging. Only in late 1978 did MARD's internal regime challengers join the general strikes and took part in the revolution. Other members of the bureaucracy then followed suit [8,42].

### **33.7.2 The Revolution of 1978–1979**

The Iranian revolution of 1978–1979 was a general popular uprising with the participation of all levels of the citizenry. Its aim was to eliminate the monarchy, the regime of the Pahlavi and the Shah, and to change fundamentally the economic and social system of Iran [10,18,30,44].

The revolution was also directed against the bureaucratic machine of the government which, as a power instrument, had the primary function of maintaining the regime and enhancing its economic and political interests [4,8,11,20,44,45].

Although the main blow to the regime was delivered by the revolutionary forces in urban areas, rural participation in the revolution was also significant, both directly and indirectly. Most of the 9 million proletarianized rural migrants ultimately fueled the revolution on the streets of the cities and became active participants in politics. As struggles spread into the countryside, most of the remaining rural population fought against both the regime and its local supporters, the larger landowners and the remaining feudal lords [8,30,46]. The peasant struggle against the feudal lords continued in 1979 and intensified during 1980–1981 [46].

It was a popular expectation among the general populace that the bureaucratic “machine of the regime” would be smashed or at least reorganized in a way as to be accountable and responsive to the public [46]. Unless changed and controlled, the “old bureaucracy could pose a serious threat to the revolution, its gains and its people” [47]. A detailed analysis of the major impacts of the revolution on Iranian bureaucracy and civil service is made by the author elsewhere [8]. The following is a brief account of some of the major impacts pertaining to MARD, with an examination of the postrevolutionary agrarian policies of the Islamic Republic.

Since 1979, several conflicting and contradictory changes have taken place in Iran, which have affected MARD, and land and other agricultural policies, shaping the state–peasant relations.



### 33.7.3 *Organizational/Structural Changes*

Three major phases characterize the changing status of MARD in particular and the bureaucracy in general in postrevolutionary Iran: (1) the status quo, (2) debureaucratization, and (3) rebureaucratization, and debureaucratization again?

#### 33.7.3.1 *Status Quo (1979)*

During 1979, under the provisional administration of Mehdi Bazargan, no fundamental changes took place in either the socioeconomic or the administrative systems of Iran. While the monarchy and the Pahlavi regime were abolished, the structure of the bureaucracy remained unchanged. However, there were forces in society that sought fundamental changes in the country, including the abolishment of the old bureaucracy [48]. But Premier Bazargan seemed to be opposed to those changes, repeatedly stated in public that “we wanted rain but received flood,” complaining about the “unrealistic demands of the people” [49]. Overall, less than 5% of the key administrators—mainly the regime maintainers—lost their jobs, and a policy of “wait-and-see” seemed to be prevalent in the bureaucracy as the old administrative rules and procedures were ignored and new laws were yet to be prepared [48].

#### 33.7.3.2 *Debureaucratization (1979–1982)*

During this second phase of the revolution, numerous political events took place in Iran, a subject that is beyond the scope of this chapter. In short, it was a period of “life-and-death situations for the Islamic Republic” [50]. The phenomenon of debureaucratization started when “the people, disenchanted with and distrustful of the bureaucracy, began forming voluntary mass organizations of their own” to provide public services and help themselves throughout the country [50].<sup>1</sup> A large number of these grassroots organizations took over many administrative functions of the bureaucracy in rural and urban areas. These organizations replaced, temporarily to a great extent, many bureaucratic organizations and provided uncomplicated services.

The most important of these organizations included the Reconstruction Crusade (*Jehad-e-Sazandegi*), a huge multipurpose cooperative mass organization covering almost all villages of Iran; the Economic Mobilization (*Basij-e-Eghtesadi*) for distribution of rationed goods and services (as a result of the Iraqi invasion and the war); the neighborhood committees (*komitehs*) which distributed rationed coupons and administered a number of neighborhood affairs (located in mosques, in operation tasks); the Housing Foundation (*Bonyad-e-Maskan*) which provided low-income housing by giving people loans (through banks) and pieces of land taken away from large landlords; the Islamic Societies (*Anjumans*); and the Seven-Member Boards (*Heiathay-e-Haft Nafare*) which were responsible for redistribution of lands among landless peasants. As one administrator of MARD put it, “these organizations, especially the *jehad-e-Sazandegi*, accomplished numerous developments projects such as building public baths, bridges, roads, small dams, rural electrification, and the like.” And, one peasant stated, “the Jihad-e-Sazandegi has been the ‘shining ring’ of the Islamic Republic,” a statement widely supported by many others.<sup>2</sup>

Changes within the bureaucracy included growth in size because of the nationalization of major agroindustrial enterprises, banks, and other organizations and politicization and Islamization of the bureaucracy. This expansion exceeded the 15%–20% of public employees who lost their jobs through purges and other personnel actions. One of the most important changes in

the bureaucracy was democratization of the administrative system. Organizational democracy was promoted by the growth of the Employee Councils (*Showrahs*) and Committees (*Komiteh*), group decision making, and legislative oversight mechanisms.<sup>2,3</sup> Permanent religious representation at the top of every agency was also a form of control over the bureaucracy. Commenting on the committees and councils, one high-level administrator noted that they were “innovative and they promoted democratic ideas in our system. But many committee members lacked managerial experience and administrative skills. It was not uncommon to see a narchy, but organizational democracy was prevalent.”<sup>3</sup> Direct public access to high officials of the bureaucracy was also made easy. An example of this was the case of the then Minister of MARD, Esfahani, who “simply sat on the floor of his office, listened to peasants, and handled their problems.”<sup>3</sup> This trend toward debureaucratization began to reverse toward the end of 1982 as changes in the power structure of the government and the institutions of the state became more apparent.

### 33.7.3.3 *Rebureaucratization*

The trend toward rebureaucratization started in late 1982 and continued for the next decade or so. Among the major events in this new phase have been a shift of power within the government toward moderate-right, political stabilization, increased diplomatic relations with Western countries, and institutionalization of power in society. The ruling power was exercised by the “moderate-right groups, mainly religious, which represented the fundamentalists and the Bazar, large landowners, and industrialists” [4].

As part of the postrevolutionary institutionalization of power, the parliament (*Majlis*) ratified administration-sponsored bills to include the aforementioned grassroots organizations and thousands of their local and regional offices in the centralized bureaucracy. By mid-1983, the Revolutionary Guards Organization and the *Jehad-e-Sazandegi* organization had already become separate ministries. The argument of Premier Mousavi and other supporters of this policy was that it would reduce duplication and waste and would result in increased efficiency, better coordination, and uniformity in policy implementation.<sup>4</sup> The opponents, on the other hand, had charged that this policy promoted “state bureaucratization of the society, inhibits citizens’ initiative, especially in rural areas, and takes away their independence, this making them dependent on the central government.”<sup>5</sup>

In April 1983, the Vice Minister of MARD told the author that, while some of these concerns were legitimate, the institutionalization policy was necessary to improve administrative performance and security. He favored, however, decentralization of the administrative system. A reorganization plan for MARD was submitted to and approved by the parliament in 1983. The plan called for centralization of policymaking at the center and decentralization of policy implementation at the provincial and local levels.<sup>6</sup>

While the Ministry of *Jehad-e-Sazandegi* became a separate established bureaucracy, numerous independent rural organizations were consolidated with MARD and its power position in society was increased. As part of the rebureaucratization, standardization and routinization of administrative processes were pursued, and there has been a return to the bureaucratic practices of the old regime. Once again, agricultural and land disputes were being referred to the Ministry of Justice which still applied to many of the old laws. This seemed to have had significant negative impact on the attitudes of citizens, especially in rural areas.<sup>7</sup> While organizational consolidation, centralization, and bureaucratization advanced, privatization of some of the formerly nationalized agroindustries and businesses were pursued as a new government policy.

### 33.7.4 *Agrarian and Rural Policy*

Until 1983, one of the popular government policies was to reverse the rural exodus by encouraging migrants to return to the countryside, by supporting the rural independent cooperative organizations, and by emphasizing rural revitalization and agricultural independence. This policy was highly favorable to the rural population and seemed to be “effective in returning hundreds of thousands of former peasants back to villages.”<sup>8</sup> A financial incentive plan provided as much as 200,000 Tumans (\$22,000) to able individuals returning to agricultural practice; they would also receive land, subsidies, and long-term, low-interest loans from the government.<sup>9</sup> This policy was reinforced by the effective “operations of the Jihad-e-Sazandegi and by other independent rural organizations such as the large multipurpose Cooperatives formed and run by farmers throughout the country.”<sup>9</sup> The constitutionally formed, independent village Islamic Societies (*Anjumans*)<sup>10</sup> also provided support for a policy of “agricultural development and self-sufficiency by 1990, a goal that took another decade to be realized.”<sup>11</sup>

In short, an egalitarian policy was pronounced (land belongs to the peasant who tills it) and pursued and it “achieved a major success in returning many people back to villages and in raising agricultural production” [47].<sup>11</sup> Three major factors seemed to contribute to this policy success: (1) the relative independence of peasant organizations; (2) the relatively considerable government support, however inconsistent, including free electricity to rural households and legal support of the Revolutionary Courts;<sup>12</sup> and (3) new land reforms.

Land reform has been one of the most important popular demands of the rural people, and two major plans for land reforms were offered. The most egalitarian plan was the Esfahani Bill (1980) which drew strong opposition from the landed class and their supporters, including some conservative religious leaders, and was rejected in the parliament. If approved, “it would abolish large landholding, and promote an independent cooperative system as the primary form of agricultural organization. ... It was one of the most egalitarian land reforms in Iranian history.”<sup>13</sup>

Following the Esfahani Bill, a much less radical land reform bill for redistribution of “selected” land among landless peasants was approved by the cabinet and the parliament. This legislation authorized the formation of an elected “Seven-member Board” (*Heyat-e-Haft-nafare*) in each district to identify and redistribute among landless peasants the lands taken away from large landowners and feudal lords, many of whom had fled from the country.<sup>14</sup> Despite continued harassment and even assassination of some members of these boards by armed agents of landowners across the country, the plan seemed to have been relatively effective and popular among peasants.<sup>15</sup>

This policy trend and the debureaucratization process appeared to change toward the end of 1982. While the independence of peasant organizations was taken away by bureaucratization, their grievances are referred to the judicial bureaucracy and government support has also gradually shifted in favor of large landownership. Evidence suggested that even feudalism was promoted once again in some rural areas.<sup>16</sup> Implementation of the land reform was slowed down, abandoned entirely in many areas, and conflicts and clashes between peasants and agents of the reviving large landowners continued to rise. This was because the power of landowners was being restored as they were encouraged to return to their businesses and their security was being assured by the government. Many of these landowners and feudalists had either fled the country or changed their residency during the revolution in order to escape the peasants’ revenge. As one parliamentary deputy put it:

they were afraid to go back to the villages because of their atrocities, plunders and illegal acquisition of lands. When the revolution took place, rural people found the

revolutionary organizations on their side and decided to get rid of the feudals and their representatives. But now a lot of these people are disappointed and discouraged because the same feudals are returning to the villages. The government should not let the old system start all over again. The country depends on these farmers.<sup>17</sup>

Many of the lands distributed since 1980 among landless peasants were claimed once again by returning landowners (*Malekin*) and some of these lands were returned to the landlords by some local governments.<sup>17</sup> MARD and the Ministry of Justice, which still applied many of the old laws, supported this policy and its major implementing institutions. In May 1983, the author saw this policy enforced. The case involved a farmer who was asking the Vice Minister of MARD for the title to the land given to him after the revolution. Vice Minister Zali responded negatively and referred the peasant to the Ministry of Justice. "MARD no longer deals with disputes over the agricultural lands." While the revolutionary court had told the farmer to remain on the farm, the Ministry of Justice had ordered him to evacuate the land and the house and return them to the former landowner.<sup>17,18</sup>

There have even been attempts since 1983 to abolish the new land reform law, but this policy initiative evoked strong resistance from many peasants and some members of the revolutionary clergy.<sup>19</sup> Supporters of large landholding even pushed "to nullify the limited law of land reform of the 1960s."<sup>19</sup> The supporters "have used, as a basis for their argument, the Ayatullah Khomeini's general opposition to the Shah's reform measures during 1963."<sup>20</sup> While this proposal did not receive legislative support, it "reinforced the reversed trend of favoring large landowners in Iran."<sup>21</sup> Sharecropping was in practice in some areas again. As a consequence, rural migration to urban areas has been on the rise, and it was expected that this rural exodus would continue.<sup>22</sup>

### 33.8 Conclusions

MARD played a significant role in Iranian society under the Shah. Socioeconomically, it transformed rural feudalism into capitalism. Politically, MARD established a firm control over rural Iran through rural bureaucratization and helped maintain the Shah's regime and enhance its interests economically and politically for two decades. MARD failed, however, to play a significant role in agricultural and rural development of Iran. Indeed, its organizational behavior had major negative impacts on rural Iran, producing increased agricultural dependence on foreign imports (up to 80%) as well as a rural exodus of over 9 million young and able rural population into cities. The displaced and proletarianized rural population took active part in the revolution of 1978–1979 in the countryside and in the streets of the major cities.

The revolution was against the state bureaucracy as much as it was against the Shah and his regime. Several attempts were made to debureaucratize and democratize the administrative system of Iran during the early years of the revolution and major policy steps were taken to promote an egalitarian system of agriculture, encourage independent rural peasant organizations, and promote rural development. This state–peasant relationship was broadened by several supportive government policy measures, including the relatively progressive land reform. Nevertheless, the subsequent policy trends toward rebureaucratization of rural Iran, reviving large landownership, and abandoning the land reform had major negative impacts on state–peasant relationships and discouraging implications for agricultural development in Iran.

Agricultural output dropped sharply, foreign import of necessary foods have increased to almost 80% (the level before the revolution), and huge rural migration to urban areas was underway

again. MARD played a major role in implementation of these policies. This study expected initially (1989) that the newly created Ministry of *Jehad-e-Sazandegi* (a rival bureaucracy to the MARD) will either be consolidated with MARD and thus strengthen this bureaucracy even further or take over MARD, which will result in the same outcome.

One of the conclusions of this study was that not only had the Iranian bureaucracy not been abolished by the Revolution, it had survived and prevailed. It exercises a great deal of power and is being used for system enhancement as well as public administration under the Islamic Republic. This trend continued despite the public's disenchantment and rural exodus.

In addition to the issues discussed earlier, several other factors contributed to public dissatisfaction. These include the war which was draining the financial and human resources of the country, the black market and the high inflation rate, the shortage of some basic foods and necessities, the application of many of the laws and rules of the old regime, and the appearance of many pathological behaviors in the bureaucracy such as corruption, nepotism, and red tape, to name but a few. These problems were often acknowledged even by officials, including the powerful religious or political leaders like the then Speaker of the Parliament, Hojjatulislam Hashemi Rafsanjani,<sup>23</sup> Prime Minister Mousavi,<sup>24</sup> and the then Interior Minister, Nategh-e-Nuri.<sup>25</sup> Other reports about the general public dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy appeared in the major daily newspapers such as *Kayhan*, *Ettalaat*, and *Islamic Republic*.<sup>26</sup>

Two approaches could reduce public dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy, improve the state-peasant relationship, and promote agricultural or rural development. One possibility was for the government to encourage and support, both financially and technically, the independent peasant organizations. A long with a comprehensive land reform, various types of cooperative systems could be supported by the government to promote independent democratic activities among rural people. This would likely stop rural exodus, decrease the public's dependence on the bureaucracy, reduce the size of the bureaucratic administration, and promote the peasants' initiative and responsibility. Such steps would broaden political and economic support for the government. Self-management and democratic administration would also promote economic and rural development. Thus, instead of rebureaucratizing the society, a policy of debureaucratization engaging citizens in governance would be wise to pursue.

The second possibility rested on the need for major reforms in the structure and process of Iran's administrative system. The postrevolutionary administrative system was expected to be responsive to the public demands, be democratic and representative of nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. Corruption and other bureaucratic pathologies should be reduced, if not eliminated. A substantial change in the administrative, labor, and judicial laws also seems necessary to avoid public dissatisfaction. The administrative system, moreover, needed to be developed professionally and a merit system needed to be applied in the bureaucracy. Every political system is concerned with regime maintenance but overemphasis on this will hinder creativity, development, and organizational performance and be counterproductive.

### 33.9 Update on the 1990s

Since publication of the first edition of the book in 1994, there have been many changes in Iranian public administration and bureaucracy. The earlier trend of rebureaucratization slowed down in the 1990s, a decade which should be characterized by structural and process reforms in Iranian governance, administration, politics, and economics. Many of these changes and reforms have come about as a result of the stabilization and confidence building of the new republic as well as

the fact that postrevolutionary environment requires new thinking and new measures in adaptation to the domestic, regional, and international or global environments of politics, economics, and administration.

Administratively, the 1990s was a period of many reforms under two reform-oriented presidents, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami; both devoted to the reconstruction of the postrevolutionary Iranian economy, political process, and public administration. A key feature of these reforms was the massive privatization policy that began under President Rafsanjani and continued slowly until the midterm of Khatami's presidency. This was proposed as a part of his third five-year development plan (2000–2005) and his comprehensive program of massive privatization with a scope that was beyond what most governments have undertaken or considered in the world. It is unlikely that such an extreme plan of economic and administrative change will take place as the Guardian Council, a high governance body overseeing legislative action, vetoed the Parliamentary approval of the program for being unconstitutional. It was likely that a compromise would be reached through revision of the program—and it did.

Iran has already used contracting out as a major public–private partnership scheme in building and implementing a massive number of developmental projects in industry, commerce, and infrastructure development since the end of defensive war against Iraq. With privatization implementation, public–private sector restructuring has taken place in favor of the private sector which has been drawn increasingly into the traps of the globalizing transworld corporations receiving concessions from the administration of President Khatami who tried to gain the attention and cooperation of the Western powers and multinational corporations for investments in Iran. This would mean abandoning some of the earlier nationalistic policies of Iran in developing and sustaining a strong independent national policy and governance structure that does not succumb to global superpower and the transworld corporations.

Downsizing and deregulation affect Iranian public administration severely, but what is needed at the same time is a clear plan of administrative reform and of organizational and managerial development that would improve public administration performance. This plan is still missing.

### **33.10 Postscript**

Since the end of the defensive war against Iraq and since publication of the first edition of this book, there has been considerable national changes in Iranian agrarian and rural policies. Although migration has never stopped, its pace has slowed down. Many factors have contributed to rural migration to urban areas, including change of career by younger generation, urban amenities, and others. Structural conditions have improved in rural Iran and government support for peasants in fiscal distress have helped alleviate some of the problems Iranian farmers have faced. In fact, the face of rural Iran has changed dramatically as I observed in my visits to Iran since 1994, after more than 10 years since 1983, and more changes have been noticed during my almost annual visits since 1999.

Construction of new roads and highways has connected urban centers to remote areas deep into mountains, facilitating communications and transportation. Bridges, public schools, colleges, technical institutes, and new urban developments have spiraled throughout Iran, such as industrial town projects, small business enterprises, agricultural development enterprises, and many more have spread all over the countryside. Electricity, television coverage, and other opportunities have reached the remotest areas of the countryside. Yet, major cities are swelling with population and pollution which have caused serious deterioration to the quality of life. The above postrevolutionary

achievements must be put in the context of international economic boycotts by the United States and Western Europe. Only recently have economic and political relationships begun to improve, and are growing, with European countries, but the United States is still pressuring Iran with stubbornness and irrationality, hoping with futility to bring Iran to its knees, a policy that has failed for 30 years since the revolution.

Another point to keep in mind is that Iran has been hosting for almost 30 years about 4 million refugees from her neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq. Although their number has now been reduced to about 2.5 million, these refugees have been spread throughout Iranian society, enjoying the benefits of public goods and privileges to which Iranian citizens are entitled. While about 1 million of these 4 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan, the presence has been a heavy burden on the Iranian economy and social and cultural services, including education, recreation, transportation, and employment. Iran has also suffered from a heavy burden on fighting a gigantic route of drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Both financially and militarily, Iran has been engaged in heavy battles with these international outlaws whose ultimate destination is Europe and the United States, but Iran has paid a heavy cost for intercepting them almost on daily basis—almost \$1 billion annually plus loss of border control troopers in fighting them. Yet, no international assistance has come to Iran for either the refugee or the drug-fighting problems.

After the election of Mahmood Ahmadinejad into presidency over 2 years ago, many dramatic changes have taken place in Iran's domestic and foreign policies, away from the previous Khatami's generally moderate approach of reconciliation with the West, inching steps toward normalization with the United States, and leaping steps toward joining the World Trade Organization. Ahmadinejad's policy has consistently focused on four macro issues: (1) a heavy emphasis on Islam and Islamization of Iran's institutions; (2) a heavy focus on national confidence building through indigenous economic infrastructure reaching not only self-sufficiency but also transforming Iran into an exporting country in agriculture and industrial and pharmaceutical products; (3) expanding Iran's capacity building efforts in all areas of economy—medical and scientific areas, aerospace and nuclear technologies, defense and security technologies, large-scale economic enterprises, educational, and cultural areas; and (4) establishing Iran's political and economic "independence" in international politics and governance structure, with an emerging regional superpower affecting international politics, with a heavy emphasis on South nations of Africa, Latin America, Asia, plus Russia and China.

Iran is rich in all resources—natural, industrial, agricultural, and human resources—and this has given Iran's new postrevolutionary leadership a self-confidence and ability to express itself with determination and assertiveness. Rarely found in the modern world, Iran as a country does not need any other country's help for natural and human resources for industrialization and advancement, even under rigid economic boycott of the United States and its key Western allies. A former importer of food products and dependent on most of its industrial products from the West, mainly the United States, Iran is now a major exporter of several food products to regional countries, one of the top 10 countries in medical sciences including nanotechnologies, a top country in higher education capacity with over 400 universities and colleges spread throughout the nation, a nuclear nation, one of the top 10 nations with advantages in certain industrial and scientific technologies exporting elsewhere, a major oil and gas producing and petrochemical output producing country, a country already producing helicopters and missile systems as well as starting to manufacture passenger aircrafts—in partnership with Russia—and an emerging automobile—with genuine Persian engines—and heavy machinery exporter with assembly lines in operation from the Middle East to Central Asia and Russia to Latin America and Africa. Despite the United States led international sanctions against Iran, foreign direct investments and economic transactions in Iran's oil fields and a number of other industrial projects have dramatically increased during the last year or two reaching over \$35 billion, and the trends continue as Iran's creative and confident policies have attracted foreign investments in

such gigantic projects of trans-Asian railroad building that connect the Persian Gulf to central Asia and Europe through the South–North corridor, and another trans-Asian oil pipeline carrying Iran’s oil and gas to India and China via Pakistan. Iran is also building one of the largest navy fleets with carriers and ships and port structures in the Persian Gulf areas.

In agriculture, Iran has been one of the few countries with sound policies that are environmentally friendly, respecting and promoting environmental ecologies, promoting wetlands and reducing pollution, supporting small business agricultural enterprises, and taking higher education institutions and colleges and paved highways deep into remote rural areas, connecting farmers and rural population to the world and represented in mainstream national administration and governance. In 2007, Iran also took initiative through a summit of the Caspian Sea littoral states—including Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan—in Tehran declaring the world’s only landlocked sea with oil and other resources to remain landlocked away from militarization and international navy intrusion, plus a host of other ecological and governance agreements that were achieved. Local, provincial, and national elections are regularly held for local town, city, county, and village councils as well as national parliament and presidential selection. Support for agricultural promotion is increased, though with fluctuations.

While a lot has been achieved in rural Iran, there is still a lot more needed to be done such as development of small industries, agricultural development projects, improvements in seeds and other crop development—Iran is heavily engaged in this already—and other projects that would not only keep rural population but also improve their life standards by bringing many educational, technological, recreational, cultural, and other urban amenities to rural areas. Ahmadinejad has followed a policy of traveling to all provinces in which he and his cabinet will meet with local officials, decide on developmental and other projects, commit to them, and order swift implementation by decentralized institutional channels of local governments, private sector partnership, and cooperative organizations networks as well as the national administrative system.

The national bureaucracy has been decentralized in the areas of planning and management and attached to the provincial Governor’s Office responsible for such tasks as they know the local needs better and engage local people directly. This seems to have been working relatively well, though empirical studies are needed to determine its effectiveness, but it is a novel policy and should be given a chance to work. The bureaucracy has been affected by this policy, as the Article 44 of the Constitution forbidding privatization of major state-owned and controlled enterprises in economy was revisited and amended by the Decree of the Supreme Leader, Ayatullah Khomeini, and subsequent administrative and legislative actions have resulted in sweeping privatization of almost every area of the economy, including oil, gas, petrochemical, mining, manufacturing, industrial, and agricultural areas. The sweeping privatization, however, is a bit different from elsewhere in the world because of its emphasis on distributing shares to “common people” by 40% rather than transferring public assets to big private corporations—there is an emphasis on social and economic justice in the Ahmadinejad’s administration policy of privatization. Studies are needed to document changes taking place in Iran in the laboratory of change and change management, but according to the International Monetary Fund’s conservative estimate, Iran has been experiencing an average of about 6% annual economic growth, a trend that is expected to increase in the next few years—Iran is developing relatively fast in all areas.

As one of the oldest civilizations on earth and one of the top six nations with natural and historical attractions, Iran has over 600,000 historical sites that attract a good number—but not enough yet—of foreign tourists, but with an aggressive promotional policy, the large nation can serve as a giant place for international tourism. The tourism industry is in infancy in Iran, given the huge potential it has, and this requires huge investments in hotel and motel development, road and lodging facilities, rental car and public transportation facilities, and so on.



## Notes

1. Statement was made by an administrator at MARD.
2. Interviews with several administrators at MARD and a professor of Tehran University, March to April 1983; also, conversations with a number of peasants in five villages in the Guilan Province, March to April 1983.
3. Interviews with several members of the Parliament (*Majlis*) and a professor of Tehran University, April 1983.
4. Radio broadcasts of Parliamentary debates during the months of April and May 1983. Also, personal interviews with two Parliamentary members and an official of the Office of the Prime Minister, Tehran, 1983.
5. Interviews with two Parliament deputies and a professor of Tehran University, May 1983.
6. Personal interviews with the Vice Minister and three high career executives of MARD, Tehran, May 1983. Also, see *A Look at the New Reorganization Plan of MARD*, publication no. 6 in Farsi (Persian), Tehran, Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, MARD, February 1983.
7. The official argument for this policy is that the judicial branch, which has now replaced the Revolutionary Courts, should resolve the disputes between the landowners and peasants. The critics argued that the judicial bureaucracy must be reorganized and corrected first and their laws be changed. Interviews with three higher civil servants at MARD in Tehran and five farmers at MARD in Tehran and Rasht, April 1983. Also, personal observations at the Office of the Prime Minister, April 1983.
8. Personal interviews with several civil servants at MARD; also conversations with several peasants in one of the villages of Guilan Province, March 1983.
9. Interviews with several farmers who benefited from such incentives, Rasht, capital of the Guilan Province, March to April 1983.
10. As will be explained later, many of these societies have become increasingly bureaucratized since 1983.
11. Interviews with several administrators at MARD and several peasants in five villages in Gilan, March, April 1983.
12. Inconsistencies were observed “when Revolutionary judges sometimes rule against peasants regardless of monumental undisputable evidence. This happened wherever and whenever the judges were influenced by the local/regional feudal landowners.” Inconsistency was also observed when the government supported some landowners in their violent clashes with peasants. This happened in several places, including, for example, in the village of Shekalgurab where the Revolutionary Guards were ordered to support the local landowner, Brarjan, who had oppressed and brutalized the peasants for more than 40 years and organized a violent attack on the village people. “We had a local revolution here, which drew national media and press attention,” stated a local teacher and farmer in Shekalgurab, March 1983. This author has known these peasants and Brarjan since childhood and followed this particular case since the revolution.
13. Personal interview, Tehran, May 1983. Also, interviews with three administrators at MARD and several educated farmers in Foumanat in the Guilan Province, March and April 1983.
14. Many of these feudal landowners were either related to the royal family or were among the “thousand families” who constituted national, provincial, and local economic and political elites of Iran. As mentioned before, the Shah was the largest feudalist power in Iran; he owned more than 2000 best villages forcibly gained by his father, Reza Khan.
15. Interviews with more than 15 administrators of MARD in Tehran and Rasht, March to April and May 1983. Also, conversations with a number of rural people in several villages in Guilan, March and April, 1983. Bloody clashes seemed to be a common and expected occurrence between the organized armed agents of feudal landowners and the peasants in Gorgan, Guilan and other rural areas of the country. For example, members of the distributing board were assassinated at night in Kerman, Azarbayejan, and Guilan provinces during 1982 and 1983.
16. Also, interviews with two professors of Tehran University and an agricultural expert at MARD, Tehran, May 1983.

17. Interview held with a member of the Parliament (*Majlis*), Tehran, April 1983.
18. Cases of returning landowners and the revival of feudalism in Iran are many. The cited case of Shekalgurab, involving the Chorbani family vs. Brarjan, is only one example.
19. Interview with a high-level agricultural expert at MARD, May 1983; a parliamentary debates broadcast on radio during the months of May, June, and July of 1983.
20. Although Ayatullah Khomeini expressed general opposition to the Shah's white revolution, he never spoke specifically against the land reforms.
21. As one farmer put it, "we don't have much support from the government, the Malek (landowner) and his agents are back and act boldly.... The black market is in charge and we only suffer. There is no incentive or hope to stay in rural area," Tehran, May 1983.
22. Interview with a high-level agricultural expert at the MARD; a also, parliamentary debates broadcast on radio during the months of May, June, and July of 1983. Moreover, several conversations with rural people in five villages in Guilan, the Foumanat area, May 1983. Personal observations of the author also supported this trend.
23. See *Daily Kayhan, Air Edition*, September 14, 1983.
24. See *New York Times*, October 28, 1985.
25. See *Daily Ettlaat*, January 8 and 12, 1984. The minister reported a major bribery problem in the Tehran Municipal Administration.
26. *Kayhan, Air Edition*, April 13, 1983; *Ettlaat*, Ibid.; *Islamic Republic*, February 1, 1983. For a detailed discussion on the public dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy, see Farazmand, *Bureaucracy and Revolution*, Chapter 38.

## References

1. Blau, P. and Meyer, M. Why study bureaucracy? In *Current Issues in Public Administration* (F. Lane, ed.), 3rd edn. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986, pp. 5–14.
2. Waldo, D. *The Enterprise of Public Administration*. Chandler Sharp, Novato, CA, 1980.
3. Riggs, F. The unity of politics and administration: Implications for developments. Paper presented at The National Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Anaheim, CA, April 13–16, 1986.
4. Bill, J. and Leiden, C. *The Middle East: Politics and Power*. Allyn & Bacon, Boston, MA, 1974.
5. Binder, L. *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*. University of California Press, Los Angeles, CA, 1962.
6. Halliday, F. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. Penguin Books, New York, 1979.
7. Zonis, M. The political elite of Iran: Second stratum? In *Political Elite and Political Development in the Middle East* (F. Tackau, ed.). John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1975.
8. Farazmand, A. Bureaucratic politics under the Shah: Development or system-maintenance? PhD dissertation, Maxwell School Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 1982, pp. 70–107.
9. Albert, D.H. (ed.). *Tell the America People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution*. Movement for a New Society, Philadelphia, PA, 1980.
10. Cottam, R. Good-by to America's Shah. *Foreign Policy* 34:3–14 (Spring 1979).
11. Helmut, R. Land reform and agribusiness in Iran. MERIP Reports 43, Middle East Research and Information Project, December 1975.
12. Sharan, P. *Government and Politics of Persia*. Metropolitan Publisher, India, 1983.
13. Keddie, N. The Iranian power structure and social change: 1800–1969: An overview. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2:3–20 (1971).
14. Keddie, N. *Historical Obstacles to Agrarian Change in Iran*. Claremont Asian Studies, No. 8, Claremont, CA, September 1960.
15. Lambton, A. *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953.

- 1 6. Lambton, A. *The Persian Land Reform, 1962–1966*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969.
- 1 7. Platt, K. *Land Reform in Iran*. U.S. Department of State-AID, Washington, D.C., June 1970, SR/LR-18.
18. Bill, J. Iran and the crisis of '78. *Foreign Affairs* 57:323–342 (1978–1979).
- 1 9. Graham, R. *Iran: The Illusion of Power*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1979.
- 2 0. Bill, J. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. Charles E. Merrill, Columbus, OH, 1972.
- 2 1. Riggs, F. *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, MA, 1964.
22. Fesler, J. The political role of field administration. In *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (F. Heady and S. L. Stokes, eds.). Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 1962, pp. 118–120.
- 23 . Dwons, A. *Inside Bureaucracy*. Little, Brown, Boston, MA, 1965.
24. Keddie, N. The Iranian village before and after land reform, *Journal of Contemporary History* 3:69–91 (1968).
- 2 5. Saikal, A. *The Rise and Fall of the Shah*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1980, p. 18.
26. United Nations, Iran Employment Service Organization. *Inter-Regional Labor Clearance*. Technical Report 2, IRA/70/018, Declassified Confidential, ILO, Geneva, 1975.
27. U.S. Department of State. Iran: Recommendations re Iran's Third Five-Year Plan. *Declassified Documents Quarterly* 4:123 (1978).
28. Government of Iran, Ministry of Information. *Basic Facts About Iran*. Tehran, 1974.
29. Claude, A. Introducing a cooperative in Shah Abad: A conflict ridden village in Iran. In *Cooperative and Planned Change in Asian Rural Communities: Case Studies and Diaries*, Vol. VI of *Rural Institutions and Planned Change* (Inayatullah, ed.). United Nations Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1970.
30. Hoogland, E. Rural participation in the revolution. MERIP Reports 87. Middle East Research and Information Project, May 1980.
31. Inayatullah, United Nations, RISD. *Cooperatives and Development in Asia: A Study of Cooperatives in Fourteen Rural Communities of Iran, Pakistan and Ceylon*. RISD Series of Rural Institutions and Planned Change, Geneva, Vol. VII, 1972, p. 78.
32. Weinbaum, M.G. Agricultural policy and development politics in Iran. *Middle East Journal* 31:434–451 (1977).
- 3 3. Etzioni-Halevy, E. *Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston, MA, 1983.
34. Ashraf, A. Historical obstacles to the development of a bourgeoisie in Iran. *Iranian Studies* 2:54–79 (1969).
- 3 5. Caldwell, J.A. *Iran: A Report*. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, New York, April 9, 1975.
36. Kurtzig, M. USDA: Economic Research Service, Iran's imports of U.S. farm products soar in fiscal 1975. *Foreign Agriculture XIII*:2–4 (1975).
37. Interview with several senior career and political officials of MARD, Tehran, 1981, 1983.
- 38 . Gorvine. In *Administrative Problems in Pakistan* (G. Birkhead, ed.). Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 1966, p. 186.
39. Sherwood, F. Learning from the Iran experience. *Public Administration Review* 40:415 (1980).
40. Shah's speech of March 2, 1975. Ministry of Information and Tourism Pamphlet, pp. 11–13.
- 4 1. Karanjia, R.K. *The Mind of a Monarch*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1977, p. 236.
42. Personal interviews held with 22 officials of MARD, Tehran, January 12–14, 1981, March 1983.
43. Interviews with three former bureaucratic elites in Tehran, March 1983.
44. Keddie, A.N. Oil, economic policy and social conflict in Iran. *Race and Class*, XXI (1):13–29, 1979.
45. Farazmand, A. The impacts of the revolution of 1978–1979 on Iranian bureaucracy and civil service. *International Journal of Public Administration*, Fall 1987.

46. Personal interviews of the author with 20 administrators of MARD and with a number of rural people in five villages in the province of Guilan, March 1983.
47. Interview with a professor of Tehran University, Tehran, March 1983.
48. Interviews with several administrators at MARD, and with a professor of Tehran University, Tehran, March to April 1983.
49. Public radio speeches of Premier Bazargan during the early months of 1979.
50. Personal interview with a professor of Tehran University, Tehran, May 1983.



## Chapter 34

---

# Bureaucracy and Reform in the Arab World

---

Jamil E. Jreisat

### CONTENTS

34.1 Introduction of Bureaucratic Attributes .....	583
34.2 Culture and Administration .....	586
34.3 The Political Context of Bureaucracy .....	587
34.4 Governance Structure .....	589
34.5 Reform: Reconciling Incompatibilities .....	591
34.6 Conclusion .....	593
References .....	594

### 34.1 Introduction of Bureaucratic Attributes

The Arab world is a vast region of 22 countries, extending over the Middle East and North Africa, and joined in the League of Arab States. Although the region is politically fragmented many of its attributes are similar such as culture, religion, language, history, and public aspirations. Most of the Arab countries gained independence from imperial domination shortly after World War II. Formal independence, however, was not the end of external designs and ambitions to dominate or control the region.

After independence from European colonial rule, the Arab countries and many developing countries, followed a path of development through comprehensive central planning that incorporated policies, projects, and programs formulated by the state. Central development plans required the creation of numerous public organizational structures to implement proposed policies and objectives of these plans. Thus, it was deemed necessary to set up structures such as central

planning boards, institutes of public administration, and ministries of administrative reform and development. Arab governments also contracted with foreign consultants to help the development process, and concluded various bilateral and multilateral technical-assistance and financing agreements with the United States, the European countries, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program.

As these Arab states were restructuring their own governments, they were essentially guided by traditional administrative concepts and practices most prevalent in the West during the middle of the twentieth century. Such administrative approaches were mostly legalistic, bureaucratic, and hierarchical. In reality, these Western administrative norms were superimposed over existing tribal, religious, and particularistic local practices. Some of these local practices evolved over centuries of Ottoman regressive rule that left deep prints all over the institutions of the Arab world. Reconciling such incompatible local and imported administrative values proved to be too complex for existing leadership to mediate and reconcile.

Subsequently, as traditional administrative concepts and practices in the West were undergoing processes of exploration and experimentation, the Arab states expended little energy or resources on administrative discovery and innovation. For decades, public administration in the West has been attempting to modify its own traditional perspectives and frameworks to escape their acknowledged rigidities and shortcomings. Many of the proposed concepts and techniques have been competing for validity and acceptance such as Human Relations, the behavioral school, Quality Circles, Total Quality Management, Team Building, Reinventing Government, and the New Public Management in its various versions. In the Arab world, however, the traditional hierarchical, command and control, perspectives remain the dominant features of public administration. The Arab states revealed no great desire to liberalize their autocratic political and administrative authority systems or expend serious intellectual or material energies seeking more suitable concepts to conditions and needs of their own societies.

A further complicating factor is that research in comparative and development administration did not produce anything resembling a consensus on what tried-and-tested frameworks are appropriate to carry out a analysis and evaluation. Nor do we have frameworks to serve as road-maps to guide and inform practitioners of what works and what does not work under certain specific societal conditions. These questions, however, remain urgent; and various research perspectives and methodologies are necessary to attain reliable explanatory and prescriptive administrative knowledge.

Ironically, while proclaiming policies of reform and rationalization of public administration, Arab rulers found in Western administrative models, employed in the service of colonial control, a convenient context that stimulated hierarchical authority structures and maintained ruler-centered forms of administration. The end result has been that the combination of incompatible legacies where Western administrative processes were superimposed over local norms and traditions generated patterns of administration in the Arab states that are not only excessively centralized and hierarchical, but, also, accentuating loyalty to the ruler in the recruitment for senior government positions. Loyalty meant positions of power and public policy making were rewarded to "trusted" individuals. Thus, systems of cronyism and nepotism permeated recruitment throughout the governance structure. In addition to the incompatible legacies, the Arab states faced scarcity of administrative capabilities at independence time and were not able to transform their administrative legacies to effectively serve the new societal values of the postindependence period.

Nevertheless, despite numerous political and administrative obstacles after independence, the Arab countries were able to make important advances in managing certain developmental policies, particularly life expectancy, children mortality rates, women's literacy, infrastructure projects, health, and education (Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), 2002). Recently, some of the

oil-producing Arab states have been in a burst of developmental activities; they have been elevated to relatively high rankings on the UNDP-Human Development Index (HDI) that measures basic dimensions of human development among 180 countries. The HDI integrates three variables: average length of healthy life, education and literacy, and economic standards of living. No Arab country is among those rated as having “low human development” in the Index (Table 34.1).

**Table 34.1 The Arab World: Basic Indicators**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Population (Millions)</i>	<i>HDI Rankings 2007/2008</i>	<i>Econ. Comp. 2007/2008</i>	<i>TI—2007</i>
Kuwait	2.5	33	30	60
Qatar	0.9	35	31	32
United Arab Emirates	1.7	39	37	34
Bahrain	0.7	41	43	46
Libya	6.0	56	88	131
Oman	3.2	58	42	53
Saudi Arabia	27	61	35	79
Jordan	6.0	86	49	53
Lebanon	4.0	88	—	99
Tunisia	10.3	91	32	61
Algeria	33.3	104	81	99
Syria	19.3	108	80	138
Egypt	80.3	112	77	105
Morocco	33.7	126	64	72
Mauritania	3.3	137	—	123
Sudan	39.3	147	—	172
Yemen	22.3	153	—	131
Iraq	27.5	—	—	178
Palestine <sup>a</sup>	4.0	—	—	—
Total	324			

*Source:* Population, Estimates in *The World Fact Book*, 2007; TI, Transparency International rankings of 180 countries, 2007; HDI, UNDP-Human Development Index rankings of 177 countries 2007/2008; Econ. Comp.: Global Competitiveness Report/index.htm (ranks a total of 131 countries); World Economic Forum, [Weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/](http://Weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/).

<sup>a</sup> Occupied territories, est.



Recognizing progress made is not ignoring the problems that remain. The Arab countries are currently facing difficult challenges. The most formidable one is modernization of the political system of governance. A UNDP study concludes that “there is a near complete consensus that there is a serious failing in the Arab world, and that is located specifically in the political sphere” (AHDR, 2004:19). The inadequacy of political development and reform is a formidable challenge facing contemporary Arab societies. The political context is largely responsible for the public administration’s inability to effectively perform its crucial role of public service delivery, human development, and social and economic transformation. As Ferrel Heady (1996:210) concludes: “In any existing national polity, the civil service system operates in a context that is affected significantly by the character of the political regime.” In most Arab states, the political power resides in the hands of the ruler and his group. They exercise effective control over the public administration system. The political leadership is considerably empowered to be a barrier to the creation of competent, professional, and performance-based civil service. Thus, the dilemma, or vicious circle, of the current Arab state is that failures at the political-level hobble the administrative structures, perpetuating a state of low professional competence and ethics, which, in turn, diminish the political ability to govern effectively and equitably (Jreisat, 2006).

Low performance of the Arab administrative systems is further reduced by incongruities of methods and objectives of reform as well as by formidable political obstacles. Various evaluations and assessments have concluded that bureaucratic performance in several Arab countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan) offers “little hope that Middle Eastern bureaucracies will serve as positive forces of economic and social development in the region” (Palmer et al., 1987:241). But such generalizations can be misleading. The diversity of Arab states in geography, size of population, politics, levels of economic growth and social development have produced uneven results in terms of administrative capacity, organizational sophistication, and liberalization of national politics. Vast differences also exist in degrees of urbanization, literacy rates, per capita income, and foreign debt. The search for explanations in the literature frequently offers inconsistent guidance. Administrative behavior and structural patterns often are presented as consequences of cultural attributes or as images of the political context. These two dimensions of culture and political context are often suggested as clarifying and explaining the current anomalies and the perceived obstacles facing administrative reform.

## 34.2 Culture and Administration

The premise here is that culture, however defined, influences organizational and individual values, attitudes, behaviors, goals, and overall preferences of people. The political structures and functions also are regarded as by products of the political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963). Significant variations of this perspective exist in the literature to permit adequate review here; but, some frameworks are of particular relevance. Geert Hofstede (1993), for example, suggests that management skills are culturally specific and a management technique or philosophy that is appropriate in one national culture is not necessarily appropriate in another. Actually, Hofstede (1993:81) claims that “there are no such things as universal management theories.” The perception of culture “as the collective mental programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another” (Hofstede, 1980:21) leads to a sort of cultural determinism where every managerial act or decision is the inevitable consequence of its cultural antecedents. Culture, in Hofstede’s meaning of collective mental programming, is difficult to change; it is “what personality to an individual” (1980:21). These conclusions, perhaps overdrawn,

consign modernization efforts to failure unless such efforts are in the images of existing cultural norms of the society.

For the Arab world, and most developing countries, this cultural perspective can be controversial, or even prejudiced. Cultural studies of Arab societies have been predisposed to fixed notions that are outmoded or abundantly distorted. The culture school is open to serious criticisms for its easy ethnic stereotyping and far-fetched views such as the “Muslim way” or “the Arab way” of doing things—which cements the idea that managerial attitudes and skills necessary for successful operations in the Arab/Muslim world are different from those needed elsewhere in the world. Lisa Anderson (1995:78) pertinently points out, that the cultural argument has its own heavy baggage when applied to Arabs and Muslims. “Much of the social science literature treats the Arab world as congenitally defective, ‘democratically challenged’ as it were, and seek to find biological, cultural, and /or religious causes for this disability.”

Another problem with the cultural perspective is the ample evidence of reductionism, particularly when applied in a single-culture analysis. True, studies of culture are valuable for organizing information and focusing on societal characteristics that influence individual behavior. But the assumption that culture totally determines organizational and managerial processes of a society, to a large extent, is an exaggeration of contextual relationships. To be sure, these relationships are significant, but they do not, alone, determine the bureaucratic structures and functions in a society. Moreover, culture is a fluid condition, constantly changing through education and information. Actually, the information revolution that has been facilitated by enormous technological innovations has undermined many barriers, homogenized cultures, and fostered global connections far more than has been admitted by the restrictive cultural approaches.

In brief, culture is not a monolithic source of influence, and many cultures may coexist in one society. The extent, and the efficacy, of the cultural norms in shaping managerial processes remains an empirical question to be established rather than assumed. Culture influences administrative behavior, but is not the determiner of such behavior. For example, the particularistic orientation of decision makers in Arab countries is frequently rooted in the value placed on loyalty to kinfolk and other members of the collectivity to which the individual belongs. Hence, widespread nepotism in public service is not treated as corruption, and repeatedly there is no attempt to hide it. Such attitudes and practices are sustained by cultural norms that place high value on family and clan connections. In recent years, however, education and enactment of new laws that emphasize merit appointments to public service positions, have reduced these particularistic cultural norms of nepotism and cronyism. Today, such behaviors are publicly criticized, opposed, and even regarded as corruptive influences by the Arab public rather than accepted as inherent or unalterable cultural attributes. Thus, cultural norms are changeable and have changed in sectors of the Arab societies; the trend is enhanced by education and information-communication technologies.

### **34.3 The Political Context of Bureaucracy**

Cross-national comparisons of public administration have always been concerned with the political context of public organizations. Many authors have attempted to articulate the political-administrative connections of various systems of governance (Esman, 1991; Heady, 2001). One outcome of such perspectives is the typologies that compare political regimes and their relationships with other institutions, particularly the bureaucracy. The political element is crucial in any determination of national development and nation-building processes. Milton Esman (1966:71) specifies three of such critical political elements: (1) a governing elite that moves and guides the

modernizing process; (2) a doctrine that legitimizes (in terms of programmed action) the norms, priorities, instruments, and strategies of the governing elites; and (3) a series of instruments through which commitments to action are translated into operating programs.

Clearly, the most critical instrument of state action is the administrative system, an indispensable means through which modern governing elites conceptualize and carry out public policies. At the same time, the administrative function is restricted, or impaired, when operating within a political system dominated by regimes of conservative oligarchies, one mass-party systems, or authoritarian military rulers. Concerned about their powers and survival, most Arab regimes actually limit the trend of professionalizing public administration. Professionalism and autonomy of administration are potential competitors with the political powers, and could signal a process of reconfiguration of the governance by reallocation of powers of decision making.

The Arab administrative systems, then, are too closely linked to a political context that concentrates powers in the hands of political leaders: kings, presidents, and prime ministers who are uniformly unaccountable in any meaningful way. The Arab bureaucratic system, then, is what Heady (1996:211) calls “ruler responsive,” which means administration is “curbed and controlled.” Generalization about such asymmetrical relationships, however, is not easy. One reason is that the political-administrative relationship in the Arab state is not totally transparent. Second, the relationship obscures a highly complex web of interactions that are mutually exploitative and legitimizing. Critics of Arab bureaucracies tend to exaggerate their self-serving tendencies, their influences in shaping societal politics, and their evolution to become the “new privileged class” (Ayubi, 1980:450, 461).

Often, Arab bureaucracies are blamed for failures of policies not within their domain of authority. Arab bureaucracies, for example, are blamed for lack of progress in areas of political participation and expanding citizens’ role in governance. But embracing or advocating such objectives in the Arab state may place bureaucracy in disagreement, or at variance, with the desires of the political leaders who, in general, rule autocratically and pack government senior posts with relatives and loyalists. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that administrative professionalism, neutral competence, and commanding performance-based criteria in action and in evaluation are in short supply. Whether bureaucracy is overpowering as in Egypt, overstaffed as in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, or ill trained as in most Arab states, performance is the most reliable determiner of bureaucratic competence and professional worth. Unable to deliver its public services effectively or meet its national development obligations, bureaucracy, as Esman (1991:145) points out, views politics “as less benign and much more threatening” to managerial achievement.

In managing public policies, Arab leaders have not been successful in making rational choices or in their effective use of public resources. Nor they have revealed a healthy deference to citizens’ rights, freedom, or involvement in the policy process. Arab regimes are primarily concerned with the survival of the political leader and his ruling cohorts. Thus, relations with outside powers have often been a function of inter-Arab regime feuds or schemes for sustaining or augmenting the powers of a ruler or his dynasty. An important factor in these power contests for survival has always been a perpetual search for allies within the Arab states as well as for protection by a dominant foreign power. In reality, major public policy decisions are almost divorced from citizens’ needs, demands, or preferences. Instead of being representative, public policies of the regime primarily strive to accommodate objectives that satisfy external powers that safeguard the regime, and preserve the domestic oligarchy that is linked to the regime’s durability.

Within such outward orientation of the political leadership, public administration often has to deal with public policies that generally have not earned public support. Governance of the state, therefore, continues to endure consequences of corruptive influences such as political loyalty,

patronage, lack of accountability, and very limited transparency in decision making. In the end, implementation of most administrative reform strategies has been rendered ineffectual, autocratic, and marginal (Jreisat, 1997:226). However, the traditional functions of administration, as maintaining law and order, collecting taxes, and repairing roads did not prepare administrators and civil servants for the specialized, technical, and complex tasks of social and economic development. Also, public administration education and training have been lacking definite and sustained national commitment and political support for policies of social change. The weak capacity for innovation of the Arab bureaucracy has been coupled with preoccupation with small and routine matters to the detriment of overall policies and strategies. Unmindful of the larger task and the greater needs, public managers often operated with the mentality and perspective of clerks rather than organizational leaders. Such attitudes have been fostered and institutionalized during colonial administrations, as Pye (1969:410) points out. The clerk's mentality demanded infinite attention to routine, detail, and inhibition of imagination in order to achieve uniformity of the product in the colonies even when major cultural differences prevailed.

### 34.4 Governance Structure

Politics and administration are the main processes of governance. The recognition of governance profound effects on contemporary societies has inspired a worldwide resurgence of interest in the theory and the practice of contemporary governance (Ahrens, 2002; Hyden, 2002; Jreisat, 2004, 2002; Nye and Donahue, 2001). Ineffective and corrupt governance has been blamed for a wide range of other problems from poverty and economic stagnation to political instability, violation of human rights, confused priorities, and mismanagement. On the other hand, good governance is a major "enabler" of human development. It is "means and ends at the same time," notes the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR, 2002:1).

Recognizing the importance of governance, the Arab states sought help from the UNDP, which launched the Program on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR) in early 2000. The Program activities, as described by these agencies, focus on three main concepts: participation, rule of law, and transparency and accountability (UNDP, POGAR, 2002). Critics of Arab governance point out failures to deliver the promised human development and to produce authentic, representative institutions with the capacity to serve and to defend rule of law and public interest. The Arab states began the twenty-first century straddled by governance systems that are frozen in time and tied to archaic old habits, norms, and forms. Arab governance remains constricted by these barriers:

1. *Centralization of public authority.* Few Arab states have competitive political parties, associational groups, or organized political activities. When such organizations are permitted to function, they often face a variety of impediments and restrictions. Political micromanagement and excessive centralization of decision making routinely undercut mechanisms of accountability, evaluation, and feedback. Clearly, centralization circumvents public participation and institutional debates on public policies. Compliance with orders of the central authority becomes the mode of operation rather than achieving results.
2. *Religion and governance.* The constitutions of the Arab states (except for Lebanon) acknowledge Islam as the religion of the state with guarantees of freedom of faith and expression, within prevalent laws and rules. This provision about religion is rooted in, or copied from, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, revised and activated in 1908 (Abu Dayyeh, 2006:101).

More than 92% of the Arab people are adherents of Islam and the state is often guided by Islamic law (*shari'a*). Thus, political and administrative leaders in each Arab state are particularly cognizant of the influence of religious precepts and religious organized groups when making policy decisions. As Palmer (2007:12–20) points out: Islam provides the moral underpinning of the society. Politicians are careful not to offend Islamic sentiments and seek to legitimize their actions by the principles of social equity contained in Islamic teachings. Certainly, the influence of religion in Arab-Muslim countries is deep. Islamic religious establishments have been effective in voicing their views on every major decision by their governments. Their influence shapes the daily lives of millions of people in every Arab society. Like adherents to other religions, Muslims have their moderates and fundamentalists, liberals and conservatives, in interpreting the precepts of the faith. Also, religious political influence on Arab states ranges from overwhelming to marginal, but always a force to contend with or to be mindful of.

3. *Corruption.* According to *Transparency International*, most Arab states are ranked in the lower half of TI Index for 2007 (see Table 34.1). Causes and consequences of corruption are subjects of continuous debates in the Arab world. Poor pay, inadequate fringe benefits, weak commitment to the state, lack of monitoring and control, and the culture of society have all been blamed. While economic factors such as low wages are often evoked in analysis of ethics within middle- and low-level civil service positions, economics alone cannot explain corruption at the wealthy top level of leadership. Most alarming, however, is that corruption does not elicit the necessary legal punishment or, more seriously, the social penalty that negatively affects respectability in one's community. Rarely one finds a public official terminated or investigated and penalized for acts of corruption, even with abundance of indicators and public finger pointing. When corruption is rooted in the attitude and behavior of public servants, development ceases to be their goal, self-enrichment becomes the focus (Jabbara, 1989:5).
4. *Succession.* Arab politics failed to solve the troublesome problem of succession in a manner that improves legitimacy and responsiveness to citizens' preferences. Succession is less of a problem in monarchical regimes where the process is delineated, some times constitutionally. The anomaly is the creation of some republican regimes. In Libya, for example, since 1969, a military officer ruled singularly and eccentrically. In Syria, a father bequeathed power to his son after about 30 years in office. The last three presidents of Egypt since the 1953 Revolution, one president died in office, the second was murdered while in office, and the third does not seem to know how to quit after 36 years in office. A different distressing predicament is in Lebanon where governance and succession is a complex web of maneuvers and schemes among various underhanded politicians vying in the name of sectarian representation (Jreisat, 2006:421–422).

The bottom line, people in the Arab states seem to have little to say about who governs, or how well, even when the country's constitution, if it exists, routinely begins with "we the people." Ironically, in presidential systems as in monarchies, heads of Arab states tend to develop a strong bond with the position of power, in success and in failure, "in sickness and in health." Term limit for Arab heads of states is "till death do us part." As Schneider (2004) notes, in several countries in the Arab world, father has bequeathed power to son while in the others, the pattern seems ready to repeat itself. That has been a formula for economic and political stagnation.

5. *Truncated administrative reforms.* Performance of public organizations and institutions largely determines the overall effectiveness of governance. Thus, developing administrative capabilities is a continuous endeavor as it is a gradual, multidimensional, and deliberate

progression. Societal development and modernization are not self-propelled processes. Political and administrative leaders in the Arab states, above all, provide the vision and commitment to achieve societal goals. In this regard, professional public administration is indispensable.

To different degrees, all Arab states have made some effort to restructure institutions, adapt new technologies, reform managerial processes, simplify procedures, and conduct workers training. Building managerial technical skills, however, is only a part of upgrading administrative institutional competence. Sustainable, strategic change extends beyond immediate managerial technical skills to include organizational learning, leadership, and continual improvement of organizational efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. Administrative change in the Arab states largely focuses on technical, procedural, and short-range capabilities.

Arab governance has not substantively cracked the cycle of concentrating powers of decision making at the political apex, nor has employed either of the dual functions of decentralization processes: One process allows the public administration structures to exercise their professional expertise and empowers public employees with the necessary resources to manage responsibly. This requires, concurrently, a continuous upgrading of employees' professional competence through a true application of merit recruitment and relevant and regular training programs. The second function is associated with representation of citizens in order for them to participate and to influence the formulation and implementation of public policies. But even when public sentiment and public employees' preferences are clearly for more participatory administrative culture, transparent public decision making, and delineation of strategic objectives, the persistent problem has been lack of support for such departures by the political leadership. Citizens in each Arab country appear to have favorable attitudes toward democratic governance and participatory management. Citizens have been demanding open, transparent, and participatory governance, which they know too well they do not have in practice.

In reality, perhaps, "meaningful, authentic participation is rarely found," even in democratic countries (Yang and Callahan, 2007:249). What is suggested here, however, is acceptance and gradual application of carefully considered measures of democratic values of governance. This includes a pattern of openness, transparency, inviting and considering different views from within and from without the organization. Democratic values emphasize clear communication and information, and call for public debates and free discussions on major policy questions in academia, in mass media, and within the confines of public organizations. Overall, professionalizing public service in the Arab states, rationalizing government organization and structure, and building institutional capacity of the state would remain merely claims rather than a reality as long as public administration is kept in a subservient position to authoritarian and corrupt political context.

## **34.5 Reform: Reconciling Incompatibilities**

Rigid traditional values in the Arab society tend to create incompatibilities with elements of the rational and impersonal characteristics of bureaucratic management. The Arab culture is described as emphasizing "social solidarity, family loyalty, dominance of authority, and rectitude" (Ali, 1987:97). The Arab societies ranked high in Hofstede's (1980) model, referred to above, on the indexes of cultural collectivism, power distance, masculine culture, and uncertainty avoidance. These cultural norms could generate attitudes and values inconsistent with the impersonal and uniform values of bureaucracy. Within such context, political leaders are able to permissively

subordinate universal rules of bureaucracy to particularistic considerations in the conduct of public affairs.

Bureaucracy in the Arab world, as in most developing countries, endures many shortcomings: more likely to be overstaffed with under-skilled employees, habitually formalistic and rigid in application of the rules, underpaid, and input rather than output oriented. Not surprising, therefore, administrative reform has been claimed by every Arab state while competent implementation is the glory of none. Is lack of fundamental administrative change caused by ills inherent in the bureaucratic model itself (Thompson, 1964:100) or that bureaucracy is hobbled by forces in its environment, particularly the political system? Bureaucracy, the critics claim, is unfit to handle the complex tasks of socioeconomic change in Arab countries because it tends to form a new privileged class, and it completely bureaucratizes politics (Ayubi, 1980; Waterbury, 1994; Palmer et al., 1987).

But the ills of bureaucracy are not inevitable side effects or inherent traits of the bureaucratic model itself. As Perrow (1979:7) points out, "bureaucracy is a form of organization superior to all others we know or can hope to afford." In its original formulation, the bureaucratic model provides for reliance upon expertise and skills and for equal treatment of all employees. To attain uniformity in its decisions, bureaucracy keeps records and data on work and output as it sets and enforces rules and regulations that serve legitimate organizational goals. While the Arab bureaucracy has not succeeded in harnessing the positive potential of the bureaucratic model as an instrument of managerial precision, promptness, and efficiency, it seems to have endured and experienced most of the unintended consequences and dysfunctions of the classic bureaucratic model.

Arab regimes lag behind the profound changes their societies are undergoing. Instead of managing the transition, muddled political processes have failed to provide meaningful institutionalized participation. Incumbent regimes have not developed clear, consistent national objectives with worthy strategies to achieve them. Traditional basis of authority have weakened or become inappropriate to the functions of the modern state. Tribal, religious, ethnic, or regional interest cannot substitute for public interest as legitimizing foundations of political actions. At the same time, political leaders grew mistrustful of opposition and regularly increased concentration of powers in their hands, augmenting regime authoritarianism and further weakening public participation in governing. In reaction, Arab bureaucracies have substituted routine work, self-serving behavior, and survival techniques to risk-taking management. Such bureaucratic behavior has been a major obstacle to numerous campaigns for administrative reform, generally decreed by the political leaders. Bureaucrats continued to increase in numbers and learned to patronize and endure conflicting pressures of politics on one side and demands of duty on the other. Thus, avoidance of responsibility, apathy, or inaction became among the survival techniques frequently employed by bureaucrats. Consequently, citizens have been alienated and disdainful of public authority, both the political and the administrative dimensions.

The outcomes of administrative development initiatives in the Arab world at large are not commensurate with the extensive investments in institutions and programs designed to build needed administrative capacities. So far, advanced academic education as well as practical training in modern management has made only a small difference in building institutional capacities, solving chronic managerial problems, or responding to pressing managerial needs. Research output is consistently lacking in empirical substance or conceptual sophistication. Development organizations (such as those sponsored by the League of Arab States) established to provide technical assistance, training, and research for the Arab states are ineffective and torn by internal feuds, poor leadership, and lack of resources. The task of generating administrative knowledge and providing technical assistance is still largely left to foreign consultants, institutions, and publications

because Arab developmental institutions simply have not developed sufficiently to take on such responsibilities.

These related matters indicate that transformation of the functions of the state requires reconciling many conflicting values and incongruities. Foremost is the issue of control. The Arab central governments have not learned the lesson of sharing responsibility and control with citizens, local authorities, or the private sector. Nor have these systems even begun to effectively employ modern notions of accountability in managing the state. One can confidently argue that the central government will continue to retain functions such as overall planning, policy formulation, information guidance, organizational coordination, and monitoring. But purely economic responsibilities and pressures of globalization are forcing more collaborative policies with the private sector and with international organizations in order to stimulate investment of private capital and to apply efficient market mechanisms of production and service. Public managers as well as political leaders are facing up to these emerging currents, requiring knowledge of global trends, skills in negotiations, and abilities to deal with foreign interests and cultures.

At the same time, reformist strategic plans have to examine and redesign the relationships with local authorities to enhance their functions and to clarify questions of accountability. Local authorities have not been activated to share in the responsibilities of developing their communities mainly because of dominance by the central government. Many aspects of the relationships between central and local authorities have to be reconsidered, particularly payment transfer and definition of respective powers of central and local governments over finance and decision making in general.

## **34.6 Conclusion**

Analysis of the cultural and political contexts of administration in the Arab societies produces insights about differences and similarities of the overall political and administrative systems, but these have limited impact on the operational dimensions of management. At the end, all tinkering with managerial problems and issues has a common goal: to improve performance by building administrative capacity for action and reforming dysfunctional administrative structures and behaviors. Thus, descriptive analyses, while necessary to explain and to understand the global dimensions of management and to underline relevant nonmanagerial contextual influences are insufficient for action-oriented reformist initiatives. What needs to be done and what reform strategies need to be applied to reform the administrative anomalies remain the main challenging questions.

Fundamental administrative change is not attained through occasional, precipitous campaigns for reforming one administrative aspect or another. Successful efforts have to be realistically linked to a reliable diagnosis of the problems and the weaknesses of organizational performance, and not simply as perceived at the political level. In brief, it is doubtful that administrative change (reform) will attain its objectives as long as such change (1) is conceived and directed for political ends rather than administrative, professional ones, (2) does not lead to a iterations or modifications of regime's operative methods, and (3) continues to exclude inputs from employees and affected citizens by the process.

Performance and accountability, then, are the issues in Arab governance; improvement of both dimensions is the challenge. Currently established forms of accountability are mostly bureaucratic constraints that limit managerial freedom by creating procedural rigidity and formalism in operations more than ensuring responsible public management. Thus, proposed management reforms are forcing a reassessment of ideas about accountability and performance in government.



The traditional reliance on hierarchical forms of accountability in operations continues to restrict managerial discretion and to enforce procedural compliance rather than focusing attention to actual results of public policies. Current management reforms in the Arab world will accomplish little if they do not emphasize accountability that balances legitimate public organizational goals and functions with the human developmental policies that serve the needs of the public at large.

True, administrative reform efforts are continuous; they seek to achieve improvements through fundamental and planned changes in organizational structure and procedures. But reaching the desired objectives requires a reform that is comprehensive, guided by broad principles, and linked to specific strategies that have operational thrust as integral parts. Comprehensive change has to embrace developmental, social, and economic policies as well as building administrative capacities. This necessitates substantial revisions of conventional methods and emphasis on particular goals such as expanding and utilizing field research to define administrative problems and their causes. Greater efforts must be made in order to broaden sources of input in public decisions and emphasize applied ethical and professional standards of public service. Finally, adopting a comprehensive human-resource developmental perspective will refocus attention to accountability and performance issues.

## References

- Abu Dayyeh, S. 2006. Arab constitutions between Ottoman inheritance and contemporary reality. *Al-Muntada* 21(3 & 4) (May/June), 100–105.
- Ahrens, J. 2002. *Governance and Economic Development*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Ali, A. 1987. The Arab Executive: A Study in Values and Work Orientation. *American Arab Affairs* 19(winter), 94–100.
- Almond, G. and S. Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Arab Human Development Report (AHDR). 2002. *Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*. New York: UNDP and Regional Bureau of the Arab States.
- Arab Human Development Report (AHDR). 2004. *Towards Freedom in the Arab World*. New York: UNDP and Regional Bureau of the Arab States.
- Anderson, L. 1995. Democracy in the Arab world: A critique of the political culture approach. In R. Brynen et al. (eds.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Ayubi, N.M. 1980. *Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt*. London: Ithaca Press.
- Esmar, M.J. 1966. The politics of development administration. In J.D. Montgomery and W.J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Esmar, M.J. 1991. *Management Dimension of Development*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Heady, F. 1996. Configurations of civil service systems. In H. Bekke, J. Perry, and T. Toonen (eds.), *Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Heady, F. 2001. *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, 6th edn. New York: Marcel Dekker.
- Hofstede, G. 1980. *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G. 1993. Cultural constraints in management theories. *Academy of Management Executive* 7(1), 81–94.
- Hyden, G. 2002. Operationalizing governance for sustainable development. In J.E. Jreisat. (ed.), *Governance and Developing Countries*. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, pp. 13–31.
- Jabbara, J.G. 1989. Bureaucracy and development in the Arab world. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* xxiv(1–2) (January/April), 1–12.

- Jreisat, J.E. 1997. *Politics without Process: Administering Development in the Arab World*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Jreisat, J.E. (ed) 2002. *Governance and Developing Countries*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
- Jreisat, J.E. 2004. Governance in a globalizing world. *International Journal of Public Administration* 27(13&14), 1003–1009.
- Jreisat, J.E. 2006. The Arab world: Reform or stalemate. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 41 (5&6) (October/December), 411–438.
- Nye, J.S. Jr. and J.D. Donahue (eds.). 2001. *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Palmer, M. 2007. *The Politics of the Middle East*. 2nd edn. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Palmer, M., Al-Hegelan, A.R., Abdulrahman, M.B., Leila, A., and E.S. Yassin. 1987. Bureaucratic rigidity and economic development in the Middle East: A study of Egypt, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia. *International Review of Administrative Science* 53, 241–257.
- Perrow, C. 1979. *Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foreman.
- Pye, L.W. 1969. Bureaucratic development and the psychology of institutionalization. In R. Braibanti (ed.), *Political and Administrative Development*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Schneider, H. 2004. In Middle East, term limit is death. *The Washington Post*, republished in *St. Petersburg Times*, November 28, 2004, p. 7P.
- Thompson, V. 1964. Objectives for development administration. *Administrative Science Quarterly* IX, 91–108.
- UNDP. Program on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR). 2002. <http://www.pogar.org/>
- Waterbury, J. 1994. The potential for political liberalization in the Middle East. In G. Salame (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats?*. London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 23–47.
- Yang, K. and K. Callahan. 2007. Citizen involvement efforts and bureaucratic responsiveness. *Public Administration Review* 67(3), 249–264.



## Chapter 35

---

# Bureaucracy and Revolution: The Case of Iran\*

---

Ali Farazmand

### CONTENTS

3	5.1	Introduction .....	598
35	2	First Period (1979) .....	598
	35.2.1	Structural Impacts on the Civil Service .....	598
	35.2.2	Process and Attitude Impacts.....	599
35	3	Second Period (1979–1982) .....	599
	35.3.1	Structural Impacts on the Bureaucracy and Civil Service .....	599
35	3.2	The Process and Attitude Impacts.....	600
35	4	Third Period (1983–1994).....	601
	35.4.1	Structural Impacts on the Bureaucracy and Civil Service .....	601
3	5.4.2	Process Impacts.....	602
	35.4.3	Impacts on Attitudes.....	603
	35.5	Summary and Analysis.....	604
	35.6	Update: Status of the Bureaucracy Since the 1990s.....	607
	Notes	.....	610

---

\* R eprinted from *Int. J. Pub. Admin.*, 10(4):337–365 (1987), revised and updated.

## 35.1 Introduction

What are the relationships between a revolution and the bureaucratic machinery of a country? Does a revolution noticeably affect the civil service system? Do popular antibureaucratic slogans result in any fundamental changes in the structures, processes, and values of administrative systems after the revolution? An evaluation of the impacts of the revolution of 1978–1979 on Iran’s bureaucracy and civil service system may serve to shed some light on these questions. This chapter explains some of the major impacts of this revolution in the Iranian civil service and bureaucracy.

The following discussion is based on information collected in three ways: first, surveys of speeches, radio broadcasts, and newspapers; second, examination of relevant government documents, official statements, and administrative reports; third, direct observation in a number of civilian agencies and organizations as a client, as a consultant, and as a researcher during a 5-month visit to Iran in 1983 and subsequent visits in the late 1990s. Interviews were also conducted with a number of officials and with ordinary citizens.

The Iranian revolution was a general and popular uprising in which all segments of the citizenry participated. Its aim was to eliminate the monarchy—the absolutist regime of the Pahlavi and the Shah—and to change fundamentally the economic and social systems of the society.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the revolution was directed against the bureaucratic machinery, which, as a power instrument, had the primary function of maintaining the regime and furthering its interests through constraints and control.<sup>2</sup> Popular expectation was that this bureaucratic machine could be smashed and reorganized in a way as to make it accountable and responsive to public needs. As in other revolutions, the new leaders were faced with the question of what to do with both the military and the bureaucratic segments of the old regime. Unless controlled, they could pose a serious threat to the revolution.<sup>3</sup>

The changes that occurred in the bureaucracy are examined here in terms of structure, process, and attitude in the three phases of the revolution.

## 35.2 First Period (1979)

The initial period after the victory of the revolution produced no fundamental change. It began with the establishment of the Provisional Government in February 1979 and ended with the collapse of the administration of Prime Minister Bazargan 8 months later, a result of the militant students’ occupation of the American Embassy considered as a “spy nest busy against the revolution.” This government was mainly secular and interested in maintaining the status quo. It was not clear whether it could change the administrative structure. Complaining about the “unreasonable demands of the people,” Bazargan lamented: “We wanted rain, but received a flood.”<sup>4</sup>

### 35.2.1 *Structural Impacts on the Civil Service*

This period can be characterized by inconsistent, haphazard, and minor change in the civil service. Initiated and carried out mainly from within civil service ranks, these changes were often opposed by the Bazargan administration and resisted by its political appointees.<sup>5</sup>

While the public sector was enlarged through nationalization of some enterprises, the highly centralized structure of the bureaucracy remained intact.<sup>6</sup> Overall, about 5% of key government personnel lost their jobs. The major criteria for personnel separation were political—SAVAK association, Shah worshipping, leftist ideology, and personal reasons. A few strategically placed

members of the bureaucratic elite were also tried and executed by revolutionary courts. The Bazargan administration was opposed to most of these decisions.<sup>7</sup>

Although the new government had formal authority, the real power was exercised by the newly formed committees and councils in the civil service. These intra-organizations were formed by those who sought major structural changes in the bureaucracy. Their purpose was “to democratize the administrative system.”<sup>8</sup>

Among the organizations that now were abolished by the Revolutionary Council were the Royal Inspectorate Organization, the Royal Court, the Royal Social Service Organization, the SAVAK (Secret Police), and political *Rastakhiz* Party, and other security and political organizations.

### 35.2.2 Process and Attitude Impacts

Civil service authorities were often sluggish in performing routine duties, although some sectors such as postal services and communications were very active. Decision making seemed to be fragmented and contradictory. Implementation was even more difficult since there were no clear-cut goals and objectives, and organizational coordination was poor.<sup>8</sup> “Wait-and-see” was the prevalent attitude.

At the same time, red tape was cut as “rules and regulations were relaxed or ignored, and the activities were carried out by concerned groups.”<sup>8</sup> Motivation to serve the society seemed to be strong. The morale of employees appeared high, and a sense of cooperation and revolutionary spirit gained momentum among the middle and lower-level personnel who sought fundamental changes. This was manifested in their demands for major administrative and organizational change.<sup>9</sup>

## 35.3 Second Period (1979–1982)

The second period began in November 1979 with the occupation of the American Embassy by militant students, part of the forces that demanded fundamental changes in socioeconomic and political systems in Iran. As a result, Bazargan’s provisional administration collapsed and new revolutionary leaders took steps to radicalize the society. As a scholar at Tehran University put it, “These leaders represented both religious and secular sectors and different social levels, but unlike the previous period, the religious leaders took the upper hand.”<sup>10</sup> The major events in this period included the presidential and parliamentary elections, the establishment of the Parliament (Majlis), prolific legislation, more nationalization of enterprises, the hostage crisis, the Iraqi invasion and the accompanying war mobilization activities, minority rebellions, several military coups, and other political events. It was a turbulent period of “life and death situations for the Islamic Republic.”<sup>11</sup>

### 35.3.1 Structural Impacts on the Bureaucracy and Civil Service

One of the most important changes in the civil service was the growth of the employee council (*Showra*) and committee (Komeeteh) systems, which were active in decision making and implementation. “This system performed many organizational functions, initiated and formulated policy and supervised its execution.”<sup>12</sup>

This was a time of a major structural change. As one administrator put it, the movement was toward “democratization of the internal organizational process and the administrative system.” But “anarchy and lack of organizational discipline was a common problem,” claimed another administrator.<sup>13</sup>

The second, and perhaps the most significant, structural impact of the revolution was the phenomenon of debureaucratization of society. A large number of independent, grass roots organizations had sprung up in rural and urban areas to deliver public services, engage in developmental projects, and contribute to the defense of the country. Of these organizations, the Neighborhood Committee (*Komeeteh-e-Mahalli*) and Islamic Societies (*Anjuman-e-Islami*) in each village, office, and factory were very active politically and administratively. These organizations seemed to have “virtually replaced many bureaucratic organizations by performing many public administrative functions.” It is not clear, however, how effective and efficient these organizations were and for how long they would remain unbureaucratic.

Another impact of the revolution was the new Constitutional requirement of legislative approval for every major policy or for the reorganization of government agencies. Because of the long and intense legislative debates that arose, the Parliament became a fierce battleground for various interest groups. Nevertheless, it “prevailed as the most democratic institution in the country.”<sup>14</sup>

Still another significant structural change in the bureaucracy was the legislatively required reorganization of government agencies and organizations, especially at the top. Three major features of this reorganization were (1) the formation of a “Supreme Council” system of leadership at the top of every public agency and organization, (2) the collective decision making of this top leadership body, and (3) the strong permanent representation from the religious leadership, especially from the holy city of Qum (Ghum), where the religious academy is centered and prominent scholars teach Islam as a comprehensive system of politics, administration, and culture.<sup>15</sup>

The size of the civil service was also affected. While the number of government employees grew as a result of more nationalization of private institutions, the overall number of public employees was reduced by about 25% as a result of purges during the second period. These purges seemed to be mainly arbitrary and excessive.<sup>15,16</sup>

The establishment of the Administrative Justice office and the politicization of the bureaucracy were among the last structural impacts of this stage of the revolution.<sup>17</sup>

### **35.3.2 The Process and Attitude Impacts**

Administrative tasks were more difficult to carry out because of defense mobilization, a freeze on government hiring, and some salary cuts. Combined with skyrocketing inflation, “uncertainty, job insecurity, and political activism were rampant in the civil service. Personnel activities were reduced to an essential minimum.”<sup>17,18</sup>

Direct access to public officials, however, became very easy. An example of this was the case of the Minister of Agriculture (Reza Esfahani), who “simply sat on the floor of his office, opened the door, and handled the problems and grievances of the barefoot peasants.”<sup>19</sup> This openness and easy access to public officials seemed to have a positive impact on public attitude toward the bureaucracy.

Revolutionary spirit seemed to be the leading attitude among many employees. Most civil servants seemed determined to defend the revolution and its gains. Popular victories in the war front also strongly motivated them to work harder. But, since the merit system was ignored and expertise was not appreciated, professional bureaucrats “felt uneasy, insecure, and uncertain about their futures.”<sup>20</sup> And, as another administrator stated, “abuses of excessive power in some agencies were having a negative impact on the attitude of some professional personnel who were loyal to both the revolution and the leadership.”<sup>20</sup> The attitude of the public toward the bureaucracy also began to change as time passed and the war continued.

## 35.4 Third Period (1983–1994)

This period marks a major shift in the direction of moderation, a relaxation of radical positions in domestic and international affairs, and a standardization of societal arrangements. The containment of terrorism and the military defeat of opposition groups in the society strengthened the trend toward institutionalization, stabilization, and long-term planning. Religious ideology and Islamization of the society were emphasized, and “unity of all Islamic groups and individuals” was repeatedly called for by Ayatullah Khomeini.<sup>21</sup>

Another major feature of this period was the ratification of the first Five-Year Development Plan by the Majlis (parliament). The plan calls for recruiting and training tens of thousands of professionals, experts, and other occupational personnel for development purposes.<sup>22</sup> Universities and colleges were opened, a number of restrictions—such as those on foreign travel—were eased, and gradual development of normal relations with other countries was initiated.

### 35.4.1 Structural Impacts on the Bureaucracy and Civil Service

One major change in the bureaucracy has been the return of the notion of “expertise,” and the call for “experts and professionals” in the civil service system. This has resulted in relative job security for the bureaucrats and professionals. The speeches of the leaders of the revolution emphasized the need for experts and professionals to implement the long-term plans and help rebuild an Islamic Iran. The speaker of the Majlis, for example, claimed: “We welcome all Iranian experts to help rebuild the country as long as they have no criminal records against the Islamic Republic.”<sup>23</sup>

Many of the structural changes that were initiated in the bureaucracy during the second phase, including the reorganization of the administrative system, have remained in force. Perhaps the most significant structural change in the civil service in the third period is the trend toward bureaucratization of a large number of the independent grass roots organizations that developed during the second phase of the revolution. According to a high-level administrator in the Ministry of Agriculture,

... these organizations have been responsible for the initiation and implementation of numerous development projects in urban and rural areas—construction of roads and bridges, low-income housing, public baths, communications development, rural electrification, etc. They also contributed to the defense of the nation against the Iraqi invasion, and helped relieve the hardships on the war refugees.<sup>24</sup>

These organizations were formed and staffed by dedicated volunteers to provide various public services. They included the Reconstruction Crusades (*Jehad-e-Sazandegi*); the Mobilization Corps for Defense of the Revolution (*Sepah-e-Basij*); the Seven-Member Board for Land Distribution (*Heiat-e-Haft Nafare*); the Islamic societies (*Anjumanha*) in the villages, factories, and offices; and the Economic Mobilization Network (*Basij-e-Eghtesadi*).<sup>25</sup>

The Majlis ratified administration-sponsored bills to include these organizations and thousands of their regional and local offices in the government’s centralized bureaucracy. The Revolutionary Guards Organization and the Reconstruction Crusade Organization became Ministries by mid-1983, and others followed. The argument of Premier Mousavi and his supporters was that the consolidation and integration of these organizations into the central administration of the government would help reduce duplication and waste, and would result in increased efficiency,



better coordination of governmental activities, and uniformity in policy implementation.<sup>25,26</sup> In a meeting that this author had with the then vice minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, it was disclosed that reorganization and consolidation were government priorities.<sup>27</sup> Opponents of the policy, on the other hand, argued that this move would increase rebureaucratization of the society, inhibit innovation and initiative on the part of the citizenry—especially in rural areas—and make them dependent on the state.<sup>28</sup>

Another change was a return to old bureaucratic practices. For example, land disputes were again being sent by the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Justice, one of the most controversial institutions of the past, and one that still applied most of the old laws. This practice seems to have had significant adverse impacts on the attitudes of rural citizens toward the state.<sup>29</sup>

The power of the landowners and industrialists was also being restored as they were encouraged to return to their businesses. Many of these landowners had either fled the country or changed their place of residence during and after the revolution in order to avoid the peasants' retaliatory actions against them.<sup>29,30</sup> During a meeting with the vice minister of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in the spring of 1983, this author witnessed a case of land dispute brought by a farmer. The land that had been given to him after the revolution was now being forcefully claimed by the previous owner who had returned to the village. The farmer requested transfer of ownership title. The vice minister responded that the farmer should go to the Ministry of Justice since "the MARD no longer deals with disputes over agricultural lands." While the revolutionary courts had told the farmer to remain on the farm, the Ministry of Justice ordered him to return the land to the previous owner.

Still another structural impact affected the employment of women. In 1983, the government submitted a bill to parliament that called for moving tenured, full-time female employees in the civil service to a part-time basis. It claimed that the foremost role of women was home management and child-rearing, and that their part-time employment would contribute to better employment for males. Women's reactions to this policy were noted in the official newspaper, the *Islamic Republic Daily*, on February 1, 1983. The paper reported that female government employees "are worried about their future, and are concerned lest they will be separated from employment for different reasons and different considerations and their income be cut." This bill was, nevertheless, later passed, though repealed afterward.

This legislation made firing female employees easier. It was estimated that about 100,000 women in the civil service are subject to this new law. If implemented, it could have an adverse impact on government operations, and on tens of thousands of families in the country.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, another structural impact on the civil service and the bureaucracy was the exercise of a great deal of power by the Islamic Societies (*Anjumans*), which had been established earlier in every village, department, and factory. Although their power was defined by the Islamic Constitution and by the religious authorities as advisory and as overseers of the operations of the bureaucracy, it seemed that they had been playing administrative and political roles as well. This structural change was also significant in that these societies had been given strong support by the religious authorities and were called the "ears and eyes" of the Islamic Republic. System maintenance and Islamization seemed to be among their major objectives.<sup>32</sup>

### 35.4.2 *Process Impacts*

The hiring freeze continued in most organizations. Many negative behaviors of the bureaucracy appeared to have been revived. According to some, "it is almost impossible to get things done."<sup>33</sup> "Red tape" and low performance seem to be prevalent problems. As one high-level administrator

stated, “one has to be extremely patient. You know our bureaucracy, how slow it is and how much deference is required.”<sup>34</sup>

As administrative performance slowed down, public discontent toward the bureaucracy grew. One could argue that this problem was caused by the revolution, which interrupted the smooth functioning of established institutions. But critics charged that the old bureaucracy was corrupt, inefficient, and repressive. Therefore, a return to the practices and structures of the old bureaucracy would be a major mistake with adverse effects on administrative performance and on the attitudes of citizens toward it. The latter argument is supported by abundant evidence about the Pahlavi bureaucracy as well as interviews conducted in Iran during 1983.<sup>35</sup>

A professor of public administration at Tehran University remarked: “The problems of the bureaucracy are going to increase as more private institutions are nationalized and more independent voluntary organizations are becoming bureaucratized.”<sup>36</sup> Routinization of the administrative process continued mainly on the basis of old laws and regulations. This process was accompanied by another problem: many developmental functions continued to be postponed because of the war and budget constraints. The sharp drop in oil prices in the world market also had a negative impact on the administrative process.<sup>37</sup>

### **35.4.3 Impacts on Attitudes**

Impacts on the attitudes of bureaucrats and of the general public toward the bureaucracy can be observed. The attitudes and morale of the professional bureaucrats appeared to have improved. Although still denied many key managerial positions, they seemed to be relatively content. “An administrator is an administrator whether it is the Shah’s regime or the Islamic Republic; it makes no major difference. His job is to implement decisions made by political officials and those at the top of organizations,” stated a senior career executive at the NIRT.<sup>38</sup>

The conflict between the need for a merit system and the desire for religious–political loyalty continues to be prevalent in Iran’s civil service. Patronage was prevalent, and evidence of indifference in employee behavior was not difficult to see. As one professional administrator put it, “there is little doubt that the negative bureaucratic values and behavior in the civil service are, and continue to be, major stumbling blocks to individual and societal achievement.”<sup>39</sup> When introducing his proposed 24 cabinet members to the Parliament in 1985, Prime Minister Mousavi called for the elimination of government red tape. The *New York Times* reported that “The failure of the previous cabinet to cut red-tape had been mentioned by some members of Iran’s powerful business community in opposing a second term for Mr. Mousavi.”<sup>40</sup>

The attitude of the general public toward the bureaucracy also seemed to be becoming negative. One of the targets of the people’s revolution was the old bureaucratic machine. The growth of grass roots organizations during and after the revolution seemed to be an indication of a need for changing that bureaucracy. Through a nationwide network of “economic mobilization,” for example, these and other organizations distributed rationed food. As one senior official of the Ministry of Economics pointed out, and several middle-class citizens agreed, “without this network, many people would not have been able to obtain basic food items due to the high inflation, the black market, and the so-called ‘economic terrorists.’”<sup>41</sup>

Evidence suggests that the underlying reason for the success of these organizations was public participation in decision making and implementation process. It was not clear, however, whether these organizations would be able to continue to perform successfully without the government’s technical and financial support.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, evidence suggested that government moves to

integrate these independent organizations into the centralized bureaucracy had increased some negative attitudes of the general public toward the bureaucracy.

Indications of discontent with bureaucratization were several. The daily newspaper, *Keyhan*, reported in 1983 that a 55-year-old worker who had been fired had taken his grievance to the Minister of Labor. He was quoted as saying: "It is almost eight months that I have been coming and going, and so far no result has materialized, and I want the government, which is the protector of the oppressed, to investigate the position of people like me."<sup>43</sup>

The same paper quotes another citizen:

... now some ministries and administrative agencies do not act revolutionary... and in my belief, the administration must first plan and then, by establishing an Islamic system and a revolution in the civil service organizations, create a healthy communication between the *administrative system and the client people*. They would result in more trust towards the administration by the people who constitute most of the clients of the ministries and organizations.

There were many people who seemed to have given up hope of relief from bureaucratic agencies. For example, after 3 years of pursuing their cases with the Ministries of Agriculture and Justice, several individuals finally gave up because of the bureaucracy's inaction and insensitivity.<sup>44</sup>

## 35.5 Summary and Analysis

The Iranian bureaucracy and civil service system under the Pahlavi regime was characterized by inefficiency, pervasive corruption, nepotism, rigid centralization, and other bureaucratic pathologies. It did not operate on a merit system, although a merit system was introduced during the 1960s and 1970s.

The revolution of 1978–1979 seemed to be against this bureaucracy as much as it was against the Shah. Most Iranians expected that this system would be reorganized in such a way as to make it accountable to the people. As a result of this expectation and a general distrust of the old bureaucracy, a number of peoples' organizations sprang up throughout the country during and after the revolution. These groups of volunteers made decisions and took action in regard to various public functions. These grass roots organizations accomplished numerous community and development projects and contributed to the defense of the country.

In spite of a number of structural changes in the civil service, along with Islamization and further politicization, the impact of the revolution on the bureaucratic machine of the country was not very significant. Fundamental changes in administrative structure and process had not taken place. Centralization had been forcefully pursued. Despite the establishment of the Islamic Councils, the centralized structure of the civil service had remained the same. The merit system was ignored; religious and political loyalty has become the first principle of personnel action. Political loyalty had been assured, it seemed, by a number of judicial, religious, and legislative oversight and control systems. They included, for example, the permanent religious representation at all agencies, the Islamic Societies, or watchdog groups, the presidential and cabinet mechanisms of control over the bureaucracy, various tools of legislative oversight, etc. These mechanisms and political appointments assure system maintenance and leadership control over the bureaucracy.

Many problems of the civil service system, such as corruption, were becoming pervasive again. Corruption had even been acknowledged by government authorities. For example, the then Minister of the Interior, Nategh Nurie, introducing the new Mayor of Tehran in 1984, reported that “unfortunately there are still people in the municipal administration who take bribery.”<sup>45</sup>

The extent of the problems of the Iranian bureaucracy could also be seen in the public statements of the former powerful Speaker of the National Assembly (Parliament), Hojjatulislam Hashemi Rafsanjani (the former president):

If this administrative system is not corrected, it is impossible to get fruitful results from our efforts. Whatever laws we legislate, no matter how good a leadership the Imam exercises, and whatever judgments the judges make, no work can be done effectively. Ladies, gentlemen, sisters, and brothers: this is the administrative system we have. Do not try to use influence and don't violate the rights of others. Sometimes the causes of corruption is the people themselves: not yet gone to the government offices, they try to meet their objective by *parti* [influence wielding]. Administrative works require piety. We cannot consider an expert civil servant without piety as equal to an expert civil servant with piety and moral devotion.<sup>46</sup>

In short, several attempts took place to debureaucratize the administrative system during the early years of the revolution.

As the government became more stabilized and Islamization intensified, however, the processes of rebureaucratization, further centralization, consolidation of the administrative system, and control mechanism were emphasized for system enhancement. The Iranian bureaucracy was not abolished by the revolution. On the contrary, it survived and prevailed as a well-entrenched institution of government. But bureaucracy always creates disenchantment among the general public.

Several factors may explain public dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy. First, the protracted war against Iraq has been draining the natural, human, and financial resources of the country, limiting the capacity of the public institutions to respond to public demands. Additionally, the number-one priority of the government had been declared to be the war, leaving everything else in lesser importance. Now that the war has ended, much of these resources could be transferred to other purposes. Second, shortages of major food items and other household necessities and a long waiting period had caused dissatisfaction.

Third, the black market had also contributed to public dissatisfaction; its pervasiveness frustrated many people. As one expert at the Ministry of Economics put it, “the longer the war continues, the worse the black market situation will become. The majority of people cannot afford to buy things in the black market with 10 or even 50 times higher than the rationed prices.”<sup>47</sup> Fourth, corruption—which was one of the most serious problems of the Pahlavi bureaucracy—appeared to surface again, at least in some agencies. It became manifest in a variety of forms: favoritism, *parti bazi* (influence wielding), nepotism, etc.

Fifth, governmentalization of many voluntary, independent organizations took control and management of these organizations away from the people (farmers, workers, shopkeepers, professionals, and others), creating disappointment and resentment. As one student of public administration at the University of Tehran put it, “it is a process of rebureaucratization of society that we are witnessing now. The state needs more control and coordination, but people also want to be less dependent on the central bureaucracy where everything moves very slowly.”<sup>48</sup>

This rebureaucratization of society seemed to have strong advocates within the ruling Islamic Republic Party, including the former Prime Minister Mousavi, who favored a strong centralized

administrative system for purposes of control, coordination, and elimination of duplications. But, as Blau and Meyer indicate, “bureaucratization quite often has the opposite effect of producing inefficiency.”<sup>49</sup> The problem of bureaucratization is coupled with the recent privatization policy of the government. Since 1983, privatization of many governmental functions and organizations was pushed, and some public enterprises were returned to private individuals, many of whose large properties were confiscated during the early years of the revolution. These include big landowners, industrialists, and contractors. There were parliamentary discussions about returning lands distributed or sold to peasants during the 1960s and early 1980s to former landowners. The privatization policy did not seem to be contradictory to the rebureaucratization policy. Indeed, they were complimentary and reinforced each other; government-business partnership strategies were resumed, and public financing of business continued through subsidies to the returning large landowners and industrialists.

At the same time, grass roots organizations were bureaucratized, disappointing and discouraging farmers and some workers. This public dissatisfaction was also manifest among some professional groups in the country. The strike by the country’s physicians, nurses, and pharmacists in July 1986, protesting state control of their associations, was an example. A letter seeking support from Iranian physicians abroad indicated that 6000 physicians had left the country since 1979, and others were considering this option.

This problem of rebureaucratization and public dissatisfaction was aggravated by the fact that most of the old laws, rules, and regulations remain operative and govern the new organizations joining the administrative system. Most people expected these laws and regulations of the old regime to be abolished. The unreformed Ministry of Justice, which applies the old laws, was one major source of disappointment for many people. While more religious judges were being trained in Qum, many of the old laws continued to govern the judicial system.

One example of the problem is the notorious Article 33 of the old Labor law under the Pahlavi, which gave absolutely uncontested right to private employers to fire their workers without due process and grievance resolution procedures. That law has remained unchanged under the private sector’s pressure, despite the frequent protests of the labor movement and opposition from some religious leaders.

Finally, the low morale, lack of pay raises, and fear of arbitrary personnel actions within the bureaucracy also seemed to have some negative impacts on the internal operations of the bureaucracy, resulting in administrative behavior becoming dissatisfying to the public.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail, conceivable alternatives to deal with the issue of public dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy. However, two possible approaches could improve public attitude toward the bureaucracy. One possibility is for the government to encourage and support, both financially and technically, the independent, nonprofit, grass roots organizations. Various types of cooperative systems can be encouraged and supported by the government to promote independent democratic activities among citizens. This would decrease the public’s dependence on government bureaucracy, decrease the size of the bureaucratic administration, and promote the people’s initiative and responsibility. It would also provide a broader basis of political and economic support for the government in power. Self-management and democratic administration would also promote economic development. So, instead of bureaucratizing society—a phenomenon that took place under the Shah—the new government could, and should, pursue debureaucratization, and democratize and develop the administrative system.

The second possibility points to major reforms in the structure and processes of Iran’s administrative system. The postrevolutionary administrative system was expected to be responsive to public demands, to be democratic and representative of nationalities and ethnic backgrounds, and

to reduce, if not eliminate, corruption and bureaucratic pathologies. Many laws of the old regime cannot be respected by the citizens who staged a revolution. A substantial change in administrative, labor, and judicial laws seems necessary to reform the bureaucracy. The administrative system, moreover, needs to be developed professionally, and a merit system should be applied in the bureaucracy. Every political system is concerned with its maintenance. But overemphasis on system maintenance (or enhancement) at the expense of administrative efficiency and satisfactory public service would, the author believes, hinder employee initiative, creativity, and organizational performance.

These two approaches, if applied, could significantly decrease public dissatisfaction and provide a more democratic, efficient, and responsive administrative system for postrevolutionary Iran.

### **35.6 Update: Status of the Bureaucracy Since the 1990s<sup>50</sup>**

The decade of the 1990s witnessed some major changes in the Iranian political, economic, and administrative structures. On the political side, the two-term election of President Hashemi Rafsanjani provided a period of continuity in the reinstitutionalization process of governance along with a strong legislative process that supplied laws and regulations for the economy, foreign relations, and administrative system. Gradually, relationship with international community increased, and economic growth became a hallmark of this period.

Economic growth of the 1990s, up to the latter part of the decade, was made possible by the emphasis on postwar reconstruction of the economy and, especially, the infrastructure development of the nation. Infrastructure and development projects spiraled all over Iran, in urban and rural areas. Building bridges, roads, highways, public facilities, dams and irrigation systems, housing and urban development projects, colleges and universities, and other industrial and commercial schemes continued throughout the Rafsanjani administration. Iran experienced high rates of economic growth, and urbanization also grew fast, but rebuilding the defense infrastructure was perhaps a top priority for Iran. As a result, Iran for the first time produced medium-range missiles capable of reaching Israel. Iran's military-industrial system also produced a number of other weapons it never owned, including ammunition, antimissile weapons, helicopters, and more. Iran also strengthened its navy infrastructure to the highest level of its history. The bureaucracy was instrumental in this process of incredible growth and development.

These achievements were attained despite the relentless and brutal economic, political, and military sanctions Iran received from its global adversary, the United States and its European and other collaborators. Iran also met a backbreaking challenge of managing about 4 million refugees from the neighboring countries of Iraq and Afghanistan, plus the relentless pressure of drug traffickers from its eastern borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan whose aim has been to transport the deadly substance to Europe and North America. Once again, just as in the ancient time when Iran stopped the eastern barbarian devastation in Europe, Iranian interception of drug traffickers has saved millions of lives in the West, all without appreciation and recognition. Only the United Nations has recognized this strategic struggle Iran has been engaged in and has provided symbolic support for such an effort, which has cost Iran hundreds of millions of dollars per year and numerous losses of its military personnel.

With the rapid economic growth and development projects, also came corruption and the notion that "many development projects began but few ever finished." Corruption, common as it is worldwide, also afflicted the Iranian government involved in growth activities. Scandals and investigations revealed major corruption cases implicating some of the high officials. An example

of this is the former mayor of Tehran, whose administration was found by the court of many wrongdoings and corruptions. Although political struggle between the two factions of government was also responsible for his arrest and conviction, there was no doubt that corruption had spread under his administration.

The landslide election of the reform-oriented Mohammad Khatami as the new president of Iran was a landmark development in Iranian postrevolutionary politics and governance. Since 1998, there has been a continuously intensified struggle between two factions of the government and politics in Iran, with the supporting and opposing forces from both secular and religious bases. This resulted in a divided government and politics in Iran, causing both opportunities for massive discourse and paralysis of governance in many cases. Both political factions have solid points of credible arguments that make the discourse a fascinating intellectual enterprise in post-revolutionary Iranian politics, governance, and administration. This division was formed when the populist President M. Ahmadinejad was elected by a huge margin in 2005.

Administratively, several changes took place in the 1990s. At the center of all administrative changes was the bureaucracy itself. Obviously, one of the major changes was the further growth of the public sector through both the expansion of the Mostazafin Foundation (organization for the oppressed poor) and the increase in number of other regular government agencies. Another development was the huge enterprise of managing the massive reconstruction and infrastructure development programs. This responsibility put a heavy burden on the bureaucracy and administrative system. But a partnership with the private sector was sought by the Rafsanjani's administration. Therefore, a third development was the growth of public-private partnerships in development projects and reconstruction and infrastructure development activities. Partnership resulted in initiation and adoption of privatization schemes. Thus, a fourth development, privatization, started out as a policy to transfer governmental functions of running a number of public enterprises to the private sector. But the government was divided on this issue, with traditional conservatives opposing it and reformists in its favor. However, some privatization programs were met severely with the workers' protests in various parts of the country, and government backed down on some projects.

With the election of President Khatami, privatization was pursued very comprehensively, vigorously, and sweepingly. There were various, and contradictory, personalities with different ideological orientations within the Khatami administration. Therefore, it was not surprising to see extreme elements pushing massive and sweeping privatization as a policy solution to some of the problems of governance. Khatami's proposed Third Development Plan (2000–2005) had called for a full-fledged privatization that included virtually all public enterprises and a massive number of governmental functions traditionally performed by the government agencies. Surprisingly, the conservatively controlled parliament approved the plan, but the Guardian Council, a higher body of legislative governance, rejected it for being unconstitutional. Either a compromise or rewritten legislation was expected to be the result of this legislative development, because it was unlikely that the legislation would ever reach the High Expediency council, the highest governance body of the nation; legislation rarely does. Nevertheless, a large number of public enterprises and many governmental functions were already been privatized, with their destinies unknown. While privatization remains a key policy issue, political and economic liberalization has captured Iranian public opinion, behind which external pressures and influence, especially of the United States and of other Western power, are at heavy play.

Reform of the bureaucracy and of the entire administrative system cannot succeed by simple solutions such as massive and sweeping privatization. Privatization is not a panacea: it will cause more problems for the government than ever before. Even the strongest proponents of privatization

admit that it has serious negative consequences and that it is one of several alternatives to government reforms. I have argued that privatization is and should be one of the last resort policy options for improving government performance. Launching a serious program of revolutionary reform can and should be the first priority, using a combination of top-down, bottom-up, and institutional approaches of organizational and administrative change and development. This also includes public enterprise management reform in postrevolutionary Iran. Another alternative to privatization is transfer of control and management of some enterprise to the cooperative systems and promotion of these self-governing organizations throughout Iran. They promote self-sufficiency, reduce bureaucratic red tape, and promote democratic governance and administration.

Privatization may reduce temporarily some functions of government, but will increase other functions of governance-monitoring and regulating the economy and industries. It also increases corruption, raises prices, causes disruption in economic development of the country. Remember that government is and has always been the engine of infrastructure and national development in both industrialized and developing countries. Contract management, regulatory administration, and social welfare functions can increase governmental responsibility, size, and operations. With privatization, government responsibility to citizens does not disappear; it only increases as the government is and should be accountable to the public for the actions of newly privatized institutions.

Bureaucracy is something very few people like. It is difficult to like bureaucracy. It is an easy target for criticism. But it is the bureaucracy that even the critical politicians like and need most. This is an observation that has been made in the West as well as the East. Bureaucracy performs essential political, economic, as well as social functions in society. It provides order and stability, and its security–military functions are invaluable. Bureaucracy is extremely functional to system maintenance and regime enhancement in all societies. Conservative former President Ronald Reagan of the United States had promised to slash the bureaucracy once elected, but he actually increased significantly the size and budget of the bureaucracy during his tenure of administration.

Why does bureaucracy persist? It does so because it is imperative to the existence and promotion of the capitalist order. Bureaucracy and capitalism go and grow hand in hand, as Max Weber once correctly observed. Market is inherently chaos-oriented and generates disorder, inequality, unfairness, cheating, and more, but market also needs a strong state and bureaucracy. Without order, market is doomed. Order is provided by bureaucracy, so the accumulation of surplus capital is facilitated without problems that are created by the same market capitalism. The problems are the by-products of corporate capitalism. With the rise of globalization and globalizing transworld corporations, there will be more inequality, more poverty, more social and institutional destruction, more environmental degradation, and more social and economic problems, all of which must be brought under control.

Security and military bureaucracies are on the rise everywhere, including especially in the United States. But the rise of security and order bureaucracy in postrevolutionary Iran is like a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it is contrary to the ideals of the revolution, a fact that the political and administrative leaders need to keep in mind; and on the hand, the revolution and its achievements are always under challenge and attacks from counterrevolutionaries and external threats—especially the major international powers that have lost privileges in Iran as their former key domain in the region. A balance needs to be maintained for social and economic spheres conducive to development of Iranians. The administration of President Ahmadinejad has stirred more international controversies, especially with regard to Iran's determined policy of nuclear technology development for peaceful reasons—a development that the United States and its Western allies tend to object to prevent Iran from that technological development, so they could maintain their global monopoly. But this



determined international policy, his domestic policies of “debureaucratization” and swift development policy implementation, and strategies of decentralization at provincial level—with some great success in many areas—have gained Iran a strong popularity at home and abroad as a self-assertive and emerging international power with a growing leverage influence in the Middle East. Iran has achieved 6%–7% annual economic growth rate. The rapid pace of development in industrial, agriculture (from an import position to export status), petrochemical, nuclear and other sciences and technologies; medical and pharmaceutical, telecommunication, airport and highway development; nanotechnologies, airo-space and Satellite technologies; trans-Asian railroad systems, tourism, and dams and irrigation system development; automobile and heavy machine manufacturer presence in regional and world markets; airplane and helicopter manufacturing, military weapons advancements; and foreign investments in its oil and gas fields are among some of the most significant areas of achievement recognized and reported by international sources, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Both the state and the confident private sector in Iran have been responsible for much of these partnership-based achievements. In fact, Iran’s private sector has been a remarkable partner in its national development strategies that have been shining worldwide with its competent presence in diverse areas of economic projects. But challenges are many such as a constant threat of the U.S. hostility with potential conflict, domestic inflation and unemployment—despite its decrease by extended employment opportunities—and problems of mismanagement at best and potential corruption at worst.<sup>51</sup>

One of the key areas of policy change has been the sweeping privatization of most state-owned and controlled enterprises and functions via national legislation of relaxing the Article 44 of the Constitution to allow privatization, foreign investments, and engagement with international exchange in the stock markets. This bold policy move was actually signaled in 2007 by the Supreme Leader Decree that paved the way for constitutional revision of the Article 44. However, Ahmadinejad’s privatization policy seems to have differed substantially from the prevailing privatization strategies, with its focus on “social and economic justice” as a milestone of economic policy, promoting “citizen ownership of state-controlled enterprises”, hence a redistributive policy initiative. The effect of this policy initiative is yet to be determined by future studies, but indications show a trend toward weakening the bureaucracy by enabling the private sector, citizens, nonprofit, and nongovernmental organizations.

To avoid the social and political consequences of sweeping privatization, of increasing security bureaucracies, and of bureaucratic pathologies, serious reforms of administration and organization are still needed to embrace and engage citizens, professional administrators, and institutions of self-governance. By enabling the environment for growth and promotion of nonbureaucratic, self-governing organizations, the postrevolutionary state can promote and improve public administration and social cohesion in Iran. Bureaucracy has survived all political masters and changes, but it is the character of the state and bureaucracy that matters most, its orientation toward serving the broad public interests.

## Notes

1. References concerning the causes of the Iranian Revolution are many. For a small sample, see Cottam, R., Goodbye to America’s Shah, *Foreign Policy* 34 (Spring, 1979); Bill, J., Iran and the Crises of ‘78, *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Winter, 1978–1979); Keddie, N., Oil, economic policy and social conflict in Iran, *Race and Class* 21 (1979); Helmut, R., The America’s Shah, The Shahanshah of Iran, MERIP Reports 40, New York, Middle East research and Information Project, 1975; Hooglund, E., Land and Revolution in Iran, University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1960–1982.

2. See, for example, Bill, J., *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization*, Charles Merrill, Columbus, OH, 1972; Bill, J. and Leiden, C., *The Middle East; Politics and Power*, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, MA, 1979; Zonis, M., *The Political Elite of Iran*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1971; Farazmand, A., *Bureaucratic Politics under the Shah: Development or System Maintenance?* Ph.D. dissertation in public administration, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 1982.
3. This expectation was expressed by a majority of politicians and citizens interviewed by the author in the spring of 1983.
4. Premier Bazargan repeated this statement several times in radio broadcasts during the early months of 1979. This was further verified through interviews held in Tehran in April 1983, with Parliament members.
5. April 1983 interviews held with several administrators and committee members in the civil service. These changes undermined the hierarchical control of the provisional administration. As one administrator put it, "everyone wanted changes in the administrative system, some called for abolition of the bureaucracy, and others called for its reform. But all wanted their paychecks."
6. Interviews with some members of these organizations including the Reconstruction Crusade (*Jehad-e-Sazandegi*), April 1983.
7. Interviews with three officeholders in the State Organization for Employment and Administrative Affairs (SOEAA), April 1983. These opinions were confirmed by conversations held with others formerly with the civil service.
8. Interviews with civil service officials at SOEAA and the National Radio and Television (NIRT), Tehran, April 1983.
9. Interviews held with three administrators at the Ministry of Communication and Postal Services, Tehran, April 1983.
10. Personal interview with a professor of the University of Tehran, May 1983.
11. Interviews with several deputies of the Parliament and with administrators in the Ministry of Agriculture, Tehran, April 1983. Also, information gathered from the National State Radio broadcasts during the same period.
12. Interview with a professor of the University of Tehran, May 1983.
13. Interviews with several administrators at the Ministry of Agriculture and the NIRT, Tehran, April 1983.
14. Interviews with two members of the parliament and three civil servants at the Ministry of Education and the NIRT, April 1983; also, interview with a professor of Tehran University, April 1983.
15. Interviews with several administrators at the NIRT, Ministry of Agriculture, including its then vice minister, and with a Professor of Tehran University, April—May 1983. Also personal conversation of the author, during same period.
16. Also, interview held with a higher civil servant at the OEAA, Tehran, May 1983.
17. Interviews with several civil servants and political appointees at the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Education, Tehran, April 1983. Also see Sharan, P., *The Government and Politics of Persia*, Metropolitan Publisher, New Delhi, 1983.
18. Statement was made by a civil servant.
19. Interviews with civil servants at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), Tehran, April 1983. Also conversations held with farmers in the province of Gilan, during the same period.
20. Interviews with several civil servants, administrators and political appointees at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), the Ministry of Economics, and the SOEAA, Tehran, April 1983.
21. Interviews with three members of the Parliament and five high civil servants at the Ministry of Agriculture, Tehran, April 1983. Further interviews with four officials of the Organization of *Jehan-e-Sazandegi* (Reconstruction Crusade) in the province of Gilan.
22. Presentation of the economic adviser to Prime Minister Mousavi to the Plan and Budget Organization at the annual meeting of the Association of Iranian Economists in Tehran, May 1983. The author was in attendance at the meeting.

23. Public speeches of the revolutionary leaders—Imami Kashani, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Moghaddass-e-Ardebili, and Mahdavi Kani—at the Friday prayers at Tehran University during March, April, and May 1983. Interviews with three high-level administrators at the NIRT, SOEAA, and the Ministry of Education, Tehran, March 1983. Also, presentation of the new Five-Year Plan made by a member of the Plan and Budget Organization at the annual meeting of the Association of Iranian Economists held in Tehran, May 1983.
24. Interview with a high official (planner and organizational strategist) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), April 1983. Also, additional interviews with a number of urban and rural citizens of Tehran and Northern Iran.
25. Radio broadcasts of the Parliamentary debates during April and May 1983. Also, interviews with members of the Parliament and two personnel officers at the SOEAA, during the same period.
26. Also, interviews with an official of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), and with a Parliament deputy, May 1983.
27. Interviews with two Parliament deputies in Tehran, May 1983; also an interview held with a professor of Tehran University, May 1983.
28. In the same meeting, a high-level administrative assistant to the minister in “Organization and Strategy” outlined to the author the main features of the recently redesigned organization structure, which was submitted to the Parliament for approval. The reorganization plan called for decentralization of the MARD, with policy power for the center, and greater administrative decision powers for both the provinces and local government departments.
29. Interviews with three higher civil servants of the Ministry of Agriculture in Tehran, April 1983. Also, five interviews held with the farmers, who brought their complaints to the MARD in Tehran and Rasht during April 1983. Moreover, personal observations at the MARD’s Office of the Minister, April 1983.
30. Also, interview with a member of the Parliament in Tehran, in April 1983.
31. Interview with an administrator of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Tehran, March 1983.
32. See Farazmand, A., *Public Administration in Iran*, in *Public Administration in the Third World* (V. Subramaniam, ed.), Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1990. Also, personal observations of the author at the NIRT and in several rural areas of the Gilan province, where the author gained insights from conversations with the rural people. Moreover, interviews with three middle-level administrators of the Personnel Department of NIRT and two top administrators at the Ministry of Economics, held in Tehran, May 1983.
33. Conversations with three administrators at NIRT, Tehran, May 1983.
34. Conversations with an administrator in charge of legal affairs at NIRT, Tehran, March—May 1983.
35. For a sample of evidence on the aspects of the Pahlavi bureaucracy, see Notes 1 and 2. Interview held in Tehran with a professor of Tehran University in April 1983. Also see Farazmand, A., *The State, Bureaucracy, and Revolution in Modern Iran; Agrarian Reform and Regime Politics*, Praeger, New York, 1989.
36. The author was a participant at the meeting where he was a member of the Curriculum Planning and Development committee for the Public Administration and Business Management programs of the universities of the country.
37. Interviews with two Parliament members, Tehran, April 1983. An interview with a professor of Tehran University, April 1983.
38. Conversations with a high-level administrator of NIRT, Tehran, May 1983.
39. Observations and interviews at NIRT, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Finance and Economics. The quoted statement was made by a financial manager at NIRT during the interview in April 1983.
40. See *The New York Times*, October 28, 1985.
41. The “Economic Terrorists” referred to here a re some of the Bazar merchants and other war profiteers who have taken advantage of a wartime economy. It was believed that these merchants created artificial shortages, resulting in a black market economy. Public outrage about this situation caused the resignation of the Minister of Commerce and Trade in 1983.
42. Interviews and observations in Tehran and Rasht, spring 1983.

43. See *Keyhan, Air Edition*, April 13, 1983.
44. Ministry of Agriculture, April 1983. Interviews and conversations with several farmers, and with officials at different levels. Also, conversations with several professionals at the Ministry of Higher Education, May 1983. This author's personal experience was also supportive evidence of this problem. The experience dealt with several agencies, including NIRT, in which, despite the strong reputation of the Agency Head, no cooperation was received from the administrative director regarding the use of this author's professional service in the organization.
45. See *Ettlaat*, January 8 and 12, 1983 (in Farsi).
46. See *Keyhan, Air Edition*, September 14, 1983 (in Farsi).
47. Interviews with a high-level administrator at the Ministry of Economics, Tehran, May 1983.
48. Conversations with a student at the University of Tehran, School of Public and Business Administration, May 1983.
49. See Blau, P. and Meyer, M., Why Study Bureaucracy? in *Current Issues in Public Administration*, 3rd edn. (F. Lane, ed.), St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986, p. 6.
50. See Farazmand, A., Bureaucracy and revolution: The case of Islamic Iran: A theoretical and empirical analysis, Paper presented at the International Congress on Elucidation of the Islamic/Iranian Revolution, Tehran, October 2–4, 1999, p. 53; Farazmand, A., Privatization in post-revolutionary Iran, in *Privatization Or Reform: Implications for Public Management* (Farazmand, A., ed.), Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2001; Farazmand, A. ed., Administrative reform in post-revolutionary Iran, in *Administrative Reform in Developing Nations*, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2002. Also see Farazmand, A., *Post-Revolutionary Iran: Regime Change, Elite Change, and the Bureaucracy* (forthcoming), and *Iran in the 21st Century: Governance, Administration, and Politics* (forthcoming).
51. Information collected during personal visit to Iran in 2006 and 2007.



---

# Index

---

## A

- Abbasid caliphs, Baghdad, 92
- Abdülhamit II and civil bureaucracy, 70
- Achaemenid Persian Empire, 3, 24
- administrative policy, toward subject peoples, 33–34
  - administrative reforms of Darius, 40
  - bureaucracy and public management, 39–40
  - bureaucratic elite, 36–37
  - central control of Satrapies, 31–33
  - economic reforms and financial management, 41–42
  - environment of bureaucracy, 34–36
  - great king and central government, 29–30
  - legal reforms and justice administration, 42
  - local government reform, 43
  - Persian bureaucracy, 34
  - professionalization of bureaucracy, 38–39
  - roads and communication, 40–41
  - Satrapy system, 30–31
  - structure and process of bureaucracy, 37–38
- Action Plan for an Effective and Responsive Administration, by GOI, 523
- Activism, 206
- Administration
- France (*see* French administration)
  - Greece (*see* Greece, administrative reform in)
  - India (*see* India, sociopolitical structure and public administration in)
  - Median Empire, 22–23
  - reform methods, 403
  - rule of universality and acceptability, 401–402
  - traditional society *vs.* transitional society, 402
- Administrative accountability
- cultural approach, 314–315
  - ethics institutional approach, 315
  - legal approach, 314
  - managerial/organizational, 313
  - political means, 313–314
- Administrative development, 3, 11
- Administrative ethics, 309–310
- global concern for, 306
  - issues in, 317–318
  - Administrative ethics movement, 306–309
    - ancient Persian ethical doctrine, 309
    - corruption, 306
    - major themes and perspectives, 307–308
- Administrative law, 22
- Administrative policy, 33–34
- Administrative principles, 241–242
- Administrative Reforms Commission, 522
- Administrative reforms of Darius, 40
- Administrative Reorganization Committee (ARC), Bangladesh, 535
- Administrative rule, 121
- Administrative sciences, 241
- Administrative Services and Reorganization Committee (ASRC), Bangladesh, 532
- Administrative systems, 222
- Africa–Asia Cooperation, 281
- Africa–Asia eco-partnership building project, 285–288
- city-to-city partnerships, 287–288
  - close cooperation with UN and UNDP, 288–289
  - meetings and objectives, 286, 287
  - preparatory phase, 285–286
  - UN’s role, 289
- African–American leaders, 216
- African–American voters, 216
- Agency spokesperson, 352; *see also* Public information officers (PIOs)
- American bureaucracy, 152, 197
- constitutive system, 168
  - exceptional environment, 166–168
  - frustrations of, 189
  - semipowered bureaucracy, 168
    - federalism in United States, 168–169
    - privatization, 169
- American environmental bureaucracy, 230–232
- Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), role in, 232
  - budget and staff of EPA, 232
  - environmental issues, 232

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),  
231, 232  
federal agencies, 232  
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)  
of 1969, 231  
per capita GDP, 230  
problems, 232  
reason for failure, 230  
American False Commission Act, 523  
American independence movement, 4  
American military bureaucracy, 9  
American public administration  
intellectual crisis in, 185  
noncomparativist view, 197  
quality, 184  
American public budgeting, 328  
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 240  
Ancient Aztec religion, 210  
Ancient civilizations, 304  
Angora Reform, 72  
Ankara University, 74  
Antibureaucratic and parallel organizations, 13  
Antibureaucratic movements, 14  
Anticipatory government, 150  
Anti-Semitism, 206  
Apartheid regime's bureaucracy, 6  
Appointee-careerist relations, 196  
Arab states, 583, 593–594  
culture and administration, 586–587  
developmental policies, 584–585  
development process after independence,  
583–584  
governance structure, 589, 591  
administrative reforms, 590–591  
and centralization of public authority, 589  
corruption, 590  
Program on Governance in the Arab Region  
(POGAR), 589  
religion and governance, 589–590  
succession and, 590  
inadequacy of political development and reform  
in, 586  
obstacles of administrative reform, 586  
political context of bureaucracy, 587–589  
reformist strategic plans, 591–593  
Western administrative processes, 584  
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), 232  
Army Corp of Engineer, 257  
Arthasastra–Asoka bureaucracy, 57, 61  
Ascetic Protestantism, 206  
Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP), 53  
Asokan inscriptions, 56, 57  
Assyrian bureaucratic empire, 3, 23  
Autonomous regulatory agencies, 193  
Avanx, 556  
Aztec society, 210

## B

Babylonian bureaucracies, 3  
Babylonian captivity, 3  
Bangladesh, civil service reforms in, 530, 539–540  
failure of, 536–538  
bureaucratic resistance, 537  
institutional barrier, 537  
political reality and dependence, 536  
socioeconomic and cultural realities, 537–538  
issues and problems, under different regimes  
Ershad regime, 1982–1990, 534–535  
Mujib regime, 1972–1975, 532–533  
reform and development since 1991, 535–536  
Zia regime, 1975–1981, 533–534  
reasons for, 530–532  
corruption in administration, 531  
defective civil service policy, 531  
management capacities and technical skills,  
lack of, 531  
problem of accountability and responsiveness,  
531–532  
for structural and procedural changes,  
in administration, 530–531  
remedial measures, for future reform, 538–539  
Banking Board, 77  
*Blacksburg Manifesto*, 166  
Blackwater Corporation, 7  
Bloody military coup d'état, 7  
Bolshevik model, of party organization, 103  
Bottom-up reforms, 12  
Brahmin–Kshatriya rivalry, 60  
Brahmin scholars, 59  
Brazil, retention of patronage-based offices, 190  
British cabinets, 196  
British East India Company, 58, 61–62  
British Empire, 54, 192  
British governments, 196  
British retainers, in India, 192  
British-style parliamentary government, 194  
Budgetary decisions, 327  
international influences on, 330–331  
Budgetary instability, and unpredictability, 332–334  
Bureaucracy, 351, 546, 609  
administrative management, 120–121  
and agency spokesperson, 352  
in ancient world, 1  
and assisting in political rule in, 2  
classic formulation of, 140–141  
commoners in, 23  
and development, 10–12  
dissatisfaction, 167  
efficiency, 240  
in Egypt and Rome, 3  
elite, 36–37  
environment, 34–36

- evils, 6–7
  - impersonal quality, 121–122
  - as institution, 2
  - meaning of, 5
  - of Persian Empire, 20
  - politics, 7
  - politics under presidentialism, 99–100
  - power, 100–102, 178, 184
  - and public management, 39–40
  - structure and process of, 37
  - theoretical perspectives, 5–6
  - twentieth century, 2, 4
  - virtues of, 113
  - and welfare state administrative systems, 2
  - Bureaucracy, criticisms of, 142–146
    - advocates of democratic citizenship and, 145
    - Anti-Washington rhetoric, 142
    - apotheosis of, 142
    - Clinton Bureaucracy, 143
    - concept of democratic citizenship, 144
    - democratic responsiveness and bureaucratic professionalism, 146
    - fear of nonelected power, 143
    - government activism, 144
    - legal–rational types of authority, 143
    - lower taxes and less government regulation, 142
    - master/servant of the people, 143
    - New Public Service, 145–146
    - opposition to power and suspicion
      - of government, 144
    - power position, U.S., 157
    - safety net programs, 144
    - societal problems, 144
  - Bureaucracy–democracy
    - as enemy of the citizen, 147
    - Gore Report, 148
    - national security and other mandates, 147
    - technical expertise and specialized knowledge, 147
    - value conflicts, 146–148
  - Bureaucratic–administrative system, 6
  - Bureaucratic design, 157–158
    - congressional relations, 160
    - misperceptions, 158–159
    - ubiquity of patronage, 159–160
    - variables, 158
  - Bureaucratic power, in third world, 100–101
    - constitutional models, 103
    - fragility of, 101–102
    - open politics, 104
    - presidentialist regimes, 104–105
    - traditional monarchies, 102–103
  - Bureaucratic professionalism
    - consequences of, 172
    - negative-extrinsic consequences, 177–178
      - bureaucratic power, 178
      - myth perpetuated, 179
    - negative-intrinsic consequences, 175–176
      - patronage alternative, 176–177
      - senior executive service, 176
    - positive-extrinsic consequences, 173
      - public administration, 174–175
      - regime survival, 173–174
    - positive-intrinsic consequences, 172–173
    - rise of professionalism
      - functionism, 171–172
      - nonpartisan careers, 170–171
      - rotationism, 169–170
  - Bureaucratic retention *vs.* rotation, 163
  - Bureaucratic variables, 87
    - income, 89–90
    - interdependence, 90–91
    - tenure, 87–89
  - Bureaucratization, 9, 113, 546
    - parabolic curve, 111–112
  - Bureaucrats, 87
    - policy making and, 381–382
  - Bureaupathologies, 113–115
  - Bus Company, 119
  - Bush administration, 8
  - Byzantine Empire, 92
- ## C
- Cabinet positions, 96–97, 185
  - Calvinist movement, 207
  - Capitalism, 34, 58, 63, 127, 130, 183
  - Capitalist market system, United States, 183
  - Capital Market Board, 77
  - Career Executive Service, 191
  - Careerism, 122–123, 187
  - Careerists in America, 192
  - Catalytic government, 149
  - Catholic Church, 58
  - Centralization, 4
  - Cevdet's idea of educating people, 72
  - Chiint-su, 59
  - Chile
    - Allemende and the bureaucracy, 371–372
    - alternative to rotationism, 187–188
    - spoils system, 191
  - China
    - of Confucius, 59
    - Chin dynasty, 58
    - labor migration, 418
    - one-child policy, 476
      - liberalized policy with relaxed implementation, 477
      - liberalized policy with stronger implementation, 478
      - restrictive policy with strong implementation, 476–477



- Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 413
- Chinese Empire, 58
- Chinese Walls, 3
- Chodak's study, etatization of Western societies, 131
- The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 203
- Church and system, Roman law, 206
- CIA-led military coup d' état, 7
- Citizen's Charters, 523
- Civic state, 184
- Civil bureaucracy, 71
- Civilization, 2
- Civil Law, 22
- Civil Service Act of 1883, 261
- Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 261
- Civil service retainers, 184
- Civil war in Paris, 13
- Class rule, 12
- Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970, 231
- Colonial bureaucracies, 4
- Commercialization, 6
- Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR), Bangladesh, 534
- Communications, 118
- Communication system, 40
- Community-owned government, 149
- Comparativism, 180
- Competitive government, 149
- Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, 256
- Computerization, 123
- Concepts of state, Germany, 135
- Conditional cooperation, 197
- Conflict of interest
  - and manipulation by big business, 485
    - bribery, 486
    - competing against government, 487
    - confidential information, 486
    - government procurement, 487
    - nepotism and patronage, 486
    - policy corruption, 485–486
    - preferential treatment and double standards, 487–488
    - privatization, 486–487
    - sale of state property, 487
    - thievery, 486
  - meaning of, 484
  - in pluralistic society, 484
  - problem, 485
  - and profit making in government, 492
  - tactics to overrule accusations of
    - absolute control of state machinery, 489–490
    - accountability mechanisms, takeover of, 490
    - censorship of press, 490–491
    - distract citizens from conflict of interest issue, 491
    - legal argument, 488–489
    - political supremacy, 489
- Confucianist merit system, 92
- Confucian School, 59
- Congress
  - curtailing powers of, 195
  - effective powers of, 186
  - Flood Control Acts passed by, 256
  - impeachment, 164
  - and key bureaucrats, 159
  - members of Congress in patronage, 186
  - and powerful lobbies, 174
  - Presidents and members of, 163
- Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 333
- Congressional decisions impact, on political appointees, 188
- Congressional relations, 160
- Constitutionalism, 127
- Constitutive system, 168
- Construction contracts, 341
- Consumers Protection Act, 1987, 519
- Contracting out, 6
- Contracts, government, 338
- Controlled/dominant bureaucracy, 156
  - dispersed power, 156–157
  - the U.S. exception, 157
- Corporate income, 335
- Corporate–military-oriented bureaucracy, 9
- Corps phenomenon, 383
- Corruption, 6, 11, 311
  - top levels of government (*see* Conflict of interest)
- Corrupt Public Servants (Forfeiture of Property) Bill, 523
- Cost–benefit analysis, 134
- Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), 323
- Critics of bureaucracy, 6
- Cuba, 368–371
- Cultural Revolution, 475
- Customer-driven government, 150
- Cybernetic hierarchy, 213

## D

- Darius's succession, 29
- Debureaucratization, in Iran, 553
- Decentralization, 76, 557
- Decentralized government, 150
- Dehumanized objects, 121
- Dehumanizing conditions, 116
- Democracy, 127
- Democratic association, 207
- Democratic Party (DP), 73
- Democratic theory, 8–10

*Dhanna Sastras*, 58  
 Dharma Sastras, 59  
 Dispersed power, 158  
 Divided governments, 163, 165  
 Division of labor, 113  
 Domination, types of, 467  
 Double standard approach and ethics, 297–299  
 Durkheim, 62, 112

## E

Ecevit government, 77  
 Economic Development Programs, 331–332  
 Economic reforms, 41–42  
 Eco-Partnership, 279; *see also* Human Resources Development  
   local governance formulation, 281–282  
   big cities and environment degradation, 282  
   intercity cooperation and partnership building, 285  
   leadership training, 284  
   managing environmental and urban interdependence, 282–284  
 Efficiency  
   critical theory, 246–248  
   critiques of efficiency concept, 244–245  
   definition, 239  
   goal for all organizations, 241  
 Egyptian bureaucracies, 3  
 Elamite  
   administration, 23  
   federal structure of empire, 22  
   Penal Law, 22  
   script, 3  
 Elitism, 193  
 Elizabeth I, Queen, 63  
 Emergency Operations Plan, 256  
 Energy Board, 77  
 Enterprising government, 150  
 Enthusiasm, 116  
 Environmental bureaucracies, 221  
   global approaches, comparison, 232–235  
 Environmental degradation, 221, 282  
 Environmental impact assessment (EIA), 231  
 Environmental Policy Unit (EPU), 228  
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 228  
 Environmental Protection Department (EPD), 228  
 Ethical conduct  
   approaches for, 299–300  
   government personnel operations, 300  
 Ethical performance, *see* Ethical conduct  
 Ethical standards, 298  
 Ethno-expansionism, 513  
 European Union (EU), 77

Evaluation, training process, 434, 443–444  
   levels of  
     behavior, 435  
     learning, 435  
     reaction, 434  
     results, 435  
*Evaluation of Training Programs*, 434  
 Evolutionary history, broad stages, 205–206  
 Evolutionary universals, 205  
 Excessive impersonality, 123  
 Executive function, 188  
 Executive power, 184, 321  
 Exit interview and survey (EIS), 270  
   assessing effectiveness of, 271–275  
   exit survey data, 272–274  
   recommendations on administration of, 275  
   problems with, 270–271  
 Exit surveys, 269  
 Extrabureaucratic institutions, 91–92

## F

Fair Competition Board, 77  
 FedBizOpps web site, 341  
 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 338  
 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, 341  
 Federal bureaucracy, 184  
   and complexity of relationship with president, 322  
 Federal contract, 339  
 Federalism, 183  
   in United States, 168–169  
*The Federalist Papers*, 129  
 Federal structure, Elamite empire, 22  
 Federal Trade Commission, 197  
 Financial management, 41–42  
 Flawed products and services, 116  
 Flood Control Acts of 1936 and 1938, 256  
 Freedom from slavery, 3  
 French administration  
   *grandes écoles* and, 382–383  
   *hauts fonctionnaires*, 382, 384  
   *Inspection des Finances*, 387  
   overarching unity of, 384–387  
   policy making patterns, 387–390  
     *concertation*, process of, 388  
     consultation meeting, 389  
     direct action importance, 389–390  
     neocorporatism, 387  
     opposition to administrative reforms, 390  
     state dominance over interests, 388  
     structure, concept of, 388  
     symbolic consultation, 388  
     texts, preparation of, 389

revisionist views, 383–384  
 rise of, 382  
 sources of, 382–383  
 vulnerability of, 390–392  
 French Fifth Republic, 198  
 French Revolution, 4  
 Functionism, 171–172  
 Funding, and contract solicitations, 340

## G

Geographical and functional, distribution  
 of power, 182  
 Gesellschaft society, 62, 63  
 Global environmental problems, 282  
 Globalization, 14, 328  
 and economic reforms in India, 520–521  
*Golden Bough*, 62  
 Governing elite, 10  
 Government  
 action and accountability to the people, 148  
 contracting, and aviation history, 338  
 corruption, 306  
 jobs, 188  
 programs, 196  
 quality of, 196  
*Grandes écoles*, 382  
 Greece, administrative reform in  
 birth and growth, of bureaucracy  
 early years, 397–398  
 postwar years, 399–401  
 transition period, 398–399  
 corruption index, report of, 396  
 EU membership and, 404  
 failure of reform  
 individual attitudes and behavior,  
 402–403  
 institutional imperatives, 403  
 societal considerations, 401–402  
 political leaders view on, 395–396  
 reform efforts and results, 396  
 Guarding the guardians, 312  
 Guatemalan bureaucracy, 367  
 Gupta period, 60

## H

Han Empire, 58  
 Heritage Foundation, 194  
 Hindu political institutions, 54  
 Historical monuments, 6  
 Hobbes's tyrannical Leviathan, 127

Hong Kong environmental bureaucracy,  
 227–230  
 critical tasks, 229  
 criticism and controversy, 230  
 Environmental Policy Unit (EPU), 228  
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 228  
 Environmental Protection Department (EPD),  
 228, 229  
 EPCOM, role of, 228  
 Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC) unit,  
 establishment, 229  
 industrial overtone, for protection, 229  
 job of public administrators, 227–228  
 per capita GDP, 227  
 political apathy and ideological detachment, 227  
 regulatory policy, 229  
 Water Pollution Control Ordinance,  
 228, 229  
 Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC), 229  
 Hong Kong  
 public service training institute; *see also* Evaluation,  
 training process  
 civil service  
 objective of training in, 439  
 training and development in, 435–436  
 Civil Service Training and Development Institute  
 (CSTDI), establishment of, 436, 441  
 effectiveness of training, 439–440  
 evaluation system for, 439, 443–444  
 levels of training evaluation, 440  
 modifications in training package, 446  
 pre- and post-training tests, results of, 446  
 trainees opinion on, 440–441  
 trainer and trainee coordination,  
 445–446  
 trainers' evaluation, 441–443  
 training package, 445  
 transfer of learning and, 444–445  
 evaluation system challenges, 436–437  
 research on, 437–438  
 training needs, 438–439  
*How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming  
 the Public Sector*, 410  
 Human civilizations, early Iran, 2  
 Human Resources Development, 281  
 Hurricane Katrina, 254–255  
 FEMA Director Brown, 262–263  
 egregious, of Brown's actions, 263–264  
 hurricane response, criticism, 258–260  
 politics administration dichotomy, 260–262  
 excessive use of political appointees, 262  
 neutral competence, 261  
 Wilson's approach, 261  
 studies and preparedness, 254–258  
 Hydraulic despotism, 58

- Impeachment, 183  
 Imperial bureaucracy, evolution of, 54–58  
*The Imperial Congress*, 189  
 Imperial unity, 58–61  
 Impure public goods, 131  
 In-and-outers, *see* Transients  
 Incongruity, 298  
 Independence for India, 216  
 India, public service training  
   assessment of training institutes, 450  
   LBSNAA  
     activities of, 451  
     computers use, 454  
     effectiveness of training, 454–457  
     evaluation of performance, 451  
     method of evaluation, 457  
     mode of assessment, 450–451  
     need for change and response, 457–458  
     nomination process for training, 459  
     perception of, 460–461  
     providers and consumers, balancing views,  
       461–462  
     research method, 451  
     techniques of training, 451–454  
     trainees' views, 453  
     trainers' views, 453–454  
     utility of training, 459–460  
 Indian (Chinese) mandarin system, 192  
 Indian environmental bureaucracy, 222–227  
   creating Department of Environment, 224  
   desired and available image, 226  
   fire-brigade approach, 226  
   implementation network loopholes, 226  
   issues, 225  
   late nineteenth century, 224  
   Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), 224  
   municipal bodies, 227  
   National Committee on Environmental Planning  
     and Coordination, 224  
   National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)  
     draft, 225  
   penetrative capacity, lack of, 225  
   regulation, 226  
   use of natural resources, 225  
   Water Boards, 224  
 Indianized Kushan Empire, 57  
 India  
   authoritarian character, Indian bureaucracy, 514–515  
   bureaucratic discretion, 510  
   bureaucratic dysfunctionality, 512–513  
   caste system, 510–511  
   central government employment, 500  
   class system emergence, 515–516  
   distribution and growth of central government  
     employees, 501–502  
   distribution of sanctioned and filled posts,  
     central government, 507  
   distribution of sanctioned posts, central  
     government, 509  
   family planning methods, 470  
   globalization impact, 520–521  
   institutional strategies, 496–498  
   linguistic multiplicity, 515  
   ministry/department-wise filled posts, central  
     government, 503–506  
   NPM in governance, 521–524  
   policy of industrial development, and public  
     sector, 518–519  
     small-scale industries, growth of, 519–520  
   population growth, rate of, 499  
   public service overstaffing, 501  
   religions' impact, 512  
   secularism, casteism, and cultural values,  
     513–514  
   social justice and alleviation of poverty,  
     516–518  
   sociopolitical structure and public administration,  
     496, 499, 524–526  
   trends in employment, central government, 510  
 Individualism, 130  
 Industrialization, 4  
 Industrial Policy Statement of 1980, 519  
 Industrial Revolution, 209  
 The Industries Development and Regulation  
   Amendment Act of 1984, 520  
 Information gathering, from employees, *see* Exit  
   interview and survey (EIS)  
 Institutionalization, 215  
 Institutionalized individualism, 216  
 Institutional reforms and changes, 12  
 Intelligentsia, 70  
 Intendants, 382  
 Interferometric Modular Display (IMOD), 556  
 Intergovernmental relations (IGRs), 21  
 International Arabian Horse Association (IAHA), 263  
*International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 129  
 Internationalization, 127  
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 11, 77  
 Interpersonal relationships, psychology of, 189  
 Iranian bureaucracy, 546; *see also* Iranian revolution,  
   impact on civil service and bureaucracy  
   bureaucratization of Iran (1920s–1970s), 549  
   bureaucratic elite, 551–552  
   goals and functions of bureaucracy, 551  
   Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  
     (MARD) bureaucracy, 550  
   power position, 549–551  
   debureaucratization process, 553

developments, Ahmadinejad's administrative reorganization, 556, 559

approach towards globalization, 557

decentralization of administrative system, 557–558

mobilization and engagement of citizens, 558

move toward debureaucratization, 557

privatization trend, 558

historical background, 546–549

birth in city-state of Susa, 546

decline of bureaucracy, 548–549

in Elamite Empire, 546–547

under Medes, 547

Persian bureaucracy, 547–548

under Safavid Empire, 548

institutionalization and rebureaucratization process, 553–554

bureaucracy changes, 554

consolidation of organizations, 554

control of bureaucracy and administration, 554–555

development programs, progress in, 555–556

Five Year Plan adoption, 554

privatization initiatives, 555

women status change, 554

Islamic Republic Government introduction, 552–553

revolution of 1978–1979 and, 552–553

Iranian bureaucracy and public administration, 20

Iranian revolution, impact on civil service and bureaucracy, 598, 604–605; *see also* Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), Iran

first period (1979), 598

process and attitude impacts, 599

structural changes, 598–599

public attitude, 606–607

public dissatisfaction with, 605–606

second period (1979–1982), 599

process and attitude impacts, 600

structural impact, 599–600

status of bureaucracy since 1990

administrative changes, 608

corruption issue, 607–608

privatization policy, 608–610

public–private partnerships, 608

role in economic growth and development, 607, 610

survival of bureaucracy, 605

third period (1983–1994), 601

impact on attitude, 603–604

process impact, 602–603

structural impact, 601–602

Islamic Arab forces, 20

“Islands of development” strategy, 368

## J

Jacksonian revolution, 190

Job opportunities, 183

Judaism, 206

Jurisdictional disputes, 120

Justice administration, 42

Justice and Development Party (JDP), 78

## K

Kautilyan bureaucratic model, 60

Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, 55

Kautilya's ideal, 59, 60

Kleptocratic or vampire state, 484

## L

Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), India, 450

Later-longer-fewer campaign, 475

Latin American bureaucracy, 364

characteristics of, 367

colonial legacy, 364

Portuguese colonial system, 365

Spanish colonial administration, 364–365

evolutionary change, 366–367

myth of state supremacy and, 368

revolutionary change, impact of, 368

Chile, 371–372

Cuba, 368–371

Nicaragua, 372–374

Laws of the Indies, 364

Legal–rational authority, 112, 140

Legal–rational bureaucracy, 75

Legislative committees, 328

Lenin bureaucracy, 13

Liberalism, 75

Liberation movements, 103

LIGA hierarchy, 213, 214

Lobbyism, 183

Local government reform, 43

Louisiana State University (LSU) Hurricane Center, 257

Lower courts, 214

Lower-level bureaucrats, 11

Lydian Satrapy of Persia, 3

## M

Mahratta power, 58

Mamlukes in Egypt, 187

- Mandarin system, 192, 193, 195
- Marketization, 6
- Market-oriented government, 150
- Marriage Act, 71
- Marxist and Weberian attitudes, 62–63
- Marx's AMP, 62, 63
- Masters of Public Administration (MPA), 307
- Mauryan bureaucracy, 55
- Mauryan Empire, 54, 58
- Max Weber's conceptualization of bureaucracy, 112–113, 546, 609
- administrators, management by, 120–121
  - implications, 123–124
  - rules and regulations, 119–120
  - specialization, 113, 116–117
  - virtues of hierarchy, 117–118
- McCloskey, Robert, 353–354
- Median Assemblymen, 23
- Median Empire, 23, 24
- Medical and legal associations, 173
- Mediterranean city of Sardis, 3
- Merit-based career, 186
- Merit system, 185
- Metropolitan municipality, 76
- Military–bureaucratic rule, 4
- Military–industrial complex (MIC), 311
- Military regime, 194
- Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), Iran, 564, 573–574
- achievements of, 567
  - agrarian policy, Islamic republic, 572–573
  - egalitarian policy, 572
  - bureaucracy and revolution, 568
  - regime challenging process, 569
  - revolution of 1978–1979, 569
  - changes in Iran after 1990, 575
  - agrarian and rural policies, 575
  - decentralization and privatization, 577
  - domestic and foreign policies, 576
  - industrialization and advancement, 576–577
  - refugee and drug-fighting problem, 576
  - remote areas development, 575–576
  - failures of, 567
  - political and socioeconomic environment before 1960, 564–565
  - political strategy and regime maintenance process, 567–568
  - postrevolutionary impact
    - debureaucratization, 570–571
    - Jihad-e-Sazandegi* establishment, 571, 574
    - rebureaucratization, 571
    - status quo, 570  - power of, 565
  - public administration performance, 574–575
  - public dissatisfaction with bureaucracy, 574
  - reforms of the 1960s, 565
    - politics of reforms, 566–567
    - white revolution, 565–566  - Shah regime and, 565
  - study of, 564
- Mission-driven government, 150
- Modern administration importance, 397
- Modern bureaucracies
- in Europe, 4
  - more complex and interdependent, 187
  - and retainer power, 161–162
  - of Western world, 4
- Modern formal organizations, 209
- Modern industrial and postindustrial society, 134
- Modernity, 204
- Modernization, 72
- Modern politics, 92–93
- open constitutive systems, 93–94
  - single-party regimes, 93
- Modern public administration, 54
- and bureaucracy lessons, 45–49
  - implications for, 43–45
- Modern social structure, 205
- Modern societies, 204
- foundation of, 210
- Modern state, emergence and evolution, 397
- Modern Times*, 113
- Mondalisation, and caste cleavage, 511
- Money-lending, 63
- Mostazafin Foundation, 608
- Motherland Party governments, 75, 76
- Mughul administration, 61
- Mughul Empire, 58, 60
- Municipal reform; *see also* Efficiency
- linking principles and, 243–244
  - literature, 242–243
- ## N
- Narmada River, 57
- National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 225, 231
- National family planning program, India, 468
- Nationalization, 132
- National Judicial Commission, 523–524
- National Office for Public Administration Reform and Training (ONRAP), 367–368
- National Pay Commission (NPC), Bangladesh, 532
- National Performance Review (NPR), 148
- National Planning Commission, 498
- National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes, 517
- National Security Act of 1947, 323
- National Security Council (NSC), 323
- National Small Industries Corporation, 520
- Nation-state-local party organization, 189

Natural calamities, 130

Nazi

- bureaucrats, 7
- concentration camps, 6
- movement, 207

Neocorporatism, 387

Neoutilitarian, 131

Nepotism, 486

New Orleans, *see* Hurricane Katrina

New public administration, 245–246

New Public Management, 6, 148–150, 310, 520–524

global application of, 150–151

Australian variant of, 151

British–New Zealand model, 151

in New Zealand, 151

transformation of public institutions, principles, 149–150

New Public Service, 248

characteristics, 145–146

Nicaragua, 372–374

Nonpartisan careers, 170–171

Nonpartisanship of American careerists, 191

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 231

NPM, *see* New public management

## O

Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), 232

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 323

Official's actions/omissions, 130

One-child policy, China

phases of

liberalized policy with relaxed implementation, 477

liberalized policy with stronger implementation, 478

restrictive policy with strong implementation, 476–477

Open functional models, 193

Organization and administrative system

Achaemenid Empire

administrative policy, toward subject peoples, 33–34

administrative reforms of Darius, 40

bureaucracy and public management, 39–40

bureaucratic elite, 36–37

central control of Satrapies, 31–33

economic reforms and financial management, 41–42

environment of bureaucracy, 34–36

great king and central government, 29–30

legal reforms and justice administration, 42

local government reform, 43

Persian bureaucracy, 34

professionalization of bureaucracy, 38–39

roads and communication, 40–41

Satrapy system, 30–31

structure and process of bureaucracy, 37–38

Ottoman Empire, 4, 66, 397

Ottoman–Turkish political evolution, 65

bureaucratic ruling

consolidation of, 70–73

emergence of, 68–70

bureaucratic ruling tradition on trial, 73–77

early 2000s, 77–79

institutionalization pattern and degeneration, 66–68

Outsourcing, 6

Overbureaucratization, 123, 124

Overtower society, 11

Özal's government, 76, 78

## P

Panchayati Raj institutions, 498

Panoptic state, 484

Papandreou, Andreas, 399–400

Paris Commune of 1871 in France, 4

Parliamentary regimes, 94–95

Parliamentary systems, 185

Parsonian theory, 216

Party system, 186

Patronage alternative, 176–177

Patronage appointees, 189

Pay and Services Commission (P&SC), Bangladesh, 533

Pendleton Act, 191

People's Liberation Army (PLA), 422

People's Republic of China (PRC)

bureaucratic reorientation, 410

decentralization, 419–420

administrative and economic decentralisation, 414

foreign investment and trade, 415–416

and fragmented authoritarian political system, 414

decentralization initiatives, 413–414

fiscal relations and, 416–418

local governments, and environmental regulations, 419

and productive ventures, 414–415

and regulation of labor mobility, 418–419

trade and commerce, 415–416

entrepreneurial bureaucracy, 420

income generation negative consequences, 423–424

role of entrepreneurial earnings, 422–423

- types and scope of public entrepreneurship, 421–422
- market-oriented government, 410–412
  - employment aspirations, 413
  - transnational competence, 412
  - WTO accession and increased foreign investment, 412
- open-door generation of managers, 411–413, 419, 422–424
- Persepolis Royal Place Complex, 8
- Persia(Iran)
  - Achaemenid period, 21 (*see also* Achaemenid Persian empire)
  - administrative system, 20
  - administrators, 3
  - bureaucracy, 2, 3, 24, 34, 37
  - Empire, 3
- Persian Gulf, 3
- Persian King, 29
- Personal income tax rates, 334
- Pharaohs, 8
- Philippine bureaucracy, 187
- Philippine presidentialist regime, 191
- Pluralism, 127
- Police department, 119–120
- Policy implications, 374–375
- Political Action Committee (PAC), 195
- Political appointees, United States, 192
- Political changes, 2
- Political competence, 180–181
- Political economy of bureaucracy, 7
- Political elite, 10
- Political environment, 35
- Political patronage, 185
- Political power, 161
- Political scientists, attitude, 194
- Politicization of caste system, 511
- Politicized military–security oriented bureaucracies, 9
- Population policies, 466, 479–480
  - China (*see* Population Policy, in China)
  - coercion, use of, 466–467
  - desired children approach, 466
  - family planning gap approach, 466
  - India (*see* Population Policy, in India)
  - organizational approaches, 466–467
  - population problem, developing countries, 466
  - voluntary cooperation, criteria for, 467
- Population Policy, in China
  - evolution of policy, 474
    - Cultural Revolution, policy reversal, 475
    - emphasis on development, 474
    - first population campaign, 474
    - future policy, 478
    - Great Leap Forward, policy during, 474–475
    - one-child policy, 476–478
    - second population campaign, 475
    - third population campaign, 475–476
  - population problem, 473
  - social development, key to success, 473, 478–479
- Population Policy, in India
  - evolution of policy, 468
    - current policy, 473
    - family planning policy in 1980, 472–473
    - first five-year plan, 468–469
    - fourth five-year plan, 469–471
    - lack of investment, in social development, 471
    - The new population policy (1976), 471–472
    - second five-year plan, 469
    - sixth five-year plan, Janta government, 472
    - third five-year plan, 469
  - population problem, 468
- Positivism, 304
- Postal Pony Express, 3
- Power position, U.S. bureaucracy, 157
- Presidential Appointee Project, 196
- Presidentialism, 164
  - costs of, 179–180
    - basic reform, 181–182
    - need for comparativism, 180
    - political competence, 180–181
  - divided government, bureaucratic implications, 165–166
  - inherent obstacles to success, 183
  - separated powers, puzzle of, 164–165
- Presidentialist regimes, 156, 168, 182
  - confronting serious difficulties, 182–183
  - Philippines and Chile, 192
- Presidentialist systems, 95–96, 188
  - bureaucratic politics under, 99–100
  - cabinet members, 96–97
  - congressional agenda, 97–98
  - decentralized two-party system, 98–99
  - judicial review, 99
- President's cabinet, U.S., 324–325
- President's personal bureaucracy, U.S., 322–324
  - confronting executive branch, 324–326
  - controlling, federal bureaucracy, 325–326
  - Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), 323, 324
  - major event in early years, 322
  - National Security Council (NSC), 323
  - Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
    - features, 323
  - policy advisors, 323
  - presidential management styles, 324
  - role of the U.S. Trade Representative, 324
  - during twenty-first century, 322
  - White House staff, 322–323
- Private formal organization, 209
- Private practitioners, 193
- Private property, 130
- Privatization, 6, 75, 169



Professional bureaucracy, 30  
 Professional, definition, 194  
 Professionalism, *see* Bureaucratic professionalism  
 Professionalism ethics, 309–310  
 Professionalization, 208  
   of bureaucracy, 38–39, 193, 547, 548, 559  
   of public administration, 309  
 Professional public administrators, 310  
 Professional schools, 193  
 Professions, 208  
 Profit motive, 294–295  
 Prohibition on Assignment of Claims clause, 345  
 Public ethics, 134–135  
 Public administration, 2, 158, 174–175, 189, 197, 353  
   in America, 185  
   in Greece (*see* Greece, administrative reform in)  
   in Latin America (*see* Latin American bureaucracy)  
 Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC),  
   Bangladesh, 535  
 Public bureaucracies, role of, 564  
 Public contracts  
   advantages and disadvantages, 344  
   length of, 343–344  
 Public enterprise, rationale for, 132  
 Public entrepreneurship, 420  
 Public goods, 131  
 Public information officers (PIOs), 353  
   and conflict-filled working environment, 357–358  
   effectiveness as performance standard, 353–354  
   literature on work of PIOs, 353–354  
   media's perspective on effectiveness, 354–357  
     credibility and knowledge, 355–356  
     responsiveness, 356–357  
   professionalism, 358–359  
 Public information profession, 353–354  
 Public interest, 311  
   and ethics, 295–297  
 Public policy, 131  
 Public procurement, government contracts, *see* Wright  
   brothers' government contract  
 Public relations programs, 353  
 Public service, 304  
   administrative accountability in (*see* Administrative  
   accountability)  
   crisis in image, 305  
   guiding principles, for ethics, 315–317  
 Public trust, 310  
 Puranas, 59

## R

Race and ethnicity, 217  
 Rationalism, 304  
 Rationality, 131

Reagan administration, 8  
 Rebudgeting, 332–334  
 Reform movement, U.S., 190  
 Republican era, 72  
 Republican secularizing reforms, 70  
 Reservation system, India, 511, 513  
 Results-oriented government, 150  
 Retainer bureaucracies, 162  
 Retainer power, 160–161  
   bureaucratic retention *vs.* rotation, 163  
   expansion of (*see* Retainer bureaucracies)  
   modern bureaucracies, dependency in, 161–162  
 Retainers, 185, 186  
 Revolution  
   in Chinese history, 59  
   in Russia, 13  
 Revolutionary changes  
   bottom-up reforms, 12  
   institutional reforms, 12  
   in machinery of government, 13  
   top-down reforms, 12  
 Right to Information Act, enactment of, 522  
*The Rise of the Meritocracy*, 196  
 Roman Catholic Church, 206  
 Rotation and functionist merit system reforms, 194  
 Rotationism, 169–170  
 Rotation theory, consequences of, 189  
 Royal court, 37  
 Riza, relations between things, 71–72

## S

Safavid Empire, 4  
 Salvation, 206  
 Sanjiu Enterprise Group, 422  
*Satrapal* administration, 24  
 Satrapies, central control, 31–33  
 Satrapy system, 30–31  
 Scientific management, 240–241  
 Sealed bid solicitations, 341  
 Second article of the U.S. Constitution, 322  
 Secularization, 211  
 Self-indulging society, 298  
 Semipowerful bureaucracy, 158, 168  
 Senior Executive Service (SES), 261  
 Senioritism, 183  
 SES managers, 195  
 Shah's military–bureaucratic dictatorship, 8  
 Simon Commission, 61  
 Single-member-district majoritarianism, 183  
 Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation, 520  
 Socialism, 134  
 Socialist state under socialism, 2  
 Society programs, 12

Sociocultural evolutionary advancement, 204, 205  
 Solidarity in social systems, 204  
 Spanish colonial administration, 364–365  
 Special Administrative Region (SAR), 228  
 Special economic zones (SEZs), 520  
 Specification document issuance, 341–342  
 Spoilsmen, *see* Transients  
 Statement of Objectives (SOO) concept, 342  
 State sales taxation, 335  
 Stratification of kinship, 208  
 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), 11  
 Subversion, 311  
 Suez Canal, 3  
 Sultanate in Delhi, 57  
*Superfamilia*, 127  
 Supreme Court, 214  
 Susa and Federal Elam, administration of, 21  
 System maintenance and system enhancement,  
     role of bureaucracy, 8

## T

Taxation, political difficulties in, 334–335  
 Taylor's ideas, to maximize efficiency, 240–241  
 Telecommunications Board, 77  
 Thailand, politics of conflict of interest in,  
     *see* Conflict of interest  
 Theories, public administration  
     administrative reform, 134  
     bureaucracy and bureaucratization, 129  
     bureaucratic growth, 134  
     citizenship and public participation, 136  
     collective action, 128–129  
     collective and individual rights and obligations,  
         135  
     collectivist/administrative limitations, 135–136  
     communitarianism, 128–129  
     good society, 137  
     government intervention and regulation, 130–131  
     national planning and utilization of resources, 133  
     nongovernmental organization, 132  
     public choice, 137  
     public ethics, 133  
     public goods and services, 131–132  
     public initiatives and enterprise, 132  
     public interest, 129  
     public investment and employment, 134–135  
     public law and regulation, 135  
     public policy, 131  
     public sector management, 137  
     public sector productivity and effectiveness, 136  
     public service, 136  
     public trust, responsibility, and accountability,  
         129–130

    public value and worth, 134  
     social welfare and equity, 133  
 Tokyo International Conference on African  
     Development, 281  
 Tolerant governance, 3  
 Traditional institutional framework, 92  
 Traditionalist bureaucracies, 208  
 Traditionalistic formal organizations, 208  
 Transients, 190, 191  
*Transparency International*, 396  
 Tricoupis administration, 398  
 Tudor bureaucracy in England, 63  
 Turkey–EU relations, 77  
 Turkish political development, 75  
 Turkish Radio and Television agency, 74  
 Tyranny, 140

## U

UN Eco-Partnership Conference, 282  
 United Nations Declaration on Human Rights,  
     1948, 135  
 Universal Human Rights, 3  
 Unsolicited proposals, and federal procedure, 340  
 Urban community development reforms, 12  
 U.S. congressional voting behavior, 186  
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 221  
 Utopia, 137

## V

Value-for-money, 134  
 Value orientations, in advanced modern societies, 216  
 Vasectomy camps, 470  
 Venizelos, Eleftherios, 398  
 Vijayanagar Empire, 58

## W

Water Act of 1974, 224  
 Weber's, characteristics of ideal bureaucratic  
     staff, 141  
 Weber's concept of patrimonial bureaucracy, 54  
 Weber's, legal authority systems, 141  
 Welfare state in capitalist systems, 2  
 Westernization, 72  
 Western-style public administration, 127  
 Whistle-blower Acts, 523  
 White House, 321, 322  
 Workhorses, 186; *see also* Retainers  
 World Bank, 11, 77

World-state persian achaemenid empire

Cyrus the great as founding father, 25–27

idea of globalized, 26

liberal policy established by, 26

as towering democratic statesman, 27

Darius the Great and Administrator, 27–29

arguments, about forms of government, 27

as great administrator, 28

need for able administrative state, 28

Persian Royal Court, 29

Xerxes, role in construction of Persepolis, 29

World Trade Organization's Agreement, on Government

Procurement, 338

Wright brothers' government contract, 338–339

acquisition planning and contracting

lead-times, 339

bid opening and evaluation, 343

budgeting and funding, 339–340

contract award, 343–345

contract payment and incentives, 346–347

monitoring contractor performance, and dealing

with delays, 345–346

publicizing and seeking competition, 340–341

solicitation preparation and issuance, 341–343

termination and bonds, 347

## **Z**

Zero-sum game, in United States, 183

Zorostrianism, 206

Bureaucracy is an age-old form of government that has survived since ancient times; it has provided order and persisted with durability, dependability, and stability. The popularity of the first edition of this book, entitled *Handbook of Bureaucracy*, is testimony to the endurance of bureaucratic institutions. Reflecting the accelerated globalization of corporate capitalism, cultures, and governance systems and the additional complexity of the tasks of public administrators, **Bureaucracy and Administration** presents a comprehensive, global perspective that highlights the dramatic changes of the last 15 years in governance, business, and public administration.

Through chapters contributed by international experts, this volume provides a thorough analysis of bureaucracies worldwide and their effect on politics, economics, and society.

**Features:**

- Analyzes bureaucracies worldwide, including those in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia
- Covers a wide range of conceptual frameworks on bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics, and administrative theory
- Explores bureaucratic change, reform and revolution, offering perspectives on future governance and administration in public and private business
- Presents insights on debureaucratization and bureaucratic politics as well as on sound governance, administration, and the administrative state
- Examines privatization, ethics, and accountability

Comprising theoretical and empirical analyses and including perspectives that span from ancient to modern times, this volume comprehensively and authoritatively advances the knowledge of the nature, role, and function of bureaucracy as the core of sound governance and administration around the world.



**CRC Press**  
Taylor & Francis Group  
an **informa** business

[www.crcpress.com](http://www.crcpress.com)

6000 Broken Sound Parkway, NW  
Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33487  
270 Madison Avenue  
New York, NY 10016  
2 Park Square, Milton Park  
Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN, UK

DK3111

ISBN: 978-0-8247-2369-9



9 780824 723699